Chapter One:

United States Foreign Assistance Policy: A Summary of its Policy towards Egypt and Pakistan.
The idea of America providing assistance to countries has been perceived as both a, self-serving device dictated by national interests and an unprecedented act of unselfishness. This use of a single program to diverse military, economic, political and humanitarian purposes has at once highlighted and confused the image of America in the world.

Experts have perceived American assistance to other nations as not just a manifestation of its national conscience but also significant for its national security. Foreign assistance supports a great many objectives. Especially since the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, foreign assistance has taken on a more strategic sense of importance, cast frequently in terms of contributing to the global war on terrorism. (Tarnoff & Nowels 2004: 2). This view further contends that the seemingly contradictory operations of, on the one hand providing American supplies to a country in the form of weapons and military advice, and on the other encouraging economic development and social improvement through loans, grants and technical assistance and humanitarian relief is puzzling. It is neither just humanitarianism nor is it just ‘realpolitik’ that has dominated the diplomacy of American foreign assistance; both are present in varying degrees. Be that as it may, further examination of American assistance policy can provide helpful analysis of this seeming contradiction.

This chapter looks at some of the major contours of United States assistance policy to the Middle East and South Asia in general, and Egypt and Pakistan in particular, from the end of the Second World War to the administration of President George H.W. Bush. It would also point out the major factors in United States foreign policy that have promoted a policy of assistance or determined in some way not to give any. This study bases itself on two assumptions. Firstly, that American institutional decision making needs rigorous examination in order to accurately locate its policy on foreign assistance. Secondly, the mapping of executive developments is necessary to contextualize the changes in American foreign policy from within. In particular the goals in American foreign policy and its impact on United States assistance programs to Egypt and Pakistan provide
illuminating arguments about the influences that shaped American foreign policy towards the Middle East and South Asia in general and Egypt and Pakistan in particular.

**Foreign Assistance Framework**

According to legislative and related material available to the Committee of International Relations and the Committee on Foreign Relations, "The Congress declares that the individual liberties, economic prosperity, and security of the people of the United States are best sustained and enhanced in a community of nations which respect individual civil and economic rights and freedoms and which work together to use wisely the world's limited resources in an open and equitable inter-national economic system. Therefore, the Congress declares that a principal objective of the foreign policy of the United States is the encouragement and sustained support of the people of developing countries in their efforts to acquire the knowledge and resources essential to development and to build the economic, political, and social institutions which will improve the quality of their lives. The Secretary of State has the responsibility of coordinating all United States development related activities." (Committee on International Relations and Committee on Foreign Relations 2003: 15-16). According to the United States Department of State (DoS) website the official goal of United States foreign assistance is: "To help build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system."(US Department of State, Office of Director of Foreign Assistance website, N.D. b: Website). According to the ‘Vision Statement’ of the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance which is part of the Department of State, American foreign assistance is meant “to ensure the strategic and effective use of foreign assistance resources to respond to global needs, make the world safer, and help people better their own lives by supporting programs that:

* Advance human rights and freedoms;
* Promote sustainable economic growth and reduce widespread poverty;
* Promote and support democratic, well-governed states;
* Increase access to quality education, combat disease, and improve public health;
* Respond to urgent humanitarian needs;
* Prevent and respond to conflict; and
* Address transnational threats" (US Department of State, Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance website, N.D a: Website).

To achieve the goals, as stated in the vision statement, the office of the director of foreign assistance "provides leadership, coordination and strategic direction within the United States government and with external stakeholders to enhance foreign assistance effectiveness and integrates foreign assistance planning and resource management across State and USAID. The office leads strategic, operational, and performance planning of United States foreign assistance with a focus on aligning resources with policy priorities. The office also develops and defends foreign assistance budget requests and allocates State and USAID foreign assistance funding to meet urgent needs and new opportunities and to ensure long-term sustainable investments; and lastly, it promotes good stewardship of foreign assistance funds by strengthening oversight, accountability, and transparency." (US Department of State, Director of Office of Foreign Assistance, N.D a: Website).

The Foreign Assistance Policy Framework as stated by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of State "is an analytical tool aimed at targeting limited American government resources efficiently and effectively within countries and at the regional and global level. It categorizes each country receiving foreign assistance based on common traits, and places them on a trajectory of progress, with the ultimate intent of supporting recipient country efforts to move from a relationship defined by dependence on traditional foreign assistance to one defined by full sustaining partnership status. With this intent in mind, it focuses foreign assistance on maximizing country progress based on strategic priorities for country advancement rather than historical allowances." (USAID, Department of State N.D.: 9). However, it should be pointed out that the framework is not used to determine funding levels for any individual country, category of countries or any particular strategic objective. The objective of building a framework is to have a detailed structure for a program that would
help the department to make tough budget decisions and focus on strategic priorities and channel resources where they are needed most. To achieve this goal the framework

* Defines the primary goal for United States Government Foreign Assistance, which is to help build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.

* Identifies the five strategic objectives (Peace and security, Governing justly and democratically, Investing in people, Economic growth, and Humanitarian assistance) related to achieving that goal.

* Defines five broad country categories of similarly situated countries based largely on independently measured indicators of country progress.

* Helps identify which types of programs are best suited to help a country progress and focuses assistance on those most critical needs, based on the intersection of the objective and the country category.

* Provides a unified point of reference for USAID and State to bring their respective expertise to bear, eliminate redundancies, and create opportunities for amplification.” (USAID, Department of State N.D a: 9).

The foreign assistance is provided with certain considerations in mind. These parameters are established by the vision statement as proposed by the administration. However, the broad factors of providing foreign assistance have not changed from one administration to the other despite different officials in charge of the formulation of the policy. According to the ‘Strategic Framework for Foreign Assistance’, as developed by the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance, foreign assistance is designed as a tool to help policy makers with strategic choices on the distribution of funds and to ensure that United States foreign assistance advances the administration’s foreign policy objectives. These objectives have been identified in to five broad categories of ‘Rebuilding, Developing, Transforming, Sustaining Partnership, and Restrictive, of countries with similar political, economic, and social characteristics”(USAID Department of State N.D. Website). Each of these categories is associated with areas of emphasis that are part of the United States Foreign Assistance policy, whether it be in terms of investments in
people and economic growth for "transforming" countries or in facilitating improvements in governance and democratic participation for "developing" countries. It needs to be pointed out that countries are placed into categories based on a set of objective indicators including governance, anti-corruption, attention to the human capacity of their people, economic growth, income status, respect of Human Rights, free and fair access to the due process of law, as well as civil and political liberty of the people. These indicators are borrowed from the World Bank Institute, UNESCO, Freedom House, and other independent sources and are also used by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).

It has to be recognized that the results of American assistance are not always related to the intentions with which assistance was given in the first place. Some countries, having received vast amounts of assistance, have been unable to show corresponding amounts of intended development. On the other hand, military assistance intended to strengthen the prospect of political stability against external forces can disturb the domestic balance, as well as the regional balance of the recipient. (Montgomery 1962: 08). Thus some studies have pointed out that American assistance has not always worked towards its stated foreign policy goals such as creation of a stable and decent world order.

Features of United States Foreign Assistance Policy

The United States provides foreign assistance under a number of programs. Most people associate United States foreign assistance primarily with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Established in 1961, USAID is the largest and most diverse United States government foreign assistance agency. Along with USAID, in January 2006, Secretary of State Rice announced the “transformational development” initiative, or “F process,” to foster greater aid program coordination and to achieve specified objectives. The Secretary created a new State Department Bureau of Foreign

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1 The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is an innovative and independent U.S. foreign aid agency that is helping lead the fight against global poverty. Created by the U.S. Congress in January 2004 with strong bipartisan support, MCC is changing the conversation on how best to deliver smart U.S. foreign assistance by focusing on good policies, country ownership, and results. To know more about the MCC, one can visit their official website- www.mcc.gov
Assistance (the F Bureau) headed by the Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) who also serves concurrently as Administrator of the USAID. In 2006 the F Bureau developed a Strategic Framework for Foreign Assistance (FAF) to align United States assistance programs with American strategic objectives (Epstein & Weed 2009: 2). While, USAID along with the F Bureau are at the center of United States foreign assistance efforts, they are connected to assistance programs established by the other departments. These various programs are formulated by the Departments of State, Defense, the Treasury, Agriculture and several other organizations. There are five major categories of foreign assistance that is provided by the United States: bilateral development assistance, economic assistance supporting United States political and security goals, humanitarian aid, multilateral economic contributions, and military assistance. Due largely to the recent implementation of two new foreign assistance initiatives - the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Global AIDS Initiative2 - bilateral development assistance has become the largest category of United States assistance. (Tarnoff and Nowels 2004: i). In addition to these bilateral efforts, the United States is a contributor to critical multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, the United Nations, the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.

**Economic Assistance: Objectives and Challenges**

The bulk of all economic assistance supporting United States political and security objectives are provided through the Economic Support Fund (ESF), an assistance category designed to advance American strategic goals with economic assistance. Congress established the economic support fund to promote economic and political stability in strategically important regions where the United States has special security interests. The funds are provided on a grant basis and are available for a variety of economic purposes, like infrastructure and development projects. Although not intended

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2 The US Global AIDS Coordinator’s mission is to lead implementation of the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). PEPFAR was launched in 2003, and is the largest commitment ever by any nation for an international health initiative dedicated to a single disease - a comprehensive approach to combating HIV/AIDS around the world.
for military expenditure, these grants allow the recipient government to free up its own money for military programs (Federation of American Scientists N.D.: Website). Since the 1979 Camp David accords and especially since the end of the Cold War, a large portion of the economic support fund has gone to support the Middle East Peace Process. However, as with all its assistance program aims, since the attacks on America on September 2001, a large portion of funds has been directed towards countries that are alliance partners in the war on terrorism.

Economic support funds can be used for development projects or in other ways, such as cash transfers, to help countries stabilize their economies and service foreign debt to achieve democratic systems and free market economies. United States foreign economic assistance, especially the bilateral assistance is provided to foreign governments, while multilateral assistance is provided to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for work abroad, to international organizations like the United Nations Development Program, and to the multilateral development banks like the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. The promotion of economic prosperity, social well-being, and global environmental issues are the stated key United States policy objectives. The United States contribution to the various programs as part of its economic assistance fund is expected to assist the recipient countries to understand and adopt open and transparent rules and regulatory regimes; implementing multilateral rules and laying the foundation for sound economic reforms that contribute to growth and stability. One does not deny that this environment of stability and economic prosperity that is created helps American economic interests as well.

Military Assistance: Objectives and Prospects

The United States provides military assistance to its friends and allies to help them acquire American military equipment and training. It is based on the notion that this would provide the forces greater compatibility with each other in situations where they have to face a common threat. The assistance program is divided in to three major programs;
* Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is a grant program that enables governments to receive equipment from the United States government or to access equipment directly through United States commercial channels.

* The International Military Education and Training program (IMET), offers military training on a grant basis to foreign military officers and personnel. Grants are given to foreign governments to pay for professional education in military management and technical training on US weapons systems.

* Peacekeeping funds are used to support voluntary non-United Nations operations. These funds provide voluntary support for international peacekeeping activities (as opposed to the United States share of United Nations-assessed peacekeeping operations, which is financed elsewhere). These funds promote increased involvement of regional organizations in conflict resolution and help leverage support for multinational efforts where no formal cost sharing mechanism is available. (Federation of American Scientists N.D.: Website).

The Negative Aspect of Assistance

It must be kept in mind that there are some negative aspects of American foreign assistance policy. For instance, the somewhat all-encompassing goal of security for a particular nation may threaten the larger aspect of reliability in the region by American military assistance. Better military resources available to the existing regimes can contribute to regional instability by reinforcing intra-regional rivalries. Military assistance also tends to improve the political position and capacity of a nation to the point that it starts to threaten the security of another nation thereby, starting an arms race and further deteriorating the situation into a possible-serious crisis. The role of economic assistance has been the subject of some debate too. It has been argued that foreign assistance does not contribute significantly to the economic process of the recipient country. Assistance that is intended to foster development may be diverted to other, nonproductive, activities by the regimes and it is wasted in countries that do not have the technical or administrative ability to absorb and use the assistance properly. In many cases, economic assistance has sustained governments in their pursuit of economically
counterproductive political and economic policies. Such policies include the persecution of particular groups, restrictions on private trade, confiscation of property, price policies that discourage agricultural production, and the expropriation of foreign capital and enterprises. However, the most substantive argument against economic assistance is that the United States through its assistance is helping nations that will in future become competitors in the global market.

United States Foreign Assistance Policy: An Overview.

United States assistance policy would present vital evidence as to how its foreign policy affects some regions and some countries specifically. In the Middle East and South Asia, for example, a study of American assistance to Egypt and Pakistan is useful to analyze the overall patterns and impacts of such a policy given that the two nations are of strategic importance to the United States and are alliance partners for very long.

According to historians and geographers, Middle East is a term which is applied to the countries of South West Asia and North East Africa lying West of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Thus defined it, includes Cyprus, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Egypt and Libya and the countries of the Arabian peninsula -Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait. The term Middle East was invented by an American admiral and it gained ground, became respectable and was accepted largely as a result of the 1939-45 war time usage in official and popular circles. (Longrigg 1963: 11). In the twentieth century the Middle East has been the scene of political turmoil and major warfare, including First World War, Second World War, the Arab-Israeli Wars, the Iran-Iraq War and the Persian Gulf Wars.

The Middle East-its people and the disputes- have for long dominated American foreign policy, both in making and application. From the creation of Israel, containment of the communists, protection of oil supplies, its defense and interests have influenced the goals deemed as crucial for the framing of American foreign policy. The continued conflicts in
the Middle East between Israel and her Arab neighbors in the years after the Second World War had made American policy of assistance, an attempt to influence if not to determine, not only the nature but the direction of America’s foreign policy towards the conflict and the participants in a region, that was of geopolitical importance to the United States.

South Asia, also known as Southern Asia, is a southern geopolitical region of the Asian continent comprising territories on and in proximity to the Indian subcontinent. It includes the countries India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Maldives and the British Indian Ocean Territories, in other words the Indian subcontinent and its neighbors. The region is appropriately named as it constitutes the south-central portion of the Asian continent. (Gonzales and Sherer Jr. 2004: 301). The United Nations also includes Afghanistan and Iran in the territories comprising Southern Asia.

The region has a long history of ancient civilizations, perhaps no other part of the world is as historically complex and culturally as diverse as Southeast Asia. The changing character of the Asian political and military environment presents the United States with a host of critical challenges. The rise of China will undoubtedly be one of the great dramas of the twenty-first century. China's extraordinary economic growth and active diplomacy are already transforming Asia, and future decades will see even greater increases in Chinese power and influence. (Ikenberry 2008: website). The other country that is changing the landscape in the region is India. India began booming, and relations with its neighbors- from China to Pakistan to tiny Bhutan – improved markedly. The result is that India has begun to play a much larger role in the world. (Zakaria 2008: 149-150). Both countries are also rapidly expanding their military capabilities. If it is to meet these challenges, the United States must begin to formulate a strategy aimed at a pivotal long-term objective: preventing a worsening of the security situation in Asia. Analysts have outlined the importance of such a policy for United States, firstly, to prevent the United States from being denied economic, political, and military access to an important part of the globe; and, secondly, to prevent a concentration of resources that could support a global challenge to the United States of the order of that posed by the former
In their view this region has played a key role in world history and will no doubt continue to do so.

**Foreign Assistance to Egypt and United States Middle East Policy Approaches**

For Egypt, its geography, population, history, military strength, and diplomatic expertise gives it extensive political influence in the Middle East. Egypt has been the intersection for Arab commerce and culture for a very long time, and its intellectual and Islamic institutions are at the center of the region's social and cultural development. The United States and Egypt enjoy a strong and friendly relationship based on shared mutual interest in Middle East peace and stability, revitalizing the Egyptian economy and strengthening trade relations, and promoting regional security. Mutual interests and a similar general outlook on the process in the Middle East were the factors forming the foundation of special relations between Egypt and the United States. From Egypt's perspective, these relations and the related peace agreement with Israel remain basic necessities in its domestic and foreign policies. The Cold War's end, USSR's collapse, and Middle East developments since the Gulf crisis have not altered this situation. An expression of this fact can be found in the joint statement published at the end of the United States-Egyptian strategic dialogue (July 1998), which begins: "The strategic partnership shared by the Arab Republic of Egypt and the United States of America reflects our common and strong commitments to peace and to regional stability. Sharing a strategic outlook on issues affecting the Middle East and beyond, we have cooperated on numerous undertakings, which have benefited our two countries and advanced the cause of comprehensive and just peace, regional stability, and economic development and progress." (Meital 1998: Website). Egypt is a key partner of the United States in the search for peace in the Middle East and resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Over the years, Egypt and the United States have worked together assiduously to expand Middle East peace negotiations, hosting talks, negotiations as is evident from the Oslo peace talks, the peace talks that have been held between the various countries of the region and Israel and the memorandums of understanding that have been agreed upon. United States assistance to Egypt's military modernization program and Egypt's role as a
contributor to various United Nations peacekeeping operations continually reinforce the American-Egyptian military relationship. According to the Department of State, an important pillar of the bilateral relationship remains United States security and economic assistance to Egypt, which expanded significantly in the wake of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979. (Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Department of State 2010: Website).

Foreign Assistance to Pakistan and United States South Asia Policy Approaches

One of the cornerstones of American policy towards South Asia has been its relations with Pakistan. The broad issues of Indo-Pakistan peace and the need to establish a strategic security relation have been a major focus in the United States-Pakistan relationship. Historically, Pakistan has had difficult and volatile relations with India, long-standing close relations with China, extensive security and economic interests in the Persian Gulf, and wide-ranging bilateral relations with the United States and other Western countries. (Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs Department of State N.D.: Website). Pakistan remains a country of paramount geo-strategic importance for America. Pakistan's strategic geographic position made it a valuable partner in Western alliance systems to contain the spread of communism. It played the role of being the 'front line state' against Soviet aggression in Afghanistan in the 1980s and continues in that role in the American war against terror at present. According to Shahid M. Amin, noted Pakistani diplomat, the United States highly values the role of Pakistan as a key Islamic country with a unique geostrategic location, being located next to the epicenter of militancy and terrorism. (Amin 2000: 335). Despite Pakistan's differences with the position of the United States on nuclear and other issues, both countries are determined to maintain friendly relations. In the views of many policy makers in both countries the two nations are bound closely by the ties of mutual interest.
Early Phase of American Foreign Assistance Policy: 1950 to 1974

The use of foreign assistance for the creation of a stable world order was generally envisaged and conceived by the American policy makers after the end of the Second World War along military lines although economic assistance was part of it too. It was largely seen from the perspective of the challenges that were presented by the threat of the communist dominating the world. The American diplomatic responses to the Cold War began with a number of defensive moves throughout the non-communist world, where alliances were formed, allies were provided with arms and economic assistance and the neutrals were strengthened so that they could be better able and equipped to defend their independence from the oppressive regimes.

President Harry S Truman was the first post Second World War president who had to deal with the issue and presided over a very critical period of the American policy making as America faced a Europe that was devastated as a result of the war, countries of Asia and Africa being decolonized and an ideologically different Soviet Union. The president had to confront a number of restraints. Globally he had to take a position that would not endanger American interests but at the same time would not benefit the Soviet Union. Regionally, he had to maintain the delicate balance of the relations between the Muslim world and America. In 1948 President Truman urged the development of a world order in which the nations of the world could be secure under laws and requested assistance to create economic conditions under which free institutions could survive and flourish. This was the essence of the Truman Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine arose from a speech delivered by President Truman before a joint session of Congress on 12 March 1947. With the Truman Doctrine, the President established that the United States would provide political, military and economic assistance to all democratic nations under threat from external or internal authoritarian forces. The Truman Doctrine effectively reoriented United States foreign policy, away from its usual stance of withdrawal from regional

conflicts not directly involving the United States, to one of possible intervention in far away conflicts. Truman argued that the United States could no longer stand by and allow the forcible expansion of Soviet totalitarianism into free, independent nations, because American national security now depended upon more than just the physical security of American territory. Rather, in a sharp break with its traditional avoidance of extensive foreign commitments beyond the Western Hemisphere during peacetime, the *Truman Doctrine* committed the United States to actively offering assistance to preserve the political integrity of democratic nations when such an offer was deemed to be in the best interest of the United States. (Office of the Historian, Department of State N.D a.: Website).

The *Truman Doctrine* was unlike the *Marshall Plan*\(^4\), which was perhaps America’s first Post Second World War attempt at a foreign assistance program. It was designed specifically for the reconstruction of post Second World War Europe. In the immediate post-World War II period, Europe remained ravaged by war and thus susceptible to exploitation by an internal and external Communist threat. In a June 5, 1947, speech to the graduating class at Harvard University, Secretary of State George C. Marshall issued a call for a comprehensive program to rebuild Europe. Fanned by the fear of Communist expansion and the rapid deterioration of European economies in the winter of 1946-1947, Congress passed the *Economic Cooperation Act in March 1948*, as the plan was officially called, and approved funding that would eventually rise to over $12 billion for the rebuilding of Western Europe. (Office of the Historian Department of State N.D.b: Website). The *Marshall Plan* generated a resurgence of European industrialization and brought extensive investment into the region. It was also a stimulant to the United States economy by establishing markets for American goods. Although the participation of the Soviet Union and East European nations was an initial possibility, Soviet concern over potential United States economic domination of its Eastern European satellites and Stalin's unwillingness to open up his secret society to westerners doomed the idea.

\(^4\) The *Marshall Plan* (officially the European Recovery Program, ERP) was the primary program, 1947–51, of the United States for rebuilding and creating a stronger economic foundation for the countries of Europe. The text of the document can be viewed at http://infousa.state.gov/govemment/forpolicy/pam-sp.html (last accessed on 30 June 2010).
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the United States Congress would have been willing to fund the plan as generously as it did if assistance also went to Soviet Bloc Communist nations. (Office of the Historian Department of State, N.D.: Website).

The Early Years-1948-1960

The 1948 Arab–Israeli War, known by the Israelis predominantly as ‘War of Independence’ and by Palestinians as ‘The Catastrophe’ was the first in a series of wars that have been fought between the State of Israel and her Arab neighbors in the long-running Arab-Israeli conflict. The war commenced upon the termination of the British Mandate of Palestine in mid-May 1948. It had been presided by a phase of civil unrest and war in 1947. Britain had ruled Palestine for over thirty years. Between 1922 and 1948 British colonial rule in Palestine was overseen by the League of Nations in a novel structure known as a mandate. The League of Nations awarded mandates over the former colonial territories of Germany in Africa, Asia and Polynesia, and of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, to Britain and France.

The war of 1947 was fought between the states of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria against the newly formed State of Israel. The Arab states had rejected the 1947 United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine (UN General Assembly Resolution 181) that created an Arab state and a Jewish state in Palestine. Under the resolution, the area of religious significance surrounding Jerusalem would remain under international control administered by the United Nations. The Palestinian Arabs refused to recognize this arrangement, which they regarded as favorable to the Jews and unfair to the Arab population that would remain in Jewish territory under the partition. The United States

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5 The League of Nations (LON) was an inter-governmental organization founded as a result of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919–1920, and the precursor to the United Nations. A League of Nations mandate refers to a legal status for certain territories transferred from the control of one country to another following World War I, or the legal instruments that contained the terms for administering the territory on behalf of the League.
6 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 called for the partition of the British-ruled Palestine Mandate into a Jewish state and an Arab state. It was approved on November 29, 1947 with 33 votes in favor, 13 against, 10 abstentions and one absent. The resolution was accepted by the Jews in Palestine, yet rejected by the Arabs in Palestine and the Arab states. Source: The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
sought a middle way by supporting the United Nations resolution, but also encouraging negotiations between Arabs and Jews in the Middle East. (Office of the Historian Department of State N.D. c: Website). The Harry S. Truman administration remained deeply divided between the pro and anti Zionist camps. White House advisors favored policies that would facilitate a Jewish state, in contrast the officials of the Department of State and Pentagon fretted about the decline in Arab amity towards the West, on which national security interests rested (Hanh 2004 :45-46). Thus American policy remained reactive and inconsistent at this period and contributed to her having strained relations with both Israel and the Arab world. The war concluded with the 1949 Armistice Agreements7, but it did not mark the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict. After the war began, the United States official policy was to comply with the United Nations calls for an arms embargo. In 1947, and again on May 14, 1948, the United States had offered de facto recognition of the Israeli Provisional Government, but during the war, the United States maintained an arms embargo against all belligerents. The United States did not become directly involved with the armistice negotiations, but hoped that instability in the Middle East would not interfere with the international balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Arab-Israeli War of 1948 ultimately led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs. (Office of the Historian Department of State, N.D.c: Website).

Britain’s relationship with the Arab world remained stained as a result of the role that it played in the conflict and what was seen as the role it played in the defeat of the Arab forces. Relations between the Arab world and the United States were also strained as a result of the American compliance with the United Nations arms embargo. The war changed the landscape of the region. Within three years of the end of the war, the Prime Ministers of Egypt and Lebanon and the King of Jordan had been assassinated, and the President of Syria and the King of Egypt overthrown by military coups. These events along with the rise of General Nasser in Egypt focused American attention on the region.

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7 The 1949 Armistice Agreements are a set of agreements signed during 1949 between Israel and neighboring Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. The agreements ended the official hostilities of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and established armistice lines between Israel and the Jordanian-held West Bank, also known as the Green Line. The United Nations established supervising and reporting agencies to monitor the established armistice lines.
The United States endorsed the 1952 revolutionary command council military coup that overthrew King Farouk and the monarchy. The military reformers seemed to have Egypt's best interests at heart and although not pro west were not pro Soviet either. (Mark 2003 b: 2). From the mid 1950's through the early 1970's against a backdrop of regional instability and intense crisis the United States and Egypt typically found themselves at odds with each other. The Arab Israeli war of 1965 and 1971 saw the United States backing Israel against Egypt. (Quandt 1990:2). General Nasser's decision to barter Egyptian cotton with the Soviet Union in 1955 in return for weapons thrust Egypt in to the center of the unfolding drama of the Cold War in the Middle East. (Burns 1985: 1). Alarmed at the Czech –Egyptian weapons deal, the United States decided to use economic assistance for the Aswan High Dam as an inducement to discourage the Nasser regime from further involvement with the Soviet Union. (Quandt 1990: 36). The late 1950s and the 1960s were periods of heightened Cold War related activity in the Middle East. The United States had made attempts to conclude a defence alliance with Egypt in 1951. The outbreak of the Korean War had led America to fear that the Soviet Union's next move would be the Middle East. They concluded that regional defence needed to be strengthened. To this end they proposed a joint Anglo- American approach to Egypt to lead eventually to a Middle East defence pact. However, all attempts to interest the Egyptians in the defence pact failed and Egypt ordered that Britain evacuate the Canal Zone. (Yesilbursa 2005: 7).

While one doesn't deny the role played by the various pro-Israel lobbies within the United States to garner support for Israel, General Nasser's nationalist rhetoric and Egypt's charge of the Arab Nationalist movement, along with the close proximity that it shared with the Soviet Union meant that Egypt and the United States relations remained strained. It was also around this time that Egypt along with Yugoslavia and India led the third world countries in the Bandung conference (1955) in establishing a Non-Aligned Movement- a movement independent from both the eastern and western blocs. This further strained the relationship. The nationalization of the Suez Canal and the subsequent war that Egypt fought with Britain and France, further pushed Nasser to
expand ties, especially economic and military ties, with the Soviet Union. In the decade of the sixties, for the Eisenhower administration the Middle East was important because of its geo-political and strategic importance and the value of its oil resources. It was the understanding of the president that the solution to lasting peace in the region was if the Arabs could also come together with America. What frustrated the administration was the Czech- Egyptian arms deal, the nationalization of the Suez Canal by President Nasser of Egypt and the subsequent invasion of Egypt in 1956 by French, British and Israeli forces. Despite the United States support to the Egyptians, the crises did not improve relations between Egypt and America. Relations with Egypt deteriorated further with Nasser supporting the rebels in Lebanon in the struggle against the United States. The 'Eisenhower Doctrine' was recommended as a response- a program of America providing economic and military assistance, should any country request such assistance to thwart any aggression from any nation controlled by international communism.

The Doctrine, for the first time put the Israelis in a multilateral program sponsored by the United States. However, the over arching importance of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union cast United States Middle East policy into a prism rather than look at its own importance. The West’s stand on the Palestinian question as well as the behaviour of the West towards Israel meant that there was very little support for the United States in the Muslim nations. This was the period that saw the growth of Arab nationalism. Egypt was also unwilling to be a part of any American alliance system when anti-Western sentiments were running high in the region. Egypt’s position and policies in regard to the Arab arena were shaped in part by the wider consideration of its relationship to the West just as its successes in challenging Western dominance of the region and its ambivalent record of its opposition to Israel played an essential role in Egypt becoming the dominant player in Arab politics in the 1950’s. (Jankowski 2002: 2).

8 The Eisenhower Doctrine was announced by President Dwight David Eisenhower in a message to the United States Congress on January 5, 1957. Under the Eisenhower Doctrine, a country could request American economic assistance and/or aid from U.S. military forces if it was being threatened by armed aggression from another state. Eisenhower singled out the Soviet threat in his doctrine by authorizing the commitment of U.S. forces "to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism." Text of the document can be viewed at http://www.h-net.org/~hst306/documents/eisen.html (last accessed on 30 June 2010).
Thus the Arab-Israeli conflict became a proxy theatre of the superpower rivalry, in which American support for Israel was matched by Soviet support for Syria and Egypt. This was most apparent in the June War of 1967 or the Six Day war. The armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan were defeated by Israeli attacks. Israel on its part was able to capture the territories of the Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, Jerusalem and the West Bank, and the Golan Heights in the six days of the war. Egypt broke formal diplomatic relations with the United States during the war following Egyptian charges that the United States provided direct assistance to Israel.

Following the death of General Nasser, Anwar al-Sadat took over as the President of Egypt in 1970. Under President Anwar al-Sadat (1970-81), Egypt's strategic posture drastically changed. Unlike his predecessor Nasser, for al-Sadat Egypt’s economic recovery and the development of the nation took priority over the idea of leadership of the Arab world. Also, the close alliance Nasser had established with the Soviet Union came to an end under al-Sadat. Most Egyptian communists were jailed and restrictions were imposed on leftist ideas and movements. Egypt expelled Soviet advisors in July 1972; an act which was the beginning of a new phase in Egyptian-American relations. Many believed that al-Sadat established close ties with the United States as it was the only way to enhance Egypt's chances to regain Sinai from Israel and improve the prospects for domestic economic prosperity. Cairo recognized that a political solution to the conflict with Israel could be attained only through American assistance and its realization that sufficient United States assistance to reach such a solution could be 'purchased' only by Egypt curtailing relations with the Soviet Union. (Mietal 1997: 107).

The ‘Yom Kippur War’ is seen by many analysts as a war that was fought by Egypt to try to regain its territories rather than against Israel. The June war of 1967 showed the seeds of the Yom Kippur War. The loss of Sinai provided a strong incentive to al-Sadat to regain the Egyptian territories by all available means, including a military confrontation with Israel. The war planted the seeds of the Egyptian-Israeli reconciliation and ironically provided the Arab states, especially Egypt, a much needed ladder to climb down on their refusal to accept and recognize the presence of Jewish state in the Middle East. It signaled the end of the Arab unity against Israel and ushered in the process of
direct and separate peace between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries. (Kumaraswamy 2000: 2-3). Thus, United States policy essentially concerned itself with the defenses of Israel and saw Egypt through the prism of Cold War.

Similarly, the long and checkered Pakistan-United States relationship has its roots in the Cold War and South Asia regional politics of the 1950s. The United States continued to view South Asia as a region of low strategic priority till the early 1950s, when a series of events in Asia and Europe undermined that belief. Mao’s victory in China became a reality. With the defeat of the Chiang-Kai Shek government, which had the steadfast support of the United States, the new regime headed by Mao viewed Washington as its main adversary. With the Soviet Union in Europe and China in Asia adopting the communist ideology, the United States feared the encirclement of Asia in a ring of anti-American regimes. American involvement in the Korean War can be attributed to this fear. The United States viewed this attack on the South as Soviet inspired and Soviet directed. As Under Secretary Of State stated that the attack was aimed at primarily at testing American resolve. With this overriding perception the United States had little recourse but to respond, thus making the containment policy a reality. (McCormik 2010:59-60). The Cold War which was till then confined to the Europe theatre, found itself embodied in Asian politics. The American policy makers, till now concentrating on assistance to European nations started to pay more attention to Asian countries.

It was felt that the threat that was emulating was primarily military in nature and to counter this threat military alliance needed to be established in the region. The concern was to build ties with nations that would be provided with equipment, weapons and ammunitions and training, so as to minimise the presence of American troops in foreign war zones. It was during this period that the United States paid attention to India and Pakistan, as two countries it could ally with to contain communism in Asia. However, India’s policy of Non Alignment and its decision to not be part of any of the blocs was viewed by America as an unfriendly policy. What further cemented Pakistan’s role in the relationship was the unfolding situation in the Middle East. With the Muslim nations of the region against the United States, because of its support to Israel, America saw an
alliance with Pakistan as a way of claiming support of a Muslim nation. It was during this period that Pakistan’s vocal support of United States policies was acknowledged and appreciated. Pakistan’s Muslim nation status, its ties with the other Muslim nations of the Middle East, its strategic location in South Asia and proximity to the Middle East were seen by American policymakers to be an advantage. While its influence was on a decline, the support that it got from Pakistan was seen as a road block that could halt the anti-America, anti-West sentiment that was sweeping the region. Pakistan’s geographic location between South East Asia and the Middle East added to its importance for the West. American concerns about Soviet expansionism, China’s influence and Pakistan’s desire for security assistance against a perceived threat from India prompted the two countries to negotiate a mutual defense assistance agreement in 1954. By 1955, Pakistan had further aligned itself with the West by joining two regional defense pacts, the South East Asia Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization (or “Baghdad Pact”). As a result of these alliances, Islamabad received nearly $2 billion dollars in United States assistance from 1953 to 1961, one quarter of this in military assistance, making Pakistan one of America’s most important security assistance partners of the period. (Kronstadt 2007: website). This underwent some modification as President Truman sought good relations with both Pakistan and India. According to Dennis Kux, former United States Ambassador to Pakistan and an expert on South Asia, by this time the principal American interest in the sub-continent was in solving the Kashmir dispute in order to prevent further instability in South Asia. (Kux 2001: 49) and not provide any opportunity for the Soviet Union to interfere in the region’s politics. Further, Truman Presidency was unequivocally committed to protecting American interests in the Cold War.

As American policy unfolded, this approach was furthered by President Dwight D. Eisenhower proclaiming that the explicit purpose of American foreign policy was the encouragement of a hospitable environment for private American investment capital abroad. He stated that

“Even as we continue our programs of military assistance, we must emphasize aid to our friends in building more productive economies and in better satisfying the natural
demands of their people for progress. Thereby we shall move a long way toward a peaceful world.” (President Eisenhower, The State of the Union Address 1957: Website).

This approach outlined by the President led to a significant expansion of United States economic assistance in the Eisenhower administration. Cold War pressures as well as the lobbying efforts of individual countries helped further this trend, and the Mutual Security Act of 1954, the first single piece of legislation to embrace the entire foreign assistance program, became the instrument for this new policy.

This Mutual security act pact was helped vastly by the refusal of Pakistan’s first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to visit Moscow in 1950. Liaquat Ali Khan had toured the US instead to the sheer delight of the Americans, resulting in the arrival of nearly $700 million military assistance to Pakistan between 1954 and 1964. The military assistance was dished out in addition to the $2.5 billion given to Pakistan as economic assistance. (Shah 2009: website). The American policy of emphasizing the strengthening of the collective security cordon around the communists was also evident in South Asia. As per policy it meant enlisting the help of the only too willing Pakistan as a partner in bolstering the defense in the Middle East. The presidency provided Pakistan with military assistance that would shape United States relations with India and Pakistan for the next three and half decades. It was thought that “the importance of bringing Pakistan in the defense of the Middle East was greater than the importance of pleasing” India. (Kux 2001: 61). In 1954 the president in principle agreed to proceed with military assistance to Pakistan. In order to allay Indian concerns this assistance was to be presented in the context of a ‘regional security project being initiated by Turkey and Pakistan with other countries in the area.’ The understanding of the State Department was that Pakistan was likely to be a dependent ally. If the United States were to pull out from the deal to give assistance to Pakistan, the effect of the decision would be to weaken the position of the pro-western moderate elements now in control. A negative decision would also send the wrong signal to Middle Eastern allies and encourage elements that opposed ties to the west. (Nawaz 2008: 107). However, there was little understanding for the specific role

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that Pakistan was to play in the defense of the Middle East. With Pakistan joining American led military alliance and being provided with military and economic assistance, Pakistan laid a claim to American resources and the United States became more concerned about Pakistan's development. By the end of President Eisenhower's term Pakistan had become the United States most trusted ally in South Asia.

President Kennedy and Foreign Assistance Policy

When John F. Kennedy took the helm of the American Presidency in 1961, the stage was set for a huge expansion of foreign assistance. On September 4, 1961, the Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act, which reorganized the United States foreign assistance programs including separating military and non-military assistance. The Act mandated the creation of an agency to administer economic assistance programs, and on November 3, 1961, President John F. Kennedy established the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). (USAID, N.D. b Website). In a special message to Congress, Kennedy called for "a dramatic turning point in the troubled history of foreign aid" and proclaimed that the sixties would be the "decade of development"--"the period when many less-developed nations make the transition into self-sustaining growth." Kennedy placed heavy stress on the willingness of recipient governments "to undertake necessary internal reform and self-help." He stressed that the … "countries of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia--are caught up in the adventures of asserting their independence and modernizing their old ways of life. These new nations need aid in loans and technical assistance just as we in the northern half of the world drew successively on one another's capital and know-how as we moved into industrialization and regular growth." He stated that “the fundamental task of our foreign aid program in the 1960's is not negatively to fight Communism: Its fundamental task is to help make a historical demonstration that in the twentieth century, as in the nineteenth-in the southern half of the globe as in the north--economic growth and political democracy can develop hand in hand.” (The American Presidency Project 2009: Website).
In November 1961, President Kennedy established by, *Executive Order 10973*: the administration of foreign assistance and related functions, the United States Agency for International Development as the executor of American foreign assistance programs. (The Federal Register, The National Archives N.D.: Website). Despite Kennedy's stress on requiring reforms from recipient governments, foreign assistance routinely went to countries pursuing policies destined to turn them into permanent economic cripples. Partly as a result of a widespread perception that such assistance was usually wasted, it consistently ranked as one of the least popular government programs with the American public. (Bovard 1986: Website).

The Kennedy administration was very sensitive to the political complexities of the sub continent. The administration while maintaining the relations developed by the previous two administrations with Pakistan wanted to establish a relationship with India as well. The appointment of, a prominent economist and confidant of the president, John Kenneth Galbraith as ambassador to India in 1961, signaled an interest in improving relations with India. The ambassador on his part wanted to expand assistance to India and an acceptance of its nonaligned foreign policy by the United States. The appointment of Chester Bowls as Under Secretary of State, the naming of Philip Talbot as Assistant Secretary of Near and East and South Asian Affairs raised India's hope. With the personal experience that these three gentlemen had, with Bowls' experience as ambassador, Talbot's experience as an exchange student in the 1930's and Galbraith's own knowledge owing to his extended stay in India in the mid 1950's gave the Kennedy administration a depth of knowledge about South Asia and especially India unqualified before. (Singh 2005:141). When the People's Republic of China attacked India in 1962 over disputed border areas, the United States provided India with necessary military assistance. The United States now saw India as a counterweight to the growing influence of Communist China in that area of the world. India accepted American assistance, but still resisted any commitment that would draw it into the Cold War. Washington continued to pursue improved relations, but India never achieved priority status. The American response to the Sino-Indian war and its readiness to provide assistance to India was a shock to Pakistan. As Pakistan had become closer to the United States, India’s ties with the Soviet Union had grown considerably, in
such a situation the assistance provide by America was seen as an unfriendly act by Pakistan. Islamabad had joined the American led alliance system with the singular motive of strengthening itself militarily and economically against its big neighbour, India. However, for America it was an opportunity to establish ties with India and also to further alienate the Soviet Union in the region and to thwart its ambitions in the region.

However, the war between India and Pakistan in 1965 did not help for American policy with regards to the region. Kashmir was, as it still remains, the main area of concern in the normalisation of relations between India and Pakistan. The alliance with America was Pakistan’s guarantee that the Kashmir issue would be resolved to its satisfaction with the support of the entire western bloc led by America. However, the 1962 Sino- India war and the prompt support that America provided India shocked Pakistan. It felt that it had to resolve the Kashmir issue before India was able to surge ahead of it in terms of military capabilities with the support of America. Thus, it opted for a military solution to the dispute and attacked India. It had also hoped that in the war United States would support Pakistan. However, as soon as the war broke out, the United States imposed an arms embargo on both the nations and declared its neutrality. Despite Pakistan’s protest that it needed American assistance and the American policies towards the war were giving undue advantage to India, the United States maintained its neutrality. During and immediately after the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971, the United States suspended military assistance to both sides, resulting in a cooling of the Pakistan-U.S. relationship and a perception among many in Pakistan that the United States was not a reliable ally. (Kronstadt 2009: 46). For Islamabad, the United States policy during the war, especially the imposition of arms embargo, was seen as an act of betrayal of an old friend.

Pakistan received a total of $3.5 billion in economic assistance from United States over a fifteen year period from 1952-67. Much of the assistance was heavily concentrated on industrial commodities, power and irrigation and transport sector. PI 480 aside, these items made up half of all United States economic assistance. While there are peaks and valleys through out this period from a total of less than $20 million in 1952 to about $260 million in 1959 and more than $550 million in 1965, the flow sank to its lowest level in
1966, a product of the unsettled circumstances of the 1965 war. (Brecher and Abbas 1972:62). A report by the Comptroller General to the Congress, called for a reassessment of economic assistance to Pakistan. The report stated that the United States continued to provide Pakistan with substantial amounts of economic assistance—an estimated $174 million for fiscal year 1976. Pakistan, however, had not taken sufficient action to improve its general economic condition. Pakistan had not resolved basic factors contributing to debt problems and maintained a high level of military spending, which detracted from funds available to develop its natural resources. (US Government Accounting Office 1976: i-ii). Differing expectations of the aspects of the relation along with America's suspension of military assistance and a dip in economic assistance led to a further aloofness in the relationship.

During this period America became wary of becoming involved in any dispute. It was trying to find solutions to the Vietnam War, where it was becoming more and more involved. In the Middle East by 1960, the United States provided two-thirds of Egypt's grain imports. And in October 1962, the Kennedy administration reached a $432 million assistance deal with Egypt. But these steps could not totally mend the damage done to United States prestige by the events of the mid-1950s. Uneasy relations with Nasser continued, especially after he signed another arms agreement with the Soviet Union in June 1963.

The Nixon Years

The Six-Day War saw the end of any relations between Egypt and America and the beginning of new relation with Israel. President Nixon and his Secretary of State William P Rogers did place enormous priority to creating a frame work for resolving the conflict. Yet they believed that the key to stability in the region lay in an agreement between the two super powers. This was the beginning of the era of Détente\textsuperscript{10}. What was different was the fact that rather than confrontation, détente provided stability between Egypt and the

\textsuperscript{10} Détente refers to the easing of tensions or strained relations (especially between nations), as by agreement, negotiation, or tacit understandings.
United States. President Nasser had severed diplomatic ties at the role that was played by the Americans in the War of 1967. This continued as Israel occupied the whole of the Egyptian Sinai peninsula, the Golan Heights and the West Bank including Jerusalem and the Gaza strip or all that the remained of Palestine. Nasser felt that the United States had the power and the resources to stop Israel but chose not to employ them. (Wright 1986: 182). But following the October War in 1973, relations between the two states were soon rejuvenated. The United States felt the tremors of the war enough to make it reconsider its previous position of total support for Israeli policies.

The war brought forth the realization for urgently finding a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict that was now threatening the economy and the security of the world. The Arab displeasure and the oil policies tipped the scales further. The oil embargo represented the apogee of Arab solidarity. (Kamel 1986: 10). The United States was handicapped by a serious disagreement within the government on the nature of the problem. The Department of State’s perception was that the root of the entire problem in the Middle East was the Arab-Israeli conflict over territory. They felt that once this problem was resolved the region would experience peace. However, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was of the opinion that the problem had other sources namely, Israel’s conquest of the territories, Israel’s very existence, social, economic dissatisfaction among the people of the region and opposition to western influence. Solving the Arab Israeli conflict would address only the first two problems and leave the major problem of Arab radicalism as it was. He proposed to work towards a solution that could be achieved best with the help of America’s friends, the moderates. He believed that this would help check the growth of Arab radicalism that was fast spreading in the Middle East. (Kissinger 1979: 558). A year later Kissinger, Secretary of State to President Nixon, started his Shuttle Diplomacy between Egypt and Israel. The result of the diplomacy was the ‘Disengagement Agreement between Egypt and Israel (1974)’. The agreement called for

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11 Shuttle Diplomacy is most often used when the two primary parties do not formally recognize each other but want to be involved in negotiations in order to disengage opposing armies as well as to promote a lasting truce between the belligerents. A third party serves as an intermediary or mediator between the two parties, "shuttling" back and forth, between the two feuding parties. The term became widespread following Henry Kissinger's term as the 56th United States Secretary of State (1973-1977). Famously, Kissinger primarily used shuttle diplomacy to mediate conflicts in the Middle East throughout the 1970s, specifically those between Israel and Arab states following the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
Israel and Egypt to observe the cease fire on land, sea and air called by the United Nations Security Council and refrain from the time of signing the document from all para-military or military actions against each other. (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1974: Website). The agreement also called for the separation of the forces of the two nations based on certain principles agreed upon. It was the culmination of the strategy to thwart a victory of Soviet arms, to prevent the humiliation of the Arab, to convene a peace conference and to cement the ties with Egypt, which was courageously willing to show the way. (Kissinger 1982: 799). Many accounts point to the view that the agreement caused some problems for Egypt vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors and friends as it was believed that the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat had signed this agreement without consulting the other Arab nations.

Thus the relations between United States and Egypt improved to the point that President Nixon made an official trip to Cairo. The relations went a step further when Presidents Ford and Anwar Sadat developed similar ties not just at work but also personally. This was the period that Egypt along with Israel started to receive the lion’s share of worldwide American security assistance allocation of about a hundred billion dollars. (Clarke 1999: 364). This was accompanied by a great distancing of the Soviet Union from Egypt. It was in this situation that President Carter came to occupy the White House in 1976.

At the same time, in South Asia, in return for the assistance that was being provided to it, Pakistan provided America with access to its military bases, and intelligence apparatus for surveillance of the Soviet Union and China and a commitment to provide America with forward bases in case of troop movements. As ties between the two countries improved Pakistan withdrew itself from the non-alignment movement and became more supportive of the actions and decisions of the United States on the international arena. Islamabad was careful not to ruffle its relationship with the United States and withdrew its opposition to the creation of Israel and joined with the West during the 1956 Suez Canal crisis. Pakistan’s relations with the United States, that much warmth and understanding of the mutual interest of the two nations in the 1950’s and the 1960’s, suffered some setbacks during the 1970’s.
In January 1969, when Nixon became President, Ayub’s regime was crumbling in Pakistan, the substantial military and economic assistance that it was getting from the United States was also slowly being reduced. The two countries under new governments decided to reestablish the relations once again. Pakistan under its new leadership was instrumental in helping the opening of relations between United States and China. The close relation between Pakistan and China that had proved to be major sore point for Presidents Kennedy and Johnson loomed less as an obstacle to Nixon than as an opportunity. (Preston & Logevall 2008: 252). Pakistan’s friendship with Beijing was the line of communication that President Nixon employed in his two years of secret diplomacy between Washington, Islamabad and Beijing. The opening of China was an essential element of American foreign policy to leverage with Moscow for an American-Soviet détente.

However, in return for the assistance that was provided by Pakistan, United States ignored the Indian view that, the administration’s new China policy would increase hostilities in the region. Given their negative feelings about India, neither President Nixon nor Secretary of State Kissinger expressed much concern about the particular consequences of the opening with China (McMohan 2008:261). In support of the Pakistani efforts, the United States refused to join the members of the World Bank to suspend economic assistance to Pakistan in 1971 over the crisis in East Pakistan. The World Bank was of the opinion that economic assistance was serving little purpose. It was only after congressional pressure mounted on the administration that the administration announced that assistance would be held up, pending a “clarification” on the situation in East Pakistan. Although the President refused to stop economic assistance he had to eventually stop military assistance in the form of arms and ammunition.

After President Richard Nixon’s visit in 1969, the American Government had resumed selling Pakistan military equipment, a process that had been disrupted by the previous 1965 India-Pakistan War. Washington wished to avoid a second war between Pakistan and India, but also feared that Pakistan would be greatly weakened if its eastern province
seceded, and so supported Pakistan initially. However, the action against the mass protests in East Pakistan was well-publicized and widely condemned, which limited the extent to which the United States Government was willing to help the Pakistani Government prevent the division of its country. The only military support that America was able to provide was to send the Seventh Fleet to the Bay of Bengal. (Office of the Historian Department of State N.D. c: Website). This support was symbolic and was of no help to the Pakistani forces fighting the war. It needs to be pointed out that while the United States was reluctant to get involved in the crisis, as a result of its involvement in the Vietnam War; India's 'Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union' also acted as deterrence. Thus, when the crisis broke out the United States was unable, as in the 1965 war, to come to the assistance of Pakistan. Though Washington was supportive of Pakistan, it was supportive only at the diplomatic levels. These developments resulted in a decline in U.S. influence in South Asia and India's emergence as the most significant power on the subcontinent. United States' prestige was damaged in both nations, in Pakistan for failing to help prevent the loss of East Pakistan and in India for supporting the brutality of the Pakistani regime's actions in what became Bangladesh. In contrast, the Soviet relationship with India became stronger, a fact that took on greater significance with India's rise to prominence in the region. (Office of the Historian Department of State N.D.c: Website).

As the war ended in South Asia with the emergence of a new state, the region once again became an area of secondary importance to American foreign policy makers. Nixon's visit to China improved America's standing vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. However, Pakistan was not sidelined after the war. The administration resumed the less controversial of the economic assistance programs. A $30 million commodity assistance program was signed in 1972 and $60 million was approved for long term industrial raw material and development projects along with the resumption of economic assistance. (Kux 2001: 207). The Nixon years in the White House were monumental in many ways. In foreign policy they saw the development of closer United States-China relations, a war

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12 The Indo-USSR Treaty of Friendship, Peace and Cooperation was signed by India and the Soviet Union in 1971. The key articles of the treaty provided for consultation in the event of a crisis and pledged that neither country would support a third party against the other.
between India and Pakistan, the explosion of a nuclear device by India, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the American withdrawal from Vietnam.

**Second Phase: 1977 to 1986.**

President Carter came to office with comparatively little experience in global politics as compared to his predecessors. However, right from the start he had shown a clear commitment to the issues of civil rights and human dignity. Thus it came as no surprise that the Middle East and South Asia were to be of particular interest to the President. He was led both by his belief in his religious learning of the lands of the Bible as well as his belief that real peace could be achieved in the regions. Finally it was his commitment to the theme of Human Rights that entailed a genuine concern for peace in these two region. (Quandt 1986: 30).

Besides these background influences there were other influences from real politics. The 1973 Arab-Israeli war contributed enormously to the increase of oil prices all around the world which in turn had stimulated inflation and the slowing down of economic growth. President Carter was determined to avoid a similar situation from arising, if possible. He believed that a stable oil pricing required a stable Middle East, which meant defusing the Arab-Israeli conflict. This also was part of his comprehensive energy policy and his concern for energy reinforced his belief that progress had to be made (Quandt 1986: 32). However, the hallmark of the Middle East policy was the forging of the peace accord between Israel and Egypt.

The *Camp David Accords* (September 1978) signed by the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and the Israeli Prime Minister Begin lead to an Egypt-Israel peace treaty in March 1979. It contains nine articles, a military annex, an annex dealing with the relation between the parties, agreed minutes interpreting the main articles of the treaty, among them Article VI\(^1\), the withdrawal schedule, exchange of ambassadors, security

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\(^{13}\) Article VI: 1. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations. 2. The Parties undertake to fulfill in
arrangements and the agreement relating to the autonomy talks is perhaps the most important. The treaty was seen as a step forward to producing a peace formula for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One of the main points of the treaty stated "...Egypt-Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the United Nations Charter" and "...Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions ...apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors — Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon." (Bureau of International Information Programs Department of State 2007: Website). The accord was struck in lengthy negotiations that lasted some eighteen months. With these two states at peace with each other and closely tied to the United States the strategic map of the Middle East was fundamentally altered. Though the Americans are of the opinion that the accords stand out as a major achievement of the United States foreign policy, for many in the Middle East the connotations of the agreement did not hold that much positive signs. Almost all partners felt that the accords fell short for resolving the Palestinian question that is the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East.

After 1973, the United States has been able to carve out a record, as a negotiator of limited agreements in the Middle East. A classic example of this was the Shuttle Diplomacy of Henry Kissinger that led to some partial agreements. The United States has over the years acquired the reputation as the major party that could bring the Arabs and the Israelis together and also provide commitments to both sides of the conflict.

good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty. 3. They further undertake to take all the necessary measures for the application in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions to which they are parties, including the submission of appropriate notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositaries of such conventions. 4. The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict with this Treaty. 5. Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter in the event of a conflict between the obligation of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.

14 Article 33 of the United Nations Charter (Chapter VI) states: 1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. 2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.
The late seventies saw Egypt pressing America to play a more forceful role in the Middle East. The United States had by degrees progressed from being a mediator to a full time partner in the peace process. It was for this reason that Egypt concentrated on American public opinion. Sadat spent endless hours with media persons, senators and representatives. In the first three years of Sadat’s rule the United States was more occupied with its war in Vietnam. The proposal by Sadat in 1971 to open up the Suez Canal did not bring about the attention that Egypt was hoping for. The 1971 expulsion of the Soviet advisors by Egypt caught the attention of the American policy makers and it provided the catalyst for developing new relations between the two nations. The War of 1973 was able to bring to Washington’s notice the seriousness of the situation but more importantly it brought to the attention of the United States and the world the fact that the Arab world could and did act as one. They could take initiatives and cause considerable harm. For example, the use of oil as a weapon was an indicator that they could also in effect harm the American interests in the region.

Given this backdrop, the foreign assistance policy became a major pillar of the United States frame work for Middle East peace. Cooperation between the two states took the form of various arms supplies, transfer of technology, provision of military facilities and joint training and maneuvers. In 1975 Egypt decided to diversify its supplies of arms. It started with British and French weapons. The United States decided to enter the Egyptian markets very slowly and gradually. It was with the signing of the second disengagement agreement that America decided to supply Egypt with transport airplanes. Military relations developed at an unprecedented level after the visit of Sadat to Jerusalem. The cost of arms sales from the United States to Egypt jumped from $68.4 million in 1976 to $937.3 million in 1978. (Wells Jr. & Bruzonsky 1987: 79). Originally, large amounts of United States economic assistance to Egypt were proffered as part of the Camp David package in 1978, with both Egypt and Israel being guaranteed 10 years of both military and economic assistance as part of the overall United States-brokered peace agreement. (Rogin 2010 website). In 1979 Egypt was offered further military credits making the United States the major arms supplier. During 1980-84, the United States sold to Egypt nearly $6 billion in military equipment, only Saudi Arabia and Britain bought more. (The
Military relations between Egypt and America also included the licensing and co-production of arms. The two nations cooperated in the manufacturing and assembly of armored vehicles and electronic equipment. In 1981, Egypt agreed to allow the United States use of Ras Banas if an Arab state was threatened, but the negotiations to upgrade the facility collapsed in 1984 because of disagreements over managing the facility and the United States Congress’ insistence on a formal agreement. Under a reported but unconfirmed understanding, Egypt was to allow United States access to military facilities after mutual discussion and agreement in times of crisis. (Mark 2003 b: 12). Given its importance as a route for oil, shipped out of Saudi Arabia through pipelines up to the Red Sea through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean, this move was well calculated. It was also the time that the Americans collaborated in joint training of its forces with the Egyptians to practice various contingencies with regards to the deployment of troops to the Middle Eastern deserts in the event of any emergency. For Egypt, United States funds helped to subsidize its defense budget and upgrade its aging Soviet hardware. Egypt became the second-largest recipient of United States assistance after 1979. The American assistance program in Egypt also helped modernize the country’s infrastructure, as United States economic assistance was used to build Cairo’s sewer system, a telephone network, and thousands of schools and medical facilities. The United States also helped organize the peacekeeping mission along the Egyptian-Israeli border and the Multi-National Force and Observers (MFO), and still maintains a rotating infantry task force as part of it. (Sharp 2009: 43)

Meanwhile, assistance policy towards Pakistan was going through difficulties. After the Sino-India war, relations between the United States and Pakistan began to slide. The United States was in no position to increase its defense links with Pakistan, despite a so called ‘tilt’ in favor of Pakistan in the policymaking circles of the United States. The political situation, domestically, within the United States was such that it was not in a position to be able to provide any substantial support to Pakistan-its most important ally
in the region. The ‘Watergate Scandal\textsuperscript{15} was threatening to dislodge the administration of President Nixon. This crisis was coupled with the consequences of the Vietnam War. In this situation the administration did not have the time or the inclination to try to renew its relations with Pakistan.

The war with India which led to the creation of Bangladesh, the lack of United States support in the 1971 war and the coming of the People’s Party to power in Pakistan saw a further decline in relations. Subsequently, India’s testing of a nuclear device in 1974 was a jolt not just to Pakistan but also the world community. Pakistan saw the testing as a threat to its own security. Pakistan stepped up its efforts to develop nuclear capabilities. Pakistan came under vigorous scrutiny and strong pressure, as soon as it proceeded to develop its nuclear capability. Against this backdrop the United States Congress passed a condition to its Foreign Aid Appropriations Bill in 1976, called the \textit{Symington Amendment}\textsuperscript{16}, \textit{barring all economic and military assistance to any country involved in importing and exporting reprocessed or un-safeguarded enrichment plants}. (Amin: 2000: 78-79). When President Ford came to power, the Pakistani Prime Minister Mr. Bhutto undertook a visit to Washington in 1975 to try to resume economic and military assistance and arms sales to Pakistan. He pointed out the dangers that Pakistan faced as a result of a nuclear powered India. The testing of the nuclear device along with the fact that India was accruing weapons from the Soviet Union prompted President Ford to be receptive to Bhutto’s plea for the lifting of the arms embargo. However, it was made clear to Pakistan that the request should not be seen as the start of a large scale arms sales program. Nevertheless, under the arrangement Pakistan was permitted to buy such "lethal" weapons as might be approved by Washington. Thus, for the first time since 1965, when India and Pakistan had fought a war with each other, Pakistan was accorded the permission to ‘buy lethal weapons.’ But, the State Department clarified that the

\textsuperscript{15} The Watergate scandal was a political scandal in the United States in the 1970s, resulting from the break-in into the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate office complex in Washington, D.C. Effects of the scandal ultimately led to the resignation of the United States President Richard Nixon.
\textsuperscript{16} The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was amended by the Symington Amendment (Section 669 of the FAA) in 1976. It banned U.S. economic, and military assistance, and export credits to countries that deliver or receive, acquire or transfer nuclear enrichment technology when they do not comply with IAEA regulations and inspections. This provision, as amended, is now contained in Section 101 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).
decision to buy arms should not be deemed as a major step signalling a renewed American strategic interest in Pakistan.

When President Carter took charge of the office, America had become wary of overseas involvement of its defense personals. The emphasis was on the restructuring of American policies domestically rather than at the international level. The emphasis was on lessening military assistance and sale and increasing economic cooperation. Within a few months of the new Administration assuming charge, the president signed a *Presidential Directive No. 13 (PD-13)* imposing a new set of regulations on the export of American arms. The directive stated that, the United States "...restrain the transfer of conventional arms by recognizing that arms transfer are an exceptional foreign policy implement, to be used only in instances where it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfer contributes to our (American) national interest." (The White House 1977: Website). Under the new directive Pakistan was unable to get any relief or any arms.

The significance that was given to the issue of Human Rights was another road block in the relations between United States and Pakistan. The administration as indeed President Carter are best remembered for the importance that was accorded to the issue of basic Human Rights. The Arab Israeli peace accords were to be the other corner stone issue that would define the Carter Presidency. It was also felt during this period that the Soviet Union was exerting more and more pressure on the pro west regimes in the Middle East. The position was that whatever little role Pakistan could play to safeguard American interests could be better done by the states of the region itself, thus Pakistan’s importance vis-à-vis the Middle East also diminished for the United States. Earlier in 1970, an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 had been made tying United States assistance to the incidence of political prisoners in potential recipient nations. By 1976, two more crucial amendments were made and one such amendment of section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act barred economic assistance to nations violating human rights. With its dismal Human Rights record and the over throw of the democratically elected government, Pakistan was denied assistance by the United States and once again the
relations between the two became strained. The American perception was Pakistan did not have a strategic role to play at that moment.

The Iranian revolution of 1976 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 again brought renewed interest within the United States for deepening United States Pakistan relations. Pakistan became a key geo-strategic player as it was the only state that could block the Soviet Union reaching the Persian Gulf. With a military ruler, General Zia Ul Haq in power, Pakistan was elevated to a frontline state and critical ally to serve the United States aims in the region. Pakistan served the American aims and played a key role in the fight in Afghanistan. (Gilani 2008: Website)

**Third Phase: Eighties - Change and Continuity**

By the time President Regan came into office the policy implications of a dramatically different view became clear. President Ronald Regan’s policy agenda was to have a profound impact on the consequences of the Arab-Israeli processes of normalization of relations and on Pakistani and South Asian regional politics. Other developments namely the Iran hostage crisis and the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the attack on Lebanon by Israel, trading arms for hostages and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan all brought about changes in the American view of the situation in the region. When Regan became President in the United States, Israel and Egypt were well on their way to making peace due to the Camp David accords. The Regan administration approached the Middle Eastern region in a more tough-minded manner than the Carter administration. (Quandt 2004). The Cold War atmosphere was ‘regenerated’ by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The invasion paved the way for a new era of East-West distrust that was reduced to some extent by the détente between the Soviets and the Americans. The efforts to ‘contain’ Moscow’s ambitions were revived and the new administration in America started to build a ‘strategic consensus’ around Egypt, Israel Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. (Fraser 1995: 127). By the time Anwar Sadat was assassinated in 1981 Egypt was the main ally and an investment of America in the Arab world, evident in the two billion dollar annual assistance that was given to it. The level of trust was reflected in the
joint American -Egyptian military maneuvers and the fact that American planes had been
given permission to refuel in Egypt en- route to the (aborted) rescue mission of the
American hostages in Iran. (Mark 2004: 185). In addition to this the Foreign Military
Finance provided to Egypt during the eighties was used to produce, in cooperation with
America, tanks for the defense of Egypt. Along with this the United States also provided
nearly five billion dollars in military loans and thirteen billion dollars in military grants
and twenty million dollars in international military education to Egypt over a period of
fifteen years. (Mark 2003: 10).

As mentioned earlier, two events in 1979, the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan, renewed American interest in improving the United States-Pakistan
relationship. With the overthrow of the Shah in Iran the United States lost one of the
‘twin pillars’ of American security policy in the vital Persian Gulf region and
demonstrated the political fragility of ‘one man, no vote’ regional allies. President Nixon
had developed the initial United States Persian Gulf policy, to fill the void in Western
participation, by establishing Iran and Saudi Arabia, the "twin pillars", as American
surrogates for the region. The worrying Soviet-sponsored military buildup in Syria and
the sobering American experience in Lebanon drove home the need for closer American
military coordination in the region; it became obvious that it could not solely rely on its
allies in the region. There was also the threat that the Soviet Union would make use of
this anti America feeling to influence and establish itself in the Middle East. With the fall
of the Shah, the United States had no other option but to look at Pakistan as a partner that
could look after its interest. It also helped matters that Pakistan was a Muslim nation. The
hostage crisis showed the weakness of the American position in the region and
Washington embarked on a campaign to seek the assistance of friendly nations in the
region to bolster American prestige and military strength. As a result of the hostage crisis
America had to withdraw its staff from the embassies in the region. In such a situation the
bulk of its operations were carried out from the premises of friendly nations, one of them
being Pakistan which had a presence in most nations of the region. In this effort
Pakistan's influence in the Muslim nations of the Gulf was not lost on the United States.
With the Soviet in Afghanistan, Pakistan suddenly became a key geo-strategic player as it
served as a buffer between the USSR and the Persian Gulf. For America Pakistan could help its interest not just in South Asia by halting the progress of the Soviet Union towards the Arabian Sea, but could also help its reach for the oil rich fields of the Middle East.

One needs to point out here that while it is true that the strategic importance of Pakistan increased tremendously during this period the strategic perception of Pakistan did not. The United States was still wary of its Human Rights records, its procurement of weapons from other countries and the civil unrest in the country. However, in the international arena it was going to face the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and Middle East in what has been termed the 'New Cold War'. It was trying to continue its policy of détente. Nonetheless, the American public opinion was against the involvement of American troops in foreign countries, 'the Vietnam war syndrome' meant that while America could support the war in Afghanistan it had to find outside soldiers. It was in this context that Pakistan became important to the United States. Having lost some of its influence in the Middle East the United States had to aggressively counter the Afghan threat. Thus, alongside the increasingly assertive Soviet foreign policy and the turmoil in Iran, Pakistan by 1979 gained more attention than it had in the 1960s and larger part of the 1970s. In fact with each alleged Soviet role in Africa and the Middle East, there was a revival of American interest in Pakistan.

The crisis on the other hand provided Pakistan with the unique opportunity to reject the overtone of the 'Super power' and assert itself. After years of benign neglect Pakistan’s security once again became a vital concern. It took ample advantage of the American fears and got in return a number of concessions in the form of aid and assistance. President Zia's international standing greatly rose after his declaration to fight the Soviet invaders, as he went from being portrayed as just another military dictator to a champion of the free world by the Western media. His government exploited Pakistan’s geopolitical situation and decided that it was in Pakistan’s interest to gain benefit from the Afghan crisis. He was quoted as saying that he viewed the invasion as a direct threat to the security of Pakistan and others in the region and as a part of a grand Soviet design to establish hegemony of South Asia. (Hilani 2005: 114-115). Indeed, Pakistan-United
States relations took a much more positive turn. President Zia expressed the hope that the assistance that the Americans would provide would not be restrictive or dependent on the fulfilment of some conditions. President Carter approved $400 million to Pakistan in assistance and established the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force to enhance United States military posture in the region. Carter also signed the funding, in 1980, that allowed upto $50 million a year to go to the Mujahideen. Yet Pakistan did not rush to welcome American assistance and its apparent reluctance to stand up to the Soviets was revealed by Zia’s statement that, “you can not live in the sea and create enmity with the whales...you have to be friendly with them.” Pakistan insisted that this assistance needed to be accompanied by some economic assistance as well. Zia dismissed the assistance offer as ‘peanuts’ and pointed out that prior United States commitments had not been reliable. President Carter and his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, cut off assistance to Pakistan on the grounds that Pakistan had not made sufficient progress on the nuclear issue. Pakistan now sought a formal treaty of alliance and American refusal to go beyond the 1959 Defence Agreement reinforced United States unreliability for Pakistan. Despite such reservations Pakistan did support the war efforts. Its tactics bore fruit with the Regan administration providing it with a $3.2 billion defence package, 40 F-16 aircrafts. (Jervis & Synder 1991: 68). The administration was also willing to overlook earlier concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and Human Rights practices.

In retrospect, the period from 1979 to 1988 was a golden period in United States-Pakistan relations. It is not a surprise then that the American perspective of Pakistan began to take on a new meaning. Warren Christopher, the United States Deputy Secretary of State, after a visit to India and Pakistan in 1979, told the House Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee that the United States perception of South Asia was changing. He further added that Washington could not make the "South Asia policy in a vacuum" and that the United States would have to consider the import of events in other areas as well while framing its policy towards Pakistan. Unfortunately, both the governments remained focused on narrow national interests relevant to their own security issues. Indeed, the American interest focused almost entirely on unrestricted support to the Afghan jihad. Although successful, it accomplished only a relatively short-term and limited strategic
aim, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The interests of Pakistan were also myopic, characterized by limited modernization of the armed forces and United States political support for the Pakistani military government. No worthwhile long-term economic policy was pursued, nor was any major economic infrastructure developed. Overall, positive United States-Pakistan ties of the 1980s were shaped by military interactions. However, they did not include any projects designed to serve the long-term interests of either country.

Although it forced the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, the war effort also produced many negative consequences in the region. An immediate effect of the US policy was a sharp rise in the number of madrassas (religious seminaries) in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). These madrassas were configured to indoctrinate young Muslim students from Afghanistan, Pakistan's tribal areas, and some Arab countries. The students were also given military training and were recruited in Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. The indirect effects of US policies in Pakistan in the 1980s included the spread of what has been called the "Kalashnikov culture." Thus, the United States indirectly supported many of the less desirable policies of the Zia regime: suppressing freedom of the press; a rise in ethnicity and sectarianism; and the deterioration of Pakistani domestic institutions. Overall, the joint policies of the American and Pakistan governments, with active support from some Arab countries, resulted in the militarization of a number of the Muslim youth, with far-reaching consequences related to the growth of terrorism. (Gilani 2006).

Thus it is very evident that for America the Middle East and South Asia are not just strategic locations, they are regions where the United States perceives a need to protect its vital interests. Whether it is couched in terms of promotion of democracy in the region or promoting its oil interests, or fighting the Soviet Union, it has relied on its assistance to bolster its policies that became evident in the 1980's and 1990's. In fact several analysts have pointed out the politics of oil to reflect one of the critical concerns of the United States in the region.
Significantly the end of the eighties then utilized Secretary of Defence Alexander Haig's Strategic Cooperation Concept that attempted to induce an anti Soviet 'strategic consensus' with both Egypt and Pakistan as a major focus of American foreign policy in the Middle East and South Asia. Starting from an assumption of overriding concern among the key countries about the Soviet Union threat, the promoters of this concept sought to utilize that concern as a lever to mobilize those countries in to a defense framework to counter the threats. Such an alignment they believed would make it possible for the countries of the area to transcend other disputes among themselves (Sarfan 1985: 328). Further, American perceptions about the rise of radical Islamic movements, whose primary target has been the United States –its citizens and property, has propelled the continuation of the policy of working with the countries of the Middle East to South Asia, especially Egypt and Pakistan, to fight against the threat that these organizations represent. The two nations are viewed by the United States as moderate Islamic nations that have been American allies for a number of years. The United States perceives that peace in the troubled regions of Middle East and South Asia is pivotal to the American national security, and these two countries have a vital role to play in any American strategy. The United States has paid particular attention to Egypt and Pakistan, as allies and friends that require American assistance so as to enable them, to provide modern leadership away from radical religious politics to democracy. Foreign assistance to Egypt and Pakistan was and continues to be an important constituent of the overall American foreign policy.

The above discussion has basically focused on the external context of United States policy towards Egypt and Pakistan. However, it is also pertinent to include the domestic context of the policy vicissitudes in order to fully comprehend the probable determinants and drivers of United States policy of assistance.

**Internal Divisions Affecting American Policy**

It has been noted that in essence the decision to give a particular type of assistance to the countries of the Middle East and South Asia, particularly Egypt and Pakistan includes the
following: firstly, it involves the global approach which would basically include the impact of a decision on the global scale. Secondly, it involves the regional approach where in the impact of the decision on the other nations of the region is involved and finally the actual area in conflict approach where in the impact of a decision on the people who are living in the conflict zone is to be considered. As scholars have pointed out, all three approaches are aimed at producing results that are peaceful and agreeable to all. (Zunes 2009: website).

An important pillar of the bilateral relationship between United States and Egypt remains American security and economic assistance to Egypt, which expanded significantly in the wake of the Peace Treaty in 1979. United States policy toward Egypt is aimed at maintaining regional stability, improving bilateral relations, continuing military cooperation, and sustaining the March 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Successive Administrations have long viewed Egypt as a moderating influence in the Middle East. At the same time, in recent years, there have been increasing United States calls for Egypt to democratize. Congressional views of United States-Egyptian relations vary. Many lawmakers view Egypt as a stabilizing force in the region, but some members would like the United States to pressure Egypt to implement political reforms, improve human rights, and take a more active role in reducing Arab-Israeli tensions. (Sharp 2009: 1). The United States has provided Egypt with an annual average of over $2 billion in economic and military foreign assistance since 1979. P.L. 111-8, the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, provides $200 million in Economic Support Fund (ESF) assistance and $1.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assistance to Egypt. (Sharp 2009: 1). Recently, President Obama’s decision to address the concerns of the Muslim world vis a vis American concerns against the rise of fundamentalism from Cairo was significant. Egyptians felt that America had shown respect to their country as commensurate with its perceived stature in the Arab world.

Similarly a stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan is considered vital to United States interests. United States concerns regarding Pakistan include regional and global terrorism; Afghan stability; democratization and human rights protection; the ongoing
Kashmir problem and Pakistan-India tensions; and economic development. The relationship is marked by periods of both cooperation and discord (Kronstadt 2007: website). A stable Pakistan would serve the long-term interests of both countries as well as larger American objectives in South Asia, which include minimizing the risks of another Indo-Pakistani war in order to preserve a stable, lasting balance of power in Asia. Although Pakistan is currently central to the global war on terrorism, Washington will have difficulty building a long-term relationship with Islamabad if it does not address the latter’s core concerns about security, particularly its external security. China’s geopolitical ambitions and growing military capabilities and the Southeast Asian states’ perceptions of a rising China will play a crucial role in shaping the future of Southeast Asia and the United States military posture in the region.

The Obama Administration states an intention to continue pursuing close and mutually beneficial relations with Islamabad. As part of its “new strategy” for Afghanistan, the Administration seeks development of a “more coherent” Pakistan policy to include conditioning United States military assistance to Islamabad on that government’s progress in combating militancy and also tripling nonmilitary assistance to improve the lives of the Pakistani people. A Special Representative was appointed to coordinate U.S. government efforts with both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan is among the world’s leading recipients of United States assistance, obtaining more than $5.3 billion in overt assistance since 2001, including about $3.1 billion in development and humanitarian assistance. Pakistan also has received about $6.7 billion in military reimbursements for its support of counterterrorism efforts. (Kronstadt 2009 b: 1).

The importance of policies that are made by the institutions that contextualize assistance to these two countries is thus highly relevant to the understanding of its eventual application. In doing so, it may be possible to understand the agenda and look at the actual policy goals of American assistance policy towards the Middle East and South Asia. Of these institutions, the United States Congress is by far the most significant one apart from the Presidency. It not only has the constitutional mandate as a equal partner in government; it has expanded its power through practice as well. In particular, the
Congressional role in the United States assistance policy towards Egypt and Pakistan has been salient and noteworthy. It has changed, amended and shaped in no uncertain manners. For instance, the Congress can not make policy decisions on American position on the various issues like future borders between Pakistan and India or the best approach to negotiating a treaty between Egypt and Israel. These continue to remain the prerogatives of the executive but the instrument of the implementation of any policy remains with the Congress because of its control over the budget. The Congress has to approve of the assistance that is being given to both Egypt and Pakistan. The Congress can review major economic assistance packages, arms sales deals, military assistance and humanitarian assistance programs and can also block the same through legislative actions. Apart from this, the Congress plays an important role in influencing public opinion. Leading Congressmen can attract attention to a particular policy through speeches, debates, news articles and press conferences. (Quandt 1986: 07).

According to some, the priority that is given to foreign assistance policy by any administration in the United States depends on the amount of attention that is being given to the matter by the President and his key advisors. If the issue is of low priority then the attention given to it has to be minimal and it is then that the influence of the bureaucracy, the Congress and the interest groups will increase. When the issue is important to the President, the interest groups and agencies will have less access to the policy processes unless the administration wishes to make use of certain agencies or to have the reaction of specific groups for its own purposes. A specific group may also have more access to a particular administration. However, one has to understand that not all public activity by an interest group necessarily turns in to influence. For example the Pakistani lobby was unable to stop the successful lobbying by the United States Indian Political Affairs Committee for an amendment to the House’s three billion dollar assistance package to Pakistan.

In sum, the critical factors that determine the content of the American policy are: the basic assumptions of the President, the individuals on whom he relies for advice and the resulting decision making system which converts ideas into policies. Indeed some argue,
all Presidents enter the White House with specific assumptions, while they are influence by the outside forces be they interest groups, bureaucracy, events or crisis, the end decision is a result of careful understanding of what is in the best interest of America. Once decisions have been arrived at this level, the Congress steps in and gives the policy its final shape. Of course, it should be noted that while implementing, it is again the executive that uses its interpretations of the policy mandate.

**Hypothesis**

The hypotheses that would be examined during the course of this thesis, are

1. United States foreign assistance is an essential instrument of United States foreign policy and it is the subject of extensive congressional debate and legislative initiatives. Since the end of the Cold War, significant changes were made in the size, composition, and purpose of the programs.

2. Foreign assistance is one of America's most flexible tools of foreign policy — it can act as both carrot and stick, and is a means of influencing events, solving problems, and projecting American values.

3. The proclaimed goals of United States through its foreign military assistance program are to promote peace and stability in Egypt and Pakistan and not contribute to an arms race.

4. In the post 9/11 period, the Congress has become more assertive in foreign policy especially with regard to providing United States foreign assistance being given to Egypt and Pakistan. Foreign assistance policy has also been transformed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 especially in the case of Egypt and Pakistan.

5. Foreign military assistance provides an indirect boost to the American economy as it mandates the purchase of American goods and services, thus making it a stakeholder in the continuation of the program.

6. Both the Clinton Presidency and the George W Bush Presidency have used foreign assistance policy differently, but both have failed to achieve their respective goals of helping democracy and controlling terrorism respectively. The United States assistance to
Egypt and Pakistan is focused, to a large degree, in sustaining the spread of peace and check the spread of radical Islamic ideas in the two countries.

**Literature Review**

The purpose of foreign policy is first and foremost to safeguard the security of a country. Concessional flow of assistance has proved to be a supple and flexible instrument of foreign policy whose application equals the number of donors and recipients in the international system. For the United States, foreign assistance has emerged as a central component of its policy relations with other countries. The history of United States foreign assistance programs reveals that it was an attempt to promote economic stability as with the Marshall Plan and then used as a means to contain communism. Vernon W. Ruttan (1996) in his book *United States Development Assistance Policy: The Domestic Politics of Foreign Economic Aid*, offers a comprehensive review of United States development assistance policy from the end of World War II to the present. His emphasis is on the structures and programs that have proliferated over the past fifty years designed to provide underdeveloped countries with technical and economic assistance. His book follows the development of the United States Agency for International Development, quasi-governmental agencies, and private voluntary organizations. He has gone on to examine United States policy toward the World Bank, United Nations agencies, and other international development assistance organizations that provide assistance. He also scrutinizes the domestic political forces that have directed United States development assistance policies, which help to show how political interests often detrimentally, influenced development efforts. The *Congressional Research Service Report* (2004) titled *Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of US Programs and Policy*, by Curt Tarnoff and Larry Nowels provides a complete view of the United States foreign assistance program, by addressing a number of the more frequently asked questions regarding the subject. The report provides an overview of why foreign assistance has continued to be such an important constituent of United States foreign policy despite the various changes that have taken place in the international arena.
The Cold War gave the United State a framework within which it could formulate its policies. However, that framework is no longer available. Unlike the Cold war, in the post Cold War world the threats to American security do not emanate from one source namely the Soviet Union. The Pivotal States: A Framework for US Policy in the developing World, editors Robert Chase and others (1999) have identified eight states that are pivotal to United States foreign policy, Egypt and Pakistan being two of these. These states would be decisive for the fate of their respective regions, due to their economic growth, military ambitions, growing population etc. These countries would rank highly in the American planners and policymakers views. The Congressional Research Service Report by Jeremy Sharp (2009) titled U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2011 Request is an overview of the United States foreign assistance policy towards the broader Middle Eastern region and not just Egypt. The report is a comprehensive view of the overall United States interest in the region and the reasons for the importance that is accorded to Egypt in United States foreign policy making. It includes a brief history of assistance to the region, a review of foreign assistance levels, a description of selected country programs, and an analysis of current foreign assistance issues. The region of South Asia is also of great interest to the United States and has figured prominently in its foreign policy decision making. The relations between India and Pakistan, the border dispute and the prominence of China along with the knowledge that all three states have nuclear weapons capabilities, and growing economies has meant that South Asia has commanded a great attention from America. A report by the Comptroller General of the United State to the Congress (1976) titled, US Assistance to Pakistan should be Reassessed, discusses problems impeding the economic development of Pakistan and efforts of the United States and Pakistan to remedy these problems. It called for a reassessment of the bilateral assistance program to help Pakistan over the longer term. The United States and Asia: Towards a New US Strategy and Force Posture by Zalmay Khalilzad and others (2003) is an overview of the challenges that the United States faces in the region and how best it can deal with them. It summarizes how the United States can best meet these challenges and maintain peace and stability in the region, thus achieving it long term strategic goals of preventing the rise of instability in the region. The United States
has a profound interest in seeing that events in Asia continue down the path of economic development, democratization, and regional peace. It is the view of the authors that United States policy toward Pakistan should seek to address numerous problems. First, Pakistan should be assisted in developing its economy as well as encouraged to reform the economy structurally. Second, Pakistan should be encouraged to cease its support of terrorists operating in South Asia and beyond and lastly Pakistan should also confront its deep crisis of governance.

A primary United States interest in continued good relations with Egypt is to capitalize on Egypt’s historic leadership role in the Arab world. The United States provides Egypt with foreign assistance, assistance for economic development, and military assistance along with participating in joint military exercises, and including Egypt among its advisors and confidants on Middle Eastern affairs. William B. Quandt (1990), in his book looks at the various aspects of this relation in his book The United States and Egypt. It provides a broad view of the security military and economic issues that have become integral to the relationship. While viewing the structure of the relationship the author has stated that there are two aspects to the relationship, one being the asymmetry in power between the two where by it is and never was a relationship between equals. The second aspect is the unique feature of the relationship. Israel is an important part of the relationship. Thus while it is a bilateral relation, one can not ignore the third party which lies in the shadows.

The Congressional Issue brief (June 2005) by Jeremy Sharp titled ‘Egypt-US Relations’, states that United States-Egyptian relations are aimed at maintaining regional stability, improving bilateral relations, continuing military cooperation, and sustaining the March 1979 Egyptian- Israeli peace treaty. Experience gained from Egyptian-United States joint military exercises proved valuable in easing coordination during the February 1991 Desert Storm operation to reverse Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. United States policy makers see Egypt as a leader and moderating influence among many Arab, African, Islamic, and Third World States. However, over the past few years, problems have emerged in the relationship. US Congress, House Committee on International Relations
Report (2004) titled 'A Hearing: US Economic Assistance to Egypt: Does it Advance Reform?', points out that Egypt has since 1991, not been very supportive of United States policies in the region, by not endorsing them in the region. The United States Congress has been concerned about the emergency rule in Egypt under which the military court holds trial of civilians, the need of an effective opposition, the "demented" growth of political parties due to the lack of support of the ruling regime and the need for better Human Rights practices. According to State Department human rights reports, there is "convincing evidence" that the Egyptian police use torture to extract confessions, and detain suspects without charge or trial. Freedom of assembly has been constricted because the government fears violence associated with some public demonstrations. Such reports have made the Congress address the issue of continuingly supporting a regime that is counter to the American views of protection of the rights of the people. A United States Government Accountability Office report (April 2006) for the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, titled, Security Assistance: State and DOD need to assess how the Foreign Military Financing Program for Egypt achieves US Foreign Policy and Security Goals, states that the United States government has since 1979 provided Egypt with more than $60 billion in military and economic assistance and it is currently among the largest recipient of United States assistance worldwide, along with Israel, Afghanistan and Iraq. The report states that while officials and experts assert that the programs yield benefit for United States foreign policy and security goals, neither the Department of State nor the Department of Defense assess how the programs specifically contribute to these goals. To help the Congress assess the balance of the economic and military assistance to Egypt the report makes certain recommendations on how to assess the impact of the appropriation on Egypt. It asked for the United States to define its specific goals and objectives.

Ties between the US and Pakistan over the past quarter century have alternated between close partnership and breakdown. Adversity pulled the two countries together, but when common threats receded, divergent national interests pulled them apart. In making their efforts to oust Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the US and Pakistan understood that they were doing themselves, as well as each other, a favor. In their perception, the Soviet
presence constituted a grave threat to Pakistan’s well being, regional stability, and to US national security. The same calculations are now perhaps being applied in dealing with the likes of Al Qaeda. Discussing the historical relations between the two nations, Dennis Kux (2001 a), a former ambassador, writes in detail about Pakistan from the moment of its independence in 1947 to its emergence as a nuclear power in 1998. He has systematically chronicled the major events, the primary issues, and the key political and diplomatic figures that have influenced the decision-making processes of the two countries. He has focused primarily on the formal diplomacy that exists between these two countries. United States-Pakistan relations have been extraordinarily volatile, largely a function of the twists and turns of the Cold War. An intimate partnership prevailed in the Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan years, and friction during the Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter presidencies. Shahid M Amin (2000) who served in the Pakistan Foreign Services and had also served in New Delhi, has analyzed the formulation of Pakistan’s foreign policy from the time of independence to the current situation in which the country faces itself in his book Pakistan’s Foreign Policy A Reappraisal. The book is an insight in to the Pakistan foreign policy decision making process, its success and failures. His is a insight in to merits and demerits of the foreign policy of Pakistan. Apart from the history, ideology and Pakistan’s geographical location that have had a profound impact on its foreign policy, he has looked at the relations that Pakistan has shared with two of its most important partners- the United States and China along with its relations with Afghanistan and India. He has looked at the successes of Pakistan’s foreign policy to promote its strategic interests by devising policies based on realpolitik. And the main weakness of its formulation has been the tendency to take decisions to tide over an immediate exigency without any long term planning. In another of his works Dennis Kux (2001 b) has highlighted the reasons that trace why Pakistan has failed to achieve political stability, sustained economic growth or a clear sense of national identity and describes the evolution of its foreign and security policies. He assesses the relationship that has developed between the United States and Pakistan over the years, and the reasons for the relations to continue to develop. A leading expert on South Asia, Steven Cohen (2005) brings to light the complex history of Pakistan. It is a comprehensive view of the various aspects that contribute to making Pakistan. It looks at the crossroads that Pakistan finds
itself vis a vis the army, the political parties and the importance of religion for the people. It is in this context that America has to formulate its policies. The analysis of this book suggests that America can not afford to ignore Pakistan for the long term without facing grave consequences. As stated in the Congressional Researcher Service’s issue brief by K. Alan Kronstadt (2009 a) titled ‘Pakistan-US Relations’, the Congress and the administration are concerned about the state of democracy in Pakistan as well as the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the terrorism. The violation of ‘Human Rights’ has also become an area of concern along with the status of women and children in the country. The Administration seeks development of a “more coherent” Pakistan policy to include conditioning United States military assistance to Islamabad on that government’s progress in combating militancy and also tripling nonmilitary assistance to improve the lives of the Pakistani people. A Special Representative was appointed to coordinate U.S. government efforts with both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

A report of the Post –Conflict Reconstruction Project by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, titled A Perilous Course: US Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan by Craig Cohen (2007), draws attention to the influence of United States foreign assistance to Pakistan as money has been the critical component of the relationship between the two countries. The report highlights that despite billions of dollars being spent in assistance by America to Pakistan the relationship is based on distrust, dissatisfaction and unrealistic expectations. The report looks at the sources of foreign assistance to Pakistan since 9/11 and indicates the American strategy based on this money trail. In his discussion paper for the International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University titled US Aid to Pakistan: US Taxpayers have Funded Pakistani Corruption, Azeem Ibrahim (2009) states that, the United States has always provided Pakistan with significant amount of assistance, however, what has been lacking is a system of supervision and oversight which has led to the assistance now being able to achieve the aims it was approved for.

Since the Cold War ended, the partnership has shriveled. The blunt message delivered by President Clinton to Pakistan’s military dictator during the President’s 2000, stopover in
Pakistan highlighted United States-Pakistan differences. Shuja Nawaz (2008) has made this point very clearly in his book *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, It's Army, and the Wars Within* which is a study of the role of the military in Pakistan. To understand Pakistan one has to understand the army that plays a very important role in the political system of the country. It provides insight into the country's most powerful institution and is key to understanding the underlying power structures of Pakistan as it struggles to find its place in the new world. It looks at Pakistan army and the relations that it has with the civilian governments and probes the reasons for the military taking over civilian administrative powers time and again. He has investigated the turmoil that Pakistan faces from within her own borders. He has looked at the role of the United States along with other nations towards the Pakistan military and the reasons for the non development of a vibrant democracy in Pakistan.

Foreign policy of any country focuses on the behavior of states in the international arena. The state is the primary actor in the making of foreign policy in America. However, the state is influenced by a variety of factors. The legislative along with the executive plays a very important role in the formulation of any policy. William O. Chittick (2006) provides such an analysis in his book, *American Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis*. It is a comprehensive study of the foreign policy making apparatus of the United States. It notes not just the history of American foreign policy but also the role played by the actors inside and outside of the government. The dynamic of decision making and the impact of both domestic and international factors on the policy making processes have also been analyzed by Steven Hook (2005) in *US Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power*. It incorporates the questions regarding the role of the United States in a world post the terror attacks of September 2001 in the context of the security and stability. He provides a balanced view of the American foreign policy making in the new post 9/11 context.

Since the election of President Clinton, Congress in reaction to executive assertiveness and as part of its struggle with the president has employed a variety of techniques to assert its influence. As Robert Gilmour and Alexis Halley (1994) note in the conclusion of their book "Congressional intervention in an area traditionally regarded as the
prerogative of the executive branch: policy and program development and implementation;” has seen the Congress ascendant. They have suggested a new theory of congressional-executive relations. They argue that Congress cannot be dismissed by the administration as a mere troublesome meddler in agency programs or as an inattentive bystander in its oversight role. The editors draw from these case histories the surprising conclusion that Congress in fact acts regularly, with the executive branch, as a powerful "co-manager" of policy outlines and program details.

The central yet complex issue of assistance effectiveness and its constraints has been analyzed with a view towards the future of foreign assistance and assistance programs. Roger C Riddell (1995) has reviewed the ethical foundations of development assistance. He has asked certain very valid questions with regard to foreign assistance such as: Should assistance be given to poor countries because it is right to do so? Or should assistance be ended because it keeps people from helping themselves and interferes with the economic forces that shape true development? He has tried to examine ways in which the impact of assistance might be enhanced, improved and increased to make a greater difference. The decades of strategic competition has had a dramatic effect on the national security spending of the United States. Michael Hanlon (1997) looks at the role that the United States has played in the arena of foreign assistance now that a number of countries have moved away from the list of foreign assistance recipients and foreign investments are slowly becoming far greater than the official assistance figures. However, there is a need to transform foreign assistance to adapt it to the changing world. It has proved to be an effective tool of foreign policy for the United States, but now the circumstances have changed and the United States needs to change with the circumstances. Carol Lancaster (2000), points out that foreign assistance as a tool of foreign policy has survived the Cold War, the reason for its birth, to continue to serve American interests. However the author points out that there is a need to change and transform foreign assistance. She has stated that purpose of foreign assistance has to be refocused and management brought into line with the new focus that provides for humanitarian emergencies and human concerns. She emphasizes the purpose of doing so for promoting both United States interest and values abroad. The question arises- can United States foreign assistance influence international
affairs enough to reduce the likelihood of war? In its study titled ‘Enhancing US Security through Foreign Aid’, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) examines one dimension of this question. It asks which increases in the United States foreign assistance budget—if combined with similar steps by other countries—might promote United States security interests by fostering stability abroad. The study points out that despite popular perceptions United States foreign assistance still forms a very small part of the overall United States budget. It puts forward a very convincing case for enhancing assistance programs for the future of United States security threats that may emerge from conflict ridden regions and unstable nuclear armed states. Carl Brown (2004) has looked at the diplomatic and foreign policy relations of the United States with countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Sudan and Saudi Arabia. The work also explores the role that the United States played in the region. He has searched for the common themes and disparities in Middle Eastern politics and the politics of the United States. It is an important work with respect to the understanding the diplomacy, politics and international relations of the countries that comprise the Middle East and the United States.

Research Methodology

The present study has used the Case Study method of research. Case study method emphasizes detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions and their relationships. Researchers have used the case study method for many years across a variety of disciplines. Social scientists, in particular, have made wide use of this qualitative research method to examine contemporary real-life situations. Case study research means a study of a single (a case study of a particular organization) or multiple case studies. In this thesis, the case studies are of Egypt and Pakistan. Analytical and deductive reasoning have been attempted to examine the data and draw reasonable inferences on the policy outcomes.

Both Egypt and Pakistan have been allies of the United States for a number of years. America and Egypt enjoy a strong and friendly relationship based on shared mutual interest in Middle East peace and stability, revitalizing the Egyptian economy and
strengthening trade relations, and promoting security. Over the years, Egypt and the United States have worked together to expand the Middle East and North Africa Economic (MENA) Conference. Multinational exercises, United States assistance to Egypt's military modernization program, and Egypt's role as a contributor to various United Nation peacekeeping operations continually reinforce the US-Egyptian military relationship. The United States- Pakistan relationship got a boost when Pakistan joined the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1955 and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1956. Pakistan also played a pivotal role in bridging the gap between the US and China. A main pillar of the relationship was and continues to remain the military cooperation between the two countries, which blossomed through an active training exchange program and the fielding of United States weapons and equipment within the Pakistan military.

Both these countries have a history of the military coming to power. Egypt has been under a military dictatorship since 1952 when the military seized power through a coup, while in Pakistan, the military has played an important role in mainstream political activities of the country with military presidents ruling the country from 1958–71, 1977–88 and from 1999-2007. Military regimes mean that the US can bargain better to its advantage, as there is little chance of a democratically-able populace rejecting its advances. Also, small gestures, such as holding elections as in Egypt in 2005 and Pakistan in 2004, talks with neighbors keep the United States and its other allies in high spirits for the future. Perhaps, for America the most important factor of the relation with these countries has been their strategic importance to American security. Stability has emerged the most important factor for the United States. With its war in Iraq and Afghanistan, Egypt and Pakistan are bound to play an important role in the future.

The two nations are also viewed by the United States as being moderate Islamic nations. Egypt and Pakistan, in turn, see the United States as a benefactor, especially in terms of aid and military technology, and would not jeopardize their relations with either the United States or their neighbors as the benefits far outweigh the rest. This is a condition that the United States feels it can exploit to stop the spread of radical/fundamentalist
ideas which is harmful to its security, both internal (after 11 September 2001) and external.

Based on the above points of comparison this study has depended extensively on both primary and secondary sources for analytical data. Books, relevant articles in journals, documents and reports have been used to both analyze and explain the data collected and their correlation with the decisions made with reference to the topic. Relevant primary sources such as Congressional publications such as Committee Reports, Hearings, Issue Briefs and other relevant documents have been consulted. Other Government publications and Presidential documents pertinent to the theme have also been utilized. Source material that is available on the internet, in the form of governmental documents as well as those in the form of newspaper articles has also been used.