"Tantae molis erat to unleash the 'eternal natural laws' of the capitalist mode of production to complete the process of separation between the workers and the condition of their labour, to transform, at one pole, the social mean of production and subsistence into capital, and at the opposite pole, the mass of the population, into wage-labourers, into the free 'labouring poor', that artificial product of modern history. If money, according to Augier, 'comes into the world with a congenital blood-stain on one cheek', capital comes dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with blood and dirt'.

(The full phrase runs as follows - 'Tantae molis erat Romanam condere gentem' translated 'so great was the effort required to found the Roman race').

The discovery and subsequent publication of the 1844 'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts' in 1933 created a multiple ripple in Marxian studies. For those who were attempting to revive and develop the Hegelian element in Marxism, for those who were trying to combat the attacks from non-Marxist quarters that Marxism was not a philosophy as it did not have a theory of ethics and grounding of action in subjectivity, and, for those whose interests were purely historiographical and often undialectical these Manuscripts became the raison d'être of their theoretical labours. I am of the opinion however that these various tendencies would have found expression in spite of the Manuscripts e.g. Karl Korsch and Lukács had already much earlier begun their articulation of a theory of consciousness—the 'subjective' or voluntaristic factor in revolution. After the war the effects of these Manuscripts were even more strongly pronounced in the works of the various existentialists, the religious echelons of 'marxists' and in the writings of those who 'disillusioned' because unable or refusing to comprehend the real structures of the errors contained in the experience of socialist societies began to reiterate the utopic promises of these Manuscripts regarding communism for after all of them as it is to most, Marxist theory and Marxism is a matter of faith. Somewhere
along the line the very concepts that were formulated with the birth of Historical Materialism were either displaced or ranged along with pre-scientific notions found in the early writings of Marx with their prolific wealth of Hegelian terminology and connotations. These theoretical efforts seemed to unmistakably hint that the key to an analysis of the contradictions of given social formations and their social relations was to be found not in political economy but in the speculative constructs of philosophic Weltanschauung that arose due to the existing fragmentary nature of men's lives - the missing link in the ideal relationship with nature, the loss of a true 'essence' and the ultimate resolutions of all forms of estrangement - of an inter-subjective nature and of that with external reality. The floodgates were thrown wide open for the deluge of various philosophic practices and the encroachment of liberal and idealist ideologies was complete. But of course, to every negative story there must be its positive side. A polemic was created. To assuage the assault the need for a more rigorous reading of the texts becomes all the more an urgent necessity. A theory that could clearly elucidate the demarcation between science and ideology had to be elaborated. The early-later Marx debate in a broad sense emerged from this problematic. Western Marxism
polarised itself around two camps - the philosophico-humanist interpreters of Marxism who remained true to the tradition of the humanist as the 'protagonist of all the humanities' - Lukacs, Korsch, the Frankfurt School, Erich Fromm, Lefebvre, Sartre, Gramsci and the anti-Hegelians for whom Marxist theory is Science - Volpe, Colletti, Althusser, Godelier, Hindess, Brist, Sidney Hook, Daniel Bell and Timpanaro. This is of course to say that there is complete collusion between the various philosophers mentioned, far from it. The implications thus on conceiving the relation between Marxist theory and political practice has been enormous. In this chapter I would like to examine some aspects of this problematic of a 'humanist perspective' interpolations and reading of Marx and argue as to why I consider it as regressive both in its reading of Marx's theory and the consequences it can engender in political practice.

For the humanist, the philosophic quest centers around 'Man' himself. The preoccupation is with a form of life, a quality of life. Humanism has been both a movement and a philosophical perspective originating in the second half of the fourteenth century in Italy and revived richly during the Renaissance. The central quest has been to restore to Man the dignity of the humaness embedded in the various
arts he creates that differentiates him from other species (paideia) and to establish a synoptic view which would ensure his freedom in relation to others and in relation to Nature. A naturalist outlook prevented the concept of freedom from being either decentered or disembodied. The ascetic world outlook resulting in loss of a sensuous relation with others and nature and an absence of a cultural heritage which the Renaissance humanists felt characterized the Middle Ages, was to be recovered in a return to the classical Hellenic period. To recognize the naturality of man (man in nature) was to also extend this relation to that of man in civil society. Moral philosophy hence superseded by virtue of its interests and, subject being Man himself, all 'contemplative' theories – e.g. physics and metaphysics. The latter investigations in mathematics by Galileo and Copernicus stemmed from this same perspective of 'naturalism in humanism'. Man at the centre and nature his domain inferred that the laws of nature were to be grasped and controlled and put to the service of man. Such an anthropocentric view necessarily maintained a pragmatic conception of the relation between man and nature. On the other hand, in social relations the search for freedom remained a spiritual exercise that refined human nature and reflected a degree of 'culturisation' in the very 'soul'
of Man. The development and sophistication of the arts were a reflection of this movement of civilisation. I must apologise for the retelling of this old story of the genesis of humanism but it is a story which has continued to dominate in the history of various philosophical systems and ideas.¹

In the 'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts' private property is analysed not by way of it being a definite element of a mode of production but in terms of the effects it has on human nature. This is in perfect congruence with the analysis of communism itself in an a priori manner, as a certain quality and expression of life. A future society is depicted in terms of what ought to be. As private property is defined as 'estrangement of man' communism automatically assumes itself to be "the positive transcendence of private property as human self-estrangement and therefore as the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man".² The Hegelian notions of transcendence and supersession fused with a Renaissance perspective of a naturalised humanity consistently dominate these writings. Private property must be abolished for a mutilated, alienated consciousness to return to a consciousness of men in their true species-being and in a harmonised relation with nature.

"This communism as fully developed naturalism equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism, it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature, and between man and man - the true resolution of the strife
between existence and essence, between objectification and
self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the
individual and the species. Communism is the riddle of history
solved, and it knows to be this solution".3

The resolution of contradiction assumes an organic movement,
the first contradiction being religion and the second private
property. What exists in Hegel's examination of social
formations–idealism combined with crude empiricism'
surreptiously inserted' is remotely present in Marx's
analysis of private property in these early writings. The
very conception and usage of idealist terminology betray the
speculative perception of private property and prevent a
scientific analysis. Religion, family, state, law, morality,
science, art, etc. are described as particular modes of
production governed by the 'general law' of private property.
And what is private property? It is described as:
"This material, immediately perceptible private property
is the material perceptible expression of estranged human
life. Its movement-production and consumption is the
perceptible revelation of the movement of all production
until now, i.e. the realisation or reality of men".4

Private property is both material and an 'expression' in the
realm of an estranged consciousness. In the section titled
'Human Requirements and Division of Labour under the rule of
of Private Property' private property is made akin to a system of 'alien needs' which create a 'quantitative being' to which in contraposition, the goal of a new mode of production is "a new manifestation of the forces of human nature and a new enrichment of human nature."\(^5\) Innumerable passages can be used as an illustration to show that the Manuscripts unmistakably utilise an anthropological, speculative, humanist mode of analysis. For the Renaissance thinker nature was the 'open book' for man; for Marx here, it is industry.

"The history of industry is the open book of man's essential powers, the perceptibly existing human psychology".\(^6\)

The publishers of the Moscow edition of the EPM in their introduction and a number of Marxist philosophers are of the opinion that these passages are reflective of Feuerbach's anthropological/humanist perspective but I think Marx's philosophical antecedents go further back than Feuerbach. However what concerns me here is not to provide a picture of the formation of Marx's ideas in terms of a theory of the origins, 'interpretation' of texts and the extraction of various elements to corroborate with a certain pre-conceived 'idea' of these texts. This necessarily results in an ideological reading reflecting certain philosophical perspectives and does not contribute to theoretical knowledge. Marxist philosophers in their debates on the
Early-Later Marx have made an ideological struggle out of this problematic by being teleological in their very approach. Either the Manuscripts are utilised to provide a supplement to fill gaps they feel do exist in the later writings or else they are discerned to be homogeneously consistent with the later theoretical developments. The theoretical problematic of science and ideology in the process has been altogether abandoned. To examine these Manuscripts from the point of view of a simple linear 'history of ideas' is an interesting exercise but it provides little insight into the nature of a theoretical terrain, the shifts that occur which really have little to do with actual historical time.

E.g., theoretically in terms of method Feuerbach is pre-Hegel although immediately after Hegel the political consequences of Feuerbach's polemics were of remarkable significance. In an immediate sense they served as a point of departure and as the theoretical object for the birth of a dialectical materialist outlook. Marx's early writings are characterised by analysis via a critique. From a critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State he goes on to a critique of the State itself. This is a methodology that continued in all his writings even in the later period in his political pamphlets. The Manuscripts represent a turning point - the object of discourse is private property and the theoretical
dislocation occurs because the language and concepts are essentially philosophical. Bottigelli correctly ascertained that the 1844 Manuscripts are a phenomenological view of political economy. Private property sets in a reaction of spiritual impoverishment. To criticise Smith and Ricardo from a humanist point of view was to discern really the anti-humanist tendencies of bourgeois economists. This amounts to an ideological practice for it is in this practice that the human subject is theoretically central. In scientific theory the human subject as such is abolished. The problem of philosophizing about political economy truly surfaces here as a theoretical problem, something of the nature Hegel earlier had encountered. Private property, classes, revolution are all central issues here. The partisanship with the proletariat is clearly declared and this is what renders these Manuscripts a political document. The attempts at a theoretical substantiating of communism remain speculative - because the method of a movement from the abstract to the concrete and a return to the abstract is yet to be developed and an a priori mode of constructing concepts is characteristic of all pre-scientific endeavours. Communism simply becomes a resolution of all existing negations. For Hegel alienation is a necessary moment in the journey of the Geist. A return to the Absolute Idea would be the culmination of all estrangements. For Feuerbach an illusory divinity creates
alienation through religion. To abolish religion is to return to the concrete man in his primal nature. For the early Marx private property is the 'loss of self'. A communist society after a revolution and the negation of private property would herald 'the recovery of the self'.

The terrain, the focus of the investigations themselves has been shifted - from spirit to concrete man to society; from an idealist/speculative to an anthropological/humanist to a communist/humanist perspective. The materialist shift is very clear but the older heritage of the philosophic/humanist concept of man as a basis and tool of analysis remains. Althusser illustrates the theoretical dislocation that takes place in the Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach where the inadequacy of the concept of man is felt and therefore replaced by the 'ensemble of social relations'. He is of the view that the concept of 'real humanism' found in the Early Works is developed as against the abstract humanism of the old for which the object is an abstract, speculative one. For 'real humanism' its content is a real object - external reality. Althusser designates this a 'practical gesture' and holds that theoretically new concepts which will explain the structures of the new object scientifically are yet to be formulated.

"This periphrasis immediately highlights the inadequacy of the concept of man to its definition: the ensemble of
social relations. Between these two terms (man/ensemble of the social relations) there is, doubtless, some relation, but it is not legible in the definition, it is not a relation of definition, not a relation of knowledge ... a knowledge of the ensemble of the social relations is only possible on condition that we do completely without the theoretical sciences of the concept of man (in the sense in which it existed in its theoretical claims even before the displacement).

In fact, this concept seems to me to be useless from a scientific viewpoint, not because it is abstract; but because it is not scientific. To think the reality of society, of the ensemble of social relations, we must put into effect a radical displacement, not only a spatial displacement (from the abstract to the concrete) but also a conceptual displacement (we change our basic concepts!)

... This is a characteristic phenomenon of the transition breaks that constitute the advent of a new problematic. At certain moments in the history of ideas we see these practical concepts emerge, and typically they are internally unbalanced concepts. In one aspect they belong to the old ideological universe which serves as their 'theoretical' reference (humanism); but in the other key concern a new domain, pointing out the displacement to be put into effect to get to it".?
Critics of Marx cannot be taken to task if they use the Manuscripts to show that there is a transposition of Hegel's synthesis from 'Geist' on to Man and that the theme of alienation is a common theme of all expressivist critics of modern civilisation. The very logic inherent in coupling alienation as a consequence of private property leads to the utopic speculation of communism as a negation of alienation, leaving the front wide open for attacks from various quarters - from positivists to bourgeois ideologues. The critique of Charles Taylor from a liberal humanist perspective can be used as an illustration. He attacks Marxism on the grounds that Marxism is a synthesis between Enlightenment science and expressive fulfilment and therefore not viable. He utilises the Manuscripts to show first the predominance of Hegelian elements and a Hegelian ambition - the reconciliation of opposites and second, that the transition from bourgeois society to communism is a simple-minded view and that this kind of 'leap into untramelled freedom' is undialectical. Charles Taylor then goes on to emphasize that 'Capital' is not a 'change of view but a shift of emphasis' and that the science it lays claim to is only the practical tasks of scientific socialism, Marx retaining the earlier philosophical expressivist transposition of Hegel in the early writings. For Taylor the early-later Marx problematic and the founding of a Science in the later works
Charles Taylor's understanding and interpretation of Marxism amounts to this:

Communism is Humanism + Naturalism

Early + later Marx = Expressive fulfilment (generic man grasps nature and can impress his free design on it) + Scientific practice (man dominates nature by objectifying it in socialist practice).

This conception serves as a perfect base for his subsequent attack on Marxism. Voluntarism connoting expressivist freedom is incompatible with scientific socialism ("soviet power + electrification").

"Marxist Leninism began to be treated as a blueprint in the hands of master builders rather than the consciousness of a new age of freedom ... Marxist-Leninism has thus realized a marriage of incompatibles, a union first of an extreme voluntarism and scientism - the notion that the science of history objectifies society, as physics does nature, as a domain of potential manipulanda - combined then with the most thorough going determinism. The first two are a natural combination for an elite imposing a new direction on a refractory mass. But this practice cannot be squared with the Marxist perspective of expressive
freedom. And so this massive social engineering is presented as the outcome of the laws of history, emerging from the masses as their inescapable will and destiny ... colossal contradiction in this position. The laws of history cannot be the basis of social engineering and reveal the inevitable trends of events; the mixture of voluntarism and engineering allows place for the growth of freedom". 10

It is difficult to discern what really is at issue for Charles Taylor. Apart from the constant shifts in category from the concrete to the abstract which makes a theoretical reply to the criticism not an enviable task, what really is the object of his critique? Is it Marxist theory or is it socialist practice not in compliance with the theory? If the former, none of the concepts of historical materialism are taken up. His discussion of the science of history reveals a fundamental error that even traditional epistemology recognises - that to conceptually discover the laws that constitute or govern an object does not infer that the object itself alters. Therefore Charles Taylor dismisses historical materialism and the laws of capitalist development on the grounds that e.g. the Bolshevik Party in 1917 'forced' a revolution and consciously altered historical processes. Then he shifts to the latter, the question of practice, decries the role of the party treating the masses as 'refractory mass' and
socialist practice not adhering to the assurances of 'freedom' made in the Manuscripts (1) and so the critique continues ad absurdum. The real root problem is that for Charles Taylor the notion of 'freedom' is an absolute one, to be sought in the realm of consciousness and the Manuscripts assume the nature of an 'easy prey' for him to denounce the achievements of real struggles that are waged in history to resolve the contradictions of a class society. Historical materialism does not survive on the logic of 'predictability'. It is Taylor who utilises this logic by examining socialist practice from the vantage point of the Manuscripts and asks the question - 'Where is the promised freedom?'. The whole manner of investigation into the dialectics of theory and practice, of the distinction between science and ideology is in itself unscientific because he collapses the distinctions and forces the discussion on to both a speculative and ideological terrain. In the final analysis it is the political implications and proletarian viewpoint of historical materialism which compel most non-Marxist critics to raise 'theoretical' questions of this kind. 'Freedom' is a point of contention - the freedom of those of the ruling class, for whom underplaying class and private property is strictly in their own concern as is overplaying the illusory nature of bourgeois freedom. Hence, they underplay the politics of the Manuscripts and stress on the
utopic elements of the Manuscripts when critically assessing socialist countries.

An ideological critique of Marxist theory and practice reveals the true nature of all ideological practices. What is ideology? Although ideology is men's consciousness and imagination of their relation with reality, but, as they perceive it, it is nevertheless an expression as real as the true nature of reality itself. It can be cognized as a system of representations, as a relation of signs and it is history which determines whether it was a false consciousness or whether it accurately determined the matrix of social relations. Objective investigation forces the social scientist to go beyond the appearances to the real but this does not infer that appearances are any the less real. Althusser defines ideology as:

"the expression of the relation between men and their 'world' ... the unity of the real relation and the imaginary relation between them and their real conditions of existence .... In ideology the real relation is inevitably invested in the imaginary relation, a relation that expresses a will (conservative, reformist, revolutionary), a hope of a nostalgia rather than describing a reality".11

The liberal's attack of socialist societies on the question of freedom (often rhetorical) is made from the vantage point
of the bourgeoisie's ideology of freedom which is accorded him and which he enjoys by his very class and the relation he has with capital. E.g., the Constitution of almost every capitalist society grants that all men are equal and free - the owner of any unit of means of production, the worker, the landless labourer. In the final analysis what it amounts to is that every man is free to exploit or be exploited. The bourgeoisie perpetuates the legal expression of equality, the illusory myths that are generated when ideas about a reality get detached from the true structures themselves and begin to be considered as existent objective realities. Social institutions are the organs that give expression to ideology and play the dominant role in the legitimization of ideological practices of roles, beliefs and norms of conduct. They define the paradigm for accepted social behaviour and the ideas men may have about their existence. They are the almost invisible organs of the State, concealing or deflecting in the vast production and matrix of ideas the true nature of the social relations of any class ridden society. Their fetishistic character distorts and distances theoretical practices from cognizing and constructing in the imagination real structures and the relations they determine. They can either serve as fetters for the development of scientific knowledge or as an impetus for science to clarify and define its goals. E.g., the
proletarian viewpoint contributes to the further development and growth of historical materialism. Marx accurately discerned the theoretical overdevelopment of Germany in contradistinction with its political backwardness when compared with France and England. Philosophic practice isolated from political practice resulted in "the deformation of real historical problems into philosophical ones". (Althusser).

"The real problems of bourgeois revolution, political liberalism, the freedom of the Press, the end of censorship, the struggle against the Church, etc., were transformed into a philosophical problem: the problem of the reign of Reason whose victory was promised by History despite the appearance of reality .... This formulation of the problem (this problematic) naturally commanded its solutions ... the whole solution is thus to be found in the critical omnipotence of which must become practical by dissipating the aberrations of History in the name of its truth". 13

Political practice develops its theory by breaking through the ideological forms that envelop real relations and thus constitutes its own explanations of social phenomena. The interventions often are accompanied by a counter ideological practice which throws up bourgeois ideology for what it really is. Thus the lived relation between consciousness and the reality it reflects on itself alters. Ultimately
therefore, to smash the State is to do away with the old institutions that served as ideological apparatuses for the survival of that State. Marxist theory attempts to explore the irrationality of capitalism by creating a disjunction in the rationalities of bourgeois ideologies. A.N. Rumjantsev points out that 'ideology' can be used in two different senses:

(1) Social science is ideological because it depends on social reality and the real needs and interests engendered by social reality - a synonym of 'superstructure'.

(2) Or, the ideological essence of social science is based on the premise of the complete sovereignty of thought - a synonym of 'subjectivism' which results in the severing of the social sciences from their historical roots.  

He illustrates by showing that for Marx to engage in a materialist critique of philosophical idealism is to "recapture free-floating abstractions that have broken loose from their material moorings, it is to put them back where they belong, to show them as the possession and tools of particular men". In 'The German Ideology' Marx and Engels explicitly state that the different theoretical products and 'forms' of consciousness i.e. religion,
philosophy, morality, etc. arise from the material production of life. The form of intercourse is connected with and created by a mode of production i.e. civil society in its various stages. Ideological practice is social activity generated by the social division of labour, private property and the State. In humanist philosophy the individual is taken as the unit of analysis and there is a conceptual interpolation of man as a generic, universal phenomenon and therefore his socio-class relations are traced ideologically. Althusser has shown how in this problematic a universal essence constitutes the dominant attribute of the individual. The basis therefore of this philosophy is an empiricism of the subject (individual man) and an idealism of the essence (human essence). Although the notion of ideology is implicit throughout Marx’s writings probably the closest Marx comes to specifically defining it is in the ‘The German Ideology’ where he explicated: "In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of their life process".
When Marxism is coupled with humanism, Marxism is reduced to an ideology performing a practico-social function without a scientific theory and a philosophy serving only as a basis for the political functions and articulations. This is not in any sense to underestimate the necessity and value of a practico-social function but even here to assume a proletarian class viewpoint to serve as the politics of a theory is not conjoint with a humanist viewpoint which has strong affiliations with the petty bourgeois liberal outlook.

When Althusser says that Marxist science is "a science which revolutionaries can use in order to make a revolution" he is making explicit that to theoretically deduce the relations of exploitation, the relations of production of a class society, is to not only theoretically define one's politics but to also simultaneously provide a theory which becomes a weapon in the hands of the class for which the theory in question scientifically analyses its origins and positions in social formations and ideologically declares its partisanship. For the social scientist social formations are the object of his enquiry. To determine e.g. as to what really are the principal contradictions that create human suffering, either the social scientist can begin with the particular mode of production and the relation between labour and capital that engenders a certain quality of life (e.g. the fact that class societies prevent large
sections of a populace from whose labour surplus value is extracted and appropriated by those who own the means of production, from realising and giving expression to their ideals and material wants and instead forces them to live the lives of an unspeakably sub-human nature) or else the investigation can be carried by negating the infrastructure altogether and speculating in an idealist manner on "suffering" itself—build it as a concept or see it as a form of life and continue ad nauseam; real, historical struggles outside the domain altogether.

Prevalent today among Soviet philosophers is the development and defence of the concept of 'Scientific Ideology'. All theoretical efforts at delineating the specificities of scientific practices from philosophic and ideological practices is viewed as being essentially 'bourgeois' and 'revisionist' attempts and as going counter to Leninism. According to this view within the phenomenon of ideology itself ideology can be either scientific or unscientific.¹⁹ To trace briefly their argument:

(1) all ideology has a material base, it is a necessary product of the "material life-process";

(2) in class societies the ideology of the ruling classes serve their interests and this ideology is projected as a "universal" ideology although it is expressive of
that of only the minority. Since illusory, since this ideology does not reflect the true nature of social realities this is 'unscientific' ideology.

(3) Therefore it follows that the class consciousness of the proletariat is 'scientific ideology' precisely because it is not a distorted perception of reality.

(4) The task of science is to formulate and develop the struggle for the transformation of social realities. The formulation of goals and tasks by science is the emergence of scientific ideology.

"In so far as science formulates these goals and tasks, it begins to fulfill the functions of ideology - scientific ideology .... The scientific definition of the programme of action by the masses, of goals and means of policy and the ways of its realisation is a characteristic and essential feature of scientific ideology". This theory of ideology is beset with innumerable problems and serves more towards creating further ambiguities for a theory of Marxism. Significantly enough the paper under reference here is titled, 'Ideology as a phenomenon of Social Consciousness'. Although (1) is faithful to the Marx and Engels observation in 'The German Ideology' that "If in all ideology men and their relations appear upside down as in 'camera-obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from
their historical life process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life process", it is (2), (3) and (4) which are beset with theoretical errors. It is the persistent usage of the term "scientific", the equation of science with ideology that is at the root of the problematic. It is true that 'illusory' ideology or if we have to call it 'false consciousness' is a reflection of a class-ridden society and that it is in combatting this that a Marxist science and a proletarian ideology emerges as a liberating force. But is it not more accurate to term the ideology of the working class as a 'revolutionary ideology' instead of as a 'scientific' ideology? To recognize, emphasize and wage the politics and the partisanship of Historical Materialism is not to theoretically collapse its distinctiveness from ideology per se. For the proponents of scientific ideology it follows therefore that science, theory is equivalent to forms of social consciousness. The difficulties thus become innumerable leading us often into that non-sequitur of a theoretical battlefield that opponents of Marxism and rabid defenders of capitalism are prone to asking - "How do we say that a particular science is proletarian and another is not?" When Lenin stressed that "materialism includes partisanship, so to speak, and enjoins the direct and open adoption of the standpoint of a definite social group in any assessment of events".
and that Marxist theory "combines the quality of being strictly and supremely scientific (being the last word in the social science) with that of being revolutionary it does not combine them accidentally and not only because the founder of the doctrine combined in his own person the qualities of a scientist and a revolutionary, but does so intrinsically and inseparably. Is it not a fact that the task of theory, the aim of science, is here defined as assistance for the oppressed class in its actual economic struggle"? Two distinct factors become clear: Firstly, that the materialist reading of history represents the class struggle in theory and secondly, that the politics of a Marxist science are not accidental or incidental but a definite product, a consequence of that very theory. Therefore contrary to (4) the struggle and the politics of the proletariat which is based on a Marxist theory, on historical materialism need not be and is not 'scientific ideology' but the active political practice that is demanded by the percepts of this theory. Theory and political practice is not furthered by a simple, juxtaposition of bourgeois ideology as error, proletarian ideology as truth and more than this to deduce as to what constitutes a scientific from a non-scientific concept by reducing science to ideology, to consciousness is to fall into the idealist trap - a non-materialist reading. To insist on the scientific character
of Marxism is to conceive of it as a new science founded on the constitution of a new theoretical object - the social formation. Political practice demands the deciphering of the complex web of contradictions in reality which the revolutionary movement must cognize for its transformational activity. Soviet philosophers by the use of the term 'scientific ideology' and the propagandist criticism that all theoretical attempts at delineating in Marxism philosophy, science and ideology is 'revisionist' conjure away the complex theory-practice problematic. As Robin Blackburn and Bereith Stedman Jones have accurately discerned:

"Ideology does not become more acceptable to Marxist philosophy simply because it is 'revolutionary'. Indeed it is precisely ideology of this sort which is most calculated to mystify political practice since it invariably imagines that it has solved in the theoretical domain problems which in fact can only be solved by political practice. Althusser is fond of quoting Spinoza's dictum that the concept 'dog' cannot bark, because he knows that too many Marxists imagine that the concept 'Dialectic' can conjure away any intellectual problem or even make the revolution".

How is the political position related with Marxist science which lays claim to being a science without requiring "organically to be political in theory"? The true nature
of the social structures which appearances do not reveal, the mechanisms of exploitation e.g. can only be discovered from assuming a political position, from the point of view of the exploited class. It is the partisanship with the working class that makes any recognition of a 'class society, the phenomenon of exploitation itself possible but this is the beginning. The theoretical working out however demands that the hidden mechanisms be grasped in abstraction and substantiated by the resultant laws thus constructed during the journey towards a new science. The structures of the capitalist mode of production revealed in Marx's 'Critique of Political Economy' developed and utilised a number of key abstractions which constitute a science of a particular social formation and here the political position remains external to that theory's content (i.e. that this theory is not organically dependent on the political position) but a political position was a necessary condition for the production of this science. To quote Henry Vettmeyer: "The specificity of Marxian dialectics as a science is that it constructs as its object the concept of this complex process. As such it is more adequate to real practice (political-ideological) since it allows us to think the complexity of its conditions, and it enables us to think the concrete contents and develop the concrete analysis of concrete situations." 27
When Marx described the dialectics as critical and revolutionary he was emphasizing the dominant concern and function of dialectics – to lay bare the laws of motion or tendencies, the disintegrating factors which give rise to the disruption of a social order, to social conflict and revolutionary change. In 'Capital' we have a dialectical mode of investigation, but not the laws of dialectics. The dialectics are a scientific method of investigation into the origins of working class positions and they examine their struggle with the infrastructure as the point of origin and the point of return. A view of Marxism as a science which has for a philosophy one that demands its practice finds its illustrations in Lenin's opposition to the Second International in 'Materialism and Empiricism' where he firmly supports and exhorts a practice of philosophy. If we take cognizance of what Marx meant when he wrote that "we connect our critique to actual conflicts show ... we only/(the world) the end towards which it really struggles .." we perhaps will find it the easier to recognize the monumental nature of 'Capital' – the varied terrains in which the investigations move – from a critique of existing ideologies – e.g. that of Proudhon, Smith and Ricardo to the founding of new concepts by the very overthrow of the prevalent Weltanschauung of capitalist relations. To conceive of Marxism as humanism is to reduce the theoretical investigations to a value-laden ideology.
which carries the simple coupling human-inhuman, thus spiriting away the abstractions founded in the analysis of commodity, the theory of surplus value etc.; in fact the basic units necessary to grasp the true nature and forms of capitalist relations. In 'The German Ideology' from a critique of the critical criticism of the Left Hegelians is developed a theory of ideology - that all struggles for power are merely the forms in which the material interests of classes are represented and fought out, that the struggle must be waged not by philosophical criticism alone but by the overthrow of the existing social relations. The 'Communist Manifesto' is a political treatise on the nature of human societies - that ultimately all history is the history of class struggles between oppressors and oppressed. In the Preface to the 'Critique of Political Economy' the materialist reading of history finds its articulation in the fundamental thesis of this work that the social relations of production correspond to a definite stage of the development of the material forces of production. Social revolution develops when at a particular stage of growth, the forces of production come into conflict with the existent relations of production i.e. property relations (defined by Marx as "... what is but a legal expression for the same thing") forcing these relations to act as fetters. The explanation is to be found not in the social relations of production
but in terms of the forces of production. The basic postulates of Marx's scientific method which distinguish it from that of earlier economists is laid down in the brief 1857 Introduction to the 'Critique of Political Economy'. The starting point of the hitherto existing method was the large aggregates such as population, nation, State-ambiguous and general concepts in themselves, and, from here the analysis of e.g. commodity and exchange were derived. The inverse is the case with Marx's method. The method begins with the analysis of commodities as the economic cell form of civil society and from here a macro-theory of capitalist production - the aggregates of population, State, world market and distribution, explained in terms of definite relations in definite stages of development, are derived. The distinction between the abstract and the concrete is central to Marx's explanation of his scientific method but this has remained a problematic to Marxist theorists i.e. the question of rising from the abstract to the concrete and returning to the abstract. In the final few pages of 'Grundrisse' Marx begins the analysis of capitalist production with the concrete for the commodity is presented as "the first category in which bourgeois wealth presents itself". Martin Nicolaus in his Introduction to 'Grundrisse' states that "the question of the proper beginning remains unsettled in Marx's
Introduction”. 29 But in ‘Capital’ the commodity is the basic cell of generalized production, the most elementary form of capitalist wealth. When utilised as a unit of analysis to explore the inner contradictions of commodity production generated by the discrepancies between use-value and exchange-value, commodity is an abstraction. In fact the entire subsequent analysis of the process of production as a process of consumption of labour power by capital, of capital being synonymous with commodity producing labour, of value as a property of a commodity, the circulation of money generated from a circulation of commodities and finally labour power itself being determined as a commodity, a basic cell of surplus value hinges on the use of commodity as an abstraction and not as a simple concrete. From the point of view of a philosophical appraisal of the scientific method also this 1857 Introduction is of great interest. Again here in these dense passages we have a critique of the method being adopted by the post-Hegelian consciousness but more than that an epistemology which demands a practice of its philosophy. To quote the relevant passage: “...to the kind of consciousness - and this is characteristic of the philosophical consciousness - for which conceptual thinking is the real human being, and for which the conceptual world as such is thus the only reality, the movement of the categories appears as the real act of the production whose
product is the world and this is correct is so far as the concrete totality is a totality of thoughts. Concrete in thought, in fact, a product of thinking and comprehending, but not (as with Hegel) in any way a product of the concept which thinks and generates itself outside or above observation and conception, a product, rather, of the working up of observation and conceptions into concepts. The totality as it appears in the head, as a totality of thoughts, is a product of the thinking head. The real subject retains its autonomous existence outside the head just as before, namely, as long as the head's conduct is merely speculative, merely theoretical. Marx here rejects the Hegelian identification of the real object with the object of knowledge, the real process with the process of knowledge and in the last section of the passage by the use of the word 'merely' in contradistinction to Hegel points to the necessity of practice, the transformation of the object and in detail extends the 8th 'Thesis on Feuerbach' that "All mysteries which mislead theory into mysticism find their rational solution in human practice in the comprehension of this practice". Althusser is right when he emphasizes in his reading of this passage that, "Marx defends the distinction between the real object (the real concrete, the real totality, which "survives in its
Independence after as before, outside the head ...") and the "object of knowledge", a product of the thought which produces it in itself as a thought concrete, ... as a thought object absolutely distinct from the real object".31 It is however Althusser's extension of this epistemological criteria to his conception of theoretical practice where he contends that it not only contains its own criteria of validity but its own theory and its own practice that betrays his misinterpretation of Marx's views on science and revolution. For Marx in fact science begins where speculation ends and for him the appropriation of the world in thought must lead to its transformation in practice. In fact in 'Capital' we have throughout a remarkable demonstration of the scientific understanding of the social processes which is connected with the participation in the struggle for a revolution of the contradictions determined thereof - a science deeply devoted to humanity, quite, quite apart from the speculative and superfluous calls for liberation from humanist schools and their interpreters.

In fact capital cannot be grasped unless it is recognised that it is a social relation. Marx's characterisation of "an enchanted topsy-turvy world in which Monsieur Le Capital and Madame la Terre do their ghost-walking as social characters and at the same time directly as things" captures
in metaphor his investigation of capital's fetishes when the
definite historical and social character of relations and
categories are inverted and 'concealed instead of disclosed'
by the phenomenal forms of everyday life. I will deal with
commodity fetishism in particular as it provides a problematic
where the issues of Marx's scientific method and ideology
become central. In the Preface to the First German Edition
(1867) 'Capital', I, we have a briefing on method and point
of departure of inquiry. They are:

(1) "Every beginning is difficult, holds in all sciences ....
The value-form, whose fully developed shape in the money
form is very elementary and simple. Nevertheless the
human mind has for more than 2000 years sought in vain
to get to the bottom of it, whilst on the other hand,
to the successful analysis of much more composite and
complex forms, there has been at least an approximation.
Why? Because the body, as an organic whole, is more
easy to study than are the cells of that body. In
the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither
microscopes nor chemical reagents are of use. The
force of abstraction must replace both. But in
bourgeois society the commodity form of the product
of labour — or the value-form of the commodity — is
the economic cell-form. To the superficial observer,
the analysis of these forms seems to turn upon minutae.
It does in fact deal with minutae, but they are of the same order as those dealt with in microscopic anatomy."\(^{32}\) (emphasis added).

(2) "The physicist either observes physical phenomena where they occur in their most typical form and most free from disturbing influence, or, wherever possible, he makes experiments under conditions that assure the occurrence of the phenomenon in its normality. In this work I have to examine the capitalist mode of production, and the conditions of production and exchange corresponding to that mode. Up to the present time, their classic ground is England. That is the reason why England is used as the chief illustration in the development of my theoretical ideas."\(^{33}\)

The difficulties posed by later philosophers regarding the categories of abstract and concrete and the claim that Marx's method begins with the concrete i.e. the commodity rests upon their confusing of the method of deriving the "economic law of motion of modern society"\(^{34}\) with the field, the area that is utilised (i.e. England) and the starting point of inquiry (i.e. the commodity). To uncover the elements of the private appropriation of surplus value which is concomitant of capitalist commodity production, the commodity which contains the value relations between the products of labour necessarily is the starting point. The epistemological method, the
formation of concepts here is historical and non a priori. In fact Marx goes so far as to elucidate that: "Man's reflections on the forms of social life, and consequently, also, his scientific analysis of those forms, take a course directly opposite to that of their actual historical development. He begins, post festum, with the results of the process of development ready to hand before him." (emphasis added). Therefore an adequate analysis of the commodity in capitalist relations requires by way of method that:

(a) A preconstituted theory cannot be applied to phenomena.
(b) The derivation of categories and concepts which grasp the conditions and relations of a definite mode of production lies not in abstraction but in concrete existent social forms. The boundaries of economic categories for which they hold true adhere to the conditions of existence of the forms to which they correspond. "A Negro is a Negro. He only becomes a slave in certain relations. A cotton-spinning jenny is a machine for spinning cotton. It becomes capital only in certain relations. Torn from these relationships it is no more capital than gold in itself is money or sugar the price of sugar." The concepts of capital and slavery do not rest on forms that are eternal and natural but on relations that are social and historical.
Hence the study of commodity has to deal, first, with production at a definite stage of development and not with production in general (which Marx terms an 'abstraction' without validity) i.e. commodity production where the product assumes the commodity form (exchange value in addition to use-value) and secondly, with capital's fetishes where the phenomenal of everyday life, the appearances and ideological distortions of capitalist relations deflect the true nature of the relations e.g. commodity is assumed to have a natural price but not a relation among beings.

In his 'Marginal Notes' on Wagner (1860) Marx reflects on his method and I'll quote at some length as apart from the 1857 introduction, these notes not only elucidate the question of method but also the distinctiveness of appearance and reality.

"De prime abord I do not start from 'concepts' and hence do not start from the concept of value, and therefore do not have to 'divide' the latter in any way. What I start from is the simplest social form in which the labour product is represented in contemporary society and this is the 'commodity'. I analyse this and indeed, first in the form in which it appears. Here I find that on the one hand it is in its natural form a thing of use, alias a use-value, on the other hand a bearer of exchange-value, and in this respect itself
Further, analysis of the latter shows me that exchange value is only a 'phenomenal form', an independent mode of representation of the value contained in the commodity, and then I proceed to analyse the latter.\textsuperscript{35}

It is in the circulation of commodities that value as a property of a commodity expresses the inner contradiction of commodity production where it emerges as exchange-value embedded in money which in itself becomes an autonomous economic agent. Value is determined by the number of absolute hours put in by the worker and therefore "as value, all commodities are only definite masses of concealed labour time".\textsuperscript{36} Ultimately the whole process of production in essence is a process of consumption of labour power by capital in its movement to augment itself, appropriate surplus value (i.e., labour power's use-value for the capitalist to produce new value larger than exchange-value) and generate more surplus value.\textsuperscript{37} Value in its final form augments itself in private property which is the 'command over fractions of the total disposable quantity of social labour'. The social relations of a capitalist mode of production find their expression in the relation between capital and wage labour. The worker is driven to sell his labour power for his sheer survival as much as the capitalist, to maintain his position in the relations of production, is compelled to
maximise the extraction of surplus-value from the worker and thus accumulate capital. Ernest Mendel in his Introduction to 'Capital', I, points out that Marx in the analysis of surplus-value and the bourgeois class ('as a sum total of profits, interests and rents') logically integrates the development of the class struggle between labour and capital. In his discussion of machinery and large scale industry Marx writes:

"By maturing the material conditions and the social combination of the process of production, it matures the contradictions and antagonisms of the capitalist form of that process and thereby ripens both the elements for forming a new society and the forces tending towards the overthrow of the old one".38

The section on commodity fetishism is the last section of the first chapter on commodities titled "The Fetishism of commodities and the Secret Thereof". It has been the source of much perplexity and debate for Marxist commentators. The terminology and analogies employed here could well turn on Marx himself what he accuses the commodity of; that "its analysis shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties".39 The major difficulty here rests with the fact that the author has to deal with capitalist ideology, the ideology of relations: "But, so soon as it steps forth
as a commodity, it is changed into something *transcendent*. It is hypothesised that when the product of labour assumes the form of commodities its 'enigmatical character' is revealed and that this arises from the form itself. How do commodities come to take the form of a social relation between products? Human labour expended in the manufacture of a product is expressed in value, and the amount of labour power in terms of time (duration) is the measure by which we arrive at the determination of value. These factors along with the relations between the products which are stamped with the social character of their labour, altogether take the form of 'a social relation between products'. Both the social character of men's labour and the relation between producers in commodity fetishism are obliterated by a new untrue relation - that between things. Marx explicates fetishization by way of the example of the passage of the light of an object which is perceived not by the 'subjective excitation of the optic nerve' but occurs as a relation between physical things. With commodities however, there is no relation between the physical properties and no *material* relation arising from the relation either. Hence Marx draws an analogy between fetishism and the religious outlook.

"In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world."
In that world the production of the human brain appears as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relations both with one another and the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men's hands.... The religious world is but the reflex of the real world.... This narrowness is reflected in the ancient worship of nature, and is the other element of the popular religions. The religious reflex of the real world can, in any case, only then finally vanish, when the practical relations of everyday life offer to man none but perfectly intelligible and reasonable relations with regard to his fellowmen and to Nature".42

In 'Theories of Surplus Value', III, in his critique of the Ricardian Socialist Thomas Hodgskin, Marx points out that while for Hodgskin fetishism is a 'pure subjective illusion which conceals the deceit and the interests of the exploiting classes' it is the exact opposite for him. The way of looking at things arises out of the relationship itself and thus the former is an expression of the latter.43 I have stressed earlier that the analysis of the commodity must be made in terms of a definite mode of production and that the analysis must be social and historical and not natural and universal. Derek Sayer sums up the structure of fetishization quite accurately.
"To view the social properties things acquire under definite social regimes as inherent in their natural forms is to obscure the essential relations that in fact constitute their conditions. It is to desocialise the world. But it is also to do something else. It is, *ipsis factis*, to *universalise the historical*, to predicate of transhistorical classes of phenomena qualities which are in fact specific to individual and historical members of these classes (and indeed define them as such). Fetishism, in short, accomplishes a simultaneous double inversion of natural and social, universal and historical". 44

For those interpreters who do not subscribe to the early-later Marx reading fetishism is an anthropological term and another name for alienation. The relations between men become relations between things, the activities of men passing into an alien being. In this interpretation there has been a severe neglect of both the scientific method that Marx lay claim to and demonstrated and the fetishistic discourse that finds its expression in the Trinity formula of Capital/Profit, Land/Rent, Labour/Wages. The method clearly implies that fetishism does not have the characteristics of a real process and that in the formulation of fetishism what is being attempted is a critique of the conceptions of economics relations, of the ideology of capitalism which must be understood to cognize the rationale of capitalism. The epistemological
principle that is implicit in 'Capital' is that for a critique it must be recognised that the appearance of reality is speculative and this appearance and the ideas based upon this have to be criticised by abstract thought keeping in mind that:

"All science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of thing directly coincided".45

It is critique which deciphers the social hieroglyphics contained in a conception and explains why the essence assumes the appearance that it does. The problematic of appearances cannot be viewed on a truth/error basis. It would be undialectical to view the problematic of reality and appearances on a truth/error basis. Rather, "it is a work of science to resolve the visible, merely external movement into the intrinsic movement".46 Humanist interpreters emphasise that the concept of fetishism implies a viewing subject and a distorted Weltanschauung. What they fail to recognize from the analysis is that it is the definite capitalist relations which generate certain forms. The errors in conception are generated by the very relations.

"The two-fold social character of the labour of the individual appears to him, when reflected in his brain, only under those forms which are impressed upon that labour in everyday practice by the exchange of products ... whenever by an
exchange, we equate as values our different products, by that very act, we also equate human labour, the different kinds of labour expended upon them. We are not aware of this, nevertheless we do it. Value, therefore, does not stalk about with a label describing what it is. It is value, rather, that converts every product into a social hieroglyphic. Later on, we try to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of our own social products; for to stamp an object of utility as a value, is just as much a social product as language". 47

It is the task of a revolutionary ideology to discover the intrinsic connections, to alter the existent conception and it is the task of the working classes to overthrow the very relations that generate the process of fetishization. In the economic trinity first given in 'Theories of Surplus Value', III, 48 is explicated the 'complete mystification of the capitalist mode of production' and it also represents in practice a materialist theory of ideology. Capital, land and labour are all revenue producing sources; capital of course in the course of its circuit producing profit, land rent and labour wages and the labour of the working class creating not only its wages but also the revenue of the other two classes. 49 However Marx immediately in 1865 replaced profit with interest because, although, profit is a phenomenal form of surplus value it still is related to
the sphere of production unlike interest which as a form manifests itself outside of the sphere of production. It is the self-valorization of money where it need not follow the circuit of $M\rightarrow C\rightarrow M$ but takes the route of $M\rightarrow M'$ ($N+\Delta M$) (a sum of money advanced returns in the form of $N+\Delta M$ purely on the basis of a contract). This couple of capital/interest is the most phenomenal form of the capitalist process. It is that which Marx terms as the 'Veräußerlichung' of the relations of capital. An approximate translation of 'Veräußerlichung' is externalization as given in the XXIV chapter titled 'Externalization of the Relations of capital in Form of Interest-Bearing Capital'. Marx describes the interest form of the relations of capital as the most concrete, mediated, fetishized and alienated (entfremdetste) form. Jacques Lacan in a most probing essay titled 'The Concept of 'Critique' and the 'Critique of political economy' (from the 1844 Manuscripts to 'Capital')' has examined both fetishism itself and the apparent links between the terminology of the earlier Marx and the later Marx. He observes that while on the one hand the movement of fetishization seems to be identical to the movement of externalization, on the other hand, the concept of the anthropological critique, 'Entfremdung' (alienation) appears as equivalent to the concept of 'Veräußerlichung'.
volumes three and four we are concerned with an Entfremdung/Veräußerlichung couple strangely reminiscent of the dominant couple of the 'Manuscripts': 'Entfremdung'/Entäußerung'.

He explicates the concept of 'Veräußerlichung' by tracing the circuit of money-capital by way of which it emerges as $M'$ ($M+dM$), the whole process disappearing and not being evident in the form $M-M'$. Marx showed how money-capital enters into the process of production where it expands in value and it is this expansion of value within the process of reproduction of industrial capital that makes possible the increase $dM$. In the formula $M-M'$, since it expresses the result of the circuit, it shows no relation between $M$ and $M'$. Rancliere argues: "The equation is an impossible one. This positing of an impossible relation is, as we know, expressed by Marx in the concept of the imaginary or irrational. Naturally a reason for this irrational or imaginary is found in the conceptual formula which expresses the totality of the circuit of money-capital and its link with the other circuits. The imaginary and a conceptual formula $M'=M+dM$ is explained by the complete formula:

$$M \cdot \mathcal{C}_{MP} \quad \ldots \quad P \quad \ldots \quad C' = M'$$

This formula expressed the conceptual relation, i.e.:

1. it grasps the set of permutations and changes of form which constitute the circuit and unite it to the other circuits in the ensemble of the process of reproduction.
of capital.

(2) It indicates the determinant character of the relation of production which underlies the whole process of the self expansion of value.

The impossible relation of $M'$ to $M$ can only be sustained by what governs the whole circuit: Capital as a relation of production, with its complement wage-labour. Thus the circuit of money-capital is the one which best expresses the capitalist process. In fact it is a peculiarity of this process that it has as its principle the self-expansion of value, as the circuit from $M$ to $M'$ clearly expresses. But this determinate form of the process of reproduction of capital, the process of self-expansion of value made possible by the relation of production of capital and wage-labour, tends to disappear in its result.\(^5\)

In $M-M'$ there is a loss of concept (Begrifflosigkeit) and it arrives at its most extreme, concrete form in interest-bearing capital. The transformation of surplus-value into profit, the division of profit into enterprise are presupposed. The financier who advances a sum $M$ and withdraws $M'$ remains outside the process of production and reproduction. Thus the whole capitalist process has disappeared in the form $M-M'$. The 'Begrifflosigkeit' expresses the disappearance of all the intermediary terms whose connection makes the relation of $M$ to $M'$ possible. It thereby expresses the disappearance
of what underlies this connection and makes it possible, the 
capitalist relations of production. This disappearance of 
the relations of production in the Begrifflosigkeit of the 
form is the basis for the externalization (Verausserlichung) 
of what Marx calls the relations of capital.\textsuperscript{53}

Through the illustration of the capital/interest circuit 
it is clear that Verausserlichung is a relation between 
the relation of production and forms of the process. As 
used in 'Capital', II, III it hardly bears any resemblance 
to the theme of alienation of the early writings where the 
essence of the concept is the externalization, the loss of 
the attributes of a subject into an external object. In 
commodity fetishism a similar form of misrecognition occurs 
when exchange-value for which the commodity functions as 
a Träger (a carrier) gets displaced in the misrecognition. 
A social relation and the factor of that which determines 
relations of production disappear in the 'Begrifflose' 
form which here is the ideological perception of capitalist 
relations - the commodity.

In a footnote Marx writes:
"When, therefore Valiani says: Value is a relation between 
persons \ldots he ought to have added: a relation between 
persons \textit{expressed} as a relation between things.\textsuperscript{54}"
The classical notion of alienation which has been a key 'theoretical concept' for humanist interpreters must of necessity rely on the notion of a subject to sustain its other idea of process — that of the subject-object dialectic. The theoretical space is such that all investigation must originate from the subject, the viewer, so much so that the process of the generation of relations within definite modes of productions remain outside or on the fringes of the inquiry. Hence I would like to draw an analogy here — that in the discourse of those who situate Marxism in the theoretical space of humanism, a fetishized mode of enquiry is adopted. An adequate materialist theory of misrecognition cannot be constructed when the subject, his essence, his perceptions of the phenomenal forms of the means of production and everyday life become the tools of analysis and not concepts which grasp the rationality of the apparently irrational relations and the forms they possess. The capitalist is a support (Träger) of the relation of production, and here it is capital, as much as the worker is a support of the relation of production, here as wage-labour. The scientific discourse necessitates that we cannot make much headway from the grounds of the worker confronting the capitalist. In the movement, the working class confronts the owners of the means of production and their supports. This is not to imply any dichotomy between theory and politics. It is a pre-
condition of all scientific theory and practice that the object or field of phenomena under investigation cannot be altered or revolutionized in accordance with intended ends and aims without a knowledge of the properties and dynamics that constitute the elements and create a particular form. Critics like E.P. Thompson have launched a polemic against theoretical anti-humanism claiming that it depoliticizes Marxism and gives science an idolized status, over and above; in fact at the cost of humanity. Apart from confusing theory with ideology they tend to conclude erroneously that to be anti-humanism in theory is to be anti-humanity in practice! Such a conclusion unfortunately demands another ideological rejoinder: to read Marxism as humanism is to not forge revolutionary politics where the working class does smash the very state that is a pre-condition for the maintenance of the private appropriation of surplus labour and augmentation of surplus value in capital, and, to deny that historical materialism represents the key nexus between economic theory and the science of social revolution. In Marx's account of the general law of capitalist accumulation, the antagonistic character of capitalist accumulation does not find its roots in alienation but in the bondage of labour power to capital and the self-valorization of capital. The relation between the capitalist and the worker is not explored in terms of
subjectivity and essence. In capitalist relations it is no longer the worker who employs the means of production but the means of production which employ the worker. Marx's insight that "Furnaces and workshops that stand idle by night, and absorb no living labour, are 'a more loss' to the capitalist"55 is a poignant description of class relations, of what the working class comes to represent for the capitalist - dead and living labour, in the ceaseless movement of "the wheels of the juggernaut of capital".56
Notes and References

1. A cursory glance at 'The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy' will reveal that of the five texts suggested for a reading on the subject of 'Humanism'; two of them happen to be Marx's 'KPM' and Sartre's 'Existentialisme et un humanisme' and that under the section titled, 'Humanism' has also been used to designate the following doctrines - Communism, Pragmatism, Personalism, Existentialism.


3. Ibid., p. 97.

4. Ibid., p. 97.

5. Ibid., p. 109.

6. Ibid., p. 104.


9. Ibid., p. 147.

10. Ibid., p. 147.

12. E.g., a survey of the realities of higher academic institutions in most third world countries tells us that although declared open to all, students of working class origins constitute an abysmally small percentage of the total student population.

13. Ibid., p. 80, n. 45.


15. Ibid., p. 24.


20. "Thus the logical basis of the distortion of consciousness in ideology is the presentation of the particular interests, aspirations, aims, etc. as the universal, i.e. their definition as universal social interests and social being. This metamorphosis, like any absolutisation of the particular, the individual, its elevation to the rank of universality involves a distortion of reality,
the conversion of ideology into distorted consciousness. From this it follows that the breadth of the social basis of ideology makes a great deal of difference to the relation it bears towards reality". Ibid., pp. 261-62.

21. "Thus scientific ideology is linked with its social base in a fundamentally different way from illusory ideology, in the sense that it not only does not distort reality (because it is the last word in social science), but is also clearly aware of the material and social roots of its origin and development. This fact determines a new type of ideological continuity which is characteristic of scientific ideology". Ibid., p. 263.

22. Ibid., pp. 267-68.


25. Refer to earlier p. 23 of this same chapter.


27. Ernest Mandel in his Introduction to 'Capital' I, when commenting on the necessity for basing communism on a scientific foundation remarks: "Precisely because Marx was convinced that the cause of the proletariat was of decisive importance for the whole future of mankind, he wanted to create for that cause not a flimsy platform of theoretical invective or wishful thinking, but the


33. Ibid., p. 19.


35. Included in 'Utopian and scientific socialism', (Moscow, n.d.), p. 50.


38. Ibid., p. 635.


40. Ibid., p. 76.

41. Ibid., p. 77.

42. Ibid., p. 77.

43. Refer to Marx 'Theories of Surplus Value', III, (Moscow, 1971), pp. 296-96.


46. Ibid., p. 307.

47. 'Capital' I, (Moscow, 1971), pp. 78-79.


49. The trinity formula pinpoints the sources of revenue of the 'three big classes' of bourgeois society - the wage labourers, the capitalists and the land owners. 'Capital' III, (Moscow, 1971), p. 385.


51. Jacques Rancière, "The concept of 'critique' the 'critique of political economy' (from the 1844 Manuscripts to 'Capital')" in 'Economy and Society', Vol. 5, No. 3, August, 1976, p. 354. This is a translation of the concluding part of his contribution to "Lire Le Capital", ed. L. Althusser and E. Balibar, (Paris, 1965) that was not included in the English edition 'Reading Capital', (London, 1970). The first three sections were published in 'Theoretical Practice', 1, 2, 6.

52. Ibid., p. 356.

53. Ibid., p. 357.

54. 'Capital' I, (Moscow edition), p. 79.


56. Ibid., p. 799.