CHAPTER II

Political Settlement of Khandesh.

At the time of Peshwa Bajirao's attack on the Sangam Residency in Poona on November 5, 1817, John Briggs was not at Poona. He had joined Elphinstone as latter's third Assistant early in 1816. The other two Assistants were Francis Whiteworth Russell, the third son of the Chief Justice at Calcutta, Sir Henry Russell, and Henry Pottinger, 'afterwards well known as Sir Henry'. Briggs's chief job lay in translating the numerous intelligence reports received from the various native courts. He was given this job because of his 'acquaintance with the languages'. Long before Briggs came to Poona, he had acquired proficiency in Hindustani and Persian. During the period 1812 and 1813, Briggs had remained at Jalna, with the Hyderabad Expeditionary Force as Persian interpreter to the army. His Commandant employed him, it seems, even as an intelligence officer. He was also in the field-carriage department and seems to have worked as a supply-officer also. In the latter capacity he was brought in communication very frequently with that singular race divided into many clans, of itinerant dealers in grain and salt, the Prinjaries, Banjara or Wanjari in Marathi. He also, probably, acquired the necessary skill in eliciting real news from these people. It was this skill and acquaintance, that must have induced Elphinstone to employ Briggs as an intelligence officer, euphemistically
called the translator. Briggs, in his autobiographical notes, gives the details of the intelligence service organised by Elphinstone, not only at Poona but also at the various courts of India. Through their own postal service and observers, the English got all the information about every messenger that came to Poona or went out of Poona. It is quite probable that Elphinstone took his young assistants into his confidence and discussed matters of State with them. Briggs seems to have been more in his confidence, or at least once there is a reference to Elphinstone and Briggs being engaged in a serious political policy conversation with Dr. Jeffreys. Briggs had been at Poona for little over just a year, he had no previous acquaintance with Elphinstone, but in this short period he seems to have impressed Elphinstone with his skill who described him as a 'very clever, active and intelligent fellow and will certainly get on in diplomatic line ....' The useful training that he was receiving was soon to be continued in different surroundings under the watchful eye of his friend and patron, Sir John Malcolm.

Throughout the year, 1818, the atmosphere both at Poona and at Calcutta, was fraught with suspicion. The British government of Lord Hastings was planning a great campaign against the Pendharis, the free-booters, who had shown audacity to make inroads in the British held territories.
Since the Pendharis were spread all over Central India, the British were urging their allies, particularly the Marathas, to join this hunt of the Pendharis. Sir John Malcolm was appointed as the Governor-General's special political Agent with the army that was to suppress the Pendharis. His duties were primarily diplomatic, but he was also expected, when the actual war broke out, to perform military duties. As the Governor-General's agent he was to "serve as a link between the Governor General and the Residents at the courts of the allied princes. Moreover, he was expected to perform both political and military duties". The most important duty of the Political Agent was to visit the various courts in the Deccan and to ascertain their views about the forthcoming campaign. Sir John was assigned to the Army of the Deccan under Sir Thomas Hislop, and he was to advise and assist Sir Thomas in the execution of the war. "As Governor General's agent, all political work connected with our operations is in my hands." Undoubtedly Sir John's position was an exalted one, and also extremely delicate. To assist him in his task, Sir John selected his two principal aids from among a large number of likely candidates. Those two were Captains Josiah Steward and Captain Briggs. Briggs was invited by Sir John Malcolm to join as one of his political assistants, an appointment fully approved and encouraged by Elphinstone himself.
offer was made, probably at Poona, when Sir John visited that place as Governor General’s agent to persuade Baji Rao to join the English in their hunt of the Pendharis. Malcolm had reached Poona on 5th August 1817. The offer was gratefully accepted by Briggs. Malcolm left Poona on 12th August for Hyderabad. Evidently Briggs could not accompany him at this short notice, especially since his family was staying with him at Poona. ‘It was out of question that my wife and family should accompany me at this time of the year’. Briggs joined Malcolm in mid-September on Nerbudda ...... shortly after the united 1st and 3rd Divisions had received their orders to cross the river. There is some miscalculation here on the part of Briggs. The united 1st and 3rd Divisions were not ordered till 10th November 1817 to cross the river, Sir Thomas Hislop having taken the command on the 10th instant. It was on the 15th that Sir John crossed the river in pursuit of the Pendharis. On the other hand, Kaye says on the basis of the documents from Sir John Malcolm’s personal records, that Briggs was present at the advance camp of Sir John when the latter moved out of Hyderabad early in September. It is probable that Briggs met Malcolm on the Godavary than on the Narmada, on latter’s way to Nagpur.

The purpose of Malcolm’s march northwards was to join the Army of the Deccan formed for the ostensible purpose of
Pendhari War. But everyone believed that the war must evoke some response from the Marathas. It was with the intention of getting the Maratha cooperation that Malcolm's embassy was principally charged. But Malcolm's diplomatic mission with the Marathas was a failure.\textsuperscript{18} Though the Marathas did not deny the English claims on them for help during the forthcoming Pendhari operations, their attitude had been equivocal.

By mid-October of 1817, the situation in Malawa had become extremely delicate. If it was not properly handled, it was capable of being very explosive to the great discomfort of the British forces advancing upon the Pendharis. The court of Gwalior was intensely unhappy about the treaty of Gwalior and was looking forward to some opportunity to either modify or completely disavow it. Information was received by the English that the forces of Shinde were in contact with various other chiefs of Malwa and Central India, as well as with the Sikhs in Punjab and the Gurkhas in Nepal.\textsuperscript{19} In the wake of the general operations, the Pendharis of Central Indian peninsula were dispersing in all the directions, but mostly to the North, where it was believed that the Gwalior Court was willing to help them. The help in this instance would mean only one thing - taking field along with them against the British.\textsuperscript{20} Amir Khan, one of the most important and powerful chief maintained an equivocal attitude and it was suspected by the British that he entertained a positive predilection to join the Marathas. It was not till the news
of the Peshwa's disaster at Khadki that Ameer Khan threw in his lot with the British and ratified, on November 15, 1817, his treaty with them, by which he ceased all hostile intentions against the British and became the Nawab of Tonk.21

The position at the Holkar's court at Indore was far more dangerous. The powerful chief of Indore, Yeshwantrao Holkar had died on October 27, 1811, leaving behind him his widow Tulsabai and a minor son, Malharrao. He also left behind an army that was too powerful and restive to allow for a carefully planned diplomacy. Tulsabai, the Regent, was faced with an unruly army whose pay was in arrears. She was anxious to avoid any rupture with the army which she could not trust. In the years following the death of Yeshwantrao, she had managed to rule in the name of her son, by playing one group against the other. She also had become dependent upon Ameer Khan, one time trusted lieutenant of Yeshwantrao. In their anxiety to localize the war, the British had successfully detached Amir Khan from the Holkar court, and made him the Nawab of Tonk. Sir John Malcolm believed that the interests of Shinde, Holkar and Ameer Khan were so blended with the Pendharis that the British Government should move cautiously, must refrain from offensive operation and should be prepared to encounter them all. 22

He also suggested to the G.G. that the British Government
should make some moderate and reasonable demands on these princes. The Governor-General, on the opening of the hostilities with the Peshwa and more particularly after the battle of Khadki, was trying to negotiate with the Holkar court through the Resident at Delhi, Sir Charles Metcalf. But the ministers at Indore remained passive. When the news of the rupture between the British and the Peshwa reached Indore, there was a general rejoicing and declaration of loyalty and solidarity with the Peshwa. Tulsibai and her ministers wanted peace with the English, if not an alliance. They expected that this would strengthen their position at the court. But other faction, more militant, led by military commanders like Roshun Beg, Ramdin, Gaffar Khan and others, wanted to throw in their lot with the Peshwa. While Metcalf was secretly negotiating with Tulsibai, Malcolm also was in contact with Indore. The arrival of the British Deccan Army near Ujjain created a sense of panic at the court. Tulsibai sent a vakil to Malcolm with overtures for a treaty. Malcolm suggested that the establishment of a Resident at the Holkar’s court and the cession of Galna in Khandesh to the British as a depot were the prerequisites of a treaty. In the meanwhile, the agents of the Peshwa were fairly active at the Indore court. Shripatrao, an agent from Poona had already prepared the pro-Peshwa attitude within the Holkar Army. In November, 1817, Bajirao sent two agents, namely Ganeshpant Pitke and Vithoji Kolte, to ask for specific help.
from the Halkar. 25 Technically the Indore court was bound to render all the help to their liege lord would claim. As usual, the Indore court, in a bid to escape the horns of a dilemma, pleaded its inability to pay its soldiers for a prolonged campaign. Bajirao immediately dispatched a sum of two lakh rupees as a part payment for the troops. 26 Though the court faction at Indore overtly agreed to Bajirao's summons, they continued their parleys with the British. But the militant faction forced the hands of the Regent and her group. The agents of the Peshwa had agreed to pay to the troops another sum of Rs. six lakhs. 27 The English records seem to suggest that it was the promise of money to be paid by the Peshwa that prompted the Holkar troops to take a hard line against the British. But if we realize that the attitude of the army was always militant and further that long before Peshwa two agents arrived at Indore, there existed a strong war party, that the Holkar troops fought as mercenaries, holds little validity. The war party forced the Holkar court to prepare for southward march, with the ultimate objective of joining the Peshwa, now moving northwards. On November 24, 1817, the court moved towards the Narmada. It was accompanied by cavalry. The troops had enthusiastically welcomed the news of the war between the Peshwa and the British. 28

Malcolm, who was in pursuit of Chitu, the Pendhari chief, had crossed the Narmada on November 15, 1817. Chitu had
flown towards the Holkar camp, thereby causing a great alarm among the British. Yet the attitude of the British government was to keep friendly relations with the Holkar court. On December 12, Malcolm joined Sir Thomas Hislop at Ujjain. The hopes of a peaceful settlement with the Indore Court were dashed to the ground, when on December 20, Tulsibai, the regent, along with her ministers, was beheaded by the military chiefs. All power now passed into the hands of the Pathan chiefs, who broke off the negotiations. Hislop immediately moved towards the Holkar army, and commanded Sir John Malcolm to join a battle with the enemy troops. Thus was joined the battle of Mahitpur on December 21, 1817, which was to have far reaching consequences on the fortunes of the Third Anglo-Maratha war, and also of Captain John Briggs then in the entourage of Sir John.

The Battle of Mahitpur was an undisputed victory for the British arms. "The battle was won by the valour of the sepoy, and not by the tactics of the Commander." 29 In his report to the Commander-in-Chief, Sir John mentioned that Captain Briggs was "entitled to my best thanks." 30

The war between the Holkars and the British was concluded by the Treaty of Mandasore, January 6, 1818. By this treaty the Holkar gave up his claim on all the territory of the Satpuda range, besides agreeing to several other conditions. Khandesh, the area south of Satpuda, was
detached from the Holkar territories and handed over to the British. Malcolm moved into Malwa and thence in pursuit of Bajirao, on orders from the Governor General. He took his senior assistant in the Political Department, Capt. Josiah Stewart, with him, and left Capt John Briggs with the Commander-in-Chief, as Governor General's Agent. Briggs was deputed by Sir John Malcolm to take charge of the territory ceded to the British Government by Malhar Rao Holkar ...... and to make arrangements for its provisional administration, the nomination has since been subsequently approved by ...... the Governor General'. He was first placed under the orders of Sir Thomas Hislop, but later on was transferred under the civil authority of Mountstuart Elphinstone, now holding the office of the sole Commissioner for the settlement of the territory conquered from the Peshwas.

The area that was placed under the control of Briggs was fairly large one. It consisted of the present districts of Dhulia and Jalgaon and the three talukas of Malegaon, Nandgaon and Baglana of the Nasik district. In 1822, Briggs estimated the area at 13,187 sq. miles with a population of 4,18,021. The density of population was 31.25 per sq. mile. Elphinstone believed that it was too big a charge for any one officer to look after and requested Briggs to hand over the parganas south of the Chandor hills to the Collector of Ahmednagar. Briggs agreed
though rather reluctantly. At that time one Rungo Pundit, a person of his confidence, was deputed by Briggs with a body of 300 sibundees, to occupy the territory south of the Chandor hills up to the Godavari river. Rungo Pundit was asked to put himself in communication with Pottinger. Elphinstone was requested to ask Pottinger to relieve Rungo Pundit as early as possible, since Briggs required the sibundees for restoring order elsewhere. The parganas south of Chandor occupied by Briggs were: Ellora, Ambad, Korabala, Dipoor, Sivoor Dhandulgaon, Patoda including the fort of Ankai, Kumbhari including Kopergaon, Nasik, Wani, Dindori, Sinner and Manik Manj. Of these, the first five parganas had belonged to the Holkars, while the rest belonged to the Peshwa.

Lying between 20°3' and 22°7' north latitude and 75°42' and 76°28' east longitude, Khandesh formed "the most northern district" of the territories under the control of the sole Commissioner of Deccan. Along the whole northern frontier the district was bounded by the Satpura ranges, in the north-eastern corner, the hill country, which belonged to the Holkars, formed its N E boundary. West and north-west, the Narmada remained the boundary of the district, while in the east and south-east, a row of pillars and some convenient streams separated it from the Central Provinces and the Berar. Its southern boundary was
marked by the Ajanta or the Chandor hill range. The region was full of wild jungle that abounded in wild life. Though there is no heavy rainfall, the district had plentiful of water supply. A number of small rivers come from the hilly region of the Satpuda. The major rivers are the Tapi, Girna, Bori, Fanjara, Borai and the Narmada. The rivers, however, were hardly used as means of transportation and in the absence of good roads, Khandesh remained, by and large, cut away from the main current of Maratha political life. Its hills compounded the problem of control and even under the Peshwas, the wild hill tribes reigned almost unopposed. During the rains, which set in sometime in the middle of June and continue through the middle of October, the rivers are normally in spate and even in 1822, the railway bridge over the Tapi, was the only bridge in Khandesh. The rivers, then, were normally unfordable, and when forded, were generally crossed on cots floted on empty gourds. Even within the district, life was dislocated and isolated. Large floods were not uncommon. In 1822, sixty five villages in the Tapi basin were entirely washed away while fifty were partly destroyed. The loss of property was estimated at about Rs.2,50,000. To such natural calamities were added the wild animals and the epidemics. The chief wild animal found in Khandesh was the tiger. In 1822, tigers killed five hundred human beings and twenty thousand heads of cattle. In May, June and July of 1822, sixty tigers were killed by the army and
others. Under such conditions villages were deserted and life in some parts of the district was paralysed. The unsanitary conditions and the extremes of climates bred epidemics. Cholera morbus was a common and frequent visitation. From 1817 to 1820, every year Cholera attacked Khandesh. In 1817 and 1818, the epidemic struck both the army and the civilians. Briggs reported the death of 84 men out of a detachment of 500 in a few days. In 1819, Dhulia suffered from Cholera. It soon spread to other towns and populous towns were deserted and there were fears that the outbreak would cause a serious loss of revenue. During the year ending July 1819, 11,521 deaths from Cholera were reported. In March 1820, there was an virulent outbreak of the epidemic in Ranjangaon claiming eighty-seven lives in just one week.

To the above natural handicaps, were added, in Khandesh, man made miseries. Once a populous and flourishing country, Khandesh in 1818, at the advent of the British was in total ruins. Elphinstone in his famous Report on the territories conquered from the Peshwa, traces the ruinous condition of Khandesh to the invasion by Yashwantrao Holkar in 1802, and the subsequent disorder that prevailed in the area. He attributes the miseries of the land also to the Pendharis and the Arabs and other lawless bands. In all there were 4032 villages in Khandesh. Of these, 540 were alienated
to various chiefs, including the Holkars. The British had 3492 villages under their direct control. Out of these 3492, 413 were uninhabited but partly tilled, 1146 were totally deserted, 97 villages were totally lost, even their sites were not remembered. Only 1836 villages were inhabited. Some parts of the province are still in a high state of cultivation, and others, more recently abandoned, convey a high notion of their former richness and prosperity.

The treaty of Mandsor had ceded to the British, Holkar-shahi territory in Khandesh, which, though considerable, did not embrace the whole of Khandesh. By the treaty, the Holkar government ceded to the company the parganas of Thalner, Sultanpur, Nandurbar, Raver, Adavad, Nyahlod, Utran, Galana, Chandwad, Ambad, Shevgaon, Korbale, Depoor, Verul, Sidurghodalgaoon, mauze Adgaon, Wadsire, Kasaba Narasol, Kandapur, Kashti Chandanpuri, and Jamugaon, Antur, Dug and Gangrad. Of these Thalner, Sultanpur, Nandurbar, Raver, Adavad, Nyahlod, Utran and Galana belonged to Khandesh while the rest belonged to Swaraj, that is the Maratha country. Bajirao had a total of 19 forts and garrison outposts in Khandesh. Of these, eleven were managed directly by the Peshwa while eight were left in the charge of his sardars. Bajirao's forts were Mulher, Salher, Bhamer, Mora, Aurangabad, Hargad, Nhava alias Ratangad, Pisola, Kanera,
Deher (Dher), and Kukurmudhe. Daulatrao Shinde was in charge of the four forts of Ashar, Burhanpur, Bhugagad and Kalibhint, (कलिभंत). These, however, did not form part of Khandesh proper. Holkars held the three forts of Galana, Laling and Shendave. The garrison at Halegaon, with the fort, was under the charge of Rangrao Narayanrao Rajebahadur, and in 1818 of his successor, Gopalrao. In the province of Gangathadi included in Khandesh in 1818, the Peshwa had in all thirty five forts, of which six were held by his sardars. Hatgad was held by the Dhamdheres, Chandwad by Holkars, Songir, Ankai Thankai and Rajdher by the Vinchurkars. It will, therefore, be seen that, though the Holkars had ceded their parts of Khandesh to the British, in January 1818, large tracts of Khandesh and the area in its immediate vicinity was still under Bajirao. After the battle of Ashtti on February 19, 1618, the Peshwa moved towards the Berar, in juxtapost of Khandesh. After the battle of Shivni, fought on April 17, with scanty followers, Bajirao moved towards Khandesh. The danger, therefore, was far more real than imaginary. To meet any such contingency, Elphinstone had proposed that Gen. Smith should follow Bajirao, Gen. Doveton should effect the conquest of Khandesh and that Sir Thomas Hislop should form a light force that would pursue Bajirao, should be more northward. Ram Deen, the principal military officer of the Holkar, after the
battle of Mehidpur, left Malwa and joined Bajirao at Nasik. The Dengale was a powerful force in Khandesh. Their pro-Peshwa feelings were no secrets. A party of 400 infantry and 100 horse under Godajee Dengale attacked Betawad and took position in the fort of Torkheda, about 25 miles west of Thalner. On 27th and 28th of February Bajirao moved towards Kopargaon. Sir Thomas Hislop planned to intercept him with the help of Gen. Doveton and Gen. Smith, 'if he (i.e. the Peshwa) tries to enter Khandesh'. Surrounded by so imminent a danger, Briggs reported to the Commissioner his preference for the occupation of the provinces ceded by the Holkar and the commencement of operations in the area under Bajirao.

In spite of the treaty of Mandsor, the occupation of the territory ceded by Holkar was not proving very easy, as was proved by the fort at Thalner. The pargana and the fort of Thalner were ceded by the Holkar to the British by the treaty of Mandsor and letters were sent to the Holkar-shahi officials ordering them that their charges be handed over to the British officers with the requisite authority. Copies of these letters of surrender were handed over to Briggs. But 'no person, however, on the part of Holkar had accompanied Briggs from Malwa, nor anyone ... deputed to meet' him in Khandesh, and Briggs felt that he was unlikely to meet with considerable difficulty in taking possession '. This feeling was based upon the experience at Thalner.
Rising abruptly from the waters of the Tapti river, where it is now crossed by the Bombay-Agra road, before that road passes the Sendhwa Ghat, was the fort of Thalner.... It was surrounded on the other three sides by a hollow way, varying in width from a hundred to hundred and fifty yards. The outer walls had a height of sixty feet above the hollow. The interior had the same elevation. The main entrance to the fort was on the eastern side, through five successive gates, communicating by intricate traverse. A winding ramp, with steps in some places, ascended through the gate to the rampart. The ground round the hollow way was intersected by ravines, round which clustered the houses forming the town of Thalner, about 350 yards from the fort.

After the treaty of Mandasor, the presence of the Army of the Deccan under Sir Thomas Hislop, was no longer considered necessary in Malwa, and accordingly, it was ordered southward, leaving a considerable force for the occupation and pacification under the command of Sir John Malcolm. Sir Thomas with the headquarters and the First Division of the Deccan Army, began his march southward, and after descending the Simrol Pass, proceeded by way of the Sendhwa Ghat towards the valley of the Tapi. John Briggs was with the Head quarters of the Deccan Army, accompanying Sir Thomas as his political assistant.
On February 27, 1818, the First Division approached Thalner, having descended the Sendhwa Ghat earlier. The territory belonged to the Holkar government, for which 'sod-shitti' i.e. release order was given to Briggs, and orders for surrender issued to Ramdas Agarwale, the Holkarshahi officer of this paragana by the Indore government. The British forces, therefore presumed that they were marching through friendly country. The baggage of the force preceded the army, when suddenly, it was fixed upon by matchlocks from the walls of the fort, thereby obliging it to fall back upon the main army. This surprised and shocked Sir Thomas Hislop, and probably led to his violent reaction later against the killedar, Tulsiram Mama. A messenger with a summons was sent to the killedar asking him to surrender the fort as per the wishes of his master, Malharrao Holkar. The summons was not answered by the killedar. Sir Thomas thereupon resolved to attack the fort, and accordingly, the British guns opened fire on the north-west angle from the cover of the town. The gunfire produced no effective impression upon the garrison in the fort. The fort garrison comprised mostly of the Arabs. The outer gates of the fort were not in very good condition, and perceiving it, it was decided to bombard them. It had its effect, and the garrison sent out emissaries to demand the terms of capitulations. On being told that nothing but
unconditional surrender would be acceptable, the garrison continued to hold out. Late in the evening, British storming party, under the cover of artillery fire, entered the main gates, and passing through the remaining three gates, came to the fifth, where the killedar opened the wicket gate and discussed the terms of surrender. Suddenly the garrison opened fire on the British, and many officers of the storming party were killed. The British then opened heavy fire and the courtyard beyond the fifth gate was cleared of the enemy and captured. The main body of attackers joined the storming party, and in the ensuing battle, almost the entire garrison was put to sword. The killedar, Tulsiram Mama was summarily tried and hanged from a tree the same evening. The hanging of Tulsiram Killedar was expected to be exemplary and Briggs hoped that this 'will prevent the necessity of our again having recourse to similar measures in the rest of the districts ceded by Holkar'. The same evening, i. e. on 27th February, Briggs issued a Proclamation to the public and warned the servants of the Holkar government now in Khandesh, that they should hand over their charges to the British authority lest they should suffer a fate similar to that of Tulsiram Mama, who 'placed himself and the garrison in the condition of rebels and subjected himself and his troops to the punishment of death'. Briggs reassured the people that the British government did not want to molest the 'servants of its ally, Mulhar Rao Holkar.'
The threat was held out only in case of non-compliance with the wishes of the Holkar and British governments. Both the fate of the Killedar of Thalner and Briggs's proclamation seem to have had the desirable effect. On March 7, 1818, Briggs was able to inform Secretary Adams that Betawad, which was attacked and occupied by Gadajee Bengale's forces, chiefly Arabs, was evacuated by them and handed over to the British. Amalner, yet another important place, was also surrendered by Arabs to the English. Holkar's commandant at Chandvad (i.e. Chandor) gave up the fort without a struggle. At Galna, the commandant and the garrison evacuated the fort even before the arrival of the British forces. The fort then was occupied by the British with Native Infantry. Yet the country was far from settled. Briggs, however, was confident that it could be brought under order. To do so, he suggested that 'a force of three to four battalions with an efficient Engineer department and a park of siege artillery would be necessary.' Such a force was to be used against the rebels holding out against the British government. Briggs did not recommend it as a measure for the final and permanent settlement of the country. He was convinced that 'the permanent settlement of Candeish will be a long and tedious operation to effect by regular troops and one that will incur considerable expense on the one hand, and a great delay in realising the revenue or restoring order on the other.' Yet he was
extremely happy to inform the Commissioner on 10th March 1818, 'that His Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop intends to place the whole of the Garrisons in Candeish under the orders of Gen. Col. MacDowell....' The Commissioner, who had already suggested such a move to Sir Thomas, agreed totally and informed the Governor General that Col. McDowell was left with part of General Loveton's force to settle Khandesh. 'I have left it to Captain Briggs to employ the Detachment in that manner or confine its operations to settling the country between the range of Chandore and the Godavary, according to his idea of the force required for the former purpose. I have earnestly requested him not to lose a moment in beginning on the line he determines in the manner most likely to have immediate effect.' Along with the regular army, Captain Briggs wanted to create a local militia holding village lands. They would not be called upon to work outside the district 'nor indeed beyond their village' and would help the Amildars in their task of revenue collection and the protection of their villages. The measure, though temporary, was immediately executed.

Two major reasons can be counted for the phenomenal unrest in Khandesh. The defeat of the Holkars and the subsequent peace by the British with them, and secondly, the presence of Bajirao and his forces in the vicinity of the province. As a result of the defeat of the army of Indor
at Mahitpur, a number of recalcitrant military chiefs then in the service of Holkar went off to join Bajirao. From Malwa to the south, they had to march through Khandesh which after the treaty of Mandsor, in their opinion, was enemy territory. A large number of Arabs, either in the services of Pundhari chiefs, or employed as mercenaries by the legitimate rulers, finding themselves unemployed, had raised the standard of rebellion. Presence of the Peshwa in the immediate vicinity of Khandesh added to this turmoil. As Elphinstone reported to the Governor General on March 20, 1818, in spite of the Peshwa's misfortune, it was 'remarkable that no chief of multim has left the Peshwa since his defeat by General Smith.' Some, like Dengle and Vinchurkar, were chiefs with considerable power and prestige in Khandesh and adjoining regions. The native local and social leadership was still with these chiefs, and contrary to what Briggs calls a matter of 'force of custom and habit,' the regard and respect that the people had for the Peshwa and the chiefs, seems to have been genuine.

'Bara Bhace and Ram Deen's (people) are many of them, inhabitants of Candeish, and some of the villages are full of them. They live quietly as long as troops are near, but flourish away by plundering the moment they (troops) are called away.' To control this situation, Briggs instructed his Mamlatdars to find out from the Patil how many riding
horses were there in each village. He had 'reason to believe' particularly after the surrender of the Feshwa that 'Candeish .... swarms with disbanded and discomfited soldiers ....' This was typical not of Khandesh alone but of the larger part of the Maratha country. Accounts from all parts of the country speak of crowds of horsemen who are dispersing to their villages, worn out with hunger and fatigue'. This, both Elphinstone and Briggs realized was not necessarily a sign of the return of tranquility. As Elphinstone informed the Governor General, '......we shall be obliged for a long time to be on guard against more extended disturbances .... arising from the number of unemployed persons of the military profession, from the unsettled disposition produced by war and by the discontents naturally excited by the introduction of a foreign Government'. In this particular respect, 'the State of Candeish' was 'in some measure favourable to the Paishwa'. If the Paishwa should go to Hindoostan, any assistance he meets there, would no doubt revive the activity of his partisans in the Deccan. His vicinity would have the same effect if he could still keep the field or remain in any of the strong countries under the Sautpoora mountains ....'. With this contingency in mind, General Doveton was asked to march north-east of Khandesh, and Gen. Smith was asked to move northwards. In Malwa, Gen. Malcolm was stationed with his army. On all sides, Bajirao
was hemmed in, and finding resistance hopeless, the Peshwa surrendered to Sir John Malcolm on June 3, 1818. Prior to that the Vimchurkar, one of the powerful lords in Khandesh, had submitted to Malcolm on May 31, 1818. '...... The Vinchoorkar, who was to attend Bajee Rao at tomorrow's (i.e. June', 1818) meeting, should, if that prince declined the terms offered, separate himself from his camp and join me; and this was agreed to without any stipulation whatever on my part ......' 82

In the meanwhile, Briggs was given the option of commencing immediately the settlement of Khandesh or of reduction of the country on each side of the Godavary. 83 Captain Briggs wisely preferred the latter......84 Rango Pant a native agent of Briggs, with a body of 300 Hindustani Horse Sibundee, occupied all the country south of the Chandore range upto the Godavary.85 The smallness of force at the disposal of the Political Agent was considered a serious constraint even by the Commissioner. Lt. Col. MacDowell was left with a force of 1100 rank and file. 86 In early April, the fort of Ankai fell into the British hands. However, Lt. Col. MacDowell could not spare any part of his already small detachment to form a garrison of the fort. Briggs felt that the fort must be garrisoned. '...... its situation and character demanded in any mind a necessity for its being held for the present by English troops. ' He therefore called on the officer Commanding at Chandore to spare a part of his small garrison under his other European officer to take
The two weak companies, about 350 to 400 men, originally sent to Chandore, thus now were distributed in the forts of Chandore, Lasalgaon and Ankai. It was this paucity of forces at the disposal of the Political Agent, that compelled Sir Thomas Hislop to place the whole of the Garrisons in Khandesh under the command of Lt. Col. MacDowell. This, hoped Briggs, would enable Col. MacDowell to form a Detachment of four or five companies. This Detachment 'with 500 Hindoostany Horse under Cornet Kaye' should march through Thalner, Songir and Galna towards Chandore or Malegaon as an exhibition of British armed strength. This, hoped Briggs, would give confidence to the inhabitants. This in turn 'will admit of our mamlatdars taking advantage of that feeling already so prevalent among the landholders of placing themselves at once under our protection ......' Even with the whole Detachment under MacDowell, a forcible military settlement of the country was totally out of question. The Commissioner admitted this fact. Under these circumstances, Briggs felt that the British 'must proportion (their) exertions so as to place much to the score of public opinion.'

The Campaigns of Col. MacDowell:

After the fall of Ankai-Tankai, the detachment under Lt. Col. MacDowell marched to Chandor and encamped there on the 10th March. The British commandant hoped that the stern example of Thalner, and the unopposed occupation of Ankai
and Chandor, would induce the commandant of the fort at Rajder to capitulate without resistance. In this supposition, Lt. Col. MacDowell was proved wrong. On the 11th the Detachment moved against Rajder, which was considered impregnable. The place is formed by nature, being merely a high precipitous mountain. The fort has abundant natural water, and in March 1818, it was well stocked with one year's provision. The British commandant sent out a summons, which was contumaciously rejected. It was, therefore, decided to cow the garrison into submission. From the more advanced hills, the garrison opened fire upon the British. The British gained the possession of these forward posts by the evening of the 11th. On the morning of the 12th the British detachment bombarded the fort heavily with shells, and the fort garrison was confined to the fort walls. Realising that further resistance was useless, the garrison asked for the terms of capitulations, which, incidentally, included a demand for the payment of the arrears of salary. The British guaranteed nothing more than their private property and freedom to go anywhere they felt like going. The garrison party then withdrew to the fort for consultation, when, suddenly the magazines of the fort blew up, and a huge and uncontrollable fire broke out. Under the cover of night, the larger number of garrison escaped. The British occupied the fort next morning. The fall of Rajder signalled the fall of Indrai, just a few miles away. Informing the Commissioner of the fall of
these forts, Briggs proposed that these forts be destroyed, 'there being no men to spare to form the garrisons' and further since they were of 'no value from local position.' However, the forts were not destroyed, since there was a considerable quantity of grain stored in them. In the meanwhile, 'in the valley of Khandesh, ... through means of civil officers, and the employment of some irregular troops, every advantage was taken of the terror inspired by the rapidity of the military operations, to reduce the subjection those places where less coercive means were sufficient.' Songir pass was occupied by Briggs's troops, i.e., Sibandis. Briggs considered this particular move as very important since that 'cut off the communication of the freebooters with each other from East or West Candeish....' Meer Fazal Ali, his another trusted Indian agent, was ordered to continue operations against the Peshwa's districts in Khandesh. Briggs hoped that with the arrival of reinforcement from Sindwa in the form of Kaye's horse, the operations would pick up momentum.

**Siege and fall of TRIMBAK:**

Col. MacDowell's detachment, after halting at Rajder till the 15th April, moved on to Nasik. It encamped there on 19th. A few miles to the west of Nasik is the fort of Trimbak. This was, then, in the hands of Bajirao's men. Briggs took upon himself the responsibility of attacking this fort, inspite of the fact that it did not fall within his
management, because 'it appeared inadvisable to leave Trimbuc in the hands of enemy' and both he and Lt. Col. MacDowell 'concurred in opinion that the loss of time in Candeish at present was not of such importance as to counterbalance the chance of our late acquisitions being recovered by the enemy in the event of all the troops being suddenly withdrawn .......' Elphinstone not only approved this move, but also congratulated Briggs on his strategy. 'Your preferring the reduction of Gungterry to the settlement of the province immediately placed under your management was well judged and showed an enlarged view of the public interests .......' 

With a view to besieging the ford of Trimbak, Lt. Col. MacDowell sent forward the engineers to reconnoitre the area. The main body took up its position in front of the fort. In the evening a party of 50 Europeans and 50 Natives, with two six-pounders occupied a position opposite the gateway on the south side, and during the night all the heavy guns and mortars were placed in battery to bear on the gate in the North-west side. On the morning of 24th these guns opened fire. Under the cover of the guns British troops moved up the ascent half way to the fort, and during the night constructed a battery. Under the close range fire of the heavy guns, the fort surrendered on the morning of 25th. The British took 25 guns. Inside the fort, Briggs found prisoners, among them, Malharrao Appa, the nephew of Sadashiv Pant Bhau, and Aba Kundle, 'the late Killedar of
Sholapur, imprisoned by Bajirao. Briggs released them and provided them with means for journey to Poona. After the fall of Trimbak, seventeen other forts capitulated without offering resistance. On the whole, Captain Briggs was happy about the success of arms in the areas under his command. Briggs proposed to send the detachment back to Khandesh, and leave a force of 300 sebandis under Rungo Pant north of Godavary. This Rungo Pant was a trusted confidant of Briggs. Though neither Blacker nor Benton, even mention his name, Briggs had a great appreciation of his work. For the conquest of the whole of Khandesh, from Chandor Hills to the Pera river, within twenty days, Briggs gives credit to Rungo Pant. Briggs had called him from Poona, after the battle of Mahitpur. Briggs asked him to reduce the area between the Chandor ranges and Godavary, a job he did extremely well. He occupied the forts of Ramsej, Deher, Bahula the districts of Nasik, Vani, Dindori, Sinnar. If Briggs had great praise for Rango Pant, Blacker has the audacity of ignoring him, when many of the seventeen forts that fell after the fall of Trimbak were conquered by the Pant. Again Blacker is wrong in claiming that the forts of Ramsej, Bahula, and Kumbhari fell after the fall of Trimbak. In his letter to Pottinger dated 9th April, 1818, that is 15 days prior to the fall of Trimbak, Briggs includes Kumbhari in the list of forts occupied by Rungo Pant. The four more forts from Blacker’s list of seventeen forts, namely, Kawnai, Hatgad, Gadgada and
Tringalwadi were captured by Rungo Pant. 107

Sardesai claims that this Rungo Pant, who was also known as Rungo Bapuji, was the same Rungo Bapuji who sent to England to defend the plead for Raja Pratap Singh of Satara. 108 Rungo Bapuji's biographer, K. S. Thakare also seems to have accepted this identity. 109 Sardesai has not produced any evidence to establish the identity except the similarity of names. It, however, seems that this identity is mistaken. Rungo Pant who served under Briggs was recommended by the latter for the award of jahagir worth Rs.2000/- per annum, in recognition of the meritorious services performed. In his letter of recommendation Briggs refers to him as 'a respectable Brahmin of Poona', 110 whereas Rungo Bapuji the Vakeel of Raja of Satara was a Prabhu, surnamed Gupte. Briggs's Rungo Pant, before taking up services under the British, had been in the service of one Trimbakrao Yeshwant, mamlatdar of Kasar Lavan (?). Afterwards he was employed in the daftar of Ramchandra Naik Wansola, the Nizam's mamlatdar at Faithan. 111 He was a native of 'Chinchoor' (Chinchwad ?) near Poona, and therefore, 'would prefer a village in that vicinity whose Tankah does not exceed 2000 Rupees' 112 From the Collector's correspondence it appears that Rungo Pant serving the British was an entirely different person from Rungo Bapuji Gupte. 113 Before leaving Trimbak, Briggs made arrangements for the safety of the whole area. In the light of the increased disorder just to the
north of Nasik, he decided to leave besides Rungo Pant, a small detachment of Sibandi under Lt. James Briggs, his younger brother. The appointment was approved by the Commissioner on 5th May, 1818. The designation of this new officer, in charge of General Superintendence of Police in Gangathadi. Lt. Briggs was to visit all forts and provide them with provision for a month. He was authorized to keep a force up to 4 battalions of Sibundees consisting of 400 men each. He was to garrison all the forts in the region between the Chandor range and the Godavary north bank, i.e. the whole of Gangathady. The considerable force that would be left with him after garrisoning the forts was to be used for the purpose of maintaining good order in the region. Besides the sibundee, 300 Hindustani horse belonging to Captain Rind's Kassala were left with Lt. Briggs. He was to observe strict discipline and was to submit to civil jurisdiction all cases of crimes that did not affect the tranquility of the country. Rungo Pant was appointed to the civil duties of the whole of the country subject to Capt. Briggs's jurisdiction. Lt. Briggs was to support Rungo Pant.

Even as the country belonging to the Peshwa was being subjugated by the British arms, the region of Khandesh was far from tranquil. In fact in early May, that was the only district still in turmoil. Poona, Ahmednagar and Satara were perfectly tranquil. The single unsettling factor in Khandesh
was the presence of Arab mercenaries. The greater part of Khandesh in fact, was ruled over by the Arabs, who have a predominating influence over the councils and actions of the leading men of the District ....... and though the people of Khandesh were, by and large, 'decidedly' well disposed towards the British authority, only the 'foreign mercenaries' were holding out against. They were 'the ready instruments of rebellion against their legitimate government and of oppression and usurpation (in) the neighbouring districts.' In the same report, Briggs speaks of the individual valour of the Brabs, their lack of discipline, their high pays, their insistence upon keeping their arms, and laments the British system of allowing them to do so. They 'have no interest in the soil or the country.' Most of the Arabs were employed by the Peshwa and many of the local chiefs as mercenaries. After the failure of the Maratha arms was demonstrated by the battles of Mehitpur, Ashti and other places, it was but natural that these mercenaries should become restive for their pay, - the principal aim for which they had come to India. Many of them had joined the Pindaris. In the settled conditions of political life, they were rapacious, when the conditions become bad, their greed and rapacity knew no bounds. The Arabs were carefully fostered by the local chiefs.

Numerous 'bands of marauders, chiefly Arabs' were collecting in Khandesh, ravaging the country. Their aim
was it seems, to follow the pattern of the Bheels, that
is of retiring into mountain fastness of northern parts
of the district. They were so recalcitrant that in
many cases they did not allow the Killedars, under whose
command they were supposed to be, to accept overtures from
the British.

**Songir:**

After an agreement between the Peshwa's agent at Songir
and an amil of Capt. Briggs, Lt. Rule commanding at Galna,
moved a small body of troops and took possession of the
town and fort of Songir, on 13th April. Lt. Rule drove
out a body of Arabs who tried to oppose him. In the fort
were eleven guns and in the town five more, with many misce­
llaneous small arms and plenty of ammunition which Lt. Rule
moved to the fort. Lt. Rule left a small garrison consisting
of 1 havaldar, 10 regulars and 20 Sibandees. On the 17th
the petah of Songir was attacked by a body of two thousand Arabs,
who carried the petah by assault. The Sibandees who were
guarding the petah, were all killed. An attack on the fort
with the help of scaling ladders, however, was beaten back
by the Mamlatdar and his sepoys. The Arabs ran away after
plundering the town. Reinforcement was promptly sent.
The gallant effort of the native officers, considered ' meri­
torious ' by Blominstone and for which he urged Briggs to
give the officers liberal prizes money being of ' secondary
importance', however, this did not end the misfortunes
of Songir. The Arabs were still in the vicinity of the place in strong number, and Briggs was apprehensive about their designs. 128 It was this apprehension which prompted Briggs to order Major Ives to march to Galna and hem in the Arabs in the neighbourhood who now amounted to ' 1500 to 2000 infantry besides cavalry ' 129 Capt. Rind's detachment was to work with him. Briggs recommended that Cornet Kaye's Horse accompanied by a battalion of Capt. Hare's Brigade should come through the Sindwa pass by the route of Barhanpur. This would intimidate the enemy. So strong was the pressure of the Arabs, that Briggs was afraid that without the active help of Kaye's forces and further reinforcement, it would be impossible to occupy eastern Khandesh. There was every possibility of losing even those areas now in possession of the British. 130 Elphinstone agreed and approved Briggs's plan and promised to send all the help that he could get. 131 Major Ives moved on to Betawad and drove the Arabs from there. 132 From there he attacked Songir to relieve the garrison, but was repelled by the Arabs. Though Elphinstone was happy about the conquest of Betawad 133, Briggs reprimanded Ives for his failure at Songir, and requested him not to undertake such exploits unless he was reasonably sure of success. 134 The Arabs, in the meanwhile evacuated Torakhede on 2nd May, and on 9th May 1818, Major Ives reported the rumour that they are moving towards Taloda. The Arabs in Candesh and other armed followers are increasing very fast, but their last
recourse is, I believe Talodah, where their families have retreated.... If they are allowed to remain until after the monsoon, they will be very troublesome to the inhabitants'.

Briggs believed, and rightly so, that Songir was strategically very important. He told Major Ives that it was more important even than the Sindhwa, since Songir 'connects our line of communication from Talneir to Galna and ensures an unbroken link of posts from Sindhwa to Trimbuck'. An object of such importance was not to be overlooked at a moment ' when everything must depend on our ready and constant communication with each other ' . He recommended that Major Ives should endeavour to increase the garrison at Songir raising it upto 400 infantry and about 4 to 5 hundred cavalry, with two field pieces.

After the affair at Songir, Briggs was convinced that the problem of the Arabs could not be solved on any ad hoc basis. ' The more I hear of the condition of Candeish, the more I am convinced that by the removal of the foreign soldiers alone the settlement and easy occupation of the country will immediately follow'. He was sensible of the limited means at the disposal of the British, but he was sure that a great deal could be achieved ' by assuming a confident tone and by allowing the impression of our character to work the rest.' From his various intelligence sources, he had gathered the impression that the Arabs were ' much alarmed at the idea of having to cope with the British troops ' and
that 'the whole population of Candeish was * ready to join ( the British ) in their destruction'. 139 The Arabs had established themselves in large number in the area surrounding Torkheda. They were apparently in the possession of most of Bajirao's districts in Khandesh. Their aim seemed to plunder the nearby towns. ' The inhabitants look to the British for protection ', but Briggs lamented his inability at the moment to provide any ' due to the scarcity of means. 140 To control, and eventually to eradicate the menace of Arabs, Briggs evolved a double action plea. The Arabs were to be hemmed in on all sides using Major Ives detachment and the Russell Brigade, operating in an inner circle. On the outer fring of the circle, he proposed the establishment of 'frontier posts on the bank of the Godavary and the Chandor range at places like Trimbuc, Ramseij, Lasalgaum, and Yevala. ' This could be extended, if necessary, to Jalana, Aurangabad, Lasoor and even Bijapur. ' This will not only protect Gungaturry but will also limit the theater of operation for Baji Rao'. 141 He instructed Major Jardine, the officer Commanding Detachment Bombay Army, that he should occupy Nandurbar and then march on to the fort of Kukurmundha. Major Jardine's eventual objective was to be the two Arab infested areas, namely Kopril and Taloda. He was not to risk 'the slightest chance of failing. ' 142 Thus, in the course of time Jardine was to join Major Ives and Russell's Brigade in tightening the noose round the Arabs.
At the same time, the second part of the plan was to be operative. The Arabs were to be offered amnesty on condition that they would leave India and go back to Arabia. They were to be allowed to carry their private property and the expense of their transportation was to be borne by the British government. The alternative to the acceptance of their offer was to be the risk of being considered free-booters and face the consequences. With an active pursuit of the hemming in operation, the offer of amnesty was not likely to be considered as weakness. A proclamation to this effect was to be made as early as possible.144 The idea was enthusiastically approved by Elphinstone who wrote 'I entirely approve of your intended proclamation, and beg it may be published without delay'.145 Briggs informed Lt. Col. MacDowell that 'Altho' the Arabs for the most part may be classed with that description of free-booters who ravage the country and are entitled to no quarter as long as they are not the servants of any avowed government, yet the peculiar circumstances of their case have induced the British Government to offer them the alternative of being sent back with their property to their own country'.146

The Arab depredations, in the meanwhile continued unabated. They demanded money from the people of Dussara and Bhamer. They had to be chased by a body of 50 Sibandis.147 Next day they plundered a village near Bhamer.148 To compound
the issues, Bajirao, Ramdin and Dengale were reported to be moving towards Sultanpur. Lt. Hodges, operating in the earlier regions reported an encounter with 300 Arabs and some Hindustani soldiers in that area. At the advent of Hodges' troops they fled away and Hodges was able to communicate the occupation of the whole of the paragana of Nasirabad, and the occupation of all the villages and gadhis like Kurgaon, Jalgaon etc. In the meanwhile Maj. Ives and Capt. Rind had been successful in expelling the Arabs from Sindkheda, Torkheda and Betawad. Capt. Munns, on 15th May 1818, attacked Bhirdai, which had been raided by the Arabs, and defeated the marauders. Arabs were seen marching towards the Satpuda hills, where the armies of Peshwa were reported encamped. It was believed that the Arabs were going to join the Peshwa. Some Arab bands were moving in the direction of Amalner.

With all these movements and depredations of the Arabs however, one thing was becoming clear, and that was, that the field of their activities was being narrowed. From his agents and amildars, Briggs learned that 'excepting Bijawul and Amalnure and Maligoun there are no Arabs to the Eastward of our line of posts through Soungheir and that they are confined to a very narrow space'. He, therefore, decided to advance direct towards the chief resort of the Arabs and reduce them at once. He recommended to Lt. Col. MacDowell that they should march without delay on Malegaon, where Gopal Row
Raj Bahadur, the officer in charge would be well disposed to help them * against the Arabs. On 16th May, Briggs and the army arrived before Malegaon. Realising that Malegaon will have to be besieged, he ordered one regiment of Russel brigade to proceed to Malegaon via Parola, and called Hodges from east Khandesh. ' This object ( i.e. Malegaon ) is now of more importance than ever, the garrison appears resolved to stand out, and the very small number of troops to carry on the siege renders the presence of your Detachment here of the utmost consequence'. He was to 'lost no time' in arriving at Malegaon. Briggs also called the irregular Horse under Lt. James Briggs from Gangathady.

MALEGAON: Siege and Surrender :

The fort of Malegaon is quadrangular in form, situated in a bend of the river Mosam, which cover one face and half of the two adjoining. On the other side the town, approaching the river at its extremities, almost encompasses the remainder of the fort. The fort consisted of two lines of works, the interior work, built of stone masonry, was surrounded by a faussebraye seven feet high and a ditch 25 feet deep and 16 feet wide. The outer line, flanked by towers, was built of mud and stone, and approached within a few yards of the town on one side and of the river on the other. The inner fort was 60 feet high with a rampart 16 feet side, approached only through narrow covered staircases. Within were number of bomb-proofs.
The fort of Malegaon was in the possession of the Raje Bahadur family, descending from the famous Naro Shankar Raje Bahadur. The Arab settlement in Malegaon dates back to the days of Naro Shankar. He had invited several hundred Arabs to come and settle in the area, and had given them lands. The descendants of these Arabs who settled at Malegaon were called the Mawallid (Indian born). A few of them continued the profession of arms, but many entered into trade or the money lending business. In Malegaon there were about 200 Mawallid families who lived in the town of Malegaon outside the fort. In May 1818, the fort was in the possession of the Arabs, mostly born in Arabia, i.e. foreigners. Gopal Rao Raje Bahadur, the de jure master of the fort had hardly any authority over them. In fact, he was virtually a prisoner in the hands of Arabs.

Gopal Rao’s troubles began when one Martand Page came to Malegaon and tried to instigate the Arabs to go on a looting expedition. Gopalrao promptly arrested Martand and put him in irons in the fort. Since then the Arabs had been pressing Gopalrao to release him, a thing Gopalrao persistantly refused to do. In the first place Gopalrao was forced to maintain the Arabs to secure his own position against the Governor appointed by Bapu Gokhale. He had agreed to pay Rs.10,000/- and to keep 100 Arabs in his service. However, when time came for payment, Gopalrao had no money to pay. On the 15th May Gopal Rao came to see Col. MacDowell and Briggs.
He maintained that the Arabs demanded the release of Martand Page and a sum of Rs. 4500/- They agreed to leave the place. Evidently Gopalrao was reluctant to attack his own town. Briggs agreed to pay the sum to the Arabs, provided they consented to return to their own country. On advancing on the city of Malegaon on 16th, Briggs and MacDowell found the fort fully garrisoned and in preparedness for war. Briggs sent his head Brahmin to the fort with a message that two English companies be allowed to be lodged in the fort. The head Brahmin, however, reported that Gopalrao, who had returned the previous day, was more or less a state prisoner in the hands of the rebels. Thereupon, Briggs and MacDowell sent in the proclamation approved by Elphinstone to the Arabs, asking them to quit. The proclamation guaranteed to the Arabs their life and property if they agreed to lay down their arms and consented to be transported to Arabia at British cost. In reply to this, the Arabs demanded elaborate security and guarantee agreement. They also did not agree to be transported back to Arabia. On receiving their reply, both the Commander of the British Detachment and the Political Agent decided not to parley any further and the army moved to siege. On the night of 18th, the Arabs made a desperate sally in which the chief engineer of the siege, Lt. Davis was killed and Maj. Andrews severely wounded. The garrison received a reinforce ment of 50 Arabs, and it was rumoured that many Arabs were
moving eastward to break through the siege and reinforce
the garrison. Realizing that the garrison was fully
determined to hold the fort, Briggs became skeptical about
the success of the siege before the monsoon set in. He
despaired of getting any battering train from the neighbour-
hood in the immediate future. MacDowell requested for
ammunition, and recorded his determination ‘to remain before
it (i.e. the fort) until it is taken or surrenders...’

On 22nd the British troops launched an attack on Malegaon, but
were beaten back. Briggs reported the continuation of
the siege and heavy losses of the British. A breach was
carried through the inner wall of the fort, and on the 27th
a storming party was sent in. The garrison from the fort
repulsed the party and Lt. Nattes of the Engineers was
killed. By 31st May, ‘about 5,800 rounds of 18 and 12
pounders shot have been expended before this place, ’ and an
equal amount would be necessary if the fort wall was to be
breached elsewhere. The resistance of the garrison was
unexpected. It is graphically described in one sentence in
contemporary Marathi documents; ’Malegaon is still fight-
ing.’

By 4th June, after moving the camp earlier on
the 1st, the town was occupied, and steady fire opened on the
eastern side.

The long siege and the determination of the British
as well as their seemingly inexhaustible power, started having
its effects on the garrison. Worst still, the Proclamation
itself was having its effect on the Arabs outside Malegaon, thereby diminishing the possibility of outside help. Jamadar Ahmed with 25 of his men from Parola accepted the conditions of the Proclamation on 2nd June 1818, while 3 Jamadars and 200 Arabs followers from Nandurbar followed the suit on 7th June. Passports were issued to them for Surat for their eventual transportation to Arabia.

By 2nd June, the garrison had lost the town, and on 4th reinforcement from Ahmednagar under Major Watson had strengthened the besiegers. On 5th June, the British fire exploded two magazines in the fort, and a large breach was made in the eastern wall. From this position, the British guns kept up a continuous fire. Finally on the 13th June the garrison asked for terms.

The battle of Malegaon was perhaps the longest single battle of the Third Anglo-Maratha war. The siege had begun on 17th May 1818 and lasted for almost a whole month. About 450 Arabs opposed 2,600 British troops with 36 guns, mortars and howitzers. The British fired about 8,000 projectiles and used 35,500 pounds (16117 Kgs) of gunpowder. The Arabs lost 35 killed and 60 wounded, while the British casualties were 233 killed and wounded.

Captain Briggs was perhaps the most unhappy man over the terms of capitulations. The garrison of Malegaon were in the situation that we shall find many others in Candeish, who depending on their strong fortresses, are determined to
hold out till the last, for terms. The only terms he was prepared to grant were compelling them to work on roads or to endure rigid confinement for an indefinite period to spare their lives. As the terms of surrender were against the proclamation, Briggs refused to take charge of the prisoners. He gave MacDowell credit for being moved by the bravery of the enemy, but felt that it was a misplaced gallantry since the Arabs at Malegaon were not the soldiers of an organised government, but a licentious band of free-booters. It is rather difficult to understand Briggs's anger and annoyance. Probably he felt slighted for not being consulted by MacDowell, probably his pent up antipathy towards the Lt. Col. found the better of him. In any case, his tirade was misplaced. Strictly speaking, he was right, since the only terms that could have been thought of were those of the Proclamation. And those terms when offered were rejected by the Arabs, thereby forfeiting their lives. But the whole idea behind the Proclamation, which was his own creation, was to avoid useless bloodshed. And that was what precisely the Colonel had brought about. The most interesting part of the whole situation was that, MacDowell had granted them no additional terms besides those mentioned in the Proclamation. He had achieved the goal for which he was fighting. Briggs's contention that an example should have been made out of the garrison is drastically contradictory to the spirit of the Proclamation. He refused to take charge of the prisoners. Lt. Col. MacDowell, reiterating his
point, requested Briggs to cooperate by taking charge of the Arabs and enable him 'to keep my convention with these men, who have had nothing to eat since yesterday morning.' The only convention that he had with the Arabs was that their lives would be spared. The Arabs were lodged in a street in the centre of the Peta of Malegaon guarded by two Native officer's parties. Elphinstone, with a cooler temper and a wider view, accepted the terms offered to the Arabs by Col. MacDowell. Briggs agreed to settle the accounts of the Arabs in consultation with Gopalrao Raja Bahaddur and the Arab Jamadar. Briggs paid a total sum of Rs.26,456.8.0 as the arrears of their pay till the first day of the seige. All Arabs were moved from Malegaon to Songir for an eventual transfer to Surat. Similar terms were offered to the Arabs at Taloda, Kopreil. At Kopreil Rs. 5177/- were paid. The Mawallids were allowed to stay in India. While some of the foreigners, like Salmeen Bin Omar Jamadar and his 39 followers, were allowed to settle in India since 'many have families here', on executing a bond that they would give up the profession of arms and become husbandmen. 'The whole of the country is ..... already in our hands.....' The Arabs were ' withdrawing fast ' and Briggs was watching them closely.' They were now all on the other side of the Tapi, and Briggs was ' going to Songir to watch their quiet retreat and prevent their re-entry to add to their sports by more depredations,' since they had no reason to complain,
' loaded with wealth' as they were. Giving a vivid picture of the devastation caused by the Arabs, Briggs adds, 'They have been the scourge of Gandesb and nothing, but a circular (?) demonstration will probably give you an idea of the extent of waste it exhibits. From having a country yielding in the proportion of 32 to 27 (Berar?) in the olden times, you pass from one village to another through perfect jungle of several years' growth'. By the beginning of the month of December, however, the scourage was removed, the Arabs were deported to the coast for eventual deportation to their own country and Khandesh was limping back to normalcy. However, the journey of Arabs to the coast was not free of moments of tension. Some of the Arabs did manage to escape while being transported to Surat. John Elphinstone, the Chief of Surat, informed Briggs that of the 22 Arabs that were sent to him only 7 had arrived, while 5 ran away at Songir and 10 at Nandurbar. The party was 'not kept under any restraint for the sake of appearing just and kind.' Briggs believed that the policy of the British government was not of putting under restraint those Arabs who had 'voluntarily given up depredations,' but only such as are taken prisoners'. The purpose of this seemingly philanthropic attitude, however, was not kindness, but the uninviting possibility of having to 'run the risk of compelling us to attack them'. 15 Arabs and one Jamadar escaped and on July 12, Briggs informed the
Commissioner of the escape of further 24 Arabs and one Jamadar. Briggs instructed Capt. Munn to keep a strict guard on the Arabs and asked him not to allow them freedom of movement. To Lt. Panget, who commanded the escort to 180 Arabs on their way to Surat, Briggs's instructions were 'to confine those Arabs who might try to escape and who are unreliable.' All these measures had the desired effects, and though the transportees might have grumbled sometimes. On the whole the operations seems to have been performed quite smoothly. Some Arabs, under the leadership of their Jamadar Ali continued to resist the English from their stronghold at Amalner. Amalner was the headquarter of the junior branch of Raja Bahadur's family. It was headed by Madav Rao Raja Bahadur. Ally and his Arabs were originally in the service of Madhavrao. However, when Madhavrao wanted to surrender the place to the British, the Arabs refused to comply. Not only did they refuse to comply, but took Madhavrao almost as a prisoner. The Raja, however, managed to get away and join Briggs. Briggs wrote a strong letter to Ali Jamadar, declaring the Arabs at Amalner as rebels. But there was no response from them. The rains being over, Elphinstone urged Briggs to undertake active operations against the Arab rebels of Amalner. The Arabs had seized the whole of Zamindars and patils of the villages in the paragana of Amalner to extort money from them, and Briggs believed that 'it is probable they will retain them till the last in their hands in hopes
that we shall compromise matters with them for the sake of
the Zamindars.' The Arabs had levied an extra-contribution on the area to the tune of £.25,000. Briggs decided to try for the last time peaceful methods. He would send a party of 200 sibundis to Amalner and see if the Arabs allow them to take possession of the fort peacefully. If they resisted, as they actually did, he would hand over the matter to the army. Briggs told Ali Jamadar that the fort must be surrendered. The just claims of the Arabs about their pay and other things would be met with but any bond taken from the Rajah while a prisoner in Arab hands, would not be admitted. This was Briggs's ultimatum to the Arabs, there being no possibility of any further discussion on the subject. But the operations had to be postponed due to the terrible state of the British army, thanks to the epidemic of Cholera. The cholera morbus attacked Khandesh with a violence almost unprecedented. His civilian officers were also taken ill. The Punchayets have come to stand still. And there was hardly any medical help. Col. MacDowell's medical officer was himself down with fever. Briggs urged the Commissioner to send medical help. Major Jardine wrote to Briggs that his troops were hardly in a position to move, leave aside take field. There were 84 deaths in a battalion of 500 men. Major MacBean reported the detachment's ill health. However, a strong force under Huskinson marched out from Malegaon towards Amalner. This force
consisted of 1000 European and 800 Indian infantry and 250 horse. The Arab garrison refused to accept defeat, but when blocked on all sides, they surrendered unconditionally. The event took place on November 30th, 1618. With the fall of Amalner, the last resistance of the Arabs was broken down.

The Arabs alone, however, were not the 'scourge' of Khandesh. There were the Bheels and the discomfited soldiers who bothered the country. The discomfited soldiers belonged to two types, namely, the Maratha soldiers and the Hindustani cavalrymen in the services of Bajirao or his adherents. The protracted war and the gradual defeat of Peshwa induced many of his followers to give up his cause. As early as December 1817, Elphinstone reported to the Governor General that the harassment caused by the British forces to the armies of the Peshwa and Gokhale had disheartened the Marathas and 'the best proof' of this was 'afforded by the reduction of their forces.' Discouraged by the constant flight of the Peshwa and disturbed by the increasing hold of the British on their homeland the soldiers thought increasingly in terms of giving up the cause of the Peshwa and returning home. The support of the petty and big Sardars to the Peshwa was also lukewarm. Those who were with the Peshwa were seeking for some opportunity to leave him and return to their homes. Elphinstone was confident that the Peshwa 'must lose a great part of his army by desertion.' A news letter of April 24,
1818 reports 'that great bodies of Bajee Row's horse would be happy to leave him under the present circumstances ...' and that '...... a great number (of Peshwa's troops) talked of returning home.' General Smith, who pursued Bajirao relentlessly felt 'very confident that the bulk of the enemy's army is broken up ......' and reported that 'numerous small parties of the enemy's horse had returned home. One Umaji Shankar reported on May 3, 1818, that the army of Bajirao was broken up, and the soldiers were going home. Another person, Rango Vasudev reported to Elphinstone that a large body of the Peshwa's army is returning home cautiously. Accounts from all parts of the country speak of crowds of horsemen who are dispersing to their villages worn out with hunger and fatigue. The pathetic condition of the returning horsemen has been graphically depicted by Elphinstone to the Governor General. Nothing can exceed their fatigue and their sufferings...... The horses are so worn out that they can scarcely move, and the men are in rags and bear evident marks of famine on their countenances. So totally dispirited are they that there is no account of their attempting to plunder even for subsistence, but many of them are being dismounted and disarmed by the common villages. Both Elphinstone and Briggs had a great compassion for these Maratha soldiers. In fact, Briggs believed that there was nothing like a Maratha soldier, the Maratha warrior being a mere peasant in arms at the times of war.
'I think you will find throughout your rule that there is hardly such an animal as a Maratha who relies solely on his horse and sword for subsistence .... The Marathas always have recourse in his plough ....' Elphinstone seems to have endorsed this view. 'The want of employment and of plunder will drive back to their old profession all who were not originally soldiers ....' Yet Elphinstone like the good statesman that he was, refused to take risks. Many armed persons still retained propensity for rebellion, and such persons were a great source, if not of danger, at least of trouble. 'The principal object of attention will then be to crush all petty insurrections and assemblages of banditti.' In June 1818, Khandesh was 'the only part of the country that is still unsettled,' because besides the Arabs and the Bhils there were number of Hindostani soldiers and Gosawis and others who had taken up their abode in the jungle fastness of Khandesh. Elphinstone believed that it was necessary that the 'lawless habits they have acquired during a long period of tumult and disorder' be broken. Briggs was convinced that 'the first thing to be thought of' was 'the tranquillity of the country from the outrages of bands ....' Though the monsoon was just round the centre and the season 'just now unfavourable' for operations against the banditti Briggs decided to use this period 'for obtaining information of their (bandit's) haunts, their power and their intentions.' He instructed his officers to collect informations about such persons and make a detailed report about them.
He was going to 'take good care' that they would be 'closely watched ( and ) it shall be done in such a manner as not to let it be supposed for a moment ( that ) they are to be molested while quiet. ' 232 However, when an unruly body of 500 armed men threatened the peace round Farola, in spite of the unfavourable season, Briggs ordered Captain Hare and Meer Fazal to attack them. 233 Ram Deen, having collected about 1500 men, went on a rampage, plundering several villages near Trimbak. Briggs asked Major Watson, who was in the vicinity, to attack him. 234 Trimbak itself was attacked by a rebel force under the leadership of a Pretender who called himself Holkar, on June 21, 1818. The garrison in the fort under the command of one Lachman Singh fought very well and repulsed the attack. The rebels retreated when the army of the area came up with a reinforcement of some 70 or 80 sibundee to the assistance of the garrison. 235

One of the principal reasons for the periodic unrest in Khandesh was the presence of a strong pro-Peshwa faction in the person of Trimbakji Dengale. It must also be remembered that Vithal Narsing Vinchurkar, a Sardar of Peshwa, was one of the few Maratha grandees who continued to be loyal to the Peshwa almost to the bitter end. The Vinchurkars had their inams and watans in Khandesh. By the middle of June, 1818, however, the Vinchurkar resistance was over and Vithal Narsing Vinchurkar was reinstated in his lands. 236
Of the major adherents of the late Peshwa, only Trimbakji remained at large and unsubdued.

**ARREST OF TRIMBAKJI DENGALE:**

On June 28, 1816, Jayaji, the Patil of the village of Ahirgaon came to Malegaon with the information that Trimbakji Dengale was hiding in that village. Briggs immediately ordered Captain Swanston, who was at Malegaon, to take a body of 800 auxiliary horse with him and to surround the village and apprehend Trimbakji. Swanston surprised Trimbakji and arrested him. There was hardly any fight. Trimbakji was brought under heavy escort to Chandor. 

Briggs himself repaired to Chandor to supervise the security measures and safe transport of the prisoner to Poona. 

Trimbakji's private property consisting of gold mohars and rupees contained in several leather bags was seized by the troops. Briggs directed its immediate distribution among the troops since the reward for Trimbakji's capture was no longer valid. 

The gold ornaments of Trimbakji's wives, Radha Bai and Rakhma Bai, were retained by Capt. Swanston, who arrested them, to restore them back to them. 

Briggs was very happy about the arrest of Trimbakji and reported gleefully that 'we have gained our object ...' He recommended that the Patil of Ahirgaon be rewarded by granting him perpetuity the village of Ahirgaon whose annual revenue to the government was Rs.1500/-. 

Grimly Briggs visualized a public hanging of Trimbakji at Punderpoor on the spot where the Shastrey
was murdered.' This morbid vision was probably produced by Briggs's desire to make an example of Trimbakji. 'This (i.e. the public execution of Trimbakji) would probably produce the greatest possible effect that could be attained from the possession of Trimbakjee's person.' However, better counsels prevailed and it was decided that Trimbakji would not be hanged after all. On learning this Briggs was relieved and confessed his relief unashamedly. Trimbakji was transferred to Thana and thence to Chunar by special orders of the Governor-General. He was destined to die a prisoner, on October 16, 1829.

The arrest of Trimbakji removed a major source of irritation from Khandesh. Minor irritants continued for a long time to come, but they were more in the nature of law and order problems rather than the problems of settlement. As for the disbanded soldiers, Elphinstone believed that they 'will not stir again till after the rains', and he 'wished' that during that interval they should remain unemployed and suffer hardship. This will drive the foreigners to their homes and the villagers to their ploughs.' The 'villages in the Marhatta country and in Candeish swarm with horsemen... and many in Candeish at least found constant employment in the distraction of the country.' The Peshwa's infantry was much more numerous than his cavalry. It was hoped that most of them would return to the plough, and of those who remained unemployed, a large number could be easily absorbed
in the revenue department, or in the police as Shibandis. 247
In the context of the acute shortage of men during the heyday of the war, Briggs had to rely heavily on the Shibandi troops raised from the local population as well as disbanded troops of Holkar and the deserters from the Peshwa army. 248
In May, 1818, the Shibandi force in the area of Gangathadi was organized on more orderly lines. About 1600 persons were incorporated in this force which was divided into four battalions. 249 Giving it a more mature thought, Briggs decided to reorganize the whole Shibandi force on rational lines throughout Khandesh. On May 16, 1818, he submitted a plan to Elphinstone. The entire Shibandi force was to be divided into a number of Rissallas. The number of Rissallas was not fixed, since the changing situation did not warrant a fixed number. Each Rissalla was to consist of 480 men, and was to be commanded by a Rissaldar. 'He is the ordinary channel for raising men and superintending the interior management. The Rissalla was further divided into eight Biradaries, consisting of 60 men each. Each Biradary was further divided into four Duffadararies of fifteen men each. Each Biradarry was to be commanded by a Subedar or a Jamadar, the former office being 'more a distinction in point of pay than of duty.' Each Biradarry was to have one Karkun, who was to act as an accountant, and a civil officer who took 'command
of the forts*. The schedule of men and officers with their proposed salaries as given by Briggs is as follows:

**Pay schedule of one Rissalla of Shibandi.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Pay @ per month</th>
<th>Total amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rissaldar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>75/-</td>
<td>75/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subhedars</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30/-</td>
<td>120/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamadars</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15/-</td>
<td>60/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daffadars</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10/-</td>
<td>320/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sepoys</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>8/-</td>
<td>3840/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karkuns</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20/-</td>
<td>160/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhistis</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8/-</td>
<td>64/-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Expenditure on pay, net total - 4639/-

Every sepoy was to be armed with a matchlock besides a sword or any other weapon he chose. The officers were at liberty to use what weapon they chose. The European Commanding Officer could discharge a sepoy or a duffadar, but in case of a native officer being involved, the case was to be decided by the Political Agent.251

The policy of associating a large number of ex-servicemen in the Shibandi or in the revenue offices, was carried to a serious extent by Briggs. He was to receive a mild reproof from William Chaplin later on for his extended establishment.252
But then, in October 1819, Khandesh had the least number of unemployed infantrymen amongst all the Districts of the Deccan. 253

As for the cavalry men out of service due to disbandment of Holkar's, Peshwas and other chiefs armies, Elphinstone had decided to take an entirely different attitude. At the beginning of the war, the British were forced to raise additional troops, particularly horse, and as the entire Maratha country was at war with them, they raised these troops in other parts of India. It was not very easy to discharge them and accept the former troops of their enemies in the service. 254 Elphinstone had asked Col. Skinner in North India to raise cavalry for him and to send it south. But in May 1818, he confessed to Skinner that he was 'overwhelmed with the whole horse of the country whom I must either provide for or let them turn Pindarries and every additional man is a source of perplexity to me.' 255 In all, about 7000 cavalry was thus raised, of which only 500 are strictly of the description required. 256 The whole of the horse employed within the Peshwas's country during the war was approximately from 25 to 30 thousand. 'The greater portion of these may be allowed to find a provision for them; but a part must be taken into pay directly or indirectly by Government.' 257 They could be absorbed in the Auxiliary Horse, but for the present they must be kept unemployed. Elphinstone proposed that the number of the Auxiliary Horse be reduced gradually by weeding out those who
had bad horses, or who were bad men and by reducing the pay. He hoped that the foreigners, i. e. those who did not belong to Maharashtra would go away, thereby creating vacancies which could be filled in by the disbanded cavalry of the Marathas. Briggs was not very happy about the decision, though he saw its rationale. He believed that the Auxiliary Horse in Khandesh, recruited from amongst the adherents of the late Holkar’s rule or of the Peshwa’s army, had performed a very useful and gallant service. He pleaded that no man should be discharged because his horse has died or is unfit without being paid a compensation of either Rs 100 or Rs 50. Since besides the Auxiliary Horse, and also within it, Briggs had a large number of Hindustani Horse, he enthusiastically supported the idea of reduction of pay. He proposed a reduction of the salary of a private horseman to Rs 30/- on which ‘No Hindoostanies who look to making little fortunes and returning home would remain …… and their defection is precisely what is wanted’. However, he proposed a compensation to those Hindustani horsemen to desiring to go back home to the extent of 1½ month’s salary. This reduction of pay was only in case of private horsemen, and not the officers who would have ‘no cause to complain.’ With all these measures however, there remained a large number of unemployed horsemen in Khandesh. In October 1819, there were 4000 horsemen out of employment in Khandesh. This probably was because of the continuing campaigns in Khandesh against the Arabs, the
Bhils and others, gave a hope of employment to the unemployed horsemen elsewhere who probably flocked there. Secondly it was probably due to the presence of a large body Mawallid Arabs, who being the natives of Khandesh could not go elsewhere and would not be employed by the British government because 'their high pay and their habits of insubordination render it impossible to entertain them.' 262 Thirdly it is likely that the Hindustani horse discharged from the services stayed in Khandesh on their way north, or many others crossed over from the Shinde or Holkar territories into Khandesh. 263 Whatever be their number, however, they did not disturb the peace of Khandesh, and were soon lost in the population. The gradually increasing prosperity of the district gave them enough incentive to give up their martial profession. Some of them might have joined Suryajirao Nimbalkar's small rebellion at Yawal in 1820, but it was a minor affair and did not in any way tax the energies of the Khandesh authorities. 264 In any case, Captain Briggs was able to report to Elphinstone on December 14, 1818 that 'Candeish has been cleared of Savigible marauders ....' 265

BRIGGS AND THE BRITISH ARMY:

During the military settlement of Khandesh, Briggs very often had very distressing experiences with the British army. The problem that distressed many English officers was the problem of forage and the purchase of fodder. The British army during the war would not pay for the fodder, in fact would take it from the villagers by force. Gen. Lionel Smith was so
distressed by this practice, that he wrote a letter specifically on this subject to Commissioner Elphinstone. In this long and painful letter Gen. Smith observed that 'It is little singular that we have gone to wars against Pindarries for plundering and allow a practice in our own armies which... is nearly as baneful to the peaceful inhabitants of a country as many mischief of these professional freebooters. The only difference perhaps is fewer cases of murder and rape by our followers than Pindarries may occasion.' The situation in Khandesh confirmed Gen. Smith's observation. On April 8, 1878, Col. MacDowell wrote to Briggs that 'with regard to forage I consider that we are in an enemy country.' Having entered a small village that offered no resistance, MacDowell ordered the place to be immediately occupied by Lt. Rule. 'His first duty, of course, will be to take charge of whatever may appear to be prize property and send in an account of it.' Briggs strongly remonstrated to Lt. Col. MacDowell against the British Army's practice of free forage and free requisition of fodder. Bringing to the notice of the Commandant the economic and military disadvantages of the practice, he laid stress upon the fact that 'it alienates the inhabitants from the new government.' He insisted that 'price must be paid for goods purchased.' Col. MacDowell agreed with Briggs and promulgated orders 'that any fodder or animal purchased without the registration by the office and payment of due price would be considered as plunder' and the accused punished as per the rules.
Forage and free fodder were not the only problems that the army raised. Its behaviour was disgraceful while attacking a town. At the battle of Kopergaon also, the British army behaved in a manner that was disgusting. They burned the houses of the civilians and looted property. At Trimbak, the British army behaved with 'licentiousness' that distressed Briggs. 'Very great irregularities were committed as the force came to its ground'. Plunder and arson were practiced on a large scale. It was only when Col. MacDowell proceeded to the spot that this was stopped. 'Many of the plunderers were seized and beaten at the time, others were confined and the whole of the plunder that could be collected was laid up in heaps under sentinels that the inhabitants of the place might come and claim their own goods...'

The sacred temple at Trimbak was polluted 'women were stripped and lying naked in the streets.' The fact was that the detachment at the end of the campaign is perfectly wild and there is no discipline at all in it, among the Europeans particularly.' Briggs was 'sorry to say that many of the officers are as notorious for their depredations as the men, and none seem(s) to think it essential to maintain discipline by checking...'

Under these circumstances and 'in consideration of the sanctity of the place' Briggs 'considered it his duty to stay a day behind the detachment at Trimbak. He collected the unfortunate people of the town together.' He made some lame excuses like the
logistical position of the town, and lamented the fate of the inhabitants and the pollution of their sanctuaries. He gave five hundred rupees for distribution to Brahmins and five hundred more to maintain the customary ceremonies at the temple. The Commissioner approved Briggs's act. 274

'Two very great objects of attainment' in the eyes of the British officers were prize money and spies. Briggs was confident that 'all these things must ... find their level and will in time subside.' In the meantime, however, they were 'sources of vexation' and made 'very bad impressions of our character, when character is everything...'. 276

With the attitudes to the civilian property and discipline held by the British officers and Briggs thus opposed, a conflict between the two was almost inevitable. Occasions for such showdowns were not wanting. The first occasion for the conflict arose in late April, when Rango Pant occupied a large territory belonging to Bajirao. The Pant occupied, as a civilian assistant to Briggs, the town of Songhir, and found some property therein. It included one elephant, nine horses, and a some military store. Earlier the Pant had captured 'two elephants and a considerable quantity of public property.' 277 Now the army claimed that property to itself as prize. Major Andrews, the President of the Prize Committee, wrote to Col. MacDowell to this effect, and the letter was forwarded by the Colonel to Briggs. Briggs believed that the
army had no claim on this property. However, he prepared a detailed list of the property. In case of the Elephants, he would await the decision of the Commissioner, but in case of other animals, he proposed to sell them and keep the proceeds in deposit till the decision of the government was known. Elphinstone agreed with Briggs and approved his measures. 'I am of the opinion that towns and places of Baji Row occupied without resistance by the civil authority are not liable to examination by the army. And that property taken possession of by the Civil Officers with the aid of Sebundees is not to be considered prize to the army ....' He, however, forwarded the correspondence to the Supreme Government for their decision. The Governor General endorsed the views held by Briggs and Elphinstone and declared that 'property taken in an open town without resistance, by civil authority, and by irregular troops, such as Sebundy, is not to be considered as prize to the Army.'

The army, nonetheless, continued to look for prizes in all directions. On April 29, 1818, Col. MacDowell wrote to Briggs informing him he had 'received information last night that a number of Bajee Rao's Sheep' were in a jungle within twelve miles of the army camp, and that he had sent a guard under a Native Officer with orders to bring them in'. Briggs had to explain to Col. MacDowell that not only was there very great doubt about the ownership of the Sheep, but that there

"To c155"
was no doubt in his mind that sheep grazing twelve miles away from the line of march could not become prize property, to whomsoever it might belong. He claimed that any kind of property of Bajirao was State property and not prize. 282

On May 1, 1818, Briggs received a private letter from Elphinstone informing him of some valuable property belonging to Bajirao being hidden in the city of Nasik. The letter informed him that the property was in the possession of one Ramchandrapant Tamhankar. 283 Briggs alerted the army Commander, Col. MacDowell, stationed seven miles away from Nasik. The Commandant, however, refused to move, claiming lateness of hour as an excuse. 284 Briggs thereupon moved alone, and before the guards could move in from the camp in the morning of 2nd, was able to apprehend Ramchandra Pant Tamhankar. Briggs 'charged him with having in his possession a treasure belonging to Bajee Row. This, he did not deny.'285

A huge treasure was recovered from his house. It consisted of an image in pure gold of Sheshashahi Vishnu weighing about 4.5 Kgs. (350 tolas), Kamarbands, bangles, glasses, bowls, necklaces, one stool (Chaurang) etc. all of solid gold. The total gold seized was about 43.8 Kgs (3,756 t). The total silver that was seized weighed about 116.63 (10003 tolas 3 masas and 6 Ratis). Besides these, there were many boxes and bags that were not opened.286 They contained jewels and gold mohars. The total value of the treasure was enormous. The Prize Committee of the army 'having received positive information of
property to a very considerable amount being now under the custody of Captain Briggs, lately discovered in the town of Nassuck belonging to Bajee Row and his adherents demanded that they be acquainted with the nature of property and humbly begged leave to lay their claims thereto. The Committee requested the Colonel to submit the copies of their communication to Hon'ble Mountstuart Elphinstone and also to Brig. Gen. Doveton for their consideration, should any objections be made to the delivery of the property to the Prize Committee. Briggs refused to hand over the property to the army, made detailed lists of various articles and forwarded the entire correspondence to Elphinstone. Briggs was distressed and annoyed at the insinuations made in the correspondence and believed that the style of the letter was couched in terms by no means suit the station which the most noble the Governor General has assigned to one in candeish. Almost a year later, the Government gave its decision in favour of the Army. This was, however, no reflection on Briggs or his stand. The Governor General wrote to Elphinstone on June 20, 1819 as follows: 'His Excellency cannot omit remarking in this place that he has perceived with much regret the tone of the observations made relative to the conduct of Captain Briggs by Brigadier General Doveton, Colonel MacDowell and the Prize Committee in Khandesh. The difference of opinion does not seem to His Excellency to have been maintained, on the part of the latter-named officers, with that degree of courtesy and attention towards the other party that might have been
looked for in a fair discussion of the question... the Governor General considers the whole of his (Briggs's) procedure to have been unexceptionable and deems his exertions in securing the treasure to have been highly commendable.'

After the capture of Trimbakji Dengale, a large booty fell in the hands of Captain Swanston. The value of the gold and silver and jewels was about 65,000 rupees. Briggs distributed this property among the 800 rank and file under Capt. Swanston. The army once again laid its claim to the Prize, a claim that Briggs stoutly rejected. 'The seizure of Trimbakji Dengale, a proscribed criminal, after the war with Baji Kao had ceased, appears to me purely an act of civil magistracy, and I am at a loss to conjecture upon what grounds the Prize Committee can found its claim to the private property of such a person.....' Both Elphinstone and the Governor General concurred with Briggs. 'Captain Briggs's view of the case, I am directed to inform you, seems to the Governor General in Council to be perfectly correct, the property in question not appearing to be on any ground claimable as prize to the army.....' The moral of the army in Khandesh was very bad. ... The present condition of the Madras army (in Khandesh) is worst to death... This I say it who should not say it... there is plenty of talk... but no interior discipline and economy'. To regulate the relations between the troops and the inhabitants Briggs raised an establishment of 'road guards'. The principal duty of the road guards was to assist the troops in procuring
food and fodder and to see that the villagers were not molested or taken advantage of. He laid down fare tables and requested the Commandant not to allow any troops to violate the rules and oppress the people through Begari. 295

Briggs took his responsibilities seriously and considered himself the Civil authority in Khandesh. 296 Col. MacDowell was his senior in the Madras Native Infantry by some twenty years. They did not get on well with each other, even when Briggs was a mere Ensign. As Briggs claims, MacDowell had tried to get him removed to other Battalion, 'but very much to his annoyance, instead of my being removed, he was.' 297 They had not met since 1808, till the war with the Peshwa opened up. 'Our old regimental position soon became known in the camp, and some of his staff were not slow in keeping the Commandants' mind in a state of irritation.' 298 Briggs gives full credit to Col. MacDowell for his courtesy, and military efficiency, and believed that 'but for the dispute as to prize property, we should have ended the campaign on good terms.' 299 With his insistence upon his civil authority, his anti-forage stand and opposition to prize money, it is no wonder that 'Briggs came to be regarded as a traitor in the camp.' 300
NOTES

Chapter II.

1. Briggs, Autobiographical notes, quoted by Bell, E. op cit p.50.
2. Ibid p. 48
3. Ibid
5. Ibid
6. Ibid, p. 49.
7. S.P.D. Vol.41, Letter no.162, p.152. This letter says, युगलकारी तितिःतिः दायें आपास्यां यानी मानारा याचे कौशलाश्रय बधूह दृष्टा, व्याय आकाशी श्लोकम व श्रीम हे तुम्हाचे यिर्दु युगल तत्वात होते. दुसरे (पाठक)र दर्शे साहा पाहनाचे युगलाः बुद्ध आहे हैं, ते निराकार केकणे बुद्ध होते, हे तिंत्य दर्शनी तिंत्य युगलात हाच मार केळा.
'This document is a confidential report made to Bajirao II by his agent.
10. Hastings to Directors, June 9, 1817, Ibid.

14. Elphinstone to Governor - General, August 10, 1817, P R C 13, p. 214.

15. Briggs Autobiographical notes, Bell, E. op. cit. p. 50.

16. Ibid, p. 54


22. Chakravorty, p. 98.


29. Ibid, p.132.


31. Bell, op. cit. p. 56.


34. M. S. Gazetteer, Dhulia District, Govt. of Mah. 1974, p. 2.


36. Ibid.

37. M E to J B, 30.3.1818, D C F 402.


40. J B to Pottinger, 9.4.1818, D C F 170, p. 59. Even with these deductions of areas, Khandesh still continued to be a heavy charge. It was not till 1868 that the three talukas of Malegaon, Nandgaon and Baglan were separated from Khandesh and added to the District of Nasik, (Gazetteer of B'bay Presidency, 1882, Khandesh, p. 1) Later still the District of Khandesh was divided into two separate Collectorates, namely, East Khandesh and West Khandesh, at the present called as Jalgaon and Dhulia Districts respectively. (M. S. Gazetteer, p. 2).


42. All this information is drawn chiefly from the Gazetteer of Bombay Presidency, Vol. 12, Bombay, 1880. All the facts are corroborated by the documents, hence the account is accepted.


44. Elphinstone, Report --. op. cit., p. 4.
49. Ibid, p. 147.
50. Chakravorty, op. cit. p. 112.
54. Briggs to Adams, 7.3.1818, DCF 170.
56. Thakur, HSI, Vol. 2, p. 177
57. Briggs to Elp., 1.3.1818, DCF 170.
59. Ibid, p. 64.
60. Ibid, p. 67.
61. Briggs to Sir John Malcolm, 28.2.1818, DCF 170
62. Thakur, op. cit. p. 177
63. Briggs to Sir John Malcolm 28.2.1818, DCF 170; also Burton op. cit. pp. 67-68.
64. Briggs to Malcolm, Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Briggs to Adams 7.3.1818, DCF 170.
68. Blacker, op. cit. p. 258.
69. Briggs to Elp. 1.3.1818, DCF 170.
70. Ibid
71. Briggs to Elp. 10.3.1818, DCF 170.
73. Briggs to Elp. 7.3.1818, DCF 170
74. Elp. to G. G. 20.3.1818, PRC Vol. 15, p. 322
75. Briggs to Elp. 19.3.1818, DCF 170
77. Briggs to Elp. 11.6.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D Vol. I
79. Ibid p. 355
81. Elp. to G. G. 9.5.1818, PRC Vol. 13, p. 355
82. Malcolm to Adams 31.5.1818, PRC Vol.13, p. 368.
84. Ibid
85. Briggs to Pottinger 9.4.1818, DCF 170
87. Briggs to Elp. 10.4.1818, DCF 170.
88. Ibid
89. Ibid
90. Ibid
92. Briggs to Elp. 10.4.1818, DCF 170
94. Briggs to Elp. 13.4.1818, DCF 170.
95. Briggs to Elp. 15.4.1818, DCF 170
96. Blacker loc. cit.
97. Briggs to Elp. 15.4.1818, DCF 170.
98. Briggs to Elp. 23.4.1818, DCF 170.
99. Elp. to Briggs, 5.5.1818, DCF 402. Gangthady is the area south of present Khandesh, the fertile valley of Godavary that joins Khandesh to the rest of Maharashtra.
100. Burton op. cit. p. 89.
104. Rungo Bapuji to Chaplin, SPD Vol. 41, p. 246.
105. Briggs to Elp. 15.4.1818, enclosure, DCF 170
106. Briggs to Pottinger 9.4.1818, and to Elp. 15.4.1818, DCF 170.
108. SPD Vol. 41, p. 248, foot note.
109. See Thakare K.S., Rungo Bapuji (Marathi)
111. JB to ME, 9.7.1819, DCF 176.
112. JB to ME, 7.5.1819, DCF 176.
113. I have been informed by Shri Y. N. Kelkar that the surname of Hungo Pant of Briggs was Khole. However, I have not been able to ascertain it.

114. JB to ME, 26.4.1818, DCF 170.
115. ME to JB, DCF 402.
116. JB to Lt. Briggs, 13-5-1818, DCF 170
118. JB to ME, 1.3.1818, DCF 170
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
122. JB to ME, 10.4.1818, DCF 170
123. Major Ives to JB, 3.6.1818, DCF 170.
124. ME to G. G., 9.5.1818, PRC VOL 41, p. 350.
126. JB to ME, 20.4.1818, DCF 170
127. ME to JB, 29.4.1818, DCF 402.
128. JB to ME, 1.5.1818, DCF 170
129. JB to ME, 26.4.1818, DCF 170.
130. JB to ME Ibid.
131. ME to JB, 5.5.1818, DCF 402
132. Ives to JB, 7.5.1818, DCF 170
133. ME to JB, 12.5.1818, DCF 402
134. JB to Ives, 4.5.1818, DCF 170
135. Ives to JB, 9.5.1818, DCF 170
136. JB to Ives, 4.5.1818, DCF 170
137. Ibid
138. JB to ME, 20.4.1818, DCF 170.
139. Ibid.
140. JB to ME, 1.5.1818, DCF 170.
141. Ibid.
142. JB to Jardine, 12.5.1818, DCF 170.
143. ME to JB, 11.3.1818, DCF 402.
144. JB to ME, 20.4.1818, DCF 170
145. ME to JB, 29.4.1818, DCF 402
146. JB to Lt. Col. MacDowell, 11.5.1818, DCF 170.
147. News, 11.5.1818, DCF 170, p. 325
148. Ibid, 12.5.1818.
149. Ibid.
151. Ibid.
152. JB to ME, 13.5.1818, DCF 170.
153. It is 12 Kms. west of Dhulia.
154. DCF 180, p. 349.
156. JB to ME, 13.5.1818, DCF 170.
157. Ibid.
158. JB to Lt. Col. MacDowell, 11.5.1818, DCF 170.
159. JB to ME, 16.5.1818, DCF 170.
160. JB to Lt. Hodges, 20.5.1818, DCF 170
161. JB to ME, 20.5.1818, DCF 170.
162. Burton, op. cit. p. 90
164. JB to ME, 20.5.1818, DCF 170
165. Ibid, A rather long, detailed and graphic letter.
166. Ibid.
167. JB to MacDowell, 21.5.1818, DCF 170
168. MacDowell to JB, 21.5.1818, DCF 170
169. JB to ME, 29.5.1818, DCF 170.
170. Ibid
171. Burton, op. cit. p. 90
172. MacDowell to JB, 31.5.1818, DCF 170
9.6.1818, the same phrase is used again on 12.6.1818.
175. JB to ME, 2.6.1818, and 7.6.1818, DCF 171.
176. JB to ME, 15.6.1818, DCF 171.
177. Burton, op. cit. p. 91
178. JB to ME, 15.6.1818, DCF 171
179. JB to Col. MacDowell, 14.6.1818, DCF 171
180. JB to ME, 15.6.1818, DCF 171.
181. MacDowell to JB, 15.6.1818, DCF 171.
182. MacDowell to JB, 14.6.1818, DCF 171.
183. JB to MacDowell, 25.6.1818, DCF 171.
184. JB to ME, 1.7.1818, DCF 171.
186. JB to ME, 15.6.1818, DCF 171.
187. Enclosure to JB to ME, 2.7.1818, DCF 171, p.283.
188. JB to ME, 1.7.1818, DCF 171.
189. JB to ME, 1.7.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 DVol. I.
190. Ibid.
191. Ibid.
194. JB to J. Elphinstone, 7.7.1818, DCF 171.
195. JB to Munn, 8.7.1818, DCF 171.
196. JB to ME, 12.7.1818, DCF 171.
197. Balljotchet, op. cit. p. 82.
198. Ibid.
201. JB to Col. MacDowell, 24.10.1818, DCF 173.
203. JB to ME, 24.10.1818, DCF 173.
204. JB to Col. MacDowell, 24.10.1818, DCF 173.
206. JB to ME, 1.11.1818, DCF 173.
208. JB to ME, 7.11.1818, DCF 173.
209. MacBean to JB, 6.11.1818, DCF 173.
211. JB to ME, 11.6.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D, Vol. I. The Bheels, forming a part of a different kind of settlement, are discussed separately in the next chapter.


217. Smith to ME, 2.5.1818, PRC Vol.13, p. 342.

218. Ibid

219. लेकिन पैक सुन्दर लेक काफी पापकर या जाकावास लागे … बाहरी सिद्धार्थ न विपुलवाली पैकांज आवश्यक हैं। जी छुटोग लापकर या जाकावास के …

220. काफी उचित बाहर उद्देश्य तथा साधनाप्रद अपा पौन उपक्रम दे लापकर पहली जीव संबंध रूप लाएं …
   6.5.1818, SPD, Vol.41, p. 189, Many such reports are published in SPD Vol.41.

221. ME to G. G., 9.5.1818, PRC Vol.13, pp. 353.


225. ME to G. G., 5.3.1818, PRC Vol.13, p. 316.
116

228. ME to G. G., 18.6.1818, PRC 13, p. 396.
229. JB to ME, 11.5.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D Vol. I
230. JB to ME, Ibid.
231. JB to ME, 9.5.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D Vol. I.
232. JB to ME, 11.5.1818, MSS EUR F 88, BOX 6 D Vol. I
233. JB to ME, 8.6.1818, DCF 171.
234. JB to ME, 23.6.1818, DCF 171.
235. JB to ME, 26.6.1818, DCF 171.
236. JB to ME, 27.6.1818, DCF 171.
237. JB to ME, 30.6.1818, DCF 171.
238. JB to ME, 29.6.1818, MSS EUR F 88, Box 6 D Vol. I
239. JB to ME, 30.6.1818, DCF 171.
240. JB to ME, 29.6.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D Vol. I
241. JB to ME, 30.6.1818, DCF 171.
243. JB to ME, 5.7.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D Vol. I
244. G. G. Governor of Bombay, 31.10.1818, PRC Vol.13,p.484
245. ME to Munro, 19.5.1818 , Ballhatchet, op.cit., p.79.
247. Ibid, p. 404
248. JB to ME, 1.3.1818, DCF 170
249. JB to ME, 13.5.1818, DCF 170.
250. JB to ME, 16.5.1818, DCF 170.
117

251. Ibid.


E. I. Papers, Vol. 4, p. 205, Ahmednagar, Poona
and Satara had 5,000, 2000 and 3500 unemployed
foot soldiers respectively against 1800 of
Khandesh.


255. ME to Skinner, 16.5.1818, Ballhatchet, op. cit.
p. 79.

256. ME to G. G., 18.6.1818, PRC Vol. 13, p. 404

257. Ibid

258. Ibid. Also his circular dated letter to Collectors,
DCF 402.

259. JB to ME, 24.5.1818, DCF 170.

260. JB to ME, 1.7.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D Vol. I.


263. Cf. / See JB's letter to ME incorporating the
the contents of Sir John Malcolm's letter to him,
JB to ME, 12.9.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D Vol. I.


266. Smith to ME, 7.5.1818, PRC Vol. 13, pp. 342-345.

267. Ibid
268. MacDowell to Briggs, 9.4.1818, and 9.4.1818, in
Bell, op. cit. p. 66 ff.
269. JB to Col. MacDowell, 19.4.1818, DGF 170.
270. Ibid
272. SFD, Vol. 41, let No.170, p.158.
273. JB to ME, 25.4.1818, Ballhatchet, op. cit. p.28.
274. JB to ME, 30.4.1818, DCF 170.
275. ME to JB, 4.5.1818, Ballhatchet, op. cit, p.28.
276. JB to ME, 11.6.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D Vol. I
277. JB to ME, 16.4.1818, DCF 170.
279. JB to ME, 21.4.1818, DCF 170.
280. ME to JB, 28.4.1818, DCF 402.
281. Bell, op. cit. p. 68;
283. JB to ME, 5.5.1818, DCF 170.
284. Bell, op. cit. p. 68.
285. JB to ME, 5.5.1818, DCF 170.
286. Ibid
287. Maj. Andrews to Lt. Col. MacDowell, 6.5.1818,
DCF 170.
288. JB to MacDowell, 7.5.1818, DCF 170.
289. JB to ME, 7.5.1818, DCF 170.
291. JB to ME, 30.6.1818, DCF 171.
292. JB to MacDowell, cited in Bell, op cit. p. 73
294. JB to ME, 1.7.1818, MSS EUR F 88, BOX 6 D Vol. I.
296. JB to ME, 26.5.1818, DCF 170.
299. Ibid
300. Bell, op. cit. p. 67.