CHAPTER IV

I

Revenue System and the Bhils

Khandesh, once considered the 'garden of the west' was deserted and covered with bushes during the beginning of the nineteenth century. The people were very poor and insecure. As the Bhil watchmen could not live in deserted villages, they were forced to take shelter in the hills and adopt a life of plunderers and robbers. Even the Bhils of the western and north western parts of Khandesh, who were cultivators and proprietors of the soil, had joined hands with other Bhil leaders engaged in depredations. To bring the Bhils back to their occupation and to revive the prosperity of the people in general, it was essential that revenue systems be thoroughly improved and suitably implemented. Keeping this in view it will be desirable to have a glance at the various measures taken in this direction by the British administration in Khandesh.

The common belief, at the beginning of British rule, was that in early Hindu times the land was held by tenant proprietors, mirasdars and that tenants-at-will, Upirs were introduced as the old proprietors sank under the Mohamadan rule. This opinion was supported by the fact that most of the fields cultivated by tenants-at-will were entered in the village books as belonging to absent proprietors. This, in Mr. Elphinstone's opinion, when combined with circumstances observed in other parts of India and with the high land-tax
authorised by Manu, affords a strong presumption that the Hindu revenue system, if there was an uniform system, was founded on private property in the soil.

Regarding the revenue system during the Faruki Kings (1370-1600) no information is available.

**Under the Mughals**

Under Akbar (1556-1605), the lands were surveyed and to a certain extent classified. The assessments were imposed based upon the natural qualities of the soil and the kind of produce it was able to yield. These assessments were for a fixed period. It was based upon the theory that the land was solely the property of the State. Permanent alienations of the soil were almost unknown and by periodic revision of the assessments, no fixed tenant rights were allowed to spring up.

A few years later (1610-1630), in some parts of Khandesh, Akbar's or Todar Mal's revenue system was modified by Malik Ambar, the famous Ahmednagar Minister. While maintaining the actual rates of assessment mostly on the foundations laid by Raja Todar Mal, Malik Ambar seems to have adopted totally different principles in dealing with the cultivating classes. Instead of keeping the State sole landowner, he sought to strengthen the government by giving the people definite interest in the soil they tilled.

In theory Malik Ambar's system combined the two great
merits of a moderate and permanent tax and the possession by the cultivators of an interest in the soil. It was owing to these measures that in spite of occasional famines and of very frequent disturbances and disorders, Khandesh remained on the whole fairly prosperous. However, the settlement was entirely with the head of the village and with the cultivators. There is little doubt that the husbandman suffered much oppression at the hands of their immediate superiors. Even in the middle of the seventeenth century (1650), when the Mughal rule was best and strongest, Bernier found the land tilled only by force and consequently very ill-tilled. Much of the land was spoiled and ruined. Nothing but necessity or cudgel made the farmers work. They never grew rich. They had to live and clothe themselves narrowly.

Under the Marathas

The Marathas first appeared (1670) as 'freebooters without any fixed dominion'. Their earliest demand consisted of the one-fourth, 'chauth' of the land revenue due to the existing government. As their power became consolidated (1750), Maratha, exactions increased. Many assignments of revenue such as Jagir, Mokasa, Sahatra, Bafti, sar Deshmukhi etc., were made to individual chiefs and others for whom it was politic to make provision. Besides these grants of certain portions of the revenue many proprietors held and collected the revenue of various estates. The whole system was 'most complicated and confused'. From uncertainty as
to the amount of revenue due and the persons to whom it should be paid, and from disputes among the chiefs, the people constantly suffered.11

Each revenue sub-division had at its head a mamlatdar, or as he was sometimes called a Kamavisdar. He had under him a regular staff of subordinate officials. The mamlatdars received fixed salaries.12 But he had also various indirect means of making money and the government probably connived at the system. He was furnished by the central government with a statement showing the various items he was expected to collect. He then moved about his district and made a settlement for each village with each Patil. The settlement was based upon the collections of former years, and in consideration of the total amount expected from the district. After the village settlement, the Patil had to distribute the sum over the holding of each cultivator as he best could. The mamlatdars were expected to keep moving about the district encouraging cultivators to take up waste lands. For this purpose they made advances out of their own pockets for which they charged a reasonable interest.13

At the end of the year, when the harvest was nearly ready, the mamlatdars, attended by the Patils and their Kulkarnies moved into his districts.14 The Patil represented any ground there was for relaxation of the terms. These discussions generally ended in a second more particular agreement in which the Patil interchanged with the mamlatdar an engagement fixing the revenue.
In addition to the original rent, 'ain jama', another regular source of revenue, were the extra cesses, 'Shivaj Jama'. These were levied partly from the cultivators and partly from other inhabitants. The main Shivaj Jama were exchange 'butta', Sugar-mill, 'gurhal' a tax on the holders of alienated land 'inam patti', a charge on betal leaves, pan takka, a tobacco tax, Jaril tambaku etc.\

Besides these cesses, the Government had other sources of revenue included in the extra collections. Some of the main such extra collections were fines and forfeitures 'Kamavasginchgari' cattle grazing fees, 'Vancharai', grass cutting fees 'ghas katarni', Havaldari etc. In many places the tax and the office were publicly sold to the highest bidder. In addition to all these exactions, there were occasional impositions on extra ordinary emergencies which were called 'jasti patti' and 'eksali patti'.

Towards the close of the Peshwa's rule (about 1804) a harmful step was taken of changing the mamlatdars from government servants into yearly revenue farmers. The office of the mamlatdar was put to auction among the Peshwas attendants, who were encouraged to bid high. Next year same operation was repeated and the district was made over to the higher bidder. A mamlatdar so chosen let his district at an enhanced rate to under farmers who repeated the operation until the sub-letting came to the patil. If a patil farmed his own village, he became absolute master of every one in it. No complaints
were listened to, and the mamlatdar, who was formerly a check on the Patil, now afforded him an excuse for tyranny. A man's means of payment, not his land, fixed the scale on which he was assessed. No moderation was shown in levying the sum fixed. Every pretext for fine and forfeiture, and every means of rigour and confiscation were employed to squeeze the utmost out of the people before the day when the mamlatdar had to give up his charge.

Besides the government demands, under the head of the village expenses, 'gaon Kharch', the people had to pay very heavy sums. This was the grand source of emolument to district and village officers. Briggs says that it seldom amounted to less than half of, and was often double and even treble the acknowledged state demand.

To the above mentioned exactions were added the losses caused by the Bhil and Pendhari raids. The ruin that fell on Khandesn during the last twenty years of Maratha rule can cause no surprise.

Land Administration under the British Rule

As to the revenue, particularly the land revenue, the attitude of the East India Company was well defined. The Principal concern of the East India Company in dealing with the extensive territories that fell into its grasp appears to have been the realisation by quick and expeditious methods of as large revenue as possible. Dr. Deshpande observes that the territories conquered from the Peshwa were
looked upon as sources of income rather than of expenditure and when they did not show any profit for the East India Company, the Indian Government did not relish it. In any case, the territory must not be 'dead loss' to the company. Mountstuart Elphinstone, the sole Commissioner in the Deccan had to work within this framework. If the expenses of holding the Khandesh territories were to exceed fifty lacks annually the Governor General had 'no hesitation in saying that it would be impolitic to hold it ....' It must not be 'an unprofitable burthen,' and were it so, 'the authorities at home' would never approve of it. With all his humanism and enlightenment Elphinstone was a servant of the East India Company. His revenue policy was in the nature of the things bounded by the basic approaches of the company to the finances in India yet it must be said that he tried to 'make the best of a bad bargain'.

Elphinstone's entire revenue system was based upon one cardinal principle, 'No innovations'. The principle on which the revenue collection was made was to remain the same as under the Marathas. There was to be change only in the form of collection. Farming was to be abolished, but otherwise the system was to remain as it was. However, he was shrewed enough to ask his collectors not to give up the rights of interference in those rights of Watandars by which they claimed a part of the revenue. Elphinstone was fully alive to the distressed condition of the ryot, and did not want to put them through further distress. He issued orders to all his collectors/Political Agent that assessment levied by them must not be
very heavy. The distress caused by war and the exploitative farming system must not be aggravated. He wanted them to collect information about the land revenue for the previous ten years so as to be able to come to some rational and permanent basis for assessment.

The entire charge under the Deccan Commissioner was divided into five different administrative and revenue units. These were Poona, Ahmednagar, Khandesh, Dharwar and Satara. Over each Unit, was an officer called Collector or Political Agent depending upon the circumstances prevailing in the region under his charge. These officers were given extensive administrative and magistral powers. Captain Briggs was appointed as the Political Agent of Khandesh with a salary of Rs 2000/- per month and an additional expense account upto Rs 1500/- per month.

Khandesh that Briggs administered during the initial period of British rule in Maharashtra, was a vast land mass of 13,187 Sq miles, with a population, in 1822, of 4,18,021 giving a population density of per square Km. It was indeed a formidable charge. One of its Taluka headquarters, namely Ambad, for example, was 360 Kms away from the District headquarters at Dhule.

In 1818 Briggs found Khandesh overgrown with forest and brushwood, the town in ruins, villages destroyed, the soil though fertile and well watered untilled, the roads cut up, the country empty of people, and the revenue collected with great difficulty and generally with the help of a military force.
It was formerly "one of the most productive provinces of its extent in the Deccan...". The soil in the districts of Satpuda and along both the banks of the Tapi has 'a rich loam, which is extremely fruitful.' In central Khandesh it was 'alternately gravelly and rich', to the south of this tract it was more fertile and just above before it approached the Southern range of hills, it became rich but 'much interspersed with loam and stones'. However, the pride of Khandesh was the region of Baglana and the tracts along the banks of the Tapi upto the foot of the Satpuda hills.

Khandesh was one of the largest forest districts in the Bombay Presidency, with over 2326 Sq miles or 22.9% of the entire area of the district, covered by Government reserves in 1880. During Akbar's reign, Khandesh was spoken of as being celebrated for its cloth manufacture. The districts of Sultanpur and Nandurbar were once famous for their fruits, 'especially the vineyards of Sooltanpoor'. The agriculture was extensive and flourishing under the administration of Mahadaji Shinde, Ahilyabai Holkar and Nana Padnis. 'It may be said that Candeish was in flourishing condition upto the year 1798, when Bajee now succeeded to the Peshawaship.' The state of anarchy that prevailed in Khandesh in the wake of Yashwantrao Holkar's campaign of 1802, and later on compounded by the Arab ravages and Bhil depredations 'tended in a very great degree to depopulate some of the fairest districts in the province. In districts of Sultanpur and Nandurbar, 'at present, there is perhaps not a fruit garden......'
to Dr. Deshpande when Briggs came to Khandesh, desolation was apparent everywhere. Immense tracts were covered with jungle, depopulating the entire region. You pass from one village to another through perfect jungle of several years' growth. As far as the eye could see there was jungle: 'It is truly melancholy.' It was only in the near vicinity that the jungle was broken into strips of fields. The rich and lush nature also harboured beasts of prey. Tiger was the chief wild animal that roamed and destroyed in the very heart of the district. In 1822, the beasts killed 500 human beings and 20,000 heads of cattle. In 1822 during the three months of May, June and July sixty tigers were killed.

Dr. Deshpande, is of the view that as a direct consequence of the unsettled conditions in the district, there was a large scale migration of people, depopulating villages. In the misfortunes that for twenty years (1798 - 1818) had been ruining Khandesh, numbers of villages had been deserted, and of some even the names were lost. Out of 4052 villages, 540 were alienated, and of the 3492 villages, 413 were uninhabited but partly tilled, 1146 were deserted, and of 97, even the sites were unknown. Only 1836 villages were inhabited. The villages which had lost their names were shown as 'Gumgaons' in the records, though their lands were attached to some other villages. All villages in Khandesh were either walled or protected by a ghadi or a fort as a security against wild beasts, marauders and robbers. The cultivation was done in the fields outside the village walls, and as the dangers increased, the area under cultivation decreased. In 1821, of
the total land area of Khandesh, only 12% was under village, while 43% was 'arable waste'. The once famous textile industry was ruined and in 1818 Briggs observed that there were 'some very coarse bad cloths made in few of the principal towns'. In 1819 only some parts of Khandesh were in high state of tillage, and others recently abandoned showed traces of former richness and prosperity. Though the bulk of the district was exceedingly fertile and well watered, the greater part of it was covered with thick brushwood and forest full of tigers and other wild beasts, and scattered with the ruins of former villages. The lands north of Tapi, once very populous and yielding a large revenue were an almost uninhabited forest'. In no part of the district except where they bordered on roads, were fields enclosed either by walls or hedges. The ploughs were small and light, seldom passing more than four or five inches into the ground. The fields were seldom ploughed in the hot months, and often, even at the time of sowing were only hoed. The long grass sometimes entirely choked the crop. Each plough and pair of bullocks was, as a rule, the property of two or even three husbandmen. The condition of the population, which was mostly agrarian, was miserable. 'Their means are so small that they are driven to the greatest distress for wholesome food.' The daily food of the common farmer consisted of 'a small quantity of milk and a coarse black unleaved cake, made of Jowary or Bajry,' for their morning meal, while for lunch the same bread was rendered palatable by a mess of chillies and dal with a mixture of salt and turmeric, and a small handful of vegetables procured from
the fields'. Meat was eaten only on festivals or at weddings. The clothes that they wore were scanty and houses were 'indifferent'.

There were no cultivators of great wealth either of Hindu or Muslim (in very small numbers) community in Khandesh. The peasantry, as a general rule, was poverty stricken. Even before the ploughing season arrived, the peasant had to borrow 'a few rupees in advance on the next year's crop to pay, this year's demand of the government.' The normal rate of interest that he paid on his loan was above 40 to 50%. At the time of sowing he had to go to the sawkar to borrow seed 'for which he promises to pay 1½ seer for every seer and frequently 2 seers, at the harvest time'. During the period intervening between sowing and harvesting, his condition was not all that bad, since he subsisted on the greens that were easily available in the field. The moment the grain was gathered, this easy means of subsistence was denied to him. The government now made its demands on him. The farmer, however found himself in a queer position; he had the grain to sell, but there was no market for it. To meet the demands of the government, he had once again to go to the Sawakar. With the borrowed money he pays a portion of his dues. Most of his produce went into liquidating his loans. Very little was left either for subsistence or for trade. The farmer could not sell his produce in the market, since almost all revenues in Khandesh 'have been for many years paid by Hawala.' When the grain was on the threshing floor, 'guards were posted to prevent its removal till merchants or bankers became security for the payment of rents', 
and 'the farmers were compelled to sell their grain and sometimes mortgage the ensuing crops at reduced prices....\textsuperscript{62} The sawakar mostly, paid the cash direct to the Mamlatdar and took an undertaking from the cultivator for 50 or 100\%, of the rent being paid to the Saw\textsuperscript{ker} in kind at the time of harvesting.\textsuperscript{63}

Since most of the Sawakars were also the grain merchants, it was easy for them to manipulate the grain prices, thereby causing great distress to the farmers. This arrangement completed one productive year of the farmer, and 'before the time for sowing comes again, he is precisely in the same dilemma as at the beginning of the year....\textsuperscript{64} buying perhaps the same grain that he himself had grown at a higher market price from the merchant.\textsuperscript{65} The only people who perhaps benefitted from this arrangement were the Deshmukhs and Deshpandes, who also were sawakers and merchants.\textsuperscript{66} Even the Patil played that role sometimes.\textsuperscript{67} In extreme cases, the farmers borrowed money from the Arabs who charged an interest that was as high as 120\%.\textsuperscript{68} 'where such is the history of Ryot's progress throughout the year, we cannot wonder at the poverty that exists, but we rather feel surprised that it is from objects of this nature, the Government continues to expect to realise its principal source of revenue'.\textsuperscript{69}

As soon as military operations came to an end and peace was established Khandesh was formed into a district well marked by natural limits. On the north the Satpudas, on the east Berar and the Nizam's country, on the south the Satmela or...
Chandore range, and on the west partly the Sahyadri hills and partly the Gaikwar's territories. Thus Khandesh remained till, in 1858-69, three of its south-western sub divisions were handed over to new district of Nasik.

Especially under the farming system, the Maratha sub-divisions had been very irregular, their limits varying from time to time. Under the East India Company new sub divisions were chosen, keeping as far as possible to the subdivisions to which hereditary officers were attached, and arranging them with a view to compactness, uniformity and general convenience. The leading principles laid down in settling the district were, that revenue farming was to be abolished. The land revenue was to be collected according to actual cultivation and except where they were 'unjust or oppressive', the old taxes were to be maintained. No new form of taxation was to be introduced. The assessments were to be based on past collections and levied with care and moderation.

The first great problem was of an efficient staff of stipendiary officers. In the latter years of the Peshwa's rule, the Sarsubhedar and the mamlatdar had been allowed to become 'almost absolute'. They had even right of inflicting capital punishment. They had fixed salaries. The sar subhedar of Khandesh was allowed to spend from \( \text{Rs} \) 5,000 to 10,000 a year for contingencies, and most of his expenses were included in village charges, 'gaon Kharch'.

One of the chief changes introduced by the British Government was the withdrawal of power from the district.
hereditary officers. During the time of Nana Fadnavis (1763 - 1800) the Kamavisdars held no communication with the people except through the Deshmukhs and Deshpandes. These men were often the real executive district officers, imprisoning and punishing people without reference to the Kamavisdars. With almost unlimited powers, they had been 'agents of extortion', the 'tools of the leaders and plunderers', who in the twenty years before British rule, had laid the country waste. 'On those occasions they acted the double part of representatives of the people and the agents of the oppressors, persuading the people that they were sheltering them from exactions, and persuading the freebooters that by their help the last farthing, had been wrong from the people.' Under the farming system, as no accounts were accepted at Poona without their signature, their power was little short of absolute. While pretending the greatest zeal to government, they were in 'league with the chief village officers, and at the expense of government, realise for themselves as large sums as could be produced.' Captain Briggs was satisfied of the view that the influence of the hereditary district officers was a source of oppression. Under the new arrangements their services were not considered useful. Orders were now sent direct from the mamlatdar to the village officials. Their registered emoluments were not touched, but all who levied unauthorised sums from the people were punished and amounts restored. Within a few years their power disappeared.

In Khandesh majority of the people lived in villages and there were hardly any big towns. 'Like all other villages
elsewhere in Maharashtra, Khandesh also had a viable village community with its traditional functionaries, the Balutedars.\textsuperscript{30} The village was the base on which rested the administrative structures. Besides the cultivators, there also resided in the village officials, Patil, Kulkarni, Cangula and the artisans known as Bera Bala. 'Baluta' derived from Bali - a share in the grain of the peasant. Baluta means yearly allowance of grain for service rendered to the community.\textsuperscript{31} The most useful and legitimate employment of the artisans was that of labouring for the villagers in the several lines of their crafts, but they also held another position as the village staff and attendants on the Patil and assistants in the various social and festive ceremonies of the village.\textsuperscript{32}

Every village in Khandesh had its Patil and its Kulkarni (accountant). The former was 'the head of the community' and the latter was his assistant. They 'alone managed the collections and all other affairs of Government, and administration'. Every village had its establishment denominated Bera Bala.\textsuperscript{33}

Patil or the village headman, found in every village was the head of the village community. He was the chief actor in all its transactions. He was the agent of Government for the encouragement of agriculture and the collection of the revenue and also the representative of the people to represent to their wants and grievances to Government. He had no defined powers as such, but traditionally he had a prescriptive right order the twelve Bera Bala and over the villagers in general.\textsuperscript{34} The moral power of the Patil was so great that Elphinstone wanted
their authority to be respected by Mamlatdars and even by the Collectors. The Patils throughout Khandesh held a large area, 108,000 bighas of rent free land, representing about 4% of the district land revenue. They also had claims to 1% of the village produce and to a share of the revenue known as tachuri or Mushahira. The average proportion of the whole was about 9% of the gross revenue.

The Kulkarni was found in every village. He was Patil's assistant. From the circumstance of the Patil 'being unable to read', the kulkarni for the most part had the superior management. He was usually a Brahmin and 'from his caste and qualification' was 'well adapted to usurp the power' which was exercised in the name of Patil. The kulkarni also held rent free land, had a share of the revenue called Moskara and a share of the crops called Yanola. The percentage of the kulkarni's emoluments on the village revenue varied from 3 to 11 and averaged about 4%.

The Mahar (Messenger) was found in almost every village. He was a sort of official assistant to the patil and in the establishment worked as a messenger. He watched the gate, attended the headman, performed material village offices, showed travellers the way, and carried loads. In spare time he prepared baskets and other bamboo articles for his livelihood. The Mahars held large land grants of about 39,555 bighas, representing an assignment of about 1% of the whole revenue. They had the same grain claim as the Kulkarni.
The Sutar (carpenter) made and repaired the wooden tools. They were found in some villages. They held very little rent-free land (only 221 bighas in the entire district). They had a grain claim less than the Mahar.55

The Chambha or cobbler was found only in the larger villages. They made and repaired all leather work used in the fields. They held almost no rent-free land (14 bighas in Khandesh), and had the same grain claim as the Sutar.56

The Lohar (blacksmith) was found in not more than one-third of the villages. He repaired all iron field tools. They held no free lands, and had the same grain claim as the carpenter.57

The Kumbhar or the potter was found in about half the villages of Khandesh. He supplied earthen vessels to district officers and Patil regularly. To other villagers the earthen vessels were supplied by him once a year. In entire Khandesh the Kumbhars held only 50 bighas rent-free land. Their grain claim was one-fifth less than the carpenters'.

The Nhavi or the barber, was found in every village. He shaved the cultivators, lighted the Patil's pipe, shampooed his feet, went with his daughter to her father-in-law's house and acted as the village surgeon. They held a little free-land (only 100 bighas throughout Khandesh) and had the same grain claim as the Kumbhar. He received a meal from every person he shaved.59

The Dhobi or washerman was found in about half the villages. He washed the clothes of the male members of the village officers,
and hereditary landholders' families and supplied white floor-cloths at weddings. They held no land, but had the same grain claims as the barber. He was fed during the wedding and at the end got a turban. 100

The Mang or tanner was found in about one-quarter of the village. He removed dead bodies, and on getting the material made ropes and strung cots. They had no free land, but had a right to the skins of dead animals and a claim to one-fifth less grain than the potter. They maintained themselves by making baskets. Where there were no mangas, a mahar did his duties. 101

The Joshi or Bhat was the village astrologer. He was found in every village. He went about on the first and eleventh day of each half of the month (Pratipada and Ekadashi) telling lucky and unlucky hours to the villagers. He also officiated at marriages for which he was separately paid. The Joshies held large grants of free land ie about 9659 bighas. They had the same grain claim as the mang. 102

The Mulla or the Muslim priest was found in a few villages only. He sacrificed sheep at religious festivals. Considering their small number, the Mullas held considerable amount of land ie 1200 bighas of free land. They had the same grain claim as the Joshi. 103

The Sonar of the Goldsmith was found in one-fourth of the villages. He examined the coins paid by the husbandmen to Government and by shopkeepers to husbandmen. They held no rent-free land. Their grain claim was the same as that of the mongs.
The Koli or the waterman was found in about one-third of the villages. His duty was to provide water to the travellers and to work as servant to the district officers and Patil sweeping their yards, fetching water and cleaning their brass and copper vessels. They supplied water at all village ceremonies. They made rafts and boats at rivers. Their rent-free land holdings very substantial i.e. about 16,307 bighas. They had the same grain claim as the mangs.105

The Jaglya or the Bhil watchman was found in every village. His duty was to watch over the village security. He guarded the gate and caught or tracked thieves. The Jaglyas held large amount of rent-free land i.e. 32,520 bighas. In some villages they were paid small sums of money. They had the same grain claim as the mangs.106

Thus, of the above mentioned village staff the most important were the Patil, the kulkarni and the Mahar. Under the Maratha rule the Patils and kulkarnis were the agents between the villagers and the district officers deshmukhs and despandes. As the whole work of distributing the demand among the villagers was in their hands, they had great power and besides exempting their own lands from a share of the burdens, were often able to levy special cesses for their private advantage.107 Under the British system though they were no longer responsible for the village revenue, the Patil and kulkarni remained the most important of the village officials both in matters of revenue and of police. Another important change in village management was reducing the amount of village expenses, gaon kharch and
making over the management of the fund from Patil to the mamlatdar.\textsuperscript{103} The district and village officers had received large sums from this fund. Under the best governments the village charges were never less than 25%. They were often as much as 50% and in extreme cases were double or treble the government demand.\textsuperscript{109}

As the Patils were well acquainted with the area and character of their tillage, the cultivators were seldom able to gain much by concealment. They endeavoured to borrow money from the Sawakar or Patil, promising to repay it in grain. Hence, unless land was granted to them on easy terms, they refused to cultivate.\textsuperscript{110}

Besides the owners of alienated estates, landholders belonged to two main classes - hereditary holders or proprietors, vatandasars or mirasdars and tenants-at-will, upris. The vatandasars or mirasdars were very few, not one in six, and almost all were district and village officers.\textsuperscript{111} Only mirasaars who were not also officers were settled in Baglan.\textsuperscript{112}

Except officers who might dispose of their lands and officer by sale, the Khandesh mirasad could only mortgage his lands.\textsuperscript{113} A tenant or upari could not transfer his land 'having no proprietor rights in the land'.\textsuperscript{114}

The Uparis, though in theory without any proprietary right, were never ousted so long as they paid their share of the Government demand.\textsuperscript{115} The same rates were levied from the Mirasadars as from the Uparis, the chief point of difference being that if an Upari gave up his field he had no claim to take it again,
while no length of time was a bar to the Watandars. Under the Maratha Government two leading forms of settlement were the plough tenure, and bandi and the field tenure, thikebandi. Under the new system the settlement was made with the cultivator and not with the Patil. Each cultivator tilled a certain quantity of land on his private account. The area and character of each man's holding was ascertained through the Patil, and the assessment was fixed by the collector. When the settlement was over, each cultivator was given a paper, patta, stating the rate of assessment and the sum he was required to pay. When he made payment receipt was passed.

Elphinstone had instructed his collectors to collect as much information as possible and at least for past ten years to lay down a rational and viable revenue policy. Inquiry into the land revenue settlement of the district showed that though they had substituted a lump assessment, 'mundabandi', for the Muslim acre-rate, tankha, the Marathas had no records. They entirely went by the old Muslim papers. Chaplin commented that the mode of assessing in the lump whole plots of land at a fixed sum, without any record of the extent, is more common in Khandesh than in other provinces. Briggs found that the district officers threw every obstacle in the way of collecting information. No complete papers showing the area and state of land were forthcoming. Such as were produced were found on measurement to be false, and it was conferred that for years the lands had neither been measured nor assessed. There was no fixed land measurement and no recognised standard of assess-
ment. Two villages closed to each other, and apparently of the same soil, were assessed differently.\textsuperscript{123}

In some villages, the property of a man of influence or of a friend of the farmer, enjoyed a low rental, and had been much enriched by the influx of people from the neighbouring over-assessed lands.\textsuperscript{124}

**Revenue Settlement, 1918-1921**

Briggs had realised that existing measurements were faulty and rates uneven, but it was not possible for him to introduce a new standard of measurement. The old customary bigha, was accepted initially though it was by no means uniform in different villages. The whole cultivated land was measured. No rates of assessment could be framed, so the rent was fixed on the average payments of the ten previous years, after a comparision of the area under tillage and the kind of crop. This included all payments which could be discovered. The only extra demand was a cess formerly levied to pay the watchmen, 'havildar' of the village threshing floors.\textsuperscript{125} As the exactions had been gradually increasing, the rental founded on a ten years' average was in most cases less than previous year's demand. At the same time, the payments for concealed tillage brought to light by the fresh measurements, and the lowering of village charges, left to the credit of Government a revenue Rs 5,27,250 in excess of the previous year's estimates.\textsuperscript{126}

After three years of experience a standard of measurement and standard of rates of assessment were introduced in 1921. The measurement of land which Briggs introduced was a standard
rod of nine feet in place of the old one of ten feet. The area of bigha under the new system of measurement was 32,400 square feet.  

Inquiry in the assessment showed that there were three classes of rent normally levied in Khandesh. The classification was done according to type of land and the irrigation facilities. The land was divided into the following categories -  

1) Jirat or dry land irrigated only by rain,  
2) Motshal or land watered by wells, and  
3) Patshal or land irrigated by canal.  

For practical purposes, the land was classified as Jirayat and Bagayat, the latter covering both the irrigated varieties. The jirayat assessment rates depended 'solely' on the quality and the extent of the land, while in Bagayat they were dependent partly on the quality of the land and partly on the kind of crop grown. Dr. Deshpande observes that 'it is possible that higher rates for richer crops in Bagayat did not encourage the cultivators to undertake that type of cultivation, thereby increasing the poverty of the district.'  

The system of fixed rent on land was called Dardam. However there was no one fixed system by which assessment was determined. 'In several pergannah the assessment is made on the nature of the crops and not merely on the extent of the land as in the whole of the country lying to the westward of a line drawn from Sindwa to Uaxys. In other regions of Khandesh the fixed rent varied 'so much as renders it almost
incredible. Unlike other parts of Maratha Kingdom, Khandesh did not form a unit of administration under one single authority. Parts of it were held by the Peshwa, parts by the Holkar and parts by the Shindees. Again, like the Marathas, the British also followed a policy of 'no innovation' in this relatively late addition to Maratha Kingdom. The Marathas 'went entirely by the old Musalman papers'. The old records of the Mughal Government, moazinas, were held the most authentic that could be produced. They were accepted by the Maratha government and assessment was based upon them and the usage. In the Bagayat lands, the Dardam varied from Rs 2½ to Rs 70 per bigha, according to crops. The result of these extreme variations was that the Government Officers tried to force the landholders to grow the richest, while the land holders as far they could, grew the 'poorest crops only'.

Captain Briggs was convinced that 'no equitable assessment can be made till there is an accurate survey of the soil obtained and a new assessment fixed according to actual measurement and nature of the soil....' This however was a long process. Till the land was surveyed, Briggs decided to follow the pattern of the Maratha Government. Briggs directed his mamlatdars that 'the present custom of collecting the revenue through the Patil and Kulkarni was to be generally adopted'. According Dr. A. Deshpande 'it is therefore, necessary to delegate larger authority to the Mamlatdars who became the most important cogs in the British revenue wheels. They were almost the eyes and ears of the administration'. Elphinstone had laid down the functions
and duties of the Mamlatdars in an elaborate letter to his collectors. One of the most important duty of the Mamlatdar was indeed the revenue settlement and collection. In his general instructions to Mamlatdars, Briggs laid down the revenue programme of these functionaries.

The Mamlatdar was required to go to each village in the area under his charge at the commencement of the season for ploughing and sowing. He was to 'promote the Lawany' by his presence and encouragement. He was to revisit the villages in the months of May, June, July and August. This was to ascertain for himself the extent of actual cultivation and see that government was not defrauded. 'In the month of September he should make his first collection on the Khureef'. This procedure was also followed under the Maratha Government. 'It was usual under the best Maratha Government for the Mamlatdar to go round his district in the months of September and October, when the crops were inspected' and a settlement made. From September onwards till the end of December it was duty of Briggs' Mamlatdars to settle with the ryots and Patils the total amount of assessment for the year. This was the time when Jamabandi was made. During his previous visits the Mamlatdar had already 'ascertained if more or less ground had been cultivated' than the previous year. Now by referring to the last year's accounts, he was to form a tolerable estimate of what the present year will yield and he was to settle his Jamabandi with the Patil' with reference to that circumstance'. This having settled, a deed of settlement was drawn up by the mamlatdar and signed by the Patil and the kulkarni. A 'Jamabandi Pattrak' was to be given by the mamlatdar
to the Patil, and personal surety, muchlka, taken from him. The Patil was to give receipts to the cultivator and submit them to the mamlatadar. The Patils were also expected to pay the pre-requisites of the local haqdar and nemnookdar.

The changes made (1819 - 1821) by Captain Briggs were, by the help of an uniform standard of measurement to reduce the varieties of dry land rates from 122 to 11, and of well-watered rates from 68 to 8. In the case of channel-watered lands crop rates were abolished, and rate charged on all land under each channel was made uniform.

In 1820 Captain Briggs collected confidential produce lists from different parts of Khandesh to fix the standard acre rates on dry and watered land. From such lists he struck an average of the best middle and worst crops, and from these three classes averages fixed one general average as under:

1. **Dry or Jirayat land**
   - (a) Best - from 2 to 3\(\frac{1}{2}\) per bigha.
   - (b) Middle - from 1 to 2 bigha
   - (c) Worst - from Annas 4 to Re 1 per bigha

2. **Bagayal Land**
   - (a) **Motasthal**
     - (i) Best - from 5 to 7 per bigha.
     - (ii) Middle - from 3 to 5 per bigha.
     - (iii) Worst - from 1 to 3 per bigha.
   - (b) **Patsthal**
     - (i) Best - from 21 to 70 per bigha.
     - (2) Middle - from 8 to 21 per bigha.
     - (3) Worst - from 1 to 8 per bigha.
These rates were accepted by the government and continued till a new settlement was effected in 1823-1824 after Briggs left Khandesh.\textsuperscript{144} Captain Briggs felt that these rates were not excessive. He gave a comparative statement of the produce, cost and profit to a farmer as result of these rates as under\textsuperscript{145}:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind of Land</th>
<th>Area under tillage (Bighas)</th>
<th>Cross income (as)</th>
<th>Cost of production (as)</th>
<th>Rent (as)</th>
<th>Profit (as)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jirayat</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motasthal</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patasthal</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Dr. Deshpande 'it is rather interesting tabulation, and one that cannot be taken at its face value.'\textsuperscript{146} Under Briggs' new scheme Chaplin, the Commissioner found that the lands which paid 8 annas per bigha as rent had to pay Rs 2.8.0 now.\textsuperscript{147}

When the rates were fixed, the Collector settled with the Patil what each cultivator was to pay. This was done publically in presence of the villagers who chose to be present. The kulkarni gave each man a note of the amount due and the settlement was openly read aloud at the village office.\textsuperscript{148} If the people complained of loss of crops from drought or blight, the maslatdar or a confidential clerk went to the spot, and examined the state of things.\textsuperscript{149}

When the demand from each cultivator was settled, a register was drawn up showing for each field in each village, its number, measurement, class of soil, and rate of assessment.\textsuperscript{150}

Under the revenue farming system the contractor commonly paid the rental in advance, an allowance being given for interest
When the crops ripened, they were gathered into the threshing-floor, and a watchman, havildar, was set over them. Sawakars then became surety that the cultivators would pay their rents. Then the grain was allowed to be taken away and sold. Rent was generally due before the crops were sold. As a result the cultivators were forced to sell their grain and sometimes mortgage their grain and sometimes mortgage their crops at reduced prices, and suffered impositions of all sorts.\textsuperscript{151}

Under the new system the watchman were abolished. The cultivators were allowed time to realise the value of their crops before the rent was called for. The rent was usually taken in cash. When rent in kind was commuted for a cash payment, the amount was usually fixed at the value of the produce in the preceding year. But the system varied much in different parts of Khandesh.\textsuperscript{152} An agreement was taken from the Patil on behalf of the village to make good all casual defalcations on account of deaths, desertions or failures.\textsuperscript{153} The cash was collected by the patil or kulkarni direct from the cultivators, and paid by him to stipendiary, officer, Shekhdar or mumlatdar, and from them it came direct into the treasury.\textsuperscript{154}

In the early years of British rule an attempt was made to revive the old system of leasehold cultivation. Under this system according to the position and character of the lands terms were fixed and the property leased to a village Patil or common cultivator. During the first year the land was rent free, during the second it paid a fourth, during the third a half, and so on till in the fifth year it was liable for the full amount. This system of leases did not get success. On the one hand, without any
special inducement of this kind, the maintenance of order fostered
the spread of tillage and on the other the people now enjoyed
fixity of tenure without a lease. Memory of former abuses also
made them unwilling to undertake the responsibility of a lease.
However this system of leases was not given up till 1897.157

Among the earliest measures to ensure a better knowledge
of the country was a survey. The work began in 1813 and continued
till 1827.158 At first it was simply topographical,159 but it
afterwards included the classification of the land into dry, garden
and waste.160

With the settlement of the land revenue, the issue of revenue
alienation was taken up. These had increased enormously under
the Maratha rule and in the later more disturbed years force and
fraud had joined to swell the roll of unauthorised alienations.161
Lists of all claims to exemptions were prepared. The cases were
examined. All those found valid were continued. When no valid
title was found, the grant was struck off the rolls.162

Though the farming system was abolished as land was concerned,
it was maintained in other branches of revenue.163 The customs
were farmed and there was at first much competition with a marked
increase of revenue. But in 1821 the contractors lost heavily
and the returns were much reduced.164 The chief item of miscella-
neous revenue was license tax, mohtarf. This cess was either
levied from the individual or a lump sum was recovered from the
head of the body of craftsmen, and he was left to distribute the
amount as he chose. The incidence of the tax was most unequal.
In some towns it was oppressive, in others it was little more than nominal. Other miscellaneous taxes yielding a total, revenue of Rs 2030 were abolished in 1320 on recommendations of Captain Briggs.

An issue closely related to the land-revenue was the rehabilitation of the deserted villages. Besides natural calamities, there were other factors responsible for the village desertions. One of them was heavy impositions. It was not rare that villagers deserted their fields due to heavy demands and the callousness of the creditors. But the majority of the desertions were due to insecurity of life and property. Repopulation of villages was a major problem.

For partly deserted villages, Briggs recommended that the Uparis be encouraged to take up land on preferential terms. The deserted lands could be resettled through the agency of the disbanded soldiers. Briggs agreed with Elphinstone's suggestions that waste lands be given in Inam to a certain number of ex-soldiers. This would help in achieving two goals of populating the villages and settling the soldiers, who in case of emergency could be turned into militia. Briggs also permitted the Namalataars to allow individual ryots to cultivate new lands on the terms usual under the old government.

Besides these measures subsidiary or tagabi was to be given to encourage cultivation. Advances made for cultivation were to be recovered during the year, while those made for rebuilding houses were to be recovered in two or three years, according to circumstances. Large remissions were also made on various
grounds such as payment of half the value of all cattles carried off by the Bhils, full payment for repairs of town-gates, repairs of wells for drinking water, the destruction due to march of the troops and for failure of crops according to circumstances. 171

Briggs believed that the condition in Khandesh would greatly improve if the irrigation system was repaired. There were 187 substantial dams of masonry throughout the district - The repair of these dams would cost the government at a total of Rs 2,14,900/-. Briggs believed that the money spent on the repairs of dams would be recovered within three to four years by the increased rents on the land brought under cultivation. 172 However, the Government was reluctant to invest money on repairs of the dams and did not allow the collector to make remissions in the revenue to villages for the repairs. 173

Commercial Revenue

The condition of trade was so bad in Khandesh that Briggs proposed a 'prospectus of Immunities and Privileges to be granted to Merchants ........ in Candeish.' Under this scheme Briggs proposed to grant rent free land 'sufficient to in extent for the erection of a Bazar, store-house, and houses for shops'. He was willing to grant large remissions to merchants. They were also to be granted Dastaks (permits) by the Huzoor Kachery and were to move about 'unmolested and unexamined' by the subordinate nakas (posts) of the province. 174 Briggs sincerely believed that 'the manufacture and trade of country should be encouraged as the
principal source of revenue and not the secondary source ......
The merchants and traders were invited from outside, and contrary
to the principle of free trade, a preferential custom treatment
had to be offered to the merchants by the State. 'Commercial
revenue' was, in Briggs opinion, so important an object that,
his treatment of the Bhils, who were the traditional guardians
of the commercial routes, tended to be almost liberal. He was
convinced that 'the bulk of the revenue should be derived from
trade and manufacture including duties on exports, imports,
licences and stamps.'

The entire problem of governmental income through revenue
was an inter related one. It moved in a vicious circle. Since
the people were poor, trade could not flourish, and since there
was no trade, poverty increased. To solve this dilemma, Briggs
suggested a two-fold policy. He wanted the land rent to be
reduced and in the second place, he wanted trade to be encouraged
through state protection. He suggested a low permanent quit
rent or tax on land equal to about 1/6th of the net profit.
He believed that if this was done, the farmers would be left
with some surplus, that would be used for the purchase of manu­
factured goods. With his ideas about the quit rent no one
agreed, but he was allowed a relative freedom in matters concerned
with customs.

The result of the changes brought in the land administra-
tion from 1918 to 1928 'was on the whole satisfactory'. The
system of settling with individual cultivators was initially
opposed. But it became popular soon as the villagers understood
that it freed them from the district officers' demands. 179

State of Revenue collections - 1818 to 1827-28

In 1818 the season was on the whole favourable though Cholera swept off thousands and severely crippled the entire population. The prices of grain went high. Out of Rs 11,90,810, (the amount for collection) all but Rs 3,850 were realised. Though the people were very poor, the security of person and property, together with liberal tillage advances, and leases granted on easy terms, made them industrious. Numbers of labourers were settling as landholders, and except with the greatest difficulty, neither cattle nor men could be hired. 180

Next year (1819-20), though Khandesh again suffered severely from Cholera, the tilled area rose by 98,389 bighas and collections by Rs 1,47,150. Prices again went high and inspite of a considerable rise in the rates, the revenue was realised 'without pressure', as the people were 'relieved from vexatious inquisitions and could sell their grain to the best advantage' and pay their rents without mortgaging their crops to usurious moneylenders. 181

In 1820 rain failed. Large remissions (Rs 95,350) had to be granted. As the same time, as the tillage area had increased by 84,800 bighas, the price of grain gradually fell inspite of the failure of crops. The revenue was recovered but some of the later instalments were paid slowly and grudgingly. 182

In 1821 the situation became worse. The early crops suffered from want of rain and the late crops were destroyed by
blight. Inspite of a slight fall in the tillage area (16,520 bighas) price of grain kept falling also due to the movements of many military consuming classes to other districts.\textsuperscript{133} Prices were lower by 15 to 20 per cent than they had been for 30 years. A reduction of rents was urgently required.\textsuperscript{134} Many of the new land-holders, without capital to support them, were ruined. Land yielding a revenue of Rs 2,19,340 was thrown up inspite of big remissions of Rs 1,29,750.\textsuperscript{135} To meet the distress, Government ordered the collector to abandon the regular assessment and make such change in the Government demand as seemed to him necessary.\textsuperscript{136} Besides the failure of crops Khandesh also, suffered from the 'attacks of Bhils' and the ravages of tigers.\textsuperscript{137} There was also a great flood in September 1821 which swept away 65 villages entirely and 50 villages partially.

The next season (1822-23) was again trying. The early crops were partially spoiled by too much rain, and the winter harvest was almost entirely destroyed by blights and thunderstorms.\textsuperscript{138} The price of grain continued to go down inspite of further fall of 100,776 bighas in the tillage area. Hence, Captain Briggs advised a further rent reduction of 25%.\textsuperscript{139} Khandesh was still covered with almost endless forests, 'a den of tigers and wild animals.'\textsuperscript{191} At the same time compared to 1813, large numbers of settlers had come from Berar, Sindia's territory and Gujarat. 234,370 bighas had been redeemed for tillage, 155 villages re-inhabited and some of the lands of 105 other villages reclaimed.\textsuperscript{192}

In 1823-24 tillage area increased by 24,204 bighas. Though the season was unfavourable, a rise in prices of grain helped the
The net collection rose by Rs 1,00,040 despite a remission of Rs 43,180. In 1324-25 tillage area increased by 16,070 bighas. It was a reason of almost utter failure of crops. Nearly half of the revenue, (Rs 6,43,450) was remitted, leaving a net collection of only Rs 6,90,440. This was the smallest revenue on record.

In 1325-26 the tillage area increased by 113,391 bighas due to liberal remissions and high grain prices. The season was again unfavourable and Rs 1,07,900 were remitted. In 1326-27 the continued high produce prices caused a further spread of 1053 bighas of tillage. The season was unfavourable and a sum of Rs 2,05,430 had to be remitted. The high prices prevented distress, and next year 1327-28. There was a further rise in tillage of 26,052 bighas. The revenue rose by Rs 1,10,170 despite large remissions amounting to Rs 1,28,450.

Revenue System, 1328

The Revenue System existing in Khandesh was described in details by the Collector Mr. Giberne in 1323 in his report to Government. Khandesh was divided in 15 sub divisions, talukas for revenue purposes. Each Taluka was further sub-divided in 8 to 16 petty divisions, tarafs or tapas. Each taraf or tapas consisted of 4 to 5 villages. For revenue purposes each village had two main officers, the headman, patil and the accountant kulkarni. Each petty division was under a Shekhdaar and each sub-division under a mamlatdar. The Patil encouraged the cultivator to take up fresh land, helped him with advice and stood security for his payment of advances. About the beginning of
October, with the shekdar the mamlatdar and the kulkarni, the Patil helped in the yearly survey of the village land and crops, aiding and superintending the measurement of the cultivated land. The kulkarni estimated the sum expected to be realised from each landholder, and forwarded it to the mamlatdar. This estimate also contained a rough register of land thrown up, of exchanges and increase and decrease in tillage with the cause assigned in each case. From these estimates the mamlatdar formed a general estimate and forwarded it to the Collector. 'At the time of the yearly survey the kulkarni noted the proceedings of the survey, and from the measurements made a 'Kulghadnijarif'. This contained numbers attached, the fields held by each cultivator. Then he made a second statement 'Kulghadnidar' showing the amount due on each bigha according to the rates in force in the former year. From these individual accounts, he compiled a general village statement, 'goshwara' giving each cultivator's name and the size of his holding and showing any decrease or increase with its cause.197

The petty divisional officer, Shekdar held a charge yielding from ₹ 5,000 to ₹ 15,000. He moved from village to village supervising the village officers and stirring up the Patil. As a check on the village officers, he kept an account of receipts, tested the entries by comparing them with cultivators' papers, and forwarded a monthly statement to the mamlatdar. The mamlatdar moved about the petty divisions, under his charge at the sowing seasons encouraging the people. At another period of the year he went to distribute the landholders' settlement papers, kul pattas.
In this statement contained the area of land held, the bigha rate due, the village expenses, and the total sum to be paid. On delivering this deed, the mamlatdar entered minutely into the landholder's account, compared his statement with the kulkarni's statement and receiving the kulkarni's memoranda of payments, endorsed the settlement paper with the sum paid and delivered it. The mamlatdar made advances, takavi in May and June for the early crops and in August and September for the late crops. He sent to the Collector a detailed monthly account of receipts and disbursements. He also forwarded weekly statements of treasury balances and sent the sum to the headquarter treasury on the first day of the month. At the close of the year a clerk, karkun, attended at the headquarters with the whole of the accounts, when they were compared and balanced.

When the Mamlatdar's and Patil's yearly measurement of tilled lands was nearly completed, the collector and his assistants, travelled through the district with the usual establishments—the hereditary mamlatdars, Shekdars and the village Patils and Kulkarnis. Thus he completed for each village its yearly settlement. The general village settlement, (gosawara) was examined by the European officer and necessary changes were made. From this was formed the village settlement deed, tharav band, showing the changes from the last year's settlement and the reasons for the changes. The rates of assessment were fixed on the basis of old customary, mamul, rates.

An attempt was made by Captain Briggs in 1821, to fix the rates according to the intrinsic value of the land by testing the soil. This proved unsatisfactory due to want of sufficiently
scientific system and had to be abandoned. Until a just and accurate survey could be made, the settlement officers contended themselves with equalising the rates whenever an inequality in assessment came to light. As rates were fixed admittedly on no certain basis, and as nothing was known as to the margin of profit they left to the landholder, the grant of remissions was a part of the system. When the crops failed either partially or wholly, the mauladaram and district officers made careful inquiries as to the extent of the loss and fixed corresponding remissions. When the crops were cut and the grain brought into the village stack-yard, it had to be watched until security was given for the payment of the Government dues. The times prescribed for the cultivator's payments were from October to January for the early, and from January to April for the late crops. In practice rules about instalments were not followed. Upto 1852 their rents were often recovered from the cultivators in one lump sum before their crops were disposed of.

The Patil helped in realising the revenue and furnished the authorities with names of defaulters. The kulkarni kept a record, tahsil, of each land holder's payments, and at the close of the year furnished a statement of actual receipts.

In 1829, Colonel Sykes observed after inquiring into the Khandesh-returns that it was the most heavily taxed of the Deccan districts. This was perhaps partly due to the specially large area of gardenland. But even without the garden land, it seemed that the bigha rate averages from Rs 1 to Rs 9 annas 2 or from 50 to 100% higher than the rate in other districts.
Revenue System During 1829-1833

Khandesh which had suffered from failure of crops for some years had during 1823 to 1832 most abundant harvests. But there was neither a local nor an outside demand for the grain. The markets were speedily glutted and the prices of food grains came down sharply. This made the money assessment extremely heavy and caused the most widespread distress. The assessment represented so large a share of crops that their payment and the expenses of immediate subsistence nearly absorbed the cultivator’s produce, leaving him no margin for improvement. Many cultivators had to give up agriculture and seek other means of earning a living. The tillage area fell by 67,766 bighas between 1827-28 and 1829-30. Only by a general lowering of assessment could prosperity of the cultivators be maintained.

Government realised that the general state of parts of Khandesh was worse than the other Deccan districts. To improve the condition it was considered necessary to encourage irrigation and garden tillage. To achieve this great reductions in the rates on well-watered land were sanctioned and the offer of advances for building wells encouraged. Reductions were also ordered in dry crop lands whenever inquiry showed excessive rates. Leases from 5 to 10 years were granted on favourable terms. Remissions amounting to Rs 2,98,430 were sanctioned.

These special measures and reductions did much to relieve the distress.

Next year (1830-31) the tillage area rose by 38,063 bighas and remaining remissions fell to Rs 79,310. In November 1831
Mr. Dunlop found the people of Khandesh in much better circumstances, comfortable and contented. The large area of waste land gave ample room for grazing cattle. Most of the cultivators kept cows and buffaloes enough to increase their stock and had some animals to sell. The sales yielded good profits. Mr. Dunlop thought that on the whole the people of Khandesh were much better off than most others. But again there came a fresh fall of prices. The tillage shrank to 20,033 bighas. Remissions rose to is 36,030. This was followed by a year (1852-33) of almost total failure of crops. The tillage area was further redirected by 40,358 bighas. Very liberal remissions (is 35,42,930) were granted. Rise in the price of Jwari, Indian millet also helped the people to tide over their distress.

1833 - 1838

From 1833 to 1838 prices continued high. Its result was a spread in tillage area from 838,757 bighas in 1835-36 to 1,201,157 in 1837-38. There was corresponding rise in the net collections from is 12,14,630 to is 13,14,470. Mr. Mitchell who passed through Khandesh in January 1837 noticed that though many villages were partially or altogether deserted and large tracts of land lay untilled and covered with brushwood, Government was doing much to open wells and repairs ponds and dams. Though the people were very poor, they were 'obliging and industrious'. No where were blessing of English rule so evident', and nowhere he he had seen those 'blessings so much appreciated'. In the Konkan and Deccan were 'constant murmurings'. In Khandesh he heard 'not a single expression of discontent', but many of 'gratitude'.

1838 - 1845

In 1838-39 came another year of extreme scarcity. There was
a fall in the tillage area of 29,127 bighas and in the net collections of rs 4,63,790. In 1839-40 due to rise in prices there was a marked increase of 59,997 bighas in tillage and of rs 5,28,110 in net collections. This was followed by a heavy fall due to sudden fall in prices. In 1841-42 kr. Vibert, the Revenue Commissioner found the rent assessment unsatisfactory in spite of the rise of 55,549 bighas and rs 63,650 of revenue.

The Revenue Commissioner realised that on account of its costliness, a regular survey could not be introduced. But he was sure that much might be done by careful revisions on the part of the collector and his assistants. The mamlatdar's charges were too large and their subordinates were underpaid and badly supervised. Had it not been for its natural richness and large area of waste land, the faulty management of Khandesh would have forced itself into notice. At the same time, especially in the south-west, the repair of dams, and in channel-watered lands, the introduction of a bigha instead of a crop rate had done much good.

In 1845-46 there was a drop in the tillage area of 7326 bighas and in the collections of rs 9650. The next season (1844-45) was very unfavourable. The rains started well. But, except a few heavy local showers in September, they ceased with the first downpour. The result was a fall in the tillage area of 50,253 bighas and in the collections of rs 3,13,950. Mr. Inverarity complained on 3rd October 1844 that in the eastern districts, Savda, Jamner, Nasirabad and part of Erandol the
Upper classes had greatly decayed. In Savda, Raver and Erandol were many mansions, once rich and beautiful, now either ruined or only partly inhabited. The common people of Jamaer, Nasirabad and part of Erandol were fairly well off. In Savda and rest of Erandol they were extremely poor and burdened with a hopelessly heavy land tax. Though they varied to certain extent, the people were on the whole 'apathetic and lazy and took very little trouble in the growth of their crops'.

The next season (1845-46) was again most unfavourable. The early harvest failed to unusual extent and the late crops were utterly destroyed by scorching sun and want of dew. Efforts were made to spread irrigation. Free resort was allowed to wells that had not been used for five years. All charges on temporary dams and watercourses were remitted. Rs 10,000 were spent on repairing and deepening wells. These measures were quite useful and emigration was prevented. In the yearly part of the season grain prices rose very high, and in hope of raising them still further, the dealers refused to open their stores. Arrangements were being made for bringing in Government grain, but large private importations by Central India speculators did away with the need of such a measures. Cholera of an aggravated type greatly increased the distress. Rs 6,55,830 were remitted to ease the situation. The result was that the bulk of people passed through this second failure of crops without their resources being seriously crippled.

The following year (1846-47) showed a rise in the tillage area of 160,735 bighas and in the net collections of
These were the highest figures since 1818. The next season (1847-48) was again on the whole, favourable. In certain places the early harvest was slightly damaged. But favoured by abundant last rains, the cold water crops yielded richly. At harvest time, large numbers of field rats attacked the grain especially in the eastern parts of Khandesh. But they soon disappeared without causing serious loss. The returns showed a rise in the tillage area of 36,597 bighas and in collections of Rs. 42,620. During this year much progress was made in repairing dams and water-sources. Rest-houses were built and wells sunk along the Bombay-Agra road.

The next season (1848-49) was again less favourable. The latter rains failed and caused some damage to the early and much damage to the late harvest. Remissions rose from Rs25,790 in 1847-48 to Rs 1,57,650 in 1848-49. The net collections fell from 17,94,280 to Rs 16,44,908. The next season (1849-50) was a year of very heavy and constant rainfall. Many houses collapsed and a large area of standing crops was destroyed. At the same time the state of the district was on the whole satisfactory. The people 'were willing and able to increase tillage, and would have done so had not the incessant rain hindered from doing so'. In the south-west of Khandesh, except in the tracts near the Dang forests where they were in the lowest state of poverty, the people were tolerably prosperous and there were no revenue outstandings. The repairing of dams and ponds and the sinking of wells had 'greatly improved their condition'.

Rs 7,69,210.
After this year of heavy rainfall came a season of (1850-51) of drought. All water cesses were remitted. In addition to this special measures, remissions to the amount of £ 1,39,780 were granted. In spite of the dearness of food (which in October rose almost to famine prices) and of epidemics of cholera and small-pox, these measures succeeded in stopping emigration, and left the condition of people so little reduced that they were able to pay every rupee of rental. In the next year (1851-52) the rainfall was again unfavourable. The rain failed and cholera caused great ravages. Remissions were granted, varying from 15.95% in Sultanpur to 0.24% in Jamner, amounting to 4.88% of the district revenue. In spite of the bad season the results were 'favourable'. Tillage spread 79,229 bighas and the net collections rose by £ 1,51,760.

The land administration in Khandesh from 1818 to 1852 may be summed as under:—

(1) During the first 15 years i.e. from 1818 to 1832 the revenue rates, in consequence of great fall in produce prices, proved so burdensome that they had to be considerably reduced. The result was that during this period though the tillage area had spread from 605,152 bighas to 760,201 bighas, the revenue for collection fell from £ 11,90,810 to £ 8,43,600.

(2) From 1833 to 1852 the progress of Khandesh was, except in the bad years of 1838 and 1845, quite
satisfactory. This might be possible due to the moderate rents and on the whole, dearer grain.

The tillage area increased from 888,757 bighas in 1850-51 to 1,496,055 bighas in 1851-52 and net collections from £12,14,650 to £17,38,040.255

(3) The increase of population had been very gradual after the first influx of settlers in the initial years. Between 1824 and 1839 there was only a rise from 552,570 to 559,574 or an average of yearly increase of hardly half per cent. From 1839 progress became more rapid. In 1846 the population had risen to 635,619 and in 1851 to 775,112.257

(4) Returns showed that in five years ending 1851, houses had increased from 170,564 to 173,040, cattle from 837,258 to 923,281, ploughs from 57,072 to 68,906, carts from 26,600 to 42,707, wells from 27,412 to 38,290 ponds from 105 to 111, dams from 149 to 152 and watersources from 159 to 220.258

The following statement shows the price of Jwari (Indian Millet), the tillage area, the land revenue, the remissions, the net collections and the population (where available) during the period from 1813 to 1851-52.259
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jwari Fonds the rupee</th>
<th>Tillage Area Bighas</th>
<th>Land Revenue Rs.</th>
<th>Remissions Rs.</th>
<th>Net Collections Rs.</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1818-19</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>603,132</td>
<td>11,90,808</td>
<td>3,448</td>
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<td>701,521</td>
<td>13,43,024</td>
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<td>786,521</td>
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<td>1823-24</td>
<td>74</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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<td>Land Revenue</td>
<td>Resimissions</td>
<td>Net Collection</td>
<td>Population</td>
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**Land Administration - 1852 onwards**

In 1852 the first steps were taken to introduce the revenue survey in Khandesh. It was one of the largest revenue divisions of the Bombay Presidency. Khandesh included wide varieties of natural features, of climate and of population. Though its material prosperity had increased, it was on the whole very backward with a sparse population and immense tracts of arable waste. The Deccan districts into which the survey was first introduced were different from Khandesh in many respects. It was felt that Khandesh would require special treatment. Sir George, then Capt G Wingate was deputed to
visit Khandesh and report on the best arrangements for introducing the revenue survey. After a tour of the district, Capt Wingate, the Revenue Survey Commissioner submitted his report (29 March 1852) to H.E. Goldsmid the Secretary to Bombay Government.  

Capt Wingate's Report, 1852

Main aspects/observations of Capt Wingate's report may be briefly described as under:

Almost whole of Khandesh, except Savda and Yaval in the north-east, and Nasirabad, Srondol and Amalner further south, seemed to be lately reclaimed from a state of nature. Of the estimated arable area only 14% were under tillage. The percentage varied greatly in different places. In the east and centre the percentage of tillage was as high as 35% in Savda, 34% in Nasirabad and 32% in Srondol. In the north and west it was low as 10% in chopda, 9% in Nandurbar, 7% in Sultanpur, and 5% in Pimpalner and Thalner. North of the Tapti and in the west near the Dang were large tracts, either utterly empty of people or with some 'Unsettled Bhils'. In the plains were stretches of thorn-covered waste with patches of tillage and villages either wholly or partly deserted. Even in the healthiest and best populated parts were many miles of waste without a single plot of tillage. Out of 3837 villages, 1079 were deserted and 587 had less than fifty inhabitants.
The area of arable waste was not less than 5,300,000 acres. Though so backward, Khandesh had a richer soil than either the Deccan or the Southern Maratha districts. Compared with the survey rates lately introduced into the Deccan and the Southern Maratha districts, Khandesh assessment was high. In Thalner and Sultanpur in dry land Rs. 3 as 8 an acre was charged. In Savda and Chopda the average was Rs. 2 as 9 paisa 4. These high rates could not have been paid in other parts of the Deccan or in the Southern Maratha districts. Besides the greater richness of the soil, the Khandesh cultivators were helped by the fact that almost all the produce was suited for export and could be easily converted into money. They also enjoyed the privilege of free grazing over vast waste. In some parts, as in Chopda, the heavy assessment had hampered the people and reduced their holdings. With easier rates, tillage will spread quickly in such areas. But the great difficulty was the want of population in most places. Able to support comfortably two to three millions of people, Khandesh had only 765,090 inhabitants. Thus there was average density of 62 to the square mile. For a century at least there was no prospect that the population would be enough to occupy the whole of the district. The cultivators of Khandesh were in much more easy circumstances than those of the Deccan. They had numbers of cattle, which due to abundance of free grazing cost them nothing.
After reviewing Capt Wingate's report Government decided that in a district so thinly populated and with so large an area covered with forest and bush, an attempt to make a complete field survey would lead to hopeless difficulties. It was therefore decided that no attempt should be made to survey the six outlying tracts of Pal in Savda, Dhanli in Chopda, Amba in Thalner, Akrani and Haveli in Sultanpur, Navapur and Varsi in Pimpalner and certain plough-rated, outbandi, villages of Beglani.

Regarding large tracts of waste in other parts of Khandesh, where setting up or repairing boundary marks would have been extremely difficult, the following proposals were made:

1. Measurements and divisions into fields with marked boundaries should be confined to the actual cultivated land around the village site and a certain portion of arable waste near it, sufficient to meet the probable requirements of several years.

2. All external village boundaries were to be surveyed and fixed by permanent mark.

3. The area of all lands not included in the first category was to be calculated in the lump.

4. Only the area that was divided into fields was to be classified and assessed.

5. The assessment of all undivided land was to be calculated on an average of the lands adjoining.
6. No field survey was to be made of villages lying totally waste.

Main aim was that the land actually under tillage should be duly assessed, and that every holder should know how he stood. As regards fresh tillage, each village would have assigned to it an area of arable waste sufficient for the requirements of some years, and all of it assessed at one uniform rate calculated on the rate of the adjoining land. Every cultivator taking up new land would know beforehand what he would have to pay. It would also avoid fraud and trickery on the part of the village and district officers considerably. When no assessed arable waste remained, the unassessed arable waste was to be broken into numbers as required. As a special case it was regardless of the quality of the soil, given at an uniform acre rate of 3 annas.

One great principal of the new survey was that every field was to be paid for as a whole. As per the existing system, a yearly measurement of the actual area under tillage was to be made and the holder charged accordingly. Waste patches of land in a field paid no assessment. Under the new system each field was a compact whole, with well marked boundaries and a fixed rent. While ploughing the Khandesh cultivators had a habit of passing over poor patches and choosing the best. Every field was more or less straggling, including large patches of waste for which nothing was paid. Such a system was incompatible with any permanent improvement.
of the land. The new survey stopped it as all land included in a number had to be paid for whether tilled or waste.252

One of the most difficult aspects of settlement was the assessment of watered land. Watered lands were of two classes - well-watered, motasthal, and channel-watered, patasthal. All land near wells, except ruined or long dissuaded wells, was subject to a special assessment which was levied whether or not the well was used.253 In channel-watered land the existing system was very irregular. Sometimes the water rate was levied whenever the land was cultivated, even though no water was used. In other places the rate was levied only when the land was irrigated. The rate too, greatly varied in different places.254 As there was so large an area of arable waste, from which a great increase of revenue might be expected, and as the rates had hitherto been higher than those in force in the Deccan and Southern Maratha districts it was decided to reduce the assessment considerably.255

The work of survey and settlement in Khandesh took 18 years, from 1852 to 1370. The measurements started as under:

1852 - Chopda and Savda
1853 - Nasirabad, Shahada, Taloda and Virdel
1854 - Amalner, Brandol and Mandurbar
1855 - Daulia and Pachora
1856 - Chaliagaon, Jamner and Shirpur
1859 - Jamnagar
1862 - Dhusaval
Survey operations were completed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
<td>Savda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>Nasirabad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>Shirpur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Amalner and Virdel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>Bhusaval, Chalisgaon, Dhulia, Erandol, Jamner, Nandurbar, Pachora, Pimpalner, Shahada, and Toloda.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first survey operations which started in Savda in November 1852, met with the most active and widespread opposition. It is possible that the district hereditary officers and some others might have thought that their influence and means of making illicit gain would be curtailed as a result of the survey. Therefore they conspired to sow distrust in the minds of the people. Most absurd stories of the objects and aims of the survey were circulated. The rumours that privacy of their houses was to be invaded and they were to be troubled and harrassed on all sides succeeded. The scheme of the rumour-makers succeeded. The people of Savda rose in great numbers against the survey officers and refused to listen to any explanation. The military had to be called in, the leaders were surprised and seized. Thus the disturbance passed over without bloodshed and from time the work of survey proceeded without much troubles.

Since the introduction of the revenue survey and settlement Khandesh 'made most marked advance' both in the area under tillage and in the amount of land revenue. Taking the figures for the Government villages the returns for the
years in which the survey settlement was introduced, show a fall in the waste of 451,565 acres, in remissions of Rs. 59,310, an increase in the occupied area of 1,042,911 acres, and in the collections of Rs. 8,68,650 or 47.3% in comparison with the average of the 10 previous years. Including revenue from unarable land, plough-rate and deserted villages, and the lands made over to Government by holders of alienated villages, the total collection show an increase of Rs. 9,05,910 or 49.5%.

Compared with the average of the ten years before the survey, the figures for 1877-78 show a decrease in the waste of 731,368 acres and in the remissions of Rs. 1,12,870 and an increase in the occupied area of 1,313,334 acres and in collections of Rs. 11,02,430 or 60%. Including revenue from unarable land, plough-rate and deserted villages, and the lands made over to Government by holders of alienated villages the total collections show an increase of Rs. 11,53,040 or 58.3%. In case of the alienated villages also there was very substantial progress in the tillage area and the collections.

Mr. Ramsay writing in 1878 about Khandesh gives detailed description of the changes brought during last two decades. 'To one who knew Khandesh 20 years ago, the change seems wonderful. At that time a vast belt of good soil covered with a tangled growth of babbul or palas trees, stretched for miles from the satpuda hills south towards the Tapi. In almost every subdivision were wide stretches of bush land broken by isolated patches of tillage. Now (i.e. in 1878) 'save in parts of Chalisgaon on the border of the Nizam's territory no tracts of good land lie waste'. Scrub jungles there still is, but this
is confined to rocky lines of hill or rolling stony ground that will yield no crop save grass. Cultivation was pushed almost to the very slopes of the Satpuda hills and even in the west where the climate was bad and population scanty. 'Thirty years ago wild beasts were found in every sub-division'. The fear of them kept 'whole villages empty' and rich plains untilled. Now tigers 'are confined to a few favorite retreats in the Satpuda hills or to the dense forests on the eastern and western frontiers'. Once panthers infested every village and lurked in every sugarcane field. 'Now (during 1378) they are found only in the hills or in a few of the rocky ravines that infest the plains'. Herds of wild hogs once lorded over the plains robbing the husbandmen of great part of their harvest. 'Now the wild boar is completely scarce'. Thus one quarter of century produced the results which in Capt Wingate's opinion, 'would prove the work of atleast a hundred years'.

This remarkable and rapid change in Khandesh was possible mainly due to the lighter and more even survey rates. But there were other factors also which helped in the progress of the district. After four years of very low prices of grain it rose quite high in 1855 and continued for many years afterwards. The farmers were greatly benefitted by this price rise. The opening of the railway (About 142 miles began in 1852 and was opened for traffic between 1861 and 1865) accelerated the development of trade and commerce in Khandesh. The American War between 1861 and 1865 also poured great wealth into the district. After the close of the war the prices collapsed and
for several years there was 'scanty or unseasonable rainfall. These caused much loss to the District. But inspite of these difficulties its 'produce and trade continued greater than before that time of exceptional prosperity' and after sometime again started increasing. As the Bhils were closely related to the socio-economic life of the district, they were also greatly benefitted by the general prosperity brought in Khandesh. Farming, became profitable. The wages paid to labourers were also considerably increased. Joining Bhil Crops was no more attractive financially as a Bhil could earn perhaps much more as a farmer or a labourer.
New Set of Conciliatory Measures adopted towards the Bhils of Khandesh in 1825 onwards

The Bhil problem in Khandesh continued to be most vexatious and challenging for the British administrators inspite of the various conciliatory and coercive measures including recourse to military actions between 1818 and 1824. The Governor-in-Council Bombay had to accept its failure in pacifying the Khandesh Bhils to the Court of Directors, London. The Bombay Government reported that 'conciliatory measures having entirely failed in reducing the Bhils to tranquillity, recourse to military coercion became indispensably necessary that great military and pecuniary means were directed to this end, but that the object had not been attained.' The Court of Directors reviewed the measures taken towards the Bhils since 1818 and ordered a new set of conciliatory measures to be adopted towards the Bhils of Khandesh in 1925. The main features in this theory of reformations according to graham were the awarding of 'strict justice to an oppressed race', 'the overthrow of the patriarchal authority of the Naiks' and its substitution by an European chief, raising of a Bhil Corps settlement of the Bhils in colonies, the provision of a comfortable maintance, re-establishment of the ancient village Bhil police and mild and liberal though firm administration BALLHATCHET REMARKS THAT AT LAST A NEW POLICY HAD BEEN INTRODUCED INTO KHANDESH. THE APPOINTMENT OF BHIL AGENTS AND THE
formation of a Bhil Corps both signified that the Government now realized the need to find a place for the Bhils in the new order of things.\(^{280}\)

**Bhil Agencies**

The formation progress and achievements of the Bhil Agencies are discussed below and that of the Khandesh Bhil Corps subsequently.

Under the new system Khandesh was divided into three Bhil Agencies as under\(^{281}\):

1. **The North Western Agency**
   
   This Agency included Nandurbar, Sultanpur, Pimpalner, and all the independent and tributary Chieftains including those of the Dangs.

2. **The Southern Agency**
   
   The Southern Agency included Jamner, Bhadgaon, Chalisgaon and the subdivisions below and adjoining the Ajanta and Satmala ranges.

3. **The North Eastern Agency**
   
   This Agency extended along the Satpuda range including the subdivisions of Chopda, Yawal and Sauda. Afterwards the central divisions of Erandol, Amalner and Nasirabad were also included in this Agency. The Agent of the North-Eastern Agency was entrusted with the duty of raising a Bhil Corps under active Native and non-commissioned officers from the line.\(^{282}\)
Each Agency was placed under the charge of resident European Officer. The duties of the Agents were heavy and varied.

As instructed by Lieutenant Colonel A. Robertson, Collector of Khandesh, they had a twofold duty consisting - firstly 'in preserving the peace of the country and secondly in ameliorating the condition of the Bheels.' He explained in painstaking details that this duty could be performed in various ways as under:

1. By a watchful superintendence of the Bhils in the charge committed to their respective charge.
2. By inspiring them with confidence in the Government.
3. By encouraging them to turn their attention to industrious pursuits.
4. By being careful that those among them on whom Government has settled pensions are duly paid the same.
5. By attending to and redressing their complaints against each other as well as under certain circumstances against other classes, or pointing out to them how redress against such classes is to be obtained as well as in all such cases when mutually agreeable to the parties by acting as arbitrators.
6. By apprehending those who may be accused of offences, and committing them for trial if the offence be of a serious nature before the Court of Circuit or in minor cases inflicting such punishment as may be customary.
among themselves, and if recourse has been usual to such a tribunal or if the Agents think it can be restored to with advantage, as a Panchayat of their own tribe may awarded.

7. By superintending such military operations as it may be found necessary to carry on to reduce to order any tribes or bands who may be committing depredations.

By entrusting the Agents with 'a watchful superintendence of the Beel's in their respective areas Robertson meant them to have the following powers -

(a) To call on any Bhils to show how they were earning their living.
(b) To restrict them from assembling in large numbers.
(c) To stop them leaving their homes without permission.
(d) Even to require security from any one who aroused suspicion.

While in the north-east Lieutenant Outram was raising a Bhil Corps, in the south, Major Ovans and Lieutenant Graham were being the Satmala Bhils to form settlements and engage in tillage. In the west Captain Rigby was attempting to pacify the western Bhil Chiefs.

Various methods were used to encourage the Bhils to take to agriculture. The Bhils were to be registered. Waste lands were to be allotted to all who were willing to form themselves, under certain restrictions, into colonies. They were to be restricted from congregating in masses, prevented from quitting, without intimation, their places of abode, and
strictly checked from assembling in Huttees among the hills on any pretence whatever. To promote agriculture, money was lent to the Bhils for the purchase of stock and other equipments. Graham soon found that men of substance were unwilling to become security for such loans - 'the very idea of the Bhells turning cultivators appearing to everyone Chimerical'. He, therefore, appointed supervisors to instruct the Bhils how best to cultivate their lands and to keep him informed of developments. This expedient was soon adopted more generally. Robertson allowed the agents to reward the Bhils who had distinguished themselves by their industry in cultivation, or by their help in the maintenance of law and order. These rewards were in form of some land free of rent for a given time, a bullock, or even a pair, a plough, a cart and other implements of husbandry, seed, grain etc.

The Patels of villages were also to be encouraged, by presentation of honorary dresses, to assist in promoting the desired object, by forwarding to the Agents correct returns of all the Bhils within their range, of the mode they subsisted, and of the adequacy or otherwise of the provision allotted by the State for their maintenance. A general superintendence of the Bhils and the petty Chiefs was required, and the dues payable to the former in villages were to be strictly enforced. Panchayets were in some instances allowed to inflict punishment under authority of the Agent. Imprisonment was ordered to be avoided, as it attended with little inconvenience to the delinquent, but with great misery to those who depended upon
him for support. Besides the Bhil, considering it no disgrace whatever, returned to his home from a residence in the Jail, in no ways subdued in disposition, and considerably deteriorated in morals.

A free pardon was granted for all past crimes to those who surrendered at discretion. Waste lands were allotted rent free for a term of twenty years, wherever the Bakhs and their followers proposed to settle. Ample grant of money and subsistence, together with animals and implements of cultivation, were allowed by Government during the period the rude husbandman was under proper instruction to make the earth yield up her treasures for his own support.

This grant was, however, to be received, not as a free gift, but as an advance, to be hereafter recovered, should circumstances permit. As the money was judiciously expended under the immediate superintendence of the Bhil Agent. The Bhils, moreover, viewed with suspicion the system of liberality and forbearance observed by the British Government, and naturally suspected the recurrence of former treachery. But strenuous endeavours successfully convinced them of the utter groundlessness of their fears, and the folly of their former conduct. By working on the better feelings of the Bhil tribes, the knowledge began to gain ground that the Government not only possessed the means of restraining their future depredations, but also entertained an urdent wish to promote their welfare.
The system of reformation continued with unabated vigour in the colonies. More than three hundred ploughs had been established by the close of the year 1826. Time, patience, and considerable persuasion, were of course necessary to induce the Bhils to undertake agricultural pursuits, and to place the colonies on a regular footing. The hereditary watchmen were gradually returning from the hills to their villages.

By continual residence among the colonies, "by unwearied attention to their wants, wishes, and peculiarities, and by kind and liberal treatment", the affections of the Bhils were gradually gained. The 'word of the Agent was received as law'. Respecting him as 'a protector and benefactor, as well as just arbitrator and judge, every real or imaginary wrong was submitted to his decision'. The Bhils turned to him for advice and assistance whenever required. 'Greater obedience was rendered', than had been ever paid to the hereditary Naiks.

To obviate all future annoyance and inconvenience, and to settle the anxiety of the Bhils with regard to the terms of amnesty, a written Kowl was presented to each individual. This Kowl served as a pass of security when absent from his village, and which was expected to be kept always near his person. In this document it was written and explained that although pardon was granted for all past offences, yet any future infringement of the peace would involve a forfeiture of the protection, and that the penalty for the past as well as for present misdeeds would be exacted from the offender. The Kowl was as under...
Translation of a Kowl granted to ____________Bheel, of the 
______________Village of ______________Purguna.

You have lived in the hills, and plundered the roads and country of the Sirkar, and committed theft and various crimes: now you are at present, and have petitioned the Sirkar that if pardoned you will not again offend, and that if Tukavee be given to you, you will cultivate and thus earn a subsistence. On this, your prayer has been considered, and the Sirkar has shown favour to you, and has this once pardoned your past crimes, and has given you for your support Tukavee, and land to cultivate; and this Kowl is written and presented to you that you may remain in your village, and cultivate, and thus gain your livelihood. After this, if you again commit any offence, your former crimes will not be considered as forgiven, but you will have to answer for both them and the new crime.

(Signature of Bheel Agent)

A happy change was 'fast progressing in the habits and ideas' of the Bhils. 'Few who took the Kowl ever violated their engagements'. They readily rendered valuable assistance to the police in tracing and apprehending the offenders. As bulk of the Bhils been thus inclined to order, the 'refractory Naiks were forced to submission'. An arrangement for the regular payment of a certain sum of money was at length satisfactorily effected, in lieu of their hucks, which had been heretofore received in kind from villages of the district.

The village police now alone remained to be extricated from
the mass of disorder into which every measure regarding the Bhil system had been formerly plunged, so as to allow every chance to the healthy operation of the new reform. Graham observed that 'when wielded in the hands of powerful Government, the system of Bhel police had been found to perform the most efficient duty, but when the curb of restraint was removed, the most glaring abuses and flagrant crimes were speedily induced. Under the name and shelter of the Jagla watchman, the Bhel plunder remained unmolested within the precincts of the village, and few of the Native functionaries could resist the easy acquisition of property by a share of the spoil, which was so readily awarded for the protection'.

Strict supervision was absolutely necessary when the amounts of hucks in each separate village, together with the number of persons required for the performance of its duties were correctly ascertained, care was also to be taken when the requisite quota was placed in charge and the surplus drafted to the colonies. The regular payment of these dues, which when neglected, was attended with much evil, was strictly enforced by personal superintendence.

The amount of rent-free land was also fairly fixed, according to the size and revenue of the village. For a share of the produce, this land being cultivated by the Patil, a bond of good feeling was thus mutually established between the parties. The Bhil was left at liberty to attend to numerous and important avocations of his office. The duties of the Patel and the Jogla being immediately connected, if the former functionary retained
a proper interest in the security of the inhabitants, and a
vigilant watch over the conduct of the Jogla, their combined
knowledge and assistance could, in all cases of crime, be
rendered of the most useful service.  

By this settlement, 'a sure remedy was provided for the
former evils', by insuring an honest assistance to all the
Jaglas who were found in the village and who instead of being
the scourge of the country were now converted into active and
useful members of police. Thos who took to the plough gradually,
'like their brethren in the colonies, became quiet and obedient
cultivators'." After a lapse of three years, the remnant
of the predatory Bheels in the Satmulla and Ajanta range, who
had been so long carrying on depredations on the eastern
frontier," remarks Graham, "was brought to terms, and the
system was fairly established in the southern parts of the
province."

A register of all the Bhils had been framed, a Kowl was
in the possession of every individual, the hucks of haiks and
Jaglas were inquired into and adjusted, the native functiona-
ries were required to see the dues properly paid, and 'the
Bhils ventured not to leave their villages without permission
of the Patil.'

A Daroga Karkoon was employed in each Taluka. He was
constantly moving from village to village to see that orders
were attended to, and that the Bhils were present and busy with
their ploughs. A Daroga Shibandi was stationed in each colony
to superintend and observe its proceedings. The Agent also moved through his districts to ensure the effect of his orders, by his personal inspection.

During the attainment of such a desirable result, Government was subjected to a considerable outlay of money. It suffered loss by the non-payment of advances made to the Bhils, which lapsed from death or other accidents.

The following statement shows Advances and Balances due by the Bhil, colonies land under cultivation, number of boys at school Chalisgaon, Budgaon and Jamner Talukas under the (Kunjdi) Southern Agency by the close of the 1843.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Annual Advances</th>
<th>Recoveries</th>
<th>Adjustments</th>
<th>Written off</th>
<th>Balance outstanding on 30 April 1843</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rs As FA</td>
<td>Rs</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Rs</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85,384 2 6</td>
<td>44,137 11 7</td>
<td>23,086 4 7</td>
<td>16,961 0 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of ploughs</th>
<th>Number of Bighas</th>
<th>Number of Jaglas settled</th>
<th>Number of boys at school</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>597</td>
<td>6,646-8</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following is the statement of advances made to, recovered and irrecoverable from and balances due by the colonists in Baglan, Mandardur, Sultanpur and Thalner Talukas under the western Bhil Agency from its re-establishment upto 31 July 1855.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Annual Advances</th>
<th>Recoveries as irrecoverable</th>
<th>Written off</th>
<th>Balance outstanding on 31 July 1855</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rupees</td>
<td>Rs</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Rs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19,552-8-6</td>
<td>13,796-12-9</td>
<td>5,623-6-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Rupees</th>
<th>Recoveries</th>
<th>Written off</th>
<th>Balance Outstanding on 31 July 1855</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rs</td>
<td>Rs</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Rs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19,552-8-6</td>
<td>13,796-12-9</td>
<td>5,623-6-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following is the statement of advances made to, recovered and irrecoverable from, and balances due by the Bhil colonists in Chalisgaon, Budgaon and Jamner Talukas under the Kunthur Agency from its establishment up to the 31 July 1855:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Advances</th>
<th>Recoveries</th>
<th>Written off</th>
<th>Balance outstanding on 31 July 1855</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total in Rupees</td>
<td>1,03,961-7-9</td>
<td>73,764-4-9</td>
<td>27,149-6-3</td>
<td>3,047-12-9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reformation of the Bhil tribe proved a blessing and a benefit to the country for which no pecuniary sacrifice could be too great.

Besides public security afforded by the Bhil Corps, every village in the province was supplied with its hereditary Jagla or watchman. These village guardians, 'who were robbers once, had thus, like the sepoys of the Bhil Corps, become preservers instead of disturbers of good order.'

Remunerable partly by Government and partly by the villagers it was the concern of these village watchmen to protect the interests of both Government and the villages, as they could be officially fined for neglect of duty. A villager whose property they had failed to protect or in the recovery of which they were unsuccessful, had in his power to withhold for a time his share of the Jagla’s emoluments.

Those of the Bhils who were neither in the colony of Government, nor village servants, procured a livelihood for themselves and their families by cultivating the soil, cutting and selling grass, firewood and timber, gathering and selling jungle fruits, roots, herbs, gums, honey etc., and during the harvest
season, by watching ryots' grain-fields, reaping crops etc. Some of the Bhils took permanent service with Ryots as ploughmen, and others spent part of their time in killing wild animals for the sake of the reward given for skins by Government. This pursuit which, while it afforded a subsistence gave benefits to Government and the Ryots by preventing beasts of prey from overrunning the country.

Captain J. Rose, second in Command and the officiating Commandant of the Khandesh Bhil Corps observed that "It cannot be said that a great many Bhils have as yet become successful and prosperous farmers, but then it is necessary to bear in mind that to enable a man to succeed as a farmer, he requires more than a mere rent free lease of land, a money loan sufficient to procure a pair of bullocks, a few farming implements, and a little seed, which is all that Government could afford to give to such needy or unsteady Bhils as it was advisable to put at the plough. To cultivate the soil successfully, a person must have some means of his own, including sufficient number of cattle to supply manure for his fields, without which they will not long yield a remunerating crop. In all these aspects, and in many others, the Bhils notwithstanding their anxiety to succeed in their efforts to give satisfaction to their benefactors, have laboured under disadvantages. Besides having no previous experience of the agricultural art, the constant care and labour required to make a farmer's occupation profitable was hardly congenial with their past irregular habits."

The general consequence of these opposing circumstance was
that a Bhil's Crop was seldom a very good one. Yet, in some parts of the province, Bhils were already to be found, observed Captain Rose, who were able to raise abundant harvests, who could hardly be distinguished in habits or appearance, from the ordinary cultivating class, and who had no privileges above their fellow-cultivators of other castes.\(314\)

Thus during the course of one generation, - within the space of little more than thirty years - has 'an almost thorough reform been effected' in the Bheels.\(315\) The result of this reticulated settlement was 'shortly manifested', and the District formerly scene of outrage 'now enjoyed tranquility'. The formidable list of crimes had dwindled down to the report of a few petty thefts. The Bhils 'from outcasts, had become members of a society' daily rising in respectibility and appearance, and becoming useful and obedient citizens of the State.\(316\)

The foregoing account the achievements of the Bhil Agencies may possibly be over-rated as these are told by the officials who themselves were connected with them. However, the success of Bhil Agencies in bringing over all reformation amongst the Khandesh Bhils can not be doubted. To great extent the Bhils were brought back to a peaceful mode of livelihood. They were gradually becoming prosperous. But later on exploitation of the Bhils by the Gujar Kumbis and other communities started taking place due to their simplicity, ignorance and love for liquor. The process of development was slowed down as the exploitation of the Bhils could not be checked effectively.
The task of raising a Bhil Corps was taken up simultaneously with the formation of the Bhil Agencies in Khandesh during 1825. The formation of a local corps was at once a crying need and a seeming impossibility. Capt Briggs was apposed to Elphistone's idea of enlisting the Bhils themselves. Briggs replying to Elphinstone wrote that "on our first occupation of Khandesh it occurred to you, I believe, that an irregular corps of Bhils would answer the purpose of civilizing and providing for them, on the plan of Mr. Cleaveland with the hill people of Banglepoor, and before we became as thoroughly acquainted with the constitution of the Bhil society such an arrangement appeared the best adopted to remove the evils, but a more close and intimate knowledge of their habits has induced me to think that any military organisation of the Sheels would be at best difficult, that it would be elevating them from thieves to soldiers, for which they are in my mind, wholly incapacitated from their licentious habits and grovelling ideas, that would be impossible to prevent crimes of the most heinous nature and then they would on such occasions immediately fly to their fastnesses, their brethren would not seize them, and the system would entirely fail of its object." Meanwhile the officer's commanding troops were complaining bitterly of the loss of their men through sickness. The country was overgrown with jungle, Malaria and cholera appeared to have become almost perpetual. Medical facilities were scarce want of local knowledge and the difficulty of the country rendered the expeditious against the
Bhils irksome and unsuccessful. An attempt was made by Captain Briggs to raise an auxiliary force consisting of the Bhils but it proved a failure and after a few years it was dissolved.

Such was the condition of Khandesh at the beginning of 1825. There could be no prosperity in Khandesh until the Bhils were brought back to their peaceful occupation. How to reduce them to order was the problem of the day. Regular expeditions were costly and mostly unsuccessful. The auxiliary force was useless and Police hardly existed. Mr. Chaplin, who succeeded Elphinstone as commissioner insisted on his predecessor's idea of creating a Bhil corps. Lieut Colonel Robertson, who succeeded Briggs as Collector of Khandesh in 1823 was himself doubtful about the success of the proposed Bhil Corps. However, being loyal to Mr. Chaplin he supported this idea and proceeded to Mausgaon cantonment to select an officer who should be 'brave enough, strong enough, able enough, and tactful enough', to undertake the task of raising a Bhil Corps. The Bombay Government wrote to the Commander-in-Chief vide letter No. 474 of 1825 dated 12 April 1825 that 'the immediate organisation of Bhel Corps in Khandeish having been determined on and the employment of another officer on the Adjunta Hills the same principles as Captain Rigby at Kokurmoonda and the Collector of that province having been entrusted with the entire management of the plan, the Governor-in-Council requests that your excellency will have the goodness to issue the necessary instructions to the officer commanding in Candeish for placing at that officer's immediate disposal such officers as Colonel Robertson may select for the duties to be entrusted to them.'
Formation of the Khandesh Bhil Corps

Colonel Robertson selected Lieutenant James Outram, the 22 year old, Adjutant of the 23rd Bombay Native Regiment of Foot to raise and command the new Bhil Corps. While selecting Outram he must have been influenced by Outram's brilliant success against a body of 500 Bhils at the fort of Mulher. Services of Lieutenant Outram were placed at the disposal of the collector and Political Agent in Khandesh for the purpose of a Bhil Corps to be raised for Police duties. At the age of 22 Outram had already done 6 years soldiering and had been Adjutant of his Regiment for 3 years. Besides his military duties, Outram had earned good name in the field of Shikar.

Outram could not join his new appointment at once due to a severe attack of fever. He had to remain in Madgaum till the beginning of May 1825. Then he proceeded to Chalisgaon to start recruiting the Bhils for Khandesh Bhil Corps.

Finding recruits for the Bhil Corps was extremely difficult task. Outram first proceeded to Chalisgaon where Headquarters of a Field Force was situated. For two months the troops were trying to check Pandu Naik and other Satmala Bhil leaders who had been 'ravaging the plains below the mountains for a long time with impunity and laughed at all the futile efforts of the regular troops to disturb them in their fastness'. Finding it impossible to get any recruit there, Outram went to Kannur where he was equally unsuccessful. Outram then realised that 'nothing could be effected towards laying the foundation of the Corps, until the spirit of the tribe in rebellion was subdued.' He accordingly
came back to Chalisgaoo in the hope of inducing active operation. But failing in that object Outram went to Jategaon (about 30 miles from there) where a detachment from his own Regiment was located to protect the village which had been threatened by the Bhils. With 30 men of this detachment he marched towards a strong position in the heart of mountains where the Bhils had assembled in great numbers for the purpose of undertaking some enterprise. Having only 30 men with him Outram 'calculated on effectually surprising the rebel from so unexpected a quarter, and on coming upon them before daybreak'. Seeing the 'red coat' in so many different quarters, 'the effect of which was increased by hearing their musketry in such opposite directions, confirmed the idea that the whole British Force was upon them'. Their 'dispersal was complete' The Bhils were so hotly pursued for some days that their power was so completely broken that Outram was then 'enabled to commence operations, and laid the foundation of the Corps' through the medium of his Captives. Some of the Captives were released to bring in the relatives of the rest on the pledge that they all should be set at liberty. Thus Outram effected an intercourse with some of the leading naiks. He 'went alone with them in their jungles, gained their hearts by copious libations of brandy, and their confidence by living unguarded among them, and hunting with them', until at last, he persuaded 5 of them most 'adventurous to risk their fortune' with him. This small beginning was considered by Outram as the sign of ensuring ultimate success.

Regarding the duties expected out of Outram as the Commandant of the Khandesh Bhil Corps, Colonel Robertson gave detailed instructions vide his letter dated 6th May 1825. Some of the instructions
(a) The Bhils in Chalisgaon, Bhadgaon and Eraundel Talukas were those who gave the most trouble and who probably were the most straitened in their circumstances. Outram was advised to embody most of men from these talukas. Hereafter a few of 'the Khotil Bhils from Jamner and Nasirabad Talukas as well as a few Bhils from Baglan may be added.

(b) Outram was suggested not to give the recruits money in the beginning. They should be chiefly paid by an allowance of grain, making to them only at certain periods small disbursements of cash. Gradually they should be paid in cash and Outram might discontinue the issue of grain to every person that he may have reason to think will not abuse the indulgence.

(c) In the first instance much duty will not be expected from the Bhils, but 'you should keep them as much employed as possible in such a manner as will teach them the important duty of obedience to order'. Nothing will better ensure this than 'when you employ them, always doing so under non-commissioned officers from the Line, who should be taught above all things to inculcate into the minds of the Bhells the principle of strictly adhering to orders, as the very essence of their duty.

(d) Outram was also advised to pay attention to their personal appearance 'which is calculated to excite more favourable impressions in respect to themselves and a change of habits'. Punishment of a personal nature should be
avoided. For minor offences 'you will soon discover punishments suitable to their own ideas and for those of a serious nature the offenders should invariably be dismissed before, if necessary, they are handed over to the Magistrate'. This will excite a pride in those who remain in the Corps.

(e) Some of the lower grade of non-commissioned officers should be left open 'as a stimulus for exertion and attention and as a reward for those who may excel'.

(f) The number to be enlisted will depend on the future decision of Government. However Outram was suggested to 'enlist as far as 400 men' without risk of exceeding the wishes of the Governor in council. He was also requested to forward a special report every two months regarding progress of recruitment. Outram was also asked to suggest about the organisation of the Corps as to officers and non-commissioned officers as well as the suitable time when arms may be entrusted to them.

(g) Outram was given a choice to establish the Headquarters of the Khandesh Bhil Corps either at Dharangaon or Erundol.

(h) 'These instructions', Robertson remarked, 'are to be considered more as an outline of what is required than as a perfect guide'. 'In other undertaking does more depend on the personal character and conduct of the officer'. A conciliatory disposition towards the Bhils 'convincing them you feel an interest in them and a pride in seeing them well, are of all others the points
that are most likely to earn their regard and to excite in them those better feelings which it is the Chief wish of Government by the raising of the Corps to generate, and your zeal and discretion the Government has every guarantee that this, its humane object, will be most sedulously attended to.

Such were the instructions Lieutenant Outram received from Colonel Robertson. In acknowledging them he made no comment for the time being, but specified his demand for regulars. He thought a detail of 2 Subedars, 2 Jamedars, 5 Havildars, 5 Naiks, 2 Buglars and 30 Privates would be sufficient check upon the Bhils when the Corps had attained its full strength. As the success of the measures might depend so much upon the zeal and conciliatory demeanour of these men, Outram wished to keep several vacancies in the higher ranks open at first, which would be a spur to their exertions. In place of a European Sergeant, Outram preferred a 'Native writer of English'. He also appointed a Carcoon as instructed.

FIRST SIGNS OF PROGRESS

Progress of the Khandesh Bhil Corps under Outram -

Lieutenant James Outram, the young Commandant of the Khandesh Bhil Corps, was armed with civil as well as military powers at least for that part of the province in which he was to reside. Two Bhil agents were already appointed - one for the Southern or Satmala range, and the other for the Sahyadris and Western Jungle. These officers had multifarious duties and were like "ma bap". The Bhils
were to them as children. They must defend the Bhils, stand up for their rights, educate them, teach them to engage in worthy pursuits, provide them with money for a start in life. At the same time they must see that their children did not waste their money in quarelling and vice, repress crime, generally practise the doctrine of not sparing the rod where its use was necessary.

Lieutenant Colonel Robertson had already issued instructions to the other Bhil Agents. He forwarded copies of those instructions to Lieutenant Outram on 28th September 1825.

Lieutenant Colonel Robertson instructed Lieutenant Outram that since he will be mainly occupied in the formation of Bhil Corps for some time it will only be in his power to act occasionally as a Bhil Agent, but whenever he acts in that capacity, he must keep these instructions in view.

The division in which Outram was to act more particularly consisted of the districts of Erandol, Nasirabad, Chopda, Yawal, Sauda and Raver. The Collector, Colonel Robertson instructed Outram that 'this range of districts I shall make over to the charge of Mr. Graham for ensuing year, and as before stated, you can only yet occasionally do the duties of a Bhil Agent. Mr. Graham will in the interim be directed as much possible with reference to the instructions now enclosed, to extend his superintendence to that class of people and you will therefore, in all you do, act in concert with and in conformity to the suggestions of that gentleman, whilst this arrangement may exist.'

The Central Districts of the Dhule, Amalner and Thalner, mumladaries were placed under the charge of Mr. Erskine. Similarly
Mr. Dent was instructed to give his attention to the Bhils of the District of Nehr (exclusive of Bhamar) and the Taluka of Malegaon north of Girna and of the Lohare talukas, which were too distant for the superintendence of Captain Rigby. All the Bhil affairs to the southward of the Outram's position eastward to Jamner and inclusive to that district, were placed under Captain Ovans.

Robertson mentioned these arrangements to Outram so that as Commandant of the Bhil Corps he might be aware that no parties should be detached by him to these districts, as but at the request of the officers in charge of them or on his (Robertson's) orders, except in case of emergency, when he thought that injury would be sustained by the public interests by waiting for any request of this description. For example, when he may have undoubted information of the retreat of any person charged with robbery, or of a gathering of banditti, or when he may be in pursuit of thieves. In all these cases Outram was required to make known the circumstances to the officer who may be in charge of the districts as soon as possible. This limitation, which will be equally acted upon by the assistants and other Bhil Agents', in Robertson's opinion, "is necessary to preclude the risk of their counteracting each other's operations."

Thus with great difficulty, Outram was able to engage the first few and those from 'the most disorderly and suspicious' Bhils. Less persuasion was required to induce some of the Bhadgaon and Erandol Bhils to join him as he passed through those purganas which together with chalisgaon, he was particularly directed to make seat of his first endeavour. By 1st July 1825 Outram was able to enlist 25 Bhils. Commenting on the nature of his difficult
task Outram reported to the Collector that "... much perseverance, patience, and trouble I foresee will be required in the first place to conciliate and bring them to proper subjection, and a steady, though mild rule, must be preserved when that is accomplished..."

As stated earlier Outram was given a choice between Dharangaon and Erandol to establish the Headquarters of the Khandesh Bhil Corps. He preferred Dharangaon which became the headquarters of the Bhil Corps, and remained so till the end. Outram arrived there before the end of June 1825. He himself lived in a disused Kacheri or court house. He managed to provide some huts for some of his men, and quartered the rest in the town.

From 25 on 01 July 1825, number of the Bhils recruited in the Khandesh Bhil Corps rose to 62 on 1st August and 92 on 1st September 1825.

It was an unfortunate coincidence that the town of Dharangaon and the very Kachery in which Outram was living had been the scene of the massacre of a large number of Bhils who were assembled on a very similar plea about 11 years ago. Outram writes that 'the butcheries of that period are fresh in their memory, and a repetition is dreaded by all but those who are now with me. To remove their fears, I have spread no endeavour by constant inter-course with them; talking of the cruelty above alluded to with marks of detestation and without reserve, explaining the advantages we expect from their services (for they could not understand and would suspect any other motive for the liberality of Government); listening to their complaints and enquiring into and obtaining redress for oppression to which the families of some were subjected when unable to complain, they themselves being amenable to justice for
a breach of its laws; interceding for those who though prescribed
have sought my intercession, taking every opportunity of displaying
a perfect confidence in them and demanding services from them, etc.,
etc."543

By these means Outram succeeded in inspiring almost all who
were in the Corps with a feeling of security and confidence in him.
Had this not been fortunately the case, the undertaking must have
been ruined on 26 August 1825. Outram had endeavoured to make the
Bhils of the Corps spend a happy holiday during the Moharum festi-
val. On the last day of the festival (26 August 1825) a rumour was
spread amongst the Bhils of the Corps that 'in the great concourse
of people assembled in the town on that day were concealed agents
by whom they were to be slaughtered in the evening'544 Outram
observes that "this was well calculated to strike terror in the
minds of men most of whom had parents or relations cut off by such
treachery in the Peshwah's region, but the report was only credited
by about 15 of the most timorous and newest of my recruits who fled
on the first alarm; the moment I heard of the rumour (which was
brought to me by the Bheels themselves) I ordered them to assemble
and was promptly obeyed I explained to them how much disappointed
I had reason to be in them, who notwithstanding the confidence I
placed in them, sleeping under their swords every night (having only
a Bheel guard at my residence) still continued to harbour suspicious
of me! They immediately went after the fugitives and returned
with eight in the evening..."545

In the beginning of August 1825, Outram sent two parties to
recruit, the one of a havildar and 20 Bhils to the Chalisgaon
Purgana, the other of a naik and 10 Bhils to Lohar Purgana. These
men belonged to these places and when they reached there, they were very much persuaded by their relations to desert as they were terrified by the rumour they had already heard. But notwithstanding their solicitations every man returned, though they could only prevail on nine men to accompany them.

Outram wanted to arm the Bhils at the earliest. He suggested to the Collector that "Arming them will be the quickest and surest means of removing the suspicious of the Bheel population generally, which are almost the only obstacle to the success of a measure which must prove of the greatest utility. It will subdue, I am confident the rapacious spirit of that class, to which the country has so long been a prey, and which no laws or measures hitherto, whether of coercion or kindness, have been able to subject." Outram was permitted to purchase only twenty swords which were distributed amongst the Bhils of the Corps. But he was not satisfied with this. He requested the Collector to expedite the issue of arms.

In the beginning of July 1825, Outram promoted 3 Bhil naiks and on 1st August 1825 one of the naiks to havildar. His motives for making such early promotion were to excite a spirit of emulation, by showing what they had to look up to as the reward of good behaviour and to teach obedience to non-commissioned officers of his creation, in opposition to what they had hitherto been only accustomed to pay their hereditary naiques.

A big problem to bring the Bhils of the Corps to order at first was their frequent indulgence in intoxication. Outram put this out of their power by the mode of payment which provided them daily with scarcely more than sufficient to obtain the necessaries of life, excepting on the last day of the month when the surplus
of their pay was given. He happily observed that they began to spend in articles of finery in preference to spirituous liquors. The payments of the Bhil Corps were regulated as follows — Two annas were paid every morning, thus controlling their expenditure which would otherwise outstrip their means, unacquainted as they generally were with the use of money at that time. The remainder amounting to 10 annas in a short month and 12 annas in a long month, was paid on the last day of the month.\footnote{349}

The clothing of the Bhils of the Corps consisted of a pugri, dyed green, a white angracka reaching to the knee, and goorgie reaching below the knee, made double and of strong cloth, which in Outram's opinion was best adapted to their inclinations, and gave them a very respectable appearance. This dress was expected to last for about six months and in Outram's view was well calculated for a Police, being perfectly uniform, and looking very well with native arms. (costing under 3½ rupees).\footnote{350}

Outram divided the corps into two classes, the one consisting of men for general police duties, the other of those whom he hoped to train and discipline as Light Infantry. The latter were selected from the youngest and the most intelligent. Various parties of the Bhil Corps were sent to recruit, all of which, though meeting with little success, deserved the trust Outram placed in them and exerted themselves to the utmost. For the same reasons, and to terrify the other Bhils into taking timely refuge in the Corps, Outram employed his men on one or two occasions to apprehend offenders. Notorious Heeria Naik was seized. They also apprehended thirteen thieves. These exertions terrified the Bhils who continued to oppose the laws. Two of the most notorious naiks Sailia and Biwaji who had
for years eluded all attempts and apprehend them, voluntarily
tendered their submission to Outram.

Outram in his report to Collector dated 01 September 1825
further mentions that 'the circumstance of the country for 15 miles
round Dhurrangaum which had been hitherto most particularly a prey
to the rapacity of the Bheels, having been perfectly free from their
depredations. Since the establishment of the Bheel Corps at this
place not a single robbery has taken place, though formerly of
daily occurrence, and travellers who then never ventured out with­
out the protection of horsemen or subundies now proceed unarmed
alone.'

The infant battalion was already nearly 100 strong. The
Commandant was the personal friend and adviser of his every man.
The Corps itself, and the surrounding public, reposed their confi­
dence in him. His men had already done good service in catching
thieves and dacoits. "The foundations of an enduring peace were
surely laid in three months by one unaided youth, than in seven
years by many experienced leaders, in hundreds of expeditious at
the cost of thousands of lives." How was it done? Not by an
unbending discipline or by incessant punishments. "Copious liba­
tions of brandy", tiger hunts, and a long holiday at the Mohurrum,
could not be expected from a severe martinet. How then was it
done? By example of one fearless gentleman, who bore the heat with
the hardiest, faced the tiger with the boldest, sympathized with
the most miserable and depraved, and held out the hand of love to
those who had known no love. What Augustus Cleveland, the
Collector of Bhagalpur and Rajmahal had done among the Santhals
of Bhagalpur in 1780, Outram was doing among the Bhils of Khandesh.
in 1825. Fortunately for the British Empire, Outram did not succumb to his early labours, but lived on to win more glory in wider fields.

Simcox comments that "the Bhils had come to be regarded not as mere criminals, but as creatures without human feeling, as dangerous wild beasts or noxious vermin, from whom no good could be hoped. It was the desire, and was considered the duty of all good citizens to hunt them, trap them, and destroy them at sight. Even the farseeing Captain Briggs despaired of reclaiming them, and it was left for Outram to shew that they were not only human beings, but useful members of society."

**The Levy Becomes a Battalion**

During the rains of 1825 Outram occupied himself with overcoming the rooted antipathy of the Bhils to drill, with recruiting more men, weeding out at the same time any who were indisposed or unfit for permanent service, with arming and clothing his men, and generally with organizing the corps.

Regarding drill, Outram selected the youngest and most promising recruits, and began to teach them regular drill. To older men he kept for the present as irregular police or Bibaudies. In his report to Collector dated 01 November 1825 Outram mentioned about 60 of the former and 40 of the latter.

Recruits came in fairly frequently, but on the other hand a few men deserted, and others were discarded. The strength only rose to 109 on 1st November 1825. It was because Outram was unable to leave a part of the country from which he had drawn a very fair population of the Bhil population.
The first arms that were supplied to the Bhil Corps were native swords. To these were added after some time matchlocks, but Outram for months endeavoured to obtain a regular supply of army muskets. The supply of these arms was delayed till 2nd January 1826, and much discontent was caused thereby.\[359\]

A detachment of 44 regulars, who were personally selected by Outram arrived at Dharangaon on 8 November 1825 to volunteer for duty with the Bhil Corps and assist in drilling it, and to supply its native officers.\[360\] The men were mostly from Outram's own regiment, the 23 Native Infantry. But their arrival 'almost ended the career of the new Corps.'\[361\] The worst suspicions of the Bhils seemed realized. It had often been impressed on them by mischief-makers that the sole object of Government in banding them together at Dharangaon was to massacre them en masse. 'Behold here was a strong and well armed detachment of the detested high caste soldiers of the line marching on them'. Flight or instant death seemed their only alternatives. In a moment, however the young Commandant turned their sorrow into joy, their despair into confidence. Outram writes in his report to collector dated January 1826 - "I effected that end completely by immediately sending away all the arms of the Regular which they had brought with them, giving the Bheels to understand that they and the detachment should be armed at the same time. In the course of a very few days, what I hoped from my knowledge of the character and respectability of the men composing the detachment, was fully effected; the Regulars obtained by their conciliatory conduct to the Bheels their entire confidence, and these high-caste men associated with them without scruple had the highest effect; they begin to rise in self-esteem and to feel proud of the service which places them on an equality with the highest classes.'\[362\]
To remove any remaining fear on the part of the Bhils by
'showing them that they could mix among their former foes without
molestation' Outram sent few Bhils to Malegaon cantonment. There they were received by 23rd Regiment Native Infantry very warmly.

Outram mentions that "not only were the Bhils received by the men of that Regiment without insulting scoffs (which might almost have been expected from such high-castemen and very probably might have been bestowed by many less superior in that respect) but where ever received by them with the greatest kindness. They were invited to sit down beside them and fed by them and talked to by high and low as if on a perfect equality from being brother-soldiers'.

Outram rightly thought that this accidental circumstance will produce more beneficial effects than the most studied measures of conciliation; and Wheel reformation will owe much to it. The Bhils returned quite delighted and flattered by their reception and entreated Outram to allow them no rest from drill until they become equal in some degree to their brother-soldiers.

Thus, was another obstacle removed - 'the dread of or unfavourable feelings towards the Regulars'. A desire to emulate them and a feeling of regard towards them was substituted in the minds of the Bhils who were in the Corps, and similar feelings were expected to be installed by these into the minds of all who would subsequently join them.

The progress of the Bil Corps caused Outram to suggest that it be provided with a regular uniform, which he thus describes: 'A dark blue cloth shell jacket and dungaree pantaloons of the same colour and should facing be allowed, I should prefer green'. This uniform was duly sanctioned, the green facings consisting of cuffs and collar were allowed, and a blue 'foraging cap' was added, also
buttons with the letters K.B.C. Outram himself asked permission to discard his regimental uniform, and adopt that of the Bhil Corps.  

A native apothecary, tents, doolies, and other camp kit were intended for and obtained.  

At the end of 1825 the Commandant and men of the Bhil Corps were so confident of each other, that the permission of the Collector was asked and obtained for a formal march through the province. This march had many objects. It was meant both to promote and show off the efficiency of the Corps, it might be the occasion of capturing any marauding bands who were about, and of testing the worth of the recruits when engaged with their late comrades in crime. It filled the Bhils with martial pride, owing to their formal recognition by the 23rd Regiment and the garrison of Malegaon as brother-soldiers.  

The strength of the Bhil Corps rose to 134 by 01 January 1826 and 249 by 1st March 1826.  

At Nandurbar the Bhil Corps was reviewed by Mr. Bax, the acting Collector, on 19 March, 1826. By 1st July 308 Bhils were in service, of whom 258 were being regularly drilled.  

On 11th July Mr. Bax, the Collector, wrote to the Bombay Government recommending the appointment of an European Adjutant. The appointment was atonce sanctioned, and the local authorities were asked to select a suitable officer.  

On the 12th December, the Corps was inspected by Mr. Bax who was much satisfied with the performance of Bhil Corps.  

Outram was so much confident about his men that he requested the Collector that the Bhil Corps may be given some real work, on
outpost duty and so forth, and that it may have the honour of furnishing escorts to the Collector and Captain Ovans, the Southern Bhil Agent. Outram writes that "Parties of the Bhil sepoys accompanied by a portion of the Regulars of the Corps may now be safely intrusted with the charge of treasure and escorting it from the neighbouring gunnah to Dooliah". He further emphasises that "The Corps is ready to act in a body or detachment against any assembly of outlaws, and I can answer for them as now quite sufficient for the suppression of any body of Bheels or of any force which can ever be assembled in the province". He further notes that the offers of the Collector and that of Captain Ovans to take a party of Bhil Corps on personal escort, Outram further writes to the Collector "nothing could be more beneficial to the Corps than your thus placing trust and confidence in the Bheels. This employment will also raise them in the eyes of other classes and it has excited a lively feeling of pride and gratitude in the whole corps and in indeed your kindness to the Corps, the interest in their successful establishment you have shown from the commencement, your recent presence on their successive paradas, the general pardon you have granted, the promotion of Bheels to Jemedars, added to the above display of your confidence, have had the best possible effect".

In January 1827 Beck arrived at Dharangaon and took charge as Adjutant. This enabled Outram to go on tour in the western part of the province. He obtained many recruits there.

Upto the beginning of the year 1827 the old Khandesh Local Battalion of irregulars had been dragging on a more or less useless existence. In April 1827, Owing to the increased efficiency of the Bhil Corps the Government ordered immediate disbandment of the
Khandesh Local Battalion of irregular, which was duly carried out.

During the summer of 1827 Outram carried out successful operations in the Satpuda against the gangs of Cundu Naik, Mahdu Sing, Govind Naik Lahanu and Zeepriah Naik. The Gangs were dispersed and their leaders captured or killed. "This was the first opportunity", writes Outram, "my Bheels had of shedding their blood for their new masters, they freely risked it and fought boldly in our cause though opposed to their own caste and probably relations. The steadiness with which they rallied, the boldness with which they charged, the prudence with which they reserved their fire, the very great fatigue they so cheerfully underwent, and the readiness with which all but the wounded returned with me to the hills entitles them to the fullest approbation of Government, especially considering they were unsupported by any Regulars."

On his return to Dharangaon for the Rains, Outram experienced very severe trouble. At the beginning of rains, water at Dharangaon used to be both scanty and foul, and cholera was often reported. Lieutenant Beck probably caught this disease and his Commandant attended him, and was thereby infected. Lieutenant Beck died shortly after catching this disease.

Neither the loss of his Adjutant nor his own ill health, prevented Outram from working hard at the men's drill. Previous to splitting up the Bhil Corps into several detachments already suggested, it was determined that the whole battalion should be reviewed by the Major General Commanding the Division at Malegaon. The review took place on 20 and 21 November 1827. The General was unable to be present, but the Corps was duly reviewed by his
Brigade Major whose report has nothing but praise for Outram and his men. The Brigade Major was extremely impressed by the performance of the Corps and requested the Major General to bring 'Lieutenant Outram's exertions and conduct to the notice of Government.'

The Government was now so much pleased with the success of the Khandesh Bhil Corps that it resolved to make a further experiment on similar lines in Gujarat. Outram was asked to make suggestions based on his own experience.

'Great as was the satisfaction of Government at the progress of the Bhil Corps, there now becomes evident a desire to restrict it both in numbers and efficiency.' Orders were issued forbidding any increase in the number of disciplined men. All recruits were to form part of the undisciplined ranks, and an endeavour was to be made to officer these ranks from among the Bhil chieftains. Equipment and stores were reduced, and economy was enjoined in every direction. The Collector and Outram protested most strongly. They argued that it was largely the sense of discipline, espirit de corps, and assimilation to the regular line, which had turned the Bhils from plunder and rapine to the protection of the country. They stated that an undisciplined and half tamed mob of Bhils under their own chiefs would be more likely to rob than to protect the country, and would eventually revert to the status quo. But Government remained for the present obdurate, though the saving effected owing to replacing detachments of Regulars by men of the Bhil Corps might well have been treated as a set off to the small extra expenditure proposed.

A small measure was introduced, about this time, to increase the authority of the Commandant. Hitherto he had but little power of punishing offenders in the Corps. He was now gazetted Assistant
Magistrate and Collector, and therefore received the necessary authority.\textsuperscript{384}

The Bhil Corps on Duty

The Khandesh Bhil Corps had now been followed from its infancy, through its growth, to a period of vigorous youth. It was armed, uniformed, and drilled, and declared fit to take its place among the regiments of the line. Its constitution and status from Commandant to recruit, was made clear. From henceforth "it must be regarded", remarks Simeox, "as the guardian of the province".\textsuperscript{385} Gradually the regular military outposts were withdrawn and replaced by the Bhil Corps, until there were no troops in the province except at Naegaon and Asirgad.\textsuperscript{386} Slowly the marauding Bhil gangs were destroyed, reduced or made to surrender until none was left. The villages were repopulated, the jungle reclaimed.\textsuperscript{387} The timid cultivators returned home and resumed their farms. The Collector reported in 1828 that for the last six months the country had, for the first time during twenty years, enjoyed repose.\textsuperscript{388}

The Bhil Corps was employed throughout the province, in pursuing foreign marauders, escorting prisoners and treasure, and furnishing outposts in situations where no one could exist during the rains except natives of the spot.\textsuperscript{389} Thus a permanent peace with rare exceptions spread over the province.

But all this was not the work of a day. It was accomplished largely due to Outram and his men.

In January 1829 bands of Bhils about 300 strong were plundering in the hills east of Ajanta and made descents on Malkapur in Berar. A detachment of 46 Bhils sepoys marched to Jamner with Major Ovans, the Southern Bhil Agent. The mere presence of the
detachment was enough to keep the maranders out of Khandesh.*

Later in the year Outram was requested to take as many of his men as were available to Mulher. A gang of Kolis from the Nasik ghats was expected to endeavour to break through Khandesh and occupy the Satpudas; regular troops were also despatched to oppose them. The Kolis, however did not dare to oppose the troops and the gang melted away.†

In September 1829 the important fortress of Sindra, Commanding the approach to Khandesh through the Satpudas, was occupied by the Bhil Corps, and the regular garrison returned to Headquarters.‡

In October 1829, Outram went on short leave, and Lieutenant Graham who had joined the Bhil Corps as Adjutant in the later part of 1828, officiated as Commandant. He was forthwith required to proceed to the north eastern Satpudas, to exterminate a gang of Nahal Bhils.

Outram returned to duty in January 1830, having been delayed in Ahmadnagar on his way from Bombay by an accident. In the same spring he was required to proceed to the west of the province and assist the troops in the quelling of a rising of the Dong Bhils. Matters were so serious, that every available man was called and sent to the scene of operations.§ The Dang country was so difficult that for almost 70 years it was left for the most part severely alone, unless the chiefs' conduct became intolerable, when they were repressed by force.¶

The Acting Collector reported on 18 May 1829 that villages of Naguri in Navpura Pargana and Chorewur in the Warsa Pargana were plundered by the Dang Bhils. Detachments of Bhil Corps were posted
along the Western frontier to prevent further aggressions, until
the season admitted of military operations.\footnote{395}

All available force of the Bhil Corps and Auxiliary Horse,
together with a strong detachment of regular troops marched on the
Dang. A severe and harassing campaign ensured, owing to excessively
difficult nature of the country, the rapid movements of the Bhils
and the assistance universally afforded to the Dang Bhils by the
Gaekwar's officers.\footnote{396}

All revolting Dang chiefs including Silpput Raja and Khem Raja
were seized and brought to Khandesh, "where the claims of each were
thoroughly sifted and settled.\footnote{397}

Great sickness prevailed among the troops after their return
from the Dang.\footnote{398}

During this campaign the services of Lieutenant Outram,
Lieutenant Graham and of the Bhil Corps as a whole were highly
appreciated by Mr. Eeyd, the Collector of Khandesh.\footnote{399}

In June 1830 Lieutenant F. Thomas Prager of the European
Regiment, doing duty with the 18th Regiment at Asirrgad, was appoin­
ted the officiating Adjutant of the Bhil Corps during the absence
of Lieutenant Graham on sick certificate.\footnote{400}

About this time a school was establish at Dharagaon for the
Bhil Corps "It attracted some attention at that time" observes Simcox,
"but was not a permanent success".\footnote{401}

In 1831 the Tadvi or Mussulman Bhils of north-eastern part of
Khandesh, aided by a number of Pardhis, began to attack the towns
below the hills in force.
A detachment of Bhil Corps marched under Lieutenant Outram to Yawal. 469 Tadvis were apprehended by the detachment of the Bhil Corps.

The year 1932 was not marked by any important rising. "There is much correspondence," remarks Simeox "during the year concerning an unfortunate quarrel between some of the Bhil Corps men at Dhule and some men of the 18th Regiment."

During this year the Bhil Corps was entrusted with the charge of the district treasuries.

In the spring of 1833 a serious outbreak began in the Satpudas bordering on the Badvani State. Outram proceeded as far as the Narmada with his troops. He overawed the Raja of Badvani into semblance of loyalty, dispersed the various gangs and finally returned to Sindra Fort.

In 1834 there seems to have been little activity among the Bhils. A gang collected in the north-east Satpudas and looted a few villages, but was apparently dispersed without difficulty.

During 1835 it was decided to replace the detachments of Regulars at Dahivel and Kukurmunda by men from the Bhil Corps. For this purpose, as the Corps had already 440 men out of 600 on outpost duty, it became necessary to increase the total strength. Accordingly the Corps was ordered to be divided into 9 companies, each having about 95 men. Outram represented that another European officer should be posted to the Corps. It was agreed to. Lieutenant Graham was appointed 2nd in Command with magistral powers and Lieutenant Morris was appointed its Adjutant.
By the end of 1835 Captain Outram left Khandesh Bhil Corps having been selected for the appointment of the Political Agent in Gujarat. Lieutenant Graham was appointed as the Commandant and Lieutenant Brown Second in Command of the Khandesh Bhil Corps.

The Khandesh Bhil Corps under Lieutenant Graham (1835 - 41).

When Lieutenant Graham took over as Commandant of Bhil Corps in 1835, he had not been without experience of his duties. He had been both Adjutant and 2nd in Command of the Corps and as he had officiated as Southern Bhil Agent for some time, he was acquainted with the civilian portion of the programme of conciliation and improvement of the Bhils.

In the first few years of his regime there was but little actual fighting recorded. A large gang of Bhils entered Sauda in 1837 and did some damage in the way of looting villages, driving of cattle and so forth. The Bhil Corps was called out, with a detachment from Asirgaod but on appearance of the troops the gang which had been estimated at 800-900 strong, melted away. There was however a continuance of trouble given by small parties of robbers. Though no gangs assembled of sufficient magnitude to warrant a regular expedition being sent out, yet there was constant and harassing work for small detachments. The taluka of Yaval was still part of Sindia's dominions, and the marauders found a refuge there. The local officials while professing to assist the company's Government found it paid them to keep in with the Bhils.

In 1838 Lieutenant Agar, Adjutant, C.P. Corps, was looted outside Burhanpur by a party of armed Bhil robbers 25 strong. They tied him and his escort up, and decamped with Rs 1,500.
The same year the camp of Mr. J.D. Inverarity, Assistant Collector, Ahmednagar, was robbed by Satmala Bhils. In 1859, Major and Mrs Brooks were attacked and relieved of all their property while travelling over the Sindva Pass. 412

Many other instances might be recorded to show that though no large campaign was undertaken, yet Lieutenant Graham and his men were kept continuously at work.

A wearisome and unseemly wrangle was kept up with Government. The officers allowances were cut, the men's bhatta was reduced, the position of the regulars attached to the Bhil Corps was depreciated. Old and bad arms and ammunition were supplied, and such necessaries as tents had to be fought for. To modern mind it may be hard to conceive that the ultimate authority responsible for the Corps was the High Court (Sadar Faugdari Adalat). Yet such was the case, and no doubt the absolute ignorance of the grave and reverend judges of military matters explains their want of sympathy for the crying needs of the Corps. 413

In 1839, Lieutenant Browne, 2nd in Command died in the Jamner jungles, and Lieutenant Morris succeeded. Lieutenant J.W. Auld of 26th Native Infantry, was appointed Adjutant 414

In 1839, Captain Graham had a short campaign in the jungle of Baglan, Pimpalner, and Navapur, Bordering on the Dangs, against a rabble of thieves acting under the Hajas of Vasurna, Chichli and Gadvi Dangs. They had looted villages in Peint and Baglan, and the country near Navpur was much disturbed. All available men of the Bhil Corps were called out, but most likely the rebels succeeded in escaping into their trackless jungles without suffering much punishment. All the chiefs attended the Bhil Agent. An unconditional restoration of property was followed by a pardon for
aggression. The claims of the Chiefs were reexaminined and settled. However, there were two results of this action. One was the increase of the Bhil Corps by a 'Daug levy' of 75 men for local duty. It was hard to obtain recruits in the beginning but gradually the levy became successful and in two years' time it was reported fit to take its place as a component part of the Bhil Corps.

The second result of the Daug operations was a long and well considered report on local conditions round Navpur. Captain Graham reported that all signs of prosperity of the area around Navpur had vanished and the 'condition of the people was wretched, and that under the 'sway of beggarly chieftains and unprincipled revenue contractors, matters were going from bad to worse'. Such 'Police as there were, were nominated from among the personal hangers - on of this or that chieftain, were in perpetual arrears of pay, and had neither the power nor the inclination to preserve the peace'. Captain Graham made proposals for the better policing of the country, for exacting work from the hereditary guardians of the passes, and above all for the re-establishment of the Western Bhil Agency. This Agency was abolished in 1838 and its functions were combined with the office of the 2nd in Command of the Bhil Corps. As the headquarters of the agency were at Kannad and those of the Corps at Dharaugron, it is obvious that neither duty could be well performed.

This period of the Corps' history, though deficient in actual fighting, is noteworthy for the careful organization by the Commandant of the enormous quantity of detachment duty expected of his Corps. That this duty, extending over a province 180 miles...
long and 100 miles broad, was 'cheerfully performed by the men, and resulted in no complaints from Government or the public in the matter of credit to all concerned.\footnote{417}

The days of regular organization and steady developments were destined to end immediately after the call of Captain Graham to the presidency 'on secret service'.\footnote{418}

Khandesh Bhil Corps under Captain Morris, Officiating Commandant (1841-43, 1844-1855)

Captain Morris performed the duties of the Officiating Commandant of the Bhil Corps from 1841 to 1843, during Graham's absence from the Corps being away on 'Secret Service' at the Presidency. Captain Graham returned to the Command of the Bhil Corps in June 1843 and finally left the Corps in 1844 after being appointed as Commissioner of Police, Bombay. The Command of the Bhil Corps was resumed by Captain Morris.

In the summer of 1841 an insurrection broke out among the Bhils between the Tapi and Narmada, to the north and west of the Sindva Pass, which necessitated an active campaign. The Collector was reluctant to resort to arms and the Government even reproached him for his delay. The force which was subsequently assembled in May 1841 consisted of 100 men of the Bhil Corps, 60 of the Poona Auxiliary Horse, and 50 of the 22nd Native Infantry. In a few days these men had marched to the Narmada had a skirmish in very bad terrain and put to flight the gang. Phannia Naik was killed and subsequently the whole gang was dispersed.\footnote{419}

The rains of 1841 were hardly over, when disturbing news came from the east of the province. A person dressed as an ascetic had proclaimed himself to be the ex-Raja of Nagpur, had
descended from the hills to the north of Berar, in the country between the Tapi and Purna rivers. He occupied Jalgaon Jamod, the principal town of the neighbourhood, and was spreading his usurpation over that part of the country. His forces were reported to number from 3,000 to 5,000 men. 'Letters from him inviting recruits, from the rebel army were discovered'. In short, an attack on Khandesh from the east was imminent. Troops were massed at Asirgad. Co-operation of the Nizam's forces was invited and the Bhil Corps under Captain Morris in Raver and Captain Auld in Betavad lined the frontier. Meanwhile a bold coup by the Nizam's troops effected the capture of the "Ex-Raja", and the dispersion of the rebels but this 'happy ending did not occur until the Bhil Corps had undergone a great deal of harassing work'.

In March 1842, the Bhils who were creating problems in the area east of the Sirdwa Pass were attacked. The troop employed were all from the Bhil Corps, with some Poona Irregular Horse.

The western tract of Satpuda Hills was thoroughly scoured and a salutary awe was impressed on the Bhils in that quarter, who had so often disturbed the peace of the surrounding country with impunity of their five principal leaders four were apprehended and the fifth and most notorious was killed. 163 Bhils were seized.

In this campaign Kaja Sing again gave valuable assistance, and was rewarded with £100 for capturing one of the rebel chiefs.

During 1843 Captain Morris seems to have introduced over the province a system which was already in force in the Southern Agency. All village Bhils were required to present themselves before the Patil for roll call, or 'Hajari'. A Bhil who absented from roll call was at once put under suspicious of having been
away for no honest purpose. To be absent on their lawful occasions, all the Bhils had to procure a 'chit' from the Patil, stating their names, and residence, and the purpose of their journey.\textsuperscript{424}

Before the rains of 1843 set in, two more disturbances took place. Two fresh rebels collected a gang in the Satpudas. As no European officer was at hand, the Subedar Major of the Bhil Corps was sent after them with 50 men. This is the first time a native officer was sent out to active service in independent command. The gang was dispersed.\textsuperscript{425}

Captain Graham returned to the command the Bhil Corps in June 1843, and Captain Morris took over the Kannad Agency, and 2nd in Command's office. He at once found it necessary to hunt down the Satmala gang, under Baherya Naik, and undertook a chase through the mountains during July and August 1843. Baherya Naik was ultimately captured in a village near Pachora, where Sindia's authorities had long connived at his finding a refuge.\textsuperscript{426}

In 1844 Captain Graham finally left the Corps, being appointed Commissioner of Police, Bombay, and Captain Morris resumed the command of Bhil Corps. On leaving, Captain Graham was asked to write a history of operations among the Bhils up to date. His report contains an admirable precis of the operations from 1825 to 1842.\textsuperscript{427}

In the spring of 1845 news was brought that Raghoji Bangrya, a Koli rebel from the Konkan, was likely to find a refuse in the Dangs and Baglash. He was said to have made alliance with the local Bhil Chiefs. Captain Morris thereupon assembled a force of Bhils, and marched to Jaykheda,
the place where Outram camped in 1835 on his way to Mulher. He
brought in the principal Bhil Chieftain, and for a while awaited
developments. The peace of Khandesh indeed was secured by his
movements, but Raghoji remained a menace to the Northern Konkan
and Nasik. It was a matter of credit to the Khandesh Bhil Corps
that Government asked that Captain Morris might be deputed with
a contingent of his Corps, to Nasik and the surrounding area with
the object of crushing Raghoji's rebellion. Though Captain Morris
and his 175 men were not successful in seizing Raghoji, yet he and
his men seem to have put an end to the armed rebellion. They were
allowed to return in July with the thanks of Government for their
work. 428

In this year two additional companies were levied for the
Bhil Corps, in consideration of its taking over the duties of
garrisoning the fort of Sindva.

Hitherto the Corps had been armed with flint-locks, but
now the issue of "percussion fire arms" was started. 429

The Western Bhil Agency was re-established in 1845 by order
of the Governor General in council. Lieutenant Jose was appointed
Agent, retaining the position of 3rd in Command of the Bhil Corps.

From this time onwards the European officers of the Bhil
Corps were theoretically as under: 430

Commandant - Stationed at the Headquarters at Dharangaon.
He was also the Assistant Magistrate and Bhil Agent for Eastern Satpudas.

2nd in Command. - Headquarters at Kannad. He was also the
Assistant Magistrate and Bhil Agent for the
Satmalas.
3rd in Command - Stationed at the Headquarters at Mandurbar. He was also the Assistant Magistrate and Western Bhil Agent.

Adjutant - Stationed at the Headquarters at Dharangaon. Nominal also Assistant Magistrate and Assistant Bhil Agent, but practically in charge of the regimental work of the Corps.

The 2nd and 3rd in command were more occupied by the civil than military duties. Though they had many outposts under them which they inspected, they were seldom on duty with the battalion as a whole, or with any considerable part of it, on active service. The above was the theoretical arrangement. As a matter of fact generally there was one or more of the officers sick or on leave, and duties had to be duplicated.

After resuming command of the Bhil Corps on his return from the Deccan Captain Morris and his officers appear to have been fully occupied in organization, both military and civil. There was a bad season in 1846, when Corps failed at least partially. Lieutenant Rose in the west started a legal campaign against the grain dealers, who exasperated the Bhils by selling bad corn at exorbitant rates. Lieutenant Rose's efforts met with no support from Government.

The name of Khaja Sing of the Sindra Pass again comes to notice. He was seized by a Colonel marching through, and forcibly detained until he shewed some shikar. Khaja Sing considered his treatment to have been most undignified and protested.

Captain Morris, with ever increasing work in supplying outposts and travelling guards, had a hard fight to keep his Corps clothed
and supplied. Every indent for supplies was cavilled at or cut down, his right to tents was contested, he was deprived of his camp lascars, in short, 'the corps would have been starved to death had the Commandant not contested every point'.

The years 1847-1849 produced no active service. Though Bhil Agents changed, Captain Morris remained Commandant, and Lieutenant d'Arcy, Adjutant. Day by day the Corps became more like what is now known as armed police, and the Poona Horse detachment more and more resembled mounted police. The Bhils on the frontier were quite, which was extremely fortunate, for Government entirely ignored the maxim 'si vis pacem, bellum para', and in view of the peaceful times began to cut down expenditures on police while adding to it in other ways.

The correspondence of the period shows the regular evolution of the Pax Britannica out of the anarchy of the Peshwa's Government. The Bhil Corps was raised to defend the frontiers against marauding gangs from the hills. Only incidently was it asked to do police duty in the plains. As the mountain freebooters were reduced, killed, or brought to peaceful pursuits, the warlike duties of the Corps diminished, while its routine increased. Sindia's territory in Chopda, Yawal and Pachora was annexed and British Government was introduced into them without ever the suggestion of an increase to the Bhil Corps.

In 1849 Captain Morris addressed a letter to the Collector, wherein he asks for an appointment almost exactly corresponding to that of the modern superintendent of Police. In 1852 he was actually made Superintendent, and the official style of the commandant now read Commandant, Khandesh Bhil Corps, Bhil Agent,
Superintendent of Police and Assistant Magistrate. What Captain Morris and his successors secured as Superintendents was official control over the local and village police as well as over their own trained men. No important warlike operations were reported between 1849 and 1852. In the winter of 1852-53 it seemed as though a general rebellion were likely in the province. Government had ordered that a Revenue Survey be undertaken and several officers were appointed to commence operations.

The people of Khandesh were extremely conservative and averse to innovations. The cry of 'a new custom is being introduced' was raised at Savda, and a crowd estimated at between 10,000 and 15,000 persons promptly assembled. They drove away the Survey officers, beat the Mamlatdar, administered strange oaths, and announced their determination to withstand the survey by armed force. The Collector and Major Morris proceeded to Dharangaon and awaited the arrival of a regiment from Malgaon. The inhabitants of Erandol seemed to be in sympathy and refused to supply transport. But when the regiment marched in they quickly changed their minds. The Collector and Major Morris marched eastwards with great rapidity, invested Faizpur one early morning, and Savda later the same day. The rioters were completely taken by surprise. Their leaders were captured and their arms confiscated. The troops remained some time at Savda, where order was at once restored and the survey operations were recommenced.

The remaining years of Major Morris Command produced no serious military operations. The gang robberies and disturbances which occurred were small and easily quelled by the local detachments.
In 1855 Major Morris left the Corps, and Captain Rose succeeded as Commandant. Before leaving his Command in 1856, Captain Rose continued the summary of measures among the Bhils upto 1855 which was earlier brought down to 1843, by Captain Graham.

Major Morris had been in the Corps for 20 years and actually served under Outram. He saw a large increase in its strength, and an expansion and alteration in its duties. In fact, its functions altered from those of fighting regiment, as organised by Outram, mobile and ready to strike at a moment's notice, but still a regiment, to those of a highly developed body of armed police, scattered in varying detachments over the province, doing its duty well on the whole, but subject to the faults attending on detached duty and infrequent supervision. Only one-fourth of the Corps was at the headquarters, and the guards consisting of the remaining three-fourths, were relieved at irregular intervals, and inspected when possible.

The Commandant and Adjutant were also Magistrates and Police officers but they concerned themselves chiefly with their regimental duties. As to the 2nd and 3rd in Command, they did practically no military duty, and were to all intents and purposes assistants to the Collector for work among the Bhils. They opened schools, repaired roads, superintended forests, and thinned out the dangerous game, and this in addition to heavy magisterial, police, and revenue duties. The introduction of vaccination, and improvement of the cotton staple were among the various odd jobs to which Captain Rose turned his hand.

Major Morris appears to have been somewhat punctilious, apt to pose as a strict soldier, and to put on the airs of "the oldest
resident". He cannot be denied, however, the honour of having carried on and completed Outram's work, both as a soldier and organizer, and if he seemed unduly touchy and sensitive, it is only fair to him to attribute his attitude to a pride in his regiment.

**Bhil Corps During 1857-58**

Khandesh was in a state of more profound peace during 1856 and the earlier part of 1857 than had been known for years. Major A.M. Haselwood was appointed commandant of Bhil Corps in 1856.

In 1857 the year of mutinies, in the Satmalas under Bhagoji Naik, and in the Satpudas under Kajee Sing Naik, the Bhils once more became troublesome.

It was thought desirable in June/July 1857 to raise a 2nd Bhil Corps to combat the enormous crowds of rebels, Bhils and others. The nucleus was formed of men from the old Corps. Recruits were obtained as quickly as possible. The sanctioned strength of each Bhil Corps was 1000 of all ranks. A staff of European officers was appointed to each corps as under:

1st Khandesh Bhil Corps:
- Commandant - Major A.M. Haselwood.
- 2nd in Command - Captain H.F. Davies
- Adjutant - Lieutenant A. Bell

2nd Khandesh Bhil Corps:
- Commandant - Captain H. Birch
- 2nd in Command - Lieutenant F.W. Atkins
- Adjutant - Lieutenant T Thacher

The above mentioned appointments except that of T. Thatcher date from 7th October 1857.
The first active operations took place in June 1857, when news was received that a large body of the Nizam's Cavalry at Aurangabad had mutinied and were descending on Khandesh by way of Ajanta Pass. It was subsequently found that there were never more than 30 or 40 of them attempting to get into Khandesh. Captain Birch quickly arrived on the spot and succeeded in rounding them up near Jamner.

There were more serious danger at Burhanpur and Asirgad. Captain Birch with his 100 men of Bhil Corp immediately marched towards Burhanpur. He received a letter from Colonel Messurier stating that some of the Sindia's contingent, 105 in number were in a state of mutiny outside the walls of Burhanpur. Captain Birch was able to disarm these men without firing a shot.

This done, more was to follow. There was danger at Asirgad itself. Same day Captain Birch and his 100 men started their march through thick jungle and pouring rain to climb the steep side of Asirgad. Troops also joined from Mafegaon on 11 July 1857. Captain Birch was able to disarm 200 men of the Gwaliar contingent, formerly part of the garrison of Asirgad. Since Asirgad was the key to one of the main routes from Upper India to the Deccan, its loss would have been a most serious matter for the British Army. Simcox remarks that 'considering the length of the marches, the weather, and the terrible state into which cotton soil roads get during heavy rain, it is not too much to say that no troops but the Bhil Corps could have marched into Asirgad with such expedition.'
Captain Birch and Lieutenant Kennedy were recalled to Dharangaon where they were badly needed to consolidate the new mass of recruits being raised for the 2nd Bhil Corps.

On the eastern frontier till now no trouble had been experienced from the Bhils themselves. But it was not long in coming. Lieutenant Kennedy was sent to the West, where Bhils from Badvani State under two leaders under Bhima and Mavasya had assembled for plunder. Lieutenant Kennedy marched on their band but was forced to retreat.

Captain Birch was sent to Shirpur, Lieutenant Kennedy being retained in charge of a detachment at Shahada and Toloda. Captain Birch was for immediately attacking the rebels who were reported about 800 or 900 strong. He requested that Lieutenant Kennedy's detachment and 100 men from Dhule might be sent to him. The reinforcements, however, were not sent quickly. The delay was fatal, for Kajee Singi, the Warden of Sindva Pass, the protector of the Agra Bombay Road yielded to temptation and joined the rebels with 200 followers. Kajee Singh or Kajar Singh became the most dangerous enemy of the British Government in Khandesh. It is desirable to discuss about Kajee Singi in some details.

**Kajee Singi**

Kajee Singi was the hereditary chief or Naik of the Sindva Pass in north Khandesh where the Bombay Agra Road crosses the Satpuda hills. He succeeded his father Goomani Naik who for various misdeeds including robbery was transported for life. At the time of his father's removal Kajee Singh was a young man. When old enough to undertake the duties and
responsibilities of the post, he was made Warden of the Sindva Pass in 1833. As he grew older he became the 'most influential as well as the most powerful Bhil Chief in Chopda, Shirpur and Shahada'. He was 'proud and haughty claiming Rajput blood'. In 1850 he was tried for assault and manslaughter, the result of over-zeal in dealing with some Bhils he had arrested for robbing. One Bhil died and two were much injured due to his treatment. For this offence, he was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. This punishment was reduced by the Sadar Court to 5 years' imprisonment with 5 month's solitary confinement. On his release in 1856, the Western Bhil Agent strongly recommended Kajee Singh's restoration, but the proposal was negatived by the District Magistrate. In the following year (1857), Kajee Singh renewed his application, and the District Magistrate obtained sanction of Government to restore him to his Warden-ship. It was hoped that his influence and cooperation on the outbreak of mutiny will be very useful. Soon after his return to duty in the Sindva Pass, Kajee Singh gathered a few followers and joined the rebels.

Captain Birch sent a detailed report to Mausfield, the Collector from Camp Shirpur on 12 October 1857 about the circumstances under which Kajee Singh had defected. On 6 October 1857 Mahadoo Nandier Chowkee and Dowloo of Sawinia Chowkee both Bhil Naiks of Sindva side came with 200 men to Sangwee on a visit to Kajee Sing. Same evening he left Sangwee along with those 200 men. Next day Captain Birch followed Kajee Sing and
found that Kajee Sing and other two naiks had looted Pullusner, carried off the Dak horses, cut the Telegraph in three places and were at Jamnia with 500 men out of which 80 were Mussalman Pardesees and 34 Ghaut chowkedar. Next day Kajee Sing occupied the Fort of Boreghat and was joined by other Bhils.

The strength of the rebels including all castes was estimated by Captain Birch between 800 and 900. Bhma Naik with his gang also joined Kajee Sing subsequently. Captain Birch was also informed by the Police Commissioner, Pune that Lieutenant Henry, Superintendent of Police, Ahmednagar was killed while attacking Bhogoji Naik. This naik had gathered a gang and was holding the hills between the districts of Ahmadnagar and Nasik. There were rumours that he was intending to attack, Khandesh either by way of Sahyadris or the Satmalas.

Mr. Mansfield the Collector arrived at Shirpur and endeavoured to make Kajee Sing 'Come in' but could not succeed. He wrote to the Government on 2 November 1857 that "from the assemblage of so many separate bands for plundering it is evident that the whole Bheel population are in insurrection and most stringent measures are required to put them down." To deal with the situation he ordered to raise 1000 to 1200 peons to replace the different parties of the Bhil Corps stationed at different posts. He wanted them to employ in military operations against the insurgents in the hills. The men of the Bhil Corps 'are by far the most useful troops for this disposition of warfare.' Mansfield also modified the
police set up to make it more efficient. Mamlatdars who were 'only the nominal head of police' were made 'real ones'.

In December 1857 a large consignment of silver belonging to the native merchants, which was on its way to Indore by the Sindva Pass was looted by Kajee Sing. With this large sum at disposal, numbers of Arabs, Makronis and other mercenaries flocked to Kajee Sing's standard. In a short time Kajee Sing was at the head of a raffle force strong enough to tempt him to dispute the passage of a siege train on its way to Delhi. With the high rates of pay he was able to offer, and difficulty of bringing a body of troops to crush him, adventurers from all sides and many Bhil Chiefs with their followers 'joined Kajee Sing. Satpuda hills from Tapi to Narmada were in a blaze. It was thought that the emissaries from Delhi had been sent to Kaji Sing.

Regarding the looting of the treasure, an enquiry was made as to whether this treasure was set up for the purpose of being looted, that is, in order to assist the rebellion. No evidence to this effect was obtained but Captain Birch's report on the subject is instructive.

Captain Birch, Commandant of 2nd Khandesh Bhil Corps reported to A. Bellington, Commissioner of Police vide his letter dated 15 March 1858 regarding the plunder of the treasure near Sindva that 'nothing elicited in evidence tends to prove that any collusion existed between the Guard in charge of the
treasure, and persons residing in Bombay, still that prior to attack some understanding had been come to between the said Guard and the plunderers, no doubt can exist in as much as (although numbering about 300) immediately on appearance of the Bhheels, they not only laid down their, but shared in the loot. Of the 300 guards 167 were shortly afterwards apprehended, and property to worth 62,630 recovered. The guards were brought to trial by Sir Robert Hamilton and 162 guards were sentenced to 14 years Riggerous Imprisonment.

On 4th April 1858 Captain Birch with his 50 men of Bhil Corps and 12 Poona Horsemen proceeded to trace the Rebel Bhils under Kajee Sing. Kajee Sing and his band left the hiding place and retreated in great haste. Captain Birch searched the jungle for some distance round their encampment and discovered hidden in the river and buried under ground in different nullah property amounting in value to about Rs 80,000. It consisted of bars of silver, five franc pieces etc. He further recovered 22 head of cattles, great quantities of grain and about 500/- worth of opium.

The list of property discovered is most instructive. Opium is only 1/160th of the whole, but Franc coins formed apparently a large part. It is atleast a 'curious coincidence that the Government had been circulating discriptions of several French officers who were reported to have landed in India with intention of volunteering their services as officers to the mutineers'. It is possible that there is
a dream in their minds to take revenge on the English and of re-establishment of French pre-dominance in India.

By April 1858, a considerable force over 2000 strong was collected in the Satpudas under command of Major Evans. The Field Force consisted of a Native Infantry Regiment, a Mountain Battery and 500 men of the Khandesh Bhil Corps with a strong detachment of Poona Horse. The loss of his camp and treasure appears to have exasperated Kajee Sing and he determined to fight. He and other Chiefs with 3000 followers consisting of Makrains and Bhils took their main position on a hill called Amba Pani. On the 11 April 1858 Kajee Sing and his rebel army were completely defeated. The Arabs and the Makrains who were the chief defenders of the position suffered heavily. Kajee Sing made his escape and with a few Bhils remained a fugitive in the hills until June 1858. The action at Amba Pani has been described in Major Evan's own words in his letters to the Quarter Master General of the Army dated 12th April and 14th April. He expressed his thanks and appreciation for Lieutenant Stanley Scot, Adjutant of the Bhil Corps, Lieutenant Hanston and Lieutenant Sibthorpe of 6th Regiment, Naib Risaldar Hyat Heer Khan of Poona Horse, Captain Langston, Captain Birch and Lieutenant Hall. The personnel of Bhil Corps under Lieutenant Atkins also performed extremely well in the attack at Dhaba Bavdi.

"11th of April 1858", observed Simeox, may well be called the day of the culmination of the Bhil Corps' history. On many occasions its worth had been proved in local warfare, both
inside and outside Khandesh. It had fulfilled its police duties creditably for 30 years, and had assisted in making the Province a peaceful and prosperous tract of country. At Burhanpur and Asirgad it had proved its fearless devotion to duty against mutineers, even though they were trained soldiers. But at Amba Pani it was associated with the Line on a footing of equality 'Side by side they fought, fell and conquered'. Two Bhil officers Captain Birch and Lieutenant Atkins were wounded several men were killed or wounded.

Though the victory at Amba Pani was signal and also fully acknowledged, it was not conclusive. Neither Kajee Sing nor Bhima nor Navasya had been secured or killed. Unless this was done there could be no assurance of peace. Many circumstances combined to delay operations.

The result of inaction was that Kajee Sing 'came in'. He was pardoned and actually reinstated as the warden of Sindra Pass. He, however, as might have been expected, again yielded to temptation in shape of a large treasure on camels. He looted the treasure and went out again. Lieutenant Atkins and Lieutenant Prokyn pursued him and his gang, defeated him and recovered over Rs 1,00,000 of treasure. Kajee Sing escaped, remained as a fugitive for some time and finally assassinated by Jamedar Rohandeen on 3rd October 1860. The operations though small as regards force employed, were both well planned and successful. It was rightly described by the Government as having prevented another Bhil mutiny.
Bhima Naik continued to give trouble till 1867, when he surrendered and was transported.

Nevertheless, the rebellion as a rebellion was broken at Amba Pau. Kajee Sing and others no doubt gave much troubles afterwards, but they were rather a menace to private life and property than to the State. The field force returned to Khandesh, and took no more serious part in operations in Satpudas.

Regarding the mutiny in Khandesh, Simeox remarks that in Khandesh it 'was directly set in motion by the terrible events in Upper India, is without any doubt'. It is 'doubtful that there was direct connexion and that there was any collusion or attempt at united action between the Khandesh Bhils and the mutineers of Upper India'.

The 'indirect connexion' may be further inferred from the stories and rumours current over the country, from the arrival of occasional stragglers from the seat of wars, and from the visible preparations of the Government. Simeox compares the Bhils with the Irish people. 'Improvident and inconsequent, they (Bhils) possess a strong sense of humour. Though it has been shown that they made excellent soldiers, yet it was their tradition to be 'again the Government'. They were also in the condition described as 'spoiling for a fight'. Those rather than whom Government employed were willing and able to fight for Government. Unemployed Bhils preferred fighting against Government going without a fight altogether. Combination of
all these characteristics and the circumstances of all times were no doubt too strong, for Bhil community, so that the Bhils yielded to the temptation to take to the hills once again.*

Of direct connexion between the Bhils and Upper India there is little proof.** Though some of the writers believe that letters of authority were granted to the Bhil leaders by the Mughal King at Delhi. The cry of "Kill all whitemen" was reported once in Khandesh. It was even said that the enormous quantity of treasure looted by the Satpuda Bhils had been sent through from Bombay on purpose to be looted, and so to finance the Bhils.

As to the first statement, Captain Birch argued that probably no single Bhil knew where Delhi was, or had heard of any king there. For listening to the second rumour, an officer of the Bhil Corps was pronounced unduly nervous and remanded to his regiment. It was also argued that the Bombay merchants who were looted, were most probably honest dealers in opium. It was only the guards over their treasure who were either timid corrupt or both.

"No single recorded action, movement, or correspondence exists" remarks Simcox, "to shew any collaboration between the Bhils and the Upper India mutineers." They had ample opportunities of combining with the rebels or communicating with them but seized none. When Tantya Tope came almost as far as confines of Khandesh, not a Bhil went to join him. "Isolated from general revolt the Bhils still contrived to give a great deal of trouble, and to cause the expenditure of many men and much money before
they were again reduced to submission. Some of the Bhil leaders might have been influenced by the indirect or direct propaganda of the 'nationalists' or 'mutineers' of the French mercenaries, it appears more probable that their revolt was mainly due to the temptations caused by the various circumstances prevailing at that time.

**Last Days of The Khandesh Bhil Corps**

With the rains of 1858 began undisturbed peace in Khandesh. Bhagoji Naik's gang, which had entered its southern borders, had been exterminated. The shadow of Tantya Topi passed and gone, the 'Atpuada Bhils were a despicable gang of dacoits.'

In 1861 Major Arthur was succeeded by Captain Atkins for a few months, and then by Captain Probyn, who was destined to remain the Commandant of Bhil Corps and Superintendent of Police for upwards of 20 years.

Except that Lieutenant Probyn was several times occupied during the next few years in hunting down Bhima Naik and his gang in Akrani there was no more active service for the present.

The 2nd Bhil Corps ceased to exist, after a life of 3 years only. Actually it had hardly any real separate existence from its parent. It was an additional leavy to meet an emergency. Its members worked in and out with those of the 1st Bhil Corps, and the two were never distinguished into separate units.

With return of peace and increase of prosperity, the sepoys
began to feel the lowness of their pay. It became very difficult to procure recruits. The Jawans complained that they could earn more by private labour. Two reasons were officially admitted for difficulty in procuring recruits. The first reason was that the labouring classes were earning very high wages for going to hills and cutting sleepers for the new G.I.P. Railway under construction. Second reason was that the intricacies of the new Penal Code were so great that they made the Jawan's life an extremely unhappy one.

Generally speaking Khandesh enjoyed from 1860 onwards, a period of rapidly advancing prosperity. It became as peaceful and prosperous as any other district. The Bhil corps automatically began to do the duties of armed police, and that duty only, for the very good reason that there was no strictly military force it lost its raison d'être. Nothing remained for the Bhil Corps to do except ordinary police routine duties. While Probyn commanded, little was said, but soon after he left, it was urged that the Bhils were not the best type of men for such duties, that the Corps had outlived its usefulness, and might well be disbanded. The name of Outram, the past services of the Bhil Corps, the picturesque nature of the Bhils, and above all the indescribable charm which the province has always had for those who have served in it, all exercised their influence. But sentiments could not stand against utility and common sense. Finally in July 1891 the Government ordered for transformation of the Khandesh Bhil Corps into the "Khandesh Armed Police (Bhil Corps)."
Thus ended the story of the Khandesh Bhil Corps. Its life was here 66 years, and the last 30 of those years were peaceful and inactive. In its first 30 years it played a great role in establishment of peace and order which was so vital for the prosperity of Khandesh. Outram considered the Khandesh Bhil Corps as the first of its kind. However, the court of Directors evidently compared it with that raised among the Pahadyas by Cleveland of Bhagalpur. Whatever may be the case, the Khandesh Bhil Corps founded by Outram proved an example to many parts of India. It has rightly been described by Simeox as 'the parent of Indian Local Corps'. The Collectors of Ahmadnagar and Poona modelled their Police Forces on it as far as might be. Outram had called for detachment of the Khandesh Bhil Corps to Gujarat to assist in forming the Local Colli Corps. Further at Outram's instance, volunteers were asked from the Khandesh Bhil Corps to assist in embodying a local corps in Malwa. Not actually assisted by men from Khandesh Bhil Corps, but modelled on the Corps at Outram's suggestion was the Mewar Bhil Corps.

Outram was content to spend in Khandesh ten of the best years of his life, to raise the Bhil Corps. Morris and Probyn, to mention only two of the most prominent commandants, were content to live many years in the province, and give it of their best. There were others also who lived and died in and for Khandesh. A Roll of Officers of the Khandesh Bhil Corps from Outram to Probyn is attached as Appendix.
Thus the set of conciliatory measures introduced in 1825 proved the real solution of the unsolved and challenging problems causing continuous headache for the administrators of the East India Company in Khandesh. Both the steps the establishment of Bhil Agencies and raising the Bhil Corps - became very successful. The Court of Directors in the despatch dated 1st April 1835 acknowledged the remarkable achievements of the Bhil Agencies and that of the Bhil Corps and communicated to Major Ovans and Lieutenant Outram particular approbation of their conduct. This despatch states that "the admirable conduct of the officers to whom the immediate executive duties were confided, especially of Major Ovans and Lieutenant Outram, has been the means of effecting a complete change in the habit of the Bhil tribes. They have universally abandoned their predatory habits, they are now a prosperous agricultural community, from among them a Corps has been formed, which has attained so high a state of discipline and efficiency that to its protection the tranquillity of the country is now in a great degree confided, and by its means a degree maintained, and by its means a degree of security, both of person and property appears to be maintained, which is scarcely excelled in any part of India." The Despatch from the Court of Directors further mentions that "This signal instance (which we have so often impressed upon you) the superior efficacy of conciliatory means in reducing uncivilized and predatory tribes to order and obedience, is one of the most gratifying events in the recent history of British India and we trust that the success..."
of your measures will impress upon our Indian Government the policy as well as the humanity of pursuing the same course in all similar cases." 

The Bhil Corps remained loyal to the British Government during 1957-58 and rendered valuable service throughout this period. It may be said that Asirgarh march and Satpuda campaign were petty affairs, involving a few hundred men only. But the importance of a battle by no means always depends on the number engaged. Their 'performance was steady throughout and at times brilliant'.

The success achieved by the Bhil Agencies, the Bhil Corps and the introduction of Revenue Survey played great role in establishment of law and order and bringing prosperity in Khandesh. Cultivation spread rapidly, the deserted villages were repopulated. The increase of the cotton trade, and the facilitation for transmission rapidly increased the resources of the province. The Bhils found ample occupation in agriculture, labour, watching of crops and other miscellaneous duties. They were encouraged to return to their ancestral villages. Their hereditary rights as village Police were reasserted and confirmed and their hereditary lands were restored. The Bhils were no more the dread of the society but had become useful members of the society.

Could Outram or Briggs, or Ovans revisit Khandesh, they would hardly recognise the country, and if they did, they would probably consider it monstrously uninteresting. Intersected with railways and roads, most of the land under plough it became
one of the mainstays of Bombay Cotton market. 'Prosaic and commercial it may be' remarked Simeox (Collector) in 1912, "yet there is a charm about Khandesh". 502
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