CHAPTER-III

THE ORIGINS OF
THE SOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE
Introduction

Neither the Tsarist regime nor its Bolshevik successor were known for a liberal attitude to public deliberations of issues relating to military theory. Nonetheless, there exists a body of theoretical expression regarding military strategy, etc., which provide valuable insights into the development of Soviet military doctrine. A perusal of the Soviet theoretical literature gives the impression that the Soviet understanding of war and related matters have been deeply influenced by Marxism-Leninism. Indeed, military theory was fortified with the scientific theory of Marxism-Leninism. The military doctrine that evolved in Soviet Union from 1920s with its core in Communist Weltanschauung remained always an enigma for the West. The confusion was worst confounded by the semantic difference of the concept of military doctrine as it was understood in Soviet Union and in the West, especially in the United States.

The present chapter attempts to understand the theories of Marxism-Leninism on War and Army and peaceful coexistence. It further analyses the conceptual meaning of military doctrine, military science, military art, etc., and also deliberates on the origin of Soviet military doctrine, which represented a unified and comprehensive Party policy for the Armed Forces.
I

Marxism-Leninism on War

The October Revolution (1917) ushered a new regime in Russia (that is, the Bolshevik Party), which had a strong root in an 'integrated ideology'. Russia became the first country in the world where Marxist ideology became an adaptive tool in national politics - thus, "the dialectical antipodes of 'theory' and 'practice' were tested in empirical action."¹ It is generally believed that the theoretical underpinnings concerning the nature of war as understood by the Soviets was based on the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, particularly on the theory of war known as the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and army.

Marxism-Leninism maintains that war as a complete phenomenon "is not eternal. It is a historical phenomenon engendered by social and economic factors."² According to Marxism-Leninism war is tied to the existence of exploiter societies:

The causes of war are rooted in the nature of a society with antagonistic classes, in the economic

foundation of the society - private ownership and the unresolvable contradictions inherent in it.\(^3\)

Lenin believed that underlying cause of war was class struggle - so long as mankind was divided into classes, and so long as there will be exploitation of man by man and nation by nation, there will inevitably be war. In this class struggle there will be "revolutionary wars, i.e., wars arising from the class struggle, wars waged by revolutionary classes, wars which are of direct and immediate revolutionary significance.\(^4\)"

Marxist-Leninist theory classifies wars as first (revolutionary wars) and unjust (predatory wars). Just wars are distinguished from unjust ones by the progressive or reactionary, liberating or aggressive aims of the belligerents.\(^5\) According to this distinction, just war

...includes wars fought by working people, who have risen to accomplish a socialist revolution against exploiters...wars of national liberation... against colonial rule, wars whose objective is to protect one country or another from foreign aggression....Just wars are progressive and revolutionary.\(^6\)


And unjust wars

...are wars against socialist countries, wars waged by exploiters against the working people, against revolutionary and democratic movements; colonial wars waged by the imperialists with the aim of enslaving peoples of economically backward countries; wars which exploiters wage among themselves for economic and political influence in the world. These are reactionary wars.\(^7\)

Thus, it follows that a war waged by people for the attainment of freedom and social progress, economic independence or against an aggressive attack, is a just war. Conversely, wars unleashed by imperialist powers with the aim of expanding their territorial, economical or political spheres of influence, are unjust wars. The Bolsheviks supported just war, and "maintained that a resolute struggle must be waged against (unjust wars)...to the point of revolution and the overthrow of one's own imperialist government."\(^8\) Marxist-Leninist theory of war categorically emphasizes that war is always unleashed by the aggressive intents of the imperialists.\(^9\)

\(^{7}\) Ibid., p.118.
\(^{8}\) Cited in Garthoff, n.l, p. 38.
Lenin categorically stated the Soviet perspective on the relation between politics and war when he said that,

War is a continuation of policy by other means. All wars are inseparable from the political systems that engender them. The policy which a given state, a given class within that state, pursued for a long time before the war is inevitably continued by that same class during the war, the form of action alone being changed...\(^\text{10}\)

Lenin actually borrowed the definition from Carl von Clausewitz, who believed that war is a phenomenon related only to foreign policy of a state.\(^\text{11}\) But Lenin defined the concepts of war and politics in relation to the Marxist concept of class. He emphatically said,

How can a war be accounted for without considering its bearing on the preceding policy of the given state, of the given system of states, the given classes?\(^\text{12}\)

Thus the Marxist-Leninist concept of war emphasised that war was inevitable as long as social antagonism is there in the world, and the establishment of a socialist

\[^{10}\text{Lenin, n.4, p. 25.}\]

\[^{11}\text{For a valuable analytical insight into Clausewitz's monumental work, On War, see Raymond Aron, Clausewitz: Philosopher of War, trans., Booker, Christine and Stone, Norman (London, 1983). The book also traces the different interpretations of Clausewitz's doctrine in Soviet Russia, etc.}\]

\[^{12}\text{Lenin, n.4, p. 25.}\]
system of society would automatically eliminate war. As will be seen subsequently in the present chapter this concept underwent reevaluations in the Soviet policies over a period of time.

II

Leninist Concept of Peaceful Coexistence:

The concept of peaceful coexistence of states with divergent social systems was enunciated by Lenin. It has been defined as "...the fundamental foreign policy principle of the socialist countries in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism on a world scale; the peaceful form of the struggle between the opposing social systems (socialist and capitalist) in the political, economic and ideological spheres."\(^{13}\) Lenin believed that ultimately socialism will triumph over capitalism throughout the world. Since this triumph cannot be achieved throughout the world at the same time, therefore, socialist countries will have to live with capitalist countries. In this correlation of forces the socialist and capitalist countries will have to live in peaceful coexistence.

\(^{13}\) Boris Putrin, *Political Terms: A Short Guide* trans., Valentin Kochetkov (Moscow, 1982), p. 60.
The fundamental aim of this concept was,

...the renunciation of war as a means of settling issues between nations, the settlement of these issues by negotiation; equality, understanding and trust between countries with due account for each other's interests; non-interference in internal affairs, the recognition of the right of every nation to resolve its own problems independently; respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; the promotion of economic and cultural cooperation founded on complete equality and reciprocal benefit.14

But peaceful coexistence does not presuppose the absence of class struggle or the elimination of armed struggle if imperial power(s) jeopardise peace by forceful means. Indeed, "coexistence is inapplicable to relations between oppressors and the oppressed, between the colonialists and the victims of colonial exploitation."15 In other words, peaceful coexistence presupposes support for national liberation movements and struggle of the working class against capitalist exploitation. And, this would continue till socialism is established all over the world, in which case favourable conditions would be created for eliminating the use of force in international relations and all armed conflicts between countries.

14. Afanasyev, n.2, p. 120.
15. Ibid., p.121.
Evolution of Soviet Military Doctrine:

From 1921 wide ranging debates and discussions started in Soviet Union over the nature of military doctrine. The debates centred around the following propositions:¹⁶

(a) whether dual (commissar-commander) or unified command of army units was preferable;
(b) whether former Tsarist officers who had volunteered or who had been impressed should be permitted to remain in the Red Army;
(c) whether discipline should be strict or 'voluntary';
(d) whether the army should be entirely regular or a militia-partisan organization;
(e) whether the Principle of the Offensive, due to the dynamic revolutionary character of the Bolshevik ideology, had a unique and primary role in Soviet doctrine; and
(f) whether the Principle of Manoeuvre, because of its successful employment in the Civil War and presumed close link with 'the people', had a special Soviet significance.

The chief participants in these acrimonious debates with Mikhail V. Frunze\textsuperscript{17} and Lev Trotsky. The debates between the two raged at a time when Lenin was more or less incapable of taking part in it because of ill-health. This proved to be costly for Trotsky as "pro-Stalin elements in the party and military establishments... condemn(ed) Trotsky, and provoke(d) him into self-condemnation, with impunity."\textsuperscript{18} This provided the ground for Frunze to espouse the necessity of a 'Unified military doctrine'. In support of his argument he put forward basic facts, the chief of which were as follows:\textsuperscript{19}

(a) in modern wars, "whole nations almost to the man,...in millions engage in combat," whereas in the past a "small segment of population or...detachments of regulars" participated in wars;

(b) "unity, integrity, and coordination" of military art and science are very important in modern wars since "they are needed not only at the time military opera-

\textsuperscript{17} M.V. Frunze (1885-1925) was considered to be the most brilliant Soviet military theoretician. Regarded as second only to Lenin as the founder the Red Army, Frunze became Chief of Staff of the Red Army in May 1924 and in January 1925 replaced Trotsky as Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of Soviet Union.


tions are taking shape but also during the time preparations are being made for them, since as a general rule these preparations...play a decisive factor";

(c) the military machinery "must create sound unity among all armed forces...from top down ... (as regards) the nature of the military missions ... and on the means for carrying them out."

(d) this unity can be achieved only when there is a 'plan' based on "clearly formulated premises" and supported by the "country's ruling class".

From these assertions Frunze drew two conclusions:

The first takes in all points having a bearing on the organizational bases for the development of the Red Army, the nature of troops combat training, and the methods for executing missions. The second takes in the dependence and association of the technical side of armed forces development to the overall structure of state life, which defines the social environment in which military work must be conducted and the nature itself of the military missions.20

Thus for Fruze, a unified military doctrine was:

...a teaching adopted by the army of a particular state establishing the nature of armed forces development, the methods of troop combat training, and the methods of troop management, based on the state's prevailing views on the nature of the military missions lying before it and the means

20. Ibid., p. 29.
for executing them, which are dependent on the class nature of the state and are defined by the level to which the country's productive forces have developed. 21

The class character of the military doctrine put forward by Frunze stemmed from his belief that the proletarian character of the nascent Soviet state would necessarily involve it in a prolonged struggle against "the rest of the bourgeois world". 22 Frunze thus proceeded to put forward his "proletarian military doctrine", assuming that "...the course of the historical revolutionary process will force the working class to go over to the offensive against capital whenever conditions are favourable". 23 Significantly, the central position of the "role of manoeuvre in the future operations of the Red Army" 24 became the point of acrimonious debate between Frunze and Trotsky. Frunze argued that manoeuvre was central to the military strategy of the Red Army because of the proletarian character of the Soviet state and further that it would not stretch the scarce physical resources of the

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22. Ibid., p.30.
country. \textsuperscript{25}

Trotsky, on the other hand, while agreeing that there was a great deal of mobility in the operations of the Civil War (which followed the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 and which formed the bedrock of Frunze's central importance on manoeuvre) argued that future revolutionary wars would not only be fought in Russia but also in other European countries, viz., England, France and Germany, where 'strategic constraints' due to geographical features "would not be affected by the class character of the Red Army." \textsuperscript{26}

Hence, Trotsky virtually negated the role of class roots of manoeuvre in the Red Army thus rejecting the necessity of a proletarian military doctrine. Even Aleksandr Svechin also tacitly agreed with Trotsky when the former argued that in the event of adoption of a dogmatic military doctrine further innovations in military theory would be impossible leading to a check in any progress in the field. \textsuperscript{27}

Nevertheless, Frunze's arguments found acceptance in the Soviet political and military establishment with the latter endorsing and advocating the concepts of the

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p. 40.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p. 41.

\textsuperscript{27} Garthoff, n.1, p. 27. Svechin who was executed during Stalin's military purges in 1938 is considered to have made valuable contribution to Soviet military theory. See Aleksandr A. Svechin, "Strategy", in Scott and Scott, n.4, pp. 35-43.
offensive and manoeuvre.28

The Frunze-Trotsky debate set the stage for further crystallization of Soviet military doctrine. But before deliberating further on the development of Soviet military doctrine, it would be in order here to understand the semantics of Soviet military terms - viz., military doctrine, military strategy, military science, military art, etc.

**Military Doctrine:**

Military doctrine (*doktrina*) as was understood in Soviet Union had a totally different connotation from the Western definition of the same. A.A. Grechko defined military doctrine as,

...an officially accepted system of views in a given state and in its armed forces on the nature of war and methods of conducting it and on preparations of the country and army for war.29

This definition underlines, from a very narrow angle, that military doctrine is a set views having the official approval for the methods of conducting modern wars.

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29. Cited in Scott and Scott, n.4, p.4.
In, The Dictionary of Basic Military Terms, the definition of military doctrine was highlighted as a policy formulation having much broader connotation than just military factors. Military doctrine, therefore, includes political, economic, scientific and technical factors which provides for the broader participation of civilians besides military officers. According to this definition, military doctrine is,

...the system of scientifically based views officially accepted by the government on the character of modern war and the utilization within it of the armed forces and also the requirements for preparing the country and the armed forces for war that flow from these views.

Military doctrine has two sides: political and military-technical. The basic contents of military doctrine are determined by the political and military leadership of the state in conformity with the socio-political order and the level of development of the economy, science and technology and the military-technological armament of the armed forces of the country and also in light of the conclusions of military science and the views of the probable enemy.30

This holistic definition of military doctrine highlights the following points:

(a) Military doctrine must be approved by the political authority of the state;

(b) Military doctrine is a well-thought out scientific treatise of modern war;
(c) Military doctrine prepares the country for future wars.
(d) Military doctrine is not developed in isolation but actively considers the correlation of forces in the international politics.
(e) Military doctrine has an intricate relationship with the economic development of the country;
(f) Military doctrine amalgamates scientific-technological advancements in warfare and armaments; and
(g) Military doctrine is not a static set of ideas but a dynamic world view of warfare in all its facets.

Therefore, military doctrine has to keep a rapid pace with the systematic developments in the world.

**Military Science:**

An all-embracing study of military which includes economics, politics, etc., constitute military science. Military science has been defined in *The Dictionary of Basic Military Terms* as,

the system of knowledge about the nature, essence and content of armed struggle, about the forces, means and manners of conducting combat activities by the armed forces and about their comprehensive
Military science thus consists of an understanding of the nature of war keeping in mind the perspectives of economic and political relations both within the state and also in the international area. It is an all-encompassing study of military factors juxtaposed with morale and psychological variables relative to the potentialities of the enemy. In other words, Soviet military science consists of a body of knowledge relating to:

(a) the character of war,
(b) the laws of war;
(c) preparing the country and the Armed Forces for war;
(d) methods of waging war.  

Military science can, therefore, be regarded as an integral part of military doctrine, supplying the latter with the necessary wherewithals.

The various components of military science thus consists of:
(a) theories of war - which includes understanding the essence of war, troop manoeuvre, positional interplay of forces and their strategies, methods of attack;

32. Scott and Scott, n.4, p. 5.
(b) knowledge of armaments relative to the enemy;
(c) military history; and
(d) relative strength and weaknesses of the fighting forces.

Military Art

It is an important part of military science "and encompasses tactics, the operating art, and strategy."33 According to S.N. Kozlov,

The theory of military art, as the most important element of Soviet Military science, studies and elaborates actual methods and forms of armed combat. It represents a complex of direct military disciplines, which, like all the remaining branches of military science, is constantly changing and being creatively enriched.34

Strategy as a very comprehensive concept denoted the art of conducting a campaign and manoeuvring an army during a war. Operating art denoted "the organization and conduct of military operations", which tactics was "the study of battle".35 Grechko offered the following description to differentiate between strategy, operational art and tactics:

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34. Cited in Scott and Scott, n.4, p. 7.
35. Garthoff, n.1, p. 31.
While strategy encompasses questions dealing with the preparation and use of the Armed Forces in War, operational art involves resolution of problems of preparing for and waging joint and independent operations and combat actions by operational formulations and Services of the Armed Forces in individual theatres of military operations. With regard to tactics, operational art occupies a dominant position. It determines tactical missions, and the role and place of tactical operations by units and formations in achieving goals.36

Thus, strategy like military doctrine falls within the general parameters of the Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and army. Strategy, that is military strategy, in Soviet usage involved laying down the broad contours of war and consisted of the preparation of a detailed blueprint for war. Thus, military strategy involved working in close tandem with political strategy. Because as I. Cherkezov said, "Military strategy is part of political strategy. The aims of political strategy are also the aims of military strategy."37 In other words, it can be said that the broad political goals of the country were outlined by the political strategy taking into consideration the configurations of international political scene, and

military strategy, being part of the political strategy, formulated the plan of action to realise the political aspirations. Svechin said, military strategy is "a continuation, a part of, politics". Therefore, it can be concluded that military strategy and political strategy constituted military doctrine of Soviet Union.

Hence, it can be safely concluded that in the formulation and development of military strategy political aspirations of the country played the most important role. This is not surprising because in Soviet Union, Marxist-Leninist science formed the basis (or at least pretended to form) of all planning - political, military and economic. The influence of politics on military strategy can be gauged from what Stalin said on strategy:

The most important task of strategy is the determination of that basic direction along which the movement of the working class must go, and along which it is most favourable for the proletariat to deliver its main blow to the opponent for the realization of those ends set by the program. The plan of strategy is a plan for the organization of the decisive blow in that direction in which the blow can most quickly give the maximum results. 39

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38. Idem.
Further,

...to define the direction of the basic blow means to pre-determine the nature of operations in the whole period of war, to determine nine-tenths of the fate of the whole war. In this is the task of strategy. 40

Therefore, political strategy involved in preparing the ground for military operations and helping the latter in the realization of political aims. Further, military strategy also involved in creating conditions for furthering political strategy. Thus, military and political strategies supplemented each other depending on the exigencies of the situations.

IV

The Frunze-Trotsky debate in the early 1920s was the last of the Soviet military doctrinal deliberations during the Stalin era. Only a small group of military commanders headed by M.N. Tukhachevskiy and another by a former Tsarist officer B.M. Shaposhnikov tried to present certain strategic precepts in the form of Soviet military thought. 41 One of the reasons for the absence of doctrinal deliberations could

41. See Erickson, n.28, pp. 292-98, 349-56.
be the ban on public discussions of issues relating to foreign policy, strategy and defence during the Stalin era. Whatever little filtered out of Soviet Union on military theory were essentially "mosaics from speeches by Stalin on military operations." 42

The most important contribution to Soviet military theory during the Stalin era was the Field Service Regulations of 1936 prepared under the leadership of M.N. Tukhachevskiy and A.I. Yegorov, which "never saw the light of the day." 43 (Tukhachevskiy was one of the victims of the 1937 Stalin purges.) According to Tukhachevskiy the Field regulations of 1936 defined "the methods of combat training in the Red Army and reflect(ed) the definite systems of views concerning the nature of modern battle." 44 Though Stalin disagreed with this, it was accepted by the Soviet military later on.

Here, it would be in order to emphasise that from 1930 the military strategic thought was completely dominated by Stalin, as he did in all other fields. So much was the control of Stalin that K.Y. Voroshilov wrote in 1951, "Military science by right is called Stalin's military

42. Scott and Scott, n.4, p. 21.
43. Ibid., p.20.
44. See Mikhail N. Tukhachevskiy, "What is New in the Development of Red Army Tactics?" in Scott and Scott, n.4, pp. 56-59.
However, Stalin can by no stretch of an imagination be considered to be a great military theoretician. Stalin himself accepted the Leninist classification of wars between just and unjust and between civil and international wars, and he also emphasized the aggressive nature of capitalism as the source of wars. Among his theoretical works the one most resembling a formulation of military doctrine was an "Order of the People's Commissar of Defence, 23 February 1942, No.55." In a major speech, delivered on Red Army Day, Stalin made the first public announcement of five "permanently operating factors" deciding the fate of war. They were: "the stability of the rear, the morale of the troops, the quantity and quality of divisions, the armaments of the army and the organizational ability of the command personnel of the army." Other variables such as surprise were regarded by Stalin as transitory and affecting the final outcome of a war.

Stalin's main conclusion was that the side with superiority in the 'permanently operating factors' would inevitably win the war. At the same time, he cautioned that it was very necessary that "the preparation of reserves to

45. Cited in Scott and Scott, n.4, p. 74.
47. Ibid., p.80.
help the front is not weakened for a minute." 48 As a military theory, this thesis of Stalin was remarkable.

The end of World War II in 1945 saw a shattered Soviet Union facing the destructive force of atomic bombs in the armoury of the new potential antagonist, the United States. The effect of this was to freeze all discussions of military art in professional journals at the level reached in 1945, 49 which was in any case very few and far between during the Stalin era. From the strategic angle, the Soviet position in the post-World War period was not an enviable one due to more than one factor - the devastation of Soviet Union in World War II, Stalin's suspicions of the West, and the West in general were fearful of Communism. In every respect the Soviets stood at a considerable, and possibly decisive, disadvantage. This set the stage for a firm conclusion concerning the instrumentality and unavoidability of war between capitalism and socialism. The post-war Stalinist theory of international relations divided the world basically into two camps - socialist and capitalist, and the existence of the socialist bloc of states was interpreted by the Soviets as a deadly threat against the cohesion of

48. Ibid., p.81.

capitalism.\textsuperscript{50} The war between socialism and capitalism was believed to be inevitable because of the inherently aggressive nature of capitalism. It was considered inevitable because capitalism was desperately trying to defend its positions in the world with all possible means. The United States, henceforth, became the main concern of Soviet Union's foreign policy.

The import of the nuclear threat posed by the United States was apparent to the Soviets, who were left with two alternatives: either to develop their own atomic bomb or to forgo it. Obviously the Soviets could not have accepted the idea of global dominance by America and, therefore, it was natural that the Soviets should have spared no effort to develop the technology for their own nuclear bomb. As Josephson said,

\ldots it is clear that the existence of the U.S. programme (to build the atom bomb) was an important factor in the evolution of the Soviet effort. The decision to embark on building the bomb was taken in 1942 only after reports had been received that the United States and Germany were already pursuing this goal. The dropping of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated that the bomb could be built and that it was extremely powerful. Before 1945 many Soviet physicists had doubted that the bomb could be built; now the Soviet effort was intensified. Work on the fusion

bomb was stepped up after the U.S. explosion of November 1952.51

Such development was not reflected in the Soviet military doctrine, the most comprehensive of which was put forward by P. Chuvikov in 1946:

Military doctrine presents itself: (1) in the establishment of a unified principle of the construction of the armed forces of the country; (2) the establishment of unified methods of the combat preparation of troops; (3) the elaboration of tactics and strategy, the art of leading troops on the field of battle, on the basis of tasks set before the given state and the level of productive forces which it has attained.

The united military doctrine corresponds to the social structure of the State. In the Soviet state it flows from its socialist principles. It is united in our country in the full sense of the word. In the Soviet Union the views on the construction and actions of the armed forces are united. Fundamentally they consist of the facts that the Red Army must be a regular army, strictly disciplined, having a united military leadership, that the Red Army must correspond to first-rate contemporary technology.52

This military theory was a repetition of the points highlighted in the discussions of 1920s without the addition of any new aspects. It is surprising as to how the author

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of the concept overlooked the importance of nuclear weapons in any future war (after 1945). Perhaps it was intentional. However, the deliberate ignoring of the contemporary technological environment was also due to the slavish repetition of the Stalin precepts - the permanently operating factors - which curtailed innovations in military doctrine. George Quester argued that the overlooking of the significance of nuclear weapons might have been also a rational and calculated strategy for a power lacking sufficient numbers of such weapons that faced a possessor opponent.53 The dogmatism in Soviet military during the post-War Stalin period was succinctly put by I. Korotov:

During these years, major changes took place in the organization of the Soviet army and in the weapons and the combat equipment supplied to it....The development of Soviet military theory during this time was influenced negatively by the cult of personality....Historical truth on the war was twisted to Stalin's advantage. He alone was credited with all military successes, and the role played by the generals was reduced to simple executive functions. At the same time, the failures in the war were written off as errors by the executors-commanders of fronts or armies....Such a politics led to dogmatization of the principle of the five permanently operating factors which supposedly determined the outcome of the war. The doctrine of the factors was peddled

as a first-rate theoretical discovery.\textsuperscript{54}

V

Conclusion:

The above discussion makes it clear that till Stalin's death in 1953, Soviet military doctrine remained generally immersed in the thesis which believed that Soviet Union, being a socialist entity, would remain engaged in an unavoidable war with the capitalist system. The military doctrine that emerged (till 1953) represented an amalgam of aspects from diverse sources. The chief among them being the Tsarist Russian tradition with emphasis on the offensive, the Russian Civil War in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, and the ideological underpinnings of the Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and army. The debate on Soviet military doctrine which received a boost with the Frunze-Trotsky debate in the early 1920s got a setback during the Stalin era. Stalin was suspicious of his potential rivals in the military which led to the famous purge in the late 1930s. The sustenance of the Stalinist autocracy meant that the honours of the military were attributed to his military genius. His military

exhortations - the most prominent being the 'five permanently operating factors' deciding the fate of a war - were elevated to the status of grand military theories. The 'window of vulnerability' faced by Soviet union - owing to the technological superiority of the United States - was neglected in the military theory of the Stalinist era. Rather the latter kept on harping on the predictability of war without making suitable amendments in the military doctrine.

In short, the assumption concerning the inevitability of war between socialism and capitalism and doctrine of the five permanently operating factors were the basis of the military doctrine during the Stalin period. The modifications, seen in the light of the new dynamics of international security regime, were taken up by Khrushchev after Stalin's death.