CHAPTER II

SOVIET ATTITUDE AND POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN - A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
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Soviet policy towards India upto the time of its independence was part of the overall Soviet policy and strategy towards the colonies and the semi-colonies of the Western Powers. Moreover, an increased level of support to Indian revolutionary activities can also be observed at a time when they wanted to extract some concessions from Britain on certain issues. But it is wrong to allege that the Soviets supported Indian freedom struggle only when they wanted to strike bargain or extract concessions with Britain in Europe. The Soviet Union never favoured the partition of India which was the direct result of British 'divide and rule' policy. Acceptance of Mountbatten plan by both the Congress and the Muslim League was viewed by them as a deal struck between the British imperialists and the Indian bourgeoisie. The initial assessment of Pakistan was very negative as they regarded it an artificial state. They regarded both India and Pakistan as stooges of Anglo-US imperialism in the initial phases because of their continued political, military and economic contacts with their erstwhile colonial master. Thus, it can be said that under Stalin, the Soviet Union followed a policy of near-indifference towards these two newly independent countries.
A. THE PARTITION OF INDIA AND EMERGENCE OF PAKISTAN

Soviet leaders and their ideologues were well aware of British intrigues in India and their designs and strategies to scuttle powerful Indian movement for independence was also known to them. This can be observed in many contemporary Soviet Indologists' writings. Prominent among those, A.M. Dyakov, described the principle of "divide and rule" as the cornerstone of British policy in India and referred to Muslim League as a tool of the Britishers from its very inception.¹

L.R. Gordon-Polanskaya - a co-author of a book - A History of Pakistan wrote, "Opposing Hindus to Muslims became the cornerstone of British colonial policy after the popular uprising of 1857-59. In many cases, the colonialists succeeded in giving a religious complexion to the class and social contradictions in the country. This split the national-liberation movement to a great extent".² Similarly, a noted Soviet indologist Balabushevich along with Dyakov in their famous book on India attributed Hindu-Muslim communal problem in colonial India to British imperialist policies. "The main and decisive reason why the Hindu-Muslim relations deteriorated was the policy of British imperialism which was always based on the principle of "divide and rule".³

1 A.M. Dyakov, National'nyy Vopros I Angliyskiy Imperializm V India (Moscow, 1948), p.189.
3 V.V. Balabushevich and A.M. Dyakov, A Contemporary History of India (Moscow, 1964), p.134.
The Soviets were from the very beginning opposed to the idea of partition of India and as a result opposed Muslim League which actually sponsored this demand. They were of firm conviction that imperialists in order to maintain their foothold on the subcontinent conspired for artificial creation of Pakistani state in the name of religion. The British were "determined to keep the country economically and politically dependent on Britain, and therefore dragged out the transfer of power, fostered the most reactionary schemes of partition, and abandoned the country in a condition which made normal relations between the two newly-created states practically impossible, thus setting the stage for imperialist intrigues". The Soviets, on the other hand, considered Indians and Pakistanis as 'blood brothers' - ethnically, culturally, and historically - the same people, artificially cut apart by imperial powers. In this regard the statement made by N.S. Khrushchev is of prime importance. He warned that when passions will calm down, the people of two countries will realize the harm done by such an artificial division.

SOVIET VIEW OF INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

Before the actual acceptance of the British partition plan of India, the Soviet attitude towards the Indian National Congress, which was the main organ of freedom struggle for

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6 N.A. Bulganin and N.S. Khrushchev, Speeches During Sojourn in India, Burma and Afghanistan (New Delhi, Tass, 1956), p.85-86.
Indian people, was very positive. A.M. Dyakov characterized the Indian National Congress as "the most influential" of the Indian organisations fighting for the attainment of "full independence". According to him under the existing Indian conditions, its social and economic programmes were most progressive. In another article he asserted that the National Congress included a number of propositions in its programme which had the support of considerably "broader sections of the population". Even after its whole-hearted support for the Indian National Army which joined hands with the Axis power - Japan - during the second world war, the Congress party was applauded by the Soviets after the war was over. In this regard Balabushevich in 1946 in an article on "Indian Struggle for Independence" observed that India could have played a much bigger role in the war if only England had not pursued a policy of colonial supremacy, which affected the solidarity of the Indian people during the war. The British imperialists rejected the demand made by the main political parties for a national Government during the war, although it was patent that such a Government

7 A.M. Dyakov, "Sovremennaia Indiia", Bolshevik(Moscow), February 1946, p.44.

8 A.M. Dyakov, "India after the War", New Times, No.2, January 15, 1946, p.11.

9 Ibid., p.13.
would have been able to draw the masses into the war and assured the maximum use of India's resources in the prosecution of the war. 10

But the acceptance of Mountbatten plan by the Congress providing for the transfer of power on the basis of a partition of the subcontinent into two independent, sovereign states, i.e., India and Pakistan, forced Dyakov to review his earlier opinion and sympathy shown to the Congress. He was obliged to agree with E. Zhukov that the party represented the reactionary strata of the Indian society. 11 In an article "Partitioned India" which appeared in New Times in 1946, he observed: "The acceptance of the Mountbatten Plan (for partition) by the leaders of the Indian National Congress was a result of a compromise deal between the Indian bourgeoisie and British imperialism. The deal is based on concessions made by both sides... What chiefly prompted the Indian bourgeoisie to make this political compromise was its fear of the mass movement for national liberation". 12 Dyakov's assessment of the leaders of the National Congress was also very positive before their acceptance of partition plan.


Gandhi was considered to be "the most influential and the popular leader of the INC". According to him the contribution made by Gandhi to national struggle was not denied even by his "opponents inside and outside the country". But he disagreed with Gandhi's idea of non-violence and economic programmes.\textsuperscript{13} Nehru was considered to be a product of "British propaganda, culture and education" but was described as a "progressive democrat" whose idea of socialism was thought to be influenced by English Fabians.

Moreover, "the majority of the Congress leaders" were considered to be far less radical than Nehru and in this bracket came the then President of the Congress - Maulana Abul Kalam Azad - a "theologian who is not tinged with religious fanaticism". Similarly Sardar Patel was considered by Dyakov as "an arrogant foe of all 'left' trends in the Congress", and Dr. Rajendra Prasad - a "convinced pacifist and non-resister". Both, Patel and Prasad were mentioned as orthodox Gandhists. A tinge of hostile attitude was shown towards C. Rajagopalachari for harbouring anti-Soviet sentiments in order "to raise his stocks in the eyes" of Britishers.\textsuperscript{14} No similar attempt was, however, made to assess the character of the Muslim League leaders by Soviet

\textsuperscript{13} A.M. Dyakov, "Indian National Congress Leaders", \textit{New Times} (Moscow), No.10, May 15, 1946, pp.27-29.

\textsuperscript{14} "Rajagopalachari's Faux Pass", \textit{New Times} (Moscow), No.12, June 15, 1946, p.19.
scholars who had from the very beginning a suspicious and hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union.  

But after the partition plan's acceptance by the Congress, E. Zhukov made a reassessment of the Indian National Congress leaders and it proved out to be essentially a negative one. He viewed that it was a deal struck between the Indian bourgeoisie and the British imperialists. He described Nehru as "a millionaire" known for his anti-British attitude but further mentioned that in recent times he has abandoned his anti-British posture in order to collaborate with British imperialists. In order to prove his point Zhukov quoted a speech made by Nehru in the Constituent Assembly of India on 27 January 1947 which emphasized the need for cordial relations with England. About Sardar Patel, Zhukov was convinced that he was the most reactionary leader of the right wing. Patel's pet theory, he alleged, was that "India's biggest danger was communism". In Zhukov's opinion Gandhi was the apostles of India's backwardness, the opponent of industrialization, and the propagandist of the spinning wheel, and of the slogan "Back to the Villages".

SOVIET VIEW OF MUSLIM LEAGUE

Soviet leaders and scholars were contemptuous and critical of the Muslim League from the very beginning due to its communal character and negative role played by it in

15 Budhraj, op.cit., no.5, p.27.
16 See Nirmala Joshi, op.cit., no.10, p.159.
"disrupting the front of the struggle of the Indian people for its independence". According to Dyakov the League leaders fanned communal feelings and resorted to damagogy through which "they managed to attract fairly wide masses of the Muslim democratic intelligencia and of the Muslim peasantry". Thus, Soviets could not lend support to the Muslim League's demand for a separate and independent state on the ground that the Muslims of British India constituted a separate nation and looked down upon Jinnah's two-nation theory. "The 'two-nation theory' was formulated with the direct assistance of the British imperialists during the colonial period". Marxism denounced religion as the basis of nationhood. "A nation", wrote Stalin, "is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up, manifested in a community of culture".

But Dyakov blamed the Congress for not making "serious attempts to win support among the Muslim masses". According to him the Congress was dominated by the Hindus, which had "paid little heed to the needs of the Muslims", and described

17 V.V. Balabushevich and A.M. Dyakov, "Indiya i vtoraja imperialisticheskaia voina", Mirovoe Khoziaistvo (Moscow), No.12, December 1940, pp.53-68.
18 A.M. Dyakov, op.cit., no.1, p.38.
the party's programme as "insufficiently radical to attract the Muslim masses". 21 Dyakov wrote that though the Indian National Congress was not a communal organisation, its members were mostly Hindus because of certain "peculiarities of the development of capitalism in India". "The weak Muslim representation gave the party ... a fairly sharply defined Hindu colouring ... Muslim communal leaders and British ruling circles widely used these facts to estrange the Muslim masses from the National Congress". 22 Most of the progressive Indians and some of the more objective British scholars are also of the view that the Congress lost influence among Muslims on the eve and during the second world war because it was not offering them anything in which they were interested. 23 Some Indian scholars have alleged that a certain change occurred in the attitude of Soviet leaders towards the Muslim League after the Soviet entry into the Second World War in June 1941. They, however, do not substantiate their assertion with any statement made by any Soviet scholar in this regard. Instead in order to prove their point, they resort to the statements made by CPI and its leaders. The Soviets on the other hand were from the very beginning critical of Muslim League as an instrument of British imperialism and as a reactionary communal organisation. Dr. Ram in his book observed that by mid-1942 the CPI openly

21 A.M. Dyakov, op.cit., no.7, p.47.
22 Quoted by Devendra Kaushik, op.cit., no.5, p.31.
committed itself to the view that India was a multinational state and that the right of self-determination should be granted to each nationality. According to him, this attitude was in consonance with the view that had been expressed by Dyakov in his well-known book on the national question in India.\(^24\) Firstly, this book was published in 1966 and not during the Indian struggle for independence and secondly, the right of self-determination to all nationality has been the policy of Soviets right from the October revolution and not a policy adopted during the second world war. In this regard the opinion of Vijay Sen Budhraj seems plausible that the "Soviet orientalists scrupulously avoided favouring the Congress or the League. They laid great emphasis on the harmful effect of disunity between the two major parties, which weakened the national liberation movement."\(^25\) This has also been emphasised by Devendra Kaushik in his book on the subject. In fact, E. Zhukov was equally critical of both the parties. In his view the Congress and the Muslim League were both motley organisations. The difference was that the Congress had capitalists at its helm whereas the League had landlords there.\(^26\)

\(^{24}\) See Raghunath Ram, \textit{op.cit.}, no.11, p.4; and J.P. Jain, \textit{Soviet Policy Towards Pakistan and Bangladesh} (Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1974).

\(^{25}\) Devendra Kaushik, \textit{op.cit.}, no.5, pp.32-33.

\(^{26}\) Nirmala Joshi, \textit{op.cit.}, no.10, p.159.
FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EMERGENCE OF PAKISTAN

Some people blame either Syed Ahmad Khan, or Jinnah, or Md. Iqbal for the emergence of Pakistan. But it is wrong to blame individuals for the creation of Pakistan. Dyakov mentioned some peculiarities of social and capitalist development in certain areas of India which was exploited by Muslim communal leaders on the one hand and Britishers on the other to create Pakistan. Jawaharlal Nehru and H. Mukerjee were of similar view when they said that colonial oppression coupled with survivals of feudalism had adverse effects on the formation of capitalist relations in India. One of these effects was the uneven economic development of the various religious communities and castes of the Indian bourgeoisie.  

Two Soviet scholars explained, "There is a tendency among Indian bourgeois historians to explain the formation of Pakistan by the intrigues of individual ill-wishers, and to deny the fact that the partition was prompted by the interests of certain classes and social groups."  

L.R. Polanskaya explains this phenomenon in the following words: "In the parts of North India with predominantly Muslim populations, where the Muslim bourgeoisie (Bengali, Punjabi, Sindhi) were extremely weak and capitalist enterprise had from the very beginning been concentrated in the hands of Hindus, mostly Gujaratis and Marwaris, conditions were highly

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conducive to the channelling of local nationalism into the mainstream of Muslim nationalism. With it merged the anti-feudal aims of the peasants, the artisans and the small landowners, all united in their hatred of the predominantly Hindu middlemen and money-lenders. Muslim nationalism also became one of the ideologies adopted by the middle-class Muslims dissatisfied with the Hindu monopoly in the middle and lower rungs of Indian industry, trade and the civil service." 29 The same writer along with Gankovsky also wrote: "Many features in the formation of the Indian bourgeoisie helped the British in their designs. Trade and money-lending, the main source of primitive accumulation for the Indian bourgeoisie, were chiefly in Hindu hands ... chiefly the castes and communal system, helped the British authorities to impart a religious context to the competitive struggle of the various groups of the Indian bourgeoisie. That was the ground on which the Muslim communal movement arose; the formation of Pakistan was a logical culmination of this movement..." 30 Similarly the same authors further observed: "The movement for a Muslim state also had an economic grounding. Pakistan was recommended to the Muslim bourgeois groups as deliverance from the competition of the big, predominantly

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30 Gankovsky and Polanskaya, op.cit., no.2, pp.6-7.
Hindu commercial and industrial firms. A movement to form Muslim trading companies, banks and industrial enterprises captured Bombay's Muslim section of the business world. Competition between the various bourgeois groups increasingly acquired a religious colour. This was why the Pakistan idea enjoyed popularity from the start among the Muslim intellectuals and the big bourgeoisie. As for the provinces with a Muslim majority, the success of the Pakistan movement there was due chiefly to religious form of local class and national contradictions.31 Holding the similar view B.K. Nanda writes, "The Pakistan idea sold fast with the Muslim community, particularly its middle class in the race for the plums of government service, trade and industry, was attracted by the idea of a Muslim state. In a competitive society anything which promised a short cut to success was welcome."32 According to O.H.K. Spate, the blunders made by the Congress, the communal struggle for patronage, and resentment of the fact that a numerical majority controlled an increasingly greater share of the country's economy, fed Muslim separatism.33

Gankovsky and Polanskaya viewed that the moment an organised national-liberation movement emerged in India, British political leaders and the colonial authorities gave

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31 Ibid., p.75.
prominence to the problem of the religious minorities and the Hindu-Muslim discord with the purpose of splitting the anti-imperialist movement. But to be fair to Soviet scholars, they not only blamed Muslims and their political party, the Muslim League, for disrupting the national movement, but were equally critical of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Indian princes for acting as tools of British imperialism. "The British colonialists, who feared the consolidation of the country's patriotic forces behind the Congress, went out of their way to obstruct the Congress ministries, and depended for support on the more reactionary groups of landlords and princes. They also exploited the leaderships of the various religious communal parties, such as the Muslim League, the Hindu Mahasabha and the organisations of untouchables." In this regard Dyakov wrote, "The organisation which in the eyes of the British ruling circles was to undermine the Congress influence among the Hindus and to complete the split of the national-liberation movement was the Hindu Mahasabha". He further observed that, "It would be incorrect to think that British imperialism relied only on the Muslim landowners and compradore bourgeoisie. The Princes, who are even now the firmest supporters of British imperialism, are mostly Hindus." Similarly, the

35 Ibid., p.69.
Director of Pacific Institute of the Academy of Sciences, E. Zhukov observed that the progressive elements in India seriously feared that "the principalities (Princely States) will remain not only a base for anti-democratic forces but likewise a stronghold of English military control over India". He strongly viewed that the Princely States would continue to flourish with British support and provide England with the necessary means to control the subcontinent.

SOVIET VIEW OF MOUNTBATTEN PLAN

Writing in Izvestia on Mountbatten Plan, A.M. Dyakov further referred to the Princely States' role in fragmenting India into many pieces. He explained that since many of the Princely States like Hyderabad, Mysore and Travancore have expressed their desire to remain separate from the Indian Union, they would become British bases in India as "feudal rights and privileges stood in need of British support". From this he drew the inference that the subcontinent would become "a conglomeration of dominions and states" which though formally remaining independent would be for all practical purposes dominated and controlled by the British imperialists.

38 Nirmala Joshi, op.cit., no.10, p.160.
Thus the Soviet attitude towards the Mountbatten Plan was very hostile. They suspected British intention of maintaining perpetual rule over the subcontinent "by hook or by crook". A.M. Dyakov commenting on this crooked plan, explained that Britain intended to "perpetuate her rule in India by splitting her in pieces and converting her into a conglomeration of feeble and, as far as possible, virtually hostile states.... In a new form, she is resorting to the old method of divide ... foment national dissension ... and rule". Similarly a Soviet commentary on Radio Moscow explained that the division of India according to the Mountbatten plan would aggravate communal tension in the subcontinent and provide the Britishers "an excuse for perpetual interference in India's internal affairs" enabling them "to retain their hold on the country".

E. Zhukov, a noted Soviet authority on the colonial question stated that "the grant of formal independence to the colonies by no means guaranteed their actual independence" and the division of India would lead Britain to maintain its dominance. The Mountbatten plan to him was not more than a deal struck between British imperialism and the Indian bourgeoisie.


accepted "under the pressure of wealthy classes who would exploit the domestic market and avert a real democratic revolution". The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia wrote, "The partition of India enabled British imperialism to weaken the economy of the country, and the enflaming of differences between India and Pakistan has facilitated British domination in both dominions". Both partitioned countries were described as "parts of the British Empire, former British colonies, retaining to a different degree their dependence on Great Britain and .... members of the so-called British Commonwealth of Nations". Instead of partition Dyakov favoured "a federation of national administrative-political regions rather than its division on a communal basis into two or even three separate states". Even Stalin referred federation as an ideal solution for many of the problems between India and Pakistan. Another Soviet writer Scherbinovskiy rather asserted that the two communities "can live in peace and maintain the most neighbourly relations with each other, if they were left alone, if their differences are not inflated, if they are not incited against each other".

45 Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia (Moscow), vol.18, January 8, 1953, p.73.
46 Ibid., vol.15, 12 September 1952, p.79.
B. THE SOVIET IMAGE OF PAKISTAN

The Soviet image of Pakistan and attitude towards that artificially created state was far from sympathetic. The emergence of Pakistan on the world map was a strange phenomenon for many a political observer in the Soviet Union. It was difficult for them to understand how it could "fit into Marxist ideology". Marxism denounces religion as the basis of nationhood. "How primitive it is to create a state on the basis of religion", 50 quipped Stalin in his conversation with the Indian Ambassador. They had a serious doubt that Pakistan could survive for long. Even Western scholars, as for example Hans J. Morgenthalau, doubted Pakistan's survival. He said, "It is hard to see how anything except miracle, or else a revival of religious fanaticism, will assure Pakistan's future". 51 "Not only did Pakistan consist of geographically two separate and disunited parts, but the two wings of the country were also culturally, racially and linguistically distinct from each other". 52 Its inhabitants simply shared a romantic view of Islam. "The new state would have disintegrated soon after its birth if political allegiance had not been tethered to religion". 53 That is why A. Dyakov

50 K.P.S. Menon, op.cit., no.48.
53 Raghunath Ram, op.cit., no.11, p.9.
considered it to be an 'artificial state', the 'sole link' between the two parts being "common religion".\textsuperscript{54} "It was not based on the territorial criterion of nationalism; it was neither a geographical nor an economic unit".\textsuperscript{55} The psychological make up of the Soviet leaders and their publicity media prevented them from extending felicitations to the Pakistani leaders on the occasion of the formal inauguration of their state. They maintained complete silence over this historic event.

Soviet scholars Gankovsky and Polanskaya, in their study showed that the partition of India neither settled the national nor the communal problem, the basic aim for which partition was effected. It did not create a homogeneous Muslim state, as millions of Hindus still lived in Pakistan. According to the 1951 census, 14.1 per cent of Pakistani population were Hindus and more than 30 million Muslims lived in India.\textsuperscript{56} They further observed that "the frontier dividing the new dominions - Pakistan and the Indian Union was fixed without regard to the national or ethnical compositions of the population of the various regions; nor was any attention

\begin{itemize}
\item A.M. Dyakov, \textit{India Vo Vremiy I Posle Vtoroi Mirovoi Voiny, 1939-49} (Moscow, 1952), p.129.
\item Budhraj, \textit{op.cit.}, no.5, p.24.
\item Gankovsky and Polanskaya, \textit{op.cit.}, no.2, p.97.
\item Also see Budhraj, \textit{Ibid.}, p.23.
\end{itemize}
paid to existing economic and cultural links or to territorial coherence". At the time of independence though Pakistan had an edge over India in matters of agricultural products, it had no large industrial centres and was extremely poor in mineral resources. As a result, Dyakov observed that "Pakistan is, therefore, an agrarian country, and its economy bears a colonial character". The two other Soviet scholars opined that, "The economy of Pakistan was dominated by foreign, chiefly British monopolies"; and "in 1950 their capital investments were estimated at 1,000 million rupees".

The dominating positions of British monopolies in the field of credit and financial system, insurance business, sea and river transport, industry and foreign trade was maintained. "The system of imperial preferences, as a result of which the dominion not only lost millions of rupees but was also prevented from protecting its national industry against the competition of British commodities, which continued to be imported under preferential tariffs, helped British monopolies to maintain their leading position in the

58 Raghunath Ram, op.cit., no.11, p.9; and Budhraj, op.cit., no.5, p.23.
60 Gankovsky and Polanskaya, op.cit., no.2, p.100.
economy of Pakistan". 61 Thus the Soviet scholars inferred that the predominance of British monopolies in Pakistan's national economy served the British interests: "The predominance of the British monopolies in the economy of Pakistan not only brought them huge profits and made it possible to preserve conditions in which non-equivalents were exchanged between Pakistan and Great Britain to the detriment of the former, but also enabled the British monopolies to influence the dominion's economic development in a direction favourable to themselves, preserving it as an agrarian and raw material appendage of the former metropolitan country". 62

Moreover, even in the political field, according to the Soviets, the predominant position of the British was maintained. "Hundreds of leading posts in the army and the civil service continued to be held by Englishmen, for example, the Governor of the West Punjab, the Governor of the North-West Frontier Province, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the commanders of the various arms of the services in Pakistan were British". 63 Three out of four Provincial Governors were British nationals at the time of partition. The key positions in the administrative machinery of the country was held by Britshers. 64 "The

61 Ibid., p.101.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., p.110.
64 Dyakov, op.cit., no.12; See also Budhraj, op.cit., no.5, p.77 and Kaushik, op.cit., no.5, p.28.
administrative apparatus of the country was headed by the Governor-General, who had full authority over the civil administration and the armed forces. By his own order he could amend the existing constitution and promulgate laws that would be beyond the effective power of review of any court.'

E. Zhukov analysed that "Churchill approved the partition plan because he knew that it would provide Britain an opportunity to retain its voice in the economic, political and military matters of partitioned India."

Pakistan's decision of retaining membership of Commonwealth of Nations also provided ample opportunity to Soviet commentators for severe criticism. Moreover, Pakistan's willingness to provide Pakistani territory to develop British military bases in the border area forced Dyakov to comment that, "Pakistan is being converted into a British bridge-head in the East, into a second Trans-Jordan of enormous dimensions". In this regard Gladkov commented that "... the reactionary policy of the Pakistan Government is fully in line with this idea of turning the country into an imperialist stronghold in the East. Pakistan democrats, people who champion genuine national independence and come out against

66 Nirmala Joshi, op.cit., no.10, p.158.
67 Dyakov, op.cit., no.12.
foreign capital, are hounded and persecuted. The agents
of the imperialists try to play on the ignorance, superstitions,
and religious fanaticism of the population, only 5.3 per cent
of whom are literate. Everything is done to dupe the Pakistani
people and make them a tool of the imperialists in the latter's
efforts to crush the national liberation and democratic move-
ments in the Middle East. The Pakistani landlords and capi-
talists deliberately endeavour to retard the political develop-
ment of the people". 68

Thus, the Soviet assessment of Pakistan at its inception
was essentially a negative one and was far from sympathetic.
The characterization made by Dyakov about Pakistani govern-
ment reflected the total Soviet view of Pakistan. He de-
scribed it as "anti-worker, anti-people, tied up with the
imperialists and dominated by feudal elements and landlords,
in effect, class-wise, a more reactionary state than India". 69

However, the partial responsibility for this negative
assessment of Pakistani ruling elites could be kept on Soviet
ideological predilections towards the emergence of Pakistan
itself and partially the international situation immediately
after the war was also responsible which forced Andrei
Zhadanov, the heir-apparant of Stalin, to put forward 'two
camp' theory. Till 1946 Moscow had supported cooperation

68 N. Gladkov, "In Pakistan: Travel Impression", New

69 Quoted by Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller,
Communism in India (Berkeley & Los Angeles, Calif.,
1959), p.188.
with the national bourgeoisie in their national liberation
movements and showered petals of roses in the praise of their
leaders. But in 1947 it suddenly reversed this policy and
opposed all cooperation with the bourgeoisie. It now adopted
an aggressive policy in the colonies which confirmed the
new Soviet view of international affairs as a struggle between
two world blocs. As a logical corollary to this attitude, the
Soviet Union followed a policy of indifference towards the
newly independent countries of South and South-East Asia.
Their independence were branded by Stalin as sham and their
leaders as 'lackeys', 'stooges', 'agents' and 'camp-followers'
of Anglo-American imperialists. This policy of hostility
towards the ruling elites in the former colonies began to
change even during Stalin's last days but it took N.S.
Khrushchev to implement it in real practice.

C. SOVIET UNION'S PAKISTAN POLICY UNDER STALIN

Stalin's initial policy towards Pakistan was a blend
of both positive and negative gestures for which many
factors were responsible. Stalin himself was preoccupied
with postwar domestic problems like rehabilitation of its
war-ravaged economy and ensurence of her security unleashed
by cold war conditions, prevented him from paying the
required attention to developing friendly ties with newly
independent countries of Asia and Africa. However, the
growing pro-West orientation of Pakistan, the cold response
of Liaquat Ali Khan to the invitation to visit the USSR, Pakistan's bid to assume the leadership of pan-Islamic forces, Pakistan Government's refusal to allow Pakistani writers to visit the USSR on 33rd anniversary of the October Revolution and Pakistan's attitude in the Korean war proved a major stumbling bloc in developing cordial relationship between the two countries. Thus, in spite of a change in Stalin's attitude towards newly independent countries in his last days, Soviet-Pakistan relations remained at a low ebb.

Despite Soviet Union's known aversion for the emergence of Pakistan, Moscow established diplomatic relations with it perhaps to ward off the possibility of a closer cooperation between Karachi and Washington. On 2 May 1948, Tass announced that both countries had decided to exchange diplomatic missions. But on account of the mental reservations of the League leaders towards the Soviet Union, the actual exchange of envoys took its own sweet time. The Government of Pakistan opened an embassy in Moscow on 30 October 1949 and three weeks later the Soviet Union accredited M. Ivan Nikolaevich to Pakistan. But Nikolaevich was not acceptable to Pakistan as he was a Soviet envoy to Afghanistan from 1943 to 1947, with whom Karachi had serious differences over Pakhtoonistan issue. Thus, Moscow withdrew Nikolaevich and named Alexander Georgievitch Stetsenko instead, a former Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in London, who could assume office in Karachi only on 15 March 1950.
Pakistan under the aegis of the Muslim League and the heads of the Egyptian International Islam Brotherhood Association organised an All-Muslim Conference in February 1949 in Karachi with a view to developing close cooperation among the Muslim countries. The representatives of the Muslim League and Islam Brotherhood toured extensively the Arab countries to canvass support for this movement. The Soviet Union alleged that the US Embassy in Karachi incurred the expenditure by the representatives of both these organisations during their visit to the Middle East countries for the aforesaid purpose. The Soviet Union had strong misgivings about this movement and condemned it strongly. Moscow feared that under the guise of religious, cultural and economic cooperation "these Moslem politicians were plotting against the national liberation movement in Asia and the Middle East and supporting the anti-Soviet military schemes of the US and British imperialists". One of the leaders of Islam Brotherhood had already made it explicit that his party was trying to build up a Muslim alliance to "combat communism in the East". The President of the

70 [New Times (Moscow), No.4, 1951.]
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
Muslim League of Pakistan had suggested in the conference that a confederation of Muslim states should be constituted. 74

For the furtherance of the same objectives two another sessions of the International Economic Conference were held in Karachi and Teheran respectively in 1949 and 1950. The first conference held in Karachi, with a view to develop close economic cooperation among the Muslim states, decided to establish an International Islamic Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Moscow doubted the economic motives of the conference, and viewed it as a cover for creation of an "anti-communist bloc". 75 It alleged at the same time that Pakistan through this movement wanted to capture the leadership of the Muslim countries, enhance its prestige among the international community and to strengthen its position vis-a-vis India by setting up a "military and political bloc". 76 Dyakov mentioned in an article that Pakistan was chiefly used by Anglo-American imperialism for strengthening its influence in the Near and Middle-East area. In his attack on Pan-Islamic movement he observed that "...in foreign policy the task of Pan-Islamism is to mask the Pakistan Government's reactionary policy of scraping

74 Islamic Review, December 1949.
75 New Times, No.8, 1951.
76 Ibid.
together an anti-Soviet bloc among the Muslim countries of the Near and Middle East. By Pan-Islamic slogans and by demagogy about the common interests of all Muslims in the world, the Muslim League is trying to conceal the dependence of Pakistan's present policy on British and American diktats and to veil Pakistan's role as the bridgehead of the Anglo-American bloc...."\(^{77}\) Pakistan was stated to be an "agent of Anglo-American imperialism to promote its interest in the Middle East and South East Asia in return for American arms and equipment."\(^{78}\)

The Soviet Union opposed this Pan-Islamic movement due to both ideological and strategic considerations. Ideologically, this movement helped in Islamic revivalism, containment of communist ideas and proved a hinderance in national liberation movement and democratization process of Muslim countries. Strategically, the Soviet Union had sizable Muslim population in Central Asian region which could have been proved quite vulnerable to Islamic revivalist ideas. Moscow's scathing criticism of Pakistan for leading Pan-Islamic movement further deteriorated their relationships.\(^{79}\)

Soviets in 1948 came to know about a secret agreement between Pakistan and Britain for a military base facility


\(^{78}\) Quoted by Raghunath Ram, op.cit., no.11, p.18.

\(^{79}\) Ibid., pp.19-20.
to the latter in the former's territory. They further believed that the United States was negotiating for similar facilities in the North West Frontier Province and elsewhere in Pakistan. In this regard Izvestia reported that "American influence is penetrating ever deeper into the political and economic life of Pakistan. It believed that the rulers of Pakistan were under their influence and for them "Pakistan is a strategic military base in the East". The fear of turning Pakistan into a military base by imperialist powers was repeatedly expressed by Soviet writers and visitors to Pakistan in this period. They specially did not look with favour to the visit of Americans to Pakistan, particularly to the northern areas, close to the Afghan frontier. Gladkov, after his visit to Pakistan wrote, "At the end of 1949, four senators, accompanied by 'all manners of experts' spent nearly a week in Pakistan. They went to Khyber Pass, studied the country around, made photographs of the locality. These activities indicated that the American and British imperialists are interested in Pakistan not only as a market and field of investment. They are out to make it one of their military bases." It is not that the Soviet fear in this regard was without

80 Trud, 21 November 1948.
82 N. Gladkov, op.cit., no.68, p.22.
any ground. Even American State Department had admitted this fact. They announced that the United States and Pakistan "have agreed on most fundamental international issues. In view of its geographical and political position in Asia, Pakistan is potentially important to the global defence effort (against communism) of free nations". \(^{83}\) In the post-war period American relations with Asian nations were very limited and mainly confined to Europe for containing communism there. But the fall of China to communism in 1949 and the outbreak of Korean war in 1950 made United States alert to the danger of spread of communism in the Asian continent. Washington realized the strategic importance of Pakistan and immediately started cultivating it.

Although the Soviet Union exchanged diplomatic missions with India almost two years earlier than Pakistan, it sought to befriend Pakistan first. It was Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan of Pakistan, and not Jawaharlal Nehru of India who was first invited by the Soviet Union to visit Moscow in 1949. The exact date of the visit was left to the future but Liaquat Ali Khan, nonetheless, accepted the invitation. The invitation was received with much jubilation and enthusiasm in Pakistan. Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, Premier of the North-West Frontier Province said on the occasion, "A great

and sovereign state such as ours could not possibly carry on without contacts with the USSR." 84 To Liaquat Ali Khan it was "a friendly visit to a neighbouring country" and he hoped that it would benefit both the countries. He further stated, "I hope to avail myself of the invitation as early as possible". 85 However, the visit never came off and he failed to avail the opportunity provided by Moscow for improving relations. Instead he preferred to fly to Washington in 1950. Liaquat Ali applied shock tactics for extracting an invitation from Washington which invited Nehru first. Liaquat Ali's visit to Washington, however, proved very successful as it brought US economic and later military aid to Pakistan and with that Pakistan's policy started rapidly moving towards greater alignment with the West. But this Pakistani move certainly annoyed the Kremlin and led Liturtturnia Gazeta to brand him as "Pakistan-type of Syngman Rhee". The Soviet weekly condemned him in strongest term for his "zealous subservience to Washington". On the conclusion of his visit, it commented "Liaquat Ali Khan returned to Karachi after assuring his American bosses that he would assist their plans for enslavement of Pakistan and converting it into a political, economic and strategic Asian base for Wall Street". It further added, "From British colony it has become an American colony". 86

84 Dawn, 10 June 1949.
85 Ibid., 11 June 1949.
Pakistan's stand on Korean war further alienated it from the Soviet Union. As soon as the hostilities between North and South Korea began, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali, then on his way back from the visit to the United States and Canada, publicly announced in London Pakistan's full support to the U.N. action in Korea and denounced that North Korea be declared as an aggressor. Contrary to the Soviet stand, Pakistan supported Security Council's decision of UN intervention in Korea. In October 1950, Pakistan supported the resolution for crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel and entry into the North Korean territory by the UN troops. Liaquat Ali Khan declared in the Pakistani Constituent Assembly on 11 October 1950 that, "38th parallel has never been recognized by the General Assembly as a permanent boundary line". He further said that "the only logical course open to the UN was to bring the whole of Korea under UN control".

Pakistan, at the same time offered a gift of 5,000 tons of wheat to the United Nations for use in South Korea. These Pakistani utterances and actions were disliked by Moscow and forced a Soviet political weekly *New Times* to describe it "as Liaquat Ali Khan's servile zeal". It further warned of a "deplorable consequences for Pakistan" for Liaquat Ali's declaration at a Press Conference in London

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87 *Dawn*, 12 October 1950.

on 31 July 1950 that Pakistan would provide "any help within its means" in support of the American action in Korea.\textsuperscript{89} Liaquat Ali Khan was even ready to send troops, but could not do so as the same were needed more at home.

This is, however, only one side of the picture. Pakistan also sent feelers from time to time for fence-mending with the Soviet Union which was appreciated by the Soviet Union. It became committed to Western bloc only when it started receiving the US military aid. Initially Pakistan was averse to the idea of compromising its newly-won freedom of decision-making and like India it too pursued the policy of non-alignment. It was one of the first few non-communist countries to recognize the communist government in China. Much to the dislike of the United States, Pakistan voted in favour of providing representation to China in the United Nations. Mahmud Hussain, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Pakistan declared in the same year that Pakistan would not be a camp follower of any bloc. Similarly his comments on Vietnam that "Karachi had intended to recognize the Bao Dai regime in Indo-China but was now holding off for a while" as "recent trends indicate it might not be there to stay and we don't wish to recognize a regime that will fall",\textsuperscript{90} was appreciated in Moscow. In 1948, it denied access to Dutch planes or ships carrying war supplies

\textsuperscript{89} \textit{Dawn}, 1 August 1950.

\textsuperscript{90} Quoted by J.P. Jain, \textit{op.cit.}, no.52, p.15.
to Indonesia; the same year it supported Iran against Britain when the former nationalised the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Pakistan was quite vehement in her support to Palestinian cause. All these actions led Moscow to exchange cultural, medical, and trade groups as a good-will gesture even before the establishment of formal state relations.

In July 1949, a Soviet trade delegation arrived in Karachi to negotiate a trade agreement. It was followed by a team of Soviet doctors in 1951. Similarly, in 1952, a Pakistani cultural troupe visited the USSR. On the invitation of the Pakistan Progressive Writers Association, a five-man delegation of Soviet writers led by M. Tikhonov visited Pakistan to attend a convention at Lahore. Between 1948 and 1952 Pakistan's trade with the Soviet Union increased at a quicker pace than Soviet trade with India. During 1953, Indo-Soviet trade amounted only to Rs 8.1 million both ways. In 1952, exports to Pakistan rose sharply to 10 per cent of Pakistan's exports. However, 1953 saw a marked decline bringing this figure down to 4 per cent only. In September 1952, the USSR favourably responded to the appeal made by Pakistan for supply of food stuffs and a barter agreement was signed in Karachi between the two countries for 150,000 tons of Russian wheat in exchange for 22,000 tons jute and 13,150 tons of cotton.

However, the negative response of Pakistani leaders to Soviet good-will gestures hardened Soviet attitude towards Pakistan. The Soviet-Pakistan relations which appeared to be
warming up in early 1949, started cooling off in the early 1950s, as Pakistan was unable to resist American pressures. Pakistan, for example, failed to send a group of Pakistani writers to visit the Soviet Union on the thirty-third anniversary of the October Revolution in return for a visit paid by a group of Soviet writers to Pakistan. This change in Soviet attitude became apparent even in trade negotiations. The Soviet trade delegation which reached Karachi on 25 July 1949 for a bilateral trade agreement and was reported to be engaged in the final stage of negotiations could not clinch the final agreement. The Soviet Union recalled the leader of the delegation on the plea of "important consultations". Thus, the initiative taken by the Soviet Union to improve relations with its neighbour proved abortive for want of adequate response by Karachi.

**SOVIET UNION AND THE KASHMIR QUESTION**

When the British left the subcontinent, the ruler of Kashmir under the Indian Independence Act, 1947 was free to accede either to India or to Pakistan or to maintain complete independence. Pakistan in an attempt to pressurise Kashmir cut off supplies of food and petrol and resorted to economic blockade of the state. When these attempts of coercion failed Pakistan instigated 50,000 armed tribals to

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91 *Literturnia Gazeta* (Moscow), 2 December 1950.

invade Kashmir from its territory. Pakistan's action led the Kashmir ruler, the legal repository of the supreme power in the state, to accede to India. The tribesmen who invaded Kashmir were prodded by imperialist powers as they were from the very beginning interested in this strategic region. The Soviet press reported that this aggression was made from the province which was ruled by a British Governor. The *New Times* wrote, "... British agents, holding out promises of easy plunder, incited the war-like Pathans to march on Kashmir as 'saviors' of Islam".93 *Pravda* reported that the tribesmen who invaded Kashmir were organized by a British general.94

The Soviet Union from the very beginning knew that the Western powers were interested in the Kashmir region due to its strategic value. Thus, Moscow from the earliest desired that the Kashmir dispute should be resolved by India and Pakistan among themselves through their own efforts, without any outside interference. The Western powers, on the other hand, favoured internationalization of the Kashmir dispute as it would have provided them an opportunity to fish in the troubled waters. This led the Soviets to maintain a neutralist and non-committal attitude on the issue, while exposing Western designs in the region. The Soviet media emphasised that the United States was not interested in the resolution of the dispute but wanted to convert Kashmir into

93 *New Times* (Moscow), No.40, 1948, p.25.
94 *Pravda*, 3 November 1948.
a trust territory of the United Nations. Pravda wrote that in view of the dominant position of the United States in the United Nations, it would manoeuvre to obtain bases in Kashmir and thus would strengthen the "defence line in Southern Asia". Pravda wrote that in view of the dominant position of the United States in the United Nations, it would manoeuvre to obtain bases in Kashmir and thus would strengthen the "defence line in Southern Asia". A Soviet weekly wrote, "The issue is more than two years old... twice brought before the U.N. ... but there is no visible prospect of its being settled, as it is fanned surreptitiously by certain influential member states". From the account of Mountbatten's Press Secretary A. Campbell-Johnson, it is obvious that it was at the instance of Mountbatten himself that the Kashmir dispute was brought to the world body and this plan was finalised in consultation with his adviser, Lord Ismay. Captain S. Brockman, Personal Secretary to Mountbatten in a conversation with Johnson stated that, "We have to get inside the problem or we will have no influence at all". New Times maintained, "For Britain, Kashmir is one of the means of keeping both dominions under her control". An Indian authority on Kashmir question has also shown in his work, the ulterior motive of Mountbatten in persuading Gandhi and Nehru to invoke the aid of the United Nations.

95 Ibid., 14 November 1950.
98 Ibid., p. 226.
"Moscow", however, "had taken a neutral attitude by abstaining on the Kashmir question in the Security Council debate in 1948-49, but thereafter, it began to give expression to its sensitivity about Anglo-US machinations in Kashmir and, to a certain extent, to tilt its attitude in favour of India". In this connection another Indian Sovietologist observed: "While avoiding any extreme action which might aggravate the already tangled question of Kashmir, A. Gromyko, the Soviet delegate to the Security Council showed sympathy for India's stand". In May 1952, Jacob Malik, representative of the Soviet Union in the UN disapproved the text of the letter to be sent by the Security Council President to India and Pakistan, the purpose of which was to prevent the Kashmir Constituent Assembly from expressing its opinion on the question of accession. In the same year the Soviet delegate urged that the status of Kashmir should be decided by its Constituent Assembly and opposed the induction of foreign troops in Kashmir.

When the Security Council took up the second report on Kashmir of the UN mediator, Dr. Graham, the Soviet representative explained as to why Kashmir dispute had not been settled for the last four years. He blamed the Anglo-American

101 J.P. Jain, op.cit., no.52, p.38.
102 Kaushik, op.cit., no.5, p.39.
powers for trying to impose their own solution on Kashmir. "The purpose of these plans is interference by the United States and the United Kingdom in the internal affairs of Kashmir, prolongation of the dispute between India and Pakistan on the question .... and the conversion of Kashmir into a protectorate of the United States and the United Kingdom under the pretext of rendering 'assistance through the United Nations'. Finally, the purpose of these plans ... is to secure the introduction of Anglo-American troops into the territory of Kashmir and convert it into their colony and a military strategic base".  

In December 1952, Soviet representative, Valerian Zorin reiterated the Soviet opposition to induction of foreign troops into Kashmir and strongly condemned Anglo-American interference in the Kashmir dispute as it rendered the solution more difficult.

Moscow under Stalin, thus, persisted with its neutral and non-committal attitude towards the Kashmir dispute. It was committed to peaceful settlement of Kashmir dispute through bilateral negotiations. Perhaps through this policy, Kremlin wanted to drive home its point to the Indian and Pakistani peoples that unlike the Western powers, it was never interested in fishing in the troubled waters. In fact, the bilateral negotiations between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan in July 1953 were appreciated by the

103 Security Council Official Records, Yr.7, mtg.570,
104 UN Document S/PV. 610.
Soviet publicity media. Pravda wrote, "In spite of the will of the enemies of peace, the meeting occurred without any so-called mediation" and "signified the beginning of direct conversations between interested sides as the sole method which in our times can be used to settle controversial international problems and conflicts". 105

If Soviet-Pakistan relations could not improve even in the last days of Stalin's rule who died on 5 March 1953, it was not Kremlin's fault. There was a clear change in Soviet attitude towards developing countries even under Stalin who in his last days renounced Zhadanov's two-camp theory and advised cooperation with nationalists everywhere. It was Pakistan which did not respond adequately to Soviet overtures, rather it always annoyed Moscow in order to please its western masters. Stalin on October 2, 1952 came out with his last theoretical work, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR. In this work he laid down three basic postulates about Moscow's relations with the non-communist world. First, he analysed that world was divided into two opposite markets, the one led by socialist camp and the other by capitalist camp (by 1952 the socialist camp had recovered not only from postwar economic crisis but had also reached to a position where it could offer economic and technical assistance to the former colonies). This was not the situation before as earlier there was only one world market, i.e., of capitalists. Now

105 Pravda, 1 August 1953.
the developing countries could receive the surplus products of socialist camp for their economic development. In other words, the capitalist camp would have a serious rival in the world market which "would deepen the general crisis of the world capitalist system."\(^{106}\) Stalin, thus, wanted to utilize surplus products of socialist economy, as an important instrument to weaken the influence of the Western powers in the third world.

Secondly, he analysed that the danger of a war between socialist and capitalist camp is not that grave as danger of a war within the capitalist camp itself which was led by the United States. According to Stalin other western capitalist countries were not going to "tolerate the domination and oppression of the United States endlessly" in the world market.\(^{107}\) He cited the example of second World War where capitalists fought for market and hoped that the same thing would happen under the new situation. And thus he advised communists to form a united front and cooperate with the nationalists.

Thirdly, Stalin advocated peaceful coexistence and advised not to try to overthrow capitalism and establish socialism by force. He was in no hurry for the capitalist system was on decay, under the new emerging situations, \(^{106}\) J.V. Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* (Progress, Moscow, 1952), pp.34-37. \(^{107}\) Ibid., pp.37-40.
"it confines itself to the democratic aim of preserving peace".108

In 1952 Stalin while replying a question said, "The peaceful coexistence of capitalism and communism is fully possible..."109

Stalin wanted to give a new direction even to his South Asian policy and had taken initial steps to develop relations with India and Pakistan. Stalin, who had not met any foreign diplomat for two years, granted an interview to the Indian Ambassador, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan in April 1952 precisely for this reason followed by another audience to his successor, K.P.S. Menon. In the same year, the Soviet Union favourably responded to the Pakistani request for supplies of foodstuffs by signing a barter agreement. In continuation of and in response to Stalin's efforts to improve Soviet Russia's relations with developing countries and especially with India and Pakistan, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, G.M. Malenkov in a speech before the Supreme Soviet on 8 August 1953 said, "The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the successful development of relations with Pakistan and to strengthening every kind of relations between the two states. This undoubtedly will play a part in strengthening peace in Asia".110

Although throughout the Stalin period Soviet-Pak relations maintained a low profile, a deterioration was

108 Ibid., p.41.
visible more in the early 1950s rather than in the late 1940s, when Pakistan tried its level best to move closer to the Western camp by receiving US economic and military aid. The Soviet Union, though it established diplomatic relations with India earlier than with Pakistan, tried to cultivate Pakistan first. Ideologically too, the Soviet Union found Pakistan more approachable, as the hold of the big bourgeoisie was considered to be much stronger in India than in Pakistan. Pakistan had no big capitalists like Tatas and Birlas in India. Strategically too, Pakistan's entry into the Western camp would have made the Soviet Union more vulnerable. Thus the Soviet Union under Stalin deemed it essential to cultivate Pakistan by despatching a number of delegations including trade delegations to Pakistan. Even an invitation to visit Moscow was extended to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to establish rapport at the highest level. If these Soviet overtures could not succeed the blame lies primarily on Pakistan.

D. MILITARY PACTS AND SOVIET-PAK RELATIONS

It appears that due to ill health in his last days, Stalin could not issue any directive regarding change of policy towards the newly independent countries in general and India and Pakistan in particular. As a result critical references continued to be made about these countries in the Soviet media for a while. But soon this line was
corrected when G.M. Malenkov, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, in his report to the 19th Congress of the CPSU, stated that the Soviet Union stood for, "and now advocates, the development of trade and cooperation with other countries, irrespective of differences in social systems". It was the continuation of the same policy initiated by Stalin, when Malenkov declared in a speech before the Supreme Soviet that Moscow attaches great importance to the successful development of relations with Karachi and to strengthening every kind of relations between the two states.

Moreover, the mention of Pakistan in the speech of Malenkov was not without significance as the rumour of US-Pak alliance was already in the air. Earlier on April 17, the Governor-General of Pakistan had dismissed the Nazimuddin Government and appointed Mohammad Ali of Bogra, the then Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States, as Prime Minister. He was an ardent and enthusiastic supporter of an alliance with the United States. Later in May 1953, Adlai Stevenson, a Democratic Party leader and John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State of the United States visited Pakistan and laid the foundation for close collaboration between the two countries. Mentioning the place of Pakistan in the American global view, John F. Dulles stated, "Pakistan is the largest of the Muslim


112 CDSP, op.cit., no.110.
nations and occupies a high position in the Muslim world. The strong spiritual faith and martial spirit of the people make them a dependable bulwark against communism. In this period not only US officials frequently visited Pakistan but there were return visits by Pakistani leaders too, to Washington. Pakistani officials also made frequent visits to the West Asian Arab countries. Referring to these hectic activities New Times wrote, "The Pakistani Ministers, it appears, are trying to induce the Middle and Near East countries to join military alliances of patently transatlantic origin...."

Frequent reports in international media over negotiations between Karachi and Washington for a military alliance caused grave anxiety to the Kremlin. On 30 November 1953, the Soviet Ambassador handed over a formal protest note to the Government of Pakistan in this connection and sought their explanation. It alleged that the negotiations between Pakistan and the United States were in progress with regard to an agreement for military alliance and to convert Pakistani territory into an American military base. The protest note further added, "The Soviet Government cannot be indifferent to reports on the afore-mentioned negotiations since conclusion

of an agreement to establish American air bases on Pakistani territory, that is, in a region close to the borders of the USSR, as well as Pakistan's adherence to plans for the formation of the afore-mentioned Middle Eastern bloc, have a direct bearing on the security of the Soviet Union". It further said, "The Soviet Union would like to receive from the Pakistan Government clarification as regards the aforesaid matter".\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Pravda} underlining its importance warned that the Soviet protest note "is of great international importance and should not be underestimated by Pakistan or the United States".\textsuperscript{116}

The immediate official response to Soviet protest note was the denial of charges. Pakistani leaders declared that they did not have any aggressive design against any power and the alliance was none of Moscow's concern.\textsuperscript{117} After a fortnight, on 18 December 1953, they sent a formal reply to Soviet protest note. It asserted that "it was the duty of the Pakistan Government to take every step to safeguard the security of Pakistan and in the discharge of this paramount duty ... to adopt and take such measures as may appear appropriate and adequate". It assured Moscow that Pakistan "would not take any step in hostility or unfriendliness

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Izvestia}, 2 December 1953.
\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Pravda}, 3 December 1953.
\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Christian Science Monitor}, 3 December 1953.
to any Government or state, with which, like the USSR, it has friendly relations.\textsuperscript{118} As obvious, these Pakistani replies could not have satisfied the Soviet Union and as a result Soviet-Pakistani relations further deteriorated. Soviet media intensified its condemnation of Pakistani ruling elites and warned them of dangerous implications of entering into a military pact with the United States.

The agreement signed between Pakistan and Turkey on 19 February, 1954 which had a military dimension too, apart from economic and cultural, cleared the way for the formal conclusion of a military-aid agreement between the United States and Pakistan. The two countries became a part of an organisation whose objective was to defend Middle East Against external aggression. Taking advantage of Turko-Pakistani agreement, Pakistan submitted a formal request for military assistance to the United States on 22 February 1954. President Eisenhower agreed to the Pakistani request. Moscow handed over another note of protest to the Pakistani Charge d'Affairs on 26 March 1954. This protest note like the earlier one repeated the charge that Pakistan had joined a military pact which was directed against the Soviet Union and had granted military base facility on her territory to the United States. It warned that this would lead to further deterioration

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Dawn}, 19 December 1953.
in their relationship, the responsibility for which would lie on Pakistan.\textsuperscript{119}

For complete five weeks, the Government of Pakistan maintained complete silence over the Soviet protest note and finally on 4 May 1954 in a communication to Moscow it rejected the Soviet allegations. The Pakistani argument was that the acceptance of US military aid did not mean that their armed forces would be commanded by the US Government. They rather blamed that the Soviet Union had drawn "unjustified conclusion".\textsuperscript{120} Despite several protests from the Soviet Union the agreement between the United States and Pakistan was finally concluded in May 1954. The United States had informed India of its resolve to conclude a military agreement with Pakistan. For Pakistan this agreement was a major diplomatic success. It assured them several benefits. By this pact, Pakistan could get military hardware of the sophisticated variety and economic aid in large quantity from the United States. She also hoped of diplomatic support on Kashmir dispute not only from the US but also from its friends and allies.

Similarly, an agreement establishing the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was signed in Manila on 8 September 1954. The United States had approached many South-East Asian countries, including Pakistan to evolve an alliance in this

\textsuperscript{119} Pravda, 28 March 1954.
\textsuperscript{120} Dawn, 5 May 1954.
area to contain the Chinese threat in this region. The Soviet Union called this alliance an aggressive alliance and declared that the real purpose behind the pact was to crush national liberation movements in Asia. After a conference of SEATO countries, held at Bangkok on 23 February 1955, Izvestia wrote, "The Bangkok Conference showed once more that the SEATO is an American instrument to fight against the national liberation movement of the Asian people".121

Meanwhile in 1954 an election was held in East Pakistan. People's massive support to the demand for an anti-Western and independent foreign policy was clearly manifested in this election as the ruling Muslim League was trounced and could get only ten seats in the assembly. Immediately after the election, 162 newly-elected representatives demanded cancellation of the military pacts.122 The Soviet Union, thus, rightly interpreted the event as, signifying popular repudiation of Pakistan's alignment with the West.123 New Times reported that "US attempt to force military alliance upon Pakistan ... has been condemned" by the people of Pakistan itself.124

121 Izvestia, 28 February 1955.
124 Ibid., No.22, 9 June 1954, p.23.
If we probe into factors motivating Pakistan to join the Western military alliance system, we find three basic long term objectives of Pakistan's foreign policy, for whose fulfilment it looked around desperately, but found its solution only in the Western camp. Because of a peculiar situation for its emergence, Pakistan's first and foremost concern became its security vis-a-vis India. The leaders of Pakistan feared that India had not reconciled itself to the idea of Pakistan's independent existence. Secondly, it wanted to face the Kashmir dispute from a position of strength. And the last basic objective of Pakistan's foreign policy was to attract economic and technical assistance for its developmental works. Pakistan's need for economic assistance was so grave that it was precisely for this reason Liaquat Ali visited Washington first, instead of Moscow despite initial acceptance of later's invitation. "It was the realization of economic dependence upon the US", says a Pakistani scholar, "that prompted Liaquat Ali to postpone, in effect to abandon, his projected visit to the Soviet Union and go to the United States instead". Moreover, in 1952 Pakistan was facing acute economic crisis in the form of starvation, food crisis, inflation and unemployment. For the fulfilment of all these


126 Budhraj, op.cit., no.5, pp.89-90; also Ram, op.cit., no.11, pp.11-12.

objectives, it first turned towards Great Britain and sought Commonwealth intervention for settling outstanding Indo-Pakistani disputes but Britain made it clear that the Commonwealth could not take either India's or Pakistan's side in their disputes. 128

After Pakistan's initial disappointment with Britain, it tried to extract support from the Middle Eastern Muslim countries in its disputes with India, in the name of Muslim brotherhood. Pakistani leaders tried to seize the leadership of Pan-Islamic movement. But this move of Pakistani leaders could not succeed. First of all Arab countries could not have digested the idea of a non-Arab Muslim country leading a movement of Muslim Arab-nations. Secondly, most of those Muslim countries, at that moment, did not want to displease the largest non-aligned country India by taking sides in Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir, which did not involve their own immediate interests. 129 Failure on these external fronts greatly disappointed Pakistan. Pakistan, thus, found in the United States an apt alternative. The United States too was at the same time eager to take Pakistan into her own fold, knowing fully well Pakistan's geographic and strategic

129 Keith B. Callard, op.cit., no.125, p.21.
location vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The United States was quite capable of extracting Pakistan from its economic, political and military difficulties. 130

In the post-war period, the United States, on the other hand, was suffering from communist phobia. Containment of communism became the major objective of the US foreign policy in this period. In the wake of achieving this objective it formed North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949, signed mutual security agreements with Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan in 1950 and 1951. These agreements, in the US view, secured the East and the West against possible threat of communism. But, according to them the Middle East and South Asia in the Southern sector was still the weakest link in this chain. John D. Ternegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, on 3 April 1954 stated: "... a power vacuum exists in the Middle East and South Asia. The countries of this region, largely lacking the resources necessary for a strong military position, are also torn by other strains and stresses which sap their strength...." 131 In their search for allies who could strengthen the defences of the Southern sector, they approached India first but India was too free minded to compromise its newly won decision-making power by aligning

130 Ram, op.cit., no.11, pp.39-40.
itself in the American anti-communist front. On India's refusal, the US strategists knowing fully well Pakistan's economic, political and military requirements, found in Pakistan a valuable alternative. Realising the importance of Kashmir in the given geo-political setting, they were eager to help Pakistan even on Kashmir dispute vis-a-vis India. The desire to establish a military base in northern Kashmir forced Washington to side with Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute, which it would not have hoped to get if the state remained a part of India. Pakistani leaders too, in their turn, tried to impress the US officials with their anti-communist utterances.

The location of Pakistan also added to its attraction to the US strategists. On the extreme west of northern frontier of the Indian subcontinent is the Pakistani-occupied area of Kashmir, which borders upon the Sinkiang province of China and is almost contiguous to the Tadzhik Republic of the Soviet Union. Washington found Pakistan too close to the Soviet soft belly and discovered that a military base in this area in the nuclear age would expose the USSR's southern flank to easy attack.

Thus the US-Pakistan military cooperation started with two divergent motives. Whereas the United States forged this military alliance with a view to contain communism, Pakistan's entry into these pacts was neither influenced by any ideological

hatred towards communism, nor any kind of entanglement with communist countries. It rather wanted to face India from a position of strength. A Pakistani scholar has acknowledged this fact. According to him, although these alliances were ostensibly directed against communism, Pakistan's entry into them was largely motivated by her unflinching desire to neutralize the growing Indian military strength.\textsuperscript{133} It is thus likely that the factors that led Pakistan to join the military pacts were quite different from those that led the United States to create them.

The Soviet Union had full knowledge of all those factors which forced Pakistan to march into the US fold. It was aware that Pakistan had joined the alliance not because it had any serious misgivings towards the Soviet Union or China but to acquire parity with growing Indian military strength.\textsuperscript{134} Thus, even at the height of Pakistan's political folly, the Soviet Union persisted with the idea of normal contacts between the two neighbouring countries. In January 1954 preliminary talks for a trade agreement were held as per schedule. During these talks the Soviet Union offered technical assistance to Pakistan. At a meeting of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, in February 1954, the leader of the Soviet delegation Menshikov


\textsuperscript{134} Budhraj, \textit{op.cit.}, no.5, pp.89-90.
expressed the Soviet desire to provide economic assistance to Asian nations with no political strings attached to it. In this meeting he invited twelve countries, including Pakistan, to send delegations of their respective countries to visit the Soviet Union in September or October to study Soviet industrial, agricultural, scientific and social progress. In this connection four Pakistani officials and three businessmen went to the USSR on a month long study tour. The delegation was led by Said Hasan, Secretary, Ministry of Economic Affairs and during their stay, they visited Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad and Kiev. On 7 September 1955, the Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy, M.M. Volkov handed over a sum of 60,000 Pakistani Rupees to the Chairman of the Pakistan Red Cross Society donated by Soviet Red Cross Society and the Spiritual Authority of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhkastan to help the flood victims of East Pakistan. Similarly, in January 1954, Soviet scientists participated in Pakistani Scientists' Conference and in March-April 1954, a Soviet cultural delegation visited Pakistan.

But these Soviet economic and cultural overtures could not loosen the Pakistani bond with Washington. Pakistan's explanation that it had entered into the US military pacts with a view to strengthening its defences could not satisfy the Soviet leaders. The good-will gestures towards Pakistan
initiated during the Stalin period continued even in the post-Stalin period. Under the specific policy frame of peaceful coexistence the Soviet Union tried to break its earlier isolationist stance and strived to improve its relations with the developing countries of the third world in general and Pakistan in particular. But the Pakistani foreign policy's specific objectives brought her to the door of Washington rather than Moscow notwithstanding the latter's lucrative aid offers. In the military alliances Pakistan found an alternative to her economic, political and military requirements, which she could not achieve by appealing to the Commonwealth's head Britain or Islamic countries. Although the Soviet Union did not like Pakistan's membership of military pacts, the anti-imperialist attitude of Pakistani masses encouraged it to make efforts to wean away Pakistan.

E. KHRUSHCHEV AND SOVIET-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

Khrushchevian period is characterized by some foreign and Indian scholars as a period of heightened tensions for Soviet-Pakistani relations and the blame is put on Khrushchev himself as he pursued a pro-Indian policy. But the actual facts tell a different story. It was during his rule that the Soviet Union made maximum offers to Pakistan, e.g., technical knowhow for peaceful uses of nuclear energy; construction of a steel mill; proposal for a mutual non-aggression treaty; invitation to Prime Minister Suhrawardi to
visit Moscow in order to establish top level contact; a loan of 30 million dollars for exploring oil resources even during the height of tension after U-2 incident, etc. Even during his sojourn in India, when Khrushchev openly supported Indian stand on Kashmir and found India closer to Moscow, his speeches never lacked friendly references to Pakistan. As such, the allegation of some analysts that the Soviet Union under Khrushchev became indifferent to Pakistan and showed special leaning towards India after the former joined the Western military camp is baseless. The Soviet Union never tried to play one state against the other and thus further complicate the matter by taking sides. If the Soviet Union found herself closer to India, it was largely due to convergence of approaches to the problems of peace and security characterized by opposition to rival military blocs and bases on foreign territory. Both the countries shared the common view that colonialism and racialism was a threat to world peace and condemned colonialism and racialism in unequivocal terms; that the US military assistance to Pakistan would not benefit the people of that country; that the US military bases in Pakistan increased tensions in South Asia and brought the cold war to this subcontinent.

The reason for this confusion among Indian and foreign scholars was the historic speech of Khrushchev at Srinagar on 10 December 1955. He mentioned in that speech that the Soviet Union had always held the view that the Kashmir
question should "be decided by the people of Kashmir themselves".  

But this was not a new stand on the issue and was consistently adhered to by the Soviet press till that time. The new stand taken by Khrushchev was that the future of Kashmir "as one of the states of the Republic of India, has already been decided by the people of Kashmir". Four days later at a press conference held at Delhi he said that during their stay at Kashmir they observed "Kashmir people rejoice in their national liberation" and "regard their territory an integral part of the Republic of India". Similar view was expressed in their report to the Supreme Soviet on their visit to India, Burma and Afghanistan. Khrushchev reported, "In Kashmir we were convinced that its people regard their territory as an inalienable part of the Republic of India. This question has been irrevocably decided by the people of Kashmir and it is our firm belief that the Kashmir people will succeed in arranging their affairs without any interference from outside". Bulganin too emphasized, "The Kashmir issue has already been settled by the people of Kashmir themselves; they regarded

135 N.A. Bulganin and N.S. Khrushchev, Speeches During Sojourn in India, Burma and Afghanistan (Tass, New Delhi, 1956), pp.82-89.
136 Budhraj, op.cit., no.5, p.122.
137 Bulganin and Khrushchev, op.cit., no.135, p.86.
138 Ibid., p.103.
themselves as an integral part of the Republic of India. We gathered this deep conviction ... in Srinagar.... The Soviet Government supports India's policy on the Kashmir issue because it fully accords with the interests of peace in this part of Asia".140

Though this new Soviet stand on Kashmir was hailed by the Indian people and a pall of gloom descended in Pakistan, the Soviets had carefully left the door open for easy retreat. The joint communique issued after the visit made no mention of Kashmir. A careful study of these statements reveals that the support given to India on this issue was not so unqualified and unambiguous and Moscow was not so firmly behind New Delhi as it was understood in India.141 The catch was in the expression "the people of Kashmir" which implied that in case of any doubt the desire of the people could be gauged once again. A.L. Mikoyan, First Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers took refuge of the same expression during his visit to Karachi in March 1956 to participate in the Republic Day celebrations of Pakistan. His statement in this regard surprised both India and Pakistan when he said, "The future of Kashmir was not for us to decide; that is for the people of Kashmir to decide".142 In reference to the

140 Ibid., p.10.
141 Budhraj, op.cit., no.5, p.121.
speeches made by Bulganin and Khrushchev at Srinagar, he clarified that "the statements of Messers Bulganin and
Khrushchev had by no means prejudged the Kashmir issue in
India's favour; the USSR still adhered to the view that it
was for the people of Kashmir to decide their future". 143
Mikoyan's statement was welcomed in Pakistan. While in
Delhi, Mikoyan interpreted it differently. An answer to
earlier allegation that India enjoyed Soviet Union's favoured
position after Pakistan's entry into Western military camp
could be seen in a leading article of Eastern Economist
published after Mikoyan's visit to Karachi and New Delhi.
It wrote, "The USSR is prepared to play an equally generous
and captivating role as a suitor in both countries. In a
sense India had lost her favoured position with the USSR,
since the same advances are now being made to Pakistan." 144

Soviet Russia's new stand of recognition of Kashmir "as one of the States of the Republic of India" cannot be interpreted
as an example of Moscow siding with India. For Soviet Union
knew it well that Pakistan had joined the Western camp, while
India had rejected the idea of turning her territory into a
foreign military base. Naturally, Kashmir as part of India
guaranteed the non-availability of the territory for establishing
US military bases directed against the USSR. According to a

Soviet view Britain worked against Kashmir's accession to India because it knew the strength of the democratic movement in that country which would not have allowed any foreign military base to operate against the Soviet Union. Their strategic interests would have been safeguarded only if Kashmir would have acceded to Pakistan. Moreover, since Britain and the USA had a brute majority in the Security Council, it enabled them with an opportunity to strengthen their position in Kashmir. India was manoeuvered by Britain to bring the Kashmir dispute in the Security Council. The Soviet Union was convinced and as an account of Campbell-Johnson, the Press Advisor to Mountbatten also indicates that the Government of India resorted to the Security Council under the pressure of Lord Mountbatten. Because, Kashmir under Pakistan had an important place in the military plans of Western powers, the Kremlin could not have favoured entrusting Pakistan with this region.

Whether India enjoyed a "favoured position" in the Soviet scheme of thing, could be adjudged by examining statements of Soviet leaders and write-ups in the Soviet press about Pakistan in this period. In his Srinagar speech in December 1955 referring to the Soviet Union's friendly

146 Ibid.
relations with Afghanistan Khrushchev also mentioned at
the same time, "We should very much like to have similar
relations with Pakistan, and it is not our fault that
such relations have so far not developed". He further
added, "In the interest of peace, however, we shall steadily
strive for an improvement of these relations". 147 A
similar opinion was expressed by Premier N.A. Bulganin in
his report to the Supreme Soviet when he said, "...the
Soviet Union would like its relations with Pakistan to be
no less friendly than its relations with India, Burma and
Afghanistan, and it is not our fault that this is not so as
yet. However, the Soviet Government will continue to exert
efforts to improve our relations with Pakistan". 148 Khrushchev
in his address to the Supreme Soviet observed that the
Soviet Union was willing "to meet Pakistan half-way in
establishing friendly relations". 149 When Khrushchev was
willing to walk half-way, he expected Pakistan also to walk
half-way even without the precondition of extricating itself
completely from military pacts of SEATO and CENTO. This view
was expressed even in other Soviet leaders' statements and
press commentaries. This was made clear by Khrushchev in
his report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (CPSU) presented to the Twentieth Party

147 Bulganin and Khrushchev, op. cit., no. 135, pp. 88-89.
148 Pravda, 30 December 1955.
Congress. He made it explicit on the occasion that "the opportunities for improving relations among countries, particularly among neighbours, have by no means been completely exhausted", even while military alignments existed. He declared that for its part the Soviet Union was prepared to conclude treaties of non-aggression and friendship, in order to remove mistrust and suspicion and to normalize the international situation.\textsuperscript{150} With reference to Pakistan he further said in the report that Pakistan would one day realize that friendly relations with the USSR would be in its own interests.\textsuperscript{151}

Earlier too, Izvestia in an article published on the date of Pakistan's independence day in 1955 commented that Pakistan, despite its membership of the SEATO and CENTO, "was not yet altogether lost" to the West. It further stated that there were "progressive forces" still within Pakistan who were determined to carry forward their country towards true independence and progress. This desire of the Soviet Union became more evident when A.L. Mikoyan, First Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, in March 1956, on the occasion of Jinnah's birthday.


\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.
celebrations at the Pakistani Embassy in Moscow declared, "Pacts or no pacts, the Soviet Union wants cordial relations with Pakistan".\textsuperscript{152} Khrushchev at the same time in his speech to the Supreme Soviet explained that it was not that Moscow wanted Pakistan not to accept aid from the West. "We are not saying to the Asian peoples: do not accept the aid which the American and British monopolists offer you. But we frankly warn them that they ought to be more careful about such "aid", because the monopolists do not give anything for nothing."\textsuperscript{153} Moreover, "The imperialist powers" aid "other countries primarily by establishing military bases on their territories, by sending troops and delivering rocket weapons. Here is how it works: They spend one dollar and make these countries spend five dollars on armaments."\textsuperscript{154} It was also made clear to Pakistan that her alliance with the West could not be a hindrance in the way of the Soviet Union providing her with economic aid. The Soviet Union had announced to the Asian members of the UNESCO that she could give economic assistance in large quantities even to non-communist countries, including those who were aligned with the West.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Dawn}, 30 March 1956.

\textsuperscript{153} \textit{New Times, op.cit.}, no.139, p.23.

\textsuperscript{154} Quoted by A. Farid-Khan, "Pakistan Under Foreign Yoke", \textit{International Affairs}, No.10, October 1959, p.83.

\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Dawn}, 29 February 1956.
Moscow knew that if it provides India with "favoured position" status, it would further increase Pakistan's dependence on the Western powers and aggravate tension on the subcontinent. The Soviet press had often reminded India and Pakistan that the differences between the two countries were being exploited by the imperialist powers and provided them good opportunities to interfere in this region. And this was not what Moscow desired. Mikoyan's statement at Karachi had clearly indicated that the Kremlin had no interest in involving itself in the Kashmir dispute. Commenting on the bitterness between India and Pakistan, Khrushchev observed in his Srinagar speech that "both sides must show a greater desire to maintain peace in this region since the development of both India and Pakistan can only take place under conditions of peaceful coexistence". 156

Kremlin was certainly anxious to strengthen its bond with Karachi, because in Soviet strategic thinking both India and Pakistan were equally important. Soviet defence strategy demanded that it should regard the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent as a single unit when only twelve miles of Afghan territory separated the subcontinent from the USSR.

The Soviet Russia in its peace-offensive move had indicated through its publicity media that Moscow was in a position to and was willing to provide economic

156 Bulganin and Khrushchev, op.cit., no.135, p.86.
assistance in large quantities to non-communist countries including even to those countries which were aligned with the West without any strings attached to it. In February 1956, shortly before the Twentieth Party Congress, in an interview to a Pakistani news agency, Premier Bulganin clearly said that "there are adequate opportunities for mutually beneficial economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Pakistan" if there was willingness on both sides. Referring to trade relations he indicated that "there exists a practical possibility for promotion of trade relations between the two countries". In the same interview Bulganin offered Soviet technical knowledge to Pakistan in order to enable it to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy and was ready to assist in building an atomic reactor.157 These offers were a clear indication that Pakistan lay well within the scope of the Soviet aid programme. This offer was once again repeated by K. Petrov in an article in Izvestia when he wrote that the Soviet Union "could share with Pakistan its knowledge and experience in the utilization of atomic energy and Soviet-Pakistani trade could also develop to mutual advantage".158

23 March 1956 was a red-letter day both for Pakistan as she was being proclaimed a Republic on that day and for

158 Ibid., No.12, p.41.
Soviet-Pakistani relations too, as the celebrations at Moscow were being attended for the first time by a high-rankung Soviet leader, Soviet Foreign Minister, V.M. Molotov, and at the festivities at Karachi, the Soviet Union was being represented by A.L. Mikoyan, First Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Molotov in a toast to the new republic said, "For our part we drink to the establishment of good neighbourliness between Pakistan and the Soviet Union", and at the same time indicated that the Soviet Russia would be willing to construct a steel plant in Pakistan as it had done in India. Mikoyan at Karachi used the occasion to deliver an invitation to the speaker of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly to bring a parliamentary delegation to the USSR and the invitation was joyfully accepted by him. These overtures by Soviet leaders were an act to expedite the normalization of Soviet-Pakistan relations. Mikoyan's visit to Karachi was viewed in Pakistan as "a step that might lead to the establishment of confidence between the two countries". Pakistan's proclamation as a Republic was given wide coverage in the Soviet press for several days which termed the event as a progressive act. K. Petrov in the same abovementioned

161 Dawn, 30 March 1956.
article in Izvestia described the proclamation as "an important event in the life of the country, signifying its advancement on the path of national development."162

In order to tide over a food crisis in Pakistan, the Soviet Union announced a gift of 16,500 tons of rice on 15 June 1956. Moreover, unlike the trade negotiations of 1949-50, another agreement on trade was successfully concluded on 27 June 1956. The trade agreement was mutually advantageous and was based on equal rights of both the countries. It accorded to each other "the status of a most favoured nation regarding import and export and other questions". Most importantly the payment by Pakistan was to be made in its own currency and the agreement as a whole was roughly on the lines of the 1953 agreement between the Soviet Union and India.163 It must have satisfied the Pakistani ego in two ways. First, its rival India was not being preferred by the Soviet Union in comparison to Pakistan and secondly, Pakistani currency was recognised at least by one of the two superpowers.164 In this period a cultural delegation was also exchanged.

Despite these good-will measures of the Soviet Union towards Pakistan in this period, Moscow could not digest the latter's alignment with the West. The Soviet press was

162 CDSP, op.cit., no.157.
163 Kaushik, op.cit., no.5, p.76.
164 Budhraj, op.cit., no.5, p.127.
still critical of this fact. The New Times wrote that the Soviet Union and China were totally justified in suspecting the intentions of Pakistan keeping in view its membership of two military blocs aimed against them. 165 A parliamentary delegation from Pakistan which visited the USSR in July-August 1956 on the invitation of Mikoyan held a two-hour discussion with Khrushchev and Bulganin on 4 August 1956. The Soviet leaders in the discussion indicated that they were "very disturbed" about Pakistan's membership of two military pacts which were directed against the Soviet Union. 166 Alignment apart, the Soviet Union was not happy with Pakistan even on Suez crisis. Although Pakistan throughout the Suez crisis voted in line with the Afro-Asian nations in the United Nations, the reactions of Pakistani delegates were milder in tone than those of many others in the Afro-Asian group. Izvestia wrote that Pakistan's role in the Suez Canal controversy was a further proof that the military pacts were directed against the independence of "Eastern countries". 167 Similarly, during the Hungarian crisis, the Soviet Union reacted sharply to the Pakistani criticism of its policy towards Hungary. 168 Replying to Suhrawardy's letter on the Hungarian issue, the Soviet Premier refuted his allegations. 169

166 Dawn, 10 August 1956.
167 Izvestia, 6 September 1956.
169 Izvestia, 9 December 1956.
The Soviet criticism of Pakistan on international issues further alienated the latter from the USSR. Yet even then the Soviet Union did not altogether write off Pakistan. To establish top-level political contacts with Moscow invited H.S. Suhrawardy to visit the Soviet Union. But like Liaquat Ali, he also chose to visit Washington. However, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as the representative of Prime Minister Suhrawardy visited the USSR in the same year.

During the eight years rule of Khrushchev, the Kashmir question was raised twice before the Security Council by Pakistan, once in 1957 and the second time in 1962. On both occasions the Soviet Government supported the Indian stand. In January 1957 Pakistan calculated that since Khrushchev and Bulganin's visit to India and Russia's support to India on Goan issue had strained the Indo-US relations and since Moscow had started backing India openly on Kashmir issue, it could secure Washington's full support on the issue. Karachi also thought that in order to soften Pakistan's opposition to the Soviet policy in Hungary and the Middle East and to improve relations with Pakistan the Soviet Union would remain aloof from the Kashmir issue. But the pro-Pakistani resolution was

170 See Budhraj, op.cit., no.5, p.128.
171 See Ram, op.cit., no.11, pp.82-83.
vetoed by the Soviet Union, mainly because it called for the stationing of UN forces in Kashmir. Pakistan, on 24 January 1957 moved a resolution in the UN Security Council with the Anglo-American support which aimed at stalling any further integration of Kashmir with the Indian Union. The Kashmir Constituent Assembly, at this time, was being convened to consider extension of certain provisions of the Indian Constitution to Kashmir and to make Kashmir a constituent part of the Indian Republic with effect from 26 January 1957. The Pakistani resolution which wanted to stop Kashmir's integration with the Indian Republic through this process, reiterated the Council's resolution laying down that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be determined in accordance with the will of the people as expressed through a plebiscite under the supervision of the UN troops, after all the Indian and Pakistani forces had been withdrawn from the area. 172

But, if Moscow was against the stationing of the US troops in Pakistan, how could it agree to the sending of foreign troops (a UN force) to Kashmir, right on its frontier? 173

The Soviet delegate A. Sobolev stated that the Soviet Union would veto all the proposals which would enable the stationing of UN troops in Kashmir. 174

172 SCOR, Yr. 12, Mtg. 765, 24 January 1957, p. 28.
173 Budhraj, op. cit., no. 5, p. 128.
174 SCOR, Yr. 12, mtg. 799, 5 November 1957, pp. 3-4.
In early 1958, the Soviet Union made another offer of economic assistance to Pakistan, when I. Alexandrovich Benedictov, Minister of Agriculture led a ten-member delegation of the Supreme Soviet to Pakistan. During his stay in Pakistan he mentioned that "... rapprochement of our two countries based on friendship and mutual confidence could be furthered by an agreement on cultural cooperation ... and also by expansion of trade based on equality and mutual benefit". 175 Answering newsmen at Dacca on 3 February 1958, he told the host country that the Soviet Union was willing to provide economic and technical assistance mainly in agriculture, irrigation, control of floods and salination, pest control and land erosion. 176 In the course of his meeting with mediamen, he further indicated that friendly and good neighbourly relations were in the interests of both the countries and if no improvement had taken place so far the blame could not be placed on the Soviet Union.

Notwithstanding these efforts made by Moscow to improve its relations with Pakistan, the latter, on the contrary, suggested at the Baghdad Pact meeting in Ankara on 27 January 1958 that the member countries of the pact should be supplied with atomic and other sophisticated weapons. 177

175 International Affairs (Moscow), April 1958, pp.64-65.
176 Ibid.
moreover, Pakistan allowed the United States to erect bases for guided missiles and rockets and to establish electronic intelligence bases near Peshawar to monitor Soviet military communications. Upset by these developments in its neighbourhood, Moscow first warned Pakistan through its Ambassador at Karachi and later on 14 April 1958 sent an official protest note to that effect. In this diplomatic note it alleged that Pakistan had allowed Washington to construct launching-grounds for guided missiles, military installations, and runways capable of entertaining modern bombers. It warned Pakistan that "grave consequences will inevitably await Pakistan if its territory is allowed to be used for the establishment of military bases directed against the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries." It further added "in the event of aggressive actions against the USSR, the latter would be obliged to use every means at its disposal to strike a retaliatory blow at the aggressor, including the bases of the aggressor that are situated on foreign soil".\textsuperscript{178} Pakistan denied these charges and instead counter-charged Moscow for participating in aggressive military organisation in the guise of Warsaw Pact. It further argued that the Western military pacts were defensive in nature. It accused Moscow of adopting a partisan attitude on Kashmir issue which had resulted into great bitterness and disappointment in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{179}

\textsuperscript{178} \textit{Pravda}, 19 June 1958.

\textsuperscript{179} \textit{Dawn}, 28 May 1958.
Thus the persistent efforts on the part of the Soviet Union could not bring corresponding results in improving relations with Pakistan. Pakistan continued to lean on Washington for the fulfilment of its foreign policy objectives in the form of economic, political and military aid, in order to face India from a stronger position. As a consequence of it the relations between Moscow and Karachi continued to deteriorate. In fact, at the time of military coup in Pakistan which brought General Ayub Khan at the helm of Pakistani affairs, the two countries were still looking for a mutually acceptable basis of relationship.

**MOSCOW AND MILITARY COUP D'ETAT OF 1958**

A military coup d'etat in Pakistan in October 1958 brought General Ayub Khan to power, but for the Soviet Union this event was hardly a matter of rejoicing. The possibility of rapprochement was further dashed to the ground because General Ayub had played a key role in cementing Pakistan's alliance with the West. As Commander-in-Chief in 1953, he had accompanied Prime Minister Mohammed Ali of Bogra to Washington. Later he accompanied Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed to Ankara and the discussions at Washington and Ankara led to an agreement on 2 April 1954 for military cooperation between Pakistan and Turkey and in military pact with the United States in May 1954. Colonel Mohammad Ahmad, a close associate of General Ayub Khan, had confirmed
this view by stating that the idea of getting military assistance from the Western countries came in Ayub's mind as early as in August 1952 and "it was through his negotiations with American political and military leaders that the United States Government invited Pakistan to enter into a Mutual Defence Pact". 180

The immediate Soviet reaction to the incidence of coup in Pakistan was that it blamed State Department for a hand in the plot. New Times explained that due to growing political consciousness among the masses, parliamentary regime in Pakistan was not catering properly to the interests of imperialist powers and thus the State Department got that regime liquidated. 181 General Ayub Khan immediately after assuming office issued a proclamation on 7 October 1958 which left no doubt about Western views. At the Twenty-first Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev expressed the view that coup d'etat in Pakistan represented "an attack" on the "democratic gains of the peoples who have won national independence". 182

The Soviet Union's suspicion that Washington had a hand in military coup in Pakistan was confirmed when General


182 Pravda, 28 January 1959.
Ayub Khan immediately after assuming power started negotiating for a new military pact. The Soviet Charge d'Affaires in Karachi handed over an aide-memoire on 28 December 1958 to Pakistani Foreign Minister seeking explanation for the proposed new military agreement.¹⁸³ It warned Karachi that the new pact would "complicate the situation in South-East Asia and the Middle East", and that there would be grave consequences if it allowed its territory to be used by foreign powers for military and strategic purposes.¹⁸⁴ In reply to this Soviet aide-memoire, the Pakistan Government admitted that negotiations between Baghdad Pact members and the United States were in progress, but simultaneously emphasized the defensive nature of the pact. It denied existence of the US military bases aimed against the USSR and other peaceful neighbouring countries.¹⁸⁵

In November 1958, President Ayub Khan made hectic visits to Iran and Turkey to explore the possibilities of close cooperation between the three states. An article in the Soviet press pointed out that the "events show that the governments of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan continue to look for solutions to internal difficulties on the paths of preparation for military ventures. They are attempting

¹⁸³ Izvestia, 20 February 1959.
¹⁸⁴ Ibid.
¹⁸⁵ Dawn, 13 January 1959.
once again to justify their policy to (sic) the 'threat of communism'. The President of Pakistan had seen this threat even in the peaceful cooperation of USSR and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{186} In the meanwhile, the United States at Ankara on 5 March 1959 concluded bilateral agreements with all the three countries separately. Under this agreement the United States was ready to provide military aid to all these countries.

The Soviet Union in an official statement warned that the conclusion of new treaties with the assistance of Great Britain was a hostile act against the Soviet Union and Eastern countries.\textsuperscript{187}

Despite a military coup in 1958 which brought pro-West General Ayub Khan to the seat of power and despite Soviet suspicions, threats, criticisms and condemnations of the Pakistani Government, Soviet efforts to normalize relations with Pakistan continued. The Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan described Ayub Government as "very energetic" one but mentioned that there were many untouched areas in which the Soviet Union and Pakistan could cooperate. He announced "only 10 per cent of the problems are controversial in nature and on the remaining 90 per cent there is possibility of developing friendly relations."\textsuperscript{188} Through this declaration he indicated that there was much common ground between the two

\textsuperscript{186} \textit{Pravda}, 8 December 1958.
\textsuperscript{187} \textit{Izvestia}, 28 March 1959.
\textsuperscript{188} \textit{Pakistan Times}, 13 June 1959.
countries on which if properly worked the differences in relations would be patched up. Just a month after the coup, the Soviet Union offered technical assistance to Pakistan to explore natural resources, particularly oil. The agreement to this effect was concluded in 1960, just after the U-2 incident. The two countries also signed a barter agreement in December 1959.

In 1959 a slight policy shift by President Eisenhower led Pakistan to play the Soviet card. In the US budget of 1959, the Senate made a major cut in the amount of the military allocations for Asian nations. Senator Wayne Morse opposed economic and military aid to Pakistan on the ground that it was "causing a loss of US prestige in India ..., and forcing India to spend more money than is necessary on her military strength". The US Senate demanded large amount of economic aid to India. President Ayub Khan responding to above US policy change, stated in an interview to a French newspaper that if the United States undermined Pakistani needs, it might turn to "Other Powers" for help. He said, "The camp opposed to the Americans attaches a great importance to our country both militarily and politically and persistently makes advances to us". In a similar vein, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's Minister of Commerce stated in July 1959 that special attention was being given to promote trade with the USSR, the East European countries including

189  *Dawn*, 12 July 1959.
Yugoslavia and the Chinese mainland. He expressed Pakistan's willingness to develop regular trade relations with these countries before long.\textsuperscript{191} On the basis of above pronouncements made by Pakistani leaders, the Soviet Union hoped to improve relations. Moscow invited Bhutto to discuss the question of development of trade relations. Nevertheless, the Pakistani leaders at this stage showed that they were not in hurry and did not favour any radical re-orientation of their foreign policy. They still preferred to wait and watch for some more time. Instead of responding to Soviet overtures, they further intensified their attack on the Soviet Union to draw the attention of the US decision-makers.

Pakistani leaders expressed concern over growing Soviet influence in Afghanistan. On this issue, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir made a statement on 21 October 1959 that "If Russian influence increases somewhere, you cannot exclude the possibility of a threat".\textsuperscript{192} In an effort in the same direction, President Ayub Khan warned the Western powers that "a Russian-Chinese drive to the Indian Ocean is a major aim in the communist drive for world domination".\textsuperscript{193} Explaining the same warning he wrote in \textit{Foreign Affairs}, "As a student of war and strategy, I can see quite

\textsuperscript{191} \textit{Pakistan Times}, 12 July 1959.

\textsuperscript{192} \textit{Dawn}, 22 October 1959.

\textsuperscript{193} \textit{Ibid.}, 19 November 1959.
clearly the inexorable push of the North in the direction of the Warm Waters of the Indian Ocean." In the same article he further wrote, "In the context of present day world politics, Pakistan has openly and unequivocally cast her lot with the West, and unlike several other countries around us, we have shut ourself off almost completely from the possibility of any major assistance from the communist bloc." Similarly, Pakistan's Foreign Minister indicated that "alliance with the West is the sheet-anchor of Pakistan's foreign policy." Pakistan reacted very sharply to the joint communique issued after Khrushchev's visit to Afghanistan in March 1960, which supported Afghan claim on north-western region of Pakistan. According to the communique, "The solution of the problem of people on the Pak-Afghan border should be reached under the principles of the United Nations Charter." Pakistan's Foreign Minister branded the Soviet support on the issue as an act of interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan. In an attempt to pacify Pakistani feelings, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Pushkin visited Karachi soon after.

195 Ibid., p.555.
197 Dawn, 5 March 1960.
198 Ibid., 7 March 1960.
The U-2 incident brought the Soviet-Pakistani relations at its lowest ebb. The American U-2 spyplane which took off from Turkey, had also touched Pakistani airfield at Peshawar before violating Soviet airspace. Such spying activities were going on from West Pakistan for quite some time. But when on 1 May 1960 the plane was shot down by the Soviets, they made a strong protest to Pakistan. Khrushchev warned a Pakistani diplomat that "if you continue to let the Americans fly from your airbases into Russia, then we will not only shoot down the US planes, but will have to aim our rockets at your bases as well". In an official protest note, Moscow warned that "if such actions are repeated from Pakistani territory it will be compelled to take proper retaliatory measures." Pakistan at first not only denied the charge but also accused the Soviet Union of repeated violations of Pakistani airspace. But soon an element of realism percolated in their mind realising that such incidents could lead to a war and in that case Pakistan would be the prime target of the Soviet attack as the Soviet Union was only 12 miles away from Pakistan, while her ally the United States was thousands of miles far off. President Ayub ordered an inquiry into the whole affair and expressed willingness to improve relations with the

200 Izvestia, 10 May 1960.
Soviet Union. Karachi at the same time informed Washington that American aircraft in future could utilize Pakistani airfields only when they made known to them their further destination. President Ayub Khan promised that he would take all steps to prevent Pakistan from getting involved in such incidents in the future.

But even during the tension over U-2 incident, the already scheduled negotiations for Soviet technical aid to Pakistan for exploration of mineral and oil resources were not shelved by the Soviet Union. Pakistan accepted the Soviet offer in August 1960. A fresh negotiation for exploration of mineral resources started on 10 September 1960 at Karachi and was almost complete. It was further resumed in Moscow in which Z.A. Bhutto, Pakistan's Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources also participated. As a result the Soviet Union gave a long-term loan of $30 million for oil exploration in Pakistan. The loan was to be repaid in 12 years at an interest rate of 2.5 per cent. Repayment was to be made in Pakistani rupees. The prices of material and equipment to be supplied to Pakistan were to be fixed on the basis of world market prices. Dr. Kapista, Soviet Ambassador to Karachi, described the agreement as "an evidence of Soviet intentions".

202 Ibid., 11 May 1960.
204 Ibid., 15 May 1960.
205 Ibid., 18 May 1960.
206 Izvestia, 23 December 1960.
In early 1960's many factors compelled Pakistani decision-makers to revise its pro-West orientation in foreign policy and normalize its relations with the Soviet Union by responding positively to regular and continuous Soviet offers. First, the U-2 incident brought a sense of realism in Pakistani decision-makers that such incident could spark off a war and in that case due to Pakistan's proximity to the Soviet Union, it could be the prime target of Soviet attack than its ally the United States which was thousands of miles away. Secondly, from 1959 onwards, there was a general disenchantment in the United States towards Pakistan. It should be remembered that in 1959 budget, the US Senate made a drastic cut in the military allocations for Asian nations and emphasized the need for massive economic aid to India. Pakistan had entered into Western military alliance to gain parity with India's natural power superiority and to enlist support on Kashmir issue from America and its allies. But, Pakistan felt cheated on the issue and received no compensation from the Western powers for its alienation from the socialist bloc, especially from the Soviet Union. Moreover, the 1960 Presidential election in the United States brought John F. Kennedy to the White House who was known for his sympathetic and friendly attitude towards India. Pakistan realized that it could not expect from the Kennedy administration what it
did get from the Eisenhower administration. So there was a total dissatisfaction in Pakistan with American policies and actions.

Pakistan's importance for Washington also diminished in the early 1960's due to realization of certain changes in international field and also due to the development of some perfect strategic weapons system in the Western camp. First of all in the mid-1950's the United States did not possess long-range missiles, and due to Pakistan's physical proximity to the Soviet border, Washington decided to lure Karachi in the military pacts. But by 1961, Americans developed inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and the Polaris fleet which were capable of fool-proof hitting of targets even thousands of miles away. So, Washington decided to rely more on their long-range missiles based in the United States in deterring the Soviet Union and China than on the military bases established on the territories of its allies. Secondly, it was also felt in Washington that Pakistan's membership of military pacts directed against the communist countries were based on expediency rather than on its conviction or ideological considerations. Moreover, since detente process between the two Super Powers had been initiated, it further diminished the importance of Pakistan in the US eyes. For the containment of another Communist country, the People's Republic of China, India - the largest democracy in the world, was more trustworthy
ally than Pakistan, who had tried in the recent past to improve its relations with China. Furthermore, the Kennedy Administration emphasized the importance of economic assistance rather than military aid for fighting communism in Afro-Asian nations and as a result the US aid to India began to rise in volume. These developments greatly disturbed Pakistan.

A sense of realization seeped into Karachi that the alliance with Washington would no longer be profitable for them and thus effected some modifications in its foreign policy to reach a settlement with Moscow and other socialist countries. They knew that there was hardly any threat from the Soviet Union. Moreover, despite Pakistan's membership of military pacts and its ideological differences the Soviet Union had repeatedly offered economic and technical assistance to Pakistan. For instance during the negotiations for oil agreement in Moscow, Khrushchev offered economic assistance to Pakistan in whatever field it needed without any corresponding strings.²⁰⁸ Soviet Ambassador to Karachi declared, "We do not want that Pakistan should weaken her relations with her Western allies. On the other hand we too want to be on good terms with Pakistani friends".²⁰⁹ Thus all the psychological barriers of Pakistani leaders were overcome for an effective relationship between Moscow and Rawalpindi to begin. In continuation of the oil agreement

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 10 February 1961.
signed in March 1961, another five-year contract between the Soviet Union and Pakistan was signed on 3 July 1961 for the supply of equipment, services of Soviet experts for oil and gas exploration. The contract also included facilities in the Soviet Union for the training of a large number of Pakistani nationals for the purpose of oil exploration. But the gradual development of mutual relations could not develop further because of traditional Soviet policy towards the Kashmir question. For Pakistan Kashmir was a touchstone to test friendship of other powers towards it.

In January 1962, Pakistan once again raised the Kashmir issue in the Security Council on the plea that India was trying to capture Azad Kashmir territory which was under Pakistani control. Pakistan thought that the Western countries would support Pakistan because they were annoyed with India on the issue of using force to liberate the Portuguese colonies of Goa, Daman and Diu - Portugal being a NATO ally of the United States. But the Kennedy administration never wanted to embarrass India. The United States supported Irish resolution which reminded the parties concerned of the principles contained in the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948 and the UNCIP (United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan)

resolution of 13 August 1948 and 1 January 1949 and urged India and Pakistan to enter into direct negotiations for resolving the conflict. The only difference between the 1957 Western powers' resolution and the present one was that the new resolution did not envisage the induction of the UN troops into Kashmir. But the Soviet delegate vetoed the resolution with the clarification that Moscow was not against direct bilateral negotiations, but against any negotiation "on the basis of the principles set forth in the now outdated resolutions of the Security Council and U.N. Commission on Kashmir". This Soviet stand on Kashmir dispute brought all the possibilities of reconciliation between the Soviet Union and Pakistan virtually to a standstill.

In October 1962 there occurred a border clash between India and China. During this conflict the Western powers rushed military assistance to India despite Pakistan's strong protests. Since China was the enemy of India, Pakistan tried to befriend China. In this process Pakistan announced on 27 December 1962 that an agreement in principle had been arrived on the location and alignment of the boundary actually existing between the Azad Kashmir of Pakistan and the Sinkiang province of China. The agreement thus endorsed the Chinese claim that border between China and the Indian Subcontinent had never been demarcated. In an agreement signed on 2 March 1963, Pakistan ceded 2700

211 SCOR, Supplement for April-June 1962, mtg. 1016, p.18.
Square miles of Azad Kashmir territory to China. Since the Sino-Soviet rift had already been an open fact in this period, Moscow decided to cultivate Pakistan with added vigour so that the growing Pak intimacy with China could be checked to safeguard its security interests in South Asia, an area so close to her border. Moscow must have realized that if Pakistan, in order to get military assistance and to enlist diplomatic support over Kashmir dispute, could allow Americans to build military bases on its territory, why it could not provide the same facilities to the Chinese also for the attainment of the same objectives. Moreover, the growing US military aid to India during the Sino-Indian war caused strong resentment in Pakistan. Rawalpindi organised several anti-American demonstrations in different parts of the country. Moscow in order to encash anti-American feelings in Pakistan took added interest in Pakistan's economic development.

The assessment of Soviet Union's Pakistan policy after the Sino-Indian war, by an Indian scholar seems very plausible. He wrote, "Moscow might have begun to think that only after India and Pakistan were able to live together on friendly terms, and cooperate in various matters, could Chinese power be effectively checked, a proper balance of power established and stable conditions created in Asia". He further added, "The achievement of that objective necessitated

that not only should the Kremlin continue to maintain its friendly relations with India, but also try to broaden the base of its policy in the Indian subcontinent by establishing mutually beneficial and harmonious relations with Pakistan as well". \(^{213}\) Pursuing the same policy direction, the Soviet premier Khrushchev received Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan's Representative to the UN General Assembly and a former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, at Moscow and reiterated the Soviet desire to strengthen its ties with Pakistan. After meeting the Soviet Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko, Zafrullah Khan was convinced that the Soviet Union was sincerely hoping to improve relations with Pakistan. \(^{214}\)

The Soviet Union's consistent effort to consolidate its relations with Pakistan resulted in signing of a number of agreements between 1963 and 1964. The oil agreement was followed by a barter agreement in August 1963. On 7 October 1963 an agreement was signed which established Moscow-Karachi air service. Another agreement related to exchange of news and teleprinter service with Tass was also signed in this period. For the purpose of purchasing earth-moving machinery, rotary drilling machinery, and other accessories from the Soviet Union, both countries signed a verdict agreement of 11 million dollars on 17 June 1964. The agreement had provision for training facilities to Pakistani.

\(^{213}\) Ibid.

\(^{214}\) Dawn, 26 June 1963.
technicians in the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{215} In June 1964 both countries had also signed an agreement for an exchange of cultural and scientific groups. On the invitation of Moscow, a thirteen-member parliamentary delegation from Pakistan visited the Soviet Union in September 1964.\textsuperscript{216} President Ayub Khan was also invited to visit Moscow in the same month by Khrushchev.\textsuperscript{217} In May 1964, when Pakistan again raised the Kashmir question in the Security Council, the Soviet representative reaffirmed the earlier position of its Government that "Kashmir's belonging to India has already been decided by the Kashmiri people", but it also mentioned that "the Soviet delegation is firmly of the opinion that the India-Pakistan dispute should be settled directly by the parties concerned - India and Pakistan - and, of course, exclusively by peaceful means. The parties to this dispute are themselves capable of taking steps to relax the tensions which exist between them".\textsuperscript{218} The Soviet Union recognised that a dispute over Kashmir issue exists.

Well before the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964, Pakistan had started demonstrating its declining interest in CENTO and SEATO. It had started developing regional arrangements outside these pacts. It refused to participate

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{215} \textbf{Dawn,} 18 June 1964
\item \textsuperscript{216} \textbf{Pravda,} 21 September 1964.
\item \textsuperscript{217} \textbf{Dawn,} 23 September 1964.
\item \textsuperscript{218} \textbf{SCOR,} mtg. 1090, 14 February 1964, paras 50-51.
\end{itemize}
in SEATO military and naval exercises and supported peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese problem. In July 1964, it along with Iran and Turkey, formed a regional organisation, namely, Regional Co-operation for Development Organization (RCD). The Soviet Union welcomed this Pakistani move. Pravda commented: "Turkey, Iran and Pakistan have started to emerge from the isolation imposed on them by the USA and Britain and have developed their independence and simultaneously their desire to solve problems on their own". 219 Apart from these developments, Pakistan was among the first signatories of Moscow Test Ban Treaty. Thus, 1963-64 proved out to be a decisive period for improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and Pakistan. It well prepared the ground for Ayub Khan's visit to Moscow in April 1965.

219 Pravda, 15 November 1964.