The most vexatious problem that Briggs faced in Khandesh was the problem of the Bhils. It was a problem which, to the end of his tenure as the Political Agent in Khandesh, Briggs could not solve to his own satisfaction. The problem of the Bhils could not be solved on par with the problem of the Arabs or that of the disbanded soldiery of the late Peshwa. It involved a large section of the indigenous population with certain definite rights which had both social and economic implications. Almost ten years after his departure from the Khandesh, in 1833, there were an estimated 55,000 Bhils in Khandesh. During the war with the Peshwa, the Bhils had taken no sides, and had continued almost unabated their ravages in and around Khandesh.

The Bhils of the Satpoora Hills plunder almost without molestation the boundaries of the Cassarbarry and Ajanta range.... These ravages, Briggs believed, he had inherited from the previous Government. Rebellions by the Bhils was a normal phenomenon under the Maratha Government. Writing from Kukurmundha one Balaji Mahadeo Sahasrabuddhe speaks of the great menace of the Bhils. The villagers abandoned their homes and the villages were destroyed. Another letter tells us of the uprising of Deoji Naik Bhil. The Bhils in the region of Kaldari created a great deal of disturbance in North-Western Khandesh in early 1811 and a campaign had to be opened against them. The
depredations by the Bhils seem to have been a regular feature of Khandesh. In Khandesh Jamav papers in the Pune Archives, one comes across repeated references to their daring raids. According to Briggs the major cause of these repeated ravages by the Bhils was that their claims were unattended to by the late (i.e. Peshwas’s) Government .......⁶. But the Marathi documents do not fully support this contention. From Taloda Narhar Bapuji Deshpande and Janardan Raghunath Sukhatme write to Poona about the depredations of Dewaji Naik bhil in the Baglana pargana, and suggest that these depredations were due to the famine. Balaji Sahasrabuddhe claims that the Bhils unite for depredations due to hunger.⁷ It seems that the whole issue of the Bhils had turned into a vicious circle. Due to the unsettled political conditions since 1802-03, the villages in Khandesh were depopulated. The process was aggravated by the Third Anglo-Maratha war and the predatory activities of the Arabs. This made life impossible for the Bhils and prompted them to undertake depredations of their own.⁸ Ahilyabai Holkar had made agreements with the Bhil chiefs for the protection of the ghats and passes and generally of the country.⁹ In all these agreements the Bhils were granted certain rights or Huks which the Bhils claimed to have been theirs since times immemorable. By endorsing them through various yads and sanads the Governments prior to that of the East India Company seem to have accepted them.
By implications they also accepted the ancient lineage of the Bhils.

The question 'Who are the Bhils?' has been found difficult by anthropologists to answer. That they do not belong to the Indo-Aryan ethnic group is a fact on which all scholars agree. And a majority of anthropologists also agree that they differ from the pre-Dravidian groups in India. 'The more we analyse the data the more it transpires that the Bhils are racially more distant from the so called pre-Dravidian groups while they approach nearer to the higher castes!' According to Enthoven, 'the typical Khandesh Bhil, the wild woodman of the Satpuras is dark, well made, active and hardy with high cheek bones, wide nostrils and in some cases coarse, almost African features. These are no doubt stunted and degraded by want and ill health .......'

Commissioner Elphinstone found them 'small and black' and always carrying bows and arrows. Graham describes a Bhil as a 'diminutive figure ...... the hardy denizen of the hill.....'.

The origin of Bhils is shrouded in obscurity. The Historically minded Briggs confessed that 'their origin is too obscure and too remote to furnish data for history'. However throughout the recorded history, the Bhils always occupied an inferior social position within the Hindu Fold being considered one of the seven lowest castes. Though their religion was less sophisticated than the traditional popular Hinduism, the Bhils worshipped all the gods and
godlings of the Hindu pantheon. The hill-tops were of special reverence to them as being the abodes of spirits both benevolent and malevolent.\(^\text{16}\) This almost primitive religious belief accompanied by a host of sacrificial rituals could have, perhaps distinguished them from other Hindu groups in an urban setting, but in the rural backward setting of Khandesh in the early nineteenth century, it was difficult to separate them from other inhabitants. 'It is difficult to say from whence the Bhels are sprung, there seems to be no good foundation for the general opinion that and they are the aborigins of the soil/that they were driven into the Hill on the Hindoo invasion, their language differs little from that of the surrounding country and their manners from what I have seen not at all.'\(^\text{17}\) This observation of Briggs is corroborated by Graham,\(^\text{18}\) Enthoven\(^\text{19}\) and modern anthropologists like Karve, Naik or Doshi. Elphinstone However, did not agree with Briggs. In his report he states 'The Beels differ from the other inhabitants in the language, manners and appearance ....'\(^\text{20}\) Yet in the social matters, the indigenous inhabitants could and did make the distinction. ' ...... (It) is obvious that where a Brahmin on one hand, or a Beel on the other, was to be tried, it would be too much to expect unprejudiced decision ......'\(^\text{21}\) In the social scale, therefore, the Bhil began with a handicap.\(^\text{22}\)

In the general structure of the social organisation, however, a Bhil was not a parasite. 'Throughout Candeish and Gungturty the minor duties of the police were conducted
by the Bheels ..... 23 When the Bhils came by this duty is difficult to say, but Graham suggests that it was under Aurangzeb that the Mughals recognised the 'usurped authority' of the Bhils 'on the condition of the protection of the passes and fortresses'. 24 This conjecture, however, does not seem very plausible since Graham also claims that one of the conditions on which the claims of the Bhils were accepted by the Mughal Emperor was their embracing Islam. 25 The Muslim Bhils do not form the majority of the chiefs or the village watchman class, and are confined mostly to the Tadwi clan residing in the northeast of Khandesh. 26 The Bhil tradition takes this responsibility of the Bhils to the remote past. In any case, if the Bhils were to come by this duty of protecting the village from thieves and robbers only after the campaigns of Aurangzeb in the second half of the seventeenth century, it is well nigh impossible that the village Bhil watchman, the Jaglyas, would have been included among the traditional village servants, the Balute-dar. That he was so included is evident from Briggs letter to the Deccan Commissioner answering the queries that the latter had made. 27 Briggs tells us that the village watchmen, or Jaglyas in Khandesh held large grants of rent free lands for the services they rendered to the society. The total land so held by the Bhils amounted to 32,520 bighas. 28 It seems impossible that an agrarian and traditional society would have alienated such a large track of land to functionaries, whose functions were of so recent an origin as the campaigns
of Aurangzeb. Their acceptance and assimilation in the complex structure of traditional Indian society is a positive proof of their police duties originating in a more remote past. Briggs himself held this view and expressed it in his magnum opus 'Land Tax in India'.

The term Bhil is a generic term denoting roughly almost all the forest dwellers. The Khandesh Bhils are subdivided into many clans and tribes. Enthoven has classified them into three major groups: viz. plain Bhils, hill and forest tribes, and mixed tribes. 'The plain Bhils, the largest and most civilized class found in almost all the villages of central and South Khandesh, are known simply as Bhils in contradistinction to the hill and forest tribes.' The hill and forest tribes consist of twelve main tribes. These are: 1) Barda 2) Dangchi 3) Dhanka 4) Dhorepi 5) Gavit 6) Khatil 7) Mathvadi 8) Mavchi 9) Nahal 10) Oavra 11) Varli 12) Vasava. All except the Dangchi inhabited the Satpuda, and are referred to by Briggs generally as Satpuda Bhils in his reports. All these tribes, ethnically are pure Bhils. The Bhilals, the Nirdhi and the Tadvis are mixed tribes, the Bhilals are half Bhil, half Rajput or kunbi; the Nirdhis and Tadvis are half Bhil, half Muslims. 'The common Khandesh Bheels who are scattered in such numbers throughout the province, reject however, all distinguishing name of clan or caste, and glory in the simple appellation of Bheel.' The distinction between the Hill and Plain Bhils was more superficial than real, as Briggs found.
The Hill Bheel and the Bheel of the Plain are entirely similar to each other, and they become residents of the Hills or plains, according to circumstances. Most of the plain Bhils were incorporated in the local police. The trouble, when it came, always came from the Hill Bhils. The Bhils occupied the eastern part of the Khandesh hill range and extended as far south as Poona. They even spread over the plains to the east, especially on the North of the Codavary, and are found as far off as the neighbourhood of the Wurda. However, the particular province of Khandesh proper was well suited for the habitation of this forest tribe. This province is nearly surrounded by broad chains of mountains, whose sides are clothed in noxious vegetation, where for many months of the year, none but the hardy denizens of the hill can exist, and where secure in the unwholesome fastnesses of these more elevated regions the cateran could undisturbedly collect his wild force, and burst from the bosom of the mist upon the unsuspecting prey on the plain. Almost on all sides, Khandesh is surrounded by hill ranges. Satpuda, which forms the northern boundary of the province, is a series of tabular trap hills, separated from each other by ravines deep and wide. The whole area is covered by 'splendid forests'. To the West, the great Bukhein Range rises steep and stony. In the south the continuous ranges of Chandor, Satmalla and Ajanta form the southern most boundary of the province. To the east, the low sterile hillocks'
separates Khandesh from the rich province of Berar. According to Briggs, the inhabitants of these hills and forests were Mangs, Ramonsees Bheels or Colees in different parts. Those bordering on Gungturry are called Colees, and those in the Baglana and Satpoora Hills, Bheels; and a tract of country lying East of Surat and Baroch and extending through Hills and forests as far as Nemueir and Candeish is styled Bheelwarra.38

The life style of the Bhils was very simple almost primitive. Their habits and ideas are totally opposed to agricultural labour; the motives which lead to the gradual accumulation of property are faint and insufficient; and honest mechanical craft is despised with the most thorough contempt.39 Graham goes on to tell us that the Bnil tribes of Matvadi, Barada and Dhorepi were generally despised by other Bhils because they made their living through honest labour.40 This, of course, was true only of those Bhils who were removed farther away from cultivating civilization. Briggs informs us that the Bhils were granted large tracts of land which they cultivated but those of the Bhils who lived outside the villages or civilized areas lived a primitive life. In this country (Bhilwarra) they cultivate the valleys by the simple method of sowing grain on spots where wood or grass has been burnt, but without ploughing and the grain thus raised, the flowers of the Maua (Moha), which is in great abundance and various roots and shrubs afford them a scanty substance.42
This smallness of their wants coupled with their capacity to undergo privations of which Graham speaks with admiration, made it difficult to control them. The peculiar character of the people and their total disregard for personal comforts and safety was one important factor that complicated the solution of the Bhil problem. 'Reckless of life, active and intelligent', the race of the Bhils was peculiarly adapted for the foray and the night attack, and '.... deeming their own lives of small value, they felt little scruple in trifling with those of others....'

Most of the Bhils were organised in Bands which were tribe and area oriented. They had their own Rajas or petty Princes among themselves. 'The imbecillity of the neighbouring states, and the enterprise of their leaders' were the circumstances that tended to alter their conditions frequently. Most of the mountain chiefs had claims on the country surrounding their hutty, either to protect it from robberies, or to guard passes which ran through their area. In most of the cases the claims were backed up by grants from former rulers, as at the least by local tradition. They claimed their rights from Ahilyabai Holkar, as in case of Goomani Naik Bhil of Satpuda or from Tukoji Holkar as in the case of Deoji Naik Bhil of Thalner pargana. There were a few spurious cases, no doubt, where plain Bhils tried to usurp the privileges of the hill chiefs. But such cases were few and far between. Almost every Bhil chief called Naik, by his followers, had a claim of pecuniary
character. Among all my Bheel (naiqs) each fellow has
the privilege of taxing a particular ghaut, some exact the
privilege of 200 Rs. annually from the Surcar while others
have a fourth of the Govt. customs; these are their Hucks,
wootney privileges of their birth and they relinquish them
with extraordinary reluctance. The Bhils in the plains
were originally the village watchmen; they were the organs
of intelligence of the police..... Over each District or
part of District was a Bheel Naiq who had superior control
over all the village Bheels, (and) was responsible for
the immediate restitution of stolen property or of tracing
the thieves...." There were a certain number of Bhils
in each village who had lands or a portion of the crops
granted to them for their maintenance. Their duty was 'to
conduct strangers beyond their limits and wake them over in
safety to the next village Bheel'. It was also the duty
of the Village Bhel to guard the village gate, and also
the cultivated fields. With their intimate knowledge of
the area and the inhabitants, they were expected to know,
and in most cases they actually knew, the hideouts and
modus operandi of the thieves. "He is enabled to do
this by his early habits of inquisitive and observation,
as well as by the nature of his allowance, which being partly
a small share of the grain and similar property belonging
to each house, he is kept always on the watch to ascertain
his fees, and always in motion to collect them....." When the tables were turned, this very knowledge could be
and would be turned to advantage of the Bhil robber. 54

It is, therefore, evident that all the Bhils, whether Hill ones or plain ones, had certain perquisites. In most of the cases the perquisites were in the form of Watans usually called the Salami Watan. 55 However, during the troubled times that followed the second Anglo-Maratha war, the control of the Central government of the Peshwa over this remote and difficult part became increasingly shadowy. The Holkar government which controlled a large tract of this territory after 1803 failed to give effective direction to the administration. 56 The increasing disorder accompanied by the pecuniary demands of the governments and other agencies compounded the distress of the population. The Second Anglo Maratha conflict was followed by a severe famine. 57 As a result of the war and the famine, 'which extended from the Satpura Hills down to Hyderabad,' Khandest lost the greater part of its population. 58 In the year 1810, Holkar's officers from Sultanpur reported that out of the 280 villages of the pargana, 11 villages were lost, 42 were accounted under different revenue headings like Dumala or Jagir, 21 were lost to predatory rebels, of the remaining 206 villages, 169 were in great arrears or lying fallow. Only 37 villages were under cultivation. 59 This unsettled condition was caused and further aggravated by the Pindharis. In the opinion of Briggs, 'the ravages committed by the Bheels and the Arabs, were not even equal perhaps to those inflicted by the Pindaries.' 60 The Pindharis ravaged the country at their leisure, being not
controlled by any superior military authority. Their usual approach was through the Ghauts near Asseer and the Mahomedan Bhels of that tract were their guides and abettors.

Giving a graphic account of the catastrophe that befell Khandesh in the form of the Pendharis, Briggs writes to Elphinstone, 'Desolation is everywhere apparent in Candeish. Immense tracts are covered with jungle, in some parts of which their still remain forts entire, and mosques appearing through the woods, the monuments of better times...'

The depopulation and devastation of the country had natural economic consequences. The revenue income of the government decreased at a time when the financial necessities had increased. The government of Peshwa resorted to the expedient of farming the revenue which ensured a fixed income to the Government. The revenue farmer '..... became for the time being the sovereign of the district, and it may easily be imagined ..... that the holder (of the contract) extracted from the ryot the uttermost of his ability to pay.' In the times of peace and plenty, the maintenance claimed by the Bhils for performing their duties as police was usually paid without demur. But during the period of universal poverty and distress, these payments were naturally enough dispensed with. 'At the time when police was most needed there was no food for the police.' As village police the Bhils had held lands on the borders, exempt from assessment, besides being entitled to certain portions of grain from every crop.
As the villages were plundered and devasted, they lost all their means of subsistence, and all their interest in the unsettled occupations of the plain. The Bheels could neither exist amidst ruins nor procure food from the cultivators of other villages, and betook themselves to highway robberies and lived in bands either in the mountains or took possession of villages in their neighbourhood. Many Bhil naiks gathered strong followings and assumed the state of petty kings, and kept regular bodies of armed men in their pay for the purpose of plunder. The revenue contractors, it seems, were both unable and unwilling to spend money for maintaining soldiers for the protection of the population, and the Bheels in a very short time became so bold as to appear in bands of hundreds, and attack towns, carrying off either cattle or hostages whom they released by receiving handsome ransoms. The methods and measures employed by the Peshwa or the local governments, to bring the situation under control were such as to give further rise to banditti. They did not hesitate to employ fraud as well as force, to effect their object, and many cruel massacres of the Bhils are said to have taken place. This naturally excited the Bhils to avenge themselves, which they did on the surrounding area with such a ferocity that caused their very name to be equally dreaded and abhorred by the inhabitants. In October, 1818, Briggs reported to the Commissioner that highway robberies attended with the most wanton and barbarous
murders are committed daily ...." 59 When Briggs told Deo Singh the Bhil naik that those Bhils who had watans in villages should return to them, Deo Singh replied, "what to eat, grass and firewood?" 70 This obviously did not endear the Bhils to the local inhabitants who seem to have carried on inbred hatred for them. But many a time advantage was taken of the revages committed by Bhils to cover the crimes of others. Briggs says that crimes of most horrid character have been usually ascribed to the Bhils under cover of whose unquieties private revenge is, I fear, too frequently indulged. 71

The devastation and insecurity caused by the Bhil incursion was really very enormous. On 23rd November 1818, Briggs reported that about 30 highway robberies, 3 murders and many instances of cattle raids having taken place in Khandesh during the period June 18th to August 7th, 1818. 72 Just to get a feel of the unsettled conditions of peace and order, a cursory view may be taken of the Bhil crimes during the early period. On 5th Nov. 1817, two English ladies were abducted by the Bhils. One was killed while the others died. 73 On 12th August 1818, Bhils took away 300 sheep from the Village of Khandala. 74 On 1st Sept. 1818 Briggs reports various raids on the Sindwa by Guaaj naik Bhil and cattle lifting and general plunder and arson. 75 On 16th August, a party of 40 Bhils abducted two Dak runners; on 21st Aug. a party of 50 Bhils carried away a villager and a runner of the custom Department; on the 27th Sept. Bhils attacked a party of Govt. carcoons wounding many; on the same day another party attacked
Captain Swanston’s servants killing one housekeeper and kidnapping a Muslim traveller. On 8th October, 1818, Briggs reported to the Commissioner murder of one Balaji Bhikaji Kulkarni of Erandole Pargana. This man was accompanied by a child. The child was also murdered. The crime took place in the vicinity of Dharangaon attended with circumstances peculiarly shocking. Murder of a wani was reported by Briggs on 11th Nov. 1818. This murder showed 'the true character of the Bheels and the state of society in Candeish.' The man, named Keshav Wani, accompanied by his nephew left the village of Lum convey to buy ghee at the village of Kurandi. The Bheels waylaid him, killed him and one of the bullocks of the cart left the bay and other bullock. The money they found on the wani totaled Rs.7/-, and the share of the individual Bil in the booty was twelve annas. On the 14th Nov. 1818, Briggs reports continued raids by Bheels in Raver area. Twenty five Bheels attacked the village of Anturwally. Two patils were severely wounded. One died almost immediately while other died after some time. The Bheels, of course, made away with the cattle. Instance of similar crimes can be multiplied. The Deccan Commissioner’s Files (Inward) from number 172 onwards are full of reports of such crimes. It cannot be argued that the bitterness of both the inhabitants of Khandesh and the British authorities against the Bheels was based upon some fancied wrong. Nor can it be argued that the outrages of the Bheels during this period of Indian history were, in the nature of the things, organized rebellion against
the British authority. The Khandesh Jamav papers pertaining to the period prior to the establishment of the British rule in Maharashtra, speak eloquently of the Bhil outrages.

Prima facie it looked that it was a simple problem of law and order that could be met with by a simple argument of force. To the colonel commanding the Detachment in Khandesh its solution was simple. 'If I had the means, I would endeavour to destroy this body of Bheels by following them both sides of the Ghauts.' But Briggs realized the deeper social implications of the Bhil outrages. To him it was not a mere problem of law and order, but a deeper issue involving tradition, economics, culture and civilization. He firmly believed that the Bhil ravaged the country because their ancient claims were not attended to. Their becoming 'the principal scourge of the population' was, in his opinion, 'very natural.' Briggs sincerely believed that his duty was twofold. Firstly he must settle the country and secondly he must 'domesticate' the wild Bhils. Both the objectives were interdependent. On the point of the Bhil claims to privileges and perquisites, he was 'disposed to give liberal equivalents to gain an object so important...' But while doing so, 'there was one thing on which I would insist, and that is that they should furnish a certain number of watchmen for each village to be supported by that village and these will be made responsible for any Dackas (raids) that may be made.' Such an arrangement, Briggs believed, would make the
Bhils feel that ' their vigilance is necessary in protecting the villages. ' This feeling, he was sure, would give them ' a degree of consequence among themselves, a kind of self-importance ' and also a confidence in the British authority. In the course of time the entire hill population could so be brought to the plains and ' they will mix at last in the mass of the civilized people ....' 85 The alluring picture that Brigg drew from his native approach to social psychology in general and to the Bhil psychology in particular is simplistic undoubtedly. Yet the very picture makes his intentions and objectives crystal clear. ' ... The manner in which the Bhils who still remain in the village are treated is sufficient to drive them to desperation ...' 86 Explaining the complexities of the social acceptability of the Bhils by other sections of the society, Briggs draws a fairly accurate and realistic picture. ' The enmity of the inhabitants against the Bhils is carried to such lengths that they would rejoice and join heartily in any plan for their extrapolation in consequence of their long sufferings and this same feeling prevails so much as to induce them to receive them into their villages unwillingly and to withhold from them that subsistence on which they principally must depend for support. ' Socially the Bhils were the ' outcasts from society, accustomed to the most servile occupation in the village from their birth...' The social problem was aggravated by its economic implications. ' That class of society which is bound to support them, the labouring farmer, is too poor to feed' the Bhils. 87 The
reclamation of Bhils, therefore, was a multifaceted problem. It was necessary to make them socially useful and acceptable; it was also necessary that the Bhils acquire economic stakes in the preservation of the then existing socio-economic order. In a scheme so wide in its connotation, every Bhil must be incorporated. 88

One of the peculiarities of the Bhil culture was that there was no such thing as an individual Bhil unconnected to some tribe and chief. Such a Bhil had no standing in the society. This strong corporate feeling could have been, as Dr. Naik suggests, the result of a tribal socio-economic order of the things, 89 or a consequence of the totemistic religion of the Bhils as Enthoven suggests. 90 Whatever be the case, a Bhil was deeply attached to his village (hutty) and to his chief. 91 Briggs also realized this. In a way, it made his attempt at the reconciliation of the Bhils easy. It was difficult, nay, impossible, to deal with every individual Bhil. They could be dealt with through their Naiks. The traditional hucks and perquisites enjoyed by the Bhil Naiks could be restored to them, on condition of requiring them to control their followers. This conciliatory policy of course was to be supported by strong-arm measures, which would ensure that Bhil realized the intentions of the government. Already on 17th April 1818, Elphinstone had instructed his Collectors that 'in cases where persons are apprehended in the act of plundering the country, you will order them to be executed immediately.' 92 The Bhils, outwardly at least,
were not to be treated differently. If they continued their ravages, they were to be punished. Briggs realised that it was a law and order problem that could be solved only through patient negotiations. Yet, 'while every measure is taken to conciliate the Bheels, the utmost exertion should be used in attacking those who invade and ravage our territory.'

In a long letter of instructions that Briggs wrote to his assistant Lt. Hodges, the policy to be pursued towards the Bheels was clearly spelt out. It is worth quoting at length, since it throws light on the execution of the policy. 'It is the desire of the government to render the Bheels inoffensive by negotiation and compliance with those demands which have been sanctioned by time, or submitted to by the last established government rather than by coercion. It will therefore, be your duty to ascertain what well founded claim they possess on the adjoining country and to satisfy those claims as soon as possible by arranging such a commutation as may afford them full satisfaction in the manner least burdensome to the people.' The primary duty of the government of course, was to stop the ravages. It was from this point that 'the settlement of the Bheels in the villages' was to be encouraged, since 'their local information and connection give them the means of detecting theft and informing against intended attacks.' 'Whenever you find that their rights on
villages are held by this species of *Vassal Tenure* , I request that their services may be called for, and they should be taught to believe that these claims are only granted on those terms,' i. e. their responsibility of policing the village. One of the major preoccupations of Briggs in the settlement of the Bhil problem was the factor of the return of the village Bhils to their respective villages. Whenever he entered into an agreement with the Hill Bhils, he forced them to agree as a *sine qua non* to expel all low land Bhils ... in their huttyes to leave from the hills to their several wuttens in villages ... By doing so Briggs hoped to achieve two important results. Firstly, he could achieve a tolerable policing of the villages, and secondly, by drawing large bodies of Bhils away from Hills, he would be able to reduce the strength of the Hill Chiefs. Once this was achieved, the Chiefs could be dealt with independently. This, however, could not be achieved, unless the Hill naiks were contacted and treated with. Briggs tried to escape the dilemma by using both the policies simultaneously.

Most of the Bhil chiefs had their 'hutty's (establishments) in the mountain fastnesses. Khandesh is particularly well situated for the hideouts in the mountain ranges. It is a low land basin, mostly of the Tapi and her tributaries, surrounded on all the sides by rocky mountains. In

* This is a curious term having no meaning in Marathi land tenure system in village.
In the north is the formidable Satpura range extending from west to east. At the eastern extremity it turns rather sharply southward and gradually merges with the Ajanta range that runs north-south. To the South-west, the Ajanta range joins the Satmalla range which runs in continuation of the Ajanta range till it reaches Anakai. The plains between Anakai and Chandore open Khandesh into Ahmednagar. Westward of Chandore is a range of hills that Briggs has called the Chandore Range. Intermittently broken, the Chandore Range reaches out west to join the northern range of Sanyadri that Graham has described as Sukhein Range. This Range moves northwards along the western border of the district till almost Navapar, from whence till Chikhali in the extreme west of the Satpura range, we have the fertile basin of the Tapi in between. All these ranges are very convenient border lines cutting off Khandesh from the neighbouring districts. In the north, the Satpuda range running east-west divides Khandesh from the plains of Walwa. The Ajanta and Satmalla ranges cut it off from the erstwhile possessions of the Nizam, while the Chandore range in the initial period of Briggs's office in Khandesh separated Khandesh from Ahmednagar district. The Sukhein range divided Khandesh from Gujrat and the Darg areas. In the year 1818, all the outlying districts of Khandesh, except Ahmednagar, enjoyed a tolerably stable governments. It was but natural that all the hill chiefs, therefore, should see inward into the plains of Khandesh for plunder and subsistence.
Going from west to east in the Satpudas, the first formidable Bhil chief was Deoji Naik Bhil, son of Joojar Naik, a powerful chief. Deoji Naik had a long-standing feud with the Ranas of Ranipoora, who were petty feudal chiefs who were thrown out of their possessions by the Pendharis and the Peshwa's officers. The Ranipoora family had considerable influence with the Bhils in the area.

To the east of Deoji Naik, among the hills near the Burwany Ghats was Ramjee Naik Bhil. Ramjee Naik was essentially a plains man, and his followers, about 80 to 100 men, were also plains Bhils. Ramjee was originally the watchman of the Torkheda town. 'He is far the most desperate, the most enterprising and the most incorrigible of all the of all the Bhels I have had to deal with'. Another chief was Auchit Naik.

Further to the east, in the vicinity of the high mountain ranges of Satpuda, was the powerful Bhil called Goomani Naik. He wielded considerable influence over the Bhils of the region and controlled the Sendhwa Ghat, the life link of the trade between Khandesh and the Northern India.

To the south of the Sendhwa and north of the pargana of Thalner, lay the pargana of Amba, perhaps the most devastated area in Khandesh. This pargana was the hideout of the three most notorious Bhil chiefs, namely, Unkaria Naik who terrified the area between Sendhwa and Kirgone; Gunjy Naik to his east and Dashrath Naik, a formidable man. A lesser chief was Roopsingh.
South of Amba, was the hilly tract of Thalner. Bhylia naik and Khandu naik associated with each other in their depredations. To the east of Amba and Thalner, began the long range of the Tadvi Bhils, whose outstanding leader was Kania Bhil.

The Ajanta range was inhabited mostly by the Nirdhi Bhils who professed Islam. Their area was within the territory of the Nizam, though they continued to ravage British territories. 'They are ... of a discontented and quarrelsome disposition, difficult to manage, and still more ferocious than their brethren to the eastward, and, during seasons of disturbance, the most atrocious acts have been invariably ascribed to their prowess.' 101 The most powerful amongst them was one Kooshaba and Jania, two brothers who had about 150 followers. 102

Westwards of the Ajanta Bhils were the Satmala Bhils. In the paragana of Chalisgaon were Roomal naik, Mohun naik, Saheboo naik, and Shankar naik. In the Satkunda hutties in the Satmala range were Satwaji naik and Suryaji naik Bhils in the pargana of Kannad and Verul (Ellora). In continuation of the Satkunda Bhils were the Kaldurry Bhils, chief amongst whom were Bayaji naik, Wagh naik, Taraji naik, Jandulla Takira and Garud naik.

In the Chandore range were the Bhils known as the Awandy Bhils. The principals among them were Sayajee naik, Bapoo naik, Jewaji naik, Sahib naik, and Rove naik Maria.
To the north of the Satmalla Bhils was Cheel naik, crossing the plains and coming to the Western ranges, we encounter the Baglan Bhils. Most of the Bhil naiks of Baglan were under the influence and control of Khushal Kunwar, the Raja of Dharboly. They normally resided in the Jaitapur pargana. The most important among them was Chandu Pradhan naik, who enjoyed considerable prestige among other Baglan chiefs. Dashrath naik Zaitapurkar, Govind naik Waklikar, Shiwba naik Harkalikar, Rameshnaik Bhordiwatkar, Singh naik Babhunikar, Ukunda naik Dhakambikar, Poon naik Bhowarikar, Patul naik, Ucharkar and Munia naik of Chowky Sultanburuj, were some of the important Bhil chiefs of Baglan.

In the Bhameir pargana, on the high road leading from Gujrath to Khandesh, in the village of Kanapiir, was Teghykhan. He was not, strictly speaking, a Bhil, but wielded considerable power over them, and employed many in his service.

Going north of the Tapi basin, to the westernmost corner of the Satpuda range and thus completing the circle of our view, we come across the Wasava family in the vicinity of Nandurbar. Of this Bhil family of the Wasavas, Jeeva Wasava was perhaps the most powerful. In the same area lived Laxman Farwi, with his base at Kukurmundha.

Besides these Bhil chiefs, other chiefs who, though not Bhils themselves yet, exercised considerable control over Bhils, and thus were indispensable in any Bhil settlement, were
the Ranas of Budawal, of Manipura and the chief of Abhona.

The plain Bhils, as distinct from the Hill Bhils, were numerous and in the times of peace were not so well organized as their counterparts in the Bhils. But during the troubled times, they normally joined their Hill brothers in the vicinity under whose technical control they normally came.  

Captain Briggs believed that direct bilateral agreements with these Bhil chiefs were possible. 'I beg you will have the goodness to explain to all the Bhel chiefs with whom you may have communication that the British Govt. is disposed to forget the past and to make provisions for the Bhels in a manner to enable them to follow peaceful habits, that it is more inclined to forgive and reclaim the Bhels than to punish them....' Explaining further the policy of the British Government, Briggs says, '...one of the leading features of our policy is to make terms with each (chief) separately.....' Early in his efforts at bringing about the pacification of the district, Briggs while addressing the Saranjamdars of Khandesh 'strongly urged the reconciliation of the Bhel chief's as an object of great moment...'

The first Bhel chief with whom Briggs came to an agreement was Coomani Naik, 'a wild beast in the Satpura Hills'. He had 250 Bhils under him and controlled the area round the Sendhwa pass, the most important trade route between Khandesh and Malwa. On 5th March 1818, Briggs signed an agreement at Dangri near Kukurmundha with Coomani naik. By this,
agreement the Bhil chief agreed to prevent any depredations or nightly attacks on the villages of the district of Thalner and to assist the civil authorities in the settlement of the region, particularly the district of Amba. No person passing through the Sendhwa ghat was to be molested by his people. The portion of the custom duty assigned to him in the times of Ahilyabai Holkar for protecting the trade through the ghat, was to be collected by the Govt. Custom House to be situated in the Sandhwa ghat and paid to him by the custom master. He on his own was not to collect any dues from the passengers. His duty was to protect the travellers unmolested through the ghat. He was also to inform the Government officials of any intelligence that he might receive about any plan of attack or assembling of troops for similar purpose. 'In consideration' of his 'performing' the above duties, the British Government will pay all those Huks which are proved by the records of the Mahal to have been customary and (pay you) out of the revenues as a Khillate annually the sum of 2000 Rupees.' 108 Briggs did not agree cheerfully to pay Gomani. 'I was long averse to the stipulation for paying 2000 Rupees annually to him in addition to his other emoluments, but the fact is that the security of the Ghauts, the tranquility of the Parganas in his vicinity and the shortness of my stay in the vicinity of Talneir rendered it advisable that I should make some permanent arrangement before I left the District ....' 109
However, on the whole, Briggs was satisfied about the arrangement. He wistfully looks forward when 'his (Goomani's) people will ... come to (Thalner) without their bows and arrows and are very useful as informers ...' Briggs was also satisfied that Goomani 'protects the Sindwa Ghaut and single passengers pass to and fro unmolested ...'.

The signing of an agreement with the chief, however, did not pacify the country totally. On 7th October 1818, Briggs had to reprimand Goomani for continued Bhil outrages in the area west of the Sandhwa. Briggs asked him to explain these outrages.

Again in December, Briggs accused Goomani of depredations and threatened him with the suspension of the Khillate. In the same month Goomani collected a toll of Rs.354/- from Amritrao's men who were passing through the Sendhwa Ghaut. Briggs promptly took him to task.

In January 1819, Briggs accused Goomani of the serious charges of cattle lifting in Chopda and of abetting the murderers of Keshav Wani. Goomani's Vakeel promptly went back and brought back two murderers and the cattle, 'minus six animals eaten by the Bheels'. Goomani, however, complained that his people resorted to cattle lifting in Chopda, since the Shinde's officials at Chopda had refused to pay his huks. Briggs immediately wrote to the Mamlatdar of Chopda to pay the Huks to the Bhils for which the British Government had given a guarantee to Goomani naik. In spite of these defaults on part of Goomani, however, Briggs felt that Goomani
However, was trustworthy. He requested Capt. Leighton, operating around the Sendhwa, not to attack any of Goomani's Bhils, 'who, I am afraid still continue to infest Holkar's country beyond Sindwa, tho' he has most rigidly adhered to the agreement he made with me in February last. 

Goomani's conduct embolden the Political Agent in Khandesh to enter into a new agreement with him. By this new arrangement, the annual payment of Rs. 2000/- payable to Goomani naik was to be discontinued. Instead, Goomani's was to maintain a force of 20 sibandies, 10 Bargeers and 30 Bheels for the protection of the Sendhwa ghat. The salaries of the persons so employed were to be paid by the British Government. Goomany himself was to receive Rs. 100/- per month. Briggs impressed upon Elphinstone that such an arrangement would save government a considerable amount and an idea of paying Goomani every month, would make him more amenable to the British Government. If the government was to undertake policing the Sendhwa ghat, then the total expenditure would come to Rs. 2595 per month. Following is the table that shows the difference in the expenses between the Government policing the ghats and Goomani doing the same.

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<th>Category</th>
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<th>Pay yearly</th>
<th>Category</th>
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<td><strong>31140</strong></td>
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</table>

Add Goomani's Khillate 2000

Grand total 33140


Along with Goomani naik, Neher Singh Raut was also to be employed in similar service with a force as follows:

- **Neher Singh Raut**: Rs. 30 p.m.
- **2 Jamadars**: Rs. 20 p.m. @ 10/-
- **30 Sibandis**: Rs. 150 p.m. @ 5/-
- **10 Horsemen**: Rs. 150 p.m. @ 10/-

\[ \text{Total} = \text{Rs. 350 p.m.} \times 12 = 4200/- \text{ per year} \]

The total cost of protecting the Sendhwa pass thus would be Rs. 8580/- per year as against Rs. 33140/- if the Government forces undertook the job. This would save for the Government a net yearly amount of Rs. 24360/-. After the scheme was agreed to by the Deccan Commissioner it was put into operation in early January, 1819. This arrangement continued and Briggs
had no major difficulty with Goomani during Briggs's tenure in Khandesh.

Briggs was lucky in settling with Goomani with comparative ease. He was to find settlement with other Bhil chiefs in the Satpuda range a fairly difficult job. Goomani had come in not because he loved the British regime, but situated as he was early in 1818, he had the opportunity of seeing the British in action. He had heard, and probably seen, the fall of Thalner and the fate of the Killedar of the fort, Tulsiram Mama. It is interesting and important to note that the first agreement that he entered into with the British was almost immediately after the fall of Thalner.  

Even then his attitude to the British remained 'equivocal'. In the Satpuda, Briggs's easy reclamation of the Bhils stopped with Goomani. Most of the major chiefs were brought to order only through a strenuous military operation. Conduct of Gunjee naik of Sultanpur -pargana and his band was 'such as to authorize their being attacked'. Gunjee naik's gang was responsible for daring depredations in Chopda. Briggs tried to incite Gunjee into submission by transferring latters privileges in the Amba -pargana to Goomani and hoped that this measure would work. This measure did not have the effect that Briggs desired. Instead, it made him more wanton and desperate. He was killed while attacking a British detachment led by Capt. Munn. His band dispersed. His son Dhanaji naik, abandoned the predatory
habits, came in on 21st March 1819 and was confirmed in his
nemnook or privileges. He 'aided the inhabitants of the
devastated Amba pargana to resettle it ....' Satpuda chiefs like Kaniya Tadvi, Dashrath naik, Ramaji
naik and Aucniit naiks, Subhana naik and Kunwar Wasava defied
the British authority and were brought to the bookmonly after
a hazardous military campaign. It were principally these
chiefs and the Bhils of Kaldaree area that led to the frustra-
tion of Capt. Briggs. In October 1818, he was ' confident
that the instant the whole of the Bhil naik are settled
with, the tranquillity of Candeish will be in a great measure
secured ....' Within a month, however, he admits 'the
total failure of all my endeavours to induce the Bhil chiefs
in the neighbourhood ( of Rawer ) either to come in or to
accept of any moderate terms for the abandonment of their
habits or the relinquishment of their retainers ...'

Of these Satpuda chiefs, Kania Bhil was perhaps the
most powerful one. Kania's haunts were in the easternmost
regions of the Satpuda. The Tadvi Bhils the tribe to which
Kania belonged, were the Muslim Bhils, who were the heredi-
tary watchmen of the Chopda, Arwad, Bayawal, Sawda, Rawer
and Ashir paraganas. According to Briggs, they became formidable ' only since last five years ' when they came in closer
contact with the Pendhars. The Tadvi Bhils never left their
villages ' to go to Hindostan with Pindarries ' but always
accompanied them southward. Kania had gathered a large force
under him. He had about 1200 Bhils under his command who
were 'but the dregs of that community'. Kania was supported by two Pendhari chiefs namely 'Shaikh Dulla and Sitto (Chitu?)'. Besides he also received support and protection from Shinde's officers at Ashir, Bayawal and Chopda. Recently Suryajirow Nimbalkar ... levied a fine of 10,000 Rupees (on Kania) and bound him to pay one fourth of his plunder to Suryaji. This fact of Nimbalkar sharing the spoils with Canmiah Bheel is capable of proof....'

Briggs warned Suryaji against harbouring marauders like Kania.

The original hutty of Kania was located some four miles from Rawer. These Bhils enjoyed their Huks in return of the police duties. Kania's Bhils maintained themselves 'peacefully by cutting and selling firewood and grass.' When the payment of their Huks was stopped, they were reduced to distress which became acute due to famines. It was then that they resorted to plunder and removed their hutty to the mountains near Pal. By then Kania had gathered a considerable following and also employed Sibandis of his own. In early 1818, he had 400 Bhils, 250 Sibandis and 100 horses. The Sibandis who lived in the Hutty received Rs.15/- per month, while those who joined in the plunder but did not live in the hutty received Rs.10/- per month. Kania had five different hutties, each one commanded by his trusted lieutenant. These hutties were:
1) Hutty of Jamsena Patil
2) Hutty of Seeta Tadvi
3) Hutty of Umeda Tadvi
4) Hutty of Jafara Patil
5) Hutty of Amlee Chowdhari

Besides Bhils and Sibandias, these five hutties had 82 horsemen among them. It can, thus, be easily seen that Kania had a considerable force under his command and was a factor to be reckoned with in the settlement of Bhils in Satpuda. It was, therefore, natural that Briggs should try to bring this powerful chief on the side of the established government. To his overtures, Kania replied as follows: 'The Cawlnamah which was sent through the medium of Jemad ud deen Shah has been received. My situation is thus: There are 5000 men under me who and their ancestors for generations past have subsisted by plunder. You are now the Masters of the Country and thousands look up to you for protection and support. If by your means I and my followers are provided with subsistence, we will abstain from plundering. I have a great many Sibundebis and Swars in my service which are maintained at considerable expence ..... I am ready to obey whatever order may be conveyed through him (i.e. Meer Jemad-ud deen Shah)'.

This exaggerated figure of 5000 followers, is of course, discounted by Briggs. However, he encouraged Capt. Kaye to settle the claims of Kania on just lines. Unlike Goomani, Kania refused to take Briggs and the British authority seriously. He continued his depredations and on 24th October 1818, Cornet Kaye informed Briggs that Kania and Suryaji Nimbalkar had made common cause and were planning
to attack Kaye's camp. ' The plot is certainly feasible, but I should hardly think they would attempt anything so rashly.' 134 Briggs received similar information independently from Sir John Malcom. He directed Col. MacDowell, Capt. Munn and Maj. Jardine to move in the direction of Nassirabad and desired Maj. Jardine to provide protection to the area between Sendhwa and Nassirabad. 135 In the meantime, Kaye wrote to Kania asking him about the plot, and to prove its falsity by coming to Kaye's camp and meeting him. This, Kania, of course, did not do. Both the sides reciprocated each other's distrust. 136 On 31st October the village of Karandi was ransacked by about 275 Bhils of Dashrath Naik who was in league with Kania. 137 Briggs wrote a strong letter to Kania accusing him of bad faith. He pointed out to Kania that not only had he broken his solemn word but had refused to come and see Briggs when latter was at Rawer. ' I am now about to leave this District, but I shall not forget that you and your followers still remain here - we shall see what is to be done - '. 138 Briggs requested Major McBean ' to take measures for the defence of this District, recommending him to attack the Bheel post at once! 139 Briggs asked Maj. McBean, the Officer Commanding in this region, to undertake a night attack on Kania Bhil 'who is said to have 520 infantry besides 900 Bhels'. Briggs, of course, does not believe this number. 140 Briggs was keen on breaking Kania's power, because so long as he remained at large, efforts at bringing other Bhils under control were
being frustrated. ' Some of the Mohomedan Bhils have been entertained by me as Sibundies, but they have been found of little use, nor can it be otherwise while Canniah's power remains untouched...\(^1\) On 10th December 1878, Kania's gang made an attack on the army and village of Mangrool in Rawer paragana.\(^2\) Briggs believed that the Bhils had friends in the village and urged that the Patil of village ' should be made an example of'.\(^3\) Pursuant to the Political Agent's instructions of 16th November, Major McBean made a surprise attack on Kania's hutty. Because of the difficult terrain, the element of surprise was partly destroyed, yet McBean was ' happy to say that we succeeded in destroying everything they had and a great number of their followers, 28 men were made prisoners.....' Both Kania and Shaikh Dulla, however, escaped.\(^4\) This success of McBean put heart into Briggs. ' It is possible that the success of this attack will induce most of the Sibundeis with Canniah Bheel to quit him and it may probably be the means of breaking up the gang altogether.'\(^5\) Briggs recommended the 28 captives from the hutty to be sentenced to hard labour on roads.\(^6\)

A full fledged war against the Bhils had begun. It is true that Briggs, in a moment of anger did say that '... It is towards their extripation we should direct our first attention.....\(^7\) Yet, his long letter to Elphinstone of 8th January 1819, spoke very humanely of the Bhil rehabilitation. The truth is, Briggs had come to an important conclusion that '... as to the fidelity of the Bheels, any pecuniary
settlement is less likely to operate than a knowledge of our full power over them ...." Briggs was to carry this dual policy to its logical end. He felt that a liberal policy alone would not help the British government. The Bhils simultaneously must feel the pressure of British armed strength. He claimed that the attack of Maj. McBean had disheartened 1200 followers of Kania 'and we are now searching in vain to find him or his bands in order to reclaim them ....'" As an extension of this strong arm policy, John Maseem's Briggs issued a general Proclamation to the public in Khandesh in general, and in Rawer pargana in particular. Among other things, it said 'that any British subject convicted of assisting the Bhels ... by supplying them with grain, furnishing them with intelligence, or in any way guilty of forming a connection with them will be considered as traitors, and their goods will be confiscated and they themselves be subject to punishment'. The Bhils in the Proclamation meant Kania and other freebooters. The aim of Briggs was to disarm Kania, not to destroy him as a person. When his brother Janniah approached Maj. McBean, Briggs informed him that Janniah may be offered Rs.1000/ to 2000/- per year, but as to Kania, no agreement was to be made unless he agreed to dismiss the Arabs and the cavalry from his service. It was the same policy that was now also continued. On 20th December 1818, McBean made yet another attack on one of the hutties of Kania. But the troops 'returned without meeting a soul ....' McBean sent a message to Kania
that he should assist in the arrest of Shaikh Dulla and if he did ... neither he or (etc.) any of his people shall be touched and whatever aid he may require for carrying this plan into effect shall be sent .......

Kania failed to respond to this invitation.

The Bheel campaign was now extended territorially from east of Rawer to Karandi in the west and north of the hills. It was to be an encircling movement, the Khandesh troops operating from east, south and west, and Sir John Malcom's detachment operating from the north. A report of Kania's being at Boree was received, and Lt. Col. Heath sent a Detachment under Lt. Gordon to ascertain the fact. Gordon did not find Kania, who he believed had been to the village about eight days prior, but he did find some of Kania's Bhils there who had deserted Kania after McBean's attack on the Hutty. Kania was now like a hunted man. He ran from place to place, and his following diminished. Briggs received communication from Capt. Bently as well as from Capt. Kaye about the willingness of Kania to submit on 'whatever terms offered'. Briggs assured him personal safety. Bently informed Briggs that Janna was trying to intervene on behalf of his brother while Kania himself was making overtures to Sir John Malcom. Kania's emissaries met Capt. Bently who gave them the customary shapagadi (turbans). Kania's overtures with Malcom continued, and fearing that Malcolm might make extravagant promises, Briggs wrote a long
letter to him giving Sir John a complete history of Kania. On 16th March 1819, Kania submitted to Lt. Col. Smith. However, it was not till 9th June 1819, that Briggs could inform Elphinstone of Kania’s final submission to the civil authority in Khandesh. Kania had a great number of retainers. Briggs thought it advisable to employ some of them. He consented to employ fifty of Kania’s followers in the service on a pay of Rs.5/- per month. Their duty was to guard the Dholkot ghat that connects Nemad to the Deccan. Other followers of Kania returned to the villages to which they belonged as watchmen. Kania himself was given a personal grant of Rs. 600/- per year, with 620 beegha of land that was his traditional perquisite. Hereafter Briggs had no trouble from Kania.

Dashrath Naik was another Bhil chief who had to be beaten into submission. He belonged to the Amba pargana. He had about 100 Arabs, some Hindustani and about 200 Bhil followers. Since the pargana was almost totally devastated and depopulated Dashrath Naik and his followers had no means of livelihood but plunder. This they did with a ferocity unmatched. Dashrath was in league with Kania, and had attacked the village of Karandi with 275 men. Dashrath had a backing from Suryaji Nimbalkar of Boyawal and ran into Shinde’s territory whenever pursued. Briggs believed that getting Dashrath would be no problem if Shinde’s officers did not protect him. Briggs requested Sir John Malcolm to move
a body of troops to the back of Satpuda in the province of Nemad. Briggs himself would post a detachment south of Satpuda to hem in Dashrath naik who has been operating in the neighbourhood of Lasour. The idea behind this move was that Dashrath should not get any provisions and should starve. It was reported that Kania had joined Dashrath after the former's hutty was attacked by Maj. McBean. Dashrath subsisted formerly from the villagers in the Chopda and Lasor areas, but this aid has been lately much withheld from him and he has turned his attention towards Nemaur (Nemad). Briggs suggested to Col. Huskisson to move a detachment of his forces through Amba district towards Lasor to prevent the Bheels flying westward. The main force was to move through Lasor and push into the Hills as and when opportunity afforded and attack Dashrath naik. At the end of February, Lt. Col. Jardine got the opportunity the English had been waiting for. He got the exact location of Dashrath naiks hideout and attacked the place. Dashrath was not in, but Jardine was able to get hold of his uncle, Dadoo Naik. Jardine burnt the hutty to ground. The attack had the desired effect. A week later, Jardine received a communication from Dashrath, who brought some sort of letter from Sir Joyn Malcolm. Jardine could not follow the contents since the letter was in Nemadi language. Jardine reported that Dashrath was under great distress and was willing to submit. However, he (i.e. Dashrath) looked apprehensive. Briggs, who already had the information that Dashrath has
gone to Sir John, considered it 'natural enough for his contempt of all overtures from me ....' 171 On hearing from Jardine, however, Briggs instructed him not to attack Dashrath, but to send him to Dhule. 172 At the same time, he wrote to Malcolm about Dashrath, describing the latter as a 'destardly person'. 173 However, in the meanwhile Dashrath had submitted to Jardine on 6th March. Jardine decided to send him to Dhule, but did not feel it necessary to put them (i.e. prisoners) in iron or confinement. 174 Dashrath was pensioned off by the Political Agent. No pension could technically be granted to him, since the perquisites that Dashrath claimed and was entitled to lay in the areas of Holkar and Scindia. But Briggs hoped that he and his men could be used to protect the Dhalbote ghat in the Chopda paragana, when that paragana was transferred to the British authority.

Ramaji and Auchit Naiks:

In the eastern part of Sultanpur paragana, among the hills near the Burwany ghats was Ramaji Naik, originally the watchman of the town of Torkheda. As already pointed out, 175 Briggs considered him to be 'by far the most desperate, the most enterprising and the most incorrigible of all the Bheels ....' 176 Briggs considered Ramaji as a sort of an upstart among the Bhil chiefs. Ramaji 'having no claim himself being a watchman of one of the low land villages, has collected about 200 Bheels to gain advantageous terms.' Briggs had offered him a pension of Rs.600/- annually. 'His agent went away apparently satisfied, but never returned.' 177
The terms to which Ramaji and his brother Auchit had agreed to were as follows:

1) Newly established rights of Girass etc. in the paragana of Sultanpur, Bhamer etc. were relinquished by Ramaji and Auchit.

2) Certain Beeghas of ground in the villages of Newadeh and Wapunda were confirmed by the British Government.

In lieu of the newly established rights, Ramaji and Auchit agreed to receive an annual payment of Rs. 600/- as salepagadi and promised to send the village Bhils back and to protect the area in the neighbourhood of Torkheda. 179 In the light of this agreement, Briggs' annoyance with the two brothers is understandable, when reports of the ravages committed by them started coming in. Throughout the month of August and September 1818, reports came in of the ravages of Ramaji's gangs. Briggs ordered Lt. Briggs to send one of his Rissallas of Sibandis consisting of 480 men towards Thalner. With the help of these troops and the regular troops posted in the region Briggs was 'determined to make a severe example of Ramjee and his adherents.' 179 However, he would endeavour 'to postpone this measure till our information regarding their strength and the places of their retreat is more complete.' 180 When force was moved, and his supplies cut off, Ramaji fled away. His followers deserted him. He submitted to the British authority and Briggs granted him a small pension. 181 However, the arrangement proved shortlived, and Ramaji and Auchit,
probably moved by the example of Kania and Dashrath, again went on rampage. Throughout the months of November and December, the brothers carried on depredations on the unfortunate country. 'Hardly a week passes without my hearing of atrocious robbery and not unfrequently attended with murder ....' 182. In January 1819, Briggs requested Col. Huskisson to undertake operations against Ramaji and Auchit. Informing him of the extent of the Naiks control, Briggs wrote 'This country (of Ramaji and Auchit) is very strong and the Bheels depend on Toorkeira, Seerpoor, Wagheria, Wagapoor and even on Curronde for provisions.' 183 But Col. Huskisson could not move against them immediately, since the forces under Col. Jardine were engaged in the pursuit of Dashrath and those under Maj. McBean in pursuit of Kania. In March, Jardine attacked Ramaji and Auchit in their hutties. Both Ramaji and Auchit escaped. Jardine was able to arrest about 90 heads of cattle. Jardine burnt the hutties. 184 Briggs promptly issued a Proclamation against helping Ramaji and Auchit naiks. 185 In utter desperation, Auchit threw himself on the mercy of the British. He surrendered himself to Col. Jardine on 7th April 1819. Jardine decided to keep him in the camp for sometime to obtain information about other Bhils. He was to be sent to Dhule in due course. 186 Two days later Ramaji himself submitted to Jardine. His submission was the work of Kashirao, the Mamladar of Thalner. 187 But when told that he would be taken to Dhule, Ramaji escaped from the camp. 188 Jardine, however, was not perturbed. He knew
that Ramaji was deserted by his followers. He was confident that Auchit, Khandu and Goomani naiks, among themselves could apprehend Ramaji without trouble. 189 On the 5th May, Briggs wrote to Elphinstone as follows: 'I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that, with the exception of Ramaji naik, there is not one Bheel chief of the whole range (i.e. Satpuda range) that is not now dependent on the British Government.' 190 However, on 8th May Jardine reported the recapture of Ramaji naik. 191 Ramaji naik was captured and brought back by Khandu naik and Goomani naik. Khandu and Goomani shared the prize of Rs. 1000/- declared by Briggs for the arrest of Ramaji. 192 Ramaji was put in irons and sent to Dhule under an escort of 40 horse. 193 Auchit, however, was sent free and became a useful instrument in the hands of Col. Jardine in reducing others to submit. Ramaji was put in the jail. Auchit, however, killed a Patil and ran away. He was joined by Subhaniya. Throughout the year 1820 they were on rampage, when they were caught. Auchit died in prison in 1821. 194

Kunwar and Jeeva Wasava:

The family of the Wasavas belonged to those Bhils who claimed a Rajput lineage. They originally held the lands of the hilly and woody country of Rajpipla lying north of Tapi and south of Narmada. The head of the family was Kunwar Wasava, 'but his power has been almost entirely subverted by his relation, Jeeva, a younger member of the family...'
Jeeva had, like other Bhils in Satpuda, taken advantage of the times to establish his power and rights over the neighbouring fertile districts. He boasted that at his whistle, he could command the service of 4000 Bowmen. Like Goomani, however, he submitted quite early and agreed to desist from ravaging the country in lieu of an yearly payment of Rs.3000/ besides his perquisites. The toll and customs to which he was entitled was to be collected by the British government and paid to him. Briggs agreed to support 11 horsemen and 40 foot for him, and with this force he was to protect the country. Briggs also agreed to accept his son and one of his own semi principal assistants in the government service. Briggs had no trouble with Jeeva hereafter.

But Kunwar Wasava was a different matter. He continued his ravages. In league with Laxman Padvi, a Bhil chief of Kukurmundha, he terrorised the country west of Sendhwa ghat. They sent orders to various villages to pay a fixed sum, and did not come to discuss matters with Briggs. Their major daring effort was the attack on the village of Ranipur, which they attacked with 150 Sibandis and 400 Bhils. The town defended itself resolutely and the Bhils returned with 13 of their fellows dead and 26 wounded. The wounded were carried away by the attacking Bhils. In early January, 1819, a party of Bhils attacked Banjaras in Bhamer paragana. Col. Jardine could not ascertain the name of the leader of the attacking gang, but Lt. Hodges was confident that the Bhils belonged to Kunwar Wasava's gang. Kunwar Wasava
retired to his hill fastness at Konkral, a village about 20 miles from Kukurmundha. Hodges suggested that he should be attacked in his hutty and every means be employed to distress him. Jardine pursued him relentlessly. Kunwar Wasava offered to submit, but did not actually come in. On the other hand, his associate Laxman Padvi, threw himself on the mercy of the British government. Kunwar Wasava, however, fled away. In May, 1819, Jardine reported that Kunwar Wasava is the only Bheel chief who has not submitted.... With all his professions of submission, Kunwar Wasava proved to be elusive. But by the end of May, 1819, Kunwar seems to have moved away into the Gaikwad territory. He carried on depredations from there. Subhedar Bhawan Singh, mamlatdar of Nawapur, reports incursions by Kunwar's men in Nawapur para-gana. By the end of 1819, Kunwar Wasava was the only Bheel chief who was not claimed by the Political Agent, though he had opened negotiations with the Gaikwad government to achieve that aim. Briggs could never really master Kunwar, though agreements were made by the latter only to be broken. Even Briggs's successor in Khandesh did not have much success with Kunwar. Later on he did settle on a personal pension in Chikhali in western Khandesh, but rose in rebellion in 1846, was arrested and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. He was released in 1854, but was removed from the headship of Chikhali. By the end of June, 1819, the Satpuda range had become comparatively quiet. On the
5th May Briggs officially terminated operations against the Satpuda Bhils. He requested Col. Huskisson to withdraw the troops from the Hills. However, as a precaution a sizeable force was left at the following posts:

1) Kukurmundha and Nawapur
   - 1 European Officer
   - 150 Rank and file
   - 50 Auxiliary horse
2) Thalner
   - 40 Rank and file
3) Galna
   - Such a garrison as deemed competent to guard the Arab prisoners.

He, however, would not leave the north-western Khandesh unprotected. It was important to render it safe since the highway from Surat to Khandesh ran through it.

The campaign against the Bhils in the Satpuda range was undertaken with a view to reducing the Hill Bhils. It did not form an inevitable part of Briggs' general policy towards the Bhils. He undertook it more in the spirit of a police action against errant subjects than a military campaign against an enemy. His attitude to the Bhils differed materially from that to the Arabs. He wanted to get rid of the Arabs, while with the Bhils, he wanted to reclaim and domesticate them. He realized that the Bhils were an integral part of the social order. Every Bhil chief originally is a watchman of some plain village. My little experience in this country is sufficient to convince me that the Bheels must be provided for, ....
this they must be reclaimed. That object could be achieved by cutting off the supplies that they receive from the plains.\textsuperscript{210} They rely solely on the plain for their subsistence and the weakness of the inhabitants makes them readily consent to supply them in order to secure themselves from their attacks.....\textsuperscript{211} When deprived of their Sibundeis, they have no longer the means of attacking villages and driving off cattle, and when their provisions are cut off neither they nor the Sibundeis can exist in the hills ......\textsuperscript{211} But it was not always that the inhabitants supplied the Bhils with provisions out of fear. Many a time it was also out of affection'.\textsuperscript{212} The knowledge of the fact that the whole of the Hill Bhils are dependent on the plain, and for this purpose 'each Huty or Sheel village, has a corresponding one on the plain from whence it procures grain, ' was 'of the greatest importance, ' whenever 'it shall be found necessary to attack them ......'\textsuperscript{213} The Bhil chiefs maintained a close contact with the village Bhils, and Briggs believed that the village Bhils were normally in league with those in the hills.\textsuperscript{214}

As result of these conditions the campaign was to have a two-fold objective. One was to reduce the hill chiefs into submission, and other was to control the Bhils in villages and also to give protection to the people. The army was to occupy the area at the foot of hills, from where surprise attacks could be made on the Bhil hutties in the hills, and
at the same time control could be maintained on the Bhils in
the villages. 'The only way the Bheels can be attacked is
by surprise ...'215 Once they were dislodged from their hutties,
most of the Bhils became fugitives. Then 'they are driven
to the necessity of begging ' in the areas to which, 'they
are for the most part unconnected and have no general feeling
......'216 As for the village Bhils, any person found
guilty 'of aiding and abetting Bheels ' was to be executed
' on the spot.'217 If the Bhils were found in the act
of plundering, or immediately after plundering, 'They should
be tried (by a court - martial) and if found guilty, executed
on the spot'.218 These orders of Briggs were questioned by
the supreme government and Briggs had to justify them in a
long letter. The Deccan Commissioner, however, considered
Briggs orders fully vindicated and supported him.219

The operations were under the overall command of Col.
Huskisson. They covered the area of almost the whole of the
southern slope of Satpuda including the parganas of Rawer,
Añawad, Thalner, Sultanpur, Nandurbar, Bhamer and Songhir
in West Khandesh, Amba, and Sendhwa in the East Khandesh
region. It was a vast, hilly and woody tract. The British
force was divided into three major detachments; one under Col.
Huskisson, 'it operated in the centre - one under Lt. Col.
Jardine - it operated in the west; and one under Lt. Col.
Heath, operating in the Rawer pargana. The three pronged
attack was further supported by a detachment under Lt. Col.
Smith from Sir John Malcolm's troops in Malwa. This detachment
was to press the Bhils from the north. The relentless pressure of these detachments reduced the Bhil chiefs to submission, and one by one, they submitted to the British authority, as has been seen earlier. The British losses, though few, were not insignificant. Yet most of them were victims of the climate, rather than of the Bhil attacks. The detachment operating in Rawer suffered particularly. Its commandant, Lt. Col. Heath died because of bad climate, his second in command Maj. McBean felt seriously ill, and the detachment came under the command of Capt. Bently.220

' During a short campaign of three months, of five officers, one died and three left India on sick certificate; and of three hundred regulars employed, one hundred and twenty marched back to Malligaum.' 221 This was, as Graham tells us, due to Malaria, Cholera was another, and more dreaded foe. Some cases were reported in Col. Huskisson's camp by Briggs.222 Both Col. Jardine223 and Maj. McBean224 reported cases of Cholera among their troops. Briggs urged Elphinstone to send immediate medical help and informed him of the 'terrible state of army' in Khandesh reporting 84 deaths in a Battalion of 500 due to Cholera.225 Yet the military operations were successful and they did relieve Khandesh of a major distress.226

Satmalla Bhils.

While Briggs's attention was held by the Satpuda Bhils, his principal assistant, Lt. Hodges was busy elsewhere. In
keeping with the instructions issued to him by the Political
Agent in his letter of 14th May 1616, Lt. Hodges proceeded to adjust the just claims of the Bhils in Satmalla, Satkunda and Kaldarry areas. Of these Bhils, Briggs speaks in the following manner: '......... Their habits are like the rest in these Hills, and although everything has been done to induce them to relinquish their habits, little more, I fear, has been gained than a temporary relief from invasion in large bodies and confidence on their part of being dealt fairly with ....... '228 Lt. Hodges found that the perquisites claimed by the principal Bhil naiks in the Satmalla region were as follows:

1) Hoomal naik, Mohan naik, Saheboo naik, and Shankar naik in the Fargana of Chalisgaon.
   a: Bhetty (present) @ Rs. 1/- from each of the 16 inhabited villages.
   b: 1 maund of grain from each village @ Rs. 2/- per maund.
   c: 2 maunds of grain from Chalisgaon and Patoda
   d: Tobacco (Pan-tambakhhu) from each village
   e: 16 Seers of Goor (Jaggury) from each village that plants sugarcane.
   f: Sundry perquisites on festivals

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{16-0-0} \\
&\text{32-0-0} \\
&\text{4-0-0} \\
&\text{8-0-0} \\
&\text{12-0-0} \\
&\text{26-0-0} \\
\end{align*}
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In the Pargana of Mehunpura.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Bhetty, @ Re. 1/- from each of the 12 inhabited villages</td>
<td>12-0-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Tobacco from each village</td>
<td>7-0-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>4 maunds of grain @ Rs.2/- per maund</td>
<td>8-0-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>27-0-0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the Kasba of Kanjangaon

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</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Bhetty</td>
<td>1-0-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>4 maunds of grain @ Rs.2/- per maund</td>
<td>8-0-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>9-0-0</strong></td>
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</table>

In the Pargana of Bhul(?)

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<td>Ready money</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Bhetty @ Re.1/- from each of the 57 inhabited villages</td>
<td>57-0-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Clothes</td>
<td>25-0-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>Claims in the village of Sahura</td>
<td>50-0-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>Sundry perquisites on festivals</td>
<td>25-0-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>507-0-0</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

In the village of Chikhalthan, paragana

Kannad:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 maunds of grain @ Rs.2/- per maund</td>
<td>8-0-0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Grand Total** 648-0-0
All the above huks of the Satmalla Bhils were confined and accepted by the British government. Briggs agreed to pay the Bhils a lump sum of Rs. 648/- per annum. In return, the Bhils agreed to give up molestation of villages. They also agreed to return all the plain Bhils to the villages, and to become watchmen to protect the area. However, in late January, one of the Bhil chiefs from Satmala region, a Bhil named Cheel naik, went on rampage. It seems that Cheel naik had sufficient cause to do so. In a letter that he wrote to Lt. Hodges, he pointed out that of Rs. 648/- agreed to by the Sarkar, only Rs. 175/ had been paid so far. Besides these, Cheel naik laid claims to perquisites in Lalinga paragana as well. These claims were to the tune of Rs. 800/- per year. It is worth quoting the letter of Cheel naik to Lt. Hodges, as it exhibits the state of Bhil mind and his general condition. Cheel naik says -

'Is it right in you to desire us not to plunder and yet make no provision for us? First cause to be paid to us our just claims and then call us to account for any robberies committed by us. Do as you please, but to give us nothing to eat and leave us to feed on leaves and grass is an admirable plan - we are Sirdars. What occasion is there for us to write more - '  

He attacked the village of Dhamangaon. Hodges, acting as the Political Agent in the absence of Briggs, threatened him with the discontinuation of his pension. The above quoted letter from Cheel naik was the reply. Hodges claimed that Cheel naik had no claims on Lalinga. He requested Col. Huskisson to attack Cheel naik, whose hutty was near Ranjangaon.
Briggs, more annoyed by the tone of the letter, and frustrated by the depredations, directed Major Hall to march towards the range of hills and occupy posts along them from Ankai to the vicinity of Kannad, and attack Cheel naik, who had ' from 20 to 40 horse '. 'Your principal object will be to obtain the possession of the person of Cheel naiq ...'. Cheel naik was proscribed and 'whoever protects him or his followers' was to be attacked. A reward of Rs.500/- was to be given to anyone who apprehend him. Cheel naik surrendered himself to Maj. Hall. Maj. Hill considered his voluntary surrender as a 'mitigating' factor, and suggested that execution be stayed.

Briggs asked Maj. Hall to ascertain whether Cheel naik was present in the attack on Dhamangaon, and if he wrote the impudent letter. If Maj. Hall was satisfied on both the counts about Cheel naik's involvement he should be executed on the spot in front of the Bheels.' I have judged it advisable to direct the trial and execution of Cheel naiq by a military court and in the midst of his haunts in preference to his being brought here (to Dhule) as I am of opinion that a summary example has become absolutely necessary among the Satmalla Bheels.' Satisfied with the involvement of Cheel naik on both counts referred to by Capt. Briggs, Maj. Hall executed (though reluctantly as it seems from his letter) Cheel naik at 5 p.m. on 26th January 1819. Cheel naik incidentally, was the only major Bhil chief or that was executed by Captain Briggs.

In the Satkunda hutties, in the near vicinity of Satmala hutties, Satwaji naik and Suryaji naik in the parganas of
Kannad and Verool (Ellora) agreed to accept a consolidated sum of Rs. 343 p.a. in full payment of their yearly claims and agreed to perform their traditional duties of police, and abstain from plunder and robbery. 239

The Kaldary Bhils:

The area of the Kaldary Bhils differed from the area of the Bhils in Khandesh proper. The Gungthadi region in which they lived, was not so much devastated or deserted as the Khandesh region. In Gungthadi every Bhil had a home in the village to which he could return and therefore controlling them was not so much of a problem as controlling the Khandesh Bhils. 240

These Bhils submitted to the British government in November 1818. Lt. Hodges ascertained that Bayaji naik, Waghnaik in the paragana of Bargaon had a consolidated claim of Rs. 266/- p.a. Jandulla Takira and Garud naik in the paragana of Burner enjoyed claims to the tune of Rs. 244/- p.a. The Kaldary Bhils had proven claims on the pargana of Lohara (Rs. 72), Shendurni (Rs. 50), Erandole (Rs. 250/-), Mhaswad (Rs. 38/-) and Utran (Rs. 68/-). Altogether, the Kaldari Bhil claims totalled upto Rs. 948/- per year. The British government agreed to pay the Bhils a consolidated sum of Rs. 948/- per year in return of which the Kaldari Bhils agreed to refrain from plunder. 241 However, within a few days, the Bhils returned the money and declared that they would collect their rights themselves. This, of course, was prohibited. 242 Hodges, tried again, but with doubtful results. 243 They did not part
with their followers, and indulged in small scale robberies. Murder was not commonly committed, as it was in Khandesh. " Village jaglas in Gungthury appear to be the most mischievous, and it is seldom that a Bazar day passes without someone or other being robbed on his way to market. " This was petty larceny, not a very serious affair, and it was not difficult to reduce them. Gundoo (Khandu?) naik and Jandulla Takira wrote a letter to Briggs claiming that their dues were not being paid by the Jamindars. They had nothing to eat. " It is better to eat and die than die without food ..... " The same Jandulla claimed responsibility for cattle lifting, which was eaten up. If no provision was made for them, they would follow the same practice. In June, a large area of the reign was transferred to Ahmednagar collectorate. Along with the problem of Bhils was also, in large measure transferred. Yet Briggs maintained a mobile force to check their incursions in Khandesh at Nasirabad, Jamner, Bhadgaon, Chalisgaon and Mehoonbara. The Arrnuddy Bhils:

From Unkaye to the Eastward commences the range of the Arrnuddy Bhels. They were pretty powerful chiefs, who were not merely the watchmen of villages, but also the guardians of the region. ' In 1815 and 1817, Gen. Smith by kind treatment and promises, induced the Bhil chiefs of Arrnuddy to send their agents to him and this laid the foundations of that confidence to which we are indebted probably for the present
Following is a table that shows the claims and perquisites of the Arrnuddy Bhils which were confirmed by Briggs and in lieu of which Briggs promised to make a consolidated cash payment of Rs. 3000/- per year on the usual condition of the Bhils giving up their practice of plunder and returning to their villages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragana</th>
<th>Ready</th>
<th>Bhetty</th>
<th>Grain</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
<th>Festival</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>money</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patoda</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>97.80</td>
<td>1287.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baijapur</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>745.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khandala</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20.80</td>
<td>398.80</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2431.00</td>
</tr>
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</table>

These were the claims of Bapooji and Jiwaji naiks.

The claims of Rovenaik were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragana</th>
<th>Ready</th>
<th>Bhetty</th>
<th>Grain</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
<th>Festival</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cash</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debur</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>122.80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chikhal-wahal</td>
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<td>70</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17.80</td>
<td>367.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimbayat</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31.00</td>
<td>697.00</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1490.20</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sum to Arrnuddy Bhils</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3921.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: JB to ME, 27.10.1818, DCF 172, enclosure to L. No. 217)
These arrangements were followed by both the parties and Briggs had no major trouble with these chiefs.

The Bhils from Dang did make threatening gestures in July 1819, but their affairs were satisfactorily settled, through the agency of Laxmanrao, the Mamlatdar of Pimpalner. 253

The three years following 1819, there were robberies and plunders in plenty, and one can get the grim but monotonous picture in Deccan Commissioner Files from number 180 to 190. There were no large scale rebellions of Bhils. Essentially they were law and order problems. The policy of Briggs was determined in the fateful year 1819, and continued throughout his tenure as the Political Agent in Khandesh.

Briggs believed that the pacification of the Bhils was an integral part of the settlement of the District. He hoped that the Bhils would return to the villages, if not driven by fear into the hills. 'Our object certainly is to induce the Bheels to live in their villages as peaceable inhabitants. We want people too much to spare any either for the gallows or for the hills ... They are extremely useful to the cultivators if they could be deterred from highway robbery and murders, and I hope a few severe examples will effect this. Indeed I have little doubt of it myself ......' 254 'I find more than half the Bheels in the villages have Bows and arrows, these must be taken from them, but it should be done in a manner not to alarm them and not in hurry either ...' 255 The primary object, however, was to provide for the Bhils. He firmly
believed that once the Bhils were provided for on a regular basis, the domesticating of the Bhils would not be a serious problem. But the major question was how to provide for them.

'The greater portion of the villages is so poor that it cannot afford to maintain its own Bheels even, and many villages being deserted altogether, the Bheels of these villages and of the inhabited portion combines to carry on highway robberies.'

His experience with the Bhils had convinced him that 'the Bheels must be provided for .... the condition of the village Bheel .... is truly meagerable....' He was also convinced 'that nothing but a bare subsistence ... is necessary to induce most of the Bheels to relinquish their habits... I would do all I could to provide for them ...'

Since most of the villages were depopulated or very poor, Briggs proposed to levy a 'Bheel Putty' on all the inhabitants of Khandesh. Out of this income he proposed to pay Rs.2/ per month to every Bhil. The sum was obviously very low, 'which in Candeish will not support more than one person of the very lowest order with food...' Yet it was sufficient to induce the Bhils or so Briggs thought, to relinquish their predatory habits. A certain but low income would induce him to do some extra work which would have a reforming effect on his traditional habits. This was Briggs' logic.

There were 2321 villages and 1,10,182 houses in Khandesh. If an assessment of ½ area monthly was levied by way of Bhil tax on every house, he would get 1,38,034 rupees which independently of the Naiqs would
He proposed that a chief naik of Bhils should reside with the mahlatdar of the paragana, and the Bhils should be made a part of the establishment. These naiks should receive ½ rupee per village per month as their salary. The tax would not be very heavy and all the sections of the society would contribute to a useful social and administrative service. He was certain that the people would pay such a tax cheerfully. Elphinstone, however, rejected the project. The Commissioner believed that any imposition, however slight, would have the effect of desertion of villages in Khandesh. Nor did he approve of the idea of creating a permanent caste of Bhils in the administration. Instead he proposed that the Bhils be paid by the villages, and the amount so paid be deducted from their revenue assessment. This was approved by the supreme government.

The idea of creating a sort of Bhil militia was tried by Briggs. In October 1818, he proposed to the Commissioner the establishment of 'a past of Sibundeis and Bheels together, or perhaps Bheels only.' In the case of Goomani naik, he did actually practice it. But a purely Bhil Corps of the Tadvi Bhils, that he raised at a monthly cost of Rs.700/- had to be disbanded since the Bhils 'were constantly in a state of intoxication, never capable of any exertion themselves...' After his departure from Khandesh, the experiment of the Bhil Corps was tried under Col. Robertson. In the first few years it did not show much promise. It was in the second half of
the thirties that it started showing positive results. It was not only the result of the humanitarianism of the administration as Graham has ventured to suggest. The Bhil problem could have been solved only in two phases: submission and reclamation. It fell to the lot of Briggs to force them to submit. He did that with great deal of sympathy. Civilizing them was a long process which Briggs could aim at, but never achieve.
Notes to Chapter III

2. Briggs to Elp., 1.3.1818, DCF 170
4. Ibid, letter No.14147
5. SPD Vol.41, letter No.44
6. Briggs to Elp. 24.10.1818, DCF 172
8. Briggs to Elp. 20.4.1818, DCF 170
9. Yad given by Briggs to Goomani Naik Bhil, 5.3.1818, DCF 170. Also, Gadhni, Ramal No.545 I.C. 7921.
14. Briggs to Elp. 24.10.1818, DCF 172
18. Historical Sketch, p. 204
19. Enthoven, op. cit. p. 154, 'The plain Bhils are scarcely to be distinguished from local Kunbis'.
20. Elphinstone, Report, p. 2
23. Briggs to Elp. 24-10-1818, DCF 172.
24. Historical Sketch, p. 204.
25. Ibid.
28. Ibid
30. Enthoven, op. cit. p. 156.
31. Ibid
33. Briggs to Elp. 24.10.1818, DCF 172
34. Elphinstone, Report, p. 4
35. Ibid
36. Historical Sketch, p. 202
37. Ibid
38. Briggs to Elp. 24.10.1818, DCF 172
39. Historical Sketch, p. 204
40. Ibid
42. Briggs to Elp. 24.10.1818, DCF 172.
43. Historical Sketch, p. 204.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid, p. 207
47. Briggs to Elp. 19.3.1818, DCF 170.
49. Briggs to Elp. 24.10.1818, DCF 172.
52. East India Papers, Vol.4, p. 701 ff.
53. Elphinstone, Report, pp. 46-47
54. Briggs to Elp. 8.1.1819, DCF 174
55. Briggs to Elp. 19.11.1818, DCF 173, Salami watan in this context meant a watan in lieu of protection provided. The total value of Salami Watan for ten years prior to 1818 was Rs. 10622.8.9.
56. Elphinstone, Report, p. 4
58. Ibid
59.
61. Ibid
62. Ibid.
64. Briggs, Autobiographical Notes, cited in Bell, op.cit. p.76.
66. Capt. Ovans, the first Southern Bhil Agent, quoted by Simcox, op.cit. p.9.
68. Capt. Ovans, cited by Simcox, op.cit. p.9, also Briggs to Elp. 27.10.1818, DCF 172.
71. Briggs to Elp. 8.10.1818, DCF 172.
72. Briggs to Elp. 23.11.1818, DCF 173.
73. SPL Vol.41, letter No.124
75. Briggs to Elp. 1.9.1818, DCF 172
76. Briggs to Elp. 7.10.1818, DCF 172
77. Briggs to Elp., 8.10.1818, DCF 172
78. Deposition of Gakeera Bhil, enclosure to letter No.281, DCF 173.
81. Khandesh Jamav, particularly Rumal No.5, and Inam Commission, Ghadani, Rumal No.545.
82. Col. McDowell to Briggs, 12.8.1818, DCF 172, enclosure to letter No.162.
83. Briggs to Elp. 24.10.1818, DCF 172.
86. Briggs quoted to Simcox, op.cit. p.8
88. Ibid
89. Naik, op.cit. passim
90. Enthoven, op.cit. passim
91. Historical Sketch, p.207
92. Elphinstone to Robertson (circular), 17.4.1818, DCF 402.
93. Briggs to Col. McDowell, 12.8.1818, DCF 173
94. Briggs to Lt. Hodges, 14.5.1818, DCF 171.
95. Ibid
97. Ibid
98. Briggs to Lt. Hodges, 14.5.1818, DCF 171
100. Briggs to Elp. 19.11.1818, DCF 173
102. Briggs to Elp. 27.10.1819, DCF 178
103. All the information above cited regarding the various Bhil chiefs is drawn from the correspondence of Briggs with the Deccan Commissioner, the military officers serving in the area, and his principal civil Assistants. His reports of October and November, 1818, and January 1819, are of great value in this respect.
104. Briggs to Elp. 20.4.1818, DCF 170.

105. Briggs to Capt. Bently, 6.3.1819, DCF 175.

106. Briggs to Elp. 13.5.1818, DCF 170


108. Yad given by Briggs to Coomani Naik, DCF 170.


111. Briggs to Elp. 7.10.1818, DCF 172


113. Briggs to Elp. 2.1.1819, DCF 174

114. See above.

115. Briggs to Elp. 16.1.1819, DCF 174

116. Briggs to Capt. Leighton, C.O. Sindwa Garrison, 3.10.1818, DCF 172. It is the same agreement of 5th March; Briggs is speaking generally.

117. Neher Singh Raut was hereditary zamindar of Thalner Pargana. As Raut he had responsibility of protecting the area in which he lived. Though during and after the war of 1818, with the Peshwa the British did not pay much attention to the claims of the ruined Rauts, Briggs wished to use their services and local influence. Neher Singh Raut was an enterprising man recommended by Briggs to Elphinstone for heading a police force in Thalner. Briggs to Elphinstone, 24.10.1818, DCF 174.
119. Thalner fell on 28th March 1818, and Goomani entered into an agreement on 5th March 1818. See DCF 170.
121. Briggs to Elp. 24.10.1818, DCF 172.
122. Briggs to Elp. 25.10.1818, DCF 172.
125. Ibid.
126. Briggs to Elp., 27.10.1818, DCF 172
127. Briggs to Elp. 16.11.1818, DCF 173
128. Briggs to Elp. 19.11.1818, DCF 173
129. Briggs to Elp. 16.11.1818, DCF 173
130. Briggs to Elp. 19.11.1818, DCF 173
131. Briggs to Suryajirao, enclosure to Briggs to Elp., 16.11.1818, DCF 173
133. Enclosure to Briggs to Elp., 10.10.1818, DCF 172.
136. Kaye to Briggs, 24-10-1818, DCF 172
138. Briggs to Kania Bhil, n.a. DCF 173, enclosure to letter No.289.
146. Ibid.
150.
154. Lt. Col. Heath to Lt. Hodges, acting Political Agent in the absence of Briggs to Poona, 1.2.1819, DCF 175.
155. Briggs to Elp., 2.3.1819, DCF 175.
156. Bentley to Briggs n.d. DCF 175.
157. Col. Huskisson to Briggs, 6.3.1819, DCF 175.
158. Briggs to Sir John Malcolm, 10.3.1819.
159. Lt. Col. Smith to Malcolm, 16.3.1819, DCF 175.
160. Briggs to Elp. 9.6.1819, DCF 176.
161. Ibid.
163. Ibid.

168. Ibid


170. Jardine to Huskisson, 6.3.1819, DGF 175.

171. Briggs to Elp., 2.3.1819, DGF 175.

172. Briggs to Huskisson, 10.3.1819, DGF 175.

173. Briggs to Malcolm, 10.3.1819, DGF 175.

174. Jardine to Huskisson, 8.3.1819, DGF 175.

175. Supra.

176. Briggs to Elp.

177. Briggs to Elp., 29.3.1819, DGF 174.


179. Briggs to Elp., 29.3.1819, DGF 175.


182. Briggs to Elp., 5.5.1819, DGF 176.

183. Jardine to Huskisson, 6.5.1819, DGF 176.

184. Jardine to Huskisson, 8.5.1819, DGF 176.
193. Jardine to Huskisson, 8.5.1819, DCF 176.
196. Briggs to Elp. 7.5.1818, DCF 170
201. Briggs to Elp., 2.3.1819, DCF 175.
204. Briggs to Huskisson, 25.6.1819, DCF 176.
206. Briggs to Huskisson, 5.5.1819, DCF 176.
207. Ibid
208 Briggs to Elp., 15.5.1819, DCF 176.
210. Ibid
212. Jardine to Huskisson, 23.2.1819, DCF 175.
219. Briggs to Elp., 16.3.1819, DCF 175. See also the marginal notes made by Elphinstone on the letter.
220. Bently to Briggs, n.d. DCF 175.
221. Historical Sketch, op.cit. foot note, p.211
222. Briggs to Elp., 4.4.1819, DCF 175.
223. to Briggs, 2.11.1818, DCF 173.
224. to Briggs, 6.11.1818, DCF 173.
227. Letter No.113, enclosure, DCF 171.
233. Briggs to Maj. Hall, 4.2.1819, DCF 175.
234. Ibid
235. Maj. Hall to Briggs, 19.2.1819, DCF 175
236. Briggs to Hall, 21.2.1819, DCF 175.
237. Briggs to Elp., 21.2.1819, DCF 175.
238. Hall to Briggs, 26.2.1819, DCF 175.
245. Briggs to Pottinger, 31.5.1819, DCF 176.
246. Ibid
248. to Briggs, 5.9.1819, DCF 177.
249. Briggs to Elp., 11.10.1819, DCF 177.
250. Ibid
251. Briggs to Elp. 27.10.1818, DCF 172.
252. Ibid
255. Ibid
260. Ibid
263. Ibid
266. Ibid Supra.
268. Historical Sketch, op.cit. and Simcox op.cit.