CHAPTER - IV

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After Iran and Iraq reached a peace settlement in Algiera in 1975, significant changes had taken place in their political structures which had adverse effect on their newly established friendly relations. In January, 1979, the Shah regime was overthrown by the Islamic revolution. Six months later Saddam Hussein became the President of Iraq who succeeded Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. After the Islamic republic had been established in Iran, the Iranian leadership began to reassert the principle of legitimacy of the imamate that the Imam must be a descendant of the Calipha ‘Ali indirect line. The concept of Islamic “World Order” was rooted in the idea of the twelvers Shi’ite cultural tradition as interpreted by Ayatto Allah Ruho Allah Khomeini, which was unacceptable to the Sunni followers. They insisted on the principle of election of the Imam or Caliphat, by the public, the last Imam of the Shi’ia who had disappeared in the ninth century, as pleaded would eventually returns as “messiah or master of the age (Sahib-Izaman). It was further pleaded that the Messiah would create justice and equality in the world because in Khomeini’s word, he alone would be able to establish “a world government of god”(a).

It was taken for granted that the Mujtahids would provide spiritual guidance for believers during the Imam’s absence Khomeini appeared to all Mujtahids that their duty was not merely
to advise. As if their advise was disregarded, so he was
duty-bound to assume authority. He was opposed to establish a
regime presided over by the faghis (jurists) called the wilay et-
- al., faqih, who would pave the way for the ultimate
establishment of Islamic world government under the Messiah.21
Following the revolution in Iran, a supreme council over which
Kohmeini presided was established to exercise the functions of
the wiylayat al-faqih and to guide the Islamic republic. Its
functions were to implement the higher authority of the Imam.

Khomeini's immediate concern was, of course the internal
affairs of Iran. But his ideas and ideal rose above national
denominations. He spoke in voice of Imam but his calls were
addressed not only to the Shi'ia followers but to all believers.
However, the Islamic revolution could no longer claim to fulfill
the promises of the Islamic revolution, which had received
support from many elements out side clerical circle. Kohmeini
emphasised that the supreme authority of the Imamate should be
considered as genesis of the split of Islam into the two major
confessional divisions.

This created deep differences among Shi'ia and Sunni
scholars. Before the revolution Kohmeini had avoided antagonizing
Sunni Muslims by insisting on the concept of Imam. But after
returning to Iran, he was addressed by his followers as the Imam
of Mujtahids who represented the supreme council of the Islamic
republic. This was not accepted by Sunni scholars (Ulma) or some
of his Shia'ia peers. The doctrine of exporting revolution had
created another obstacle in the relations of Iran and Iraq. Kohmeini viewed that the Iranian revolution was an Islamic revolution. It was obviously God's will he pleaded that it should extend beyond the border of Iran.

Kohmeini appealed to all believers in other Islamic countries to participate and adopt the model of his country which aroused enthusiasm of extremist activities in the neighbouring Muslim countries in the Gulf region. Even some made an attempt to seize power by violence means. The struggle for power among Iranian revolutionary leaders tranished Kohmeini's spiritual leadership. Instead of rising above rival groups they sided with leaders who represented extreme clerical views. When the extremists dominated, the moderate leaders in the country warned their countrymen from exile about the danger of clerical extremism. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, traveled widely in Islamic lands and Europe and addressed himself to Sunni and Shi’ia followers alike. Kohmeini’s travel abroad was relatively limited. After Najaf in Iraq he spent hardly a year in Paris and returned to Iran, hence, he had lost support of Islamic modernist elements.

The doctrine of the export of the revolution intended to spread the revolutionary movement, had it’s roots in Kohmeini’s teaching, while he was in exile in Iraq. He had preached Jihad, Islamic concept of war. Jihad stressed to resort force, after the success of the overthrow of the Shah in Iran and establishment of Islamic republic. After Kohmeini embarked upon expansion of his
influence. He often made no secret of his intension to spread the revolution to other countries by violence. Kohmeini’s appeal outside Iran was expressed differentiatlly and had greatest appeal among the Shi’ia in Iraq. The Arabian peninsula was relatively deprived as a group. The attraction was a broader than a simply religious attraction. But his appeal to non-Iranian Shi’ia have had serious destablizing consequence for the relevant regimes.

The Islamic revolution was received at the begining in Iraq and other Gulf states with mixed feelings. On popular level the reaction to the fall of Shah’s was favourable. Since clerics were allied with younger leaders, who had received their education in the western institution. However, people in the region hoped that the new leaders would follow a foreign policy sympathetic to their aspirations. Both Kohmeini and young leaders had made statements in the support of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and other groups. Iran as expected was to deal with the government of its non-Super Power neighbours most of whose people were Islamic. Israel was declared as an oppressor state.

Therefore, in Iraq some of the Ba‘ath leaders were critical of Shah’s hegemonic policy. They felt that the Iranian revolution would provide an opportunity of trust and co-operation, since the revolution leaders had denounced foreign alliances and had wished to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy.
In 1979, when the Iranian revolution was still in its infancy, the presidency in Iraq passed to Saddam Hussein from Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr. Its reaction and the attitude of Iran was debated in the meetings of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and the Ba’ath regional command. The Ba’ath leaders argued that the new regime in Iran would not pursue hegemonic policy towards Iraq, and the Gulf region. In case if it took place in Iran to Iraq would firmly stand against it. While some other Iranian leaders held that both countries advocate several identical goals such as Non-alignment, independence, and revolutionary principles. Hence, they argued this principles might pave the way for co-operation between the two countries. Iraq adopted acquiescent posture during the course of Iranian revolution 1978-1979, the slow consolidation of that revolution revived the Iraq’s hopes of recapturing the last territories.

But the political trends in Iran were not very encouraging as the extremist clerics were controlling the political system. In Iraq the Ba’ath leaders were alarmed that the political system controlled by the Iranian clerics might encourage opposition groups in Iraq to agitate against the Ba’ath regime. Iran was closely associated with regional enemies of Iraq. The clerics argued that opposing Iraq was essential, if primary regional enemy such as Israel, was ever to be contained.

The Iraqi regime recognized the need for stronger hands to protect the regimes from the infiltration of revolutionary elements into the country. The political trends in Iraq and other
Arab countries began to change. The crucial events led to transfer of power from President Bakr to Saddam. During this period Anwar al-Sadat signed peace agreement with Israel 1977. Reacting Iraq at a meeting of the Arab summit in Baghdad, initiated suspension of Egypt membership from Arab League and broke off diplomatic relations.

Meanwhile, Iraq started negotiation of unity with Syria and tried to provide effective leadership. All these developments led to the nomination of Saddam by President Bakr, since he wished to retire from political life. This originated the sharp conflicts between Iran and Iraq plunging the two into a lengthy war which appeared to be the only feasible course.

DIPLOMATIC AND LEGAL DIFFERENCES:

The agreement of 1975, was primarily designed to resolve the rivalry between Iraq and Iran. Instead of reducing the conflict it became itself source of tension between the two countries. The treaty failed to settle their problems. There was no reconciliation and co-operation between them at the official level. Rather, it proved a great disappointment to Ayatollah Kohmeini because the Ba'ath government stopped its support to Iranian Mujtahdis in Iraq, and imposed restrictions on their activities. Perhaps more disappointing was the pressure brought on Kohmeini to discontinue his activity against the Shah regime in Iran. "The bad blood between Saddam Hussein, President of Iraq and Ayat-Allah Kohmeini the Islamic revolutionary leader of Iran commenced when Saddam Hussein drew out Kohmeini from his refuge
in the holy city of Najaf South of Baghdad. Kohmeini had been in Najaf ever since he was expelled by the Shah from Iran in 1964. He was placed under house arrest in September 1978, because of his support to the Anti-Shah movement in early 1978, and later expelled for issuing Anti-Shah statements. It was blamed by Iraq that Kohmeini had been creating disaffection among the Shi`ites in Iraq.

Kohmeini, while in exile in Iraq, was not in a good terms with Ba`ath Government. Seemingly it was a marriage of convenience, as both he and Ba`ath knew quite well that their co-operation served only immediately purposes. There was no agreement on fundamental issues. Following his expulsion from Iraq, Kohmeini went to Paris, where he enjoyed freedom of political expression. Here, he was joined by a host of Iranian revolutionary leaders. Later they triumphantly declared the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

A provisional government headed by Mahdi Barzagan one of Kohmeini’s civilian followers was set up to prepare a constitutional draft for the new regime. The Mujtahids, moved slowly and slowly to dominate Iran’s political scene. Finally, Iran’s civilian control was brought under Kohmeni’s spiritual leadership. He exercised his authority as a Deputy of Imam, who went into the Ghayba (absence) as per Shi`ia doctrines. In 1979, he had appealed to the Iraqi’s to overthrow Saddams “corrupt” government. He even predicted that, the Ba`ath regime would be thrown into the dust- bin of history like the regime of Shah.
During the meeting of the Non-aligned Conference in Havana, in 1979, Foreign Minister Sadun Hamadi, invited premier Bazargan and Foreign Minister Yazdi to visit Iraq. Reportedly while both were prepared to deal with Ba'ath government but Ayatallah Kohmeini was not prepared to deal or negotiate with Iraq. Instead, he delivered a message on his behalf his son on March 21st, 1980, that, we should exert all efforts to export our revolution to the other parts of the world. He added let us abandon the idea of keeping the revolution within our border“*”.

Iraq being immediate door neighbour, this declaration alarmed the Ba’athist regime as it felt would be the first target before revolution reach out to the other lands. Iran’s refusal to negotiate with Iraq aroused the concern of Iraq’s leaders that the new Iranian regime was not prepared to honour the Algiers Agreements, which Shah had conducted with Iraq in 1975. Appreciating the initial preoccupation of Iranian leaders with domestic affairs, the Ba’ath government had dispatched official communications offering Iraq’s good will toward the new regime, expressing its readiness to open a new chapter of cooperation and friendship between two countries. But no encouraging reply was received, therefore, the Iraqi regime concluded that Iranian leaders neither they will honour their country’s treaty nor would deal with Iraq as per established diplomatic norms and procedure.

The Iranian propaganda against the government of Iraq continued, with high-ranking Iranian leaders including Kohmeini, Sadiq Gatabl Zada and Muhammad Ali Raja’i. They made statements
through foreign correspondences in which the Ba’ath leaders were accused of hostility toward Iran. Ba’ath leaders were denounced as oppressive, anti-religion, and corrupt. Later, it was revealed that Iran had territorial ambition which became clear from the statement of Iran’s Foreign Minister Qutab Zada who said on April 8th, 1980, that "Aden and Baghdad belong to us."  

Even Bani Sadr reportedly gave a call "to go to Baghdad and liberate Iraqi people. Bagdad felt that it was an interference in the domestic affairs of Iraq holding that we consider the Islamic nation as one and the Imam (Kohmeini) as the religious leader for us and Iraq and all Islamic people of the Middle East.

The Kohmeini doctrine baffled all the neighbours in the Gulf region. All the concerned denounced it as inconsistent with Islamic teachings and stamped it as Shu’ubiya, the expression of Persian ethnicism. The war of wards erupted between Iran and Iraq. Before they could go to war violations of airspace were often reported in the press. Surely, these violations recurred on both sides of the frontiers. Following there was a sudden explosion of a bomb at a gathering of students at the University of Mustansirya in Baghdad.

This incident was followed by the attempts on the lives of Tariq Aziz the Deputy Prime Minister and Latif Nasif Jasim, the Minister of Culture and Information. However, infiltrations and subversive activities were not new. The government of Iraq became alert by these events. Further sporadic violations of airspace
and incursions across frontier section were reported. Meanwhile, reports were reaching Iraq that, the Iranian regime was in disarray. The army and people in the provinces were reluctant to support the leaders of Islamic republic. This pointed a gloomy picture about the army’s condition in Iran, which was meant might in turn encourage Iraqi regime, and challenge to Saddam leadership.

IDEOLOGICAL RIFTS:

The war of words between Iraq and Iran had already started before their forces met in the battle ground. Each country was stressing supremacy of its ideology. Through broadcasts over the media, confessional contraversies, and subversive activities the war of propoganda both strived to influence the minds and attitudes of peoples. Both sides invoked stereo type and distarted news in order to justify once position and undermine the other’s. Although, it might not have immediate effect such as war. However, if permeated in influencing the ultimate outcome of the war. The subject matters varied, from frontier dispute to intervention in each other’s domestic affairs.

The nature of the regime and charcter of leaders with superiority of Islamic form of government was glorified. The texts of Kohmeini writings were widely distributed and translated into several foreign langauges. The clerical leaders championed that the Islamic Republic set up by the Iranian Revolution was ideal form of Islamic government as prophet Mohammad and his successors had laid down as expounded in Kohmeini’s teachings.
The form of government was opposed to all sorts of oppression. This government seeks justice in accordance with Islamic law. The two regimes, the Ba'ath of Iraq and the Islamic republic of Iran by their very nature engaged in ideological warfare, even before actual hostility was commenced. Both aspired to establish new social orders, Iran embodying the fundamental principles and values of Islam, and Iraq espousing modern doctrines, such as nationalism, socialism and democracy, etc. Both tried to achieve Arab unity through adoption of Pan-Arabism. Since both countries population being Muslim, Islam became the source of a spiration. The Iranian leadership regarded it as very foundation of its regime legitimacy, whereas the Ba'ath considered it as a component of its national ideology. The Iranian regime believed that, ultimate authority belong to God and its exercise was delegated to Imam, in the absence of Imam, divine authority was still exercised in theory by Mujtahids. Therefore, their authority was legitimized by God.

Iran put stress on Shi'ism, and instigated Shi'a followers in Iraq to denounce the Ba'ath regime as it was based against Shi'a of non-Arab descent.

Iranian regime's move had gone, so far as, to deny legitimacy of the Ba'ath government on religious and historical grounds. Therefore, U.S. had made no secret of its intention of containing the Islamic republic of Iran, as it was viewed the state was run by fundamentalists who were bent upon spreading insurgency and terrorism around the world.
The Iranian propaganda machinery claimed that the Ba’ath regime came to power not by legitimate Islamic upheavals but by violent and illegal military actions, like Mu’awiya founder of the Umayyad Dynasty who usurped power by force from the Calipha ‘Ali, the first Imam’. Later, he passed it to his son Yazid, so Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, President of Iraq, had came to power by military coup in 1968, and passed the office to Saddam Hussein in 1979. Remarkably, it was wished that they tried to reminded Shi’a world of the historical event of usurpation of authority by Mu’awiya from the Imam Ali depriving his descenndants of the right to succession.

So, they planned to mobilize the Shi’a of Iraq and neighbouring countries to revolt against their regimes, which would finally facilitate the establishment the true Islamic states in the region. After Mujtahdis of Iran succeeded in gaining power, they started to influence the clerics of Persian decent in Iraq. They increased their appetite to achieve power in Iraq with Iranian peers support. In 1965, Hizb al-Da’wa al-Islamiya (the Islamic call party) came into existance. At the beginning it was not a political party. Its activities were restricted to the revival of Shi’a teachings. It functioned at the area where Shi’a followers out numbered Sunnis, such as Najaf, Karbala, Samara and Kazimya, etc. But its ultimante goal was unmistakenably political. As teachings of Shi’ism tended to raise tensions. The Al-dawa party published a bulletin which reported the activities of the Shi’a dissidents in Iraq, who run para military training camps in Iran(5).

120
The Dawa's teachings had been by and large responsible for the revival of sectarian strife. In 1970, the high religious authority in Iraq was passed from al-Hakim to mohammad Bagir al-sadrr. The Da'wa party attitude had changed towards both the Shah and the Ba'ath. In 1975 an agreement was signed through which the Ba'ath came to terms with the Shah. As a result Kohmeini had parted company with Ba'ath and began to support Da'wa party. He had also supported the new spiritual leadership of al-Sadir.

The two leaders had won each other's confidence, following Kohmeini return to Iran after establishment of the Islamic republic. It was reported that he had invited al-Sadr to lead the Islamic revolution in Iraq. Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, born into an Arab family of Najaf in 1930, who's family had dedicated to the Shi'a affairs. Several member's of his family were drawn into politics, and had participated in the nationalist activities. Al-Sadr, who, won a high reputation in the nationalist movement, had published wide range an Islamic subjects. Although, he pleaded that his writings were aiming to reform the society, but his ultimate goal was political as classified by critics of Ba'ath regime.

He was acknowledged by Ulama as Chief Marji, who had power to issue legal opinions on questions of the day, that would be binding on the community of believers on all levels. It was instrument through which the Mujtahids could carry out the call of high religious authority in religious as well as educational
institutions (al-Hawzat, al. illmiya). Even ever since the Ottoman empire days, the Shi’a community had began to establish these educational institutions, because of the discrimination against Shi’a in education and employment fields.

Therefore, Shi’a followers were bound to fall back on their own communal organizations and school run by the Ulama, and ultimately guided by the high religious authority. The students from Iran often went to Najaf in Iraq, as its institutions had an excellent reputation throughout the Shi’a world. This had helped the Shi’a students to develop an affinity for one another and common identity, since they were brought up in these educational institutions irrespective of their country. When the war broke out and the media spread the call of the Mujtahids in Iran to their co-religionists in Iraq to rise up against the Ba’athist regime, the initial response was almost spontaneous leading to tensions and an attempt of uprising among Shi’a community in Iraq.

The mass media, echoing Kohmeini’s ideas denounced, time and again, the Ba’ath regime as secular and racist because it segregated the people on the grounds of national and ethnocultural identities. Surprisingly, underground organizations were inspired by Iran as they were very active in the country spreading propaganda called on believers to overthrow the Ba’ath regime. The "supreme assembly of the Islamic revolution in Iraq (Sairia), which was led by Hajatolislam Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim Sairi was closely linked to Iraqi underground al-Dawa. Kohmeini
had instructed them as he did on September 20, 1983, to aim to form an Islamic government and to implement God's command in Iraq.

The Iranian regimes had waged systematically ideological war through the press and subversive activities not only in Iraq, but also in other Arab countries and the west. There had been public statements against Israeli occupation of Arab lands. They supported Palestine liberation Organization (PLO) and had provided President Asad and Colonel Gaddafi with pre-texts for their support of Iran, ever since Iraq's pre-occupation with the war against Iran. This, had undermined Arab position vis-a-vis Israel thus keeping armies of both countries locked in the war, instead of joining Arab confrontation with Israel. Mean while Iran had intensified its support to the Shi'a of Southern Lebanon. As Iran had its own view of its role in the Muslim world as the champion of Shia Islam.

The Iranian leaders had supported all their sympathizers outside Iran. In Syria they sought co-operation with members of Da'wa party and Amal organization. But the differences in views of the leaders of both organizations regarding leadership questions, whether to entrusted to civilian or clerical led to the divisions and hence two organizations had emerged.

The revolutionary Islamic and national front of Iraq, had both Areligious and civilian, members headed by Hassan al-Nagib who was a retired Iraqi General supported by Syrian authority. The second organization was established in 1982, and its clerical
leadership was headed by al-Islam Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim, an Iraqi of Persian descent. Having dual nationality, Iranian as well as Iraqi, he was instrumental in helping the Iranian authorities. However, the Iraqi government countered these activities by encouraging the Shi'a leadership inside Iraq (Ulama). Their differences were exposed with Iranian Mujtahids, and they persuaded Shi'a followers to give up their support to the Iranian revolutionary leaders, who strived to divide the Muslim people. Therefore, the Gulf was not merely a battle between armed forces of two countries.

But it also became confrontation of manifold dimensions between two political systems. Whereas one claimed to drive its legitimacy and inspiration from religion, the other one derived its legitimacy from Pan-Arabism and nationalism. Both were stressing doctrines compatible with modern age. Yet, for their survival, they were to make concessions, and to accommodate to modern conditions of life, and to adjust material and technological innovations to the cultural heritage, which the people not only in both countries, but all over the world honoured.

MISCELLANEOUS CAUSES:

Although the Iraq-Iran war was started as a conflict between two Gulf neighbours, still it was no longer confined to only two countries. It was a war in which almost all the Arab countries were directly or indirectly involved. Iran's Arab relationship was influenced by the fact that Iraq, the Arab state next to
Iran, their relationship were full of pitfalls in the view of boundry problems. Iraq was directly involved in several conflicts with Iran, such as Shatt al-Arab question, Khuzistan and continental shelf agreement, etc. Iraq began to use the slogan of Arab solidarity against Iran, and attempted to colour the Iraq-Iran dispute as Arab-Iranian dispute.

Clearly Saddam Hussin launched campaign to harp on the theme of Iranian threat to the Arabs in Gulf. Saddam as a Deputy Chairman of Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council reportedly on October, 17, 1971, said "we want Arab Gulf to be a free Arab region, we are an Arab party (the Ba’ath party of Iraq) and we are very jealous for our Arabism to the great extent, but imperialism concentrate its attack on us, because we refuse co-operation with it. We do not want others to picture us as the first threat to the Gulf region and the foreigners as the second. What we believe is that the Iranian regime and the Shah, who is in power, are the first threat. What we want for the Arab Gulf is that it keeps its Arabism."(19)

(C) The Problem of Nomenclature:

In additional to the question of Arab-Iranian Conflict there were some specific issues that from Iranian point of view, had constituted threat to its national security. Both the Arabs and Iranian were extra-sensitive about name, Arab or Persian of the Gulf peninsula. The controversy had originated in the mid 1950s, under the impact of the Arab nationalist fervour emanating from the Suezwar. The Arabs maps printed which had described the Persian Gulf as "Arabian Gulf".(19)
The term Arab Gulf had gained popularity in the Arab World, this was not a mere matter of nomenclature.

Iraq-Iran rivalry was deep rooted in their history. It was a rivalry between two different races, religious and cultures which had divided the two societies. An effort to create Arab News Agency in 1976, had created a bitter Arab-Iranian controversy. All ambassadors from all Arab Gulf countries were recalled Iran urgently. The idea was to form an Arabian Gulf News Agency which was initiated by Abu Dhabi in Conference of Ministers of Information of seven Arab States in the Gulf. The Iranian government objected to it very violently when the question about the name was raised. Hassanen Heikal, the noted Egyptian journalist while interviewing the Shah for a Beirut paper, al-Anwar said that one possible explanation for the change of name was that out of eight states sharing the shore of the Gulf except which was Iran only non-Arabh state. The Shah refuted the argument by saying, 'Do facts of history and geography change in this manner'. As things stand today there is no acceptable solution to this deep rooted problem.

The Arab Iran rivalary or rather Iraq-Iran rivalry, once again proved that both countries as things stood were in no mood for worthwhile compromise.

(B) Khuzistan or Arabistan Issue:

Arabs nations have always asserted that this strategically located area on the Persian Gulf coastal oil, have had belonging
to the Arab world. As facts stand it was occupied by Reza Khan in
the early twenties\(^{21}\). In addition, Khuzistan was an old problem
that had plagued Arab-Iran relations. The east bank of Shatt
Al-Arab had been peopled by Arabs for many centuries, being ruled
by successive Arab dynasties, and the area was always known as
'Arabistan'. This area had become as emirate in 1960, under emir
Ali Bin Nasir al-Kabi. During the Kabide period this lasted over
200 years. Later, Arabistan expanded to encompass the town of
Hindian in the east Ahwaz in the north and Shatt al-Arab in the
west.

Through skillful and cunning maneuverings the successive
emirates were able to play the Ottoman empire off against the
Persian to their own advantages, thus avoided being drawn into
forced alliance with either. As they had emerged as defacto
guardians of Shatt al-Arab they had developed a formidable navy
that dominated the northern part of the Gulf and enabled them to
collect tolls from all ships visiting Basra. Both Ottomans and
Persians launched periodic forays against Arabistan, which
managed tenuously to remain independent for many years. The
Arabistan Emirate occupied an extremely important position being
the main route and trade link between the two rival empires. It
was also the half-way port between India and the East African
coast. While British East India Company came in the scene they,
challenged the Kabide’s trade monopoly in the area. The British
worships became involved in frequent clashes with those of
Arabistan. The British played double game of plotting to Snatch
Persia into British empire, while at the same time, accepting
bribes from Ottomans for protecting Basra, then bereft naval spot. At the same time the British navy blocked the mouth of the Shatt Al-Arab, but at the same time it was itself blockaded out from that water way.

The commercial port of Muhammarah (Khorramshahar) was established in 1812, which had increased the importance of Shatt al-Arab. In 1823 the Persian invaded Arabistan and seized and occupied Muhammarah thus subjugated emirate temporarily. After a three day battle in 1837, Ottoman troops captured Muhammarah, drove out Persians and occupied the most of Arabistan, including Falihya. On the Jarrahi river, then its capital city Arabistan incorporated into the Wilayat of Basra. At about this time both the British and the Russian forced themselves on the scene as a mediators. They compelled the Ottomans to withdraw back to the west side of the Shatt Al-Arab. But British were against allowing Persia to annex Arabistan because they wanted its Karun river area to be opened to them for commercial and naval enterprises. A mixed boundry commission was established in 1843, which for the first time defined the southern part of the join frontiers as being the Shatt Al-Arab, the 72 miles long water way that was the confluence of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates, and flew south wards into Persian Gulf. The second treaty of Erzerum of 1847, confirmed earlier boundry agreements. Khuzistan was an old problem that had plagued Arab Iranian relations even during twenties.
The disputed Shatt al-Arab created a difficulty of smooth navigation in the Persian Gulf. The threat perception of Iran’s security by Iraq had persisted. Iranian oil installation especially before acquiring super-tankers, it had the requirement and facilities port, where oil could be pumped into-tankers, but Abadan was situated on the controversial Shatt al-Arab, as long as Iran-Iraq relations were smooth Iran could underplay that threat. But after 1959, following the outbreak of Iraq-Iran hostility on Shatt al-Arab issue, Iranian began to have a second look at Abadan. The big tankers could not navigate the shallow waters of the Shatt al-Arab. The Kharg island was about thirty miles from the shore, which had the advantage of deep water and a sheltered harbour for big tankers. Though it was relatively distant from the Iraqi border. But its isolation pass had created problem of security on the major terminal points against either a surprise attacker.

Iran’s oil security lied in ensuring an uninterrupted passage of oil tankers in the Gulf and beyond it. Unlike, Iraq or Saudia Arabia did not have pipeline to the Mediterranean. Therefore, freedom to use the waterway both in the Gulf and beyond, and also in the Shatt al-Arab became a cardinal principle of Iran’s oil diplomacy. Iran’s fear of the threat to the oil lane in the Gulf arose both from a larger fear of Arab-vis- Iranian rivalry as well as the fear of guerrilla threat to the tankers in the Gulf and subversion based on the Arab littoral. It also arose out of
the general fear of Iraq, especially in the controversial Shatt al-Arab.

POLITICAL CAUSES:

Iran had succeeded to emerge as dominant regional power in the Gulf despite the fact that there were seven small and big oil producing Arab states in the same region. Iran's policy during seventies, was the result of the logical continuity of its earlier policies, such as its need to control the life line of Iran, to protect its oil wealth, and oppose radicalism and insurgency in and around the Gulf. The growth of Iran of a major military power in the 1960s had resulted from its being surrogate. British withdrawal from east of Suez had facilitated to lower western powers profile in the Gulf. This tempted Shah's anxiety that Iran's vital oil industry components on the Gulf-oil wells at the head of Gulf. The biggest oil refinery in the world, Abadan on the Shatt al-Arab estuary and the loading facilities at Kharg island were left vulnerable. The west's interest was also served in encouraging him to take responsibility for protecting the vital sea lanes of the Gulf. He called important checkpoint at the straits of Hormuz the "jugular vein of the west.""^^^\n
The USA economic interests in the Persian Gulf are primarily determined by the huge oil resources. The importance of oil for the USA grew in the 1970s, when, it became the biggest importer of energy resources, mainly from the Persian Gulf.\n
130
Iran's quest for a dominant role first in the strait of Hormuz (Oman), then in the Arabian sea (Bab al-Mandeb) and finally, in the Indian Ocean was in essence the logical result of its Gulf policy. The ruling elites in pursuit of a well-defined policy tended to exploit all possible chances not only to justify its policy but also to enlarge the number of options available to it. Iran used the threat from Arabism, radicalism insurgency, and question of the security of the Persian Gulf was justification for its policies.

The Iranian elites have had propounded the thesis of encirclement during 1970's. They visualized Iran being surrounded on all sides by a combination of interlocking forces hostile to Iran. The threat to Iraq was perceived from Afghanistan, India, Dhofar, Iraq and USSR. This thesis gave Iran an excellent justification to adopt aggressive political and military policy in Oman and Dhofar. The province of sultanate of Oman had become the focal point of an incipient radical ferment in the coastal states of the Gulf.

The uprising of the revolutionary movement, first surfaced in the Sultanate of Oman. Dhofar was annexed by Sultan Turki Ibin to Oman in 1879. But his hold remained shaky over the territory until the beginning of this century. Dhofar offered an excellent terrain for guerrilla warfare. Situated on the southern fringe of the Arabian peninsula, it has an area of 35,000 square miles. It represent the most tropical enclave in the peninsula. It has had an arrow but fertile coastal plain, about 300 miles long. Behind
the plain stood ten miles wider range of qara mountains, which were watered annually by south west monsoon of the Indian Ocean. The mountain rise to the a height of 3,000 feet before they descend north wards into the infernal sands of the Rub al-Khali Desert (the empty Quarter), the monsoon extending from June till September, here the nucleus of popular front for the liberation of the occupied Arabian Gulf was established in 1960, when a splinter group of the Dhofari branch of the Arab nationalist movement a pan-Arab and pro-Nasser organization founded in the late 1955, in Lebanon by young graduates of the American University of Beirut. Here was a cover organization called the Dhofari Charitable Association which had engaged in the religious and social welfare activities.

The shifting international environment not only help Iran to justify its policy but also to seek international support. Iran used the old argument of the threat from Arabism, radicalism and insurgency and security of the sea lanes. The developments that took place in 1973's resulted increase in the oil price, strengthened Iran's position, offered Iran sufficient petro-Dollars to think in terms of developing independent foreign policy. However, environmental change began after 1975. Iran during the 1970s, was a dominant military power in the Gulf.

This was a result of USA deliberate policy of wooing not only the oil rich Arab States in the Gulf but also Egypt, so as to enlarge its long-term strategic options in the Middle East. Iran had attained its objectives in the Gulf. It publicaly
proclaimed its legitimate claims as the dominant Gulf power. The north-eastern corner of the Indian Ocean was not vacuum. Despite the propaganda that the British east of Seuz might lead to more rivalry. British already had left Aden, and the Soviet task force had moved towards Bab al-Mandeb. The Anglo-American base at Diego Garcia was already taking shape. The US naval base in Bahrain was upgraded. The Shah’s desire to be the Guardian of stability in the region coincided with American interests. A strong pro-western posture of Iran served to solidify the position of conservative states within the Arab Gulf. The Iranian military took responsibility for patrolling the Gulf, and combing to the assistance of regimes faced with internal threat.

Iran’s expansion its policy in the Gulf, Arabian sea, and of course Indian Ocean, was logical extension of its Gulf policy. Iran had to face the inevitable resistance from forces that had already established themselves in the area. Especially USSR, Iraq, and Egypt were perceived as a potential threat to the Iranian security.

The perception of encirclement from threatening nations gave Iran justification to develop options that might strengthen her policy to emerge as a major regional power in the Arabian Sea and even in the Indian Ocean. The thesis of encirclement rested upon the hypothesis that India was prepared to link up with Iraq and USSR in their alleged frontal encirclement against Iran. The most significant developments which led to negotiation India-Soviet treaty of 1971, and Iraq-Soviet treaty 1972, because of
Bangladesh war, which resulted distintegration of Pakistan enhanced Iran's anxieties.

However, this theory of Iran's threat perception could not be proved, since India had maintained cordial relations with Iran. On the other hand Pakistan sought close ties with China and even with USSR. It was Iraqi aggression that posed the most likely threats to Iran's security, of gulf states and to the flow of oil. These concerns with intra-regional contingencies reflected in early planning for the rapid deployment force. The changes in military postures associated with Carter Doctrine enhanced American's ability to intervene in conflicts involving local actors.

The US economic interest in the region was not limited to oil. For Washington the Persian Gulf was a high profitable market for armaments. In 1974 the countries of the region purchased weapons worth 4.3 billion dollars, or 52% of the total export of American weapons for that year.

The most significant attempt to deal with the problem of the Gulf security by Gulf states was the establishment of the Gulf co-operation Council (GCC). In February, 1981, the evolution of idea of a regional security system was not new in the Middle East. It was implied in the pact of the Arab League to provide adequate security, that had prompted the Gulf countries to envisage a security system of their own. The outbreak of Iraq-Iran war presented serious threat to their very existence which prompted them to overcome local differences and dynastic rivalries to form an Arab Gulf Security Organization.
Therefore, the very creation of GCC was intended to coordinate a military systems. A common security policy was not thought at the initial stage. In fact it came in the form of ad-hoc response to either internal challenges or violent trends in the Iran-Iraq. Consequently, internal security and external defence constituted commonalities in the GCC security cooperation (30).

ROLE OF REGIONAL ACTORS:

Iraq-Iran conflict was the product of historical forces in which other Gulf countries directly or indirectly concerned with. The impact of war fought on land, sea and in the air could not possibly, therefore, be ignored or isolated by Gulf states neighbours. In fact the whole Gulf had become a war theater. Approximately fifty miles area around Kharg island was declared by Iraq as war zone. Most of Iran’s southern Gulf territorial waters was declared by Iran as prohibited zone for navigation by the non-combat vessels. Iran’s message to Iraq immediate its neighbour and to all Islamic countries was meant that its aim was to establish the Islamic government. They felt that the very enforcement of Islamic law was to deal with domestic and foreign affairs in accordance with Islamic standards. Without each country would be formally associated with Iran in an equal or subordinate relationship was not clear. Still, Iran reviewed its policy of carrying into international arena its doctrine of revolution. It appeared that Iran present threat in the region (31).
Iran seemingly aspired to win the war and wished to play the role of leader in the maintenance of peace and security in the region. Iraq's relations with the Arab Gulf States have never been always cordial and friendly, mainly because of Iraq's territorial ambition particularly in Kuwait. Baghada move alarmed other Gulf countries, following the fall of the monarchy in 1958, and establishment of the republican regime in Iraq and recurring military coups. These development have had strong impact, in the region. The adoption of socialism and other radical doctrine by the Ba'ath party, and its alliance with Soviet Union also concerned the Gulf States. Alarm further deepen in recent years, when the Ba'ath stressed pan-Arab goals, and enhanced greater interest in Gulf affairs.

The Ba'ath leaders, time and again, assured Gulf rulers that they have had no intention of interfering in their domestic affairs. While the Gulf States shared Iraq's viewpoint in principles regarding the pan-Arabism doctrine. But they were suspicious of Iraq's ambition to play the role of leader in the Gulf security affairs. The understanding between Iraq and Saudia Arabia began when the Amir Fahad, who was a crown prince, visited Baghdad in 1974, after a year, Saddam Hussein, who was Vice-Chairman of the revolutionary command council, visited Riyadh. While speaking Riyadh, Saddam made it crystal clear that Iraq's policy was aimed at strengthening Arab independence and maintain its territorial integrity. Iraq's aim was not to threat their independence.
However, due to its alliance with Soviet Union and foreign pressure, stress of radical doctrines had penetrated in Iraq which were inconsistent with Arab nationalism. Still initial talks were followed by the settlement of a number of pending issues. The dispute over the neutral zone and delimitation of the northern frontier between the two countries were settled. "In February 1979, Iraq signed a mutual internal security agreement with Saudia Arabia".

This brought close relations of Iraq with Saudia Arabia. In fact it was a result of Egypt’s unilateral decision under Anwar al-Sadat’s leadership to deal with Israel which pushed Saudia Arabia and Iraq towards more close relations, reaffirming Arab solidarity. In addition two more events worked as means of harmony in their relation, the first was Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which was perceived as a move by Super-power to threaten the Gulf region. The second was Islamic revolution in Iran, which was considered as immediate threat to their regimes. On February 1980, Iraq proclaimed the Arab patriotic declaration, consisting eight points, in which it committed itself to refrain from resorting to force, except in legitimate self-defence in its relations with Arab and other regional countries.

After the outbreak of Iran-Iraq hostilities, Iraq declared that it was fighting not only its own war Iran, but an Arab war to defend not only Iraq, but for Arab territorial integrity. After announcement of British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf islands, Iran had advanced its claim on Abu Musa and the greater
and lesser islands of Tumbs, which were claimed by other littoral states of the Persian Gulf. Earlier Iran had peacefully handled its claim to Baharin islands. Though it was hoped that its claim to the three islands (Abu Musa and the two Tumbs), could be settled through peaceful means. But twenty four hours before the British withdrawal Iranian troops replaced the British and occupied the three strategic islands of Abu Musa and the two Tumbs on November 30, 1971, butterssed by its strategic control of the strait of Hormuz. After gaining the three islands, Iran claimed as a regional power in its own right. It was hailed as the policeman of the Persian Gulf.

However, when war began, Iran started to counter attack and it appeared as if it was gaining ground, Iraq’s Arab neighbours could not remain indifferent to the possibility of Iraq’s losing the war. Arab Gulf countries were not adequately prepared to tackle their own security problems. The oil installation on the western coast of the Gulf was exposed to attack by Iranian air crafts. Most of the Arab countries became sympathetic to Iraq. But they hesitated to commit themselves. Those who took stand against it, according to the Arab league provision held a meeting in Tunis, in September 1980. Shortly after the outbreak of war, the members arrived at no consensus.

The Arab Gulf countries supported by Jordan, Morroco, Mauritania and North Yemen took side of Iraq. Whereas Syria and Libya supported Iran. Each side had its own point of reasons. Algeria prepared to offer its good offices to Iraq and Iran as it
had done in 1975. However, with great enthusiasm Jordan supported Iraq. King Hussein considered the Arab revolt which his grandfather King Hussein Bin 'Ali the Sharrif of Makka had led during the First World War. The fountain spring of the Arab nationalism subsequently spread throughout the Arab World. He perceived establishment of Islamic republic in Iran as threat to the Arab nationalist movement. Jordan extended economic assistance by throwing open its Red Sea outlet through the port of Aqaba for Iraq’s export and import trade as well as other land and air facilities. From Islamic perspective Saudia Arabia has remained as cradle of Islam and the home of the two holy sanctuaries of Makka and Madina. Iranian’s activity in spreading propaganda during pilgrimage against the Saudian regime, and its call to the Shi’a minority in Saudia to demand more legitimate reform in the fields of education and culture. The Bahrain Shi’a community relatively well organized and active, reacted more quickly to Iranian instigation. As a result Shi’a followers demonstrated against the ruling Sunni family.

Syria’s economic difficulties might have contributed to Asad’s hostile attitude toward Iraq. Despite Saudi’s financial assistance, Syria became heavily burdened with debt. To the world bank and Soviet Union, Syria concluded agreement with Iran, in which Iran was to provide Syria with one million tons of free oil and two million tons at 25% less than OPEC price over a year. It seem that Iranian impose on Syria on Lebanon are going to be more important in Syrian eyes, then what the Iranians are doing to the Iraqi, the other alternative to Syria’s alliance with it would be
to call to life Syrio-Iraqi unity scheme. Which will give Asad a free hand to reduce Iran’s influence in Lebanon.

Libya’s attitude towards Gulf war was determined by several factors, but the most important was its conflict with USA. Indirectly, its conflict with the US caused the quarrels with moderate Arab States, such as Saudia Arabia and Jordan. After outbreak of Gulf war USA despatched air borne warning and control system air craft to Saudia. Reacting on it colonel Qadhafi referred the presence of the AWACS as an occupation and called for Jihad to free the holy sanctuaries. The disappearance of Musa al-Sadr, the Shia’a spiritual leader in Lebanon, who visited Libya in August 1973, its relations with Iran was bound to be affected, as Libya had adopted Pan-Arab policy. Qadhafi was seriously perturbed of Kohmeini’s demand for investigation of Sadr’s disappearance in Libya. Had Quadhafi taken Iraq’s side this might have antagonized Iran in turn. To avoid Kohmeini’s possible denunciation of his policy he supported Iran economically and militarily, that is why Iranian never opened the Sadr’s issue. Since Iran was facing difficulties arising out of war and isolation the Iranian leader persuaded Kohmeini to drop his inquiry about the fate of Sadr. Therefore, he justified his support of Iran as an Islamic country.

However, Iran-Iraq war has proved to be a conflict among Arab countries or with a country outside of the Gulf area, affected the interests of all which invited foreign intervention, resulting in more security complications in the region.
ERUPTION OF WAR:

Iraq's bid for its supermacy in the Persian Gulf area began early in September 1980. In March the diplomatic relations titled as a consequence. Iraq claimed for expulsion of Shi'a fifth column. Iran also claimed in July that the Islamic revolution had foiled a coup attempt backed by Iraq. Following in September 22nd, about 45,000 Iraqi troops invaded Iran. Iraq had expected a swift victory within a fortnight or three weeks, Iraq's was aims were to regain full control over Shatt al-Arab, obtain three islands in the Straits of Hormuz, and probably obtain autonomy for the Arab inhabitants of Khuzistan province. Iraqi military strategy was conceived along the lines of an Israel-type blitzkrieg. The whole operation was to be wrapped up in less than two weeks.

Iraq began liberating some of the 240 square miles of territory awarded to him under 1975 treaty. The Iraqi invasion of Iran was launched on four separate axes, extending across 450 mile wide front north to south these were:

1. In the north between Gaser-sherin and Naft-eshah the Iraqi crossed in division strength (10,000 men), heading towards Kermansh in the east.

2. A little further south of Mehran, the Iraqis crossed over bridge (about 3,000 men).

3. Further south again, a bridge force crossed moving towards Dezful. With its airbase, hydro electric station and crucially important pumping station for the pipeline linkage Iraq's southern fields to Tehran. Dezful is strategically important town for Iran.
4. Against Khorrashahar and Abdan area, the intention being to bulldoze away through the oil complexes to occupy the whole of Abdan island.

5. A fifth attack was launched later in the Penjwin area, to the north of Qasrsherin, the intention being to block-off roads from Sanandaj along with Iranian troops called break into northern Iraq in the direction of Sulaimaniyah.

In the initial phase Iraq could have advanced more inside Iran’s territory, but it seems the Iraq was not sure how the Super powers would react to a full-scal offensive, especially the United States, or whether the Israeli’s would exploit Iraqi pre-occupation with Iran to launch an attack on the northern frontier, and how neighbouring Syria would react. In addition Iraqi was more worried as how the Kurds in the northern hills would exploit the situation.

The well used age old highway from Baghdad to Tehran crossed the Iraq-Iran border to pass through the Iranian town of Qarscherin, which had a predominantly Kurdish population, about 12 miles from the frontier, to the east of Qasrsherin are the massifs of the Zagros mountains, which behind to the west are undulating fertile plain. Qasrsherin sits on a ‘T’ road junction, the highway goes east wards through the mountains Kermahshah (base for an Iranian armoured division), and onwards to Tehran, south wards from Qasrsherin runs the frontier road, generally about midway between the foothills of the mountains and the frontier, to Gilan Ghorab (about 20 miles distant), and hence to Ilam. Additionally, a motorable track runs almost along side the
actual border to Naft Shah (Nafte-Shah), about 30 miles from Qasrsherin, and then to Sumar, another 5 miles or so, and hence to Mehran.

An Iraqi mechanized division made a dawn southerly flanking attack, which quickly over ran Qasrsherin, the leading bridgade pushed along the highway for another mechanised bridgade turned and moved south wards along the frontier road to Gilan Gharb, and just beyond, while elements of the third bridgade.

Crawled along the frontier track eventually to reach Naftshah and Sumar. These advances were fairly slow moving ones, taking the Iraqis six days to reach Sare Pale Zuhab, seven to reach Gilan Gharb, and at least ten to reach Sumar.\(^{(38)}\)

In the initial Iraq’s had a two-to-one advantage in man power on the ground and the benfit of the well-prepared supply lines. The offensive on such a broad front from Naft e-Shah to Khorram Shahr was launched by armour and artillery and could make rapid advance against the improvised and ill-equipped Iranian armed forces. But once Iraqi army reached the well populated towns like Khorramshahr, Dezful, and Alwaz by the end of the second week the Iraqi artialary and armour divisions were not able to engage against the local population. The limited infantry, estiamted to be around 5,000 men, committed to the offensive proved to be totally inadequate to seize the well-populated town. Iranian response to the Iraqi offensive can be summarised as follows:
1. Around 25,000 regular army personnel with light ammunition spread all over the four fronts.

2. The revolutionary guards (pasadran) units which were quickly mobilized and sent to the western and southern Iran’s and to all the important towns.

3. The gendarmerie, whose function had been to protect the frontier, equipped with light medium weapons, some artillery and experienced in static warfare.

4. The Mustadfin army, consisting mostly of unemployed persons, and who had been largely used in a logical capacity to aid combat units.

5. The border tribal militia, consisting of a large number of tribal warriors, who had been induced to fight the advance Iraqi artillery.

Therefore, Iran was able to reorganize its army and started offering stiff resistance. The most surprising aspect of the Iranian response was the use of the air force, from September 24th to October 11th 1980. The Iranian air force especially F-4 phantoms and F-5Es have continuously bombed the principle Iraqi cities like Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk, one story of F-4s that bombed the Baghdad power station in the first week of October passed over the city at about 30 of altitude in groups of two with rear element covering the lead aircraft which carried out the strikes. Similarly the F-5Es equipped with guns, side winder missiles and injection rocks were able to make precise target hits on oil refineries and air base.

Iran could not easily reciprocate by inflicting equal damage on Iraq’s economics resources. At very outset of the war it had
effectively ended Iraq's capacity to export oil via Gulf. Since then Iraq had concentrated on building alternative export routes (pipelines through Turkey and Saudia Arabia), despite the efforts of Iranian supported Kurdish Guerrillas in northern Iraq\(^{40}\).

Iraqi armoured division slowly, but persistently forced, through Khorramshahr and soon aided by groups of infantry rushed in re-inforcements, fighting along on gaining desperate battle that almost destroyed the city itself. By 3rd of October most installations and buildings in both Khorramshahr and Abadan wore or had been on fire, as were oil storage, tanks at the Iraqi Basra refinery across the Shatt al-Arab the Iraqi oil terminal at FAO was deserted. Iraqi air force restricted itself to the role of protecting vital targets. The significant feature of the aerial warfare in the Iraqi-Iran was instead of supporting the ground forces, it concentrated on destroying vital economic targets. It appeared as if the two countries were fighting a total war in the conventional sense. The justification was that crippling the economy would incapacitate the other side from supporting the frontline troops.

Because a country on the war path would have expected this and prepared for it, besides a fighting nation some how rouses up effort to keep frontline troops supplied. Commencing a war with attacks on economic targets and vital installations like nuclear reactors was an indication that a long drawn-out war was intended.
The deliberate picking of economic targets for strikes through aerial bombing and artillery shelling has damaged ports, oil refineries and upcaming industries, put the cloak of modernization back by at least a decade. The damages to each side would amount to 25 to 35 billion dollars, to which add another 10 to 15 billion dollars for each side in loss of oil revenue during the 18 months of the war (41). Iraq’s airforce was targeting to wreck Iranian economy. In retaliation this led to the increasingly frequent Iranian attacks on shipping in the Gulf, and especially on tankers carrying Kuwaiti oil or doing business with Arab States of Gulf (42).

As a consequence both the countries, could not carry economic activities along with war. Both countries were depending upon foreign labour force, especially Iraq, due to outbreak of war thousands of external labours who were to execute a large part of Iraq’s developmental work either left the country, or shifted to the safer places within the country. Reorganizing this labour force after revising their contracts become one dimension of the problem. Since, ports and oil installations in both countries were targets of aerial bombing huge losses in their basic infrastructure in their ports, needed urgent repairs. Moreover, both countries depended heavily on Shatt al-Arab waterway and ports. Iraq was exporting from the Shatt al-Arab area about 3.5 million barrel per day, and Iran about 1.4 million barrel per day. Also mainly from the same area on 22nd the export of oil ceased abruptly. The Shatt al-Arab had become the frontline.

**ECONOMIC COST:**
Under aerial bombardment and artillery fire, the Iraqi oil terminals at Khor al-Amaya, Mina al-Bakr and FAO were badly damaged and became unusable. The Basra oil refinery was shut down too. Iraq claimed that all 152 oil storage tanks at Abadan were on fire, the Abadan refinery ceased functioning on 29 September, and the Iranian refineries at Kerman Shah, Shiraz and Tehran operated at less than half capacity, which accounted for the shortage of petrol for domestic use. The Khorramshahr was soon completely destroyed and oil terminals at Bandar Khomeini and Busher were partially destroyed and became no more unusable.

The disruption in oil production affected both countries. To meet the domestic consumption Iran introduced even petrol rationing system and cut down vehicular traffic. Iraq got some oil from Arab neighbouring countries such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Not only Iran went to the extent of ordering jet fuel from international market. The standard of living in both countries suffered a sharp decline. The development projects have been major casualties of the war. In both countries an equally important area would be relencing the military arsenal. Both Iraq and Iran were having an annual defence expenditure of more than six billion dollars and 1.5 billion dollars during the second half of the 1970s. Even if 25% of this was being spent on stories the two countries together ought to have invested seven to eight billion dollars to reequipped their armed forces.
Crisis in Oil Market:

Iraq's loss of exports was 3.2 million barrel per a day, 2.4 million barrel per a day from the Gulf terminals and 800,000 barrel per a day from mediterranean ports. Iran was deprived international market of about four million barrel per a day. The client states of the oil became the worst affected since both were heavily committed to state-to-state deals which was estimated to be around 80% of the total. The clients for crude oil from post-revolution Iran had heavily fallen among non-communist developed countries. Only Spain and Sweden were getting about 120,000 barrel per a day, and east European countries 140,000 barrel per a day until the war broke out. Among developing countries, India was the largest consumer, Iraq used to sell crude oil almost half to western Europe and Japan, around 420,000 barrel per a day to east Europe and the rest of developing countries.

However, for the industrialized countries, oil companies failed to adjust their gap in demand and supply. Other major producing countries like Saudia Arabia, Venezuela and Kuwait, Qatar, increased their ceiling of production, the worst sufferers were developing countries like India, Philippines and some African countries. Though they imported comparatively small amounts from Iraq and Iran, they were critically short. Normally, deals were made state-to-state, with soft means of payments. But the war forced them to purchase from international market, where they had to make payment on the spot. Thus, it created enormous difficulties to their economy.
Resultantly, Iraq-Iran war had set the oil market on fire. The countries of the world family suffered the shortage of the crude, due to their stock of crude, in some countries like Japan, with sufficient stock of 100 days. The market itself was flowing with production. The net loss of both countries was estimated at about 1.5 million barrel per a day to the market.

With war dragging on, each side threaten to fight the war finish. It was feared that the war might not remain localised. Iraq’s military and political power was butterssed by substantial regional and international assistance. The organization of petroleum exporting countries, acted responsibly to maintain crude market equilibrium. But, this in turn created difficulties for its member because after war, whether member would be willing to reduce their production to the previous ceiling or no, plus accommodating back Iraq and Iran as reliable suppliers. Still, the war continued in low-level fighting for many years. Though the OPEC members honoured their commitments to the two countries for the time being, but effort to make it permanent feature led to more complications after the war. The OPEC was a cohesive group for the limited objective of protecting the rights of its member countries on their hydrocarbon resources in terms of ownership and remunerative price. With the outbreak of the armed conflict among its member countries OPEC had to take the step of protecting the warring member’s interests mutually which became most difficult.
GLOBAL REACTION:

Iraq in its war with Iran had been supported by almost all of the Gulf countries. In both the situation if either country win the war the Gulf nations felt that they would be so sers. All the Gulf countries were ruled by conservative monarchies, who feared the threat of the Ba’ath radicalism. Apprehension was raised that victory of Iraq might threat their existance in case Iraq try to export anti-monarchical radicalism. Iran, on the other hand, was preaching. Islamic fundamentalism, who represented the other edge of the sword. However, not affected the Gulf countries honoured to Iraq oil commitment which had demonstrated the unity of the Arab oil producing countries and strongly pleaded stability and equilibrium in the internation market.

The US militarization of the Gulf, have had caused the Gulf war. It had aquired bases in Egypt, Somalia, Oman and Kenya, Saudia Arabia, which made request to US arms. Accordingly, four air borne warring and control system aircraft (AWACS), weredespatched, by US to monitor Saudia air space and assist them in their air defence. The armada of 60 worships had also been mobilized and stationed in the Gulf for quick operation. As the war dragged, the sense of insecurity among Gulf countries prompted them to look to the United states their traditionally for protection. In contrast, the Soviet Union strengthened its ties with South Yemen and Ethiopia and signed a treaty of peace and friendship with Syria. The non-aligned group of nations
called for immediate cease fire. Similarly the organization of Islamic countries (ICO), and United Nations also urged for cease fire. But, Iran put forward conditions, for resigning of Saddam Hussein. In addition, the Iraqi forces must surrender all their arms to Iran, and Basra was to be given to Iran as a reparation.

Iraq-Iran war became a bitter lesson for the developing countries. As their economy can not be pushed too far to achieve the levels of skills of a developed countries within roughly one or two decades. The modernization of their armed forces has to be slow and steady. Since the Second World War the economic installations have become the prime targetts in culiminated regional armed conflicts everywhere.

The US interests in the Gulf region have arises out of its over all oil requirements. However, closely linked to it has been the US need for the Gulf market. As a result of the spiralling rise in the oil prices since 1973 the US bill for oil imports shot up form $3.9 billion in 1972 to the tune of $24 billion in 1974. Since, then it has been steadily increasing. Afterwards, Washington has been encountering unprecedeened balance of payment problem and hence called for an aggressive drive to step up its exports. In addition the corresponding growth of the oil income of the producing states in the Gulf provided a rapidly expanding market for foreign goods and services. So, geo-strategic importance as well as economic compulsions vigorously reflected in the American approach to these problems in this region since the 1960s.
In broad terms American policy in the Gulf region since the Second World War had evolved in two phases. In the first twenty five years, it was aimed to insulate the Gulf from Soviet influence and to prompt a good operating climate for western oil companies. The US wished to enhance its own power than on a local surrogate, who could not be able to guarantee uninterrupted oil supply in case of crisis in tolerable and sufficient quantities. In this regard Warren Christopher, the United States, Deputy Secretary of State had categorically pointed the United States would do whatever is necessary, including military action, to keep the strait of Hormuz open for commercial traffic\(^{45}\). Obviously Iraq-Iran rivalry opened the flow of accumulation of huge military machinery exceeding of both countries requirement of legitimate defence.

The keen contest in acquiring arms led many fallouts endangering security of the Indian Ocean region also. The America strengthened their military presence in the high seas around the Gulf. There was frequent visit of American ships from Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. In November, 1974, the US Congress passed legislation in Diego Garcia, permitting Pentagon to upgrade the tiny tall from communication facility to an air and naval station by expanding runway to 12,000 ft. and construct a huge fuel storage tank. With advice of the late Shah of Iran, for reason of his own regional ambiguous viewpoint he did not favour American military presence in the Gulf itself. The American decision to build a base at Diego Garcia could be seen in this context\(^{46}\).
The rapid advance of the same Gulf states through succeeding generations of weapons left behind increasing amounts of older equipments for disposal by transfer. Such transfers had been made to countries like Pakistan previously and later to Afghanistan. This had led to the creation of heaven to the extremist especially fundamentalist forces in the region. In the present unpolar system dominant by USA, this system led to the flourishing of fundamentalism and terrorism in international area. Within an easy access to the arms and training base Afghanistan because an alive example. The concern of the whole Asia and Middle East, at present should be focused on this issue. With initiation of UN sponsored conference on terrorism hope has been aroused, but since there was no consensus it continued to remain a crucial issue for the world peace and security.

ASSESSMENT OF PROSPECTS:

During Iraq-Iran war the Iraqi offensive had resulted in total failure. Both the countries failed to achieve a decisive victory. It was due to the broadness of the fronts strategy of both the side. There was huge loss of human life as a consequence of long war. These casualties in six years of Iraq-Iran war had exceeded those of all Arab-Israeli wars in the last forty years, who included 100,000 or so dead.

The strategy adopted by Iraq was basically defensive, but it turn to be offensive which required a high degree of co-ordination and mobilization between the three wings of the armed forces. The soldiers had meagre battle experience. Probably
Iraqi military intelligence underestimated the Iranian military capabilities. The geo-strategic location of Iran made it difficult for easy military operation. Iraqi planes had to fly for a thousand miles to reach Tehran. Both countries economy weakened proving difficult to sustain a long war. But whatever their weakness in Iraq-Iran war, their motive was to justify their claim as regional power. Iraq-Iran war helped Iranian clergy to keep alive the Islamic struggle and secure their own power-base. However, the West by supporting Saddam Hussein effectively created a new regional power which became a political threat to its Arab neighbour Kuwait which was no match to Iraq.\(^\text{49}\).

2. Ibid.,


4. Ibid.,

5. Ibid., p. 9.


10. Ibid.,


12. Ibid., p. 8.

13. Ibid.,


15. R.K. Ramazani, op. cit., p.7

16. Ibid.,


21. Ibid., p. 119.


27. Ibid.,

28. Ibid.,

29. Ibid., p. 76.


32. Dietal, Gulshan, op. cit., p. 56.


37. Sreedhar, op. cit., p. 42.


39. Sreedhar, op. cit., p. 43.

41. Sreedhar, op. cit., p. 44.

42. **Military balance**: 1987-88, p. 126.


44. **Military balance** : op. cit., p. 126.


46. Agwani, M.S. op. cit., p. 128.

47. **Military balance**, op. cit., p. 126.


157