Capt John Briggs was appointed the Political Agent in Khandesh on 4th March 1818. The most vexatious problem that he faced was the problems of Bhils. It was a problem which to the end of his tenure as the political Agent in Khandesh (till March 1825), Briggs could not solve to his own satisfaction. The problem of the Bhils could not be solved on par with the problems of the Arabs or that of the disbanded soldiery of the late Peshwa. It involved a large section of the indigenous population with certain definite rights which had both social and economic implications. After ten years of his departure from Khandesh in 1833, there were an estimated 55,000 Bhils in Khandesh. During the war with Peshwa, the Bhils had taken no sides, and had continued almost unabated their ravages in and around Khandesh. The Bhils of the Satpura Hills plunder almost without molestation the boundaries of Cassarbarry and Ajanta range. Briggs believed that he had inherited these ravages from the previous Government. Rebellions by the Bhils was a normal phenomenon under the Maratha Government. The depredations by the Bhils seem to have been a regular feature of Khandesh. In Khandesh Jamav papers in the Pune Archives, one comes across repeated references to their raids. According to Briggs the Major
cause of these repeated ravages by the Bhils was that 'their
claims were unattended to by the late (i.e. Peshwas's) Govern-
ment. 'But the Marathi documents do not fully support this
connection. Balaji Sahasrabudhe claims that the Bhils unite
for depredations due to hunger. It seems that 'the whole
issue of the Bhil had turned into a vicious circle.' Due to
the unsettled political conditions since 1802-03, the villages
in Khandesh were depopulated. The process aggravated by the
Third - Maratha war and the predatory activities of the Arabs.
This made life impossible for the Bhils and prompted them to
undertake depredations of their own.

Condition of Khandesh was miserable when the East India
took over the Administration of Khandesh from the Peshwar in
1818. The villages were deserted. Agricultural land was
covered with jungle. Life was miserable and insecure. The
Bhils once useful members of society had taken to the hills
and had dread of the community by their alarming depredations.
The condition of Khandesh was so bad that it was doubted
whether its administration would be economical for the East
India Company. Briggs, the first political Agent of Khandesh,
observe in 1818 'Desolation is every where apparent in
Khandesh. Immense tracts are covered with jungle, in some
part of which there still remain forts entire, and mosques
appearing through the woods, the monuments of better time.
The object condition of the people and the arts the lower
classes have practised against their oppressors, have
tainted their morals. He further observed that 'the
State of the cultivators is particularly deserving consid­er­ation. Their means are so small that they are driven to
'the greatest distress for wholesome food'. 'The mass of the
population being so poor it is to be concluded that there
can be little encouragement for trade or manufactures'.
Various factors are responsible for this deterioration. The
agriculture appears to have been 'flourishing and extensive
under the administration of Mahji Scindia, Ihlia Bye Holkar
and Nana Purnavese of Poona State. It may be said that
Khandesh was in flourishing condition upto the year 1798 when
Bajirao succeeded to 'the Free Government Peshwship after
the death of Nana Purnavese'. Khandesh being the original
scene of Yaswantrao Holkar's rebellion 'first suffered in
the greatest degree from his cruelties and licentiousness of
his troops', then again it was laid waste at his time of
return to Pune through Sindva Pass. After overturning the
power of Bajirao he returned through Burhanpur 'devastating
the eastern tract of Candeish in the same manner as he had
done the Western'. The scourge of war was succeeded by
unusual drought and famine in the following year. This
famine in the following extended from the Satpuda hills
down to Hyderabad and in this calamity Khandesh lost greater
part of its population. Khandesh might have still recovered
if any attention had been paid by the Government to its
situation. The portions of Halkar and Sindia were exhausted
by incessant demands on the revenues and that of Bajirav by introduction of farming the revenue. Many of those who were able fled to the neighbouring countries of Gujarat and Berar. Many villages became depopulated. The Bheels, the watchmen of the villages could neither exist amidst ruins nor procure food from the needy cultivators of other villages, and be took themselves to highway robberies and lived in bands either in the mountains or took possession of villages in their neighbourhood. The revenue contractors were unable and unwilling to expend money in the maintenance of soldiers to protect the country, and 'the Bheels in a very short time became so bold as to appear in bands of hundreds and attack towns, carrying off either cattle or hostages, whom they released by receiving handsome ransoms'. Introduction of the practice of hiring, Arab mercenaries by the local rulers added to the miseries of the people. From being mere soldiers the Arabs became money-lenders and charged exorbitant rate of interest 8 to 10 per cent per month. Fifty rupees borrowed to celebrate a wedding is not unfrequently a debt that follows the borrower to the grave.

The Pendharis were perhaps the biggest enemy for Khandesh. 'The ravages committed by the Bheels and Arabs, were not even equal perhaps to those inflicted by the Pendaries.' Their usual approach was through the ghat near Asir and the Mahomedan Bhils of that tract 'were their guides and abettors, and in their absence plundered on horseback like the Pindaries themselves.'
Under the formal Governments when they administered, direct control over the province, remarks Briggs, 'the police intelligence was entirely entrusted to the Bheels and Colies, the executive part to the Sebundies'. There were certain number of Bhils 'in each village who had lands or a portion of crops granted to them for their maintenance, and his duty was to conduct strangers beyond their limits and make over in safety to the next village Bheels'. They were 'the watchmen at night', they sat and protected passes during day and night, and guarded the cultivated fields'. In these duties they were "most useful to the inhabitants, but the circumstances have driven the greatest part of them to seek shelter in the Hills, and they have now become the scourge of their own country". Briggs further states that in each District Bhil naiks were appointed 'to superintend the whole of the village Bheels, and the remains of this system is still maintained in the District of Gungturry, north of the Godawery and in some of the southern Districts of Candeesh'.

The poverty of the ryots induced them, in the first instance to "withhold the payments of the Bheels, the latter driven to necessity have taken highway robbery, and the manner in which the Bheels who still remain in villages are treated is sufficient to drive them to desperation." The prospect of plundering with impunity had with other circumstances deprived the villages of most of their watchmen and the forest and brushwood which covered the face of the country for miles together was 'peculiarly advantageous for their attacks and favour
their escape. Briggs reported that highway robberies attended with the most wanton and barbarous murders are committed daily.

**Initial Bhil Policy - Elphinstone's guidelines**

Mountstuart Elphinstone, the sole Deccan Commissioner in his letter dated 11th March 1818, to Captain Briggs recommended that 'overtures should be made to the chiefs about well founded claims they possessed on the adjoining country and to satisfy those claims as soon as possible, either by allowing the Bheels for the present to make the collections to which they have been accustomed or by such a commutation as may afford full satisfaction to them in the manner least burdensome to the people'. He at the same time calls Captain Briggs's attention "to the policy of pensioning the more powerful chiefs on the condition of their answering for the conduct of their tribes according to the plan formerly practised with so much success by Cleveland with the Mountains of Banglapore".

Elphinstone further suggests that "If these measures do not alone quiet the Bheels, which from their present habits it is possible they may not, it will be necessary to make examples of some of them, but this ought if possible, to be put off till it can be done with vigour and perseverance, and in the meantime no pain should be spared to keep the Bheels quiet and prevent their annoying us, or aiding our Enemies". In this letter dated 18th June 1818 to the Governor General Elphinstone proposed "to restore to the Bheels the allowances formerly given by the Maratha Government, on condition of
their protecting the Roads, and even to make some addition to secure their good conduct" and in his Report on the Territory Conquered from the Paishwa after adverting to the policy of governing the Bhils through their chiefs. He further adds "The Bhils may also be gradually encouraged to settle in the Plains, either as cultivators or as watchmen to villages, a change which would weaken the power of the chiefs by lessening the number of their retainers. In the meantime it will be requisite to ascertain with as much precision as the case admits and the "powers which the Bheel Chiefs were in the habit of exercising under the old Government". This enquiry "is indeed necessary to prevent an inexperienced Magistrate from interserving unintentionally with the privileges of those chiefs".

Bhil Policy and its implementation under Briggs

In pursuance to the Deccan Commissioner's instructions Captain Briggs wrote a long letter on 14th June 1818 to Lieutenant Hodges, his assistant, the policy to be pursued towards the Bhils. "It is the desire of the Government to render the Bhels inoffensive by negotiations and by compliance with those demands which had been sanctioned by time or submitted to by the last established Government, rather than by coercion. It will therefore your duty to ascertain what well founded claim they possess on the adjoining country and to satisfy those claims as soon as possible by arranging such commutation as may afford them full satisfaction in the manner least burdensome to the people". The primary duty of the
Government of course, was to stop the ravages. It was from this point that "the settlement of the Bhels in the villages" was to be encouraged, since "their local information and connection give them the means of detecting theft and informing against intended attacks'. Whenever, you find that their rights on villages are held by this species of Vassal Tennure, I request that their services may be called for, and they should be taught to believe that these claims are only granted on those terms, i.e., their responsibility of policing the village. He also added that 'while every measure is taken to conciliate those Bhels who are disposed to abandon their predatory habits the utmost exertions should be used in attacking those who invade and ravage our Territory.' One of the major preoccupations of Briggs in the settlement of Bhil problem was the factor of the returns of the Village Bhils to their respective villages. Whenever he entered into an agreement with the Hill Bhils, he forced them to agree 'as a sine qua non to expel all low land Bhels ... in their Hutties to leave from the hills to their several wuttens in villages ....' By doing so Briggs hoped to achieve two important results. Firstly he could achieve a tolerable policing of the villages, and secondly, by drawing their large bodies of Bhils away from Hills, he would be able to reduce the strength of the Hill Chiefs. Once this was achieved, the chiefs could be dealt with independently. This, however, could not be achieved unless the naiks were contacted and treated with. Briggs tried to escape the dilemma by
Important Bhil Chiefs of Khandesh

Most of the Bhil Chiefs had their hutty's (establishments) in the mountain fastnesses or in the foothills. The geographical features of Khandesh provided ideal hideouts for these Bhils. Khandesh is a low land basin, mostly of the Tapi and her tributaries, surrounded on all sides by rocky hills. As mentioned earlier in the north is the formidable Satpuda range extending from west to east. At the eastern extremity it turns rather sharply southwards and gradually merges with the Ajanta range which runs north-south. To the south-west, the Ajanta range joins the Satmala range which runs in continuation of the Ajanta range till it reaches Ankai. The plains between Ankai and Chandore open Khandesh into Ahmadnagar. Westward of Chandore is a range of hills (Briggs calls it Chandore range) which are intermittently broken and run towards west to join the northern range of Sahyadri to which Graham has described as Sukhein range. This range moves northwards along the western border till Navapur, from whence till Chikhali in the extreme west of the Satpuda range, there is fertile Dasiu of the Tapi in between. All these ranges are very convenient border lines cutting off Khandesh from neighbouring districts. In the north, the Satpuda range running east west separates Khandesh from the plains of Malwa. The Agauta and Satmala ranges cut it off from the erstwhile possessions of the Nizam, while Chandore range seperated, Khandesh from Ahmadnagar district. The Sukhein range divided
Khandesh from Gujarat and the Dang. In 1818 all outlying districts of Khandesh, except Ahmadnagar, enjoyed a tolerably stable governments. 'It was but natural that all the hill chiefs, therefore, should see inward into the plains of Khandesh for plunder and subsistence.'

**Bhil of the Satpuda Range**

Starting from the extreme west in the Satpudas, the first important Bhil Chief was Deoji Naik. He was son of Joojar Naik. Joojar Bhil was a servant of the Patel of Chirlee (Sultanpur district). He was employed by this Patel as his midman of communication with the authorities of the district at length. However, taking advantage of the troubles which were then commencing he joined with two other chiefs - Jumshu Bhil of Ranipura and Owjia of Aundurra and began to plunder and rob in the district of Sultanpoor. They at times had no fixed place of residence but generally lived in the hills subsisting while in season on the Mohwa and mango fruits and afterwards by indiscriminate plunder. It was one of their practices to write threatening letters to the villagers. If their demands were not met, they plundered the villages and stockyards and seized hostages for ransom. They also set fire to villages and completely sacked them while driving off the whole of the cattle of a village. Having risen to importance as scourages of the region the local authorities were at last forced to attack them. Joojar and two of his associated then settled at Chabla Amba, a place of difficult access in the Satpudas on the verge of Akraui Raj. Here they established
Nutty or regular plundering colony where all the Vagabonds of the region were welcome. After sometimes they seized the son of the Patel of Padulda. This Patel reported the matter to Jukoji Holkar, then on his way to Pune, Joojar released the Patel's son on the condition that he would be taken into monthly pay with 25 followers at Rs 62½ a mouth. The Bhils adhered to this arrangement for a few years till Jukoji Holkar was alive. On his death they returned to Chable Amba and started their usual courses. About this time Yeshwantrao Holkar, as a fugitive sought an asylum from the Akrani Raja. The Raja refused saying that his was a patrimonial principality and that its loss might be incurred by interfering in state quarrels. He however, pointed out the collections of Bhils and mercenaries under Joojar at Chable Amba. Yeshwantrao accordingly joined them and enrolled the whole of the gang amounting to 1000 or 1200 Bhils and several mercenaries in his service. Under his name and authority they immediately attacked Sultanpur, took the deputy of the mamlatdar prisoner and plundered and sacked the place. Though they retired afterwards on the mamlatdar's coming against them in force, they continued depredations in other quarters. After a short time when hard pressed they passed Yeshwantrao on to the Dharangaon hills. Then they again took possession of the fort of Sultanpur. In 1210 Bungas Khan made exertions to expel them from this fort but failed. Afterwards Jooja's associates Junshu and Aujia were seized and given up for a reward of Rs 5000/- by the Wasava and they were put to death. In 1211
Yeshwantrao Holkdar deputed Rowji Holkar to Sultanpur who only succeeded in somewhat restoring order by putting to death every Bhil that fell in way. In 1213 when Yeshwantrao Holkar was in Khandesh on his way to Pune, Joojar met him to pay his respect. Yeshwantrao presented his son, the present Deoji Naik with a horse, a dress and gold bangles in consideration of the assistance he had formerly received from Joojar. It is also believed that the village of Chickli was bestowed on him in Jaghir. All the bonds extracted from the district were to be restored and claims made therein cancelled for a sum of Rs 6,500/-. The Bhils notwithstanding all this only remained quiet for a few years. In 1221 they again resumed their former courses and made exactions under the plea of the bonds which they had cancelled in 1213. On this occasion the mamlatdar to induce them to be quiet ordered that they should receive an allowance from every plough in the district. Afterwards the Akrani Raja and Joojar quarrelled and the former attacked Chabla Amba and set it on fire expelling the Bhils and killing Joojar. This occasioned a renewal of every kind of outrage on the region by Deoji Naik till the settlement made with him by Major Briggs. As a revenge, son of the head of Ranipura family was subsequently murdered, and his family betrayed into the hands of Bajirao's officers by Deoji Naik. This Naik on condition of being answerable for the police of the district of Sultanpur, was restored to his rights enjoyed under Yeshwantrao Holkar's Government. Briggs gives a list of established and usurped rights Deoji Naik and Daulata his
brother in the pargana of Sultanpur as under:\textsuperscript{41}

Mauga Chikli Pargana of Sultanpur - Confirmed
125 Takas or \$ 62\frac{1}{2} monthly - Confirmed

The above were granted to his family by Yeshwantrao Holkar and continued up to a late period. And since they were withheld, the Bhils plundered the district. 'They now promised to refrain from all acts of depredations in future and to be responsible for all highway robbery in the pargana of Sultanpur and to relinquish the custom of collecting grain from the villages which they had lately established on the Pargana.\textsuperscript{43}

In the eastern part of Sultanpur Pargana among the hills near the Burwany Ghats was Ramjee Naik.\textsuperscript{44} He was originally a watchman of the town of Torkheda on the Tapi. He absconded among the hills and took to highway robberies only about 12 years ago (ie in 1806). He had about 50 to 100 followers all belonging to the villages on the plains. 'He is far the most desperate, the most enterprising and the most incorrigible of all the Bhils I have had to deal with.'\textsuperscript{45} Briggs made several overtures to him but the only reply was by another robbery or another murder at length. A party of 'horse and foot' was sent against him and as a result of which he submitted to Captain Briggs. 'I thought it politic to grant him a small pension to induce him to relinquish his habits.'\textsuperscript{46} The terms granted to him were as under -

List of the established and usurped rights of Ramji Naik and Auchit Naik -
Newly established rights of girass
in the pargana of Sultanpur, Bhamer
Relinquished

Certain number of Bighas of ground in
the villages of Nevadeh and Warpudah
Confirmed

In lieu of the above rights which they have only been
established in the Bund Amul Ramji and Auchit 'consent to
receive 600 Rupees annually as sela Fugry to support themsel-
ves and a number of needy adventures who have adhered to their
fortunes and also promise to send the village Bheels to their
own Wattans' and to be responsible for all acts of robbery in
the neighbourhood of Torkheda. 47

Next to Ramji were Bhylia and Guadoo Naiks. Both were
earlier watchmen. They had claims of Rs 100 annually on the
pargana of Thalner. They had about 50 to 100 followers and
resided in separate Hutties. Bhylia Naik came to Briggs and
agreed to abstain from all highway robberies on consideration
of receiving Rs 200/- annually. But shortly afterwards he
engaged in his old practices. He along with other members of
his gang was apprehended and sent to Sougher fort for trials. 48

Khandu Naik, 'a fine looking young man of about 22 years
of age' agreed to relinquish his habits for a pension of
Rs 200/- annually. 49

Next powerful Bhil Chief was Goomani Naik who controlled
the Sandhwa Ghat. He had 25 Horsemen and 200 Bhils who lived
entirely in the hills. He received his usual rights from the
villages of the Thalner Pargana, and Rs 2000/- annually to
protect Sindva Ghat. His Bhils also carried Dawk through the
ghats for which they received Rs. 72 monthly, the whole of which
was paid to Goomany Naik.50

Next to the Thalner Pargana and lying close to the hills lay
the Pargana of Amba, perhaps the most devastated area in Khandesh.
It had been long deserted and the watchmen Bhils had 'very
naturally taken to the Hills.'51 This pargana was hideout of
the three most notorious Bhil Chiefs. The first of these was
Unkaria Naik. He had a Hutty between Sindhwa and Kirgone. For
many years he had plundered Nimer and continued to infest the
high road to Malwa. Next to him was the hutty of Gunjy Naik.
He had about 80 retainers. He fell upon the rear of Captain
Mann's detachment and plundered it. He died himself on same
night of the attack and his gang was entirely dispensed.52

Beyond the hutty of Gunjy Naik came that of Dashrath Naik.
His daughter was married to Goomany. He was also a watchman of
Amba pargana. He had about 100 Arabs in his pay, some Hindustani Sibandies and about 200 Bhil followers.53 The third no-
torious Bhil Naik of this pargana was Roopsing.

To the eastward of Dashrath Naik's position were the Tadvi
Bhils 'possessing the Mohomedan faith'. These Bhils 'differ
little from the inhabitants of the plain and in their dress,
their manners or their habits'. It is possible that they were
converted during the time when Burhaupur was a royal residence
under Mughals. 'They are the hereditary watchmen' of the par-
ganas of Chopda, Aravad, Byavul, Sowda, Raver and Asir. Briggs
further comments that 'it is only within the last five years that they have become at all formidable, a circumstance which I attribute chiefly to their connections with the Pindaries...'. Their most outstanding leader was Kauia Bhil 'with nearly 1200 men'.

The Bhils of Ajanta range were called Nirdhi Bhils. They also professed Islam. Their area was within the territory of the Nizam, though they continued to ravage British territories. 'They are... of a discontented and quarrelsome disposition, difficult to manage, and still more ferocious than their brethren to the eastward, and, during seasons of disturbance, the most atrocious acts have been invariably ascribed to their prowess.' The most powerful among them were Kooshaba and Jania, two brothers who had about 150 followers.

Westwards of the Ajanta Bhils were the Satmala Bhils. In the Pargana of Chalisgaon were Roomal Naik, Mohun Naik, Saheboo Naik and Shankar Naik. In the parganas of Kannad and Verul (Ellora) of Satmala range were Satwaji Naik and Suryaji Naik Bhils who lived in Satkanda hutties. In continuation of the Satkunda Bhils were the Kaldurry Bhils. Bayaji Naik, Wagh Naik, Taraji Naik, Jandulla Takari and Garud Naik were important Bhil chiefs amongst the Kaldurry Bhils.

In the Chandore range were the Bhils known as the Arrnuddy Bhils. Captain Briggs in his report dated 27 September 1818 to Elphinstone gives a detailed account of these Bhils. He mentions that the police of the 'Gungtury and Candeish Districts in the neighbourhood of the Chandore and Cassarbarry Hills has for many
years been entrusted to the Bhils, and that the approaches to
the Hill Forts have been principally watched by them, though the
garrisons were composed of soldiers'. Each village had a number
of Bhil watchmen (called Jaglas). They "perform the menial
offices of the village, run of errands, watch the town by night,
and tend the cattle by day, serve as guides to travellers and
sit on eminences at mouths of passes to overlook the surrounding
country and to give information of the approach of troops".
'Over each District was a naik', or chief who was held respon­
sible for gang and highway robberies. The village Bhils were
under his authority, and it was their duty also to find out
thefts in their respective villages. The Bhil police was paid
in two ways. Firstly, the village Bhils received grain from
inhabitants and on market days they got something from what was
brought there as greens, spices etc. Secondly, being the
'lowest caste' they 'not unfrequently shared the refuse of the
travellers meal. When not employed they brought wood and grass.
Some of the chiefs or Naiks lived in the Hills and were expected
not only to protect the roads but to guard the passes. It
became necessary that each should have a few retainers and they
accordingly received a sum of money and grain annually from
the District over which their authority extended.57

From Ankai to the eastward commenced the range of Arrnuddy
Bhils. "They appear to have been made the guardians of the
passes and the country rather than watchmen'. Their authority
over their respective districts was much more and unlike Chandore
and other districts it was not only confined to the limited duties
of police subordinate to the District officers. Since the Bhil
naiks took to living in the Hill, and during the famine weather they were driven from necessity they seem to have taken to high-
way robbery, and this probably arose from the poverty of the returning inhabitants who were unwilling, and perhaps unable to pay them their regular annual fees...., the numbers of the Bheels too had increased, and the former allowances were either inadequate to their support or fell short of expectations."
The main Arnnudy Bhil - naiks were Sayajee naik, Bapoo Naik, Jewaji Naik, Sahib Naik and More Naik Maria, 58

To the north of the Satmalla Bhils was the Hutty of Cheel Naik.

Crossing the plains and coming to the Western ranges, there, were Baglan Bhils. Roberts remarks that in Baglan "the majority of the aborigines are Bheels' and many of them held property in Jagirs on condition of guarding certain passes or tracts under grants from Mughals. 59 But what from the causes that have embinged society in other parts of the province and from dissension among the co-partners most of their own villages having been run waste, they also give unbounded licence to those propensities that rendered their tribe at that time the bane of society". 60

Proceeding north from Baglan come to the districts of Bhamer and Navapur in the village of Kanapur was Teghy Khau, He was, strictly speaking, a Bhil, but wielded considerable power over them. 'He was a Patel who took advantages of the time and by the most daring aggressions' became very powerful within a short period. 61
To the northward of the districts of Navapur and Nandurbar was Kukurmundha, the country surrounding which on west and north was occupied by various Bhils and other chiefs. "These also like those of Baglan compose a majority of the population of the country and cultivate the soil as well as fill the office of Potell, instead of as in the plains of Khaudeish only discharging the duties of watchmen". They too were hereditary chief-tains of villages and even of more extensive tracts. They enjoyed besides the rent of their own lands, long established dues as Girass from some of the Government villages, as well as a right to sundry exactions on merchandize carried through their districts. Thus going north of the Tapi basin, to the westernmost corner of the Satpuda range and as such completing the circle of our view, we come across the Wasave family in the vicinity of Nandurbar. Jeeva Wasawa was the most powerful chief of this family. In the same area lived Laxman Parwi, with his base at Kukurmundha.

Besides these Bhil Chiefs, therewere other chiefs or rajas, who exercised considerable control over Bhils, though they themselves were not Bhils. Therefore, they were indispensable in any Bhil settlement. Out of such chiefs were Ranas of Budawal, of Ranipura and the chief of Abhona.

Settlements with Bhil Chiefs

Early in his efforts at bringing about the pacification of Khandesh, Briggs strongly urged the reconciliation of the Bheel chiefs as an object of great moment. He believed that direct bilateral agreements with these Bhil chiefs were possible. I beg you will have the goodness to explain to all the Bheel
chiefs with whom you may have communication that the British Government is disposed to forget the past and to make provisions for the Bhels in a manner to enable them to follow peaceful habits, that it is more inclined to forgive and reclaim the Bhels than to punish them.... Briggs further mentions that 'one of the leading features of our policy is to make terms with each (chief) separately.....'

Briggs and Satpuda Bhil Chiefs Settlement with Goomani Naik

The first Bhil Chief with whom Briggs came to an agreement was Goomani Naik. He had 230 Bhils under him and controlled the area round the Sendva Pass, the most important trade route between Khandesh and Malwa. On 5th March 1818, Briggs signed an agreement Goomani Naik agreed to prevent any depredations on the villages of the district of Thalner. He also agreed to assist the civil authorities in the settlement of the region, particularly the district of Amba. No persons passing through the Sendva pass was to be molested by his men. The portion of the custom duty assigned to him in the times of Ahilyabai Holkar for protecting the trade through the ghat, was to be collected by the Government. Custom House to be established at the Sendva ghat and paid to him by the custom master. He was not to collect on his own any dues from the passengers. His duty was to protect the travellers passing through the ghat. He was also to inform the Government officials of any intelligence that he might receive about any plan of attack or assembling of troops for similar purpose. In consideration of his performing the above
duties Briggs agreed to pay Goomani Naiq a sum of £2000/- annually. Briggs was satisfied that Goomani 'protects the Sindwa Ghat and single passengers pass to and fro unmolested. However, signing of the agreement with Goomani, did not pacify the country totally. Briggs had to reprimand Goomani on 7th October 1818 for continued Bhil outrages in the area west of the Sindwa. Again in December 1818 Briggs accused him of depredations and threatened him with the suspension of the Khillate. In same month Goomani collected a toll of £354/- from Amritrao's men who were passing through the Sindwa Ghat. In January 1819 Briggs accused him of serious charges of cattle lifting in Chopda and of abetting the murderers of Keshav Vani. In spite of these defaults on part of Goomani, however Briggs felt that Goomani was trustworthy.

Goomani's conduct Briggs to enter into second agreement with him on 16 January 1819. By the new agreement, the annual payment of £2000/- payable to Goomani was to be discontinued. Instead Goomani was to maintain a force of 20 Sibandies, 10 Bargeers and 30 Bhils for protection of the Sindwa Ghat. The salaries of the persons so employed were to be paid by the British Government. Goomani himself was to receive £100/- per month. Briggs impressed upon Elphinstone that such an agreement would save Government a considerable amount (ie £24360/- per year) and the mode of monthly payment would make Goomani more amenable to the British Government. This arrangement continued and Briggs had no major difficulty with Goomani during his tenure in Khandesh.
In the Satpuda, Briggs's easy reclamation stopped with Goomani. Most of the remaining Bhil chiefs were brought to order at least temporarily only through strenuous military operations.

Gunjee Naik

Conduct of Gunjee Naik of Sultanpur pargana and his band was 'such as to authorize their being attached.' Gunjee naik's gang was responsible for daring depredations in Chopda. Briggs tried to incite Gunjee into submission by transferring his (Gunjee's) privileges in Amba pargana to Goomani and hoped that this measure would work. But this measure did not produce desired effect. Gunjee became more wanton and desperate. He was killed while attacking a British detachment led by Captain Munn. After Goomani's death his gang dispersed. His son Dhanjee naik abandoned the predatory habits, came in on 21 March 1819 and was confirmed in his nemoon or privileges. He 'aided the inhabitants of the devastated Amba pargana to resettle it.'

Change in Briggs's attitude towards the Satpuda Bhils and resort to coercive methods

With the Satpuda Bhils Briggs's easy reclamation had ended with Goomani Naik. Other Bhil Chiefs such as Kavia Tadvi, Dashrath Naik, Ramji Naik and Auchit Naik, Subhania Naik and Kunwar Wasava defied the British authority and Briggs resorted to coercive means against them. It were mainly these chiefs and the Bhils of Kaldaree area that led to the frustrations of Captain Briggs. In October 1818, he was 'confident that the instant the
whole of the Bheel naigs are settled with, the tranquillity of Candeish will be in great measure secured... Within a month, however, he admits 'the total failure of all my endeavours to induce the Bheels chiefs in the neighbourhood (or Rawer) either, to come in or to accept of any moderate terms for the abandonment of their habits or the relinquishment of their retainers...'

Kania Naik

Kania's haunts were in the easternmost region of the Satpuda. He was leader of the Tadvi Bhils who professed Mahomedan faith and were hereditary watchmen of Chopda, Arwad, Bayawal, Sawda, Rawer and Ashir parganas. According to Briggs they had became formidable 'only since last five years', when they came in closer contact with the Pendharis. The Tadvi Bhils never left their villages 'to go to Hindustan with Pindarries' but always accompanied them southward. Kania had about 1200 Bhils under his command who were 'but dregs of that community.' Kania was supported by two Pendhari chiefs namely Shaik Dulla and Chitu. He also received support from Shinde's officers at Ashir, Bayawal and Chopda. 'Recently Suryajirao Nimalkar... levied a fine of 10,000 Rupees (on Kania) and bound him to pay one fourth of his plunder to Suryoji.' Briggs warned Suryaji against harbouring marauders like Kania.

The original hutty of Kania was located some four miles from Rawer. These Bhils enjoyed their Huks in return of police duties and also maintained themselves 'peacefully by cutting and selling firewood and grass'. When the payment of their
Huks was stopped they were reduced to distress which became acute due to famines. It was then that they resorted to plunder and removed their hutty to the hills near Pal. Kania had five hutties. In early 1818 he had 400 Bhils, 250 Sibandis and 100 horses. The Sibandis who lived in the hutty received Rs 15/- per month, while those joined in the plunder but did not live in hutty received Rs 10/- per month.

Thus Kania had a considerable force under his command. It was therefore, natural that Briggs should try to bring this powerful Bhil chief on the side of the established government. To his overtures, Kania replied as follows. 'There are 5000 men under me who and their ancestors for generations past have subsisted by plunder. If by your means I and my followers are provided with subsistence, we will abstain from plundering... Briggs discounted this exaggerated figure of 5000 followers. However, he encouraged Captain Kaye to settle the claims of Kania on just lines. Unlike Goomani Kania refused to take Briggs and the British authority seriously. He continued his depredations. On 24 October 1818 Cornet Kaye informed Briggs that Kania and Suryaji Nimbalkar had made common cause and were planning to attack Kaye's camp. Briggs directed Colonel MacDowell, Captain Munn and Major Jardine to move in the direction of Nassirabad. He also desired Major Jardine to provide protection to the area between Sindhva and Nassirabad. On 31st October the village of Karandi was ransacked by about 275 Bhils of Dashrath Naik who was in league with Kania. Briggs requested Major McBean, the Officer Commanding in this region
to take measures for the defence of this District, recommending him to attack the Bhil post at once. Briggs was keen on breaking Kania's power, because so long as he remained at large, efforts at bringing other Bhils under control were being frustrated. On the political Agent's instructions of 16th November 1818, Major McBean made a surprise attack on Kania's hutty. Because of the difficult terrain, the element of surprise was partly lost. Yet McBean was 'happy to say that we succeeded in destroying everything they had and a great number of their followers, 28 men were made prisoners....' Both Kania and Shaikh Dulla, however, escaped.

A full fledged military campaign against the Bhils had begun. In a moment of anger Briggs said that '... it is towards their extirpation we should direct our first attention....' Yet, his long letter to Elphinstone of 8 January 1819, spoke very humanely of the Bhil rehabilitation. Briggs had come to a conclusion that '..... as to the fidelity of the Bheels, any pecuniary settlement is less likely to operate than a knowledge of our full power over them....' He felt that a liberal policy alone would not help the British Government. The Bhils simultaneously must feel the pressure of British armed strength. Briggs claimed that the attack of Major McBean had dispersed 1200 followers of Kania and 'we are now searching in vain to find him or his bands in order to reclaim them....' Briggs issue a general proclamation as an extension of his strong arm policy in Khandesh in general and in Rawer pargana in particular.
According to the proclamation 'any British subject convicted of assisting the Bhels... by supplying them with grain, furnishing them with intelligence, or in any way guilty of forming a connection with them will be considered as traitors, and that their goods will be confiscated and they themselves be subject to punishment'. The Bhils in the proclamation meant Kania and other freebooters.\(^{100}\)

The Bhil campaign was now extended territorially from east of Rawer to Karandi in the west and north of hills. It was to be an encircling movement, the Khan troops operating from the north, south and west, and Sir John Malcom's detachment operating from the north.\(^{101}\) On 20th December 1818 McBean made yet another attack on the one of the hutties of Kania. But troops returned without meeting a soul... Kania was now like a hunted man. On 16th March 1819, he submitted to Lieutenant Colonel Smith.\(^{102}\) However, it was not till 9th June 1819, that Briggs could inform Elphinstone of Kania's final submission to the civil authority in Khandesh. Briggs thought it advisable to employ Kania's some of retainers. He consented to employ 50 of Kania's followers in the service on a pay of Rs 5/- per mouth. Their duty was to guard the Dholkot ghat that connects Nemade to Deccan. Other followers of Kania returned to villages to which they belonged as watchmen.\(^{103}\) Kania himself was given a personal grant of Rs 600/- per year, with 620 Beegha of land that was his traditional perquisite. Hereafter Briggs had no trouble from Kania.\(^{104}\)
Dashrath Naik belonged to the Amba pargana. He had about 100 Arabs some Hindustani and about 200 Bhil followers. Since the pargana was almost totally devastated and depopulated Dashrath Naik and his followers had no means of livelihood but plunder. This they did with a ferocity unmatched. He was in league with Kania and had also backing from Suryaji Nimbalkar of Boyawal. Briggs believed that getting Dashrath would be no problem if Shinde's officers did not protect him. Briggs requested Sir John Malcolm to move a body of troops to the back of Satpuda in the province of Nedar. Briggs himself would post a detachment south of Satpuda to him in Dashrath Naik 'who has been operating in the neighbourhood of Lasour'. It was reported that Kania had joined Dashrath after the former's hutty was attacked by Major McBean. Dashrath subsisted formerly from the villages in Chopda and Lassor area, but 'this aid has been lately much withheld from him and he has turned his attention towards Nemaur (Nedar)....' Briggs suggested to Colonel Huskisson to move a detachment through Amba district towards Lassor '... to prevent the Bhels flying westward', The main force was to move a 'through Lassor and push into the Hills as and when opportunity afforded' and attack Dashrath Naik. At the end of February 1819 came to know about the exact location of Dashrath Naik's hideout and attacked the place. Dashrath was not there but Major Jardine was able to get hold of his uncle, Dadoo Naik. The entire hutty was burnt to ground. On 8th March 1819 Dashrath submitted to Major Jardine. He was sent to Dhule and pensioned off by Briggs.
Ramji Naik operated in the eastern part of Sultanpur pargana, among the hills near the Burwani ghats. He was originally a watchman of Torkheda town. Briggs considered him to be 'by far the most desperate, the most enterprising and most incorrigible of all the Bheels.... [112] Ramji 'having no claim himself being a watchman of one of the low laud villages, has collected about 200 Bheels to gain advantageous terms'. Briggs offered him a pension of Rs 600/- annually. His agent went away apparently satisfied, but never returned.[113]

Ramji and his brother Auchit had agreed to the following terms:

1. Newly established rights of Girass etc. in the pargana of Sultanpur and Bhamer were relinquished by Ramji and Auchit.

2. Certain Beeghas of land in the villages of Newadeh and Warpuda were confirmed by the British Government.

In lieu of the newly established rights, Ramji and Auchit agreed to receive an annual payment of Rs 600/- as shelapagadi and promised to send the village Bhils back and to protect the area in the neighbourhood of Torkheda.[114]

Reports of ravages of Ramji's gang kept on coming throughout the months of August and September 1818, Captain Briggs ordered Lieutenant Briggs to send one of his Risallas of Sibandis consisting of 480 men towards Thalner. When force was moved and his supplies cut off, Ramji fled away. His followers deserted
him. He submitted to the British authorities and Briggs granted him a small pension. However, this arrangement proved short-lived. Ramji and Auchit again went on rampage. They carried out depredations throughout the months of November and December 1818. 'Hardly a week passes without my hearing of atrocious robbery and not unfrequently attended with murder...'. In January 1819, Briggs requested Colonel Huskisson to undertake operations against Ramji and Auchit. Colonel Huskisson could not move against them immediately, since the forces under Lieutenant Colonel Jardine were engaged in the pursuit of Dashrath and those under Major Mc Bean in pursuit of Kania. Jardine attacked Ramji and Auchit in March 1818. Both Ramji and Auchit escaped. Jardine burnt the hutties. Briggs issued a proclamation against helping Ramji and Auchit naiks. Auchit surrendered to Lieutenant Colonel Jardine on 7th April 1819. Two days later Ramji also submitted to Jardine. But when told that he would be taken to Dhule, Ramji escaped from the camp. However, on 8th May 1819 Jardine reported the recapture of Ramji naik. He was captured and brought back by Khandu Naik and Goomani Naik. Khandu and Goomani Naiks shared the prize of Rs 1000/- declared by Briggs for the arrest of Ramji. Ramji was put in iron and sent to Dhule under an escort of 40 horses and put in jail. Auchit was set free and became useful instrument in the hands of Lieutenant Colonel Jardine in reducing other Bhils to submit. Auchit, however, killed a Patil and ran away. He was joined by Subhania. They were on rampage throughout the year 1820, till they were caught. Auchit died in jail in 1821.
Briggs in his report of 19 November 1818 to Elphinston, "further account of Bhels in Caudeish and their established and unsurped rights" gives the following accounts of the rights of Ramji and Auchit naiks and the agreements made with them -

Newly established rights of Girras in the Pargana of Sultanpur and Bhamer

Certain number of Beechas of ground in the villages of Newadeh and Warpuda

In lieu of the above rights which they have only been established in the Bund Amul Namjee and Auchit consent to receive 600 Rupees annually as Sela Pugry to support themselves and a number of needy adventurers who have adhered to their fortunes and also promise to send the village Bhels to their own wuttuns and to be responsible for all acts of robbery in the neighbourhood of Toorkheira".

(Source - Briggs to Elphinston, 19 Nov 1818, DOP 173, Enclosure No 2 to the letter No. 292.)

Kunwar Wasava and Jeeva Wasava

The family of the Wasavas belonged to those Bhils who claimed a Rajput lineage. They originally held the lands of the hilly and woody country of Rajpipla lying north of Tapi and south of Narmada. The head of the family was Kunwar Wasava, but his power has been almost entirely subverted by his relation, Jeeva a younger member of the family.... Like other Bhils in Satpuda, Jeeva Wasava had also taken advantages of times to establish his power and rights over the neighbouring
fertile districts. He boasted that 'at his whistle, he could command the service of 4000 bowmen'. Like Goomani, however, he submitted quite early and agreed to desist from ravaging the country in lieu of an early payment of Rs 3000/- besides his perquisites. The toll and customs to which he was entitled was to be collected by the British Government and paid to him. Briggs agreed to support 11 horsemen and 40 foot for him, and with this force he was to protect the country. Briggs also agreed to accept his son and one of his principal assistants in the government service. Briggs had no trouble with Jeeva hereafter.

**Kunwar Vasava**

Unlike Jeeva Vasava, Kunwar Vasava continued his ravages. In league with Laxman Padvi, a Bhil chief of Kukurmundha, terrorised the country west of the Sindva ghat. They sent orders to various villages to pay a fixed sum, and did not come to discuss matters with Briggs. They attacked the town of Ranipura with 150 Sibaudis and 400 Bhils. In early January, 1819 a party of Bhils, belonging to Kunwar Vasava's gang attacked Baujaras in Hamer Pargana. Jardine pursued Kunwar Vasava to submit. Kunwar Vasava offered to submit but did not actually come in. On the other hand his associate Laxman Padvi, threw himself on the mercy of the British Government. Kunwar Vasava, however, fled away. In May 1819, Jardine reported that Kunwar Vasava 'is the only Bheel chief who has not submitted...'. With all his professions of submission, Kunwar Vasava proved to be elusive. By the end of May 1819, he seems to have moved away.
He carried on depredations from there. By the end of 1819, Kunwar Vasava was the only Bhil Chief who was not claimed by the political Agent, though he had opened negotiations with the Gaikwad Government to achieve that aim. Briggs could never master Kunwar Vasava, though agreements were made by the latter only to be broken. Even Major Robertson, Briggs’s successor could not have much success with Kunwar Vasava. Later on he did settle on a personal pension in Chikhali in western Khandesh, but rose in rebellion in 1846. He was arrested and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. He was released in 1854, but removed from the headship of Chikhali.

Captain Briggs, the Political Agent in his report dated 24 September 1818 to Deccan Commissioner gives a 'List of the Established and Usurped rights of Jeeva Vasava in the Perguna of Naudoorbar’ as under -

Toll on laden Bullocks of follows

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rupees per 100 at Nandurbar</td>
<td>₹465/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rupee per 100 at Navpur</td>
<td>₹153.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rupee per 100 at Badwur</td>
<td>₹380/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rupee per 100 at Pissale</td>
<td>₹142/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rupee per 100 at Girass</td>
<td>₹150/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>₹1280/-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

'Confirmed, The toll to be collected by the British Government and paid to Jeeva Vasava, who relinquishes his rights to send his troops to make collections.'

As these exactions have been levied of late years, and during the Anarchy or the Bond Amul, Jeeva consents to relinquish for ever all claims to Girass.'
Besides 3 villages with Pargana of Bhamer. He was entitled to receive Rs 3000/- annually for maintenance of 10 Horses in the town of Nandurbar.

The British Government in consideration of the number of followers which have now accumulated about Jeeva Vassawa agrees to entertain for the service of the Mahal as follows -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Monthly</th>
<th>Annually</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kunwar Vasava - the son of Jeeva</td>
<td>@ 50 Rupees</td>
<td>Rs 600/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jadu Singh Jemindar @ 40 Rupees</td>
<td></td>
<td>480/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Horsemen @ 20 Rupees</td>
<td></td>
<td>2400/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rs 2880/-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sibandis -
1. Jemindar @ Rs 20/-
2. Daffadars @ Rs 8/-
3. Sibandis @ Rs 5/-
1. Carkun @ Rs 25/-

Rs 3012/-

To Jeeva Vasawa annually as a Khelat - Rs 3000/-

Total Rs 9492/-

"In consideration of this liberal allowance Jeeva Vassawa binds himself to be responsible for all acts of gang robbery and highway robbery in the following tarafs of the Nandurbar Parguna."

(Source - Briggsto Elp., 24-10-1818, BCF 172, Encloser No. 5 of Letter No. 212)

Nature and conduct of the Operations against the Bhils of the Satpuda Range during 1818-19

The operations against the Bhils of Satpuda range during
1818-19 were conducted under the overall command of Colonel Huskisson. They covered the area of almost the whole of the southern slopes of Satpuda including the parganas of Rawer, Arawad, Thalner, Sultapur, Nandurbar, Bhamer and Songhir in the West Khandesh, and Amba and Sindva in the East Khandesh region. It was a vast, hilly and woody tract. The British troops were divided into three main detachments as under -

(a) One under Colonel Huskisson which operated in the Centre,

(b) Second detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Jardine which operated in the west,

(c) Third Detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Heath which operated in the Rawer Pargana.

The three pronged attack was further supported by a detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Smith from Sir John Malcolm's troops in Malwa. This detachment was to press the Bhils from the north.

By the end of 1819 the Satpuda range had temporarily become comparatively quiet. On the 5th May 1819 Briggs officially terminated operations against the Satpuda Bhils. He requested Colonel Huskisson to withdraw the troops from the Hills. However, as a precaution a sizeable force was left at the following posts:

1. Eukurmundha and Nawapur
   - 1 European Officer
   - 150 Rank and File
   - 50 Auxiliary horse.

2. Thalner
   - 40 Ranks and file.

3. Galna
   - Such a garrison as deemed to competent to guard the Arab prisoners.
It was important to render the north-western Khandesh safe 'since the highway from Surat to Khandesh ran through it.'

According to Dr. Deshpande "the campaign against the Bhils in the Satpuda range was undertaken with a view to reducing the Hill Bhils. It did not form an inevitable part of Briggs's general policy towards Bhils. He took it more in spirit of a police action against errant subjects than a military campaign against an enemy. His attitude to the Bhils differed materially from that of the Arabs. We wanted to get rid of the Arabs, while with the Bhils, he wanted to reclaim and domesticate them." Briggs rightly believed that the Bhils were an integral part of the social order. 'Every Bhil Chief originally is a watchman of some plain village.' Briggs says that 'my little experience in this country is sufficient to convince me that the Bhels must be provided for,' for doing this they must be reclaimed. This aim could be achieved by cutting off the supplies they receive from the plains. 'They rely solely on the plains for their subsistance and the weakness of the inhabitants makes them readily content to them in order to secure themselves from their attacks....' 'When deprived of their Sibundies, they have no longer the means of attacking villages and driving off cattle, and when their provisions are cut off neither they nor the Sibundees can exist in the hills.....' Briggs firmly believed that the knowledge of the fact that the whole of the Hill Bhils are dependent on the plains and for this purpose 'each Hutty or Bheel Village, has a corresponding one on the
plain from whence it procures grain', was 'of the greatest importance, whenever it shall be found necessary to attack them...'. The Bhil chiefs maintained a close contact with the village Bhils, and Briggs believed that the village Bhils were normally in league with those in the hills.

Keeping in view these factors the campaigns were directed to achieve two main objectives. One was to reduce the hill chiefs into submission, and other was to control the Bhils in villages and also to give protection to the people. The army was to occupy the area at the foot of the hills, from where surprise attacks could be made on the Bhil hutties in the hills, and at the same time control could be maintained on the Bhils in the villages. The only way the Bhils can be attacked is by surprise. Once they are dislodged from their hutties, most of the Bhils became fugitives. Then 'they were driven to the necessity of begging' in the areas to which, 'they are for the most part unconnected and have no general feeling....' Regarding the village Bhils, Briggs ordered that any person found guilty 'aiding and abetting the Bhils' was to be executed 'on the spot'. The Bhils found in act of plundering or immediately after plundering 'should be tried (by a courtmartial) and if found guilty, executed on the spot.'

As result of these operations against the Bhils of Satpuda region during 1818-19, most of the Bhil chiefs were reduced to submission, and one by one they submitted to the British authority. The British losses, though few, were not insignificant. Yet most of them were victims of the climate, rather than Bhil
attacks, the detachment operating in Rawer suffered par­ticu­larly. Lieutenant Colonel Heath, the Detachment Commander died because of bad climate. Major McBean, its Second in Command fell seriously ill, and this detachment was put under the command of Captain Bently. During a short campaign of three months, of five officers, one died and three left India on sick certificate; and of three hundred regulars employed, one hundred and twenty marched back to Malligaud. The high rate of casualty was, according to Graham, due to Malaria and Cholera. Some cases were also reported in Colonel Muskisson's camp by Briggs. Both Lieutenant Colonel Jardine and Major McBean reported cases of cholera among their troops. Briggs requested Elphinstone to send immediate medical help and informed him of the 'terrible state of army' in Khandesh. He also reported 34 deaths in a Battalion of 500 due to cholera. Briggs reported that these operations were successful and they did relieve Khandesh of a major distress. However, this success was very shortlived and quickly new chiefs came up to take over the old and killed leaders and they continued depredations for next few years.

Briggs and the Satmalla Bhils

While Briggs was busy with the Satpuda Bhils, his prin­cipal Assistant, Lieutenant Hodges was engaged in adjusting the just claims of the Bhils in Satmalla, Satkunda and Kaldarry areas in accordance with the instructions contained in the Political Agents letter of 14 May 1818. About the Bhils of Satmalla, Satkunda and Kaldary regions Briggs remarked that 'Their habits are like the rest of these Bhils, and although
everything has been done to induce them to relinquish their habits, little more, I fear, has been gained than a temporary relief from invasion in large bodies and confidence in their part of being dealt fairly with, whenever promises are made to them which under all the late Government were invariably broken and generally ended in treachery and the death of those who were so simple as to rely on them.  

Annual perquisites claimed by the main naiks of Satmalla region and the agreements made between them and Lieutenant Hodges were as under:

Roomal Naik, Mohan Naik, Saheebu Naik and Shankar Naiq -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pargana</th>
<th>Rs</th>
<th>Annas</th>
<th>Faise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. In the Pargana of Chalisgaon</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Bhetty (present), Re 1/- from each of the inhabited villages -</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) 1 maund of grain from each</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) 2 maund of grain from Chalisgaon and Patoda -</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Tobacco from each village -</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) 15 seers of Goor (Jaggury) from village in which sugarcane is planted -</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Sundry Perquisites at the Festivals</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>97</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pargana</th>
<th>Rs</th>
<th>Annas</th>
<th>Faise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. In the Pargana of Mohanpura</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Bhetty @ Re 1/- from each village of the 12 inhabited villages -</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Tobacco from each village -</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) 4 maunds of grain -</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. In the Kasba of Raujangaon

(a) Bhetty - 
1 0 0
(b) 4 maunds of grain - 
 Rs 9 0 0

4. In the Pargana of Bhunl

(a) Ready money - 
550 0 0
(b) Bhetty @ Re 1/- from each of the 57 inhabited villages 
57 0 0
(c) Clothes - 
25 0 0
(d) Claims of the Suhat in the village of Sahura - 
50 0 0
(e) Sundry perquisites at the festivals 
25 0 0
 Rs 507 0 0

5. In the village of Chikhaltan, Pargana Kannad

4 maunds of grain 
 Rs 8 0 0

Grand Total Rs 648 0 0

'The Satmalla Sheels have consented for the future to receive a consolidated sum of Rs 648/- (Six hundred and forty eight) Rupees annually in lieu of the above Rights and to perform the services usually exacted from them to superintend the police of the District in which they have claims, to be responsible for gang robberies or highway robberies and either to produce the thieves or to trace them where they may be seized. They promise also to send back the village Sheels into that their respective homes to deliver up all Bonds for the payment of money that may have been given to them by Pattahs and others and henceforth to obtain from all acts of plunder and robbery.'
On 31st January 1819 Lieutenant Hodges, during the temporary absence of Captain Briggs reported to Elphinstone that the village of Dharangaon had been attacked by the Bhils and plundered. Property taken was soon traced to the hutty of Cheel naik, one of the Satmala Bhils with whom agreements had been concluded in November 1818. Cheel Naik and his Bhils were to be paid Rs 649/- annually in lieu of their claims in different parganas. They had promised to give in future no cause of complaint. Lieutenant Hodges sent a letter to Cheel naik demanding restoration of the stolen property and threatening the naiks with the deprivation of their pension and resentment of Government, if refused. Cheel naik answered that "the letter which you sent to us, stating that the village of Dharangaum had been plundered and desiring the restoration of the property taken has been received and understood, and this is the answer; when our naiks met you at Dharangaum, you promised to cause our Hucks to be paid, but as yet we have not received them nor we received the Bheet Bukra and other dues from the Pargunnah. It is necessary to let you know that you have not performed your engagement, on which account we attacked the village. If you will now provide for us, we will refrain from plundering. It is right in you to desire us not to plunder and yet make no provision for us. First cause to be paid to us our just claims, and then call us to account for any robberies committed. Do as you please, but to give us nothing to eat, and to leave us to
fed on leaves and grass, is an admirable plan. We are sirdars what occasion is there for us to write more. The Hurcarrah Haree will answer all enquiries, you promised us 600 Rupees for the pergunnah of Bhaul of which we received 175, our Hucks in the Pergunnah of Lulling amount to 800 Rupees; and 800 Rupees are due to us for the Pergunnah of Dhoolia, which you know. Captain Briggs observed upon this that the claims set forth in the letter were wholly unfounded. He wrote to Major Hall that "your principal object will be to obtain, possession of the person of Chiel Naiq, in which case you will be pleased to institute an enquiry as to the fact of his having sent the letter alluded to, and of his having plundered the village of Dharangaon upon conviction of which you are authorized to execute him on the spot." Chiel naik voluntarily surrendered to Major Hall and acknowledged the attack on Dharangaon. Major Hall executed (though reluctantly as it seems from his letter) Chiel naik at 5 p.m. on 26th January 1819. Chiel naik incidently, was the only major Bhil chief who was executed by Captain Briggs. The court of Directors expressed their dissatisfaction over execution of Chiel naik. They observed that "these instructions thou (though) well intended do not appear adequate to their end". Chiel Naik 'had certain things which he thought himself justified in doing, and he did not attempt to deny them...... Major Roberton, Briggs's successor tried to justify the execution of Chiel naik, But the justification does not seem to be very convincing.
Satkunda Bhils

In the vicinity of Satmala hutties were the hutties of Sutkunda Bhils. Their main chiefs Satwaji naik and Suryaji naik in the parganas of Kannad and Verool (Ellora) agreed to accept a sum of Rs 343/- annually in lieu of their yearly claim and agreed to performed their traditional duties of police, and abstain from plunder and robbery. They agreed to produce the thieves or to trace them where they might be seized. They also agreed to send back the village Bhils into their respective homes. Lieutenant Hodges gives a list of annual perquisite claimed by Satwaji and Suryaji naiks of Satkunda hutties as under:

In the pargana of Kannad –

Bhetty \( \frac{1}{2} \) Rupee from each of the 10 inhabited villages of the mucasu Umeriel \( \text{Rs 15/-} \)
1 Rupee and 1 Passeri from each village \( \text{Rs 20/-} \)
1 Rupee in each pole. \( \text{Rs 10/-} \)
Shupper each village \( \text{Rs 10/-} \)
1 cundy and 12 maunds of grain \( \text{Rs 55/-} \)
Total \( \text{Rs 109/-} \)

In the pargana of Verool (Ellora)

Bhetty and sheep Surra Chobe from the Kusba \( \text{Rs 22/-} \)
Bhetty and sheep and \( \text{Rs 4/-} \) from each of the 19 inhabited villages \( \text{Rs 38/-} \)
Pugree and Papoora \( \text{Rs 27/-} \)
3\( \frac{1}{2} \) cundy and 3\( \frac{1}{2} \) maunds of grain \( \text{Rs 147/-} \)
Total \( \text{Rs 255/-} \)
Grand Total \( \text{Rs 343/-} \)
Briggs and The Kaldary Bhils

The Kaldary Bhils lived in the Gungthadi region which was not so much devastated or deserted as Khandesh proper. In Gungthadi every Bhil had a home in the village to which he could return and therefore controlling them was not so much of a problem as controlling the Khandesh Bhils.

Lieutenant Hodges made agreements with the Kaldary Bhils in November 1818. List of annual Perquisites claimed by Kaldary Bhils as given by Lieutenant Hodges is as under -

1. Claims of Bayaji Naik, Wagh naik and Taraji Naik in the pargana of Bargaon -

(a) Bhet and Sheep @ Rs 2/- from each village – Rs 114/-
(b) 1 maund of grain from each village – Rs 114/-
(c) 5 seers of goor from each village in which sugarcane is planted – Rs 10/-
(d) 8 seers of grain from each owner of a field in the Kusba of Bargaon – Rs 18/-
(e) 3 pice from each tradesman of the Kasba. – Rs 10/-

Total – Rs 266/-

2. Claims of Jandulla Takaria and Garud Naik in the pargana of Burner –

(a) (i) Bhet and sheep, 3 Rupees from each Village – Rs 84/-

(ii) 8 seers of grain in each plough (total 70 maunds) – Rs 140/-

(iii) 6 seers of Goor on each field of Sugarcane – Rs 244/-

Rs 510/-
(b) Lohara Pargana

(i) Bhet and sheep @ Rs 2 each village - Rs 48/-

(ii) 8 sheers of Juwari from each house - Rs 24/-

Rs 72/-

(c) Shendurni Pargana

Ready money - Rs 50/-

(d) Erandole Pargana

Bhet and sheep, Rs 2/- from each village - Rs 210/-

(e) Mhaswad Pargana

Bhet and sheep, Rs 2/- from each village - Rs 38/-

(f) Utran Pargana

Bhet and sheep and Rs 2/- from each village Rs 68/-

Grand Total Rs 948/-

"The Caldurry Bheels have consented for the future to receive a consolidated amount of Rs 948/- annually in lieu of the above Rights and to perform the service usually exacted from them. To superintend the Police of the districts in which they have claims to be responsible for gang robberies or highway robberies, and either to produce the thieves or to trace them where they may be seized, they promise also to send back the village Bheels into their respective homes and henceforward to abstain from all acts of plunder and robbery".

(Source - Briggs to ISLp., 7-12-1818, DCF 173, Encloser 3 to letter No. 315).

Within a few days of the above mentioned agreements, the Kaldary Bhils, however, returned the money and declared that they would collect their rights themselves. Briggs did not allow this. 'This they have been told will not be allowed of,
but they shall have them collected and paid to them.\textsuperscript{173} Hodges tried again, but with doubtful results.\textsuperscript{174} Regarding returning of money by the Kaldary Bhils. The Court of Directors observed that this 'was certainly not the act of ordinary freebooters and the communication ought at least to have excited some enquiry as to the reasons which had led them to repeat of their engagements.'\textsuperscript{175}

These Kaldary Bhil chiefs did not part with their followers, and indulged in small scale robberies.\textsuperscript{176} These were normally not accompanied by murder as it was in Khandesh.\textsuperscript{177} Village Jaglas in Gungthury appear to be the most mischievous, and it is seldom that a Bazar day passes without someone or other being robbed on his way to market.\textsuperscript{178} This was petty larceny, not a very serious affair, and it was not difficult to reduce them.\textsuperscript{179} Cundunail and Jandhulla Takira wrote to Briggs that their dues were not being paid by the Jamindars and they had nothing to eat.

'It is better to eat and die than die without food ....'\textsuperscript{180} However, in June 1819 a large area of this region was transferred to Ahmednagar collectorate. Along with it the problem of Bhils also, in a large measure transferred. Yet Briggs maintained a mobile force to check their incursions in Khandesh at Nasirabad, Jammner, Bhadgaon, Chalisgaon and Mehoonbara.\textsuperscript{181}

The Arrnudy Bhils

From Ankai to the Eastward commenced the range of the Arrnudy Bhils.\textsuperscript{182} 'They appear to have been made the guardians of the passes, and the country rather than watchmen and this accounts for the power to which they attained.'\textsuperscript{183} Briggs observed in 1816
and 1817 General Smith 'by kind treatment and promises, induced the Bheel Chiefs of Arr Nuddy to send their agents to him, and this laid the confidence to which we are indebted probably for the present settlement.'\(^{134}\) The main Bhil chiefs of this region were Sioji Naik, Bapoo Naik, Cundoo Naik, Jewaji Naik, Saheb Naik, Tillaji Naik, Rore Naik, Momul Naik, Yeswant Naik and Bahinji Naik. Sioji, Jewaji and Rore naiks 'appear to have had the protection of several Districts and the Guards of the Passes between Unkye and Kunnur ....'\(^{135}\) Briggs gives list of rights of the Arrnudy Bhils which they claimed annually from various districts as under –

1- Bapooji Naik and Jewaji Naik

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a) In the pargana of Patoda</th>
<th>Rs</th>
<th>Annas</th>
<th>Pice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Ready Cash</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) 3 cundies of Grain</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Bhety</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Sheep each per village</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(v) Sundry perquisites at the festivals of Dussera And Diwali</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1267</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(b) In the pargana of Baijapur</th>
<th>Rs</th>
<th>Annas</th>
<th>Pice</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Cash money</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) 3 cundies of grain</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Bhety and sheep</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Sundry perquisites of festivals</td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>745</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>
2. Bore Naik’s Rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a) In pargana of Dehur -</th>
<th>Rs</th>
<th>Annas</th>
<th>Pice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Ready money</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) 2 cundies of grain</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Bhety and Sheep</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Sundries of festivals</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>427</td>
<td>10</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(b) In pargana of Chikhalwahal -</th>
<th>Rs</th>
<th>Annas</th>
<th>Pice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Ready money</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Grain and cundies</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Sundry on festivals</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>267</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(c) In pargana of Nimbayat -</th>
<th>Rs</th>
<th>Annas</th>
<th>Pice</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Ready money</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Grain and cundies</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Bhety and sheep</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Sundry on festivals</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>597</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(Source — Briggs to Elp, 27-10-1818, DCF 172, Encloser to letter No. 217.)
The Arnudy Bhils consented to receive a consolidated amount of Rs 3000/- annually in lieu of their above rights and agreed to perform the services usually exacted from them i.e., giving up their practice of plunder and returning to their villages.

These arrangements were normally followed by both parties and Briggs had no major trouble with these chiefs.

**Dang Bhils**

As stated earlier the Political Agent/Collector exercised the political Superintendence and control over the Bhil Rajas of Dangs. The Dang country 'consists of about one thousand square miles, and is divided into five principal and two smaller Dangs, in all seven forest tracts', namely Garvi, Wassorna, Amalli, Dherbowti, Pimpri, Owchar and Chinchli. Each Dang had its own Bhil chief or Raja, though the Garvi Chief was looked upon by the others as the principal Raja.

The Dang Bhils made threatening gestures in July 1819, but their affairs were satisfactorily settled through the agency of Laxmanrao, the mamlukdar of Pimpalner.

Briggs, in his letter to Elphinstone of 25 February 1819 forwarded a list of sums payable to the Bhil Chiefs in Khandesh as under -
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hills</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Watchmen of</th>
<th>Date of letter</th>
<th>Total of</th>
<th>Grand</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baglana</td>
<td>Dusrut naiq</td>
<td>Zaitapur, Wansa</td>
<td>24th September 102-12-0</td>
<td>128-15-0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Govind naiq Wuntaklycar</td>
<td>Zaitapur</td>
<td></td>
<td>308- 6-0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gung naiq Narcoila</td>
<td>Zaitapur</td>
<td></td>
<td>163- 8-0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chakunda naiq</td>
<td>Zaitapur</td>
<td></td>
<td>60- 0-0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roop Sing naiq</td>
<td>Zaitapur</td>
<td></td>
<td>75-5-0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mohun naiq Bhamercar</td>
<td>Zaitapoor, Korally</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mohun naiq Salwuccar</td>
<td>Tilwun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mohun naiq Potail naiq Galwarecur</td>
<td>Zaitapur</td>
<td></td>
<td>76-2-0</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gunjoo naiq, Nyana naiq, Dhukumleycur</td>
<td>Zaitapoor, Barry</td>
<td></td>
<td>469- 1-0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cund naiq, Badul naiq, Kall naiq</td>
<td>Pimpalner, Zaitapoor</td>
<td></td>
<td>420- 4-0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Owcharkur</td>
<td>Pissale, Barry</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rajah Seepat Garrycur</td>
<td>Warsal</td>
<td></td>
<td>87-10-0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jawjee naiq Malgaoncur</td>
<td>Zaitapoor</td>
<td></td>
<td>14- 0-0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bagampa Dhoudy Badur</td>
<td>Zaitapoor</td>
<td>236-14-0</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dhoorjum naq Bahoolnycur</td>
<td>Zaitapoor</td>
<td>21-0-0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chunoo Prudhan</td>
<td>Zaitapoor</td>
<td>290-0-0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ivorjan (? naq Kundycur</td>
<td>Zaitapoor</td>
<td>1027-7-0</td>
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<td>Kowjee naq Dhumerecur</td>
<td>Tilwun</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neem naq Chasurcur</td>
<td>Chasur</td>
<td>52-0-0</td>
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<td>Ramchander Naq Kirlycur</td>
<td>Warsa</td>
<td>300-0-0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rajah Kooshul Koowar Dhurbotycur</td>
<td>Comerput</td>
<td>218-0-0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jeewa Wussava</td>
<td>Bhamer, Pissale, Dhywal,</td>
<td>4280-0-0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pimpalner, Chuwpullah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chunder Sing Rana of Boodawul</td>
<td>Nandoorbar, Kutuny, Sooltapoors</td>
<td>1770-0-0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The undermentioned Bheel Chiefs dependent on the Rana of Boodawul.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luchmun Parwy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasha Parwy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Raila Parwy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamar Walwee</td>
<td>Raj Pepla, Bhamer</td>
<td>500-0-0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

11054-10/4
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chandore Range</th>
<th>Bapoojji &amp; Joewajee naig Arrnuddy Bheels</th>
<th>Patoda, Byzapoor 27th Sept.</th>
<th>Kundalla</th>
<th>Dapur, Chichulwahaul, Nimbayct</th>
<th>3000-0-0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rare naig</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romul naig, Mohun naig, Jahitoo naig, Shankar naig</td>
<td>Satmally Bheels</td>
<td>Chaslesgaum, Kunur</td>
<td>649-0-0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayajee naig, Wahag naig, Janee naig, Caldurry Bheel</td>
<td>Bhaur, Ranjungaum</td>
<td>Bhurgaon, Barnair, Lahana, Sindoorny, Irrundole, Meyswur.</td>
<td>948-0-0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutwajee naig &amp; Soorajee naig, Sutecoond Bheels</td>
<td>Kunner, Ellora</td>
<td>Talneir 19th Nov</td>
<td>343-0-0</td>
<td>4740-0-0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satpoora Range</td>
<td>Bhylia and Cundia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cundoo naig</td>
<td>Talneir</td>
<td>100-0-0</td>
<td>16800-10½-0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goomany naig</td>
<td>Talneir</td>
<td>2000-0-0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ramjee naig, Ouchit naig, Goorekur</td>
<td>Sooltanpoor, Bhamere</td>
<td>600-0-0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roopsing naig, Cundoo naig, Rohummak-eecur</td>
<td>Talneir</td>
<td>200-0-0</td>
<td>3100-0-0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N. B. - In the Satpoora range most of the Bheels are under the protection of Sindia's Districts, and have refused to enter into terms, but continue to plunder.

(Source - Briggs to Elp. 25-2-1819, DCF 175, Letter No. 424, enclosure).
On 9 June 1819 Briggs also forwarded to the Deccan Commissioner details of the Establishment or 'Bheel Nemnooks' of the Satpuda Hills which are as under:

### Establishment or Bheel Nemnooks of the Satpura Hills.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Land Beegha</th>
<th>Rupees monthly</th>
<th>Annually</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1819,</td>
<td>Kannish Turwee</td>
<td></td>
<td>620</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>600</td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Shah Baz Khan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>400</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td></td>
<td>50 Bheels @ 5 Rupees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>including Meer Khan</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>aud Beela</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>3000</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Misree Khan Janorikur</td>
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<td>250</td>
<td>30</td>
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</tr>
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<td>April</td>
<td>Boovan Khan Arrawad</td>
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<td>Meer Khan</td>
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<td>96</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bizlee Khan</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1819</td>
<td>Dhondo Turwee</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>Meer Khan</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Bhicka Choudry</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Sullabut Khan</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>1819</td>
<td>Jannish</td>
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<td>50</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Kokdoo</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Month</td>
<td>Name of Village</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1819</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>Dhunjee Umbhakur</td>
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<td>Ragmul</td>
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<td>Bhagchund</td>
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<tr>
<td>1819</td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>Goomary Naiq of Sindwa</td>
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<td>85</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10 Sibundee</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10 Sibundee</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Besides his Hucks to be continued</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1819</td>
<td>June 1st</td>
<td>Khandoo Bheel</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sultanpoorkur</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Date means the date on which the nemmook agreement was signed by the Bhil naiks and Briggs.**

**Village means village in Inam or rented by the Naik.**

(Source: Deccan Commissioner's File, No. 176 Letter No. 521, (Enclosure) dated 9th June 1819.)
The Dang Chiefs submitted on appearance of the force sent against them. In the Satmalas, the famous Hirla, dividing his men into three formidable bands, laid waste the rich plains of Bhadgaon and Erandol. 202

When Briggs left Khandesh in April 1823, in spite of all his efforts, the province was still harassed and unsafe. Lieutenant Colonel A. Robertson, Briggs’s successor, found Hirla at large in the south, and in the north the rich lands near the Satpudas wasted by the Nahals. 203 Robertson continued Briggs’s line of action till 1825 when a set of new conciliatory measures was ordered by the court of Directors, London. During 1823–24 the troops were strengthened, the Bhils scattered and their settlements destroyed. 204 For two years these fierce retributions went on. But though many were caught and killed, fresh leaders were never wanting, their scattered followers again drew together and quiet and order were as far off as ever. 204

According to Dr. Deshpande, Briggs believed that the pacification of the Bhils was an integral part of the settlement. 205 He hoped that the Bhils would return to the villages, if not driven by fear into the hills. ‘Our object certainly is to induce the Bhils to live in their villages as peaceable inhabitants. We want people too much to spare any either for the gallows or for the hills… They are extremely useful to the cultivators if they could be deterred from highway robbery and murders, and I hope a few severe examples will effect this. Indeed I have little doubt of it myself…’ 206
The success of the military operations conducted during 1818 and 1819 did not last long. The Bhils though promised a living on coming to the plains, would not return. Fresh leaders came to the front. In the south, Jandhula and Jakria, operating in the Satmala hills fiercely ravaged the southern plains to take revenge of their executed leader Cheel Naik. In the east joined by Sheik Dallu (the famous Firdari) Dasrath went out in revolt. In the west, Auchit Naik, killing the Patel of his village, fled to the hills. The Bhil watchmen turned against their own villages, and in one month from Nandurbar came the record of a hundred robberies, house-breakings, and murders. Severe steps were determined upon, and the military operations again commenced. During 1820 Major Morin simultaneously occupied posts for one hundred miles at the foot of the hills and obliged the southern Bhil Chiefs to surrender with their followers. Jundhula, Jakria and Mohan Naik surrendered to Major Morin with their 1200 followers. Military operations carried on in the west and north-east. Troops marched to the Satmala range where Ankooos and Duggar were making head. Operations continued during 1821. In the west, though at first unsuccessful, the troops pressed the rebels hard, and before a year was over (1821), Auchit and Sheikh Dallu were caught and imprisoned.

A few months of quiet in 1821 was followed by another Bhil outbreak in 1822. Gaugs of Bhils were 'plundering the province in every direction'. The Nahals of Satpuda range committed dreadful depredations in Khandesh and Nimar under Russoola Naik. The Dang Chiefs submitted on the appearance of the force sent against them. In the Satmalas, the famous Hiria, dividing his men
into three formidable bands, laid waste the rich plains of Bhadgaon and Erandol.

When Briggs left Mhandesh in April 1823, inspite of all his efforts the province was still harassed and unsafe. Lieutenant Colonel A. Robertson, Briggs's successor, found 'Miria at large in the south, and in the north the rich lands near the Satpudas sanded by the Nahals. Robertson continued Briggs's line of action till 1825 when a set of new conciliatory measures was ordered by the Court of Directors, London. During 1825-24 'the troops were strengthened, the Bhils scattered and their settlements destroyed.' For two years these fierce retributions went on, but though many were caught and killed, fresh leaders were never wanting, their scattered followers again drew together and quiet and order were as far off as ever.

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object of Briggs was to provide for the Bhils. He firmly believed that once the Bhils were provided for on a regular basis the domesticating of the Bhils would not be a serious problem. But issue was how to provide for them. 'The greater portion of the villages is so poor that it cannot afford to maintain its own Bheels even, and many villages deserted altogether, the Bheels of these villages and of the inhabited portion combine to carry on highway robberies. Briggs was convinced that 'nothing but a bare subsistance... is necessary to induce most of the Bheels to relinquish their habits.... I would do all I could to provide for them....'

To provide for the Bhils, Briggs suggested Elphinston to levy a 'Bheel putty' on all the inhabitants of Khandesh. There were 2321 villages and 1,10,182 houses in Khandesh. If an assessment of 1\(\frac{1}{2}\) anna monthly was levied by way of Bheel tax on every house, Briggs will get Rs 1,38,034 'which independently of the Naiks would support 4588 Bheels at 2 rupees monthly.' He also proposed that a chief Naik of Bheels should reside with the manlatdar of the pargana and the Bheels should be made a part of the establishment. These Naiks should get \(\frac{1}{2}\) rupee per village per month as their salary. Briggs thought that the tax would not be heavy and all the sections of the society would contribute to a useful social and administrative service. Elphinstone, however, rejected Briggs's proposal. The Deccan Commissioner thought that any imposition, however light, would have the effect of desertion of villages in Khandesh. He also disapproved the idea of creating a permanent caste of Bhils in the administration. In its place Elphinstone proposed that the Bhils be paid by the
In October 1818, Briggs proposed to the Commissioner the establishment of 'a post of Sibudies and Bheels together, or perhaps Bheels only'. He actually experimented it with Goomani Naik. He also raised a purely Bhil militia of the Tadvi Bhils at a cost of Rs 700/- per month. This experiment failed after sometime. Briggs reported its failure by commenting that the Bhils 'were constantly in a state of intoxication, never capable of any exertion themselves....'

The policy of Briggs, according to Dr. Deshpande, 'was determined in the fateful year 1819, and continued throughout his tenure as the 'Political Agent in Khandesh'. Three years following 1819, there were robberies and plunders in plenty, and one can get the grim but monotonous picture in the Deccan Commissioner's Files from number 180 to 190. Dr. Deshpande is of the opinion that 'there were no large scale rebellions of Bhils. They were law and order problems'. But Graham's opinion was that 'during his (Briggs's) administration, continued settlements had been made only to be broken, and force employed, by which for a time submission was obtained'. The measures adopted towards the Bhils during this period (1818-24) had failed and the Bombay Government admitted to the court of Directors that 'the object had not been attained'.

**Reasons for the failure of the Bhil policy adopted between the years 1818 and 1824.**

The measures adopted towards the Bhils of Khandesh for
brining them back to law and order during the years 1818 to 1824 could not be a success. The Government tried to offer various favourable terms to the Bhils and their chiefs. Briggs and his assistant Lieutenant Hodges were able to make agreements with some of the Bhil Chiefs. But after some time most of the Bhils discarded the engagements and went back to the predatory habits. Resort to military action was taken subsequently but that also could not produce desired results. The 'whole blame of the broken engagement was unhesitatingly laid' on the Bhils. The renewal of irruptions into the plain by some of the naiks, who had made engagement and continuation of them by others who held back from all negotiations was followed by declaration on the part of Briggs, the Political Agent that 'the Bhil naiks had broken their faith' and the attempts to conciliate them had entirely failed'. He also stated that 'there remained no alternative but in military coercion'.  It may be interesting to find out as to why the Bhils and their chiefs renounced the engagements so 'favourable' to them and again resorted to a life of plunder and precarious subsistence. It is also worthwhile to find out how far it is justified to put the entire blame on the Bhils and accuse them of bad faith. It is surprising to notice that the Bhil 'excesses were renewed with much impurity' inspite of putting against them a 'large military force of three Battalions and 1500 Horse, aided by the civil power...'

The failures of these measures may be ascribed to several collateral causes such as the general feelings of the inhabitants, who from different motives of interest or fear favoured the impunity of the Bhils and to the connivance, corruption or negligence of the local authorities.  It will be unjust to put the entire
blame on the Bhils for breaking their engagements.

After perusal of the measures adopted for the purpose of putting an end to the predatory system of the Bhils of Chundesh the court of Directors expressed dissatisfaction over some of its aspects. They were believed that these measures were 'for the most part equitable' but they were sure that 'there was certainly some discrepancy between the agreements themselves and Captain Briggs's explanation to them'. Chief Naik's doubts appeared to be genuine but no efforts were made to clarify them. However, Robertson argued that 'there was no room left for that freebooter (Cheel Naq) or his family to dispute as to whether they were paid for service independent of their iliks for which they were bound to perform certain services'. The explanation of Robertson, does not appear to be very convincing and ambiguity in the terms of engagement can not be ruled out.

The court of Directors were also unhappy about the adequacy of the concessions or propriety of the disallowances and observed that 'in some instances Captain Briggs granted in addition to their admitted rights' for example in case of Chandoo Naik where as the grant made to Teghy Khan 'was very inferior in amount to the revenue which he had previously enjoyed'. Major Robertson tried to justify this by arguing that Teghy Khan's claims by 'taking advantage of the time' he had 'criminaly raised himself' and his fortune was otherwise to be attributed to the spirit in which the arrangement for terminating these evils was conducted'. These not only 'allowed him to remain at his native village but conceded to him its revenue besides an annual pecuniary consideration'. He further maintains that 'Teghy Khan's interests had been consulted
to as great an extent as had he been more deserving than he was, they ought to have been'\textsuperscript{228}.

It appears that the Political Agent was not himself very much convinced about the utility of the agreements with the Bhils. Though he expressed an anxiety to make suitable provision for the Bhils yet while he admitted the policy of conciliating them and of granting them an equivalent for their just claims he manifested his 'conviction that the object of supressing their predatory habit is to be gained rather by convincing them of our Power (British power) to punish such offences than by the force of engagements'.\textsuperscript{229} Hence, it is most likely that recourse to military coercion had been looked forward to from the very beginning both by Captain Briggs and Captain Pottinger of the Collector of Ahmednagar.\textsuperscript{230} Captain Pottinger had expressed his decided opinion that 'every thing had been done which, either the policy or the dignity of the British Government could admit of, to conciliate the Bhils in that quarter’. He strongly recommended that 'should they recommence their late system, steps might be immediately taken to seize the Naigs or drive them out of the country'. Their numbers, he further said, were so small that he saw no difficulty in exterminating them should it be found requisite.'\textsuperscript{231} The feeling, which it indicates, 'towards these unfortunate people' (the Bhils) was strongly disapproved by the Court of Directors.\textsuperscript{232}

It is also possible that the allowances granted to Bhil naiks were not adequate to their maintenance. The family members of the Bhil naiks had considerably increased but the allowances were mainly based on the part claims. This may also be one of the factors due
to which the Bhil naiks were not much interested in the agreements. Captain Robertson tried to establish the adequacy of the allowances but it is not very convincing.

The corruption and malversation prevalent amongst the administrative staff was also one of the important reasons for the failure of the agreements. 'From evidence already received and from the whole tenor of the conduct of the accused parties, it is to be feared that many of the Bhil naiks who had accepted pensions in commutation of their recognised claims were victims of the same system of easy and unchecked malversation'. The Court of Directors also observed that the treasury servants appear to have appropriated to themselves all they could so appropriate with a prospect of impunity'. In no case the prospect of impunity could have been 'more complete than in case of the Bhel naiks, whose complaints, it was evident from the evidence, would not have lead to enquiry, and would be answered only by menaces carried into immediate effect'. Enquiry instituted by Captain Robertson, the officiating Political Agent during Briggs absence in December 1821 brought to light that 'large and numerous bribes were received from Jaghirdars and Zumindars, extra assessment were levied on the district, large sums of public money were received and not credited to Government, payments were entered and charged which did not exist; a trading concern was carried on with the public money in the treasury'. It was also further charged with strong probability that the 'Ryots had been defrauded of portions of their Tuccavy advances and that Robbery and murder, had been corruptly concealed'. The Deccan commissioner in his letter to the Bombay Government dated 26 June 1821 remarked that 'the
tenor of the accompanying Military reports may also give rise to a suspicion that it has become the interest of the higher classes of Native Revenue officers to persecute the Bheels, with a view to perpetuate the disorder which open so wide a door to malversation in the range of their own immediate management.' Chaplin further states that 'the few enquiries he had been able to make since the receipt of Captain Briggs's letter of the 18 June 1821 'which conveyed to me the first intimation I have received of the progress and result of the late Military operations, have tended in some degree to confirm the belief that such may have been in part the remote causes of the failure of measures that have heretofore succeeded.' Robertson admitted that 'it is very true that the establishment was dishonest' but did not think that 'with more ample and less hazardous means which were available to them of gratifying their desires', they would mis-appropriate the small pensions of the Bheels. Had the pension or any dues of the Bheels been misappropriated, it would have surely reached Major Briggs knowledge. Robertson also tried to exonerate the establishment of ever having directly or indirectly contributed, to the excitement of the disorders of the Bheels. But his reasons put forward by him are not very convincing. He himself stated that his belief was 'founded on negative circumstances only'.

Besides the military executions, great numbers of prisoners were condemned to hard labour for life 'without any form of trial. The reasons assigned for this were 'very unsatisfactory'.

It is also not justified to charge the Bheels for being unfaithful to their engagements. There appears to be 'nothing in the peculiar character of the Bheels to render the making and
keeping of engagements more difficult with them, than with other tribes similarly circumstanced. On the contrary, 'even the breaches of engagements with which they are charged bear traces of their good faith.' For example, Lieutenant Hodges had made an agreement for the support of the Koldury Bhils by which they agreed to relinquish their attacks on the village in the plains. But shortly after they 'repented of their determination and have sent back the money which was sent for their support, affirming that they will collect their own rights.' Returning the money they had received before they resumed what they had agreed to relinquish, namely the collection of their own rights, 'was certainly not the act of ordinary freebooters.' This incident ought to have at least excited some enquiry as the reasons which had led them to repent of their engagements. But it is unusual that no efforts were made in this regard by the political agent. The loyalty of the Khandesh Bhil Corps throughout its existence leaves no doubt that the Bhils were quite loyal and faithful. Captain J. Rose also observed in 1855 that 'great faith may be placed on their words.'

The Court Directors found it impossible to acquit Captain Briggs 'of blame for allowing the abuses of his establishment to attain such a height.' The Commissioner, Mr. Chaplin ascribed the long concealment of these malversations chiefly to 'Captain Briggs's inexperience of the artifices of Native Revenue Servants, and to the implicit confidence which he reposed in Appajee Rao.' The Court of Directors remarked that this may exonerate Briggs's personal character from any suspicion of connivance in their gross malversations but 'speaks very little in favour of his qualifica-
tions for an office essentially requiring such an experience as would have enabled him form a just estimate of the character and conduct of the persons employed in matters of Revenue.\textsuperscript{250} The Court of Directors further remarked that 'with these views of the conduct of Captain Briggs we should have decided his immediate removal from Candeish, if we were not advised that you have already appointed him to other office.'\textsuperscript{251} They also added that since Captain Briggs's measures were 'entirely approved by you' (Governor in Council Bombay) it will not be 'equitable to hold him exclusively responsible for any errors in the policy which has been adopted towards the Bheels'.\textsuperscript{252}

Briggs's attitude towards the Bhils was initially very kind, affectionate and sympathetic and he showed keenness in amicable measures towards them. But later on he put more 'reliance on measures of coercion'. He proposed 'a general seizure of the Bheels the making all the Bheels of the Pergunnah striking the Hills find security for their good conduct, or in default of their doing so treating them as vagrants, or committing them to hard labour, and setting a price on the heads of Aukoos and Buggur naikes'. These proposals were disapproved by the Governor in Council, Bombay. These suggestions of Briggs 'indicate a disposition to resort, without due consideration, to very harsh extremities'.\textsuperscript{253}

Thus the main reason for the failure of the Bhil policy between 1818 and 1824 in Khandesh is its improper implementation by the local administrative machinery rather than so called 'unfaithfulness' of the Bhils themselves. On the other hand it
appears that 'the terms expected by the Bhils were not fulfilled towards them' and therefore, the breach of the engagement cannot be fairly charged to them, nor can the unwillingness of other Chiefs to enter into similar engagements be regarded with surprise."
NOTES

CHAPTER III


3w Ibid.


5. Briggs to Elp., 1.3.1818, DCP, 170.

6. Ibid.


10. Ibid.


13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Briggs to Hodges, 14.5.1818, DCP 171.
32. Ibid.
33. Briggs to Elp., 8.8.1818, MSS EURF 88 Box 6 D Vol I.
34. Ibid.
35. Briggs to Hodges, 14.5.1818, DCP 171.
36. Deshpande, A., op. cit. p. 139.
37. Ibid, p. 140.
40. Ibid.
41. Briggs to Elp., 19.11.1818, DCP 173.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Historical sketch, p. 206.
55. Briggs to Elp., 27.10.1819, DCP 178.
57. Briggs to Elp., 27.10.1818, DCP 172.
58. Ibid.
59. Robertson to Chaplin, 10.3.1825, para 8, DCP 208.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., para 9.
62. Ibid., para 10.
63. Ibid.
64. Deshpande, A., op. cit., p. 143.
65. Ibid., pp. 143-44.
68. Briggs to Captain Bently, 6.3.1819, DCP 175.
69. Ibid.
70. Briggs to Elp., 11.7.1818, MSS EURP 88 Box 6 D, Vol I.
71. Yad given by Briggs to Goomau Naik, DCP 170.
72. Briggs to Elp., 11.7.1818, MSS EURP 88 Box 6 D, Vol I.
74. Deshpande, A., op. cit., pp. 146-47.
77. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Deshpande, A., op. cit., p. 150.
84. Briggs to Elp., 27.10.1818, DCP 172.
86. Briggs to Elp., 19.11.1818, DCP 173. Also Robertson to Chaplin, 10.3.1825, DCP 208.
88. Ibid.
89. Briggs to Elp., 16.11.1818, DCP 173.
100. Deshpande, A., op. cit., p. 155.
104. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
110. Jardine to Huskisson, 28.2.1819, DCF 175.
111. Jardine to Huskisson, 8.3.1819, DCF 175.
112. Briggs to Elp., 7.10.1818, DCF 172.
113. Ibid.
117. Briggs to Elp., 29.3.1819, DCF 175.
118. Jardine to Huskisson, 10.4.1819, DCF 175.
119. Jardine to Huskisson, 8.5.1819, DCF 176.
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226. Court of Directors to Bom. Govt., 27.7.1824, para 16, SRF 53.
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