CHAPTER FIVE:

Findings and Suggestion,
Including Recommendation
Chapter 5 -

Findings

Security and development in the Persian Gulf, especially after the discovery of oil reserves, has always been a hot topic of discussion among the regional and industrialized nations. Historically speaking, especially over the past one hundred years or so, the regional states have never been in charge of ensuring the Persian Gulf security. The British Empire used to view itself as the sole provider of security to the region for almost two hundred years until after the World War II. It was also in charge of protecting the region’s oil reserves, oil exports and free trade.

The rise of cold war brought up different views on global/regional security in which the Persian Gulf was acknowledged as a strategically important place. Following global developments in 1970’s, nations realized the importance of oil and for that reason the security of Persian Gulf also became a focal point.

On the other hand, after the withdrawal of British troops, considering the cold war exigencies, the United States started to play the role of guardian for the Persian Gulf and this region became a US strategic interest. Consequently, Washington came up with two-tier security plans of Nixon-Kissinger: using local forces i.e. using Iran’s military power and Saudi Arabia’s economic strength. Shah’s regime in Iran was chosen as the region’s gendarme. However, after the 1979 victory of Islamic Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini, the security pillar of this plan collapsed as the new revolutionary system in Iran was against the US hegemony. This was a major blow to the Nixon doctrine.
After the Saddam invasion of Iran in 1980, the region had to deal with a new face of insecurity. The consequent developments such as the spread of war across the Persian Gulf, the tanker wars, and the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait were the last nail in the coffin of any security idea for the Persian Gulf.

Following the liberation of Kuwait, Washington increased its military presence by setting up its fifth naval fleet in Bahrain in 1995. The aim was to put into operation a unipolar system. To this end, the majority of PGCC (Persian Gulf Cooperation Council) states (except Saudi Arabia) signed defence treaties with the US and other Western powers and purchased advanced military hardware, consequently triggering an arms race.

As a sign of protest to such policy, in 1995 and 1996 the American forces came under two terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia. This was an indication of extremism in the region and following the terrorist attacks and the Taliban regime’s control over Afghanistan which was a consequence of mistaken calculation on the part of ruling coalitions in the region. The anti-Americanism under the leadership of Osama Bin Laden reached to its peak by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The global reactions to the incident fundamentally changed the international security concepts, the role of global security players and alignments, triggering a “hegemonic war” in which the US wanted to dominate its own established order. After the US invasion of Afghanistan and its occupation by the coalition forces, Washington adopted a much more radical strategy for the Persian Gulf. For instance, it came up with the so-called “axis of evil” unilaterally invaded Iraq as a gateway to the Arab World without getting the UN approval and with amid protests from other major powers. The plan was to exercise hard
power to pave the way for political changes and then use soft power in economic and cultural domains to prepare the region for a major agenda to dominate the world.

Although the US army managed to oust the Ba'athist regime in Iraq in a matter of three weeks, the prolonged occupation failed to deliver the expected results for Washington. The security issues came to the surface right after the early days of occupation gradually eroding the US military machine and making them more vulnerable on this part of planet. Reports suggest that the US forces are able to defeat countries such as Iraq but they are unable to restore security after dictators have been removed. There is an atmosphere of uncertainty in the region in the face of such developments as well as the presence of other forces from the UK, France, Australia, Canada, Italy etc. This has undermined the overall political, economic and security relations in this volatile part of the world. After Iraq’s occupation Bush repeated that the region is “vital” for the American strategic interests. During his speech at a naval graduation ceremony he said the difference between Iraq and Vietnam is that “they did not have the capacities to attack us at home. Since we don’t want to fight them at their homes (Iraq). Now America has launched a new wave of distrust and baseless allegations against Islamic Republic of Iran in collaboration with its neighbours. The outcome of mentioned factors has complicated Iraqi situation and periled the regional security conditions.

However, the territorial dispute, as another factor, is considered as a potential threat for the security of the region. There have been some bloody wars in less than a decade in the region which was faced with a severe damage in the economy and the development of the region. All the Persian Gulf countries have the border and territorial disputes with
each other. There are more than fifty territorial disputes between the regional countries that the stability of such disputes has rarely been led to the ultimate solution.

One of the other security threats within the region can be referred to the arms race as a result of the governments demanding power. The statistics reveal that the military expenditure of the Persian Gulf countries compared with their GDP (Gross Domestic Product) during the last two decades had a considerable growth and almost in all the regional countries, except Iran, most of their budget belongs to the military sector. Thus, this process has been led to the development of cynicism and distrust among the countries. The arms race in the region, regardless of creating and intensifying tensions in the relationship between the regional countries, has had ample of deleterious economic effects on these countries. The problems can be studied in the following subsets:

1) Disparities in the economic development of the regional countries; the raw materials of the Persian Gulf countries, the natural materials and its diversity, area, the normal population, the geo political situation, the work force and the level of progress in industry have considerable differences with each other and the unequal stages of development among countries have made them not to equally enjoy the solidarity and convergence of interests and the process costs for them more than the benefits which will be considered as their security.

2) The incomplete of regional countries' economy: the Persian Gulf countries regardless of the issue that they are not economically competent, they have competing economies but they depend on the countries outside the region. The issue has hindered of
interdependence between the regional countries and their more dependency on the countries outside the region has led and further will be led to the weakening of their economic ties.

3) The political economy of the regional countries is not similar and these countries enjoy the two free and centralized economic systems. Thus, in order to create ties among the countries and start economic cooperation of their economic structures and institution is essential.

4) The insufficiency of communication infrastructure is also considered as a barrier for the regional countries, which led to the limitation of many attempts to establish regional solidarity among the countries.

The political, ideological, ethnic (Iranian, Arab and Kurd) and religious (Shiites and Sunni) disputes are also considered as the conflicts, which are resulted to the instability and insecurity in the international and regional arena. As long as the regional countries witness the internal instability, the region is more prone to insecurity. Some of these countries are still involved with the central issue such as the national identity and the political sovereignty. However, most of these countries are governed by non-democratic regimes and their political legitimacy is questioned. The national identity has not yet been formed in the frame of the Persian Gulf countries and the sub identities confront against each other. On the other hand, the regional countries still witness the other issues such as the crisis of distribution and partnership, which threatens the internal security of the regional countries.

The other group of the security threats within the region we can refer to the vague security practices and the incompatibilities between
this group of the countries, which has created a type of situation for unpredictable crisis. The lack of recognition of the players and the designers of a strategic behaviour in the Persian Gulf concerning the social feature of a security environment, the ignorance of the environmental dynamics and the diversity in the strategic behaviour of the players has highlighted the incompatibilities among the member countries resulted into ample of crises. On the other hand, the presence of American military forces in the Persian Gulf and the tendency of the countries in the region into security alliances outside the geographical boundaries of the region have faced the building indigenous security of the region with some obstacles. Achieving political legitimacy through developing the military and strategic capabilities into its maximum and the lack of concentration on the need for a balanced security with a multilateral approach and also the differences of the security perceptions of the players concerning the security building are regarded as some of the obstacles. This obstacle faces an effective planning to establish strong indigenous security institutions and the political cohesion with some difficulties. If the political cohesion, in the local and regional level, is weak and also the effective and organized institution are not formed to set strategic relationships, it is obvious to say that they will search their building security outside the geographical boundaries of the region. In this regard, Kun Buss, professor of security studies in Wales University has presented a new definition of security emphasizing on realistic security models that are related to the cold war period. He states that the countries turn to the military security only if they have little capability for resolving the threats within a structure. If the political leaders are responsible for planning the strategic behaviour and consider the security as an element for the elimination of poverty, the creation of
social justice and the maximum peace-building, it is obvious to say that they will give little attention to the violent conflict.

From the indicators of the lack of order and coherence in the Persian Gulf crisis, the following can be stated by order:

1) Heterogeneous political structures in regional states;
2) All eight regional states are involved in territorial and border disputes and because of artificial borders as a direct consequence of colonialism and lack of conformity between political and geopolitical/geographical borders; tensions and challenges can quickly resurface by foreign provocation;
3) The regional states are developing and accordingly face particular and transitional crises;
4) The Persian Gulf Arab leaders and authorities have dissimilar attitudes with less or lacking self-restraint, which results in hasty political conducts;
5) In the light of incongruent cultural/educational milieu, the elite, officials and army chiefs also have dissimilar vision making processes;
6) In light of intellectual differences coming from inadequate interactions, the press, media people, political/scientific elite and religious leaders always create rift;
7) The majority of regional states don’t have an efficient approach to attain regional goals; involvement to current affairs stops them from paying attention to much more strategic programs;
8) Unequal balance of power among the regional states;
9) The regional states don’t have incorporated foreign policies. In most cases their positions are against regional interests and they have different declared and practical policies;
10) The dysfunctional relations between Islamic Republic of Iran and the Western world on one hand and strengthening ties between the Arab states and foreign powers on the other, have given the upper hand for foreign powers in the region;

11) The majority of media outlets in littoral states are either inefficient and uncoordinated or under direct control of foreigners. This is one of the main obstacles in the way of forming a widespread strategic culture;

12) Trade exchanges among the littoral states are limited as the majority of their economic ties are with the western world as a factor for dependence on foreigners and regional divergence;

13) Measures taken by the regional states towards detente and confidence building have not been institutionalized yet. They fail to fulfil expected results and therefore are interpreted and practically ineffective;

14) Due to imbalance of resources and lack of coordination between the regional states, in most cases oil has only created troubles and brought up deep-seated challenges and reliance on imported technologies;

15) Security is viewed quite differently and most often contradictive among the political elite and regional nations. Foreign implications and interferences aggravate the volatile security of the Persian Gulf; this has become a chronic disease short of a prescribed treatment;

16) The numerous measures taken by littoral states over the past 50 years or so to reach collective security have gone nowhere except for an inefficient structure in the form of Persian Gulf Cooperation Council that only includes the littoral states of southern shores and
is embroiled with internal disputes and has never been resourceful despite its dynamic charter of association;

17) Founding the military bases, permanent presence of US forces in the region, and occupation of Iraq are aimed at realizing hegemonic objectives that go beyond access to the region’s rich energy resources. The resources are:

a) Widespread and coordinated Western media propaganda and their pretension of Iran’s nuclear power program as a threat;

b) Instalment of missile defence shield in Czech Republic and Poland under the pretext of defence against Iranian perceived missile threats which has been vigorously protested by Moscow;

c) To consider Persian Gulf as vital for its interests, and the prolonged occupation of Iraq seen as a means to grasp the vital resources;

As we see, the presence of insecurity and the crisis in the region can make the political system vulnerable while at the same time the economy of these countries can also made vulnerable.

The Persian Gulf with more than seven hundred oil wells is considered as the world oil storage. It should be noted that not only all the Persian Gulf countries depend on the oil economy but also the other countries in the world depend on the oil of this region too. Thus, the region, in terms of its strategic location, has become the most important region of the world.

As it was mentioned before that the lack of development in the regional countries is not the per-capita income levels in these countries. The three countries of the region i.e. United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar and Kuwait have nearly the highest per-capita income of the world, but the issue has been resulted into the explosion of wealth through the sale of crude oil. In fact the thing that makes a distinction
between the Persian Gulf countries, mainly its Southern area, and the other developing countries is the common feature of these countries which is oil. However, we can see the system, political and social structure, etc. are still faced with many problems that the crisis and the regional turmoil’s have led to the deterioration and the delay of the process of economic development.

The economic foundation is so weak and unstable in which oil is considered as the biggest and most important export, while in the East Asia, the economy is based on the production and the export of the goods made. As a matter of fact, the presence of huge oil reserves has made the countries not to have any concerns regarding the national income which is resulted in their failure to implement new ideas to develop the non-oil export sectors. On the other hand, as it is mentioned in chapter four, the rapid population growth, the lack of investment in non-oil sectors, the shortages of skilled and specialized groups in the modern and industrial sectors (mainly the Southern and Arabian part of Persian Gulf) are regarded as the other problems for the economic growth of these countries that the regional crisis act as a factor to delay the process of the economic development.

**Iran’s National Security Approach towards Security Developments**

In the early years of Islamic Revolution, there were signs of an extensive security discourse in Iran, which was developed to a more compromising and pragmatic behavioural patterns in foreign policy and national security during the Iraqi imposed war on Iran (1980-1988). In post cold war era, while the emergence of neo-liberalism across the
globe set security building on the basis of a mixture of state-oriented and community indices, Iran's national security patterns were inclined towards making compromises towards participation and collaboration. As a consequence, during the tenure of former president Mohammad Khatami, the discourse of constructive engagement and new initiative of security building prevailed. The new approach was in alignment with changes in global security strategies. However, the neo conservatives take over in US administration in Washington who tried to design their security strategies based on a hegemonic order, encountered Iran's constructive engagement with hostility. Such an approach paved the ground for changes in Iran’s national security policy to a new agenda as “constructive resistance” whose discourse was based upon some traits of “efficient interaction”. Such a policy has been fashioned within the framework of security oriented strategies. Then again, such tendency towards resistance has to have a resourceful and multilateral nature.

Under the circumstances, it could be presumed that challenges faced by neo cons in Washington due to the US occupation of Iraq led to different security developments in the American strategy, especially after 2008 US presidential election and its focus would be the Persian Gulf. When US military fervent subsides, security building measures will come to the surface in the form of soft power. Bearing that in mind, the national security of Islamic Republic of Iran should take into consideration the different aspects of the regional and international levels of the regional and international levels of analysis indeed, the development of regional and international interactions along with principles of economic, political and cultural development has amalgamated the country's internal and external security. However, Iran's surrounding environment is unique in terms of geo-economic and
the different views of Persian Gulf littoral states on extra regional powers as well as their double standard positions offer both opportunities and requirements, necessary for the country’s new security policies. The development of Iranian-Saudi bilateral ties could be an example in this respect. Former Iranian minister of defence, Ali Shamkhani announced that the Iranian official has convinced the Saudi military officials to purchase defence hardware from Iran. Iran had also encouraged the Saudis to take part in research projects and defence industries.

However, the subsequent trends led to competition and even an imminent conflict in the absence of implementation mechanisms as well as different attitude of the two countries officials, thus, once again, resulting in Iran’s regional siege. This was because of the system of governance of the Arab regimes’ concerns since 2004, over the changing system of governance in the region. They were demanding the support for the pro-American authoritarian governments instead of promotion of the so-called “democracy” in the region. Since these countries are in no way ready for the theory of “democratization”, they view this as a factor for instability. Since July 2006, we can witness widespread contradictions in the British and American regional policies against Iran. Generally speaking, on one hand, the Arab states try to coordinate their actions with Iran, and on the other, view their political future as guaranteed by the US. Therefore, they got prepared for regional cooperation in line with the American objectives and interest and numerous regional trips taken by US or other Western officials. e.g. Barak Obama, Condoleezza Rice, Dick Cheney, Angela Markel, Nanci Pelosi could be seen as signs and indications of organized threat against Iran aiming to stop the progress of Iran’s security by strategic siege,
simply because Western/UN resolutions alone had not been able to strategically restrict Iran. There is a duty for the country’s diplomatic structure to organize new requirements for national security within the framework of soft power, regional cooperation and Islamic unity. Indeed, solely under such circumstance will it be possible to destabilize the calculated American Arab alliance? Yes, it is not impossible but difficult political task.

After facing Iraq realities on the ground, Washington changed its policy of “democratization” into “security building” at the same time, it has been trying to challenge and isolate Islamic Republic of Iran. Of course, the US confrontation against Iran is a main obstacle in the way of regional prosperity and convergence. Iran’s positive role guarantees peace, security and progress for the region. The victory of Islamic Revolution was in the cold war era during which the bipolar world collapsed. After the neocons took power in Washington, they needed a made up adversary to put into service their aggressive policies and justify their next moves. To this end, the US blamed Iran for regional troubles and eve came up with the rhetoric of “Shiite crescent” among other unfounded accusations. Washington is trying to isolate Tehran through economic sanctions and even military strikes. Nonetheless, it has overlooked the fact that any threat to Iran’s security will also be a threat to its geopolitical surrounding areas. Iran’s cultural influence across the region dates back to 2000 years ago and such accusations are not going to win US support among the regional states and nations forever.

The relationship between Iran and the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council is divided into two periods:
1) During the imposed war (Iran and Iraq)

2) After the imposed war

The policy of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (PGCC) during the imposed war was always based on controlling the Islamic Revolution and preventing it from flourishing in the region, the PGCC provided countless contributions to Iraq. The gross tendency of the PGCC to Iraq during the war was to strike a balance between the forces of Iran and Iraq so that the region will not be affected by an absolute power. Although the PGCC supported Iraq, it didn’t seek Iraq’s victory. In fact, they demanded the continuation of a long-term war till the erosion of capability between the two countries, while they prevented the war to be developed into the other six countries. But in 1998 and after the acceptance of UN resolution 598, the pattern of PGCC has rapidly changed.

The period after the imposed war: during the period the relationship between Iran and Iraq and PGCC was eclipsed by the unrealistic territorial claims of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Believing to follow the sustainable principle of good neighbourliness and establish and develop friendly relations with its neighbours in order to frustrate the plots, which are against stability and lasting security in the vital Persian Gulf region, the Islamic Republic of Iran, following the policy of patience, restraint, de-stress and confidence building, in recent years has tried to show its good faith to resolve the disputes. Believing in the mutual understanding and resolving the differences through peaceful negotiations and dialogue, Iran has also tried to draw the regional countries’ attention to their vital interests in the shadow of stability and security in the region and
significance of stability and its effect on all aspects of social, economic, and political affairs.

Considering the fundamental policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran based on resolving the disputes peacefully and following the policy of de-stress and mutual cooperation and designing a new security system in the Persian Gulf region based on denying the presence of foreigners in the region, the necessity of reviewing confidence building measures is felt more.

Graph: Iran's Foreign Policy Objectives in the Persian Gulf

1) Free and Secure access to international waters,
2) Guaranteeing the security of its southern borders and vital maritime waterways including the Strait of Hormuz,
3) Constant Monitoring of the movement of foreign military forces close to its territorial waters,
4) Protecting the Persian Gulf environment and prevention of water pollution,
5) Combating maritime terrorism,
6) Prevention of arms, illegal drug and human trafficking,
7) Demilitarization of the Persian Gulf, especially the withdrawal of foreign troops,
8) Encouraging economic and political integration in the Persian Gulf,
9) Establishing a viable regional security system to minimize the influence of extra regional powers.
10) Increasing defence and strategic cooperation with India for more stable and secure region; in the field of energy supply, sea-lane control, military and naval exercises, fighting against terrorism and narcotics.
PGCC Policies vis-à-vis Iran

The littoral states of the Persian Gulf have adopted two different policies in order to deal with future conflicts:

1) Adopting a neutral position and establishing economic/political relations with other nations;

2) Boosting security and military capabilities through purchase of modern warfare and signing defence/security treaties with the Western powers.

The leaders of these nations have come to assume that by establishing strong trade relations with the Western and Eastern powers they can become immune to regional disputes and instabilities. To this end, they also tend to reduce their dependency on oil export revenues by shifting towards the non-oil sector. For instance, Dubai has managed to realize this goal to some extent. At the moment, the tiny Sheikdom’s oil revenues only constitute to just about 12% of its GDP. There are, however, fluctuations in the policies of the PGCC (Persian Gulf Cooperation Council) member states towards Iran.

During the 1990-1995, Saudi Arabia while being a follower to Washington, spent millions of dollars on purchasing modern defence hardware, supported the Madrid Conference and the Oslo accord and even lifted sanctions against Israel to some extent. But in September 1997, a high ranking Saudi delegation to Tehran headed by Prince Abdullah was seen as a sign of shift in Riyadh’s policy towards Tehran. More talks came after the visit of an Iranian battleship to Jeddah port served as further proof that the two sides were keen on reconsidering their positions. Qatar also never followed the containment
strategy of the United States against Iran. Following Saudi Arabia, Bahrain also invited Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, then Iranian president to Manama and extended a warm welcome to him in March 1998.

However, because of its claims over the Persian Gulf islands, the UAE maintained its anti-Iran position and supported Iraq in Saddam era. To undermine Iran’s growing influence in the region, it went against the US policy to topple Saddam’s regime at that time.

During numerous summits and meetings, its allies supported UAE’s baseless claims over the three Iranian islands. But most of the supports have been symbolic and not beyond adopting a formal position. A statement released after the 26th PGCC (Persian Gulf Cooperation Council) Summit in Abu Dhabi (December 19, 2005), claimed, “Given the continued occupation of the three islands by the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as their surrounding waters and trade zones, the Council maintains its firm and known position that these islands are an inseparable part of the UAE.” Also in a statement released after the 19th session of the Council in Abu Dhabi (December 9, 1998) there was a reference to the issue, in which the participants urged Iran to stop building settlements on the islands and change their demographic status.

Kuwait is more than any other PGCC (Persian Gulf Cooperation Council) states dependent on the US. For the same reason, it was under constant pressure from Baghdad.

Kuwait backed the US policy vis-à-vis Iraq although it had reserved a different position with regard to Iran. This is because Tehran could put a significant weight on the balance between Kuwait and Iraq.

Although the Kuwaiti rulers depend on Washington for their existence, nonetheless they are not in the mood to be accused of being hostile towards Iran. Iran and Oman have had cordial relations, though,
for the same reason, the Omani officials are against the US policy of isolating Tehran. Iran’s superiority, shared interests in establishing security in the region and dependence on foreign forces will stop the PGCC (Persian Gulf Cooperation Council) from adopting hostile policies against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

**Important Questions in Mind:**

It is necessary to answer three questions in sketching out a future picture for the Persian Gulf:

1) Will the US devise its future national security strategy based on intervention by means of political/security treaties with the littoral states in order to justify its military presence in the Persian Gulf?

In 1821, the 6th president of the United States, John Quincy Adams warned: “the Americans should refrain from the temptation of going overseas in search of a monster to destroy.” Even after the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the removal of Saddam’s regime and the Taliban, the US politician still view global instability as a threat to their national security. Therefore, those backing the American empire will never leave the Persian Gulf alone.

They will continue to sell arms to the oil rich littoral states and will also offer military support to their allies. In May 2006, the US adopted a new strategy to contain Iran in the region in collaboration with the littoral states. The goal was to help these nations to form a military defence shield and boost their capabilities to stop and search passing ships that could possibly carry nuclear cargos. The US administration is hell-bent on changing the political and strategic equations of the region in their favour, and they want to do so by prolonging their
military occupation of Iraq while confronting Iran and its regional policies.

2) Are the littoral states prepared to adopt a policy independent of great powers and initiate a serious regional cooperation with Iran?

It is hard to put too much hope for a shift in their policies and positions. The Pan Arabism and leftist nationalist leaders of Arab regimes of the Middle East even long before the establishment of Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 have for some time been misusing a bogus name instead of the legal and historical term of “The Persian Gulf”. Some people still like Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Moamar Gadhafi of Libya, and Saddam Hussein did so in an attempt to undermine Iran’s influence in the region. At the moment, the Saudi officials are apparently concerned about the growing influence and power of Shiites as well as Iran’s raising influence in Iraq and the Middle East. However, they have differences among themselves on how best to deal with the issue. Some in Saudi Family believe that Iran’s rising influence in Iraq and the region will undermine the influence of Saudi Arabia. Others argue that only through cooperation with Iran will it be possible to resolve the region’s security once and for all. Still, there are others who are urging Washington not to hold talks with Tehran and Damascus over ensuring security in Iraq. Quite the opposite, there are also some who encourage the White House to hold direct and unconditional talks with Tehran. For instance, Turki al-Faisal, former head of Saudi Intelligence Agency, said in an interview in October 2006 that, “Saudi Arabia always talks to Iran. Washington is making a big mistake by not talking to Tehran. We had a similar experience in the past. We faced numerous problems when we cut our ties with Tehran in the 1990s. However, things returned to normalcy when we resumed our
relations. This serves our interests. Therefore, we are of the opinion that talks with others is much better than shutting the doors to their faces”. (Former Saudi Ambassador, 2006) Such a huge contradiction among the high ranking Saudi officials was seen as a reason for Turki al-Faisal’s resignation from his ambassadorial post and his return back home from Washington. The US Vice President Dick Cheney, during a visit to Riyadh, did seek help from the Saudis to end violence in Iraq and resolve other regional issues in which the US was directly involved, such as the problem of Lebanon, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iran’s nuclear case. This clearly serves as evidence that Saudi Arabia is now following the US policies vis-à-vis Iraq and Iran. Therefore, if Washington decides to change its policies with regard to the region, Riyadh would most probably follow suit.

3) Will Iran reconsiders its policies on the Persian Gulf?

Iran has been against the US interests in the region because it wants to protect its own interests and has the independent military capabilities to do so. It is the only regional power that continues to successfully challenge Washington’s policies throughout the Middle East. Western pundits are of the opinion that although Iran’s military hardware is far less modern than others, it has made huge investments in sectors to secure enough strategic deterrence and defensive capability to a great extent. In other words, If Iran is stopped from using the Persian Gulf waters to export oil due to the probable blockade or military attack by its enemies, it can similarly stop others from doing so. Iran’s rivals see its purchase of submarines, mines and anti-air missiles as evidence that it might use them to block the Strait of Hormuz at the times of crisis and war. On the other hand, Iran’s military doctrine has
been and still is defensive. The country aims to prevent enemies from attacking its territories from the sea by putting obstacles in their way.

As one of most important actors in Persian Gulf, Iran’s foreign policy objectives have had effective impact on the security of the entire region. Despite pessimism towards the establishment of a security treaty in which all the Persian Gulf littoral states could be involved, there are many signs which indicate that these Muslim nations are more than ever willing to strengthen ties and shun confrontation. Since the end of the Iraq-Iran war in 1988, the Iranian administrations have been trying to boost ties with the six PGCC (Persian Gulf Cooperation Council) states. Yet it is early to establish a regional collective security system in which all the littoral states can be involved. As long as the regional and non-regional states are not willing to abandon their anti-Iranian policies and recognize Iran’s true position as a key to the region’s much needed security arrangement, Tehran will have no other option but to pursue its independent policies about the Persian Gulf. In circumstances as such, the possibility of yet another regional conflict cannot be ruled out either. Indeed, the absence of an effective security arrangement can pave the way for the longer presence of foreign powers in the region, offering them the much needed justification to augment their influence, conduct changes in the nature of political regimes and security environment of the region so as to serve their interests.
Suggestion

Considering the issue that in recent years we have witnessed a considerable evolution and transformation in the concept of security, we can claim that security now has a broad concept which is not merely limited to the military dimensions, however, the concept of it concludes ample of life dimensions such as economic, social and political dimensions and their effects on each other. At this juncture, an overall security in the Persian Gulf cannot be only placed through military means. In fact, it requires a net adjustment to arouse all the countries and all the countries can participate in it. This is not achieved but through a comprehensive and cooperative partnership of all the regional countries and avoiding any disputes and bipartisan. The Islamic Republic of Iran can play a crucial and significant role in this regard. The international and regional challenges are considered as the main incentives and motivation to achieve the main starting point based on the recognition of the mutual interests of the regional countries. On the other hand, the security of the region rings around creating a collective security. This requires a common security system in which the security strategies of all the countries have been integrated to complement each other strengths. The establishment of such a system requires an agreement on a series of common actions. The first attempt in this direction can be referred to the confidence building measure. In order to change the Persian Gulf region into peaceful and secure region, the goodwill must replace grudging, which is now considered as the basic need of the region. The Islamic Republic of Iran is doubtlessly one of the powerful countries in the region and the principled policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the
security of the Persian Gulf is based on denying the presence of foreign troops, particularly the American troops. But following the events of the 11th of September 2001 and the presence of American forces in the region, the best solution that the regional countries can implement to achieve their goals is the policy of cooperation, reducing tensions and resolving conflict peacefully. However, the policy requires a confidence-building between the regional players.

In order to achieve a new atmosphere followed by the confidence in a rule, fundamental changes are required in the region. Considering the issue that it has not seen any fundamental changes in the domestic affairs of the Sheikhdoms and these regimes continue to remain without any modifications. But there are indicators which depicts that the awareness of the regional countries is growing. The most significant one, related to the indicator, reveals the positive developments in the relations between the regional countries, particularly the relations between Iran and the Arab countries in the region.

Determining the relationships in order to achieve a trustful atmosphere in the region is highly significant. The regional countries should clarify their foreign policy in the developments occurring in the Persian Gulf and they should recognize the opportunities and pave the way for cooperation.

However, their realistic policy should be based on the national interests, exigencies and the regional and international circumstances. They should also replace cooperation with competition so that the present atmosphere of the region will lead towards trust and mutual understanding.
Some of the most considerable measures for confidence-building and reducing tensions in the region have been mentioned below:

1) Islam as an ideology which rules in the region should carry the message of unity. They should avoid severe prejudices. As a result, the ideological competition and the Islamic cold war (Shiites and Sunnis) should be avoided and thus the seizure focus must be eliminated.

2) The establishment of fraternal relations among the Muslim countries in the region and the elimination of dispute between Arab and Persian and the emphasis on the issue that providing all their national interests depend on peace and social integration.

3) The establishment of equal relationship without any violence and competition that till now has been exploited by the interested countries in the region such as America, England and Israel.

4) Oil is considered as the most important resource to acquire currency and the most significant revenue for the regional governments so that just the region’s oil and gas provides 95% of the total needs of the related countries. Therefore, the oil policy should be adopted with a full coordination with the regional countries in face of the industrial countries in order to increase and control oil prices and maintains its level.

5) Adopting new security measures by the regional countries relying on the principle of not interfering in the internal affairs of each other and having the sense of equality with all nations without any tendency to violence in the new security framework. The aim should be to discourage violence and encourage peace.
6) The expansion of economic cooperation among the regional countries and the increase in the economic dependencies, as these transactions will have an impact on the political decisions and brings the regional countries closer together in peace and ultimately it will lead to the reduction of tension. The economic cooperation usually happens through the formation of joint economic unions which is results after the political confidence-building. All the regional countries should boost their economic system; as it is the only way to support the national goals of the countries.

7) Attempting to resolve the territorial and border disputes as some of the regional governments, politically motivated, try to internationalize the border disputes as a result of America’s military presence in the Persian Gulf. The regional countries should develop their relationship in the form of the policy focusing on reducing tension and confidence-building and they should resolve their problems through direct negotiations, without interference of any other countries or trans-regional powers.

The success of this scenario within the strategic regional framework will also pave the way for success of sustainable regional security as well as promotion of peace along the borders of the “security arrangement” at the final point.

This strategy is the wisest strategy in the present circumstances simply because a joint security solution also has a strategy tendency towards regional order and security plus fulfilment of security in different spheres and angles as its ultimate goal.
Therefore, this strategy can be considered as a dynamic strategy for serving the national interests and security concerns of all players in the Persian Gulf region.

Why this scenario is being introduced as the wisest and finest option?

A strategy as such for ensuring security requires preconditions in the region explained in the following:

1) The first level of the security partnership arrangement concerns individual security in which Arab officialdoms have to pay closer attention to domestic political developments through political reforms, promotion of democracy and political participation. However, there is no consensus in this regard yet. Thus it has to be developed.

2) In line with regional convergence and the priorities that have been scientifically established in the process of this research, they must also work towards economic cooperation, free trade, cultural exchanges, building trust and security.

3) Iran has already inked cooperation agreements with the littoral states on fighting drug trafficking, organized crimes, protecting the environment, and even sea patrols. It has also had favourable economic ties with some of them with promising outlook. In fact, Iran has already established close economic and political ties with Iraq, participating in its reconstruction efforts. All these along with active diplomatic efforts to set up informal organizations and confidence building serve as further proof that a strategy as such could indeed be delivered.

4) In this policy, for numerous reasons such as bilateral military treaties between the tiny Sheikhdoms of the PGCC with the global power, their strategies are being devised in line with US
policies. The US could ensure stability in the Persian Gulf region if it can optimally protect its own interests.

Like ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) member states, which have signed bilateral agreements with the US as a balancing power, a limited US presence could from one hand change the perceived Iranian or Iraqi treat to tiny Sheikhdoms eye of littoral states and on the other, help stop the increase in the number of radical and terrorist groups or organizations in the region.

5) The foremost challenge for this strategy is the formal diplomatic relations between Tehran and Washington plus the uneven ties with the Western and influential countries. However, this factor does in no way go against the characteristics of the proposed joint security arrangement.

6) The US invaded and occupied Iraq as a gateway to democratize the Arab world. The Iraqi gateway to the Arab world can create opportunities and threats in the future. Obviously the future Iraqi threats will not be military in nature. However, it could still act as a “Shiite Crescent”. It could act as a Shiite-Arab nation and devise dynamic policies to promote Iranian culture ties with Arab world and also lessen nationalistic conflicts throughout the region.

7) Generally speaking, the regional states can use their rich oil resource to sort out individual/social security issues; make government subsides goal-oriented; pledge global energy security through fair pricing practices; enhance confidence-building measures in bilateral and trilateral rclation; and interact with each other as team. This strategy with patience and
articulation and care could make the regional states a role model in collaboration and security building for other Muslim States and even Asia.

8) Based on theoretical principles of regional convergence, the regional (indigenous) norms similar to the ASEAN model and the confidence-building measures in the European model are being considered, it has been introduced as the optimized option.

9) We should make decisions based on the slogan of science, wisdom and resolve that could serve our constructive interests in the future security arrangement of the Persian Gulf. This could also pave the way to educational development for what was lost in the past along with establishing sustainable peace and security across the entire region.

The countries of Persian Gulf therefore, must follow the EU and ASEAN model of regional cooperation. AWAN (Association of West Asian Nations) is best model for Persian Gulf security and economic activities. The members of AWAN must work together based on a different compilation of norms. The similarity of regional elements of ASEAN and Persian Gulf makes it a proper role model for regional unions and fora. The ASEAN’s particular producer lays emphasis on informal mechanism, intense negotiations for reaching a decision that is based on political consensus and minimized bureaucratic procedures which happens to be totally different from the Western models. Consensus could be reached through negotiations and consists of a wider area, and if the majority reaches an agreement on any particular issue, others will keep their silence.
The road to ASEAN passes through the growing socialization of superior norms and long-term interactions. The organization is authorized to deal with three subject matters:

Building confidence, the organization has been most successful in its confidence building measures. Some of these could include voluntary sharing on allocation of defence budgets, growing number of dialogues with regards to different security matters, plus the increase in the number of contacts between military structures.

Just like its ASEAN model, a comprehensive participatory modern security assemblage will be on top of the security structure comprising balancing realities between the policies of major international powers and regional states. On the other hand, the US presence in the Persian Gulf is much more overwrought than in ASEAN.

This is only because some regional states are severely dependent on the US for its security. At the same times, they need to symbolically reduce such reliance for political reasons. The successful experience of ASEAN can offer useful guidelines for setting up a new assemblage both in form and contents.

Based on the above study, certain conclusions have been arrived at and also certain recommendations have been proposed to strengthen regional cooperation in the Persian Gulf Region. A working model has also been proposed for AWAN (Association of West Asian Countries).
Strengthening Regional Security Cooperation & Development in the Persian Gulf Region

1) Since time immemorial western powers have interfered in the internal affairs of the Persian Gulf and Arab countries. Whether it was the Portuguese, the British or the Americans in the 21st century, this region has always been controlled and manipulated by foreign powers. Strategically this region lies mid-way between Europe and East Asia and hence is of immense strategic importance. In the ancient times control of this region was important to maintain the vital sea lines of communication. With the recent discovery of petroleum products and natural gas this region has risen to prominence. Therefore external powers have important economic stakes in the region.

2) Over the last few decades western powers led by USA have pursued a policy of “Divide and Rule” in the region to perpetuate their dominance in the Persian Gulf region. Persian-Arab rivalry, Shia-Sunni tensions, ethnic nationalism and power politics have been exploited by America and its allies to further their hidden agenda.

3) This western interference has further complicated the problems in the region and has been largely responsible for creating instability and fomenting tensions in the region. The American intervention in Iraq created more problems rather than solving them. Ever since American intervention in Iraq, sectarian violence in the region has been on the rise.
4) To prevent western interference in the regional affairs of the Persian Gulf states in the future, there arises a strong case for the establishment of a regional security framework. Whether it was a Shia dominated state or a Sunni majority state or a Wahabbi, all the communities have suffered US hegemony in the region. Drawing important lessons from history, the Persian Gulf countries must come together on the name of Islam forgetting their ethnic and sectarian identity to form a regional security framework to protect their common interests. Under the banner of AWAN (Association for West Asian Nations).

5) Critics point out that the mutual differences among the Persian Gulf countries are so wide that any concrete understanding for a regional security and development framework is unworkable and even if established would take decades to fructify into a strong regional alliance. But it must be remembered that even the European Union took more than 48 years to firmly establish itself as a workable regional institution.

6) The first step towards building such a regional alliance would be to bring about a truce among the Shia-Sunni-Wahabbi communities in the region. Prof Samuel Huntington’s theory of the inevitable clash of Islamic and Christian dominated civilization and the resulting success of the Christian civilization in crushing the Islamic civilization should form the basis for uniting the various Persian and Arab states under a common regional security initiative. In order to solve the larger and important problems like the Palestinian issue, combating US hegemony etc. it is necessary to initiate a process of peace and reconciliation among the two communities.
7) It is generally assumed that major decisions pertaining to foreign policy are made by diplomats and politicians. Many tend to forget the role of the people’s power in the decision making process. The current crisis in North Africa has displayed the power of people’s movement aided by technology, which allows the rapid dissemination of information across the globe. In the case of Persian and Arab states more than the religious leaders and politicians, the people have to take initiative in urging their respective governments to shed their sectarian differences and unite together to establish a strong regional security initiative to save the Islamic identity from Christianity.

8) Dependency on USA should be minimized and assistance from emerging countries like Russia, India and China must be sought to modernize the armies of the Persian Gulf region. The defence equipments of Russia India and China are also relatively cheaper. Also the Russia India and China are exploring potential market for their defence products and a mutually beneficial arrangement can be worked out.

9) At the State level it would be commendable on the part of Iran if it could take the first steps in this regard to initiate dialogue with the neighbouring Arab states. Iran with its recent strides in military and technology is widely respected across the Persian Gulf region. Its firm stand against American hegemony has also won it many laurels cutting across religious lines. Therefore, first steps for the establishment of a regional security framework has to taken by Iran and Saudi Arabia who are champions of Shia and Sunni communities respectively.
10) The states in the region will have to shed their differences in order to build a strong and credible alliance which can deter any foreign power from acting irresponsibly against the interests of any Persian Gulf states. Another reason for the growing US hegemony in the region especially in the last three decades has been due to the absence of any credible opposition from USA’s traditional cold war rivals like the erstwhile USSR and the People’s Republic of China. The disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Union and the following economic crisis prevented Russia from voicing US’s hegemonic attitude in the Persian Gulf region. But after two decades the Russian Federation has recovered from its domestic crisis and is today asserting its power. Russia and China have strongly supported Iran in its Civil Nuclear Programme. Therefore, it would be logical to conclude that any regional security alliance, which is primarily anti-west, will receive strong backing from the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. By seeking the political support from the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, the idea of a Persian Gulf security framework is not meant to revive the cold war but merely to restore the Balance of Power in the region and promote security & development in the region.

11) The AWAN will have to adopt a LOOK EAST POLICY in order to expand their economic activities. Traditionally the West Asian and the Persian Gulf countries have catered to the needs of the Western countries. But the rising East Asian economies are bound to provide potential markets and avenues for lucrative trade for AWAN countries. Also close coordination with the ASEAN and
SAARC can help in achieving a higher goal of promoting Asian Solidarity.

12) The chances of success of any regional security mechanism increase if the concerned organization has a strong and credible economic foundation. There is an old saying in international relations i.e., “Politics Divides and Economics Unites”. A strong economic foundation can help in achieving consensus on critical political and security issues. The recent success of SAARC can be affiliated to the efforts taken by member countries to promote trade and economic cooperation. Similarly, the Persian Gulf countries will have to focus on promoting cooperation in the economic and trade sectors.

13) The AWAN countries will also have to diversify their economies. Currently these countries are heavily reliable on oil/natural gas exports for earnings. But these countries will have to consciously shift their energy towards developing non-petroleum sectors like manufacturing, heavy industries and services to kick-start their economies.

14) On the security front, the AWAN countries can play an effective role in the reconstruction of the war torn Muslim countries like Iraq and Afghanistan. Their efforts are bound to increase the chances of success in bringing about enduring stability in these countries. Also joint regional efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan can also provide a testing ground for the AWAN nations to test their ability to work together. Under one roof and on one platform.

15) Although the concept of AWAN is based on the ASEAN model but the AWAN countries must always strive to achieve the sophistication of the European model. The European Union has by
far been the most successful regional grouping. It has successfully achieved regional integration by introducing a common currency, promoting the free movement of goods and people. Therefore the final goal of AWAN should be to achieve a regional integration on the lines of a European Union model because only then it will be capable of defending its collective regional interests of security and development of Persian Gulf.

Activities of AWAN

Following activities are suggested:

1) West Asian Development Agency (WADA):
   a) An organization with the above name should be established under the auspices of AWAN to promote industrialization in the Persian Gulf & West Asian region. It can become a useful forum for interaction between developed and developing countries of West Asia.
   b) WADA can provide technical assistance in the industrial development by organizing industrial training programmes, providing advisory services and rendering assistance to countries in obtaining fair and equitable external financing.
   c) Countries like India, Russia and China can render valuable assistance in the establishment and effective functioning of AWAN.
2) Strategic Economic Dialogue Forum (SED):

a) The SED can provide a forum for productive multilateral engagement between west Asian nations with diverse responsibilities for economic and trade issues.

b) Under SED a West Asian CEOs Council can be formed to provide the Governments with private sector inputs for revitalizing the economic partnership...

c) A Trade Policy Forum can be formed to increase trade and flow of investments among AWAN countries. This forum can be used to discuss vital issues like reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers among the AWAN countries.

d) Efforts should be undertaken to establish a West Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement on the lines of SAPTA. Efforts should be made to provide for preferential access to a list of products manufactured in the West Asian Region.

e) Efforts should also be undertaken to establish a Free Trading Agreement between the AWAN countries. Such an arrangement will require the developed and developing region of the west Asian regions to reduce their tariff and non-tariff barriers to allow free trade among themselves.

3) Establishment of AWAN University:

a) A world class university on the lines of SAARC University can be established to cater to the needs of West Asian intellectuals and academics under the auspices of AWAN. Such a university will impart valuable knowledge to students from all West Asian countries.
b) AWAN University will also encourage research in various fields in science, strategic studies, management, humanities etc. concerning the development of the West Asian region.

c) Scholarships would be granted to students belonging to the developing nations of West Asia.

4) Centre for Peace and Reconciliation

a) As the name suggests, a centre for promotion of peace and reconciliation needs to be established. Such a centre would encourage dialogue among the different sects of Islam in West Asia and try to unite them to promote solidarity among AWAN countries.

b) Apart from intra-religious dialogue, the centre would also generate peaceful discussion on Arab-Persian rivalry arising out of ethnic differences.

c) The centre would also encourage discussion and diplomacy on the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes among West Asian States.

Charter of AWAN

1. Political Clauses:

1) The members of AWAN will strive to build solidarity among them through collective action and remain united to protect their vital regional interests...
2) The members of AWAN believe in the universal principle of cooperation and peaceful co-existence professing different ideologies, faiths and beliefs.

3) The members would not interfere in the domestic affairs of member nations of AWAN.

4) The members would respect the territorial integrity of the member states and they will undertake efforts to resolve outstanding political, economic and military disputes through peaceful means.

5) The members of AWAN will not undertake hostile military action against the member states.

6) The members of AWAN will consult each other and present a unified front in various International forums like the UN General Assembly to promote West Asia interests.

2. Military Clauses:

1) The member countries will sign a Treaty of Friendship & Cooperation which will allow member countries of AWAN to enter into mutual consultations in the event of an attack or threat of attack. The treaty will also stipulate that an attack on a AWAN country would be regarded as an attack on the whole AWAN and the member countries can undertake joint military efforts to neutralize the threat.

2) The member countries will regularly conduct joint military exercises and training to develop coordination for prospective coalition operations in the future.

3) The member nations will make efforts to revive and expand the scope of the Persian Shield Force to cover the whole West Asian Region.
4) The member nations will collaborate in the design, development and manufacture of advanced military technology to gain self reliance in Defence Production.

5) Joint efforts will be undertaken by the member nations of AWAN to combat insurgency and terrorism by promoting intelligence cooperation and timely information exchange.

6) The member nations will strive for the establishment of an AWAN Peace keeping Force (APKF) on the lines of African Union. Member nations will have to compulsorily allocate a certain number of contingent troops for the efficient functioning of such a peacekeeping force.

7) Efforts will also be undertaken by the militaries of AWAN nations to police the critical Sea Lanes of Communications to ensure free flow of commerce in the region.

3. Economic Clauses:

1) The member nations of AWAN will strive hard to promote economic development in the region. The member nations will make efforts to promote trade and investments in the region.

2) The economically well-developed member nations will work closely with the developing nations of West Asia to promote equitable gains.

3) Through technical and monetary cooperation the AWAN nations will work closely for the improvement of infrastructure development to facilitate intra-regional trade.

4) The AWAN member nations will work in close coordination during the annual conferences of International Financial
Institutions and collectively bargain for the benefit of the West Asian bloc.

5) The AWAN member nations will initiate dialogue with other regional groupings like ASEAN, SAARC, EU, SCO and explore avenues for cooperation.

6) The AWAN member nations will make efforts to evolve a joint energy policy with due consultations with OPEC countries.

7) AWAN nations will also undertake efforts to develop and manufacture non-petroleum goods to reduce reliance on petroleum products earnings. Joint efforts will be undertaken to expand the scope of manufacturing and services sectors in the West Asian region.

8) AWAN nations will explore avenues for the establishment of a common currency for the whole West Asian region including a few North African countries.

Organizational structure and functioning of AWAN
1) The Presidency of AWAN will change after every two years on a rotational basis.

2) The West Asian Parliament will take all decisions on the basis of majority. It will determine the common policies of AWAN based on deliberations and consultations. It will also receive, consider and take decisions on reports and recommendations from other organs of the regional grouping. It will also monitor the implementation of policies and decisions of the AWAN and ensure its compliance by member nations.

3) A West Asian Summit will be hosted twice a year with a gap of six months in between. The Summit will be attended by the Heads of State of AWAN member nations.

4) Defence Minister’s Council:
   a) The council will be responsible for discussions and deliberations on matters pertaining to defence and security in the region.
   b) The council will be directly responsible for the joint military efforts in the region.
   c) The council will also undertake the administration and maintenance of the AWAN Peacekeeping Force and render possible assistance to it during active deployment.
   d) The council will also be responsible to discuss the avenues of joint military exercises in the Persian Gulf region with foreign countries.

5) Foreign Minister’s Conference:
   a) To build a common foreign policy agenda for the whole west Asian region.
   b) To discuss current regional and international events and their possible implications on the West Asian region.
c) To initiate dialogue with other regional and international organizations and explore avenues for collective action.

6) Economic council:
   a) The Finance minister’s of AWAN will meet at least twice a year to participate in discussions on vital economic and trade issues.
   b) The Finance Minister’s will duly consult the various forums elaborated under the Economic clause to establish a common market in the region.
   c) The council will also deliberate on important fiscal and monetary policies like common currency, stability of commodity prices etc.
   d) The council will strive to establish a Free Trade Area in the West Asian region.

1) After Researching continuously for 3 years I have arrived at the conclusion that there lies a positive relation between security and economic development in the Persian Gulf region. In my study I have discussed and suggested at the great length that the Persian Gulf countries will have to forge a political, military and economic partnership to bring long-term stability and sustainable growth in the Persian Gulf, A close study of all the Persian Gulf states goes to show that the region holds immense potential for rapid economic development,

2) with the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the gradual thinning of American presence from Iraq, there lies a great opportunity for the Persian Gulf countries to come together and make a fresh start towards normalizing relations and ensure enduring peace and stability in the region, and also dilute future foreign interference in the region,
3) As a student and researcher I have made an honest attempt to present a workable model for regional integration in the form of AWAN. After studying and minutely examine the charters and experiences of various regional groupings, AWAN has been conceived by incorporating the best feature of various organisations. The recommendations suggested are workable provided the Governments of the Persian Gulf exhibit the necessary political will to implement the policies. As a researcher I have fulfilled my obligations of studying the regional security in the Persian Gulf from all aspects and it is up to the governments of the concerned countries to act positively.

4) As suggested on several occasions in my thesis, the countries will have to shed their ethnic differences and make a fresh start to build a strong regional integration model in the Persian Gulf,

5) Iran and Saudi Arabia must take a lead role in initiating dialogue to jump start the creation of AWAN. I propose that like SAARC a working paper on the creation of AWAN be circulated among the Heads of Governments and try to gauge their responses towards such a model,

6) As a researcher I propose that Iran must take a lead role in initiating such a measure. Also I believe that further discussions and interactions on the modalities of the AWAN model needs to be discussed among officials, politicians and research scholars of the region,

7) My job as a researcher was to provide a workable model for Persian Gulf security and development which was long desired to ensure its stability and prosperity. I hope that my thesis will open:
new avenues for further serious deliberations on the issue and help the decision-makers of the region in making wise decisions,

8) I am confident that given the necessary political will, AWAN can succeed and in a very short span of time become one of the most successful models of regional integration. The people of the Persian Gulf have long desired that stability and prosperity be restored in the region and I am confident that AWAN can help in fulfilling the people’s desires for a peaceful and content life for themselves. The AWAN model and its recommendations will help the countries of Persian Gulf in reconciling their differences and pave the way for a mutually beneficial cooperation among the Persian Gulf states.