CHAPTER-II

THE CONCEPTS PRAMĀ (VALID COGNITION) AND PRAMĀNA (SOURCE OF VALID COGNITION) IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

The Indian concepts of Pramā (valid cognition) and Pramāna (source of valid cognition) come under the purview of epistemological discussion. Hence before taking up the problem of the means of knowing a negative fact properly, it will not be uncalled for to discuss the theories of different schools of Indian philosophy regarding the valid cognition (pramā) and the means of valid cognition (pramāna), because negative facts are known through a distinct means of valid cognition called anupalabdhi by some Indian thinkers.

All thinkers in general have given their attention to the problem of cognition for a long time. So their queries are confined to the following; what is the nature of cognition? What is the criterion of the truth of cognition? What are the sources of acquiring it? These epistemological queries lead to the formulation of a theory of cognition. In the modern time, truly speaking, the whole battle of epistemology is centred round the possible distinction in the nature of cognition. Here we notice a difference between Western and Indian view on this point.
In Western philosophy there are generally two groups of epistemologists, namely, the sceptic and dogmatic regarding these issues. According to the sceptic, the problem of knowledge is beyond solution, but the dogmatists think that it is capable of being solved.

As is well known, Plato had to counter the sceptical and the Heracliteon tradition of knowledge in which, in fact, 'knowledge' was reduced to subjective, changing, sifting 'opinion' and 'beliefs'. The philosopher of Plato's conception, on the contrary, was concerned with 'knowledge' - par excellence which was certain, unalterable beyond any sceptic doubt, which, i.e., was far different from what passes as 'knowledge' in ordinary parlance. Aside from the requirement that knowledge must be certain, the other requirement that Plato sets for knowledge was that it must be of object. While the first requirement would dispense with the sceptic doubt or uncertainty about knowledge, the second would obviate the subjectivity. Knowledge is of 'Ideas' grasped by Reason. The uncertainty, probability, variability etc. that in fact (so to speak) any sensationalistic, Heracliteon, sceptical account of knowledge are got rid of in Plato's Idealistic account according to which knowledge is fixed, certain and indubitable because it is oriented to Ideas which are fixed and permanent. Plato thus conceived knowledge within a rigid, fixed unalterable ontological structure, viz., the world of Ideas.

The Platonic tradition was contained in Aristotle, the
only difference being that as against Plato, Aristotle main-
tained that the Ideas (or 'Forms') of Plato's conception could
be instantiated in sense-perception without their ideality being
impaired through such an instantiation. Aristotle was as much
an ontologist regarding his account of knowledge as was Plato.
The rigid, structuralist ontology of knowledge was as much
Aristotle's as it was Plato's, though Plato ought to be credited
with conceiving it for the first time.

The Cartesian tradition too was the continuation of the
Platonic heritage. What comes within the sweeping, all-embracing
doubt of Descartes was the item of sense-perception and all
that is related to it, i.e., history, tradition etc. Doubt comes
to a halt with the 'Cogito ergo Sum' which was but the first truth
of reason: my reason finds it impossible, i.e., contradictory
to assert 'I think' and negate 'I exist'. And methodically, i.e.,
rationally advancing from the 'Cogito', Descartes proceeds to
restore own belief in the world initially doubted. But then, the
world that is restored to us is the world grasped by reason,
i.e., the world of which the 'essences' or 'primary qualities'
are conceived and not perceived. The Platonic ideal 'essences'
are seplicated in Descartes world of 'primary qualities'. So
the idealist philosophers hold that an object not only does
things but also exists. When an object is capable of various
actions and relations, the different aspects of object as doing
and being is also accepted. But Indian thinkers analyse both
these aspects of an object.
The Platonic, Rationalistic, Cartesian structuralistic conception of knowledge came to be challenged for the first time in the Empiricism of Locke, Berkeley and Hume. Where Descartes had conceived of the primary qualities of matter as 'essences' grasped in reason (after Plato), Locke conceived of them as sensible qualities. Their only difference is from 'secondary' qualities being their invariance. Locke's description of the process of sensation is conformed by his realistic stand and also comparable with Nyāya definition of perception. Where in the Platonic tradition 'esse' was 'concipi', in Berkeley "esse" was "percepi". Where in the Rationalistic tradition, the basic principle from which the entire structure of knowledge could be derived (Cp. Leibnitz), was the principle of 'ground' and 'consequent' in the Humian view the 'ground' - 'consequent' principle was of no avail in finding the discrete, atomic sense-impressions which could be 'associated' - not structured in a system - by the empirical law of 'invariable', 'antecedence' and 'consequence'. Hence the empirical thinkers accept that a thing is never known apart from what it does or apart from its relation to other things.

It is in Kant that the conception that knowledge is to be viewed within a determinate structure is re-assessed in a way which differs from the Empiricists' re-assessment of it and which

1. (§.46) TS. "Indriyārthasannikarsajanyam jñānam pratyakṣam".
   - Tarkasamgraha by Ananbhatta, Translated by Gopinath Bhattacharya, Calcutta, 1983.
From the above discussion it is seen that Western philosophers in general accept knowledge as valid knowledge, whereas invalid cognition is not knowledge at all. On the other hand, knowledge, according to Indian thinkers, means a true cognition, certain, uncontradicted or unfalsified which is distinct from a false one (mithya-jñana). In Indian philosophy, the word 'jñana' stands for both valid and invalid cognition. In this sense 'jñana' or cognition, which are synonyms, are divided into two classes: prama (valid cognition) and aprama (invalid cognition). The above distinction was made by the old Naiyāyikas in order to analyse valid cognition in their own way and the sources of valid cognition (pramaṇa).

According to Nyāya, valid cognition (prama) is a definite or certain (asandigdha), unerring (yathārtha) knowledge and it consists in knowing the object as it is. But a cognition is invalid which has, for its predicate, a character which is not possessed by the subject (of the cognition). Thus, prama means

3. (§ 37) TS. "Tadvati tatprakārakah anubhavah yathārthah. (Yathā rajate 'idam rajatam' iti jñānam). Sa eva prama iti ucyate".

4. (§38) TS. "Tadabhāvavati tatprakārakah anubhavah ayathārthah; yathā Suktau 'idam rajatam' iti jñānam. Sa eva 'prama' ityucyate".
   - Ibid.
yathārthānubhava (yathā + artha), i.e., not in the sense of similarity or resemblance, but in the sense of definite and assured knowledge of an object which is true presentational in character.5

In other words, true cognition is an expression whose qualifier is such that it belongs to the object (Tadvati tatprakārakatvam).

Thus we may explain the cases where the above definition can be applied and where it cannot be. For example, 'I know a piece of silver as silver' - this knowledge has three qualifiers like 'thisness', 'silver' and 'silverness'. In this case, the object of knowledge is in to-to without any distortion and, therefore, is valid cognition. For, here the knowledge is one which has silverness as its qualifier (rajaṭatvaprakāraka) and the 'this' (a real silver) possesses silverness. Hence, the knowledge possesses the property of rajaḍatva rajaṭatvaprakārakatva which is the same as 'This is silver'. On the other hand, when we perceive 'a piece of shell as silver' then the cognition is invalid. For in this case the 'silverness' which functions as qualifier does not belong to the qualificandum 'this'. So this is not rajaḍatvavat, and this object of cognition is not tadvatitprakāraka.

Now we may conclude by citing two important points namely, one is the nature and another is the test of truth or validity. In

5. Pramā - Laksana (Bengali article),
- Pandit Biswa Bandhu Bhattacharyya, p. 99,
Research bulletin of Philosophy, Vol.I,
No. I, 1984, Jadavpur University, Calcutta.
the first point there is difference of opinion among the different schools of Indian philosophy. According to Jayanta, prama is that knowledge of objects which is free from doubt and illusion. Gangesa holds that prama is that which informs us of the existence of something in a place where it really exists. The Prabhakaras define prama as immediate experience (anubhuti). Bhattas, under the influence of the Buddhists, hold that valid cognition (prama) invariably pertains to a novel object. Dharmakirti, the eminent Buddhist logician, defines true cognition as harmonious or non-discrepant (avisamvadī) in the sense that there is no conflict between the cognition of an object and the practical activity meant to obtain it. Moreover, he holds

6. "Avyabhicārinīmaṇasandīghāmārthopalabdhiḥ vidhadati्र")
   - Nyāyamanjari, 1-20 (Pramanālaksanam).

7. "Yatra yadastitatra tasyānubhavaḥ".
   - Tattvacintāmanī (Pramāṇa Section).

8. "anubhūtiśca na pramāṇam".
   - Brhatī 1.1.5.

9. "Sarvasyaṇupalabdhe'rhthe prāmāṇyaṁ ........."

10. "Pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam arthakriyāsthitih avisamvādananām ....".
    - Pramāṇavārtika, 1.3.
that valid cognition is a new cognition, the cognition of an object not yet cognised earlier.\textsuperscript{11} Among the Śāmkhya Philosophers Kapila states that \textit{prama} is a determinate knowledge of an object which is not known before. The Advaitins hold that valid cognition consists in knowledge which is \textit{abādhita} or unsublated. In this connection Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra gives two definitions of \textit{prama} where the first includes memory in it, and the second refers to novelty as an essential feature of valid cognition.\textsuperscript{12}

With regard to the test of the truth of knowledge there are four well known theories in Western Philosophy: (a) Correspondence theory, (b) Coherence theory, (c) Pragmatic and (d) Self-evidence theory. According to the correspondence theory, a true proposition is one that corresponds (not in the sense of resemblance) to a fact, i.e., to an actual state of affairs. In general, the statement the \( P \) is true if and only if it is the case that \( P \). In other words, a statement is true if it corresponds to facts. The upholders of this theory admit correspondence as the nature of truth, but they are silent when the test of truth is concerned there. The upholders of the pragmatic theory hold that a true proposition is one when it works satisfactorily in experience, that is to say, when it proves to be both intellectually and practically satisfying.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} "\textit{ajñatārthaprakāśo va} ...... ".
\item \textsuperscript{12} \textit{Śāmkhayapravacanabhāsya} (Adyar Library, 1932), 1.8.7 and \textit{Vedantaparibhāsā} (Pratyaksapariccheda).
\end{itemize}
Two aspects of this theory are important in this context: (i) A true proposition is one which works satisfactorily in experience, and its utility (i.e., workability) is the only test of truth. (ii) Truth is held to be something that happens to a proposition and a proposition is made true by being verified, apart from verification truth is a meaningless term. In this sense the test of truth is not different from the nature of truth. The coherence theory holds that the test of the truth of a proposition is to be sought in the consistency between the proposition whose truth is in question and other relevant propositions. The consistency upon which the coherence lays emphasis is of both sorts as the nature and test of truth. According to self-evidence, the test of truth of a judgement is self-certified which never depends for its certainty upon anything extraneous to the elements of a judgement. The basic principle of this theory is, therefore, constituted by intrinsic validity of the data of our knowledge. Thus we may say that what is self-evidence is, as Descartes calls it, indubitable.

In Indian philosophy there is also a difference of opinion among the different schools concerning the nature and test or criterion of truth with regard to prama. Regarding prama, the Nyāya philosophers admit that the nature of truth is correspondence, i.e., Tadvitatatprakārakam which means the object of knowledge is in to-to without any distortion, whereas the test of truth is practical efficiency, i.e., arthakriyākāritva. The Buddhists regard it as the causal efficiency which forms the
test of truth. This view can be compared with pragmatic theory in the West. The analysis of Dharmakīrti also resembles the coherence theory of truth, because truth, according to him, should correspond to experience. With Advaita Vedānta too, it is the principle of non-contradiction which is the means of examining the truth.

So it is seen that generally all philosophers accept truth unanimously. They hold that truth should be the differentia of knowledge (pramāṇa). But they express the mark of pramāṇa according to the various meaning of truth. We may point out here the different views of different philosophical systems in Indian philosophy about truth.

The Nyāya definition of Pramāṇa

The word "jñānam" is not same as the English word 'knowledge'. For the area of the word "jñānam" is wider than that of knowledge. The word 'pramāṇa' which covers a specific area of "jñānam" is permitted to translate as knowledge. But apramāṇa which also covers a portion of "jñānam", is not knowledge. Hence to translate any type of "jñānam" as knowledge is very much misleading or confusing. In a word, all individual manifestations of knowledge are "jñānam", but not the vice-versa.

According to Nyāya, knowledge is the quality of self and "jñānam" receives the status of a guna. Every guna (quality) remains in a substance through the relation, called inherence and the subs-
tance is none other than the self. That \( \text{jn\=na} \) is described as a
guna remaining in self is known through the method called paris\=esa.
\( \text{\=jn\=na} \) cannot remain in the substance like earth, water etc. as
they have their specific qualities. \( \text{\=jn\=na} \), being a quality, must
remain in a substance which is self (\( \text{\=at\=man} \)). In this sense, both
\( \text{\=prama} \) and \( \text{\=aprama} \) are the quality of the \( \text{\=at\=man} \) depending upon
self-mind-contact. But there lies a difference. In the former
case we perceive the object of knowledge as such, whereas in the
latter case we perceive such thing as otherwise.

So valid cognition, according to Ny\=aya, is defined as that
which informs us of the existence of something in a place where it
really exists, or which predicates of something a character really
possessed by it.\(^{13}\) In other words, valid cognition is defined as
presentational knowledge (\( \text{yath\=arth\=anubhava} \)).\(^{14}\) Four factors are
involved in it, namely, the subject or the knower (\( \text{pram\=ata} \)), the
object or the known (\( \text{prameya} \)), the method by which the subject
knows the object (\( \text{pram\=ana} \)), and the resultant knowledge (\( \text{pram\=iti} \)).

\(^{13}\) "Yatra yad astitatra tasy\=anubhavah pram\=a, tadvatitatprama-
k\=arako\text{\'{\textbackslash}i}nubhavo \=v\=a".

\text{- Tattva\=cint\=amani (Pratyaksa Section),}
Asiatic Society Ed., p. 401.

\(^{14}\) \text{Tarkasamgraha-D\=ipika on Tarkasamgraha by Annambhatta -}
Translated and Elucidated by Gopinath Bhattacharya,
These four factors mutually constitute the whole truth. So it can be said that valid knowledge (prama) is not possible if any one of these is absent. The Western philosophers in general use to distinguish between the three factors, namely, the subject, the object and the resultant knowledge. But the Indian thinkers add one in support of these three facts, i.e., pramanas or the sources of valid cognition.

Udayana defines the mark of prama as proper discernment (Samyak paricchitti). According to him, it is the condition of the real nature of a thing and independent of a previous perception. From this definition it follows that Smrti is not included herein. As Smrti is not independent knowledge, its object is the same as that of the original perception which produced it. In order to exclude Smrti from valid cognition Udayana uses the term 'anapeksa' (i.e., independent) in his definition.15

Among the commentators on the Nyāya-Sūtras, Vācaspati Miśra is the earliest who deals with the topic of validity and invalidity of knowledge. Udayana is influenced by Vācaspati and lends many

15. "Yathārthanabhavo mānāṁ anapeksatayate".
- Nyāya Kusumāñjali, IV, I.

supports to his view. He introduces a detailed discussion by say­
ing that validity and invalidity of knowledge are extrinsic, i.e.,
due to some extraneous conditions.

Characteristic features of pramā in Jaina logic.

The Jainas define knowledge as 'Svaparāvyasāvi-jñānam,' which means that the nature of knowledge is to be self-revealing as well as object-revealing. This very nature may be compared with a lamp. A lamp, like knowledge, reveals its object by virtue of revealing itself. According to the Jainas, the relation between the self and its knowledge is bhedabheda. In this sense they do not accept either complete difference or complete non-difference between knowledge and the self from their doctrine of anekāntavāda. So the Jainas' view in this regard is quite different from the both, i.e., the view of Nyāya and the view of Advaita also.

Thus knowledge or jñāna is taken to mean any cognition of an object, while the word pramā is used in the logical sense. That is to say, it is true-cognition. According to the Jainas, right or definite cognition about an object which is other than doubt, error, etc., is pramā.16 In other words, definiteness is essential mark of the validity of knowledge.17 The characteristic definiteness here,


however, does not differ essentially from the view of the Naiyāyikas, because definiteness is further stated by Jaina logicians themselves to be the determination of an object in the form in which it really exists.

In the Jaina philosophy the first great-logician, Siddhasena Divākara and Āchārya Samantabhadra define valid cognition (pramāṇa) as having its nature to reveal itself as well as its object.¹⁸ Knowledge (jñāna), according to the Jainas, is divided into two kinds: Pramāṇa or means of knowledge proper and Naya or partial knowledge.

Pramāṇa refers to the knowledge of a thing as it is. The definition of pramāṇa is commonly given by the Jaina logicians as follows. The knowledge which reveals itself and its object, and which must be determinate is called pramāṇa. There are many logicians in Jaina philosophy who explain the definition of pramāṇa in different ways. But those are not very different in their meanings. Akalanka defines pramāṇa as knowledge which is uncontradicted and which manifests the unknown object.¹⁹ But Naya is the knowledge of a thing in a particular context or relationship of the

¹⁸. Pramāṇam Svaparābhāsi jñānam bādhavivarjitam/ Svaparāvabhāsakām yathā pramāṇam bhuvi buddhilaksanān//
    - Brhatśvayambhūstotra, 63.

¹⁹. "Pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam anadhi gatārthādhi gamañcalakanātavāt".
    - Astasāhasrī, p. 175.
knower. In other words, Naya is that particular standpoint from which we deliver our judgement about a particular thing. As we are not omniscient, so it is not possible for ordinary people to know all the qualities of a thing. For what they know is relative and limited. For this reason our intention to explain the meaning of Naya in order to achieve the nature of valid knowledge.

Nayas also differ with difference of standpoints accepted by a particular school. Thus every Naya gives us relative knowledge and that can be hypothetically entertained. Since when it reveals the true nature of the object as it exists, it is true. On the contrary, when this is obstructed, it is not true. According to the Jainas, everything possesses an infinite number of qualities (dharma). When we affirm a thing by one of these manifold qualities, we apprehend Naya. But when we know a thing in different ways by different qualities, the knowledge comes through pramāṇa. Thus both pramāṇa and Naya are essential for valid knowledge of a thing.

Hence, there is no judgement which is completely true or completely false. This is known as the basic doctrine of the Jainas called 'Syādvāda' which means the doctrine of 'may be'. It signifies about absolute affirmation and absolute negation are impossible as all judgements are a partial application to reality, i.e., they are incapable of giving us a complete truth which can be grasped in to-to.

20. "Nīyate gamyate arthaikadesō'neneti nayah".

- Syādvādaratnakara, p. 8.
The Jainas again classify knowledge into two - immediate (aparoksa) and mediate (paroksa). As the Jainas admit Syādvāda, the first is here defined as a vivid and relative knowledge. Such knowledge can be known through the operation of the sense-organs or without their operation, i.e., mediumless. For these reasons immediate knowledge is of two kinds, viz., Vyavahārika (depends on medium like sense-organs) and paramārthika (mediumless).

Immediate knowledge, according to them, is further divided into three, namely, Avadhi, Manahparyāya and Kevala; and mediate knowledge into two, namely, Mati and Sruta. Among these five kinds, Kevala-jñāna is unlimited or the highest and absolute knowledge which requires no media of sense-organs and mind to grasp its object. For it cannot be described, but only be acquired by the liberated souls.

Mark of pramā in Śāmkhya-yoga view.

According to Śāmkhya-yoga, knowledge is the modification of Buddhi or citta and is located in Buddhi itself. In this connection they have admitted a difference between pure consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. (Vṛtti-jñāna). Pure consciousness, devoid of all relations and buddhi, is the real form of Śuddhapurusā. This Śuddhapurusā which is mere revealing consciousness is indifferent,

21. "Matiśrutāvadhimanahparyāyakēvalāni jñānam". - Tattvārthadhiṣṭhīnāsūtra, - Edited by Uma Śvāmī
neutral and a disinterested spectator of the world-show. It cannot be regarded as the material or efficient cause of the universe. On the other hand, Vṛtti-ñāna or phenomenal knowledge may be correct or wrong depending upon the phenomenal perspective when the absolute is viewed under the limited sphere of existence. In this sense Purusa falsely appears as the knower (visayī) of the object-knowledge (visaya-ñāna) caused through the operation of buddhi and this falsity is never felt in the phenomenal stage. So Purusa is not the real substratum of vṛtti-ñāna, whereas the real locus of object-knowledge is buddhi. It means the Vṛtti (mode) of the object which amounts to knowledge when consciousness is reflected through it. Like Advaita Vedānta, Sāmkhya too, believes that knowledge through Vṛtti (mode) is the revelation of the object. Thus, this Vṛtti-ñāna, being a modification of buddhi, may be regarded as attributive in nature and consequently also may be regarded as substantive in nature in relation of identity between substance and attribute. This type of knowledge as propounded by the Sāmkhya school is nearer to the ray-like substantive-attributive knowledge of Rāmānuja School so far as its object-revealing nature is concerned, but their only difference in this respect is the acceptance of the locus (adhāra) of knowledge. For Sāmkhya, buddhi or intellect is regarded as the locus of Vṛtti-ñāna, but Rāmānuja has accepted the existence of ray-like knowledge in the soul in place

22. "Na Prakṛtiḥ na viκṛtiḥ, Purusah".

- Sāmkhyakārika, 3.
of Vṛtti-jñāna. In the sense of Rāmānuja, the soul, in its empirical state, is the locus of object-knowledge.

As the problem of validity and invalidity of knowledge is concerned, the first question is: Is knowledge self-valid or other-valid? In other words, does knowledge become valid by itself or by other? According to Sāmkhya-yoga, knowledge is not only self-valid but invalidity also is intrinsic in knowledge. So both validity and invalidity are inherent in the cognition itself in regard to origination. In this sense both jñāna and ājnāna are inherent in buddhi. But ājnāna is not in the sense of negation of knowledge, but it is confused knowledge with regard to two non-discrimination between two different things. In this respect Sāmkhya-yoga view is quite different from the view of Naiyāyikas as well as Buddhists for depending on extraneous conditions.

According to Vācaspati Miśra, knowledge is a variety of modification of the internal organ, directed towards the object known and is of the nature of the intelligence residing in the agent. It is certainly discursive in character. In this sense he holds that knowledge is self-luminous and also represents the same as the self. No difference whatsoever exists between the self and consciousness. Consciousness illumines itself and by itself.

Padmapāda also maintains in his Pañcarādīka that the self

23. Bhāmati on Čātussūtrī, p. 50.
is the nature of self-revealing pure consciousness.\textsuperscript{24} Prakāśatman, in his \textit{Vivarana}, also counts the same thing of self-revealing consciousness. According to his opinion, self-revealing pure consciousness is nothing, but is the self-revealing by itself.\textsuperscript{25}

Vācaspati Misra, like the Mīmāṃsakas argues that knowledge is the means of its own validity and does not require anything else to establish its validity. He also criticises the view of practical efficiency and the inherence of reality as a genus (\textit{Sattā-Samanya-Samavāya}) as the admission of these leads to duality by saying that manifestation (Prakāśa) alone has to be admitted as constituting the validity or truth. But Vācaspati differs from the position of the Mīmāṃsakas regarding the conception of valid cognition (prama). According to Vācaspati, valid cognition (prama) is a cognition which is not previously known (anadhigata) and not contradicted.\textsuperscript{26}

It means that valid cognition or truth is abiding, eternal and non-contradictory. Thus he distinguishes false cognition from the conception of validity. On the other hand, Kumārila opines that prama means cognition which instigates one to practical activity, but Vācaspati holds that there is no reference to action.

\textsuperscript{24} Post-Samkara, Edited by A. B. Sāstrī, Oxford, 1980, p. 77.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{26} "Avādhita-anadhigata-asandigdha bodhajanakatvam hi pramanatvam pramanānāṁ".

Here Vācaspati includes the word 'anadhigata' (not previously known) in his definition in order to exclude Smṛti, because through Smṛti we get an object which is already known. Another word 'avadhīta' should also be taken to exclude wrong or false cognition or illusion, because false cognition is always contradicted. Here we find a similarity between Vācaspati and other Advaitins. According to Advaitins, non-contradictoriness is a mark of validity which Vācaspati also holds.

According to Vijnānabхikṣu, knowledge is related to buddhi and purusa knows the object through reflection only. He further argues that the object to be known is reflected into buddhi which received reflection of purusa as well. This Buddhi having the reflection of both purusa and object is again reflected in purusa. So knowledge appears as located in purusa through this reflection.27

This is called 'double reflection theory' admitted by Vijnānabхikṣu which is the opposite to Vācaspati's 'single reflection theory'.

Vijnānabхikṣu defines pramā as reflection of buddhi having the form of object in purusa,28 and pramāṇa as vṛtti of buddhi. He further argues that buddhivṛtti may also be taken as pramā. For when the result of knowledge is considered to be located in buddhi, pramā will be sense-object-contact, etc.; and when the result of knowledge is considered to be located in purusa, pramā will be

28. Ibid.
the function of buddhi. So purusa is not a real cogniser, but the witness of knowledge. In this connection, Vallabhaçarya adds in the clarification of prama-pramana by saying that when both the function of buddhi and the apprehension of purusa are said to be prama, pramana will be both function of buddhi and function of sense-organ. 29

Mark of prama according to Advaita-Visistadvaita view.

According to the Advaita Vedanta, the word ‘jñana’ is used to mean both knowledge: absolute knowledge and empirical or relative knowledge. The absolute knowledge means transcendental or non-rational knowledge, i.e., knowledge of Brahman which has no relation with empirical objects; whereas empirical knowledge is the creation of avidya or maya. The former knowledge is called Svarupa or Brahma-jñana and the latter knowledge is called vrtti-jñana or empirical jñana. Here Svarupa-jñana although absolutely unrelated to objects, yet somehow becomes connected with objects which it reveals. So Advaita epistemology will be discussed only in terms of vrtti-jñana when we talk about relation between knower and known.

Vrtti-jñana may either be true or false depending upon the fact at the empirical level. Thus vrtti-jñana, according to Advaita, which may be true or false, is a form and hence an appearance of svarupa-jñana, in as much as it is relative and condi-

29. Kirana 1.7 (With Yogasutra, Bhasya and Rajamartanda), Benaras, 1959.
So Advaita suggests that the so-called vṛtti-jnāna cannot be called as jnāna (knowledge) unless it is illumined by the principle of consciousness or Brahma-jnāna.

Now pramā, according to Advaitins, is truth, i.e., valid cognition and which is opposed to it, called invalid cognition or apramā. Valid cognition (pramā) is defined by Dharmarāja Adhvarindra, the author of Vedānta Paribhasā, as a cognition which is not previously known (anadhigata) and is not also contradicted. It means that valid cognition of an object lies on the property of its being uncontradicted and novelty. The word anadhigata is used in the definition in order to exclude memory or Smrti from the scope of valid cognition (pramā), because Smrti is not accepted as knowledge proper. Now the question is: Should memory be admitted to have the status of knowledge? In reply, we can say that it is not. For memory is that which is already known, i.e., past experience. In other words, memory or past experience is to be true if it is reckoned as identical with the content of past experience which it claims to represent. But valid cognition is such that which is not already known (anadhigata). This is the reason for which memory is not a distinct source of knowledge, but it is a clear experience and given a separate name.

Another characteristic feature of knowledge is non-contra-

30. "anadhigatābādhitārthavisayaka-jnānatvam pramātvam".

- Vedānta Paribhasā,

dictior: and novelty. The word 'non-contradiction' means the object which is not contradicted (avādhitatya) which implies the exclusion of wrong cognition (as it is always contradicted). Anything that is contradicted or sublated can not be true. This view is very much similar to Hegel's own view of truth as resolving and reconciling all contradictions in itself. For the Advaitins, knowledge should be such as to incapable of being contradicted at all times. For this reason, they have rejected the pragmatic test of causal efficiency on the ground that sometimes even an invalid cognition may lead to the fulfilment of a purpose as when mistaking the brightness of a distant jewel for the jewel we approach and get the jewel. Hence it is clear that the invalidity of the initial cognition which caused our action is due to its being contradictedness.

Novelty means informativeness or newness (i.e., knowledge-proper) which is also included in the nature of truth in order to exclude Smṛti, because Smṛti is reproduced knowledge and hence, not a new knowledge. In this sense novelty is to be considered as an essential quality of knowledge. The British empiricist at the beginning of the development of modern philosophy also gave emphasis on 'novelty' as a unique character of knowledge. Some-time after we find the similarity between Kant and the Advaita School with regard to the mark of valid cognition. For Kant, knowledge as knowledge-proper, must be informative or new, i.e., synthetic in nature. Moreover, this view of the Advaitins also is

similar to that of Vācaspati who expresses in Bhāmati that novelty and non-contradiction are the marks of valid cognition (pramāṇa).

Now it is, however, necessary to point out that some Advaitins do not exclude Smṛti from the scope of valid cognition. Naturally the following question arises from their standpoint:

Can we say that in the case of a continuous process of knowledge (dharavāhika-jñāna) of the same object, our experience at every moment during that period (Kāla) is regarded as knowledge? Most of the ancient Indian philosophers answered the question in affirmative although on different grounds.

Some Advaitins admit that in the case of a continuous process of knowledge of a table it is not the same at different moment as we suppose ordinarily. For them, the object (the table) of our knowledge must be determined by both spatial and temporal properties to our consciousness. If we do not perceive the spatial property of an object (a table), we cannot judge that it is high or low, big or small. Again if we do not perceive temporal property of an object (a table), we will fail to judge it to be 'present'. Hence time-quality is a common element entering as a category in all judgements. But if we do not do so, it would be impossible for us to distinguish the present knowledge of a table from the past one. For this reason, we can say that the determination of a table by the first moment of a continuous process of knowledge is not the same as determined by the second moment, simply because the common factor, the time element, remains unknown. Every moment
of knowledge of an object is not the same as the previous moment which is also as good as a new object. In this sense, the definition of valid cognition \( \text{prama} \) can be applied to that case where quality of novelty is also present. Moreover, real escape from this difficulty is possible if we take the term \text{anadhigata} in a technical sense. The knowledge of an object whose essential nature is previously unknown or unperceived is called \text{prama}.^{32}

Some thinkers admit that the above argument is not a very happy answer to escape from the difficulty. They hold that memory or \text{Smrti} is equally present in the case of a continuous process of knowledge. Hence it is not proper to argue that the time-quality of the object in a continuous process of knowledge is perceived as new at every moment.

The \text{Naiyayikas} think that this problem can be solved by understanding the real sense of novelty which is present in the case of knowledge, but absent in the case of memory. As memory is the impression of past experience, so novelty is absent there. Hence, every moment of a continuous process of knowledge stands in its own right and claims to attain the status of independent validity. For the \text{Advaitins}, on the other hand, it is not a problem at all; be-

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32. "\text{Nirupasyāpi kālasya indriyavedyatvabhypagamena dharavāhi}-\text{kabuddhherapi pūrva pūrva jñānāvisaya-tattat-ksaṇavisēsavisaya-}\text{katvena na tatravyāptih}".

cause knowledge persists so long as fresh knowledge does not come to replace it.\textsuperscript{33} So valid cognition can be regarded as such if its object is neither contradicted nor previously known. It may be argued that the whole world become \textit{vādhita} just after the self-realisation as accepted by Advaitins. In reply, it has been said that here contradiction means the contradiction in the phenomenal level. The whole world becomes \textit{vādhita} when there is the realisation of Brahman, which is not contradicted here.

The Advaitins admit that validity is intrinsic in nature (anti-thesis of the view of Buddhas) and invalidity is extrinsic. The intrinsic nature of validity consists in the non-requisite of anything other than that which originates or reveals cognition. On the other hand, invalidity is extrinsic in nature, since its origination is due to the defect (dosa) present in the cause of cognition. In this sense, true cognition is not only self-luminous, but also self-valid.

On the other hand, for the Viśistadvaita School of Uttararamīmamsā, knowledge consists in both the faithfulness to the object and prompting in the fruitful activity. In other words, knowledge is that which reveals an object to its subject by virtue of its intrinsic capacity.\textsuperscript{34} It can be compared to a lamp which

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{33} Vedānta-Paribhāṣā (Venkatesvar Press, 1911), p. 26.
  \item \textsuperscript{34} "Sva-Sattayaiva svāśrayam prati kasyacit viśayasya prakāśanam hi samvedanam".
  
  - Ramānuja Bhāṣya on Vedānta Sūtras, 1-1-1, p. 65.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
reveals the presence of an object around it but does not know it. It reveals the object to a conscious self. Thus, the function of knowledge is, therefore, the revelation of something outside it, i.e., it does not require another knowledge to reveal itself. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin defines valid knowledge (prama) as that which apprehends an object as it really exists and which prompts fruitful activity.\(^{35}\) As all knowledge, according to Rāmānuja, is true for it's revealing some objects, there is no false knowledge, i.e., āñāna.

Viśiṣṭādvaitaśādins opine that knowledge is intrinsically valid and even wrong cognition is valid with regard to the substantive parts (this) of their objects but invalid with regard to their attributive parts (silver) in the case of the illusory knowledge as "this is silver".\(^{36}\) Thus the validity of knowledge is intrinsic to it, whereas its invalidity is extrinsic due to the accidental condition of defects (dosa) which vitiate it.

This view is opposite to the Nyāya view according to which validity of knowledge is extrinsic. Hence, it may be said that there is no valid reason for the intrinsic invalidity of knowledge,

\(^{35}\) "Yathāvasthita-vyavahārāṇugunam āñānam prama".

- Nyāyaparīśuddhi (Venktanātha), Chowkhamba sanskrit series No. 249, p. 90.

\(^{36}\) Sarvārthasiddhi (Venktanātha) a commentary on Tattvamuktākalāpa, Benaras, 1900, p. 554.
because all individual manifestations of knowledge are not invalid; but that there is a valid reason for the intrinsic validity of knowledge, viz., their universality. This also holds a position opposite to the Sāṃkhya doctrine of intrinsic validity and invalidity of knowledge, because it is self-contradictory to assume the same knowledge both valid and invalid.

Definition of Pramāṇa and problem of accepting the means of knowing negative fact.

The word pramāṇa comes from the root ma (to measure) and signifies the means of measurement. Thus, we etymologically derive the expression pramāṇa from pramiyate anena iti pramāṇa. From this we know that the scope of pramāṇa lies in ascertaining the correctness of a cognition.

This view of pramāṇa based upon the etymology of the word as the means of testing knowledge which is not a final one. Thus, the Indian thinkers regarded pramāṇa both as a means of discovering truth and verifying knowledge. In a word, pramanās, according to early Indian thinkers, were regarded as vouching for the certainty of knowledge; while the later philosophers consider them as those aspects of objects that are unknown hitherto.

Now we shall consider the general definition of pramāṇa in various schools of Indian philosophy and find that all the systems of Indian philosophy, more or less, agree in respect of literal meaning as well as the function or purpose of pramāṇa in
the sense that it is conducive to the valid knowledge (pramā). Pramāṇa is generally defined as the karana of prama, i.e., a special cause in producing a particular effect or prama. But there is much diversity of opinion among Indian thinkers as regards the exact nature of the karana of valid knowledge and also the scope of it.

In the first place, the Buddhists maintain that pramāṇa is knowledge that does not fail to agree with the objective reality, i.e., "avisamvādiviñāṇaṁ pramāṇaṁ". The expression avisamvāditva in respect of knowledge - 'non-failure to agree' means producing successful activity to obtain the object (arthakriyākāritvām). This definition is not correct, because inferential cognitions relating to objects of past one and future do not prompt one towards any activity and so they cannot be treated to be valid.

The definition of pramāṇa given by the Prabhakaras is an immediate experience (anubhuti) which is different from memory or Smṛti. In this sense memory, although not a pramāṇa, cannot be treated to be erroneous in nature. This definition does not seem to be sound. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his Nyāyamanjari while reviewing the Buddhists definition of pramāṇa states that experience is only the fruit of pramāṇa and it itself is not a pramāṇa. It is because the term pramāṇa is significative of the sense of an instrument when it is etymologically, derived as 'pramīyate anena iti pramāṇam'. Even in ordinary experience it is only an instrument that is considered to be a pramāṇa as is known from experi-
ence such as 'we know this from a pramāṇa'. Hence to define a pramāṇa as of the nature of experience strains common-sense too much. 37 This criticism also is exactly applicable to the case of the definition given by the Prabhākara School. On the other hand, the Bhaṭṭa School of Mīmāṃsa defines pramāṇa as instrument of valid cognition of an object which is unknown hitherto and which is not sublated later on. 38

The Śaṅkhyā-yoga also defines pramāṇa as that which is an instrument of valid cognition. Vācaspati Miśra is of the view that the buddhi-vṛtti and pauruseyabodha are to be considered as pramāṇa. In regard to the former, namely, buddhi-vṛtti which is of the form "This is pot" it is the aggregate of the sense-organs, manas and ahankāra which is the instrument or pramāṇa. And in regard to the latter, namely, pauruseyabodha which is of the form "I know the pot" it is the buddhi-vṛtti that is the instrument or pramāṇa. Thus the group of sense-organs, manas and ahankāra is to be viewed as pramāṇa in respect of pauruseyabodha only in an indirect manner. According to Vijnānabhiṣṣu, karana can be defined as the cause which is invariable and immediately followed by the product indirectly, because it implies intermediate operation (avāntaravyāpāra)

as a karana.\(^{39}\)

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, there is no difference as to the definition of pramāṇa as this school also accepts pramāṇa to be the instrument of valid cognition, i.e., 'pramāṇakaranam pramāṇam'. In Tarkasamgraha-Dīpikā, Annambhatta holds that karana is the uncommon causal condition (asādhāranam kāraṇam).\(^{40}\) It means that karana is understood as the uncommon or special cause through the operation of which a particular effect is produced. In a perceptual knowledge (pratyaksa pramā), e.g., a sense-organ (in the case of external perception) or Manas or mind (in the case of internal perception), is the instrumental cause (karana). Like these, there are many causes which are essential for the production of external perceptual knowledge. But soul or ātman is a cause which is common to all sorts of knowledge, whereas particular sense-organ is not common to all except perception, i.e., it is an uncommon cause to the external perception alone.

Here, the term asādhārana distinguishes karana from other causes, while the term vyāpārayat excludes the other objects of its genus which are not operative at the time of producing the

\(^{39}\) Śāmkhyasūtra with Śāmkhyaprvacanahāsa 1.87, Varanasi, 1966.

\(^{40}\) (§ 40) TS. Asādhāranaṁ kāraṇam karanam.

effect, but have the potentiality to do so. Thus, a cause is said to be karana that must not merely be uncommon (asadharana), but also possess active function (vyapara). The contact between the sense-organ and an object is an undoubtable cause of perception. In this sense, it is present in perception alone instrumentally, and hence uncommon. But still it is not the karana of perception, because it does not require a further function (vyapara). So it can be said that pramana is such an active and uncommon cause of knowledge or prama.

The Advaitins also following the Bhatta School define pramana as the instrument of valid cognition which is uncommon and is not stultified later on. Visistadvaita too defines pramana as the instrument of valid knowledge. And valid knowledge is that which has for its content something that is adapted to practical needs of life. According to the Dvaita system of Uttaramimamsa, pramana is that which comprehends an object as it is, i.e., yatharthama pramanam.41

So it is seen that all thinkers of different schools in India as well as in the West are concerned with the question as

41. "anadhigataabadhitarthavisayakah jnanam prama, Taka karana, pramanam.

- Vedanta Paribhasa, Adyar Library, Madras, 1942.

and also

Pramana Paddhati of Jayatirtha, p. 9.
to the nature and number of ultimate sources of knowledge (pramāṇa)

In the West, philosophers generally recognise only two sources of knowledge - perception and inference. Somehow the pramāṇa of testimony (Sabda) has been neglected. Because, during the middle ages, before the emergence of modern Western philosophy, Sabda - scripture, the Bible - was recognised as a source of valid knowledge about supra-sensible things. For Christians, the Bible continues to be a source of valid knowledge. By and large authority (āpta) as a source of knowledge has been neglected in modern secular philosophy. But in India there is diversity of opinion on this matter among the different schools. The Ārvākās admit that perception is the only source of knowledge. The Buddhhas admit perception and inference as the two different sources of knowledge. The Śāmkhya philosophers hold three sources of knowledge, viz., perception, inference, testimony. The Naiyāyikas admit four: perception, inference, testimony and comparison. The prabhākara-Mīmāṃsakas again admit a fifth way of knowing - arthāpatti (postulation or assumption) in addition to these four. The Bhattas and Advaitins recognise six methods, viz., anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) in addition to the other five already mentioned. The Paurānikas add two more, namely, sambhava (probability) and aitihya (tradition). In the Manimekhala it is said that, according to Vedavyasa and Jaimini, there are ten sources of knowledge, viz., two new methods known as Svabhava and parisēsa apart from others already mentioned. Th. Stcherbatsky says: The followers of Caraka increase the number of the sources of knowledge upto
Now concerning the means of knowing negative fact, the Bhāttas and Vedāntins accept sixth method of knowledge, viz., \textit{anupalabdhi} as a pramāṇa. Now an effort will be made to discuss critically whether the means of knowing a negative fact as admitted by the Bhāttas and Vedāntins is really a separate source of knowledge (pramāṇa) or not. Although there is much controversy, some problems may arise on the way of understanding: Are there really negative facts? What is the source of knowing them?

Facts may be of two types: positive and negative. The positive facts are known through perception, inference etc., e.g., "This is a red book" or "This is P". This is known through perception which is the means of knowing the positive aspect of P. The sense-organs and \textit{manas} act in some way. But in the case of negative facts there is no sense activity and the corresponding subject activity should be negative, e.g., 'There is no jar on the ground' or 'There is\neg P\neg'. It is known through a separate source of knowledge, i.e., \textit{anupalabdhi}. Thus in this context, an effort will be made to discuss the Advaita theory of \textit{Anupalabdhi} which has been admitted as a separate source of knowing negative facts.

Some thinkers think that non-existence is cognised through perception while others through inference. But Advaitins do not

\[42. \textit{Buddhist Logic}, \textit{Vol. I}, \textit{p. 72}.\]
belong to the former as well as the later group. The Prabhakaras and Sāmkhyas hold that negative fact or non-existence has a specific type of reality which is not found in the case of positive fact or existent thing. Inspite of this non-existence can be known through perception like the positive fact or existent thing. The Naiyāyikas also have arrived at the same conclusion with the help of different line of arguments.

Advaita Vedānta recognizes six prameṇas, all of which are taken over from the Mīmāṁsā school of Kumarila Bhaṭṭa. According to them, anupalabdhi or non-apprehension can not be reduced to any of the other five prameṇas. It would be wrong to presuppose that the non-existence of an object is inferred from its non-apprehension. For, inference requires a universal proposition asserting an invariable relation between major and minor terms, and there is no such proposition employed, for example, in the case of the cognition of the absence of something. So it is obvious that anupalabdhi cannot be known through perception, comparison, testimony, or postulation. For these reasons, the Advaitins regard anupalabdhi as an independent source of valid knowledge. So it can be said that the non-existence of a thing can be known through a separate source of knowledge or prameṇa which is called anupalabdhi or yogānupalabdhi. In other words, the anupalabdhi as a prameṇa is the specific cause of such immediate knowledge of non-existence which is not attained through any of the known means of knowledge. The Advaitins have carefully argued that the fact of
knowing the absence of an entity can not be included in perception and inference. If something is the source of knowledge and if it cannot be included in perception, inference etc., it has to be accepted as an independent source of knowledge or pramana.