Certain unique and specific features of the Cuban revolution of 1959 have always held attraction in academic research and debate on contemporary Cuba. Foremost, the Cuban insurrection, since the beginning of the struggle in Sierra Maestra in 1953, was led and articulated by urban, middle class youth, epitomised in the personae of Fidel Castro Ruiz himself. Secondly, unlike most other revolutionary movements of twentieth century, the struggle was much briefer and did not involve most of the Cuban people in actual guerrilla warfare. This is not to deny the national character of the movement and the support the guerrillas received from popular sectors of Cuban society i.e. peasantry, rural wage labour, urban working class, youth and students, and intellectuals, etc. Thirdly, the evolution and trajectory of the Castro-led guerrilla insurrection itself is interesting. The movement had begun with broad goals of a democratic polity (restoration of the constitution of 1940); national ownership of economic resources; land distribution and a fair wage structure for rural and urban wage earners. However, after 1959, what the rebels created was not a multi-class democratic coalition that supervised a mixed capitalist economy but eventually a socialist regime that directed one of the most highly planned economies in the world. Fourth, finding itself in the midst of Cold War, the post-1959 Cuba chose to take its chances within the Soviet camp so as to ward off American intransigence and interventionism. As American interventionism became more and more intransigent, Cuba moved quite rapidly into Soviet socialist camp, working out various economic and security arrangements with Soviet Union and other socialist bloc countries.

The above-mentioned critical points apart, the ideals and imperatives of the 1959 revolution—such as land distribution; national ownership of economic resources especially taking control of the private American interests in the sugar industry; end to the violence and repression that was deeply embedded in the Batista regime; generating employment and social equity—ran counter in many ways to the imperatives of Cuban capitalist system. The dynamics of a class struggle—embedded in Cuba since the wars of independence under Jose Marti
towards the end of the nineteenth century—became manifest soon after the revolution. The social dimension of the revolution took an overtly socialist hue through the policies implemented soon after the revolution, the penetration of guerrilla bands in the state hierarchy especially through the raising of revolutionary armed forces, spread of popular militias in areas of education and culture, and eventual formation of Cuban Communist Party (PCC).

Scholarly analyses have used ideological manifestations, major economic policies, and change and development of institutions to identify and delineate various phases of revolutionary Cuba: the period from 1959 to 1965 is generally considered the period in which Cuba made the transition to being a full-blown socialist economy and polity. Over the next ten years (1965-1975), Fidel Castro was engaged in consolidating the socialist revolution under his leadership. The first party congress of the Cuban communist party in 1975 clearly marked the initiation of ‘Sovietisation’ of Cuban economy and polity.

The fourth phase began with the termination of special economic and political-security relations with the Soviet Union-led socialist bloc in 1989. The transition debate in the 1990s has been about transition from a centrally-planned socialist economy to still a socialist economy that is incorporating market forces. The polity is communist party-dominated one; albeit allowing greater personal freedoms and encouraging civil society, including importantly church and foreign non-governmental organisations. Cuba since the late 1980s is undergoing a process of reform, or restructuring, of its politics and economy, the methods of social regulation and the ideological and cultural production that have prevailed for decades.

Ostensibly, the twin reforms, or restructuring, of economy and politics is taking place since mid-1980s. Cuba was laid up with problems of bureaucratic centralisation and rigidity and economic stagnation which necessitated Castro to make a call for ‘rectification of errors’ in 1986. In that sense some sort of political liberalisation and economic restructuring began in Cuba, significantly even before perestroika and glasnost had begun in Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev. It is to be noted that, as Cuba had to do it virtually all alone after 1989, many of the
emergency programmes and strategies were devised, literally speaking, for the survival of the nation and its people. Reasons are any and many; and both domestic and external factors are cited in explaining the crisis. On the external front, the demise of socialist trading system viz. Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the collapse of socialism in Soviet Union and the socialist bloc countries hit hard the special arrangements Cuba had built over the years. Cuba declared a ‘Special period in Times of Peace’—a euphemism for economic emergency—that forced the government to adopt measures that led to some fundamental changes in the management of economy. A sort of ‘stabilisation’, with ‘orthodox’ economic features, was immediately put in place in 1989. As signs of recovery emerged, deeper economic restructuring ensued after 1993. These transformative changes have elicited an intense debate among Cuban economists, academics, and policy-makers over the reach, scope and timing of economic reform process.

Internally, Cuba had to apply macro-economic policy measures to stabilise the economy through the application of fiscal and monetary policy tools, many of which remained somewhat incomplete and fell short of their aims. Some of the specific fiscal measures proved to be rather incorrect in their design; because, in the first place, they were not intended to eliminate both the macro and micro rationing system in the socialist economy. Cuba had to persist with a strict system of rationing which, theoretically-speaking, could be both an efficient instrument for distributing scarce goods and an obstacle to stabilisation. Measures taken to restore stability also conflicted with long-term objectives of economic reforms; as these measures were seen negating the credibility of the entire reform process. Also, critics have suggested that most of the measures were timidly and inappropriately applied; many were announced many months in advance, thus fuelling inflationary pressure by increasing incentives for hoarding and thereby exacerbated shortages of goods and services.

Nevertheless, Cuba moved forward introducing more far-reaching changes after 1993, which included a new law on foreign investment; the de-criminalisation of the use of ‘hard’ currency; authorisation of self-employment in approximately
150 private occupations; and the transformation of state farms into cooperatives with private incentives.

In the external sector, the socialist economy vigorously sought reinsertion into the international market system, exploring new commercial relations with advanced Western and developing countries and courting foreign investment in select sectors of the economy. On the whole, the economic reforms have had the effect of moving the Island towards a kind of 'mixed' economy; albeit one which remains socialist. In this transition to 'mixed' socialist economy, large scale decentralisation of economic activities is taking place in marked departure from the ethos of a centrally command socialist economy. In 1993, legislation was passed to authorise self-employment and small private enterprises; foreign investment was permitted with the exception of health-care, education and defence sectors leading to significant investment in tourism, petroleum, nickel, telecommunications, biotechnology and manufacturing industries. It needs reiteration that the economic reform process remains under state guidance and control and is directed only towards areas of economy where it is calculated that foreign investment will not compromise Cuba's socialist character, its national independence and sovereignty, and national development of its main resources in future. The point here is that it is ideology and politics which continues to dominate and shape economic reform process, and not the other way round. Yet another notable feature is the emergence of a sort of duality in the economy. While market-friendly reforms—albeit within socialist parameters—have reversed the country's worst economic crisis, they also have widened the gap between the socialist sector using national currency—the peso—and the internationalised sector ruled by the repatriated American dollar. The coexistence of the two sectors is sharpening social contradictions besides generating conflicting value systems. Even more noteworthy consequence of economic reform process is the creation of new social category, the so-called "technocratic entrepreneurial" sector, which has three basic components—foreign investors; directors of state enterprises; and prosperous peasants, commercial intermediaries, service providers and others. Another social sector that has experienced remarkable internal change is that of state wage-earners, particularly those in working class. With the legalisation of self-employment at the end of 1993, new private business focusing on providing small services and food stuffs
has begun to emerge. Somewhat paradoxical but it is true that introduction of market elements has benefited more the wage earners and small peasants.

After the period of rectification (1986-88), Cuban economic restructuring since 1989 can be divided into several phases: (i) the phase between 1990-93, better known as ‘the ‘Special Period’ in times of crisis’, was essentially one of the crisis management. The main challenge for the socialist economy was its twin dependence—on export of sugar and on a single trading partner viz. Soviet Union. The economic and social cost of the emergency measures during the ‘Special Period’ were, no gainsaying, high. As economy contracted and disarticulated, massive reduction and rationing of services and goods were introduced, which stymied the ‘orthodox’ measures. There were three policy goals during the ‘Special Period’: adjustment to reduced imports, an effort to increase efficiency and productivity especially in strategic sectors, and adjustment of external relations. To reduce fiscal deficit, subsidies to the state enterprises were cut, drastically in some cases. Prices of select goods were raised and new taxes were imposed particularly on new economic activities. The government promoted self-employment in select private services such as restaurants and introduced stringent rationing in the distribution of durable and non-durable consumer goods. Noteworthy reforms during the ‘Special Period’ included the ‘Food Plan’ (Plan Alimentario) of 1989 which encouraged larger state farms to use more intensive methods so as to create food self-sufficiency. In 1993, many large state farms were broken up into smaller basic units of cooperative production—called Unidades Basicas de Produccion Cooperacion (UBPCs)—giving material incentive to cooperative farmers. As noted earlier, foreign direct investment was sought and concessions were offered in select sectors of tourism, oil prospecting, steel and transport and telecommunications. State ensured the joint ventures a highly skilled and disciplined labour, whose retraining and retooling was the responsibility of the state. Further, dollar was legalised, with select stores accepting only dollars.

Many of these emergency measures were of ‘unilateral’ economic nature. Generally prescribed by international monetary fund (IMF) to developing countries undergoing structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). In the case of Cuba, these were however self-imposed. It is to be noted that social policies,
nevertheless, remained the priority of the regime during the 'Special Period'; and on most social welfare indicators, Cuba continued to perform better than even developed economies. Notwithstanding economic contraction and 'orthodox' economic measures, social spending on food, public health, education, culture and arts, employment, community services, social security, etc. increased during the 'Special Period'. Education, health-care and housing remained free of charge (not one single school or health-care centre was closed down during the 'Special Period'). Some landmark reforms were also made in the legal and political system, and the civil system for survival of the Revolution.

(ii) Beginning 1993, economic reforms moved towards building a kind of 'mixed' economy, albeit without compromising the socialist character of the economy and the society. Since Cuba adopted a fundamentally different approach after 1993, it can be categorised as the second phase in economic reform, or restructuring process. The so-to-say 'retreat' of socialism has involved gradual introduction of what has been described as 'constrained market features'. While the years 1993-94 saw a process of fiscal and financial reforms and further market-oriented changes through legalising private economic activities, the year 1994-95 marked the beginning of economic recovery. Since 1994, the Cuban government has made use of conventional monetary and fiscal instruments of economic policy. For instance, there have been price increases to help reduce liquidity, subsidies have been substantially cut, and a system of direct taxation has been implemented.

On the fiscal side, the introduction of taxes to support state services, as the economy emerged from a five-year economic recession, was one of the boldest economic steps. The socialist government insisted that in order to maintain free social services, people must pay taxes. Within a year, fiscal reforms cut the public sector deficit from 33 per cent of GSP in 1993 to 7.4 per cent in 1994.

Admittedly, these economic measures have coincided with political and social changes, creating new forms of political participation, social regulation and cultural-ideological production. Cuba has been undergoing a political 'rectification of errors process' (proceso de rectificacion de errores) and a process of political apertura i.e. 'opening' since the Third Congress of Cuban Communist Party (PCC) in 1986. It is to be noted that the 'rectification' and 'opening' had begun before the
processes of *perestroika* (political opening) and *glasnost* (economic restructuring) were initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev in Soviet Union. Soviet political liberalisation and economic restructuring only accelerated Cuba's own 'rectification' and political 'opening'. On the eve of Fourth Congress of PCC in 1991, there was a call for an open public debate to establish a “consensus based on a recognition of the diversity of views that exists within the population and strengthened by democratic discussions within the party and the revolution.” For several months before the party Congress, Cuba witnessed the freest and most democratic public debate in its history. Millions of people in thousands of settings (schools, labour halls, community centres) exercised the right to criticise, to propose solutions, or simply to offer opinions on questions ranging from daily life to public policy.

Not only the socialist system, the ruling PCC also underwent 'rectification' process. The PCC had launched a campaign in March 1990 for open participation in the preparations for the October 1991 fourth Party Congress. In this broad-based nation-wide discussion, held in scores of party plenums, nearly every issue was up for review and rectification. The two crucial issues excluded from any public discussion and scrutiny however were the socialist nature of the regime and the single-party system. Interesting outcomes of these nation-wide debate included popular demand for devolution and decentralisation of power, greater role for national parliament through expansion of representation and more frequent legislative sessions; and accountability and responsiveness of the government to popular concerns and needs.

The fall-out of the open national debate was immediate: a massive reshuffle in the Central Committee and Politburo of PCC with younger elements replacing the veterans of the 1959 revolution. Secret ballot was used to elect 126 of the 225 members to the Central Committee of the PCC. The party also approved direct, individual vote for electing representatives to the national parliament, i.e. National Assembly of People’s Power. The reform was intended to increase democracy within the framework of the one party system.

In July 1992, the National Assembly passed the constitutional reform law, providing for direct election of provincial delegates and deputies of National
Assembly for a term of five years. Virtually a new Constitution was proclaimed which declared Cuba a secular state, and not an atheist state. The change fostered further rapprochement between the revolution and religion. Earlier, state had relaxed several limitations on religious activities, allowing people to express their religious beliefs and to attend religious services more freely.

The cumulative impact of these changes on national culture and socialist ideology has been noteworthy. The state-church rapprochement, it is argued, has set in motion a process of religious revivalism in Cuba. The economic restructuring, allowing foreign ownership and control over labour, has given rise to a new nationalist discourse. Besides, the still limited degree of personal freedoms and representativeness notwithstanding, Cuban citizens are expressing their views including dissent against the regime and its policies. A number of civil society associations, some even with political goals expressing dissent, were allowed to be formed. Changes are still within the ambit of socialism; but it is the socialist discourse that is under transformation. Whichever way one looks at it, new actors and forces, issues and ideas, and mechanisms and institutions have emerged to change Cuba the way it had been since 1959.

This raises the question, whether Cuba will be able to sustain the change; or will it collapse under the weight of the changes, if not the challenges alone, it is experiencing? Economic reforms have so far been socially sustainable; and political opening, or liberalisation, has not challenged the rule of PCC. Externalities, most importantly the response of United States, however remain critical to the nature and pace—in fact, to the fate—of the entire reform process. The embargo, imposed in 1965, had further crippling effect on the economy and society after the passage of Cuba Democracy Act in 1992 and further amendments to it in 1996 by the US Congress. Commonly called the Helms-Burton act, the US legislation has tightened the embargo by providing punishment to any foreign enterprise doing business with Cuba.

(iii) The fifth Congress of PCC in 1997 marked the third phase in the reform process. On the whole, the party Congress not only offered no new reforms; to the contrary, the party congress marked the return to ideological orthodoxy. The
political resolution defended the one party system; upheld the socialist democracy based on mass participation rather than on bourgeois "liberalism" of contention among diverse interests; and defended human rights based on social justice rather than unfettered political liberties. The fifth Party Congress was prefaced by a widely discussed document on the defence of human rights and unity. Another significant change was that the number of those from the armed forces or the ministry of interior increased in the Politburo of the PCC. The economic resolution did not offer any new changes; it only called for overall greater economic efficiency and continued growth of the tourism sector, it being the leading foreign exchange earner.

Nevertheless, some notable changes still took place in the electoral arena. In the elections held on 11 January 1998, the method of direct and secret ballot was adopted for electing deputies to the National Assembly and delegates to the provincial assemblies. Popular turn-out was as high as 98 per cent. In February 1999, Castro introduced the most severe legislation that Cuba had ever experienced, sentencing political dissidents, who deviated from the party line, to between twenty and thirty years of prison. With this, Cuba was once again entering a period of ideological orthodoxy guided by the PCC, proclaiming ever-greater social justice and political empowerment and participation of citizens.

The return to ideological orthodoxy continued beginning the next decade. In June 2000, local and provincial gatherings discussed the need for the PCC to withdraw direct involvement in public administration in order to improve party's role as the main guarantor of the revolution's ideology. The veterans of the 1959 revolution returned and the Asociacion de Combatientes de la Revolucion Cubana (ACRC) was given a high national profile. Amidst all these political changes, the party leadership continued to strongly reaffirm the centrality of the leadership of Fidel Castro; and the imperative of mass mobilisation and the defence of the la patria. There was a response from the autonomous civil society organisations. On 8 December 2000, Mesa Redonda de Reflexion, founded in January 1999 and which incorporates a number of independently formed organisations such as the Partido Democratico de Solidaridad (PSD), Corriente Social Democratica Cubana (CSC), Partido Democratico Liberal de Cuba (PDLC), Proyecto
Democratico Cubano (PDC) and the Consejo Unido de Trabajadores Cubanos (CUTC), called for a national debate on changes for 2001 and initiated six months of workshops designed to formulate a charter of human rights.

(iv) The ailment of Castro in 2006 and gradual transition in the top level of the regime and the party since 2007 marks yet another phase arguably in favour of 'pragmatists'. The ascension of Raul Castro, it is said, offers a window of opportunity to move Cuba towards a ‘mixed’ socialist economy, greater insertion in global capitalist economy, and even a possible rapprochement with the United Stated and US-based Cuban-American community.

The present monographic study is a modest academic exercise in describing and analysing the complex twin reform process in Cuba. The subject matter calls for an approach that is historical and analytical. At the same time, comparative political analysis has to be used in comparing and contrasting changes within Cuba in the periods since the revolution and until mid-1980s and then since mid-1980s. It is also germane to suitably compare Cuban experiences with the processes of political democratisation and economic liberalisation in other Latin American countries. In brief, the study describes and analyses the twin reform processes in the historical context of model of development built after the 1959 revolution. A comparative perspective enables the study to identify and develop the elements of continuity and change in the economy and politics since 1986.

Academic writings still tend to be either highly critical or laudatory of the developments in Cuba. The study closely follows the debate among the Cubanologists. In the absence of regular published and verifiable data on Cuban economy and society, available secondary source data has been used to build the arguments and hypotheses in the study. As for the use of primary source material, recourse has been made to the proceedings of the various Congresses of the Cuban Communist Party and its mouthpiece, Granma. Many facts and data have been gleaned from Granma. To write this thesis, government documents, to the extent that they are accessible, have also been used.

The Scholar of the thesis has good proficiency in Spanish language, and this facilitated his work in terms of use of Spanish language material. Certainly a
field study would have given an opportunity to deliver a superior quality thesis by collecting relevant primary source material besides meeting and interviewing the select Cuban scholars and government and party functionaries. In writing the monograph, the writings of leading Cubanologists have been consulted with great benefit in conceptualising the twin reform process in Cuba.

Following research questions or hypotheses have been tested and argued in the monograph:

(i) Economic reform process is leading Cuba towards an uncertain market-oriented, albeit, socialist economy.

(ii) Political participatory mechanisms have increased the level of popular mobilisation, even regime legitimacy, but not the prospects of democracy under the rule of Cuban Communist Party.

(iii) Social sustainability of the twin reform process explain the persistence of socialism in Cuba and survival of the PCC regime.

(iv) Adjustments in external relations facilitating greater economic engagements with the global economy, including a prospective rapprochement with US, remain essential for the success of ongoing reforms and eventual survival of socialism in Cuba.

Cuba has been an area of great interest to academics ever since the 1959 revolution. Social scientists and political commentators have written extensively on Cuba; so much so that there now exists an entire community of Cubanologists. The present monographic study is a modest attempt by an Indian doctoral student to describe and analyse the process of political and economic reforms, witnessed since the mid-1980s. It focuses on only the contents of the twin reform process but also examines the background to these reform efforts, and delves into the timings, sequencing and trajectory of the processes. In many other Latin American countries, processes of political democratisation and economic liberalisation have not been without tension and contradictions. Reforms so many times failed, at others cancelled each other out. Economic liberalisation measures are often electorally costly; similarly political reforms and interests often conflict with the logic of economic changes. The way Cuba has handled the conflict and tension
between the two becomes important for comparative study. The present study examines political and economic reform process in Cuba since 1986 till mid-2010. All said and done, Cuba remains with all its reforms essentially a socialist economy, albeit one with market features. The medium and long term trajectory indicates Cuba moving towards some kind of a 'mixed' socialist economy. Political democratisation still seems to be in distant future. With all participatory mechanisms and electoral exercises, one wonders whether Cuban citizens have been empowered to effect change in the decision-making processes; and even the regime some time in the future.

Be that as it may, Cuba has survived one of the most critical times in its contemporary history. Many had predicted end of socialism, somewhat like what happened in many former Soviet republics and East European countries. Cuba did not have those ‘velvet’, ‘pink’ and other colourful revolutions that took place in East European socialist countries and republics. Castro’s personal charisma has remained unaffected and his control over the regime remained unquestioned. When the ‘transition’ from Fidel to Raul took place, it was at the bidding of Fidel Castro. Besides, the ‘transition’ has been a smooth, seamless process with no rupture, interruption, power struggle or dislocation. Many scholars had doubted the survival of the revolution in these two decades.

The study has focused primarily on political and economic aspects of reform. Of course, there are any and many other areas which could have been covered; for instance, the transformation in the intellectual and cultural areas. They have been briefly dealt with in the context of broader subject of study.

The thesis is divided into seven major chapters. The introductory Chapter delineates the background of Cuban revolution, its features, process of political developments and role of ideology in Cuban society. The Chapter is divided into four major sections: background of the 1959 revolution; phases through which the revolution has passed; specific features and dynamics of the socialist regime; and contemporary debate on the relevance of the political system. The Chapter presents
an overview of salient social, political and economic trends and the trajectory of
building of socialism in Cuba in the aftermath of the 1959 revolution almost up to
the mid-1980s. An analysis of revolutionary process and social change conveys
and confirms the various phases Cuba passed through during this period. Under
this a number of issues have been discussed—‘Sovietisation’ of Cuban economy,
the first and second Congresses of PCC held in 1975 and 1980; Cuba’s trade and
economic relation with Soviet Union and East Europe; and Cuban perception of
political and economic developments in the 1980s in Soviet socialist bloc.

The Chapter II focuses on political and economic developments during
1986-90 period. An analysis is made of the crisis that faced Cuba in the 1980s
including failures of economic planning and stranglehold of bureaucratic controls
and centralisation of power. These were the mistakes made in 35 years of socialist
rule. In this background, the Chapter examines the process of ‘rectification of
errors’. Why economic crisis deepened in 1989 after the disintegration of Soviet
socialist bloc? How the declaration of ‘Special Period in Times of Peace’ in 1990
impacted the regime support and legitimacy? To what extent the policies adopted
in this period resulted in ameliorating the economic situation? The third Party
Congress in1986 took steps to recalibrate and reform socialism so as to meet the
impending challenges. However, the collapse of the special ties with Soviet
socialist bloc produced new challenges and threats that could have undermined
Cuban revolution. In the ‘Special Period’, a number of new policies were
introduced to restore economic growth and increase political participation.

Third Chapter broadly describes the political developments during 1991-
1995. For a critical evaluation of the major developments in this period the Chapter
has been divided in four major sections: the debate and decisions at the fourth
Congress of PCC in 1991; Constitutional changes and electoral-political reforms;
civil society and its interaction with the regime; and evolving pattern and direction
of socialist democracy in Cuba. The ANPP revised 42 articles and updated 34 of
the 141 articles of the 1976 Constitution. The political institutions like National
Assembly, Council of State, Council of Ministers and other organisations like
Organ of Popular Power and Popular Councils (Consejos Populares) helped to
reconsolidate faith of the populace in Cuban Socialism in difficult time. By
adopting a process of socialist development the people Cuba are empowered to fulfill their social potentials.

The Chapter IV examines economic reforms and change during 1993-95. It delineates the areas and patterns of economic reforms since 1993. How the reform contributed to recovery of economy. The reform in agricultural sectors by dismantling of the state farms system and the creation of market friendly farmers’ market helped the farmers to earn some extra money. As result, a large section of population got involved in farming and producing agricultural products at a time of great food scarcity and spectre of unemployment. Fiscal deficit was tackled through orthodox economic measures, dollar became a legal tender and the regime worked out new exchange rate mechanism and monetary reform. The opening of sectors like tourism, mining, telecommunications, petroleum and gas, food and beverage industries for foreign direct investment helped integrate the Cuban economy with the international market. Several joint ventures were established and Cuba, as a result of these reforms, began engaging in multilateral economic relations.

Chapter V investigates aspects of reforms after 1997 when Cuba made a return to ideological orthodoxy and cancelled many reforms of the previous years. The first section titled ‘Pace and Direction of Political Reforms’ critically examines the major developments in political sphere from 1997 till almost the mid-2010. The section analyses the causes of slowing down of economy and how it recovered after 2003. Further, what measures government took to maintain the sustainability of economic growth? The next section examines the importance and implications of transition from Fidel to Raul Castro after 2006. The last section evaluates the debate on transition.

The penultimate Chapter looks into the adjustments Cuba engineered in its external relations. The Chapter describes in details Cuba’s relations with Latin America and Caribbean after revolution. A separate section looks into the close economic and political cooperation that Cuba established with several Latin American countries that went ‘leftist’ in the first decade of the present century; in particular, relations with Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador seems to have created an
axis that represents a powerful voice for alternative development strategy in the region. Another section examines the importance of Canada's relations with Cuba after Canada became a member of OAS in 1989 and made Latin America a major focus of its foreign policy. Canadian support has helped Cuba carry forward its reform process in a peaceful and piecemeal manner. Besides, the Chapter covers the impact and implications of US actions including the passage of Cuba Democracy Act and Helms-Burton amendments on reform process and regime survival. It also examines the possibility, or otherwise, of rapprochement with US. European Union has in general maintained trade and investment relations that have helped Cuba during the past twenty-five years or so. In particular, joint ventures established in partnership with Spain in tourism and hospitality sectors have been beneficial. Other areas such as telecommunications, mining and oil prospecting besides biotechnology have attracted foreign direct investment. Of late, revival of economic and trade linkages with Russia has generated enormous interests among academics; the Chapter also examines this aspect. Relations with China enabled the regime develop new market for its exports; besides, China became a source of machinery and investment after the demise of Soviet Union. Relations with developing countries are moving beyond political and ideological solidarity so as now to cover aspects of economic cooperation and South-South cooperation and a multipolar world order. In this respect, relations with India have also move up with a modicum of trade and economic cooperation in the present decade.

The final Chapter presents a summary and an overview of the discussion and analysis of the preceding six Chapters besides the main findings of the present monographic study.
**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACS</td>
<td>Association of Caribbean States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAP</td>
<td>Asociacion Nacional de Agricultores Pequeno (National Association of Small Farmers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANPP</td>
<td>National Assembly of Popular Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNDES</td>
<td>National Bank for Economic and Social Development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANF</td>
<td>Cuban American National Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community and Common Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARIFORUM</td>
<td>Caribbean Forum (of Africa, Caribbean and Pacific; ACP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Comite de Defensa de la Revolucion (Committee for the Defence of Revolution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMEA</td>
<td>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMECON</td>
<td>Council for Mutual Economic Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Confederacion de Trabajadores de Cuba (Confederation of Cuban Workers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR</td>
<td>Directorio Revolucionario (Revolutionary Directorate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>Desarrollo de Servicios Constructivos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMCC</td>
<td>Empresa Mixta Cementos Curazao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Revolutionary Armed Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEV</td>
<td>Federacion de Estudiantil Universaria (Federation of University Students)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIHAV</td>
<td>Havana International Trade Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMC</td>
<td>Federacion de Mujeres Cubanas (Federation of Cuban Women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTAA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area of Americas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMC</td>
<td>Industrial Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPEA</td>
<td>Institute for Applied Economic Research</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
JUCEI  Juntas de Coordinacion, Ejecucion y Inspeccion (Local Government Council)
JUCEPLAN  Junta Central de Planificacion (Central Planning Board)
M-26  Fidel's 26th July Movement
MERCOSUR  Mercado Comun del Cono Sur
MINAC  Ministry of the Food Products Industry
NACLA  North American Congress on Latin America
NAFTA  North American Free Trade Agreement
NGO  Non-governmental Organisation
OAS  Organisation of American States
OPP  Organos de Poder Popular (Organs of Popular Power)
ORI  Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas (Integrated Revolutionary Organisation)
PCC  Partido Comunista de Cuba (Communist Party of Cuba)
PRC  Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Cuban Revolutionary Party)
PSP  Partido Socialista Popular (Popular Socialist Party)
PQRS  Partido Unido de la Revolucion Socialista (United Party of the Socialist Revolution)
SADF  South African Defence Forces
SDPE  Sistema de Direccion y Planificacion de la Economia (System of Economic Direction and Planning)
SELA  Latin American Economic System
TIMSA  Telecomunicaciones Internacionales de Mexico
UBPC  Unidades Basicas de Produccion Cooperativa (Basic Units of Cooperative Production)
UJC  Union de Jovenes Comunistas (Union of Young Communist)
UN  United Nations
UNAC  Nation Union of Writers and Artists
UPC  Union de Pioneros de Cuba (Pioneers Union)
WTO  World Trade Organisation