Chapter III

EXTERNAL INFLUENCES: ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES, WEST ASIA AND CHINA
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The three main influences on Pakistan's nuclear programme have been those of: (a) The United States, (b) West Asia, and (c) China. Let us look into these influences one by one.

I. Role of the United States:

The active role of the United States in Pakistan's external policy began in 1954, the time when the two signed the Mutual Defence Agreement, negotiations for which had been going on for some years. Liaquat Ali Khan himself had, while touring America, talked in terms of alignment with the U.S.

Extremely difficult internal conditions, discussed in the previous chapter, and the fear of a larger neighbour — India — were the main guiding factors which turned Pakistan towards the West. According to Venkataramani, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali had also sought massive military aid. While the former's request was ignored, the US decided to ship "secretly" arms to Pakistan on latter's request; the move, however, failed.

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1 S.M. Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies (Minneapolis, 1974), p. 121.

2 Liaquat had said: "I have come to assist America discover Pakistan." He also pledged support to US actions in Korea, which he said "were saving Asia from danger of world Communism". See Arif Hussain, Pakistan, Its Foreign Policy and Ideology (London, 1961), p. 93 and Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan: The Heart of Asia (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1950), p. 28.

uranium to India.

One of the first steps of gesture towards Pakistan was the offer of aid worth $400 million out of which $200 million was military aid. President Zia rejected the Carter aid offer terming it "peanuts" and instead, sought a treaty guaranteeing Pakistan's security.

In February 1980 a high level US team comprising National Security Advisor Zbignew Brzezinski and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited Pakistan. While downplaying the prospects of such a treaty, held open prospects of increased aid. They also warned that a Pakistani nuclear test would spell the end of any US assistance.

Pakistan was adamant on the nature of commitment during the subsequent discussions also. In fact a US military team visited Pakistan as Brzezinski visit was drawing close. There were a number of lists drawn up consisting of what the US was prepared to give and what Pakistan felt it needed, the

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73 The reason offered by Carter was that since the US had already shipped 200 tons of enriched uranium, it would be foolhardy to stop now, because the Indians would reject even the limited safeguards. Financial Times (London), 1980 and Tahir-Kheli, n. 11, p. 141.

74 Spector, n. 31, p. 85.

75 Zia called $400 Million "Peanut". International Herald Tribune, 18 January 1980.

76 Ibid.
discrepancy was enormous. Both sides maintained their respective positions and an impasse was reached in the months that followed. The situation, however, changed when Ronald Reagan succeeded Carter.

Shortly after taking office in 1981, the Reagan administration began negotiations with the Pakistani President, Gen. Zia, for a US economic and military programme far larger than the one that had been proposed by President Carter. By June an agreement was reached on a six-year $3.2 billion aid package, including sale of 40 advanced C-16 fighter bombers. In approving the aid in 1981 the Congress granted a six-year exemption from the Symington amendment. However, it also strengthened a portion of law prohibiting US aid to any non-nuclear weapon state that subsequently detonated a nuclear explosive device. Under Section 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 670 (b)(2) 1981. Quoted in Spector, n. 31, pp. 91-93 and also see Spector, n. 63, p. 282. Under the 1981 amendment the US aid should be cut off automatically, although the President could continue assistance for 30 days of "continuous session if he determined that termination of assistance would be detrimental to the national security" of the United States, after that aid would cease unless restored by majority vote of both Houses of Congress.

77 Tahir-Kheli, n. 11, p. 103. The Pakistani list would have cost $11 billion. Included in it were radar, aircraft, anti-tank missiles, armed helicopters, tanks, APCs light field artillery and guns.


80 Spector, n. 63, p. 104.

81 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 670 (b)(2) 1981.
Assistance Act, prior to its amendment in 1981, Pakistan was ineligible for assistance because of its import of enrichment equipment. This restriction was removed by the Congress, Pakistan became eligible for the $3.2 billion aid.

In 1982 the Reagan administration warned Gen. Zia that US aid would be jeopardized if Pakistan began to extract plutonium from spent fuel at its unsafeguarded New Labs reprocessing plant.

As has been stated in earlier chapters, by 1984 Pakistan had made considerable progress in the enrichment field. Dr. A.Q. Khan declared that Kahuta plant had succeeded in producing enriched uranium. Gen. Zia subsequently confirmed the point but said that non-grade weapon material had been produced. In a speech in June 1984, Senator Cranston declared that Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme was continuing, Reagan administration officials also admitted this. The Krypton affair, also discussed earlier, further lent credence to these assertions. The ACDA Chief, Kenneth Alderman warned against the "dangers of Pakistan's nuclear programme". The US-Pakistan ties, however, remained cordial.

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82 Spector, n. 63, p. 282.
84 Nuclear Fuel, 27 February 1984, p. 11.
86 Patriot and Hindustan Times, 13 October 1984.
In fact there were reports of the United States offering nuclear umbrella to Pakistan, provided Pakistan gave up the nuclear option. In September 1984 President Reagan sent a letter to President Zia expressing strong US concern over Pakistan's continuing nuclear activities, threatening grave consequences in the event of Pakistan enriching uranium to more than the specified five per cent.

But an amendment moved by Senator Cranston to the continuing resolution appropriating money for fiscal year 1985 that would have cut-off aid to Pakistan, unless the President specified that it was not developing a nuclear explosive device or acquiring technology and material for detonating a device was rejected by the Senate.

On 16 November, Yaqub Ali Khan, Pakistani Foreign Minister visited the United States assuring the Reagan administration of Pakistan's willingness to limit the output of the Kahuta facility, as a reply to Reagan's letter.

In February 1985 Gen. Zia said that Pakistan had acquired

87 Nawa-i-Waqt, 5 October 1984. The US embassy in India denied to comment on the correspondence between President Reagan and Gen. Zia. The spokesman for the embassy said that the "President has regular correspondence with the world leaders, but we do not comment on any of that correspondence or whether such correspondence took place."


89 Spector, n. 83, p. 117.

enrichment to a grade necessary to run the plant ... less than five per cent.

On 13 March 1985, Reagan administration agreed to supply Pakistan with sophisticated air-to-air missiles to bolster its defence against Soviet and Afghan incursions.

In 1985 while approving aid for Pakistan, Key House Sub-committee and Senatorial Foreign Relations Committee adopted an amendment seeking to restrict Pakistan's nuclear programme. While the Senatorial committee noted that aid could continue as long as the President determined that it did not yet possess a nuclear device, the sub-committee adopted an amendment to suspend aid to any non-nuclear weapon state that violated US export laws in order to obtain equipment for the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device. The provision gave the President a broad discretion to waive the application.

On 21 June 1986, the Soviet Union, in its series of warnings over Afghanistan, for the first time warned Pakistan against developing nuclear weapons. The United States warned the Soviet Union, in a reply to the warning, not to interfere


in Pakistan's affairs. However, when Junejo, Pakistan's Prime Minister, visited Washington in July 1986, the United States expressed concern over the Pakistani nuclear programme.

Amid reports of the nuclear activities discussed in detail in the earlier chapters, including those of the US intelligence on Pakistan's success in producing weapon grade material, President Reagan certified in October 1986 that Pakistan "does not currently possess a nuclear explosive device".

On 18 December 1987, a Pakistan-born Canadian Arshad Parvez, was convicted in Philadelphia for attempting to export beryllium, a metal used in nuclear weapons to Pakistan. The verdict in the case made clear that the jury believed that the material was intended to support Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. The Government of Pakistan has denied any involvement in the episode. Nevertheless, in mid-January 1988,

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97 Indian Express, 19 December 1987 and Dawn, 17 February 1988. Parvez was convicted of five of eight charges levelled against him including the charges of violation of US export control laws and conspiracy to defraud the US Department of Commerce.

98 Patriot, 7 December 1986. Gen. Zia said the Pervez case had been cooked up by the US.
President Reagan determined that Pakistan had violated the Solarz Amendment. The President simultaneously waived the cut-off in the provision, however, to permit continued assistance to Pakistan.

Thus one can safely conclude with an excerpt from a Carnegie Endowment report, prepared by a Task Force of 16 specialists which says:

In sum, on several occasions, the United States has backed away from enforcing the sanction of an aid cut-off against Pakistan, permitting the waiver of Symington Agreement through legislation in 1981 and again in 1987; waiving the Glenn Amendment by Presidential Action in 1987; declining to react to the production of highly enriched uranium in 1986 and 1987 to avoid suspension of assistance even though Pakistan had apparently acquired the wherewithal for its first nuclear device; and waiving Solarz amendment in early 1988, despite finding that Pakistan had attempted to smuggle material out of the United States to be used in the manufacture of nuclear explosive device. 99

The inference which follows from the above stated facts can be summarized as:

(a) It may not be fully correct to say that the ball is no longer in the US court. It never was -- in the earlier stages US role was minimal because the programme itself was modest. In the later stages, Pakistan was, at not cost, ready to give up the option. The US, despite concrete evidence, was forced to waive its own rules in 1981 and again in 1988.

(b) The myth that the US is interested in implementing non-proliferation measures stands exploded. Not only the President, but some of the most ardent advocates, Senators Church, Percy and Glenn almost retraced steps when the vested interests came up.

(c) The success of US in getting the deal cancelled was not a success in terms of achieving the so-called non-proliferation vis-a-vis Pakistan. In the controversy it turned Pakistan (and successfully so) in adopting the other route to the nuclear weapons, namely enrichment.

(c) Pakistan was successful in obtaining the parts from Europe and other nations because of the commercial interests of the companies involved and because of the gap in the guidelines of the London Supplier Group of which Pakistan made use of, just as it was able to get the ban on arms sales lifted.

II. Role of West Asia: Islamic Bomb

In an interview to a local daily of Jeddah, Gen. Zia-ul Haq called for a careful study of the meaning and implication of the word "Islamic Bomb". The President said the US, Israel, Soviet Union and India have atomic bombs and asked as to why they were not called "a Christian bomb, a Jewish bomb, a communist bomb or a Hindu bomb". In another interview A.Q. Khan described the word "Islamic Bomb" as a "figment of the Zionist

100 Khyber Mail, 14 March 1982, quoted in IDSA News Reviews on South Asia and Indian Ocean, 1982, p. 162.
mind" which has been used in full force by the anti-Islamic Western countries".

Gen. Zia and so would A.Q. Khan do well to remember the concept was mooted by Zia's predecessor, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. In his last testament he had said, "we know that Israel and South Africa have the full nuclear capability. The Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilization have the capability. Only the Islamic civilization was without it, but this position was about to change".

Islam, as shall be seen subsequently, has played an important role in the country's politics, nuclear issue being no exception. Louis Hayes has said: "The political and social essence of Pakistan is Islam".

While this is debatable, the fact remains that Islam has been made use of, time and again, by every leadership, sometime or the other, beginning with the Objectives Resolution of 1949, which sought to base the constitution on the ideals of Islam. Thus all the three constitutions have declared

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102 Bhutto, n. 44, p. 138.


Pakistan as an "Islamic Republic of Pakistan". Ayub had initially dropped the word "Islamic" but had to reinstate it. The constitutions also talked of enabling the Muslims to lead their lives in accordance with the tenets of Islam and fostering unity among Muslims, nationally and internationally, by setting up advisory councils. When Fatima Jinnah was put as a candidate against Ayub, he got a Fatwa issued from Ulama that the head of the state could not be a woman under the Islamic law. His land reforms in accordance with the Islam showed lip-service being paid to Islam.

By the time Bhutto came to power, Islam had already percolated down to masses, as a state religion, pragmatism guided him not to disturb the status quo. In his manifesto Islam was the din of the party, apart from the usual Islamic features, there was a separate section - Part IX - containing provisions relating to Islam. While in his election speeches he called it Islamic socialism, to raise public sentiments in his favour, he imposed some Islamic provisions when popular dissent rose against him towards the end of his career -- he

107 Choudhury, n. 104, p. 72.
108 Munir, n. 106, p. 84.
109 Hussain, n. 2, p. 43.
110 Munir, n. 106, p. 86.
declared Ahmadiyas as non-Muslims (without saying who a Muslim was), introduced prohibition on a stricter scale, banning gambling and declared Friday a holiday.

When Gen. Zia came to power on 5 July 1977, he said he had accepted the challenge as a "true soldier of Islam". His Islamization measures include setting up of Shariat benches (imposing Islamic punishment), Islamic banking, levying "usher" and "zakat", not to miss banning political parties that do not believe in Islam, to name a few.

Compared to the domestic politics, the role of Islamic foreign policy has had sharper variations.

Jinnah had said: "It'll be friendship with all nations". Pakistan, however, espoused the cause of Arabs on the Palestinian issue and stood for creation of Eritrea on the basis of Islamic brotherhood.

Disillusioned with the Commonwealth Conference in May 1949, Liaquat Ali Khan stated in terms of option open to Pakistan and launched a campaign to bring Muslim countries

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111 Ibid., pp. 90, 96.
114 Qaid-i-Azam Speaks (Karachi, n.d.), p. 93.
115 Hussain, n. 2, p. 134 and Pakistan Horizon, vol. 12, no. 3, 1960, p. 128. The reason given in that the Muslim population was against anything like Ethiopian rule.
First International Islamic Economic Conference was held in Karachi in December 1949. During 1950-51, treaties of friendship were signed with many Muslim countries. There were also reports about Pakistan supplying arms to many Arab countries. Zafrullah Khan toured several Muslim countries in 1952 to invite 12 Muslim Premiers to attend a conference for setting up a system of consultation on the question of common interests. The conference, however, never took place. By 1953 Pakistan was giving up "its policy of running after Muslim countries".

Pakistan's joining Western alliance system came in for sharp criticism from the Arab countries, both from the conservatives and radicals. Thus while Saudi Arabia wondered how an Islamic state of Pakistan could accede to those who had joined hands with Zionist Jews, Egypt, which had deep hostility to Turkey, saw it as a manœuvre to split the Arab world at Egypt's cost.

Pakistan's role during the Suez Canal crisis was peculiar. Popular sentiments were in favour of Egypt. Suhrawardy, however, showed cool detachment for Egypt. This

116 Pakistan News (New Delhi, Embassy of Pakistan), 18 September 1951.
118 Pakistan News, 3 June 1950. The report was, however, denied.
119 The Economist (London), 29 May 1953.
120 Mushtaq Ahmad, Pakistan's Foreign Policy (Karachi, 1968), p. 71.
the Prime Minister said that "what has happened in Egypt is a threat to Muslim world, but the threat has not come from UK". In fact, in a statement issued later on 23 November 1956 he said: "Egypt was blocking the canal" and the reason for not calling UK the aggressor was because the UN had not found her so. The crisis thus brought loyalties to the surface.

Pakistan's relations with Egypt deteriorated further when Nasser did not welcome the idea of President Mirza visiting Egypt in November 1956, who was visiting Muslim countries, nor did it accept any contribution was in the wake of these deteriorating relations that Pakistani Prime Minister said, "The Arab world is divided, even if they were united zero plus zero would always be zero."

Ayub toured several Islamic countries, but there were no particular change in Pakistan's policy. In April 1960 when Nasser visited Pakistan, he said, "I do not want to use Islam in international politics" though Pak-UAR agreement required the inspiration of Islamic brotherhood.

In the 1965 Indo-Pak war Syria and Iraq sided with Pakistan. Material assistance came from Iraq and Turkey and

123 Hussain, n. 2, p. 144.
124 Dawn, 11 April 1960. Nasser was honoured with Nishane-e-Pakistan. He offered to mediate in Kashmir issue but not unless India is prepared.
Jordan argued for Pakistan at the United Nations. In 1966 Ayub condemned Israeli attack on Jordan and sent fighter planes to latter. His policy was pursued by Yahya, in fact there were reports of Pakistanis fighting in Jordan in 1970.

In the 1971 Indo-Pak war Egypt was reported to have allowed USSR to use its territory for lifting weapons. According to Bhutto Iran had helped Pakistan during the war.

After the 1971 war Bhutto worked assiduously to strengthen ties with the Muslim states, after being disillusioned with the US and China for their role in the war. He appealed to all Arab nations to stall any proposal to accord recognition to Bangladesh.

Pakistan played an active role in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. According to Bhutto Pakistan had made response to the request for arms. Pak training missions were conspicuous

125 Madmood Safdar, *A Political Study of Pakistan* (Lahore, 1972), p. 222; Pakistan also received military assistance from Regional Cooperation Development (RCD) under military offshoot of CENTO.


128 Al Ahram (Cairo), 12 March 1976; quoted in *Dawn*, 19 March 1976; also see *Dawn*, 16 April 1976.


131 *Dawn*, 12 July 1973; but he refused to specify the nature of contribution.
in Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and an appeal was made to the UN Secretary General and President Nixon to review American policy in Middle East. Kausar Niazi, the then Federal Information Minister said an attack on Arabs was "an attack on us".

Bhutto continued his tour which he had broken short in the wake of Arab-Israeli war. Bhutto took the lead in organising the Islamic Conference and hosting the second Islamic summit in Lahore in 1974.

With the rise in the wealth of the Arab states in 1970s, Pakistan benefited economically from these relationships receiving hundreds of dollars as economic aid. According to the Pakistani Economic Survey: "Pakistan has special relationship with the countries of the Middle East and has received valuable economic assistance from these countries since 1973-74 by way of general purpose, balance of payments support as well as loans for the implementation of country's priority development projects". What these priority development projects are, it does not specify.

In 1974-75 Pakistan was the second largest recipient of the OPEC aid and between 1973 to mid 1976, five Arab countries

132 M.G. Weinbaum, "Pakistan Enters Middle East", in RAI, n. 6, vol. 2, p. 793.
134 Tahir-Kheli, n. 11, pp. 63-64.
and Iran provided grants and loans worth nearly $1 billion.

From 1973 to 1979-80 assistance worth $1,222.5 million was received from Iran, Libya, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and OPEC Fund. Besides equity participation aid loan for financing important high priority projects met with considerable success. Total economic assistance from these sources up to March 1980 amounted to $1,776 million, $88.66 million in the form of grants and $1,688.14 million as loans.

In the background of Bhutto era, Pakistan's relationship with Libya deserves special mention. The ties between Muammar al-Qaddafi and Bhutto were strong particularly in 1974, the time when an agreement was signed under which Libya agreed to finance Pakistan's nuclear programme. According to a BBC report, there were various secret meetings between Libyan and Pakistani representatives. The Libyans wanted the entire capability and were ready to supply the money. According to the

137 Pakistan Economic Survey, n. 135.
138 These included Pak-Arab refinery in Musultan, an Engineering and Medical College in Baluchistan, 500 KW transaction line from Tarbela to Karachi, Pak-Libyan Holding Company, cement plants, Pipri thermal project etc.
report "stagging consignments of money -- sometimes as much as a hundred million dollars in cash -- was specially flown from Libya to Pakistan". The flights began in December 1975. Three countries out of sixteen, visited by Bhutto along with Khalid Hassan were Sudan, Ethiopia and Libya. According to Khalid Hasan, "He didn't get it from Haile Selaissie, I can assure you".

There were other countries, the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia also interested in the project. Their interests, however, were different from those of Qaddafi. They principally wanted Pakistan to possess the expertise. Qaddafi extended his stay in Pakistan when he came to attend the Islamic Conference. Addressing a meeting he told the Pakistanis "our strength is your strength, our resources your resources". Money was offered according to Feldman, "during Qaddafi's visit in 1974 and to have been agreed to bring Jallaud's 1978 visit". It is quite possible that since the meetings stated in the BBC programme were highly secretive, this was seen as the first open attempt by Libya to have offered the aid. In return Libya was said to expect a sample of future

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141 "Project 706 : The Islamic Bomb", Recorded from BBC Programme, Panorama, 15 June 1980, p. 4.
142 Ibid., p. 3.
143 Ibid.
144 Dawn, 26 February 1974.
There were also reports of a joint Libyan-Pak plan for nuclear test in Libyan desert.

According to Spector, "Although it has been widely speculated that in return for this aid Pakistan promised to provide complete nuclear weapons to Libya, the consensus in the US intelligence community, according to knowledgeable officials is that Pakistan never agreed to such a quid pro quo".

Arguing along the same lines Feldman says, "If Qaddafi really expected to receive Pakistan's nuclear weapons, he was bound to be disappointed. Pakistan is unlikely to surrender control over mass destruction weapon to leader of such ill repute. The political costs likely to follow a possible intelligence penetration of this sort of transaction would be enormous."

He, however, does not rule out a more modest contribution to Libya from Pakistan, for instance, in providing enrichment or reprocessing services, whereby Libya could get weapon grade material through a "short cut". With the fall of Bhutto, ties with Libya touched a low ebb.

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146 Foreign Reports, 9 August 1978.
147 Feldman, n. 145, p. 91.
148 Spector, n. 31, p. 77.
149 Feldman, n. 145.
150 Ibid.
As stated earlier Gen. Zia maintained the "Islamic links" with the Muslim countries. Aid has continued to flow even in the subsequent years. In 1981 Kuwait gave aid worth $130 million, and Islamic Bank worth $19.4 million.

In 1982 OPEC gave a loan of $25 million, and Saudi Arabia $500 million (for buying six F-16s). Military assistance from oil rich nations in 1983 amounted to $1000 million.

The Jeddah based Islamic Development Bank launched operation worth $89,170,000 in June 1984. Besides workers' remittances from Middle East rose from 25.5 per cent in 1972-73 to 77.9 per cent in 1985-86.

So far as aid for nuclear plan is concerned, the ties were maintained. Niger supplied uranium in 1979.

After the US stopped the aid, Mufti Mahmud, PNA Chief, visited a number of Arab countries and said that these countries would make up for the loss in aid. Saudi Arabia became the

152 Times of India, 23 August 1981.
155 Times of India, 14 January 1982.
156 Ibid., 26 February 1983.
157 Ibid., 26 June 1984.
159 Statesman, 12 December 1979.
main donor. Saudi Arabia's willingness to provide financial support for Pakistan's nuclear programme, says Feldman, was aimed at "preventing Pakistani-Libyan or Pakistani-Iraqi nuclear co-operation".

In fact in 1981 Saudi Arabia reportedly offered $500 million to help make a bomb, seeking an agreement to exclude Iraq and Col. Qaddafi from the proposed project. Pakistans made good use of the opportunity. In the initial meetings held between Saudi Deputy Minister of Defence and Aviation, Prince Turki-as-Sajar and Petroleum Minister, Sheikh Yamani, and Agha Shahi and M.A. Khan, Pakistanis said that they had no money and were left with the choice of either dropping the project or going to Iraq. Sheikh Yamani offered $250 million, which was turned down by Pakistan. Saudis were forced to offer more money -- $800 million -- which was acceptable to Pakistan. 163

Besides there were reports of Turkey having offered its site for testing Pakistan's nuclear device. Kuwait, reportedly also tried to help Pakistan's nuclear plan by making a bid to buy heavy water for Pakistan.

164 Times of India, 29 September 1981; also see ibid., 10 September 1982.
The Arab compulsion towards acquisition of nuclear bomb, has been explained in terms of the uncertainty in Israeli nuclear strategy. Israel has a full fledged nuclear programme, with speculation abounding on its posture. The Arabs are in search of a deterrent against the Israeli capacity.

Within the Arab world, the most frequent Arab response to the possibility that Israel will acquire nuclear weapons has been to threaten that this would lead Arabs to do the same. Thus Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya and Jordan have on more than one occasion individually expressed the desire to acquire nuclear weapons vis-a-vis Israel.

Then came the question of alternatives within the Arab world. Egypt has a modest nuclear programme since the 50s,

166 According to Feldman, the uncertainty about Israeli nuclear strategy is about whether Israel's position is that of "nuclear option" or "bomb on the basement". The former, according to him, "implies that operational weapons have not yet been assembled but that the capability exists to do so within a relatively short time. A bomb in the basement positive nuclear weapons have been assembled but that this fact has not been disclosed. Those who believe in Israel's posture to be "nuclear option" speculate the length from a few weeks to a few years. Among those who believe that Israel has weapons in the basement estimates range from a few to more than two dozen. See Feldman, n. 145, pp. 7-8.

167 Zalmay Khalizad, "Pakistan and the Bomb", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 36, no. 1, January 1980, p. 15, "Israel's Evident Nuclear Capabilities have increased the incentive of these countries (Arabs) to acquire similar capabilities.

which received impetus after it ratified the NPT in 1981. Iraq was also a moderate power till mid 70s, which could have emerged as a nuclear power had its reactor been destroyed by Israel on 7 June 1981, became a signatory to NPT on 29 October 1969. Syria's programme is still in embryonic stages, its economic energy commissions having been established in 1976. In Libya, also a party to NPT, Libyan Atomic Energy Commission was established in 1973, subsequent

169 The Egyptian Atomic Energy Commission was founded in 1955, and the Centre for Nuclear Research was opened in 1957. In 1961 Egypt acquired a 2 mw Soviet made nuclear research reactor. However subsequent attempts to acquire reactors - 130 MW from UK in 1963, 2600 MW from USA in 1974 (promised during Nixon's visit did not materialise). It was only after Egypt decided to ratify the NPT that agreement with USA and Germany materialized. John Cooley, "Egypt Assessing Nuclear Strength", Christian Science Monitor, 2 January 1975; John Cooley, "CAIRO Steers Clear of A-race", Ibid., 2 January 1975; International Herald Tribune, 7 August 1976; Feldman, p. 145, pp. 70-71; International Herald Tribune, February 1981; Financial Times, 8 February 1981.


development have been slow.

According to Palit and Namboodiri, Bhutto exploited the Arab sentiment (vis-a-vis finding a deterrent to Israeli bomb). It was sometimes around 1973-74 that Bhutto sold the idea of Islamic bomb to Col. Qaddafi and King Faisal. According to Weinbaum and Sen, "Bhutto had tried to convince Arab states that they would profit from Pakistani know-how, should the French build the nuclear plant". Besides, the Arabs anyway were providing "considerable generous economic and military aid to Pakistan after the 1973 oil price revolution".

The Middle East connection can be seen in Pakistan's reaction to US decision in 1979 to cut off aid. Pakistan

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172 According to Spector, Nuclear Proliferation: Today, n. 31, p. 149, Libyan programme appears to be limited to training students abroad and operation of a small Soviet supplied reactor research centre at Tajoura. In March 1976, France agreed to supply a 600 MW nuclear power reactor. The agreement was signed during Chirac's visit to Tripoli, however France backed out of it later. "Rumours of Libyan Atomic Bomb Quest Raise Fears", Washington Post, 30 July 1978; Foreign Report, 9 August 1978; Foreign Report, 18 June 1980, p. 35. Libyan repeated attempts to purchase atomic bomb from China did not succeed and later refused. Foreign Report, 9 August 1978. See Feldman, n. 145, p. 75.


174 Weinbaum and Sen, in Rai, n. 6, p. 800.

charged that the decision was "the outcome of Israeli efforts to stop Pakistan from sharing advanced nuclear research with fellow Islamic countries".

Discussing the Islamic bomb concept Akhtar Ali says, "A Pakistani nuclear bomb may not be that Islamic and that there are severe limitations to its usage". He lists instances of infighting among the Arabs, Egypt Vs Syria, Egypt Vs Iraq, Syria Vs Iraq, Iraq Vs Jordan, to name a few, besides dividing them into the conservatives, moderates and radicals.

Arguing it further he adds, "Even if we assume that Pakistan ventures to do so (transfer nuclear weapons), it might be possible only in normal peace time, when military vigilance is low, to clandestinely affect such a transfer. But who would be the recipient? No Arab country would be willing to take the risk." With heavy American influence in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Gulf States and Egypt, he thinks transfer is not possible without the knowledge of Americans.

Pakistan in contrast to all these countries had a well established civilian nuclear programme. Another notable feature was that while all the other Arab countries had acquired wealth in the recent years (thanks to the oil bloom and the consequent

178 Ibid., p. 95.
cartelization of the petroleum exporting countries) they still lacked the infrastructure, the leadership with the requisite vision and skilled personnel. A bomb could not be supplanted in the relatively hollow infrastructure of these countries whereas Pakistan with its well established earlier nuclear programme was a much better choice compared to the best of potential Islamic countries. Pakistan had a well established infrastructure, the trained personnel and requisite leadership, and the only difficulty was financial which the Arabs were ready to solve. It is possible the Arabs saw Pakistan as the only ultimate choice (to meet the Israeli threat).

A more acceptable conclusion has been drawn by Cronin, who says:

If Pakistan transformed a nuclear device or placed its nuclear capabilities in the service of Arab states, Pakistan would play its card for a questionable gain and would face severe penalties from the West. Nonetheless, a Pakistan nuclear capability would have a great impact on the Middle East in view of Israeli perceptions concerning the 'Islamic bomb'. 179

While attempt has been made in this chapter to trace Pakistan's links with the Arab world, at no point of time it is implied that Pakistan is acquiring the capability to fight the Israelis or submerging its identity with the Arabs. The entire gamut of Pakistan and Arab connection is traced just

As far as the United States was concerned the alliance was part of the US move to promote a "regional association of non-communist countries in South Asia" and securing such military mights in South Asia. It got "base facilities for reconnaissance flights over USSR and China -- significant privileges in the era before spy satellites". Incidentally, 1954 was also the year the US exhibition "Atoms for Peace" toured Pakistan and was seen by hundreds and thousands in the major Pakistani cities. The exhibition, which carried a message from President Eisenhower, explained "the virtues of the new found sources of alternative answers to man's search for energy, food and medical treatment".

The signing of the Mutual Defence Agreement served as a precursor to a number of other agreements. Pakistan became a member of the South East Asian Treaty Organisation on 8 September 1954. It joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955 (renamed in 1959 as the Central Treaty Organisation). The United States, however, never formally joined the Pact.

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8 Venkataramani, n. 3, p. 362. It was felt by the US that indigenous Pact members sought to use the pact for their own narrower purposes that were not in consonance with US policies.
The alliance, according to Dulles, however, was not directed against India. Nehru also claimed to have been thus reassured by the American side.

In 1957, under the "Atoms for Peace" programme inaugurated by the US, Washington supported Pakistan's entry into the UN International Atomic Energy Agency and helped elect it to the Board of Governors. Several research institutions (including Oak Ridge, Brookhaven and Argonne) entered into bilateral agreements with Pakistan to help train its personnel for a role in the programme of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission.

As the relationship unfolded in the 1950s there was no incongruity between its pursuit of nuclear policy and the US policy. In fact, as stated earlier, nuclear issue itself had not assumed prominence in the Pakistani politics till the seventies. Therefore the question of its being or playing a determinant role does not arise. The argument that "nuclear issue was fairly typical of the big-brother attitude adopted by the US and welcomed by Pakistan in 50's", does not carry

9 Ibid., p. 361. Dulles in fact said that he had sought "categorical assurance" from Pakistan. "Under the principles of UN Charter, the US would be supporting India, if it became victim of any armed aggression", he said.


12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.
much weight. In fact in 1960, the US and Pakistan allowed their nuclear co-operation agreement to expire anticipating that Pakistan could seek further assistance from the IAEA.

The only contribution of significance was that in 1960 the US Atomic Energy Commission approved a grant of $350,000 to Pakistan for the installation of a 5 MWe pool type research reactor at Rawalpindi, estimated total cost of the project was $3.5 million. In 1961, the US firms were retained to study the feasibility of constructing one or more nuclear plants in Pakistan.

A number of radiation centres were set up at Lahore, Tandojam, Faisalabad, Karachi, Islamabad and Peshawar where isotopes and x-rays were utilised for agricultural, medical and industrial purposes. It has been claimed by some writers that "in all phases of the Pakistani nuclear programme the US was generally helpful until a series of events occurred in the 1970s". The details of the help, however, have not been given.


15 Ibid.


17 Shirin Tahir-Kheli, n. 11, p. 118.
In fact in the 60s the US-Pakistan relations in general were not very good. Soon after Ayub Khan came to power, he wanted to change the pattern of relationship with the West — favouring a relationship based on equality rather than that of Western dominance. In practice, however, the relationship remained unchanged. In fact, under the Bilateral Agreement of Co-operation with the US in March 1959, the US got access to Peshawar base for ten years. The US-Pakistan axis witnessed its climax in the U-2 spy plane incident.

Things, however, changed soon with the victory of Kennedy in 1960 elections who had a "soft-spot" for India. In the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, India sought and got assistance from the United States. The aid was not contingent on Indo-Pak settlement on Kashmir issue. Pakistan henceforth started looking for allies elsewhere — in China. Since Pakistanis

19 Shirin Tahir-Kheli, n. 11, p. 7.
20 A US U-2 plane flown from Peshawar by Francis Gary Powers was shot down while flying high across the Soviet territory. The Pakistanis had leased a cite for electronic intelligence base at Badaber in Peshawar.
24 Burke, n. 1, p. 179; China offered an aid of 60 million and an assistance on Kashmir issue to Pakistan. *Pakistan Horizon* (Karachi), vol. 17, no. 1, First Quarter 1964, p. 4.
were aware that they could not do without aid from the United States, Ayub decided not to break away from the alliance.

During the 1965 war Ayub sought President Johnson's intervention but the US remained neutral, imposing a ban on both India and Pakistan. The ban, however, was lifted on 12 April 1967. With the ascendancy of Richard Nixon in 1969, US proved favourable to Pakistan, as Pakistan was seen an effective via media by the US in its attempts to normalise ties with China.

However, in the Indo-Pak war in 1971, the United States by and large refrained from any direct action apart from sending a task force led by an aircraft carrier "Enterprise" into the Bay of Bengal on 15 December 1971, a day before the war ended and condemning India at the United Nations. Earlier the United States had cancelled its aid to Pakistan on 8 November 1971.


27 Burke, n. 1, p. 190.

28 Tahir-Kheli, n. 11, p. 35.

29 Ibid., p. 44. According to her, Nixon was not using the Task Force as a military instrument but rather as a political instrument.

The year 1972 is significant from the point of view of nuclear developments. As stated earlier, this was the year when the crucial decision to go nuclear was taken at Multan. While it cannot be ruled out that the failure of the United States to help Pakistan could have influenced Pakistan to develop its own security options, it would perhaps be too much to say that the US inaction guided Pakistan on a nuclear path. As stated earlier, Bhutto had all along argued for developing a nuclear weapon option. In fact the US did not make any move to dissuade Pakistan till the reprocessing deal was signed. Clearly, the United States did not see Pakistan as a potential nuclear power till then, at least not till the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974.

Part of the explanation lies in the fact that these developments were highly secretive. For instance, the small secret reprocessing facilities - New Labs - was built with the help of the Belgian firm - Belgonucleaire and SGN, "although the French Government may not have been aware of SGN participation". The Programmes were, according to a US analyst, unknown to the US officials.

Thus while Pakistan was negotiating with France for the reprocessing plant, India detonated a device in Rajasthan.


32 Spector, n. 31, p. 78.
desert near the Pokharan mountains. Bhutto characterized the Indian explosion as a "fateful development", saying, "the explosion has introduced a qualitative change in the situation prevalent in the subcontinent". He sent his Foreign Minister, Aziz Ahmad, to various Western capitals in search of a "positive response to Pakistan's request for protection against possible nuclear blackmail from India". The move did not yield anything because the United States and other Western nations did not want to get involved in matters that, according to their judgement, did not directly impinge on their national interests.

Following the explosion, however, the US intensified efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons. In the fall of 1974 the US convened a secret meeting of the principal nuclear suppliers nations in London in an effort to gain acceptance of a uniform set of nuclear export standards.

The fact that Pakistan's nuclear plans were not in the open was made use of by Bhutto adequately. Thus just prior to the lifting of arms embargo in February 1975, Bhutto said that Pakistan's nuclear weapon policy was "under constant review" and depended on whether Washington provided Pakistan


34 Foreign Affairs Records (New Delhi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Vol. 20, no. 6, June 1974, p. 195.

35 Tahir-Kheli, n. 11, p. 120.

36 Ibid.

37 Spector, n. 31, p. 78.
with sufficient conventional weapons.

The US did not doubt Pakistan's intention till February 1976 as stated earlier in the previous chapter. It voted in favour of the Pakistani-IAEA agreement embodying these controls when it came before the IAEA Board of Governors and appeared prepared to go along with the sale on these terms.

Things changed soon, however. The election year - 1976 - found Ford on the defensive vis-a-vis campaign by Carter especially on non-proliferation issues. The latter lamented that the "Republicans had rewarded India with additional supplies of nuclear material even though India, not an NPT party, used our past aid to explode a nuclear device". Ford thus felt "obliged to respond" and to somehow placate the fears within the Indian lobby inside the Congress and the State Department of another pro-Pakistani tilt in the making. The growing Congressional pressure particularly from Senators Reibicoff, Glenn, Church and Percy compelled Ford administration to pressure Pakistan to dissuade it from advancing its nuclear programme. Accordingly, the United States approved the

38 Pakistan Times, 7 February 1975.
39 Tahir-Kheli, n. 11, pp. 122-23. According to her, "If the pursuit of nuclear option was at one end of the security spectrum, pursuit of a more concrete conventional supplies was at the other."
40 Spector, n. 31, p. 79.
42 Tahir-Kheli, n. 11, p. 124.
Canadian action to cut off the supply of fuel to KANUPP.

As stated earlier, Kissinger personally journeyed to Pakistan and France in 1976, to pressure both to cancel the deal. It was during this meeting that Bhutto said Kissinger had threatened him to cancel the deal or else we "would make a horrible example of you". Kissinger is also reported to have offered 100 A-7s to break the deadlock for the cancellation of the reprocessing deal, the offer, however, did not materialise.

The US pressure on France, also, did not yield anything initially. The Gaullist government rejected the US measures as being ineffective and impinging on matter of French national sovereignty. Chirac had called the deal a matter between two sovereign states and that there was no question of accepting US pressure "in an affair that concerned only France and Pakistan".

After Chirac's resignation in August 1976, there was a shift in French policy. Giscard d'Estaing visited the US in October 1976 and in December 1976 the French Government's order on discontinuing the further sale of reprocessing

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46 *Pakistan Times*, 7 August 1976.
facilities was made. The order as stated earlier, however, was not to affect the existing deal with Pakistan.

Things changed in the US also with the ascent of Carter. For Nixon-Kissinger-Ford proliferation was not a high priority issue as it was to Kennedy and Johnson. Ford's response to elections (Congressional pressure) has to be seen in the context of the elections. There was a feeling in Washington that once the elections were over, Congressional fervor could be controlled.

One of the first measures adopted by him was to stop the sensitive transfers of nuclear technology even though the NPT permitted such transfers with safeguards. The International Security Assistance Act of 1977, which amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and authorised international security assistance programmes for 1978 required changes which came to be popularly known as Symington-Glenn Amendment (Section 670). It dealt with nuclear reprocessing transfers and nuclear detonations and stated that no US funds were to be used for providing military assistance or granting military education. Further, no military credits were to be made or

48 The Hindu, 12 December 1976.

49 Kapur, n. 43, pp. 509-10.

50 Ibid. This optimism was, according to Kapur, underlined by Nixon-Kissinger-Ford approach to keep the US dialogue with potential proliferator alive bilaterally. This team had insisted India after 1974 explosion but was unwilling to persuade India by cancelling contract for supply of enriched uranium which fuelled the eight water reactors.
guarantees given to countries which deliver nuclear reprocessing materials or technology to any other country or is not a nuclear weapon state as defined in the NPT.

The amendment was, however, accompanied by a provision that the President may furnish assistance otherwise prohibited under the act if he certified in writing to the House and the Senate that the termination of the aid would be "seriously prejudicial to the achievement of US non-proliferation objectives or jeopardise its common defence and security".

The US pressure did not break any grounds with Pakistan. Bhutto had condemned the US efforts of delaying the deal had talked in terms of revoking the alliance. "We are not treated as well as many other countries which are not even friendly with the US", he had said. He also accused the US of a "massive huge international conspiracy against the Islamic State of Pakistan, including a plot to oust him (Bhutto)". While it


52 Ibid.

53 National Herald, 9 November 1976.

54 Dawn, 4 December 1976.

55 Times of India, 29 April 1977. The United States, however, protested against the allegation. Hindustan Times, 30 April 1977.
is difficult to assess the viability of the charge, the fact remains that the US succeeded in getting the French reprocessing deal cancelled. President Carter visited France in January 1978; consequently the French modified the proposal (of the co-processing plant), which was unacceptable to the Pakistanis leading to the cancellation of the deal.

It is important to note that the US success was, if it can be called so, limited to exerting pressure on France. For, first, it did not, in any way, discourage the Pakistanis from the nuclear path (despite terminating military aid, economic aid to Pakistan in September 1977 and secondly, it led to Pakistanis concentrating the attention on the enrichment path secretly. Particularly noteworthy is the fact the new Government in Pakistan also did not deviate from the policies of the previous government, so far as the nuclear issue was concerned.

Having got the reprocessing deal cancelled, the US started reviewing the question of aid. A senior officer, Newson, was

56 *Statesman*, 8 January 1978.


58 Spector, n. 31, p. 80.

59 Ibid., p. 81; *Pakistan Times*, 29 June 1978. General Zia reiterated Pakistan determination to go ahead with the deal, hoping that France would maintain its stand on the issue.
According to Kapur, a high-level meeting was held in Washington D.C. between the two governments on 16 and 17 October 1979 to discuss with Pakistan its participation in the Gulf security force, and in return the US would lift embargo on US military aid. The deal could not be clinched because of revelation by the head of the US team, General Smith, of concrete evidence of Pakistan's nuclear activities up to the point.

On 25 December 1979 the Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, leading to a dramatic change in US policy. The non-proliferation policy was relegated to the background as Senators Glen, Percy, ardent opponents of aid earlier, now opined that in view of the Soviet action in Afghanistan, Washington should make an exemption to its nuclear policy and accept Pakistan's assurances on their nuclear plans. Senior officials of the State Department and Department of Defence emphasised the need to aid Pakistan, even though they remained deeply committed to the non-proliferation policy. The non-proliferation objectives were further affected when Carter overruled Nuclear Regulatory Commission ruling and, thereby authorizing the shipment of enriched

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70 Kapur, n. 60, p. 190.
71 Tahir-Khel, n. 11, pp. 139-140 (detailed statement).
sent to Pakistan followed by a senior level delegation. The argument used was that CHASNUPP was not in operation, so Pakistan was no longer violating US Congressional legislation, hence aid ties could be resumed. And aid was resumed in October 1978.

The US learned of Pakistan's attempts to put together the enrichment plant in 1978. An inquiry was ordered in October 1978 following disclosures in UK (amid a labour dispute), described earlier. Estimates from the CIA, State Department, and ACDA all converted to one conclusion that unless action was taken immediately Pakistan would go nuclear within a year. Already armed with relevant Congressional legislation, the US now moved quickly to impose sanctions in 1979 when it made public its concern over the enrichment programme. Announcing that the US was terminating aid to Pakistan, the Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Pickering, declared in a Congressional testimony "that the Pakistan programme is not peaceful, but related to an effort to develop


61 Donnelly, n. 14, p. 16.

62 Tahir-Kheli, n. 11, p. 134.

63 Leonard Spector, Going Nuclear (Massachusetts, 1987), p. 103.
a nuclear explosive capability.

In a new policy move, guided by developments in Iran and Indian Ocean, President Carter offered a sale of 50 Northrop F-5- fighter planes equipped with ground to air missiles and promised diplomatic backing for Pakistan proposal for a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia, if it accepted the full scope safeguards. Pakistan rejected the offer.

US began increasing the economic sanction by taking a tough stand on the country's appeal for debt rescheduling. Gen. Zia visited the United States in September 1979 and assured him of peaceful intention of Pakistan's nuclear programme, seeking a review in the US policy. It did not yield anything. Even when Agha Shahi met the US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance the next month, neither was ready to compromise. Pakistan failed to solve the nuclear dispute with the US.


68 Times of India, 17 October 1979.

to point out how Pakistan exploited the Arab need to meet its own interest. It is a matter clear to all including Pakistan that the Arabs would not invest so much money to develop a nuclear capability against any other country other than Israel.

III. The Role of China

The role of China in the nuclear programme of Pakistan is based on speculation and hypotheses for the simple reason—lack of clear cut evidence. This has been compounded by the silence of Chinese leadership over the issue, except, perhaps, mild denials every now and then.

Besides the subject itself is so new, many questions pertaining to the acquisition of the capability by Pakistan need to be answered satisfactorily. The role of China, consequently, becomes even more speculative.

Sino-Pak relations date back to 1950, the year People's Republic of China (PRC) was recognised by Pakistan. Pakistan supported PRC's claim to the UN seat. During the Korean crisis, Pakistan voted for the resolution branding North Korea as an aggressor but refrained from the one declaring

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180 *Dawn*, 5 January 1950. Pakistan was the first Muslim country and second Commonwealth country to do so. The diplomatic ties however were established in 1951.

181 GAOR, session 6, Plen. mtg. 283, 25 September 1950, p. 91. Sir Zafrullah said, "China is not applying for membership, it is a member state, a permanent member of the Security Council."
China the same (aggressor). It also abstained from voting on a resolution seeking sanctions against China and North Korea. In return PRC showed remarkable forbearance of Pakistan's membership of the SEATO. This paved the way for meeting between Chou En-lai and Mohammad Ali Bogra at Bandung in April 1955. The achievement of the meetings can be summed up as, in terms of Chou En-lai: "We achieved a mutual understanding although we are still against military treaties". The sentiments were reiterated when Suhrawardy visited China in October 1956.

These statements notwithstanding, PRC scrupulously avoided making any statements on the Kashmir issue that would be against Pakistan's interest for it knew that attitude of a

183 Ibid.
184 Peking Radio described SEATO as an aggressive military alliance, hostile to the people of China and Asian people, Statesman, 5 September 1954, but it did not send a formal note of protest against members of SEATO, whereas USSR did. Mohammad Ayoob, "India as a Factor in Sino-Pakistan Relations", International Studies, vol. 9, no. 3, January 1968, p. 279.
185 William Rushbrooke, The State of Pakistan (London, 1962), p. 120. Accordingly the Chinese Government assured Pakistan that there was no clash of interest between the two countries but that did not apply to India-China relations, where a conflict was expected in near future.
187 Dawn, 21 October and 24 October 1956.
country to the issue was for Pakistan "a touch stone by which friendship or animosity are listed". Thus, China, according to Mao Tse-tung in 1957, was going to be neutral. He advised other countries to do the same. This stand was welcomed by Pakistan.

To begin with the Chinese were suspicious of Ayub, "the Main architect of Us-Pak alliance". The fears compounded by Pakistan's neutrality in the Taiwan issue and permitting pilgrims from Nationalist China, yet the Chinese did not send a protest note to Pakistan when the Mutual Defence Agreement was signed between Pakistan and the US.

Pakistan began mending its relations with China only after the offer of mutual defence pact made by Ayub to India, in the wake of disturbances and clashes in Sino-Indian border was rejected by Jawaharlal Nehru. India rejected the proposal asking 'joint defence against who'? After rejection of the offer, Pakistan began mending its relations with China. China and Pakistan agreed to hold discussions on border demarcation in

189 Dawn, 21 July 1957. Welcoming the Chinese stand, Pakistan Foreign Minister, Firoz Khan Noon, said if the Soviet Union also adopt the same stand, Kashmir question would be settled immediately. Hasan, n. 186, pp. 364-65.
191 Pakistan Horizon, n. 182, p. 226. According to Sangat Singh, China had, however, proscribed the agreement. Sangat Singh, n. 21, p. 192.
192 Times of India, 3 and 6 May 1960. Nehru said the real motive behind the offer was not joint defence but Kashmir.
193 Burke, n. 1, p. 141.
1961 and consequently talks began in 1962, a few days before the Sino-Indian war. Pakistan, as stated earlier, protested against US arming of India during the war. In addition, in radical contrast to Ayub's offer, Bhutto declared in the National Assembly, "Pakistan will not join India in any action against China, even if the Kashmir dispute was resolved amicably".

A few days after the Sino-Indian war in 1962, an agreement was signed between China and Pakistan in regard to demarcation of border. This was followed by an air transit agreement in the month of August the same year. Ties with China continued to improve with Chou En-lai visiting Pakistan in 1964 and Ayub's China visit in 1965.

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196 Agreement was finally signed on 2 March 1963 between the Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi and Bhutto, Pakistan Foreign Minister. Out of 3,400 square miles, Pakistan secured 1,350 square miles and China 2,000 square miles. According to Pakistani claims it got 750 square miles which had been under the possession of China. *Dawn*, 3 March 1973; "Ramification of the China-Pakistan Border Treaty", *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 51, no. 3, Fall 1964, p. 40.

From 1966 onwards Pakistan again started championing admission of China to the UN. In 1964, China came out with an open support for Pakistan's claims to the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

That China could be an ally to depend on was confirmed during the Indo-Pak war of 1965 when it had lent full moral and material support to Pakistan including condemning India as an aggressor.

Following a ban by US on sale of arms to India and Pakistan in the wake of 1965 war, Pakistan turned to China for military aid. Despite unsettled conditions in 1966 following first phase of cultural revolution, ties with Pakistan were unhindered. In fact, Pakistan was the only country with which some diplomatic contact was maintained. It was in this light that Pakistan rejected a proposal on regional economic co-operation between India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and USSR mooted by Kosygin.

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198 Ayoob, n. 184, p. 294. Pakistan had changed its stand on seat to China -- Representation be deferred unless support for China became near unanimous. In 1961 it changed its stand and voted for PRC.

199 Ibid.


201 On its National Day on 23 March 1966 Pakistan displayed F-59 tanks, 51C - 19 fighter planes.


203 Pakistan expressed its inability to join a pact directed against PRC. Times of India, 16 July 1969.
was a major factor that US asked Pakistan to convey its desire to establish a new relationship. After the sizable withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam in 1971, China decided to receive Kissinger in July 1971. With this Yahya's role as a "courier" came to an end.

Compared to the 1965 war, the role of China in the 1971 war had been minimal. In fact when before the war Bhutto had visited Peking in November then Chinese leaders refused any active military support.

When Bhutto visited China in 1972, the Chinese Government converted four past loans amounting to $107 million into grants and deferred the payment of 1970 loan of $200 million for 20 years. It refused Bhutto a defence pact, though it promised to meet Pakistan's defence requirements. The Shanghai communique issued at the end of Nixon's visit 1972 mentioned support for Pakistan.

Soon after the Indian explosion in 1974, the Chinese leaders criticized the Indian Government for harbouring to

205 Ibid., pp. 266-68.
210 Current Background, no. 952, 27 March 1972, p. 36.
become a sub-super power. They pledged support to Pakistan specifically against "nuclear threat and nuclear blackmail". In 1975 the Chinese Vice Premier visited Pakistan and among other things, lent support to the Pakistani proposal for a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia. The importance of the subsequent year was revealed by Bhutto in his death cell testament where he had said:

In the light of recent developments which have taken place, my single most important achievement which I believe will dominate the portrait of my public life is an agreement which I arrived at after an assiduous and tenacious endeavour spanning over eleven years of negotiations. In the present context, the agreement of mine concluded in June 1976, will perhaps be my greatest achievement and contribution to the survival of our people and our nation.

By deducting 11 years mean the agreement must have begun in 1965. According to Samina Yasmin soon after the civil aviation agreement was signed, there were rumours of a secret Sino-Pak military agreement.

A high level delegation headed by Bhutto visited Beijing between 26-30 May 1976, which included the famous

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213 **Pakistan Times**, 21 April 1975; **Far Eastern Economic Review**, 16 May 1975, p. 34.
214 Bhutto, n. 44, p.
215 Yasmin, n. 190, p. 17. According to her, however subsequent events proved that the scheme of Sino-Pak relations essentially remained limited politically, economically and militarily.
Pakistani nuclear physicist and nobel laureate Dr Abdul Salam, Bhutto's Scientific Adviser. Two agreements were signed—one on scientific and the other on military co-operation.

According to Namboodiri, the Chinese help to Pakistan consisted of transfer of nuclear weapons' design information, assistance in setting up an enrichment plant, supply of nuclear test data, conduct of nuclear test on Pakistan's behalf or to make test site available, the supply of heavy water and the transfer of plutonium reprocessing technology. According to Sinha and Subramanian, the pact alluded to was with China who helped Pakistan build its reprocessing plant because it wanted to gain access to Pakistan's CANDU reactor technology.

According to David Hart, PRC provided technical assistance at Kahuta in 1979. According to Ashok Kapur, "The agreement which Bhutto highlights in his memoirs was between China and Pakistan. This agreement was established after, possibly in response to, the cut-off of Canadian nuclear aid to Pakistan, even though the idea of such a cooperation existed prior to 1971."

The joint communiqué issued after Bhutto's visit said:

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220 Kapur, n. 60, p. 245.
Pakistan's Prime Minister thanked the Chinese Prime Minister for China's firm support to the proposal of the Pakistani government for nuclear free zone in South Asia and expressed deep gratitude at China's willingness to assume appropriate commitments arising therefrom.

However, it was never specified what these appropriate commitments were. This gave rise to a number of speculations. None, however, was followed seriously. Much later in 1980 a report said, China had suspended nuclear co-operation with Pakistan after the overthrow of Bhutto in July 1977 but after the Soviet assisted coup in Afghanistan in April 1978 China suddenly became very friendly with the Zia regime in Pakistan and some nuclear liaison were resumed.

The change in government in Pakistan in 1977 did not affect the Sino-Pak relations adversely. Gen. Zia had said in a message to Den Xiaopeng that "the traditionally close and friendly relations between Pakistan and China would continue to grow and gain strength with each passing day".

After the Chinese Vice-Premier Gen. Piao's visit to Islamabad, it was reported by the Iraqi news agency that a "generous offer" of nuclear co-operation -- to help build a reprocessing plant -- was made by China in view of the special relationship that existed between the two countries. According


222 Pakistan Times, 26 July 1977.
to this report, it was also meant to bring Pakistan on par with India in the nuclear field and also to minimise India's influence as a nuclear power in the region.

There was no significant development from 1977-79 in the nuclear relations between the two countries, at least evidence is not available. However in June 1978 Karakoram Highway was formally opened, linking Xingjaang with Tibet through Aksai Chin. According to Ashok Kapur, during 1977-79 China did not do much to the agreement because it did not trust Zia as it had trusted Bhutto and it was only after the Afghanistan invasion that Pakistan-PRC co-operation suddenly increased. In 1979, according to Chaudhuri, however, China made pleas on behalf of Pakistan, when Vice Premier Deng held discussions with Carter urging the US not to penalise Pakistan for an alleged bomb.

In 1979 after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, China increased aid to Pakistan. On 18 January 1980, Beijing accused USSR of seeking a stepping stone for a southward thrust


225 Kapur, n. 60, pp. 245-46.

226 Choudhuri, n. 204, p. 262. According to him, "similar pleas have been made by China to top ranking US policy makers who have visited China in recent years".

227 Ibid., p. 27.
towards PRC and the whole Subcontinent.

After the failure of initial round of talks with the US, General Zia visited Beijing in May 1980 where he told senior Vice-Premier Deng and Premier Hua that China was the only country that had struck to its principles.

General Zia-ul-Haq visited Beijing in August 1980. It was at that time that reports on a likely Pak-China collaboration on a nuclear test appeared. The London-based Lebanese magazine *Uruba-val Arabi* reported that China had "responded positively" to a Pakistani request to conduct a nuclear test on China's soil. The Arab-owned magazine *a Days* also reported that following Gen. Zia's visit, Chinese nuclear experts had arrived in Pakistan to speed up Pakistan's first peaceful nuclear explosion. Another report published in *New Scientist* (London) in 1981 and attributed to American and Israeli intelligence sources said that China may provide a site for Pakistan's first bomb (which was expected to explode later that year (1981). It also stated that negotiations had already taken place between China and Pakistan to ready the site by the end of summer. A denial of this report was

228 Mehdi, n. 208, p. 69.


231 Ibid.

made by the Pakistani Embassy.

In an interview in the subsequent month, James Malone, Assistant Secretary of the State and Reagan Administration's chief nuclear negotiator, said that China had apparently supplied to Pakistan material other than fuel related items, which he declined to specify. A month later, a *New York Times* report said that the US Government officials were disturbed by intelligence report suggesting that China had helped Pakistan in trying to develop a capacity to enrich uranium for weapon use. A BBC report later said that the information that China was aiding Pakistan's nuclear programme was conveyed to the US administration in its briefing to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee just before Gen. Zia met the Committee in Washington.

The US administration made this out as an excuse to justify American military and economic package worth $300 million so that Pakistan does not seek aid from other countries like China to acquire nuclear weapon technology, the BBC said. Supply of military equipment to Pakistan, the US administration maintained, would create confidence and security in Pakistan's mind. BBC added that Pakistan's nuclear weapon issue was discussed thoroughly when President Zia met Senate Foreign

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235 *Indian Express*, 16 December 1982.
In early 1983 there were reports of Pakistan having received from China a sensitive information concerning the design of nuclear weapons themselves. Accordingly, the US officials said that China may have confirmed for Pakistani technicians that a particular nuclear weapon design would work. According to another report, though there was a difference of opinion in the intelligence community as to what China has supplied to Pakistan, there was consensus that what has been supplied is critical in Pakistan's suspected nuclear programme. A June 1984 report indicated that China had actually given Pakistan the design for the weapon used in China's fourth nuclear test, a low-yielding uranium device to be detonated in 1986. China, however, denied that it had validated Pakistani nuclear weapon design.

Further information on Sino-Pak nuclear collaboration came in June that year when Senator Cranston told the Senate that Pakistan had already acquired the nuclear capability. According to him "Pakistan can make at least a dozen bombs" and he warned that there was a danger of a nuclear war between

236 Ibid.
238 Nucleonics Week, 23 January 1983.
240 Ibid.
India and Pakistan.

What is interesting about Cranston's revelation was that most of the information came to him from a secret 15-page document that has now been declassified. This document on Pakistan's nuclear programme and China's assistance to Pakistan had been prepared by 90 experts. He said that the State Department had been hiding this fact from the Congress because the officials feared if Congress came to know of this, it would stop the 3.2 billion aid.

The United States suspended the talks on transfer of nuclear technology to China in September 1982 because of the American suspicion that China was helping Pakistan in latter's efforts to acquire nuclear capability. The talks had been dragging on for one full year because of US insistence and Chinese reluctance to accept restrictions incorporated in the US Atomic Energy Act. Under this Act no foreign buyer could reprocess the fuel from American reactors. But they secured a US commitment that this restriction would not be used to inhibit the growth of the Chinese nuclear industry.

242 Times of India, 22 June 1984.
244 Nuclear Week, 20 January 1983. According to it, it was a paramount concern to US, "what China has supplied to Pakistan". Also see ibid., 4 January 1983 and Times of India, 30 September 1986.
The talks were resumed when Premier Ne Zou Zeyang visited United States in January 1984. During President Reagan's trip to Peking in April, the US-Chinese trade pact was initiated.

The Sino-US accord was signed in July 1985, before signing the accord the Chinese President twice assured his country's intention to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. At the time of signing the accord, it was announced that the agreement enabled the American industry to participate in the building of 10 Chinese nuclear reactors worth 20 billion. This "highlighted the fact that the US was keen to have a share of China's lucrative nuclear market, which was basically dominated and controlled by West European countries".

Reacting to the Sino-US accord, Yaqub Khan, in a BBC interview, dismissed the idea that Pakistan would benefit from nuclear technology that China was to buy from US, as fantastic. "The agreement reached between the two countries in April is a matter of those two countries alone. It has nothing to do with Pakistan", he said.

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246 Nucleonics Week, 3 May 1984, p. 9.
249 Ibid., also see Nucleonics Week, n. 233. According to the US Assistant Secretary of State James Malone, the accord was a "pre-requisite for US companies to sell certain nuclear material to the world market".
While on the one hand China concluded an accord with the US, on the other a decision to negotiate an agreement with Pakistan, was reached with Pakistan, during Jumejo's visit in 1985 to Beijing. An accord on nuclear energy was reached between Pakistan and China on 15 September 1986. At the signing ceremony the Chinese Prime Minister, Zhao Ziang said "China does not subscribe to NPT, regards it discriminatory, it does not believe in proliferation of nuclear weapons nor does it help other country do so". The Pakistani Foreign Minister Sahebzada Yaqub Khan said that Pakistan also believed in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The agreement, reportedly for co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, incorporates all the safeguards laid down by the IAEA to cover all material and equipment covered under the accord. According to one report quoting A Q Khan, among the facilities involved in the agreement is the secret enrichment plant.

A nuclear collaboration between Pakistan and China is advantageous to both. For China, it is Pakistan who has

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251 Siddiqui, n. 248, p. 56.
252 Hindustan Times, 16 September 1986 and Indian Express, 16 September 1986.
255 Siddiqui, n. 248, p. 56.
always been an important factor, particularly, in view of its balance against the South Asian giant -- India. The construction of Karakoram Highway and Khyber Pass, despite the Indian protests are evidences of Chinese attempts at consolidation of ties with Pakistan against India. From the Chinese point of view, a nuclear Pakistan could one day fill in the gap in South-West Asia in the nuclear containment of the USSR. The South-western region propagated to be the target for the Soviet push downward can be fitted, as we shall see subsequently, once Pakistan acquires the nuclear capability.

However, there are certain other assumptions which tend to discount the possibility of a serious military collaboration between China and Pakistan. There is very little evidence of voluntary transfer of nuclear secrets or nuclear material, except the US-Israel, US-South African connection. It is up to the Chinese to test the viability of friendship of a nuclear Pakistan. After all Soviet Union was reported to have helped the Chinese nuclear programme (see Chapter I) and the Chinese turned against them.

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257 Times of India, 20 May 1983.