CHAPTER II

TARABAI – SHAHU RELATIONS
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Creation of Kolhapur gaadi did not mark an end to the conflict between Tarabai and Shahu. Tarabai’s initial policy of hostility towards Shahu was continued. Tarabai and Chandrasen Jadhav created critical position for Shahu. But Shahu, with the help of Balaji Vishwanath emerged as powerful Chhatrapati of the Marathas. In the beginning of the year 1711 Tarabai attempted to depose Shahu through Keso Trimal. In her letter of 27 February 1711 she wrote to Ramchandrapant Amatya that through Kesho Trimal she had asked Hindurao Girjoji Yadav to join her faction. She had also offered Peshwaship to Nilopant, grandson of Keso Trimal, in the same letter. She asked her sardars to take forts and territory, which were in Shahu’s possession. In return she offered the title of Vakanisi and some money.¹

CONFLICT BETWEEN BALAJI AND CHANDRASEN:

Chandrasen was very jealous of Balaji Vishwanath. He was waiting for an opportunity to desert Shahu. He had made a coup for it. Till the end of 1710 the conspirators were doing their work secretly but in 1711 they got an opportunity after the quarrel between Balaji and Chandrasen. The contest between Shahu and Tarabai was further intensified due to personal enmity between Chandrasen and Balaji.

The conflict between Chandrasen and Balaji came into the open in the summer of 1711. On October 11, 1711, the deer incident opened fresh hostility between Chandrasen and Balaji.² Balaji and Chandrasen were marching against the rebels like Damaji Thorat and others. One day at
Umbraj, near Karad, an officer named Piraji Raut from Balaji’s contingent was hunting a deer. After long chase the deer took shelter in the tent of Vyasrao. Vyasrao was a Brahmin clerk working in Chandrasen’s office. The deer had sought protection. Piraji asked to hand over the deer. But Vyasrao turned down his demand. He replied that being a Brahmin he had kindness for animal life. Despite that Piraji tried to kill the deer. But Vyasrao protected it. Piraji threw his spear at Vyasrao and wounded him. Piraji then ran to his master Balaji and confessed his crime. Vyasrao complained against Piraji to Chandrasen. Chandrasen asked Balaji to hand over Piraji to him for giving him punishment. But Balaji, expressing his regret, refused to do so. Chandrasen ordered his troops to attack Balaji’s contingent and seize Piraji. Balaji escaped with his men to Purandar fort and sought shelter of Pant Sachiv. Chandrasen besieged the fort and demanded Balaji as the price of peace. So Pant Sachiv asked Balaji to leave the fort. Balaji with his wife and children and some troops with Ambaji Purandare ran away through river Nira. Balaji, with his faithful officers Ambaji Purandare and Pilaji Jadhav, fled to Pandavgad. From there he sent Ambaji Purandare to report Shahu about the happenings. Purandare first contacted Govindrao Chitnis. He then reported the things to Shahu through Virubal and Rani Sagunabai. Shahu sent his force to Pandavgad and brought Balaji at Satara for safety.³

Shahu ordered Chandrasen to present himself in his court at Satara. Chandrasen asked Shahu to deliver Balaji in his hands to give him suitable punishment. He also stated that if Shahu did not deliver Balaji to him, he would go over to Tarabai’s faction. Shahu wanted to solve the problem
through negotiations. Chandrasen demanded that the Pratinidhi and Khanderao Dabhade should be sent to him for negotiations so as to end hostility. Though Shahu was aware that both of them were not loyal to him, he agreed to send them for negotiations. Both Pratinidhi and Dabhade were former supporters of Tarabai. Chandrasen made use of this visit to involve both of them into the conspiracy against Shahu and asked them to support Tarabai. Both of them gave their approval for this.4 He also compelled Pratinidhi to send letters to other commanders.

Maharani Tarabai was waiting for some such development. She gave her full support to Chandrasen Jadhav. Tarabai was carefully watching the incident in Shahu’s camp. When she noticed that Chandrasen did not give his full support to Shahu, she called him to her side. In one letter to Shivaji-I, son of Tarabai, dated 27th August, 1711, Chandrasen wrote, “My loyalty is to the master and my only desire to win fame and fortune by service to the master..... I have up to this day (by continuing to remain the opposite camp) managed to win over Rajashri Appaji Thorat, Shahaji Nimbalkar, Santaji Pandhare and others. I have resisted the affection and regard shown by Shahu and indeed shown open hostility to him insisting that Pratinidhi and Khanderao Dabhade who are known to be loyal to the master (Shivaji) should be sent to negotiate (differences that had arisen). Upon this both were sent for discussion. Before this the plan had already been decided among Thorat, Khanderao Dabhade, Santhaji Pandhare (and myself) .... Subsequently we included the other commanders into the conspiracy and even persuaded the Pratinidhi to join us. We proclaim our allegiance to the master.... After this
when we have marched to Satara and destroyed the root of civil conflict in this kingdom. The master will no doubt reward us appropriately".

Tarabai must have been eagerly waiting for such an opportunity. Promptly she wrote back to Chandrasen stating her full support to this secret conspiracy. She wrote, "... How can I express in a letter the extreme happiness that I felt when your letter was read out to me? .... Accordingly you must carry out your aim of wiping out the present state of division and ensure that the master's rule is uncontested. The fact that you have managed to bring together the Pratinidhi, Dabhade, and More is no mean achievement but proclaims your great ability, your foresight, your wisdom and when one thinks of your valour one realizes that you have no equal ..... The Pratinidhi is a devoted servant and the fact that he and you have despatched letters to the commanders of the fort has our full approval...The master too has given parallel order to commanders of the fort and to other servants..... Haibatrao Nimbalkar Sarlashkar is also wholly loyal to the feet of the master .... The master is also pleased with Thorat, Khanderao Dabhade and Santaji Pandhare who have all joined in this great task. They too had written letters (to him) to which suitable replies have been sent.... The orders given to everyone enjoin all to confer together so that the tasks in hand are fulfilled ... You should carry out the plans that you have written about him and inform us of their success.".

Tarabai had information about discontent among some members in Shahu's court; especially differences between Senapati and Senakarte. She immediately made contact with Senapati and called him on her side.
Chandrasen had taken her support secretly. Chandrasen, with the help of some other notable chiefs organised military revolt against Shahu. But only because of Balaji Shahu could suppress this revolt. Chandrasen was the architect of this coup.

**CHANDRASEN BECAME A PARTISAN OF TARABAI:**

Chandrasen left Shahu’s court in the monsoon of the year 1711 with his troops. Shahu removed Chandrasen from his office of Senapati in October. Shahu confiscated the Mokasa of Peta Supa and Baramati from Jadhavrao (Chandrasen) and conferred it upon Santaji Jadhavrao, a new Senapati. This illustrates the rebellious attitude of Chandrasen, which led to his dismissal from the post of commander-in-chief. At the same time Tarabai appointed Chandrasen as Senapati of Kolhapur Kingdom. Chandrasen was not able to carry out his plan of marching against Shahu at Satara and turning him out of his capital. Shahu promptly called his Sarlashkar Haibatrao Nimbalkar for help and for punishing the disloyal Senapati. Haibatrao defeated Chandrasen on the battlefield of Jeur near the pass of Adarki. Then Chandrasen went to Panhala and openly joined Tarabai. But he did not remain in Tarabai’s camp for long.

After some months, Chandrasen was approached by Daudkhan who was a Mughal officer in the Deccan. He was a very shrewd man. He exploited the situation. He offered a Jagir to Chandrasen. Daudkhan also offered Jagirs to other Maratha sardars like RambhaJi Nimbalkar, Thorat, etc.
When Tarabai realised that Chandrasen was not more useful for her against Shahu, she called the other commanders to rebel against Shahu's authority. Inspite of Nimbalkar's victory over Chandrasen, Nimbalkar also began negotiations with Kolhapur. Shahu's troops at that time were in Khandesh and Bérar. But Balaji Vishwanath saved Shahu's kingdom from collapse.

CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE REBELS:

After the departure of Chandrasen, Shahu took strong steps against his disloyal servants. He deposed the Pratinidhi Parsuram Trimbak, from his office. He confiscated his property and ordered him to be blinded. But Khando Ballal Chitnis has mediated and through his prayers the order of blinding was converted into that of confinement.

Balaji was the only capable man Shahu could rely upon. Balaji undertook to raise a new army. Balaji, through his friends and bankers, borrowed large sums of money on personal security and raised an army. He also tried to win Shahu's opponents not only by using troops but also by acts of diplomacy. He was able to manage to restore balance of power in favour of Shahu.

KRISHNARAO KHATAVKAR:

After organising new army, Balaji made new arrangements to suppress rebellions with arms and diplomacy. First of all took steps against Krishnarao Khatavkar on the advice of Shahu. Krishnarao Khatavkar was the Mughal Mansabdar. He was Brahmin. He had enjoyed the title of Maharaja. He had
stronghold at Khatav, which is 15 miles to the east of Koregaon. Krishnrao was supporter of Daudkhan and Tarabai. He had caused much trouble to Shahu. He had established his sway on the surrounding territory of Khatav. To suppress rebellion Shahu ordered Balaji to march against Khatav.

Parshuram Trimbak Pant Pratinidhi was still in prison. When he learnt that Balaji was marching against Khatavkar he asked his son Shripatrao to go with Balaji in order to obtain royal favour. He had advised his son to either die in battle or exert himself so as to win royal favour for his father. Balaji and Shripatrao made sudden attack on Khatav. Khatavkar's army was destroyed. Krishnrao and his eldest son were killed on December 2, 1711. Other two surviving sons of Khatavkar sought Shahu's protection. Shripatrao, son of Pratinidhi displayed great bravery on the battlefield. He was rewarded for his service. His father Parshuram Trimbak was released from captivity and appointed as Pratinidhi. Shahu also gave Khatav to the two surviving sons of Krishnrao.

KANHOJI ANGRE:

Rajaram had appointed Kanhoji Angre as admiral or Sarkhel of Maratha fleet. He was all in all of the west coast. But he cared little for Chhatrapati's authority. He considered himself an independent prince. He had risen to power during the regimes of Rajaram and Tarabai.

He was not opposed to Shahu on his entry into Maharashtra. He was loyal to Shahu. Some letters and unpublished papers show that Shahu used to send his agents to Angre for getting some foreign goods and war materials.
After Chandrasen's revolt, Kanhoji also left Shahu and joined Tarabai and subsequently marched against Shahu's troops and territory.

Kanhoji seized Kalyan and the surrounding district. He also conquered the forts Rajmachi, Dungad, etc. He marched towards Poona. Shahu had despatched a large army under his Peshwa Bahiropant Pingle. Bahiropant had no courage to march against Kanhoji because he was one of the first rank commanders of his times. Kanhoji made sudden attack on Lohagad. He captured Lohagad and defeated Bahiropant Pingle. He eventually took Shahu's Peshwa as prisoner and put him at Kulaba.

As Shahu's Peshwa was in prison, his position became very critical. Shahu ordered his Pratinidhi to take charge but he was also unwilling. Pratinidhi did not want to fight against Tarabai, his former master. He also thought that the task entrusted to him was beyond his power. Thereafter Shahu ordered Balaji, his only capable man, to march against Kanhoji. But Balaji accepted the assignment only conditionally. He asked for the Peshwaship before the beginning of his expedition. But Shahu was not ready to do so. Shahu told Balaji that after his campaign, he would become a Peshwa. But Balaji convinced Shahu that he must meet Angre as fully empowered prime minister or Peshwa of Chhatrapati who had powers to decide policy of war or peace. Parshurampant Pratinidhi and Khnado Ballal had made recommendations to Shahu to appoint Balaji as Peshwa. Finally on November 17, 1711, Shahu appointed Balaji as Peshwa of Chhatrapati at his camp at Manjari.
Balaji had well known the power of Kanhoji, hence he decided to use diplomacy rather than arms. So he decided to solve the problem through negotiations. Both Balaji and Angre were from the same coastal region. They had warm feelings for each other. Balaji eloquently explained to him the dangers posed to the Marathas if they remained divided. Balaji also convinced Kanhoji that it would not be possible for him alone to fight against the Siddi, the English and the Portuguese. Moral and material support of the Maratha Chhatrapati would be required to deal with his enemies in a better way.

Kanhoji agreed to accept Shahu’s terms. Till 1713 Angre was supporter of Tarabai. But when war with Siddi was opened, Angre thought that it would be better for him if he joined Shahu. Balaji and Kanhoji met at Valvan near Lonawala in January 1714. Kanhoji went back to Kulaba. Balaji also went to Kulaba. The treaty was drawn up on February 28, 1714 at Kulaba. By the terms of that treaty, Kanhoji was confirmed in his office of Sarkel or Admiral of the Royal Fleet. Kanhoji was allowed to retain Rajamachi and other forts. Angre released Bahiropant Pingle, the former Peshwa and allied himself with Shahu. Tarabai’s side became very weak after Kanhoji walked over to Shahu.

Actual treaty was signed in 1715 at festival of Holi by Shahu and Kanhoji. “By this treaty the first recognition of inconvenient fact that the Maratha Sardars were not the servants of Shahu who held their offices and monuments attached to them in he shape of assigned territories and forts during the pleasure of the Chhatrapati, but had independent right of their own of which the Chhatrapati could not deprive them even if he wanted to do so,”
said Brij Kishor. This means that the treaty had delineated clearly and accurately the limits of territories of Chhatrapati Shahu and the possessions of Kanhoji.

**NIZAM AS SUBHEDAR OF DECCAN:**

Emperor Bahadurshah died in 1713. Johender Shah successor to the imperial throne had been murdered within one year. Farukhsiyar, grandson of Bahadurshah, defeated and killed his rival the heir apparent to the throne, and became emperor on January 17, 1713 with the help of Saiyyad brothers. Zulfiqurkhan had been put to death by Saiyyad brothers. His representative in the Deccan Daudkhan Panni was transferred to Gujarat. Chin-Qalalin-Khan-Ghazi-ud-din Firuz Jang was appointed the viceroy of the six Subhas of the Deccan with title of Nizam-ul-mulk-Khan-I-Khan in February 1713. Nizam added to the difficulties of Shahu.

Daudkhan Panni left Aurangabad in July 1713. Nizam arrived there in October the same year. He immediately assumed charge of his office at Aurangabad. Nizam desired to carve out for himself an independent state in the Deccan. Zulfiquar Khan had adopted policy of winning the Marathas over to his side by friendly gestures. However, Nizam wanted to crush the Marathas.

Nizam did not agree to the policy of paying the chauth and Sardeshmukhi to the Marathas, which had been collected by the Mughal officials in the Deccan. He adopted the traditional Mughal policy of weakening the Marathas by creating dissensions among them.
When he arrived in the Deccan, conflict between Shahu and Tarabai was going on. He decided to exploit the situation and destroy both the sides one after another. In accordance with this policy he welcomed Chandrasen and honoured him with Jahagir and treated him as his friend and adviser. Through Chandrasen he negotiated with other Marathas and offered them Saranjam and Jahagirs on the advice of Chandrasen and Rambhaji Nimbalkar. He also began to encourage Tarabai and her supporters. It created the vortex of confusion in Maharashtra. The weaker party of Tarabai gained support from the Nizam and as a result the position of Shahu became extremely critical. Following letter written by Shivaji-I, to Nabab Nizam explains his attitude. "... I am hoping to be of use to the exalted court but, I think that this depends upon the support and the help of Nabab (you). If I am favoured with this kindness, I shall manage the affairs (bandobast) of Deccan to the entire satisfaction of the Nabab with mutual help and the co-operation."13

Balaji Vishwanath, the great supporter of Shahu, rose equal to the occasion and face Nizam–Tarabai alliance. He eventually suppressed the Nizam. Shahu–Tarabai contest for power in the Deccan would have probably come to an end with dethronement of Tarabai’s son Shivaji in 1714. But another power intervened in the politics of this region. It was Nizam-ul-Mulk who intervened and also took Sambhaji-II under his protection. Dr. Yusuf Hussain asserts that “Nizam-ul-Mulk took advantage of the dissension prevailing between the Kolhapur party which owed allegiance to Tarabai and
that of Shahu. Sambhaji who succeeded Shivaji on the throne of Kolhapur yielded to allurement and became practically a tool in the hands of Nizam.\textsuperscript{14}

**BLOODLESS REVOLUTION AT KOLHAPUR:**

For three years since Tarabai had proclaimed her son as Maratha Chhatrapati, the struggle for supremacy went on between Shahu and Tarabai. When Chandrasen Jadhav joined Tarabai’s side other Sardars like Udhaji Chavan, Krishnarao Khatavkar, Damaji Thorat were won by Tarabai over to her side. But soon the situation was changed. The balance of power was shifted in Shahu’s favour. Chandrasen, from whom Tarabai had great expectations, left Tarabai’s faction and joined the Mughals. His example was followed by some other Maratha chiefs and Sardars. Some went on to the Mughal side, while some others returned to Shahu’s camp. Balaji Vishwanath proved himself as a very capable man. He marched against the rebellious chiefs (the supporters of Tarabai) and defeated them. Also he had won some others to Shahu’s side by diplomacy. Thus it was clear that in the beginning of 1714, Tarabai’s faction became weak and she had little chance to defeat Shahu. On the other hand, a storm was raised against her. The bloodless revolution took place on the fort of Panhala.

Rajasbai and her son Sambhaji-II deposed Tarabai and her son Shivaji and put them under arrest. Sambhaji-II became the Chhatrapati of Kolhapur. The exact date of this revolution was not known. But it had occurred between August and September of 1714. The last letter in the name of Shivaji-I was on the date of August 2\textsuperscript{nd} 1714 and the first letter issued under Sambhaji-II

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was dated September 15, 1714. So it can be inferred that the incident might have occurred sometime during the intervening fifty-three days.

But this revolution or change in power did not come about overnight. From 1712 the process of the revolution was initiated. This change evoked no favourable reactions for Tarabai either in palace or outside it. What had happened was regarded as inevitable and a welcome change. There are documentary evidences to show that the process of change started from 1712 and it was completed in 1714. From 1712 the Tarabai’s faction became weak. Her commander-in-chief Chandrasen Jadhav on whose help she tried to overthrow Shahu, left her side and joined the Nizam for his own interests. Damaji Thorat, Santaji Pandhare and others followed his example. Kanhoji Angre, Sarkhel of Marathi fleet, joined Shahu because of Balaji’s efforts. Kanhoji was honoured by the title of Sarkhel. Thus the chief admiral had left her side. So the seaside and Konkan passed under Shahu’s possession of Shahu. Shidhoji Ghorapade was the Senapati of Tarabai before Chandrasen’s arrival. When Chandrasen joined her side she neglected Shidhoji Ghorapade. He could not bear the insult. So he left her faction and went in the south. Haibatrao Nimbalkar also rejoined Shahu. Also Khanderao Dabhade rejoined Shahu and became the chief commander of Shahu’s army. Thus all influential persons left her side and joined either Shahu or Nizam. On the one hand Shahu became very powerful with the help of Balaji and others. At the same time, Tarabai was becoming very weak day-by-day. Nizam also tried to strengthen his position in the south.
It was not possible for Rajasbai and Sambhaji II to remove Tarabai and her son without the support of Ramchandrapant Amatya. Ramchandrapant was the only wise and important man on Tarabai’s side. But he always felt disgusted with Tarabai. She always suspected Ramchandrapant’s integrity. She had put him in prison on suspicion that he was in favour of Shahu. But when she was unable to carry on the administration, she again restored him to his office. But differences between the two did not vanish. The relations between these two were always strained. Although Tarabai was suspicious about him, he had done his best efforts to save Karveer Chhatrapati.

Tarabai had been following advice of her new ally Chandrasen. He had advised her to join hands with Nizam to fight war against Shahu. But patriotic Ramchandrapant did not give his approval to this anti-national policy. He could never allow the Mughals to drive a wedge between the two Maratha Chhatrapatis. He could never give his consent to take help of the Mughals in crushing the grandson and lawful successor of Shivaji. Ramchandrapant thought that the activities of Tarabai were very dangerous for the Kolhapur ‘Gadi’. So removal of Tarabai appeared to be the best solution to this problem. Otherwise either Shahu or the Nizam would have taken Kolhapur Raj under their possession. So there was no other way for Ramchandrapant than to dislodge Tarabai from her position.

Tarabai’s nature was also the cause of her removal. Tarabai was an ungrateful, hard-hearted and vindictive lady. Her administration was not popular. She had never adopted the policy of forget and forgive. She always tried to do anything for her son who was a mentally retarded child and hence
not capable of carrying on administration in future. Even a man like Ramchandrapant suffered from her ungrateful nature. Sambhaji-II had described in a letter written to Purdilkhan how Tarabai's or Shivaji's rule was unpopular. "... The unjust practice of my elder brother, Raja Shivaji has crossed all limits. I have been placed on the throne to look after the comforts of the people!"16 Sambhaji wrote such letters to Nizam also in which he had described the then prevailing condition in his state.17

Thus it becomes clear that Ramchandrapant was the key man of this bloodless revolution. He had taken Rajasbai and Sambhaji in his confidence and then the removal of Tarabai took place. Ramchandrapant also tried to gain support from the Nizam in this coup. Ramchandrapant got indirect support from Udaji Chavan and Kanhoji Angre who were powerful Sardars of Tarabai. Udaji Chavan did not participate directly but also did nothing to oppose the coup. So Sambhaji after acceding to Kolhapur Gadi granted him a Jagir yielding an annual income of Rs. Three lacs. Kanhoji Angre had changed side and gone over to Shahu a few weeks before the coup.

Balaji Vishwanath, the most capable man from Shahu's camp and Shahu himself might have played some role in this successful move. "Balaji thought that it was impossible to restore Shahu's authority till daring and active woman like Tarabai remained in power at Kolhapur. Balaji got the chance when acute quarrel broke out between Tarabai and Ramchandrapant. Balaji had sent message to Rajasbai and offered her Shahu's support if she overthrew Tarabai. Eagerly Rajasbai accepted the offer."18
Tarabai had restored Ramchandrapant in his office but differences between the two increased. Ramchandrapant had soft corner for Shahu. He had kept his correspondence with Shahu. Ramchandrapant had written a letter sometime before November 1713, in which he had expressed his desire to work as chief minister or Hukumatpanah of Shahu. In return Shahu accepted the request and wrote him a letter on August 1, 1714. He wrote, "The request as above is agreed to by this letter. We shall without reservations, observe the conditions." This letter indicates that Shahu and Balaji Vishwanath had keenly observed the developments at Kolhapur. Since long time, Balaji tried to widen the chasms between Tarabai and Ramchandrapant through Naro Mahadev from Ichalkaranji who was also Balaji's relative. Balaji had offered his military support to Shambhaji if it was needed.

END OF TARABAI'S RULE:

Tarabai's officers holding charge of Panhala were corrupt. It was difficult to capture Tarabai and her son without their help. Tarabai, the ambitious and suspicious lady, could not know anything about this coup till she became a prisoner. Rajasbai, mother of Sambhaji-II, played an important role in this coup. In her letter, Tarabai wrote, "In the course of time we were compelled to undergo a sad experience. Rajasbai and her son Sambhaji managed through some of their agents to put us in confinement and inflict hardship upon us. Sambhaji was seated upon the throne." The agents of Rajasbai means Giroji Yadav, Antaji Trimal, Tulaji Shitole etc. These were the main persons who were instrumental in removing Tarabai. The commander of fort Panhala was Giroji Yadav, in whom Tarabai
had full confidence. But he also joined Sambhaji or it would be better to say that he joined Ramchandrapant. Ramchandrapant won these officials to his side by giving them bribe. They might have suffered due to Tarabai’s ungrateful nature and so they had offered their support against her. All these persons mentioned in Tarabai’s letter were not higher officers. Without the help of higher authority like Ramchandrapant this coup could not have taken place. The bloodless revolution had another aspect indicating that there was political conflict between Tarabai and Ramchandrapant. Sambhaji II had only nominal part in the coup. Because actually when the coup occurred both Rajasbai and Sambhaji were under confinement of Tarabai at Panhala fort. All this means that Ramchandrapant had prepared plan to depose Tarabai and her son from his office but before that he had taken Rajasbai and Sambhaji-II into confidence.

A letter from the Portuguese viceroy of Goa dated December 11th, 1714 contained congratulations to Ramchandrapant besides some presents for the palace revolution. It means that the Viceroy of Goa also knew that Ramchandrapant was himself associated with the palace revolution. In the same letter he wrote that he had known about the coup but he was doubtful whether it actually took place or not. He also wrote, “.... You are well aware that the news of your success would have given me great joy, since both politically and personally. Our relations are most friendly. The queen who, all these days, used to regain over your kingdom had the most amicable relations with us ....”
Bloodless revolution or the Palace Revolution of 1714 was an important landmark in the annals of Kolhapur-Satara relations. Kolhapur-Satara relations between 1710 and 1714 were essentially the relations between Shahu and Tarabai. Since the creation of Kolhapur Gadi in 1710, Tarabai tried her level best to defend her position and possessions. Shahu too launched campaigns against the rebel Maratha Sardars and consolidated his position by employing various methods and means. Territory under Shahu's control soon expanded, Balaji Vishwanath rendered remarkable services to Shahu during those troubled day. Tarabai's strange nature and unwise policy made her unpopular with her own people and hence things led to the palace revolution of 1714. Consequently Tarabai lost her important position in Kolhapur State.
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5. Malgaonkar Manohar, Chhatrapaties of Kolhapur, pp.88, 89.

6. Ibid., pp.88,89, Aitihasik Patravyavahar, No.5.


14. Ibid. Please see the preface p.XII, Dr. Yusuf Hussain, First Nizam, p.56.


17. Ibid. p.155.


