CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

Iraq as a sovereign nation emerged from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of devastating World War II. Historically, Iraq as a geographic entity was popularly known as Mesopotamia. Traditionally, Iraq was known as a land between the two rivers. In addition, because of its geo-politics Iraq was called as cliff.

Iraq until 1918 was included in the fertile crescent which was scattered bordering Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. In the recorded history Iraq had a glorious empire which had richly contributed to the present process of human civilization. Babylonian’s vast treasure is best known and rated high by historians such as legal Hummurabi’s. His best contribution in law code, touching economic, social and moral life is popularly acclaimed globally. This glorious empire collapsed and declined due to deep disunity and struggle.

Iraq like most of other Arab countries was conquered by the Turkish who had founded their capital at Istanbul. Afterwards, the heart of Islam shifted along with central authority over Arab states to Istanbul. Iraq united under ottoman in a single wilyat (province). Iraq as a modern state started to evolve in period in which the great reformer and statesman Midhat Pasha assumed office of the governship in Baghdad(2). Throughout the entire
period of the Ottoman rule, Iraq was placed in unique status and enjoyed special position which was witnessed by creation of a powerful army on European model. To safeguard its vast empire after consolidating its foothold in the Indian subcontinent Britain took keen interest in Iraq.

Oil Exploitation:

The discovery of oil reserve dramatically changed the significance of Middle East. Naturally Iraq was no more exception. Its oil resources was estimated to be about 40 billion barrels with proven reserve of 46 billion barrels Iraq ranked second to Saudia Arabia in the middle east. Iraq’s oil production ceiling prior to the initiation of hostilities with Iran was approximately 3.5 million barrels per day, out of total capacity of 4 billion barrels per day. It was 11 percent of OPEC’s total for 1979, or about 5 percent of world production.

The increased oil revenue have important impacts on Iraq foreign policy. To forcefully assert in the Middle East Iraq considerably expanded its role within OPEC an organization of Arab members, and non-align movements. To materialize its action aspirations globally Iraq had embarked on ambitious programme of financial assistance to the Third World countries. To achieve its regional ambition Iraq systematically raised its oil revenues from $5.7 billion in 1974, to approximately $21 billion in 1979. The oil revenues for 1980, already totalled some $21 billion before the out break of war with Iran in September 1981. Despite increasing government expenditure, Iraq’s account surplus rose
from $3 billion in 1977, to an estimated 20 billion in 1980 and its foreign exchange reserves jumped from $6.7 billion in 1977, to around $35 billion in 1980 prior to the war(^4).

Iraq had a very low contacts with the west. After revolution of 1958 the dramatic changes took place. Remarkable developments, which breded, facilitated the Baathist in capturing power in 1968. The young educated junta who faced with economic, social and political problems internally brought dramatical changes, fully conscious of country’s capacity and potential, they aimed in establishing Iraq as a prominent regional power in the gulf region in the future.

Iraq During Cold War:

In the late 1950s, Iraq became centre of attraction of Super Powers rivalry. In 1955, Iraq joined American sponsored security agreement, which came to be known as Baghdad pact.

The Baghdad pact became most controversial which met with strong opposition from the Iraqi political parties such as communist and Ba’athist along with Arab nationalist. They felt that Iraqi government’s decision as a conspiracy which became party to imperialistic U.S. design. They also suspected. Iraqi Elites behaviour as pro-western. Their vehement criticism of the Baghdad pact characterized Iraqi political thought and activity in post 1958 revolution.

Following series of developments which took place successfully compelled Iraq’s foreign policy at the beginning of
1960s, to shift towards concentrating more and more attentions in the gulf region. With nationalization process of western owned Iraq petroleum companies, expansion on ports and oil facilities in southern Iraq subsequent developments stimulated Iraq to claim over Kuwait. This era also witnessed dramatic events which equally contributed to the Iraqi’s foreign policy shift. There came split in Baath party national leadership in Syria in 1966 and reassertion of Baath control over Iraq government, which was dominated by military factions. During the 1970’s the Baathist government after consolidating power realized that their country had enough potential to play more regional role in Arab affairs and Gulf region.

After consolidating its position the party managed gradually to control and command government bureaucracies. They established Kurdish autonomy region in 1970’s and allowed opposition parties to function under state guidelines. The oil production levels were increased as revenues were utilized to embark on huge agricultural and industrial projects, as well as, to broaden the existing social programmes. Kurdish areas in the North and Shi’ia areas in the South became major beneficiaries of these policies.

Iraq’s foreign policy during this period was pragmatic in nature. To manage its external affairs successfully Iraqi Baathist government redefined its ideology. They adopted positive neutralism towards both Super Powers. Tactfully elucidating their own non-aligned posture the Iraqi government opposed both American as well as Soviet involvement in Iraq and middle East.
affairs. Meanwhile, Iraq increased oil production level throughout 1970’s and refused to join Arab policy of stopping oil export during 1973’s. During Arab - Israeli war, Iraq continued its pragmatic foreign policy and took the following steps.

2. Settlement of outstanding dispute with Iran.
3. Foreign aid programme to the Third World.
4. Attempt to defuse the crisis of two Yemen states.
5. Continued support for restoration of peace to Lebanon.
7. Support and at the same time repression of Palestinian groups.
8. Announcement regarding Israel’s right to its security in 1982.

Iraq, was fully conscious of oil importance which enormously affected world politics.

Baathist, since they came to power in 1968, were cautious about Shah of Iran’s regional ambition. Hence, Iraq’s concern revolved around vulnerability of their country’s oil industry. This led to the nationalization of the northern oil fields in 1972. Iran posed the most direct threat to Iraqi oil industry for social, strategical and political reasons. The Kurdish region in the north, produced almost 60% of the country’s total annual oil production. Therefore, Iraq was vulnerable to the internal political unrest fomented by outside powers. These factors puzzled Iraqi government and remained source of threat to the sovereignty and integrity of Iraq. Iraq often perceived threat in
the form of direct bombing in war time. Iraqi oil ships were susceptible to foreign attack and blockade especially in the south where one-half to two thirds of all Iraqi oil ships passed.

Moreover, Iraq suffered from isolation during late 1960's. There was growing sense of political isolation from the conservative and hereditary regimes in the Gulf. They excluded Iraq from the membership of Gulf Co-operation Council. This exerbated Iraq's geo-political concern in the region. Seemingly, this might have pushed Iraq to face their traditional enemy Iran alone. Iraqi government's concern further increased when Iran became a close to U.S.A. Through this Iran became a major recipient of American military sales and the US became defacto guardian of the Gulf. American military equipment to Iran began to flow in significant quantities after 1955. Between 1972 and 1976 Iran received more than one third of all American military sales in the region which amounted to $10.6 billion.

Iran abrogated the treaty regarding sharing of Shatt al-Arab water way. Iran put its claim over Bharain and subsequently annexed the three Gulf islands in 1971. Iraq also suspected Iran's involvement in assisting Shia and Kurds as well as conspiring to over throw Iraqi Government.

To repulse Iran's mischievous design Iraq responded by lending support to the Khuzistan nationalist movement, which was seeking separation from Iran. In retaliation, Iraq expelled about 80,000 Shia of Iranian origin, who were residing in Najaf and Karbala. Famous among them was Iranian revolutionary leader Iyat
Allah Khomeini. At this critical juncture both the super-powers took keen interest to divert the attention of both countries Iraq and Iran in the region. The US adopted two pillar policy in which Washington evolved strategy to ally at least two regional countries Iran and so a lesser extent Saudia Arabia to act as political stabilizer for U.S. interests. The primary interest in the Gulf as defined by America had been "orderly development, regional co-operation" and continued modernization of the Iranian and Saudia Arabia military to enable them to provide effectively for their own security and at the same time to foster the security of the region as a whole. The US twin pillar strategy had begun around 1971 as an off shoot of the Nixon doctrine. Its significant focus of attention had been to provide military, economic assistance to the nations which were of vital interests in American foreign policy agenda to safeguard its larger interests.

The Iraqi government's burden increased when domestic ethnic group pressure magnified in country's rivalry with Iran. To manage this critical situation Iraq sent a delegation to Moscow in July 1970, to seek weapons and later in April 1972. Iraq signed a 15 years Treaty of Friendship with Soviet Union. On these developments America reached and classified Iraq as a primary threat to its neighbours. By this time Washington visualized Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The US apprehension was obvious as a designed assisted by its allied Iraq, South Yemen to advance to the Gulf region.
Iraq-U.S.S.R. Alliance:

The Iraqi move towards closer ties with Soviet Union was determined first and foremost by its urgent need for the Soviet military support vis-a-vis Iran. The outbreak of hostilities with its neighbour, Iran by the end of 1972, induced Iraq to seek Soviet strategic alliance. The Iraq-Soviet Treaty of Friendship was signed in 1972. Afterwards the ideological stance adopted by Iraq became more vigorous against America.

The era from mid 1973's to the termination of Iraq-Iran dispute in mid 1975's manifested much close relations between Iraq and Soviet Union. The Iraqi government's foreign policy was almost pro-Moscow. Although, the posture of Iraq's foreign policy was pro-Soviet but at the same time Baghdad took anti-Soviet stands on some issues. To achieve certain objectives Iraq maintained its hostile policy towards the United States. The motive behind decline of Iraq's relations with both Super Powers was intended to neutralize them in its conflict with Iran. The compulsion of war with Iran in the fall of 1980's forced Iran to revive its old ties with the Soviet Union.

These development provided USA with a rare opportunity, and immediately Washington utilized this chance to conduct its foreign policy in the Gulf region to affirm its control. Perceiving growing nexus between Soviet Union and Iraq, which was posing threat in the region, the US took the position to stop Soviet expansion. The Soviet policy towards Iran was also decided by its proximity, vast territory, and population, bordering
Soviet Union. So, the Soviet Union, while getting closer to Iraq was continuous not to isolate Iran completely, as America might have capitalized these developments in its favour.

To counter balance the increasing American influence in the region, the Soviet interest demanded that Moscow come nearer to Iraq. Soviet interest lie in containing Iran. In Iran-Iraq war Moscow intended. First, to block Iran’s expansion of its Islamic ideology to the bordering Soviet republic with Muslim majority. Secondly, to counter the pro-USA regime of the Shah in Iran. At the same time Soviet Union strived to preserve some balance in its political attitude towards both countries during 1969-75 and 1980-88.

There were fluctuations in Soviet-Iraqi relations. The chief reasons were the Ba’athist capture of power in 1968 and the end of the Iran-Iraq was in 1988. Still the Soviet Union remained, the first great power in Iraq’s foreign relations agenda.

Iraq’s pro-Soviet attitude and its growing importance in the Middle Eastern region compelled USSR to secure strategic ties with Baghdad, even at the expense of sacrificing its interest in Kurdish issue. It was with intention of capitalizing strategic advantages the Soviet Union came closer to Iraq. In order to make Iraq a powerful nation the Soviet Union generously supplied military hardware during 1980’s.

The Iraq-Iran war and Arab Israeli dispute were the major factors that promoted the USSR’s relations with key Arab states.
Moscow was considered a successful competitor to the West as supplier of military hardware.

Since the United States was fully aware of Gulf geo-strategic significance, so its oil potential became a focal point in its foreign policy objectives in the coming decades. Therefore, the U.S. to take advantages and entered the Gulf in the early nineteenth century when American merchant paid a visit to Oman. The withdrawal of Britain from this region almost was replaced by America. Since then Gulf region marked the beginning of Russo-American fierce competition. It became an important item in their foreign policy Agenda.

However, U.S. suffered two major strategic reversals before it could attain supremacy in the Gulf. The loss of its position and influence in Iran, and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought turning point in the US foreign policy. Washington became much worried about its increases in the Gulf. The US policy with regard to the Gulf during the cold war era was characterised by the protection of oil resources. At the same time the US administration wanted to deprive the Soviet Union, its archrival any access to the warm waters ports. To fortify its grand design in Arabian ocean the the US inducted Diego Garcia as an important naval base in the Indian Ocean to cope any probable threat posed by the Soviet Union.

The US also tried to involve Gulf countries in its strategies game to avoid any Soviet adventurism at American expense. Thus, US managed to achieve the control of the Gulf oil
countries, who contained two-third of world proven reserves of crude oil. Today, America imports one quarter of Middle East oil traded in the world. In 1986, Western Europe received some 30 percent of its oil imports from the Gulf, while Japan received 60 percent of its oil imports from the Gulf, while United States could receive five percent. The great bulk of these oil exports must pass through strait of Hormuz. Hence, it was vital to U.S.A. interests that it should remain open for smooth navigational purposes. In case of large scale conventional confrontation in Europe or elsewhere, the regions oil supply often become important determining factor. The growing dependence on oil in the future from the Gulf area was estimated at about 60 percent. The U.S. in early nineteenth century had realized the importance of Indian ocean with its unique position as a link between the markets of the west and the goods and resources of the East. America wanted to have full access and control on this link which was becoming more and more vital for its economy.

After Mediterranean and red sea. The Indian ocean fall under US total supremacy. Thus, the US succeeded to control the most vital region for international energy. America prevented any Soviet adventurism in these area. Now US established effective permanent military presence in the Gulf with nearly 25,000 troops along with major naval facilities in Bahrain and ground forces stationed in Saudi Arabia. The US by this time shifted its policy towards Iran which was its long time friend to a foe. This irritated Iran as a result the Iranian leaders became unhappy and openly criticized America. The Iranian revolution demonstrated
great difficulties for USA and western policy makers in the region. An entirely new and powerful social, religious and political upheaval in Iran had gained widespread acceptance among the people. The tremendous upheaval often caused embarrassment to power and influence of Western policy in the region. The upheavals in Iran provided favourable political climate which facilitated Soviet influence in the area. It was with this Super Powers growing rivalry in mind in late 1979, and early 1980. Carter administration began the complex process of putting together a long term United States Foreign Policy agenda for the Gulf and Indian Ocean.

After exit of Shah of Iran the US administration abandoned its policy to promote Iran as a dominant regional power. The focal point of U.S. security strategy shifted to check the Soviet expansion. For the first time after World War II open competition between Super-powers intensified. By the time the Soviet Union involved in Afghanistan, open conflict erupted between two super-power.

The Soviet aggressive posture posed obvious open threat for American interest. Therefore, U.S. reacted quickly through Carter Doctrine. There were three scenario’s which posed naked threat to the US. First, Gulf county’s security might be destabilized from within by their Muslim orthodox groups backed by Iran; Secondly, in case if Iran defeat Iraq in war it would assume unchallenged regional military power position. Thirdly, the Soviet Union might respond to any Arab country favourably in case they turned to Moscow for help.
To manage the fast growing developments in the Region. President Carter on January 23, 1980, made public announcement firmly cautioned. An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region would be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault would be repelled by any means necessary including military force.

The Carter declaration set out the essential elements of U.S. policy in the Gulf region. In fact Carter doctrine was an extension to American old strategy during nineteenth century Monroe doctrine. Its principle tenets were cardoning the Americans off from European machanizations and post-world war II Truman Doctrine which responded similarly to the Soviet Union's threat against Greece and Turkey. Backing Carter doctrine, U.S. responded to the regional security framework, by enhancing the military capability of their allies in the Gulf.

To rebuff the Soviet military adventurism American launched rigorous military exercises. Apart from military exercises U.S. acquired access to support facilities in several middle eastern countries. Therefore, increasing U.S. regional capabilities and co-operation made it clear that any adventurism by Soviet Union in the Gulf - or Indian Ocean would not be tolerated and accepted by America and its friends in the region.
One of the major events which dramatically altered the politics of the Middle East was Iran-Iraq War. The volatile nature of the region naturally invited massive American naval concentration in and around the Gulf. To provide safety in the region, to reflag Kuwaiti oil tankers America first intervened directly in military form. The Iran-Iraq crisis generated an escalation of direct military clash between two Superpowers.

The crisis in Iran almost transformed it into an Islamic republic. At the time of mass upsurge in Iran the Iranian student’s of Islamic wing of the revolution had captured U.S. embassy in Tehran and had detained American diplomats. Although the US responded cautiously at the beginning but later Washington took military measures and inflicted serious damage on the potential opponents. Not only America “quietly conveyed to Tehran through third party that:

1. U.S. - flagged ships would continue to use the Gulf.
2. The United States would respond with military means against Iranian assets if any U.S. flagged ship was harmed.
3. The U.S. would react similarly if any U.S. facilities were subjected to Iranian-sponsored terrorist action.
4. The United States might destroy not only important military assets but also vital economic facilities and to impose a total naval blockade of all Iranian maritime trades(14).
Thus, the US by displaying military retaliation shattered Iran but at the same time restored the belief and confidence of the friendly Gulf countries. Using threat of the friendly Gulf countries, America compelled opponents to submit to its will. It was a time of greater array of opportunities and danger in the region.

The U.S. revised its strategic thinking and departed from previous notion of preparing themselves for achieving objective in along term rather than countering an urgent situation. The US deployed rapid force to respond to any crisis and modified its command, control, communications and intelligence network\(^{12}\).

Thus, Iraq-Iran war become a turnign point in Super Powers rivalry in the region. Within this backdrop American naval forces intervened in the Gulf. By this time Iraq initiated attacks against vessels belonging to Iran or in the service of Iran. Seemingly Iraqi strategy had been to compel Iran to begin negotiations for ending its war with Iraq. To achieve this goal Iraq exploited its overwhelming air superiority in order to disrupt and cripple Iran's oil exporting capability. In Iraqi air strike Iran suffered huge damages. To repulse Iraqi air operations in contrast Iran choose to react by attacking vessels of Iraq's allies in the Gulf. Iran wanted to put enormous pressure on Baghdad. As a consequence both sides stepped up their attacks on vessels passing through Hormuz peninsula by the end of 1987, around 66 vessels had been already attacked by both sides.
The more worrisome was the intensification of Iranian reprisals in the Gulf during first half of 1987. Iranian attacks actually out numbered Iraqi strikes. Iranian changed and shifted their operation to the nights. There was dramatic alteration in Iranian raids in terms of time, method and weapon system in which frigates and missiles boats and rapid patrol boats were frequently used. This type of attack increased risk and insecurity of neighbouring Gulf states.

The Iran's decision to single out ships of Kuwait or in Kuwait's service was the direct cause responsible for Super Powers intervention in the region. Every since out break of war Kuwait was a major supporter which providing financial aid and allowed vital war materials to be transferred to Iraq through its territory. The Iranian motive of targetting of Kuwait was probably to bring indirect pressure upon Iraq. Iran also closely monitored and searched the Soviet merchant marine ships, with strong belief that Kremlin might be a major arms supplier to Iraq.

To put pressure on Iran the Soviet war ships moved into the Gulf and established a modest naval presence in the region. Not only Moscow intensified escorting their merchant shippings enroute to Kuwait. To provide safety the Soviet Union entered into negotiation with Kuwait concerning transport and protection of the oil shipments. Remarkably, it may be pointed in the history of cold war that both Super Powers interests coincided. When Iran deployed the Chinese anti-ship silk warm missiles which
threatened Kuwait, to protect itself, she asked for US and Soviet assistance to reflag its oil tankers. Moreover, when Iranian navy detained a Soviet arm carrier in the Gulf the Soviets Union responded by stationing combat vessels in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. To threaten and undermine Kuwait internal stability, Iran initiated terrorist and subversive activities in Kuwait.

To counter and check Iranian subversive activities the US proposed to reflagging of all Kuwaiti oil tankers. But Kuwait felt obliged to lease three tankers from the USSR in order to preserve some sort of Super Power balance in the region. The U.S. administration took the decision to reflag all the Kuwaiti tankers and intervened massively in the Gulf. This Americans move was necessitated to justify to safeguard direct and fundamental interests. The US re-affirmed its position and demanded to safeguard all the Kuwaiti tankers for uninterrupted flow of oil. Upholding principle of navigational freedom the US tried to contain even reduce Soviet presence. The US supported the security and stability of its allies as the stability of the region was significant concern for all.

The United States along with the entire west had a vested interest in ensuring that the Gulf did not fell under the control or hegemony of the Soviets or any other hostile power. The US was apprehensive that the Soviet Union might seize the opportunity of Kuwait’s invitation to justify and expand their presence. Not only Moscow might have manoeuvred in obtaining rights of access
to ports and other facilities. Although Soviet political presence in the region in fact dated to the 1963 when Moscow established diplomatic relations with Kuwait, Oman, and the UAE late in 1985.

The Soviet naval presence in the northern Arabian sea underwent an expansion at the beginning of 1970's. Lately it was evolved into the Indian Ocean fleet which was able to deploy from naval and air bases in Aden in South Yemen. Soviet could have utilized Iranian search of their ships as justification for dispatching a naval escort force into the gulf and established legitimate presence in the Gulf.

Especially, the Kuwaiti's invitation to Moscow could have formed a sufficient ground for Soviet presence in the region. Before the commencement of Soviet escort operation in the Gulf America rebuffed a President Gorbachev request for bilateral talks on the Gulf claiming that the appropriate discussion on this could be taken in Security Council of the United Nations. America intervened on behalf of Kuwait. America declared that its interest lie in supporting all its friends in the Gulf. Followed by the act of arms deals with Iran which came to be known as Iran-Contra scheme (1985-1986). Iraq and Gulf states of the region viewed the transaction as a treachery, which brought about a drastic shifts in American foreign policy formula operative in the Middle East. Through this enactment America adopted new approach to facilitate to ensure U.S. commitment to its worried friends in order to terminate or atleast prevent the expansion of the Gulf war. This, Iran-Iraq war had provided temporary relief to both the Gulf monarchies as well as western powers\textsuperscript{45}.
America thought that continuation of war would harm its interest in the region. At the same time it might heighten the threat to its allies. So in pursuit of American objectives Iran’s capability ought to be reduced. Not only the Soviet Union in Iraq-Iran war should be neutralized on diplomatic front. In the entire game American activity was wholly U.N. sponsored and hence succeeded in Security Council front. Therefore, Security Council resolution 598, which was adopted unanimously on July 20, 1987, and called for the cease fire in the Gulf War.

It was because of American diplomatic intervention Iran-Iraq war was terminated in a manner acceptable to both warning countries. Earlier Iran refused to stop the war justifying its stance that Iraq should be held responsible for the initiating the war. To put pressure the US brought another UN resolution intended to intensify diplomatic activity aimed to impose formal arms embargo on Tehran. Washington knew that unilateral step without the support of the other great powers would be meaningless. Neither Soviet Union nor China had agreed to support an arms embargo. However, U.S. believed that dual efforts of reflagging Kuwati ships and enforcing of economic embargo would deter Iran from endangering or putting military pressure on U.S. allies in the Gulf. Hence, the cumulative effects of the operation ultimately would convince Iran continuation of the war was in futile. The United States massive naval intervention in the Gulf which was undertaken to protect oil producing states in the region proved to be a difficult task.
Britain and France rejected U.S. request to assist it in mine sweeping operations. But, later when, the mining of waters in the region spread beyond the Gulf waters in early 1987’s Britain and France announced that they were beefing up their naval units in the Gulf with mine sweepers, worship and auxiliary vessels and later were joined by Holland and Belgium. However, by the early of 1988, the operational activity of U.S. led western countries to believe that it could not be said as comprehensive aid or strategic cooperation rather than a U.S. design for a long security arrangement to protect, assist and intervene on any scale as it might be required.

After wards America stationed four AWACS in Saudia Arabia operated by American crews. Later Oman too extended same access rights for U.S. vessels and aircrafts in bases on its soil. In addition Bahrain continued to serve as the site of the head quarters and maintenance operations of the US expanded middle east naval task force.

So, the credit of ending Iran-Iraq hostilities was the very presence of the Super Powers in the Gulf. It was a great relief for the oil producing Gulf countries as Super Powers presence constituted less of threat than Iran’s victory over Iraq. The Gulf crisis brought Super Powers into the scene by granting them bases and access to military facilities. Without full co-operation with U.S. Gulf countries might have not benefited from continuation of Iran-Iraq war. In the absence of Super Power intervention the Gulf Co-operative Countries might have did
little toward defending their own vessels or those in their service.

Iraq, which had long sought an end the war welcomed the American naval intervention in the Gulf. Baghdad realized that this was the only realistic option to terminate hostilities. Iraq’s was fully convinced that military pressure exerted on Iran by itself alone would not be sufficient. Iraq took a dim view of Soviet manoeuvring at the U.N. aimed at delaying arms embargo by Security Council on the ground of U.S. proposal with improvement of Iran-Soviet relation. The reluctance of Iran not to accept Security Council resolution to the cease fire, Iraq was left with no better option than to accept American intervention.

Therefore, the end of Iran-Iraq war came as a relief to both U.S.A. and Iraq. But Iraq failed to achieve its expectations which at the beginning of the war Baghdad lead targeted to realized. Undisputedly, the Iraq-Iran war proved strategic advantage for the U.S.

America had different considerations and priorities rather than simply terminating Iraq-Iran war. Washington wanted to checkmate Soviet Union on the one hand and on the other hand safeguard the interests in the Gulf, U.S. intervention constituted a challenge that held out both potential risks and possible opportunities to be capitalized. America was apprehensive that Moscow wished to expand its presence and influence in the Gulf which was pinpointed in their foreign policy agenda. Contrary, the Soviet Union was fully aware about
west's requirement for Gulf oil was for greater than its own. So, Soviet Union felt that in case of achieving its objectives in the Gulf region, Kremlin would be successful in transforming its most cherished foreign policy objectives in expanding national interest.

However, allowing the America intervention in the region via the Arab states would go against Soviet interests. In addition, it would generate tensions in the Middle East and would adversely affect its relations with the United States. The Middle East region has been described by leading American officials as the most strategically important area in the world. In the absence of America the region might fell to Soviet influence.

The United States was very much apprehensive about indigenous movements that could have challenged American interests. By the time when Gorbachev introduced his Glasnost, the effects of which dictated the opposite course. It might have led to jeopardize the Soviet relations with the two warring camps. By early 1988, Soviet preferred to take the advantage of its relationship with Iran in the absence to any agreement with U.S. concerning the gulf region. The Soviet Unions, publicly advocated the creation of an international naval force under UN supervision to protect shipping in the Gulf. Moreover, Kremlin indicated its readiness to do its best level toward bringing the war to an end. Moscow put forth proposed acceptable to both parties to seek honourable solution. This stance gave U.S.S.R a logical point to launch a propaganda campaign against the unilateral American intervention in the Gulf.
Iraq came out of its war against Iran as a bankrupt state suffering high inflation and debt. Still, Baghdad emerged as the unchallenged power in the region with its one-million man army and valuable fighting experience. With huge armament arsenal no doubt the process of reconstruction and restructuring of the economy was extremely difficult task for Iraq. An army of more than one million did not match the economy of such small states was another obstacle for Iraq. Iraq did not succeed to guarantee the continuation of financial assistance by other Gulf states and allies during its war with Iran. This left Iraq in a deep frustration. Therefore, in utter disappointment not to achieve its specific goals after exhaustive war with Iran resulting in failure Iraq took costly decision and invaded Kuwait on 2nd August, 1990.

At this juncture both super powers started their own course and stood in sharp contrast at the beginning of the crisis. This in turn provided Iraq a span of five months before U.S. and multinational forces started the liberation process of Kuwait. Soviet Union favoured a diplomatic solution to the crisis. But U.S. began mobilizing its own troops and built strong alliance system to meet the crisis. The events on the other hand moved very fast in Soviet Union in December 1991. This brought an abrupt the break up of the Soviet Union.

Prior to it Edward Shevard Nadze became Foreign Minister who succeeded in the reducing the tension with west. Deeply torn in economic and ethnic turmoil internally the Soviet Union was
helpless to play any significant role in Soviet foreign policy. On March 11, 1991, Lithunia declared itself independent. This was followed by Lativia and Estonia ending the annexation by Stalin in 1939-40 of the three independent balatic republic. The whole world took by great surprise the dramatic and speedy events taking place in the Soviet Union. In July, 1990, Soviet initiated the strategic arms reduction talk (START), with U.S. President George Bush in Washington. As a result Moscow reduced long range nuclear arsenals by 30 percent.

The Soviet Union by mid 1991, abandoned a long time ally Iraq and backed U.N. moves to isolate Iraq. Economically crippled Soviet Union allowed the U.S. a free hand to form 30 nations coalition in the Gufl. On 26 February, 1992, in US led military operation Kuwat was liberated. Iraq accepted an unconditional cease-fire with the most humiliating conditions ever imposed on any sovereign nation Iraq economy suffered complete destruction covering its industry agriculture, and basic infrastructure.

After Saddam Hussein’s terrible defeat the U.S. President George Bush, started talking of a "new world order". Therefore, defeat of Iraq in six weeks, despite having a battle hardened and million man strong army that fought Iran for eight years, sent a clear message to the whole world. That U.S. was willing to take the lead and fight any scale of war which threaten its interests. After exist of Soviet Union as a Super power the US remained, intact as a Super power. The U.S. policy has largely been successful in extending American strategic and economic interests
in the region (9). Therefore, it may be said that Gulf war marked the "end of cold war" and starting point of the emergence of unipolar world.

==== o0o ====

25


4. Ibid.,


10. Schloesssr, op. cit., p. 22.
12. Ibid., p.8.
15. Ibid., p.2.