CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION.
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In the present thesis, attempt has been made to study the Buddhists and the Māmaśa philosophy as presented by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his Nyāyamaṇjarī. In the plan of our work we proposed to critically examine the depth and the completeness of the Prima-facie arguments of the opponents namely, the Bhaṭṭas and the Buddhists, which are quoted and refuted by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. We also proposed to bring out the contribution of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa to Indian Logic in particular, and Indian Philosophy in General. We may now summarize and present our findings in the form of observations in conclusion.

So far as Jayanta's Treatment of the Buddhists and the Māmaśa philosophy is concerned, it may be observed that Nyāyamaṇjarī can very well be treated as a source book for the study of these systems. Jayanta's method of presenting his hypothesis is a peculiar one. He introduces the view of his opponents, like, Pūrvamaṃsaṅgītas and Buddhists, analyses their merits and demerits and ultimately puts forward his own theory or supports the existing Nyāya tenet by the method of elimination or assimilation of the rival hypotheses. The prima-facie arguments are complete comprehensive. It is also notable feature that, Jayanta's completeness and accuracy of presenting the prima-facie view along with the arguments of the opponents like, the Buddhists and the Māmaśakas can be seen in many a case. To mention a
very few, while refuting the Buddhist notion of abhāva, he not only presents their view but also gives in detail the eleven-fold divisions as proposed by the Buddhists.

It is also be observed that Jayanta's introduction of the rival theories is remarkably impressive, and his account of the Buddhist terms kalpanāpodha and abharānta is very clear and exhaustive, and his refutations of Buddhist view also superup. It is also understood that he is perfectly honest in presenting the views of the Māmsakas, as noted.

It may be observed here that, Jayanta's aim is not confined simply to approve or refuse the Māmsaka's or Buddhists' definitions but he tried to present a comprehensive view of them which may be of unifying nature in spite of all the diversities in various aspects.

Jayanta is never partial in his view. Even he quotes the view of Bhāṭṭa as authority when he finds it logical. For example, while he refutes the Buddhist view of Śabda, he quotes Kumarila's view.

In the same context he again quotes Kumārila that the knowledge produced by a word, reveals an object, the reason that the sentence has been asserted by a trustworthy person points out so the consequence that the knowledge, produced by such a sentence is true. Thus, the consequence is different from the object of the verbal knowledge.
It is also observed that while Jayanta is refuting the Buddhists view on notion of pramāṇa, he refers to Kumārila, to serve a clear definition of constitutes perceptibility that a sound is an object of auditory perception, is never directly grasped. When one hears a sound, his cognition assumes the form that 'it is sound but not that it is an object of hearing'. But it is indirectly known through the joint method of agreement and difference. A deaf man cannot hear a sound. A man who has normal power of hearing hears sound. Hence sound is hardly the ears of a man. It is a case of inference.

Further, while discussing about the term 'sesavat' in the theory of anumāṇa Jayanta refers Kumārila just to state that the subject of inference is both the consequence and the reason. It becomes the consequence when it is qualified by something which has not been established. It also acts as the reason when it is qualified by something which has been experienced and determined before.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa was never found to be dogmatic or orthodox and a blind follower of his predecessors. Therefore he tries to present all possible interpretations and leaves the readers or the scholars to decide for themselves without imposing his own preference.

For example: While recording the various interpretations on the qualifications in the definition of pratyakṣa of Gautama, he
remarks: so many view have been presented here and the competent learners should make their own choice that is which appeal to their minds.

In spite of the fact that he is a true student and follower of Gautama and Vātsyāyana's trend, he never fails to make his own point or differ from the views of Vātsyāyana by making additions or suggestion. For example: While commenting on anumāṇa he remarks: the example given by Vātsyāyana is not proper.

Further in the case of Śabda pramāṇa he adds: to make the definition of Gautama perfect, the words Jñāna, artha, Vyava- sāyātmaka and avyapadesyam, are to be borrowed from the preceding sūtra.

We present here a few important doctrinal introductions innovated for the first time by Jayanta.

1. Jayanta defines pramāṇa as collection of conscious as well as unconscious objects which results in producing such apprehension of knowable objects as is different from doubt and illusion.

2. Jayanta categorically states that the etymological sense of the term pratyakṣa does not convey the original meaning and he differentiates between pratyakṣa as pramāṇa and pratyakṣa as pramāṇa by supplying an additional word 'yatah' to the Gautama's Nyāya sūtram.
3. The technical terms used by Gautama in his sūtra received the attention of almost all logicians, but it is Jayanta Bhatta who has recorded as many as six alternative explanations of the term, avyapadesya.

4. On the definition of sabda he remarks. To make the definition of sabda self-sufficient one has to borrow the words, jñāna, artha, vyavasāyatmaka and avyapadesa from the sūtra which contains the definition of perception, therefore his suggestion of the inclusion of these words in the definition of verbal knowledge on the same grounds on which these have been incorporated in his definition of perception is really great.

5. It may be observed that Jayanta Bhatta's NM was the first to bring forward the theory of tātparya being a distinct vṛtti.

6. Though he has accepted the twofold classifications of Gautama and Vātsyāyana, has added two more sub varieties of abhāva namely, aeoksābhāva and sāmārthyābhāva.

On the basis of what has already been discussed we now present here Jayanta's contribution to Indian Logic. His theory of knowledge consists of a systematic set of answers to a systematic set of questions. Knowledge is a quality, it is neither an activity nor a relation. Jayanta refers to "buddhi" and "upalabdhi" as definitive synonyms of jñāna. It is observed that according to Jayanta pramā is that "knowledge of objects which is free from doubt and illusion, and he is quite aware of all the factors of knowledge such as pramā, pramāṇa, prameya and pramīti."
He defines *pramāṇa* as a collection of conscious as well as unconscious objects which results in producing such apprehension of knowable objects as is different from doubt and illusion.

He forcefully supports the viability of only four sources of valid knowledge and refutes others with convincing arguments. He opposes the Buddhist idea of *pramāṇavyavasthā*, and successfully endorses the *Nyāya* view i.e., *pramāṇa samplava*.

It has been also been observed that, Jayanta has brought out a new characteristic, "Bodhābodhasvabhāva" in the definition of *pramāṇa*. No other Naiyāyika has stated so clearly as Jayanta that conscious as well as unconscious objects from the collection of conditions of a means of knowledge. Though he rejects doubt as a form of valid knowledge, yet it is he who has properly evaluated the role of doubt as a beginning point of Philosophy.

We have already noted that Jayanta presents the opponents view, like pūrvamīmāṃsakas, and Buddhists indetail and in a faithful manner. He introduced the Umbeka's view of *pramāṇa* i.e., the terms *drṣṭa* and "avisamvāda" exclude doubt and error respectively, from valid knowledge. He also has introduced the Buddhists view of *pramāṇa* and number of *pramāṇa*, i.e. according to Buddhists a valid means of knowledge is that which is not contradicted and which leads to the attainment of the object revealed by the apprehension, and they accept only two *pramāṇa*,
i.e., perception and inference.

It may be noted that Jayanta's argument over Mīmāṃsakas is, though the succession of cognition is not the knowledge of the new object, yet it is valid knowledge and his assertain is that the Bhāttas definition of the pramāṇa is too narrow.

On the Buddhists view, he pointed that their definition of pramāṇa is absolutely unrealistic; since, it is too narrow to cover all cases of valid knowledge.

On Jayanta's theory of perception it may be observed that it is mainly based upon the exposition of Gautama's sūtra dealing with the nature of perception. Jayanta, however hints at certain points which are basically his own innovations. It may be observed that, Jayanta categorically states that the etymological sense of the term pratyakṣa does not convey the original meaning, and he differentiates between pratyakṣa as pramāṇa and pratyakṣa as pramiti by supplying an additional word "yataḥ" to the Gautama's aphorism.

While interpreting the aphorism of Gautama, Jayanta has recorded as many as six alternative explanations of the term avyapadesya.

It may be noted that Jayanta enjoys the credit of bringing to light a good number of view of the long forgotten logicians.
It must be noted that Jayanta's most striking contribution to the theory of perception is to be found in his exposition of the determinate cognition, (Savikalpa pratyaksa) Jayanta's observation on the Yogaja pratyaksa in his NM are only related to his assessment of the Māṁsā view on the viability of the yogic assertion of dharma, and who do not accept the yogaja pratyaya whereas the Naiyāyikas maintain the Yogaja pratyaksa is the third kind of perception, and it belongs to Yogs only.

It is also noteworthy that, Jayanta has introduced the pratibhā pramāna i.e. Foresight perception which reveals a future object.

Jayanta has played a remarkable role in the development of the theory of anumāna so far as of the old school is concerned. Though he did not mention the definition of anumāna according to Māṁsakas, he explained the ascertain of vyāpti, according to them. It is also worthy to notice that Jayanta has discussed elaborately the theory of anumāna according to the Buddhists, i.e. Niyama is one of conditions of inference. The Buddhists maintain there characteristic features of inference namely, spaksa, vipaksa and the paksa. Jayanta did not mention any criticism against the Bhātta theory of anumāna, and vyāpti, since the latter Bhāttas influenced by the Naiyāyikas. However he was vehemently criticised the Prābhākaras view.

While he refutes the Buddhists view of anumāna, he points
out that, in the case of identity, the probans and the probandum cannot be refuted as 'the indicator' and 'the indicated', and he, sarcastically remarks that if the 'probands' and the 'probandum' are identical, anumāna should be possible in both the ways, i.e. each being identical with other. He also refuted the Buddhists view of the threefold-characteristic: features of hetu, which is dead against of the Naiyāyikas fivefold characteristic features.

Having introducing and refuting the view of the Mīmāṁsakas and the Buddhists, Jayanta records the Gautama's NS. On this he observed that the nature of anumāna remains unexplained in the sūtra and it simply indicates that the inference 'depends on perception' admits of three kinds i.e. pūrvavat, sesavat, and sāmānyatadrsta.

Vātsyāyana introduces the sambandhanirdesa of liṅga and liṅgin in the sphere of anumāna. Uddyotakara presented various explanations of the word trividham. Jayanta has given his own explanation of the terms, pūrvavat, sesavat, and sāmānyatadrsta in the alternative ways. It is observed that Jayanta admits the terms sesavat and sāmānyatadrsta as closely related, but he also contends that the principle involved in each case is different, the examples might be similar.

Jayanta interprets the word "pūrvavat" in the tripartite division of inference i.e. taking "vat" in "pūrvavat" etc., as the remainder of the suffix "vati" and holding that it is the universal concomitance between the reason and the reason
and the consequence which is responsible for the establishment of one by another. Therefore whenever one discovers the universal relation of concomitance holding between the reason and the consequence on the basis of our previous perception of the same homogeneous reason, with the same homogeneous consequence, the inference operates.

Jayanta interprets "Sesavat" in two ways:

It is merely a verbal statement that a cause is inferred from its effect, but in reality the up-country which has heavy shower of rain, which is inferred from the abnormal swelling of the river, or a particular country may be the subject of inference, instead of the river holding that this country is in contact with another country which has heavy-shower because it has rivers with swollen stream.

"vat" as the remainder of the suffix "vati" propounding that the conclusion in this inference is arrived at through the method of elimination.

Commenting on the Vātsyāyana's interpretation of the term sāmānyatodrsta Jayanta remarks: The example for sāmānyodrsta given by Vātsyāyana is not sound i.e. "sun has motion" because, reaching different places due to motion actually illustrates the inference of cause from its effect, it is rather an example of "sesavad".

According to Jayanta the meaning of "sāmānyotodrsta"
is that when we infer the consequence from the reason which is neither a cause nor an effect.

The alternative interpretation of this term given by Jayanta is that, when we infer the imperceptual object on the basis of concomitance between the universal of the antecedent and the universal of the consequent, that is called sāmānyatodrsta anumāna; for instance, we infer the existences of the organ of hearing from that of auditory perception.

Though the Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṁsakas and the Advaita Vedāntins have accepted upamāna as a distinct source of valid knowledge. Still there are divergent views among them, with regard to the definition and process. Jayanta brings out the main conflict between the Mīmāṁsakas and the Naiyāyikas to the forefront. It is mainly his account of upamāna which decides once for all the demarcation lines between the Nyāya and the Mīmāṁsā view of upamāna.

Jayanta begins his discussion with the introduction of the views of Bhattas, and Prabhākaras, and observed that, though in the cases of pratyaksa, anumāna, śabda, arthāpatti, and anupalabdhi the Mīmāṁsakas have defined the results, in the case of upamāna they choose to define the means. (pramāṇa). The Mīmāṁsakas might have been conscious of the difference between upamāna and upamiti, and observed that in their definitions of the pramāṇas the subject is sometimes the result.
It is noteworthy that according to the Naiyāyikas upamāna serves as an instrument of identification, whereas according to the Mīmāṃsakas it as an aid to make up deficiency of descriptive detail in the substitution of one thing for another, since they include it in one or the other means of knowledge.

Jayanta vehmently rejects the Mīmāṃsakas view. He asks: how does a citizen remember only the cow and not a horse or an elephant seeing a gavaya. And further he states that, the Mīmāṃsakas upamiti is nothing but a remembrance.

After refuting the Mīmāṃsā view of upamāna, Jayanta has given the definition, according to his predecessors and contemporaries, and he proves beyond that upamāna is a distinct way of ascertaining the signification holding between a name and the object denoted by it.

According to Vātsyāyana "upamāna" is the knowledge of an unknown object by means of its resemblance to a known object. But he used the term, "sāmānya" in the place of "sādharmya" and whereas Gautama defines upamāna as the means of knowledge and states nothing about the result of upamāna, but Vātsyāyana gives a clear cut exposition of upamiti as well.

According to Uddyotakara, the compound "prasiddha sādharmya as "prasiddham sādharmyam" or prasiddhena vā sādharmyam yasya" qualifies the term gavaya i.e., the relation of denotation of a word and its meaning is upamāna. He further states that the
element of "vaidharmya as a basis of upamāna in addition to "sādharanny" and he justifies his thesis by pointing out that the term "sādharannya" in the sūtra is symbolic and it comprehends vaidharmya as well.

Jayanta's contribution to the theory may be noticed in his remarks that the instruction given by a reliable person plays only a second part, since, the words help only in pointing out the efficiency of the perception of similarity; the statement here is not the immediate cause but only a pointer to another cause i.e., perception of similarity.

It may be observed that Jayanta does not oppose the Mīmāṃsakas for the sake of argument. Rather, gives a fair exposition of their views. For, example, he takes Kumārila's exposition as the prima-facie view of the Mīmāṃsa system. He neither leaves out nor adds any point in explaining their tenet.

And it may be also noticed that Jayanta supports Gautama and Vātsyayana against the Mīmāṃsakas and gives due importance to the views of his contemporaries. Thus it may be mentioned that, Jayanta's definition of upamāna is the sensuous perception of a resemblance which results in the cognition of the relation between the term and the object denoted by it. And almost the latter Naiyayikas followed Jayanta in their account of upamāna. i.e. Samjñā saîjñi sambandhajñānam.

Jayanta has discussed in detail the problem and the nature
of the verbal testimony. He justifies the acceptance of śabda as a distinct means of valid knowledge and opines that without the inclusion of the term 'āpta' in the definition, it will become too wide, since, in that case it would apply to a word which does not produce the true knowledge. Similarly, for the term upadesa he refers to the view that to delineate the nature of śabda and to make the definition self sufficient and perfect one has to borrow the words, jñāna, artha, vyavasāyātmaka and avyapadesya from the sūtra which contains the definition of perception, therefore his suggestion of the inclusion of these words in the definition of verbal knowledge on the same grounds on which these have been incorporated in his definition of perception, is worth noting.

Jayanta's etimological meaning of the term upadesa is also superup, and he notes that it is a fact that to be aware of an object is to know it, still, to be perceived, intend and to be denoted, are not synonymous with one another and it is the term upadesa which differentiates śabda from the remaining means of knowledge.

Regarding the term āpta Jayanta quotes Vātsyāyana and states that, the terms, cikyāpayisa viz. intention to impart and upadestā viz. the teacher, in the Bhāsya have special significans. The first term signifies that, a person who is not partially disposed is āpta and the second term signifies that he should be efficient in the art of teaching, i.e. he who
does not have any of these qualifications cannot be a teacher. His further states: if the term āpta is not included then tradi-
tion (aitihya) would not be distinct from verbal testimony.

His arguments for proving "the relation between word and its meaning is conventional", are vital. The criticism of the Buddhists hypothesis of apoha, asserting that the words denote real objects which are not mere negation of their opposits, are significant. His views on Prāmānyavāda are also original, and he is very perfect in presenting 'self validity' (svatah prāmānya) of Mīmamsakās. He is of the view that truth or falsehood applies only to a judgement and that there is no contradiction in nature.

It is also noteworthy that, Jayanta has discussed the anvitābhiṣhānavāda of Prābhākaras, and abhīhitānyavāda of Bhāttas in their own view without any bias...Jayanta has also recorded the Buddhists view. i.e., the verbal knowledge is inferential, since it is known to be valid if it is in agreement with the undoubtable and unquestionably true of a reliable person. But Jayanta refuted their view and stated that, it is not fair to hold that if the validity of verbal knowledge is notestabli-
shed, then such knowledge merely refers to an imaginary object, since it is universally experienced that words produce the knowledge of objects.

Jayanta has given an exhaustive treatment to the concept and account of Arthāpatī. His presentation of the Mīmāṃsa
views is perfectly impartial, and his refutation also is not based on the twining of facts.

He begins his discussion with the introduction of the Bhatta interpretation of śabara's statement, that whenever a fact known to us or learnt from a verbal source seems to be apparently absurd and requires the assumption of some other fact to explain it, it is called arthāpatti. This definition of arthāpatti is held by Jayanta as the prima-facie view of the Mīmāṃsakas.

It may be noticed that Jayanta has nothing to remark against śabara whereas he ruthlessly takes his followers to task. It is a fact that Jayanta was aware of the divergent interpretations of śabara's statement by Kumōrila and Prabhākara.

It has already been stated that the Bhattas accepted arthāpatti as a distinct source of valid knowledge, but Jayanta rejects their tenet stating that it is not different from inference. Jayanta further states that, even if we accept it for the sake of argument, it will lead to regress us and infirritum.

Jayanta is of the view that Prabhākara's standpoint that the sequence of the gamaka and the gamya i.e., the implicans and the implicate, in inference, is different from the sequence of the gamaka and gamya in arthāpatti, is not based upon sound judgement.
It is also noteworthy that, according to Jayanta the śrutārthāpatti is simply absurd; because, the meaning of the implicit part of a sentence could be easily inferred from the meaning of the existing part.

As we can see Jayanta's contribution rests mainly in the fact that he has presented the problem in all its details, from the point of view of his own system. It may be observed that Jayanta's exposition of arthāpatti is remarkable, because it sets at rest the controversy over the various side-issues of the problem and tries to prove the superiority of the Nyāya position over that of the Mīmāṃsā.

It is a fact that the ontological foundation of Jayanta's views on abhāva were already there before him still it is Jayanta who has the credit of defining abhāva for the first time from the epistemological point of view. He has also the credit of stating that it is not devoid of all causal efficiency but is capable of producing consciousness. Jayanta Bhatta has discussed elaborately the Bhāttas, Prabhākaras, and the Buddhist views on abhāva and refuted them as well.

In the classification of abhāva Jayanta followed Gautama and Vātsyāyana strictly and described mutual absence and constant absence as mere varieties of prāg-abhāva. He also mentioned two further varieties of absence apeksabhāva, and sāmāthyabhāva of which the former he said, was a variety of prior absence, and the latter might be assumed sometimes under destruction. He
tries to reduce all types abhāva into prāg-abhāva and dhvamsabhāva.

It may be also observed that Jayanta is of the view that abhāva is that which is referred to by a negative judgement, expressed by the negative proposition containing the particle "nañ". Abhāva is a distinct objective reality which is not included in the cognition of any other thing or which cannot be identified with any other thing. The cognition of Abhāva cannot arise from existence. Though abhāva is a distinct type of knowledge object, yet it is simply capable of being cognized through the method of perception and therefore, there is no need of accepting anupalabdhi as a distinct way of knowing. Finally, it should be noticed that, normally the Naiyāyikas argue this topic against the prabhākaras, but it is Jayanta alone who cited the Buddhists arguments, against the reality of Anupalabdhi (asmabhistu bhāvavadabhāvah api jñānajanasamartaka isyate).

While commenting on the momentariness of Buddhists he states that the distinction between vicious and harmless infinities was known to the Indians at least as early as the sixth or the seventh century A.D., and he quotes a passage which differentiates the two clearly.

"Mūlaksatikarīmānuḥ anavasthaṁ hi dūsanam
mūlasiddhau tvarucyā'pi nānavasthānivāryate. NM. pt.II.p

With regard to the view of the Mīmāṁsaka that sakti is a distinct category Jayanta's preference goes in favour of his
predecessors. He alike the Naiyayikas maintain that śakti is not a distinct padartha but included in causal factor. His contribution and view is briefed by him self in the following couplet.

svarūpādbhavatkāryam sahakāryupābrmhitām /
na hi katpayitum śaktam śaktim anyām atindriyām NM pt.I.p.61

Jayanta's view on sāmānya and samavāya is similar to the Naiyāyikas. The significant contribution of Jayanta in this regard is his refutation of the Buddhists arguments against the acceptance of samavāya and sāmānyā.

Jayanta has ably and aptly refuted their arguments and has established that both samavāya and sāmānyā are to be accepted.

He has also thoroughly criticised the Bhāttas view on samavāya. His logic in favour of samavāya is unique, which may be quoted:

pratitibhedāt bhedo'sti desabhedas tu nesyate
tenātra kriyate vṛttih samavāya prakīrtitah NM. pt. II.p.23.

So far the shortcomings, are concerned we are very fortunate to have very little to point out. In some cases Jayanta has left Prābhākaras unnoticed, which may be considered as his weak point. By Mīmāṃsakas he primarily means Kumārila, whom he quotes by repeating the actual words.

It is noticed that Jayanta defends Vātsyāyana's view against his opponents by hook or crook.