CHAPTER VI

JAYANTA'S CONTRIBUTION AND HIS OWN TREATMENT OF THE CONCEPTS
VI.0.1. Jayanta's conception of Pramāṇa

Prof. V.N. Jha in his studies in Language, Logic and Epistemology, has present an excellent exposition of Jayanta Bhatta's concept of Pramāṇa. We present here a reappraisal of without any comment: He starts with recording the view of the old logicians. The knower gains the knowledge of an object to be known through some means. Here, the knower is the pramātā, and object to be known is prameya, the knowledge is pramiti.

Sūtrakāra Gautama deals with Pramāṇas specific varieties, and their functions, but does not define it. He has given clue to know it very easily from the expression sādhyasādhanam mentioned in the definition of upamāṇa. That a pramāṇa which produces the knowledge of the sādhya may be either of the four namely perception, inference, composition, and verbal Testimony.

According to Bhāsyakara the definition of pramāṇa is the instrument of knowledge. From this we can know that by which we get knowledge of particular object is pramāṇa.
According Uddyotakara pramāna is called the cause of knowledge, which is not accepted by Vācaspati mīśra, to avoid the samaskāra as a pramāna. According to Vācaspati mīśra the definition of pramāna is pramākaraṇam (pramānam), Ujñāna the author of Nyāya Parisuddhi also has given the same explanation of pramāṇa. And almost all naiyāyikas have followed Vācaspati mīśra.

Jayanta Bhatta a poet-Naiyāyika states in his Nyāya mañjari the definition of pramāṇa as follows: "a collection of factors which is both, of the nature of knowledge and of the nature of non-knowledge, and which caused the knowledge of an object and which must be correct and undoubtful is pramāṇa."

Thus, for savikalpaka knowledge of an object, the factors are the eyes, the object, the soul, the mind, the contact of eyes with the object and the nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is of the nature of knowledge, the rest of is of non-knowledge. In the same way, we can easily understand the factors involved in the case of inferential, analogical and verbal knowledges are of the nature of the knowledge as well as non-knowledge.

Thus a collection of factors which produces undoubtful and valid knowledge is called a pramāṇa.
Jayanta has recorded several objections to his theory of pramāṇa.

Since collection (sāmagrī) is a single entity and since except this there can be no other instrument of knowledge, how to apply the definition karaṇakāraka here? and how it is called most essential instrument?8

For this Jayanta's answer is that they do not understand properly the implication of his thesis.

In the Panini sūtra, sādhaka tasnam karaṇam, the meaning of tamaṇ can be applicable only to the collection of factors, that produces the result and not any individual factore.9 and further he says that if pramāṇa is present, the object (prameya) is present, the eyes are functioning and all other factors are present, then this collection of factors definitely produces the perceptual knowledge of that object.

Therefore, No individual kāraka can claim of excellency, whereas sāmagrī can claim of excellency. So, sāmagrī is pramāṇa.10

With reference to what object the pramāṇa should be operated, as the collection includes all the factors involved in the production of knowledge, Therefore if a
pramāṇa does not have any kind of prameya for its operation, then how can we call it as a pramāṇa?  

It is argued further that, if the agent is also included in the sāmagrī then there will be no knower, (Pramātā). And also it shows the direct contradiction with the Bhāṣya. Because, it is stated that Pramātā pramāṇāni, prameyaṁ, pramitiriti ca tarṣu vidhāsu tat tvam parisamāpyate. 

For these objections Jayanta simply replies that sāmagrī is pramāṇa means, sāmagrī comes into existence, that's all. It never gives the sense that individual kārakas remains intact and so there remain the pramātā and the prameya. So, the pramāṇa can be operated to that object. 

Therefore the collection of factors produces the knowledge, Once it is produced the person is called pramātā (knower) and the object prameya. In this manner the statement of Bhāṣya is also not contradicted. 

Here the opponent puts one more objection: whether the collection is different from the elements of collection or the same. If it is different from the elements of collection, then how it is not realised separately. If it is same, then there will only one kāraka left i.e., karanakāraka .
and also nothing can be called kartā or kārama.¹⁷

Jayanta answers that, if there is the presence of all factors, then we get the knowledge of collection, if not, or they are divided, we do not get the knowledge of collection, i.e. anvayavyatirekabhyam jñā nam jāyate. These factors may be called Samudāya or sāmagrī and the elements are called samudāyins. Therefore, there is no doubt of vanishing of all the karanas, other than the Karanakāraka.¹⁸

Now the opponent may raise the question: How is it that the people also do not think using instrumental case-ending after the word sāmagrī if it is a pramāṇa.¹⁹ But they think and do use instrumental case-ending after caksus dīpa etc.²⁰ But no one says that sāmagrāḥ pasyāmah. Therefore sāmagrī pramānam is absolutely wrong.²¹

Jayanta gives answer for this that, what is the meaning of sāmagrī. i.e. Except this the word sāmagrī should not be used elsewhere in the different manner. Therefore, it is not correct to do use sāmagryā pasyāmah.²¹

So, if sāmagrī is taken as the means of valid knowledge, no one can raise objection. How we can not find sāmagrī
superimposed on the adhikaranakāraka of Sthālyam pacati, likewise the usage dipenapasyāmaḥ etc., are.22

Hereafter Jayanta is quoting the opinion of some other philosophers.23 That is a kāraka other than a kātr-kāraka and karmakāraka can be called karanam i.e. pramanam if it produces a correct and class knowledge.24 Then the people do use instrumental case ending, as in dipena pasyami, caksusā nirikse etc.25

Now Jayanta questions the opponents, that as per your view there should be only these kārakas in all, which is not correct.26

The answer of this question is that, in the case of production of knowledge of an object, it is correct. But in the case of other actions like pāka etc., however, while a person thinks over the different help rendered by different factors, namely the abode of action, rice etc., One has to justify the usages of adhikarana etc. The mind, the lamp and the eyes are to be taken only as karana-kārakas, as they do not have difference in the case of the production of knowledge.27

Jayanta further asks them that among the three kārakas which has to be taken as the most essential factor.28 (sādhakatama).
They answer that it seems the people always add instrumental case-ending to words like dipa, manas, caksus etc. Therefore we can take this discrimination (vailaksanyam) by people as their excellence. And also there is no contradiction with the statement of NB where it is stated that pramānam pramātā, pramayam, pramitiriti caturvargenaiva vyavahārah parisamāpyate. Therefore a kāraka other than the kartā and the karman is called pramāna if it produces a real and clear knowledge.

As the last sentence of this discussion in NM contains again the word sāmagrī creates a problem. Professor Jha has rightly pointed out that the great scholars like J.V. Bhattacharya did not understand it properly, because he has taken this sentence as the concluding remark of Jayanta Bhatta himself which is totally wrong, if we understand it correctly. In fact having kept his view first, then Jayanta cleared the objections created by the opponents. After that aparetu forms also the part of the opponents theory only, because it contains the word kartrkarmavilaksana which is dead against the theory of Jayanta Bhatta, as he has not excluded and kāraka to form his sāmagrī.

The granthibhanga of Cakradhara, the only authoritative commentary on NM published so far, says that, "sāmagrī sabdah
Therefore, no contradiction of upakrama and upasamhāra and sāmagrī means samagrapradhāna i.e. janaka or kāraka.

It may be observed here that the later logicians have followed vācaspati Miśras definition of pramāṇa, namely, pramā karanaṃ pramāṇam.

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Notes and References


2. sa yena arthaṁ pramīnoti tat pramānām. Ibid., Introduction, 1.1.1.


4. smṛthiśeṣo api prāmāṇyaprāsaṅgah. Ibid, p. 35.

5.avyabhicārinīṁ asandigdhāṁ arthopalabdhiṁ vidadhathī bodhābodhasvabhāvā sāmagrī

6. Here Dr. V.N. Jha points out that Sri K.S. Varādācārya has wrongly interpreted in his tippani of own edition of Nyāyamaṇjarī. See "Studies in Language Logic and Epistemology. p. 34, F. No., 8a.


5. sāmagrīśa ekatvāt tadatiriktasādha-kāntarānupalambhāṁ kimapeksamasyāṁ
atīśayam brūmāh, Ibid. 

9. yata eva sādhatamaṁ karanam, karana. sādhanaśca pramāṇāsabdah, tata eva sāmagryāṁ pramāṇatvaṁ yuktām. Ibid. p.21
10. tadvyatirakena kārakāntare kvacidapi tamabartha, 
   saṃsparsānupapateḥ, Ibid. p. 21

11. nirālambanaśca idānim sarvapramitayo 
   bhaveyuh, ālambanakārakasya caksurādivat 
   pramānāntah pātītvāt, Ibid. p. 20.

12. kasca sāmagryā prameyam pramīmite? 
   pramātapi tasyām eva linah. Ibid. p. 21

13. Ibid. p. 21

14. kārakānām dharmaḥ sāmagrī na svarūpahānāya teṣām 
    kalpate, sākalyadasāyām api tatsvarūpa 
    pratyabhijñānaḥ, Ibid. p. 22

15. sākalyaprasādalabdhapramitisāmbandhanibandhanah 
    pramātprameyayor mukhyasvarūpalābhah, Ibid. p. 22.

16. samagrebhyah sāmagrībhinnā cet kathām 
    prthag no paralabhaye? Ibid. p. 22.

17. abhede tu sarvakārakāni karaniḥbutānyeva iti 
    kartikarmavyakaroccheda prasangah 
    Ibid. p. 22.

13. samudāyinām sāmagryavasthāyāmapi svarūpānāpāyāt 
    samudāyi visese karani sāmagrī karnām, atā eva na 
    pramiteḥ nirālambanatvam etena pramātā prthagupa 
    darsita iti vidhācatustayamapi samāhitam. Ibid. p. 22.

19. na ca loko'pi sāmagryah karanabhāvam anumamyaḥ 
    tasyām karanavibhaktim aprayuñjianah naḥi evam 
    vaktāro bhavanti laukikāḥ "sāmagryā pāsyāmah iti. 
    Ibid. p. 21
20. kintu dipanapasyāmah, caksusā nirīksāma iti, Ibid. p.21.
21. sāmagri hi saṁhatiḥ sa hi saṁhanyamāṇa
vyutirekana na vyavahārapadaviṃ avatarati. Ibid. p.22.
22. yastu dipendriyānāṁ tritīyānirdeśāḥ sa phalopajana
nāvinābhāvisvabhāvatvākhyasāmagri sārūpāsāmā
ropananibandhanah. anyatṛpi ca tadrūpa
samāropene sthālyam pacatīti vyapadesā
drṣyate eve. Ibid, p. 23.
23. apare punarācaksate, Ibid. p.23.
24. tasmāt kartrkarmavyatiriktāṁ avyabhicārādīvīsesnakārthā
pramājanakāṁ kārakāṁ karanāṁ ucyate, Ibid. p.23.
25. Ibid. p.23.
27. pākādikriyāsu kriyāśrasyaṅdhāraṅḍyapakarabhedapar-
yālocanayā bhavatu adhikaraṅḍikāra
kāntaravyavāhārah. Ibid, p. 23.
29. soayāṁ esāṁ paśyati kartrkarmavilaksanyāṁ
caksurādīnāṁ tadvālsanyameva ca tesāṁ
atisayah iti. Ibid. p. 23.
30. Ibid. p.23.
31. Ibid, p.23, tasmāt kartrkarmavilaksanā saṁśaya
viparyayarahitārthāvabodha vidhāyini bodhābodha-
svabhāvā sāmagri pramānamiti yuktaṁ. Ibid, p.23.
32. His translation is as follows: "Therefore, we arrive at the final complete definition of a proof of true knowledge that is the collection of all conditions other than a subject and an object partaking of the nature of consciousness and unconsciousness and productive of the knowledge of an object other than an error or a doubt, is the instrumental cause of true knowledge".


VI. 0.2. The classification of means of knowledge (pramāṇa)

According to Indian Philosophy, there are divergent views on the number of means of valid knowledge. (Pramāṇa) On the whole eight pramāṇas are accepted. At one extreme there are the cārvākas¹ who recognise only one pramāṇa, viz. perception (pratyakṣa), while at the other extreme we have the purāṇikās² who accept as many as eight pramāṇas. viz: pratyakṣya, anumāṇa, sābdā, upamāṇa, arthāpatti, amupalabdhi, sambhava and aitihya.

The vaiśeṣikas, the Buddhists, and Jainas³ accepted first two pramāṇas. The sāmkhyas and yogins accepted first three pramāṇas.⁴ The Naiyāyikas⁵ accept the first four pramāṇas, mainly, perception, inferences comparison, and verbal-testimani.

The prābhākaras⁶ accept the first five pramāṇas.

Bhaṭṭas and Vedāntins accept the first six pramāṇas.⁷

Let us see the Jayanta's view on the classification of the means of knowledge. Being a stanch follower of Old Nyāya and a true supporter of Gautama and Vatsyāyana, Jayanta professes for four pramāṇas. At the same time, he is perfectly judicious in presenting the view of his
opponents on other pramāṇas. He is perhaps the first and
the last logician who has given serious thought to this
problem. He deals with arthāpatti, abhāva, sambhava and
āthiha which are accepted by Prabhākara, Bhāṭṭa, Vedāntin,
and Paurāṇika, in the form of separate chapters, possibly
with a desire not to reject anything except when it proves
redundant on a clear-cut-examination of all the relevent
factors. He, however, seems primarily pre-occupied with his
desire to refute the Buddhists position and to bring home
to them that the Nyāya view of four pramāṇas is unchallengeable.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa mentions that though the author of the
Nyāya sūtra has not indicated the number of pramāṇas, yet
as he mentioned only four means in his aphorism, so,
obviously he accepts no less than no more than four pramāṇas.

Gautama according to Jayanta, has performed two
functions by a single sūtra, the division of pramāṇa and its
definition. Jayanta stated that it is not necessary that
a sūtra should serve a single purpose of expressing only one
meaning. It is rather the marked the quality of ability
of the sūtras that they yield more than one meaning. As such
there cannot be any dispute that Gautama accepts only four
pramāṇas. Thus it matters little whether he has counted
them or not.
Jayanta has analysed and criticised his opponents, like mīmāṃsakas, Paurāṇikas, views who have accepted more than four pramāṇas.
Notes and References

1. pratyaksamakeva pramāṇam iti cārvākāḥ āhuh. NK. p. 554.
2. sambhavaithye api atirikte pramāṇe iti paurānikāḥ āhuh. NK. p. 556.
3. a. pratyaksamanumānam Ceti dye pramāṇe iti kanādapradhānāḥ vaisesikāḥ manyante. Ibid. p. 554.
   b. pratyaksamanumānam ceti pramāṇadvayameveti bauddhāḥ ārhatāsca maṇyahte. Ibid. p. 555.
4. pratyaksamanumānam āptavacanamiti trīṇī pramāṇāni iti sāṅkhyaḥ yoginah. Ibid. p. 556.
   cf. pratyaksānumāsamagamāḥ pramāṇī. ys. I.7.
5. pratyaksānumānopamanaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni. NS. 1.1.3.
6. pratyaksānumānopamanaśabdāḥ arthāpattisuti paṁca pramāṇāni iti prabhākarāḥ. NK. p. 556.
7. pratyaksānumānopamanaśabdāḥ arthāpattiranupalabdhi ceti sat pramāṇāni ityapare Bhāttāḥ vedaṇṭibhedāscāhuh. NK. p. 556.
8. NS. 1.1.3.
VI. 0.3. Refutation of pramāṇa-vyavasthā:

The pramāṇa vyavasthā namely, one to one correspondence in the case of means of valid knowledge and the respective objects as propounded by the Buddhist is criticised by Jayanta in favour of pramāṇa samplava. Jayanta, against the Buddhists view, points out that each pramāṇa exclusively functions in his own sphere, and if this is accepted, inference cannot be valid means of knowledge. For an inferential cognition is based on both perception and inference. Here two pramānas function with a view to making known a single object. The characteristic feature (liṅga) indicates the probandum when the two are known to be invariably associated.

The knowledge of their relation is preceded by a knowledge of the relata is supposed to be derived from the same inference. This would amount to the fault of mutual dependencey.

Further Jayanta states that it cannot be derived from another inference, because, that leads to the fault of infinite regress. Therefore, it is perception, by means of which we come to know the probans and the probandum as
also the vyāpti and thus it is proved that inference also presupposes pramāṇa samplava.\(^5\)

The acceptance of inference presupposes the acceptance of mutual overlapping of the means of valid knowledge or the Buddhists may give up the idea of the inference and accept only one pramāṇa, namely, pratyakṣa, as does the lokāyatas.

Similarly, in the actual inference, the knowledge that the smoke is present in the subject, is also derived from perception, therefore there is also samplava. Those who do not deny samplava\(^6\) cannot do so unless they deny inference itself. The assumption that there are only two types of the objects of knowledge can be proved only when inference and perception function together.\(^7\)

An object becomes directly perceptible or indirectly cognisable according to the situation and place. An object which can directly known in one time, or place, may be known only indirectly by a person belonging to a different time or place.\(^8\)

The Buddhist argue against the application of the proofs on the ground that an assumption like this contradicts
other assumptions and is redundant. To this Jayanta points out that the definition of pramāṇa as "anadhigātārthagantr" being rejected, the fault does not arise at all. And we do not even find any contradiction in it. While a proof comes into being, it does not cancel any antecedent judgement like the negative judgement that this is not silves.

As for the doubt that the object of different pramāṇas being the same, they will give rise to similar cognitions, Jayanta brings to notice the argument that in spite of the common object the cognitions differ on as much as their means differ.

Therefore Jayanta concludes that the denial of samplāva, in the majority of cases of proofs apply to all objects, but there are few cases in which a particular proof has an exclusive objects of its own.

To conclude, Jayanta has no objection for pramāṇa vyavasthā so far as a specific objects are concerned. But, it cannot be common to one and all objects.

In most of the case pramāṇaviplāva will operate, without any difficulty.
Notes and References

1. asati sampave anumānaprāmānya

2. na hi avijñātasambandama lingam gamakamisyate,
   sambhandhadhisca sambhandhidvaya vagatipūrvikā. Ibid. p.48.

3. sāmānyātmaka sambandhi grhāṇīcānunānataḥ tasmādeva
   yadyate vyaktamanyonya sāmsrayaḥ. Ibid. p.48.

4. anumānīntarādhīnā sambandhi grhapūrvikā sambandha-
   -dhigatirṇaḥ syāt manvantarasatairapi. Ibid. p.49.

5. tena dušre'pi sambhandhagrāhakaṃ lingalinginoḥ pratyaksa-
   mupagantavyaṃ tathā sati ca samplavah. Ibid. p.49.


7. visayadvaividhyasiddhāvapi pratyaksānumāna eva
   parasparamapi sampalvayeśām. Ibid. p. 56.

8. pratyaksatvaṃ parakṣo'pi pratyakṣo'pi paroksatām.
   desakālādibhedena visayahpratipadyate. Ibid. p.50.

cf. pramānena, pramānābhyaṃ, pramānāḥ iti
   sampalvo gamyate. NV. p.12.


10. vaiphalyāṃ anadhigatārthagrantva viśesanādi-
    væranenaiva pratisamāhitam. Ibid. p. 51.

11. virodhe'pi nāsti pūrvajñānopama mardena nedaṃ
    rajatamitvat uttara vijnānanutpādāt. Ibid. p. 51.

12. visaya sāmye'pi upāyabhedāt pratītibheda bhavyevya.
    Ibid. p. 51.

13. tasmāt sthitamet prāyen prāmnī prameyam abhisampsam
    va-te, kvacittu prneye vyavatisthante api iti. Ibid. p.52.

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VI. 1.1. Jayanta Theory of Perception:

It is a fact that in the history of Indian Philosophy i.e. in both epistemology and metaphysics, Nyāya sūtras occupy a very unique place, and the definition of perception of Gautama is the root cause of all logical and philosophical discussions. Jayanta has re-emphasised the Gautama's view on perception as expounded by vātsyāyana. The term "pratyakṣa" consists of two parts, "prati" means before or near or related to, and "aksa" means sense-organ eye, which conjointly, mean immediate knowledge or the cause of immediate knowledge. This may be translated in English as "perception".

In this context, at first let us examine the view of Gautama.

According to Gautama the definition perception is that a cognition resulting from sense-object contact which is inexpressible by words, which is not erroneous, and is determinate i.e. definite in character. Thus, the definition means that pratyakṣa prāmāṇa is that from which arises the knowledge that is based upon sense subject-contact.

In this connection Jayanta opines that if we supply a word yatah to the Gautama's aphorism, it will certainly
afford a faultless definition.\textsuperscript{2} Therefore the means of direct awareness, is that which is the source of such consciousness as has been specified by the above mentioned adjectives.\textsuperscript{3} Thus the definition of perception is neither too wide nor too narrow,\textsuperscript{4} and also we are not to twist the words of the sūtra to make out the real sense of it.\textsuperscript{5}

Let us analyse the meaning of the terms contained in the aphorism.

\textit{Indriyārtha sannikarsa:}

According to Gautama \textit{pratyakṣa} is brought about by the sense object contact, i.e. it has been depicted by him as the cause behind perception.\textsuperscript{6}

Vatsyāyana maintains that in every perceptual situation the self writes with the mind, the mind with the sense and the sense with the object,\textsuperscript{7} which is obviously, intended by Gautama.

He further states that the apprehension of pleasure by the soul are also the cases of perception. The mind is regarded by him as a sense-organ, though unlike other sense-organs, it is non-material and devoid of qualities and operates on all objects, without being confined to specific
Thus it may be understood that according to Vātsyāyana, the sense object contact is a necessary condition for all kinds of perception including the apprehension of pleasure by the soul.

According to Uddyotakara the definition of perception is that knowledge which is brought out by the sense-object contact. In this connection, as regards the term utpanna, Vācaspati states that it is indicative of the fact that the contact of the 'sense' with the 'object', is instrumental in bringing about perceptual knowledge.

According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, the way in which the sense-organisms come in contact with their objects is six-fold, i.e. smell, taste, sight, touch and hearing. Jayanta further states that, the existence of the sense-object contact is proved by the fact that the sense-organs cannot grasp the veiled objects. Therefore the sense object contact should be admitted. According to Jayanta the term utpanna in the sūtra implies that both the sense-organs and the objects, condition the perception of an object. The object is that which is perceived. That the object is causally connected with the act of perception, is proved by the fact that only the object in question is cognised.

Jayanta concludes that the term "utpanna" suggests that
the sense organs determine perception as its condition so that the object which is perceived also conditions its perception.\textsuperscript{15}

Jayanta maintains that the perception of an object, may be produced by four or three or two phases of contacts depending on individual case.\textsuperscript{16} Four phases of contact are required to produce perception, the perceptual cognition of the colour of an external object. The inner perception of internal phenomena, as per example, pleasure, pain etc., requires three contacts, for its perception,\textsuperscript{17} since external organs such as eyes, have no part to play in this case.

The transcendental perception of the soul by a sage requires only two contacts, because a third object, i.e., either a subject or an object does not exist besides the soul and the internal organs.

Jayanta further explains that the sūtra on perception does not include the contact of the soul with the internal organ in the list of causal factors of perception though it is one of its conditions, since such a contact is the common factor of all forms of consciousness and not a special condition of perception only.\textsuperscript{18} This is of course same as the view of his predecessors.
Avyapadesyam: According to Vatsyayana in this world, all objects are associated with the words or names. By the help of these words the objects are properly cognised. Whatever comes to the frame work of our knowledge is subjected to verbal expression. Our verbal behaviour depends on the fact that whatever is knowable is nameable. Therefore while our sense organs come in contact with the object colour or taste, our perceptual cognitions of the objects, say colour and tastes are known and it is communicated with the words colour and taste which stand as the name for the corresponding objects. As such type of knowledge arises due to the words naming, the object of the knowledge, one may doubt that the knowledge is due to words, and not a case of perception. Thus to remove this difficulty Gautama has used the word avyapadesa in the sutra. 19

Uddyotakara, supports the above mentioned view of Vatsyayana for he is silent on the meaning of this word.

Jayanta has recorded as many as six alternative explanations of the term avyapadesa. He begins the discussion quoting Vatsyayana as vrddha-Naiyayikas and his views on avyapadesya. He states that the perceptual knowledge which arises from the sense-object-contact and which is named after its object such as the knowledge of colour, taste etc., is
known as anyapadesya. Therefore, the term anyapadesya is used here to arise the idea that no knowledge which is expressed by words is perceptual. 20

Jayanta further maintains that, it may be understood that the knowledge which is verbally expressed, does not come under the area of perception though there is the involvement of sense object contact in the process of cognition. But it is also a valid knowledge. If it is not perception then under which category of valid knowledges it should be included. Do naiyayikas accept a fifth kind of valid knowledge? 21

According to Jayanta some scholars of the Nyāya school maintain that, an unknown person, say a child, perceives an object for the first time but does not know it definitely as to be a 'jack-fruit-tree' so he enquires to his elders what is it? He gets the reply that it is a jack-fruit-tree. After hearing the sentence of an expert the child learns the name and grasps the meaning relation between the name and the object and the sense perception at that particular time remains intact. Here the knowledge of the child consists of two significant aspects. i.e. his sense perception and the name involved in grasping the meaning relation for the first time. 22 This dual aspect of the knowledge is certainly a verbal knowledge as they call it, even if sense-perception is
involved here. So, for the removal of such a knowledge, from perception the term \textit{avyapades\'ya} has been employed there. This knowledge is not a separate category of valid knowledge. Therefore the anticipation of a fifth kind of knowledge does not hold good.\textsuperscript{23}

Jayanta further states that if it is asked to the child as to, how does he know something as 'jackfruit tree'? The reply is suddenly: it has been referred to, as such, by Devadatta.\textsuperscript{24} But he never says, that he has seen it with his own eyes that it is a jackfruit-tree. In this knowledge of the child the word element plays a major role of an instrumental cause. It may be noted that Gautama has not made any condition to exclude the operation of a sense-object-contact from the domain of verbal knowledge,\textsuperscript{25} rather he has made the provision that a verbal knowledge may involve a sensuous element.

In this connection Jayanta criticizes this view on the ground that the author of the \textit{Ny\'ayas\'utra} cannot be taken as a preacher of moral duty like \textit{manu} so as to facilitate us to think that the piece of knowledge in question is verbal.\textsuperscript{26}

Jayanta further states that, according to some other
logicians the term *avyapadesya* is given in the *sūtra* with a view to defending the definition of perception from the charge of defining as absurd subject.\(^{27}\)

In this connection Jayanta refers to Bhartrhari's theory that there is no knowledge in this universe which is not associated with words. If such is the contention of the grammarians, the definition of perception will become mere verbal one.\(^ {28}\) But Gautama clarifies their stand in this way that the consciousness of a person which is unaware of a word and its meaning and of their relation is not derived from words.\(^ {29}\)

Though the knowledge "this is Cow" results from the verbal knowledge still then at the initial stage the sense perception should be defined and that can be made possible by introducing the word *avyapadesya* in the *sūtra*.\(^ {30}\)

A third interpretation is quoted according to which the knowledge "this is cow" does not refer to the object, qualified by its name, rather to distinguish the *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* type of perception. For example when we hear the word *dandi purusah* i.e., a man having a stick in his hand, becomes our knowledge. If this consciousness were not a distinct one it would have been simply an awareness of a man whereas the fact is that a man and stick
are not present to our consciousness, as unrelated, because the stick qualifies the man i.e., the relation of the qualifying to the qualified governs this consciousness which arises from the knowledge of the term dandī purusah. But this view is untenable on the ground that the qualified which is qualified by the compound word qualities is the sole object of knowledge. Hence one cannot say the knowledge "this is a cow" is a verbal knowledge rather it is clear case of perceptual knowledge. Hence, the word avyapadesya has not been used in the "sūtra" to meet the change that it is impossible to define perception.32

Jayanta Bhatta further quotes that, according some other scholars of Nyāya schools the term avyapadesya is used in the sūtra to exclude ubhayaja jñāna from the range of perceptual cognition.

By ubhayaja jñāna one understands that kind of perceptual knowledge in which somebody can have (i) the sensory as well as (ii) the verbal knowledge. In other words, one can know the meaning-relation between a word and an object present before the sense. For example a child sees an object at the initial stage and asks his elders as to what was that. "It is a cow" is the answer, the child gets which the resultant knowledge of the child is a combination of sensory knowledge and verbal knowledge. So it is known as
ubhayaja jñāna and it has its source from the verbal knowledge.  

If such is the contention of the logicians, then the knowledge, i.e., this is cow which is required to communicate the object, cow is produced by the ubhayajñāna. The knowledge, "this is cow" is a determinate knowledge generated by the sense organ together with the memory of sentence. \( \text{(vyddhavākyā)} \). Here the difference between the ubhayaja jñāna and savikalpajñāna is that in the case of ubhayajñāna the vyddhavākyā, being the object of auditory perception as well as visual perception, is present before the speaker, whereas in the case of savikalpajñāna the elder is revived in the memory of the person who has grasped the word-meaning - relation to cognise the object. So, the word avyapadesya which excludes ubhayajñāna also prevents savikalpahajñāna from the range of perception. To this Jayanta observes that this way of interpretation is not in keeping with the view of the Naiyāyikas for they have declared savikalpaka perception as the life blood of their system. \( ^{35} \)

Jayanta further mentions that the perception at the time of saṃketagraha and the perception in the form of savikalpaka after saṃketagraha can be taken as savikalpaka perception only. \( ^{36} \) Thus, it is better to take recourse to the old Naiyāyika, Vātsyāyana who advocates that the word avyapadesya is included in the sūtra, to exclude the verbal expression from the range of perceptual cognition. \( ^{37} \)
After introducing and then criticizing above mentioned justifications for the inclusion of the epithet in the Gautama sūtra, Jayanta further adds that the word is meant for excluding the knowledge of savikalpaka only which is quite different from the verbal knowledge. Because the remembrance of words and its meaning plays an important role here. Though it acts as an auxiliary cause to the effect like a lamp to the eye, it does not necessarily enters to the body of an effect. But perceiving an object by the help of a lamp is not the same as perceiving the lamp.

Jayanta concludes, having examined various interpretations of the term by different kind of anonymous logicians that the author of the Nyāya-sūtra includes both determinate and indeterminate perception within sense-perception and by the term "avyapadesya" he refers to indeterminate perception. He, however, remarks that so many views have been presented here and the competent learner should make their own choice i.e. which appeal to their-minds.

The next epithet is the sūtra is avyabhicāri (non-erroneous). According to Vātsyāyana, during summer when our eyes come in contact with the sun-rays, the flickering of the sun rays along with the heat waves radiating from the hot surface of a desert appears as water. So in order to avoid this type of erroneous perception, avyabhicāri is used in the sūtra.
Uddyotakara, agrees with vātsyāyana and clarifies his statement that when perceiving the flickering rays of the sun as water, the object is not really erroneous, rather than the apprehension of it, is erroneous.41

Jayanta follows Vātsyāyana and states that the term avyabhicāri has been included in the sūtra to exclude erroneous perception from the domain of perception.42 For example, the perception of a mirage is erroneous, because what is presented to consciousness does not correspond to reality, later. Here one thing is mistaken for another and it is the epithet "avyabhicāri" in the sūtra which excludes any such possibility.

Jayanta objects to the hypothesis that, "indeterminate perception" has the sun-rays as its object but it causes such "determinate perception" of water it is erroneous.43

Jayanta further mentions that as taking the sun-rays for water is a case of error, so it is immaterial as to which stage or form of *perception" the mistake occurs.44 The term Vyavasāyātmaka has been mentioned in the sūtra to convey the sense of another perceptual cognition which is definite in character. Vātsyāyana opines that the word is employed in the sūtra to exclude the doubtful apprehensions like "is this smoke or is this dust? from the scope of
perception. 45

Uddyotakara advocates the view that the mind is distinct from other sense-organs for, it is connected with all sorts of apprehensions but the senses are only meant for the specific objects. The difference between the mind and the sense does not depend upon their being non-material or material as it is neither material nor non-material. 46

Jayanta employs the same i.e., vatsyāyana's view for the inclusion of the word in the sūtra. There is, however, difference in the examples which they supply to illustrate their standpoints. Jayanta states that the term Vyavasāyātmaka has been incorporated in the sūtra to exclude doubt from the range of perception. It is wrong to maintain that the characteristic 'sense object contact' is enough to achieve this purpose since doubt is grasped by the mind which is not an external sense organ. Jayanta maintains that a doubt expressed in the form, it is either a pole or a man" is produced by the external sense organ. 47 Doubt such as two astrologers conflicting predictions are, however, subjective since the inner sense organ is their sole cause.

In conclusion it may be said that Jayanta's theory of pratyaksa is mainly based upon his exposition of Gautama's śūtra dealing with the nature of perception, and his analysis of pratyaksa, thus, has a number of novel features and it deserves the attention of scholars.
Notes and References

   cf. NS. 1.1.4.

2. yatah śabdādhyāhāramātrena niravadya
laksanopavarnana samarthasūtra pada saṅgati

3. yata evām yadvisesanavisistam jñānākyam
phalām bhavati tatprayaksamiti
sūtrārthah. Ibid. p. 104.

4. na kvacit avyāptirativyāptirvā. Ibid. p.104.

5. na kācīt klistakalpanā. Ibid. p.104.

6. indriyasya arthena sannikarsāt. udpadyate
yat jñānam tat pratyaksam. NB. p.18. NS. 1.1.4.

7. ātmā manasā sāmyujyate, manah indriyena
indriyāṁ arthena iti. NB. p. 18. NS. 1.1.4.

8. visistakāranvacanamiti. Ibid. p. 18.

9. indriyena arthasya sannikarsāt utpadyate
jñānam tat pratyaksam. NV p.94. NS. 1.1.4.

10. utpannagrahanena ca sannikarsasya
utpādakatvam sūcitam. NVTT. p. 94. NS. 1.1.4.

11. sannikarsastu indriyānāṁ arthaissaha

12. vyavahitānapalabdhirītī brūmah. Ibid. p.114

13. tasmāt asti sannikarsah.

15. yathā ca indriyāṇāṁ karanāṁ anvayavyatirekābhyaṁ
   jñānakāraṇatvam evam arthasya karane api iti
   upapannagrhanena darsitam. Ibid. p. 115.
16. taccoedāṁ pratyakṣaṁ catustayatrayadvayaśaṅnikarsat
   pravarttate. Ibid. p. 115.
17. sukhādau tu trayasaṅnikarsat jñānaṁ udpadyate. Ibid. p.115.
18. ātmanasostu sadopi jñāna janaṅkatvam iha na
   sūtritaṁ sarvaprameśasādhāraṇatvāditi. Ibid. p.115.
19. yāvat arthamvai nāmadeyaśabdāṁ taṁ arthasaṁpratyayah
   arthasāṁ pratyayāśca vyavahārah NB. p.18. NS. 1.1.4.
20. yat indriyārtha sannikārādutpannam
   sadvisayanāmadheyena vyapadisyate rūpa jñānaṁ
   rasajñānaṁ iti tadvyapadesyaṁ jñānaṁ
   pratyakṣa phalam mā bhudityavyapadesyaghranaṁ
   NM. pt.1. p.121
21. nāsti kiñcit pañcit pañcamaṁ pramānaṁ. Ibid. p. 121.
22. śabdendriyābhyaṁ saṁbhūya janitatvāt
   ubhayajam idaṁ jñānaṁ. Ibid. p.121.
23. na cedāṁ pañcamaṁ pramānaṁavatarati
   kintu śabdāṁ eva etat anumanye. Ibid. p.121.
24. mama devadattena ākhyātaṁ
   panaso'yaṁ iti. Ibid. p. 121.
25. sūtrakrta śabdālaksanaṁ varnayatā na indriyānupravesasprat-
   tisedhāya kimapi visēsanāṁ uparacitaṁ. Ibid. p.21.
26. **manuvatstra[kär]śroṭi na dharmasya upadesākāḥ**
   yenaitadanurodhena tasya brūyāma śabdātām. Ibid. p. 122.
27. **asambhavadosavyavacchedārthāṁ avyapadesyā**
   padopadāṇāṁ, Ibid. p. 122.
29. **tadvyatiriktkarakanārkāryatvanupapateḥ.** Ibid. p. 123
30. **gaurityādi jñānāṁ udpādyamānāṁ śabdāṁ**
   eva iti avadhāryate. Ibid. p. 123.
31. **na ca nirvikalpakasamaye yat,"kañcitidāṁ"**
   ityādi sāmānyāśabdollekhāḥ
   ko'pi kaicit anubhūyate. Ibid. p. 125.
32. **tasmāt gaurityādi jñānānaṁ śabdātvepi**
   tathāvidhasya jñānasya lakṣyasya
   satbhāvāt na vyarthalaksanāṁ iti
   evam asambhavadosanirākaranārthāṁ
   avyapadesyapadam iti. Ibid. p. 125.
33. **tasmāt ubhayajajñānāvayavacchedārthamevedam**
   padamiti. Ibid. p. 132.
34. **yadayām gauriti saṅketagrhanakālā-**
   nubhūta devadattādi udīritasamjñāopa
   desākvacanasmaranapurvakaṁ vijñānam
   udpadyate tadapi udbhayajameveti. Ibid. p. 133.
35. **naiyāyikānāṇca savikalpapratyakṣa**
   mayāḥ prāṇāḥ. Ibid. p. 133.
36. pratyaksanta sanketagrhanakāle'pi svavisayagrāhakaṁ. Ibid. p. 133.

37. tasmāt varāṁ jarannaiyāyikakathī
-tasabdakarmatāpannejñānavacchada eva āśrīyatāṁ.
Ibid. p.134.

38. śabdānusmṛtijatve'pi na sābdama jñānam īdrsaṁ śabdasmṛtīṁ sahāyāṁ syat indriyasya pradīpavat. Ibid. p. 134.

39. ityācāryamatanīhā darsitāṁ yathāgamaṁ yadebhyaṁ satyamābhāti sabhyāṁ tadavalabyatāṁ. Ibid. p.135.

40. grīsmē marīcayo bhumenosmānaṁ samsrṣṭāṁ
spandamānāṁ dūraṇthasya caksusā sannikṣryante,
tatra indriyārthā sannikarsat "udakaṁ" iti jñānam utpadyate, tacca pratyaksam prasajyate? ityata āha avyabhicārī āti. NB. p.19. NS. 1.1.4.

41. yat tadaagadijñānam upajāyate marīcisu
spandamānesu, na tatārtho vyabhicarati āti.
na hi te na marīcayo na va spandante kiṃtu jñānam vyabhicarati. NV. p.114. NS. 1.1.4.

42. vyabhicārījñānavacchedārthāṁ. NM. pt.I. p.135.

43. nirvikalpakamapi prathamanayanasannipātajñānam
udakasavikalpa᷃jñāna janakaṁ udakagrāhyeva na. Ibid. p.135.

44. savikalpakaṁ avikalpakam va yat
atasmin taditi jñānam utpadyate tadvyabhicāri,
tacceha vyāvartyamiti. Ibid. p.135

45. dūrāt caksusā hi ayaṁ arthaṁ pasyaṇ
na avadhārayati dhūma iti vā, renuriti vā, 
tadatāt indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam 
anavadhāraṇajñānām pratyaksām prācacyate?
iti. NB. p. 19. NS. 1.1.4.

46. prthak ca anabhidhānat nāsti 
manasāḥ indriyatve pramāṇaṁ, tataśca 
na indriyaṁ nanah. NV. p.123, NS. 1.1.4.

47. dūrāt sthanupurusāsādhāraṇaṁ dharmaṁ 
ārohaparinaḥsarūpam upalabhamānasya tayoh anyatartra 
vartamānāṁ vakrakotarādīṁ karacaranāṁ vā visesān 
apāyataḥ samānadharmaprabuddha samkāratayā 
ca ubhayavartino'pi visesān anusmartah 
puro'vasthitārthavīśayaṁ sthanurvā puruṣo vā 
iti samsāyajñānāṁ upajāyate tad indriyārtha 
sannikarṣotpanvatvādi visānayuktamapi 
na pratyaksa phalaṁ. ataḥ tadvyavacchedāya 

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VI. 1.2. The cognition of transcendental perception

(Yogaj pratyaksa)

The transcendental perception is almost accepted by all the systems of Indian philosophy, whereas regarding the other two types of perception i.e. nirvikalpaka and savi-kalpaka there is divergence of views. In fact that, according to jainas, it is kevalajñāna, for Buddhists it is buddhi, kavivalya of saṃkhya, and Brahma sāksātkāra of saṃkhya, and Brahma sāksātkāra of the vedantins are more or less the synonyms of yogaja perceptions.

In NM we sees that Jayanta's observations on the yogaja pratyaksa are only related to his assessment of the Mīmāṃsā view on the viability of the yogic ascertainment of dharma, and who do not accept the yogaja perception.

Here in this context, Jayanta had interesting discussion of yogaja pratyaksam with the Mīmāṃsakas. Now, the question may arise in our mind or Mīmāṃsakas may enquire: what is the positive proof in favour of yogaja pratyaksa which apprehends Dharma. To this Jayanta answers with the example that the comprehensive of this perception lies in its superior quality. For example it is stated in the great epic Rāmāyaṇa that, Sampāti the
king of vultures saw the daughter-in-law of Daśratha i.e. 
Sītā from a distance of a four hundred miles. Therefore 
it is a fact that there are degrees in the power of the senses 
like the degree of colours. Those where perception reaches 
the highest degree of perceptions are called 'sages'.

Now, the Mīmāṃsakas argue that even the perception 
reaches the climax of perfection, yet it cannot violate the 
law which governs the nature of its object. Dharma is 
not all a perceptible object.

Kumārila states that when a person comes across the 
superior quality of perception he notices that a man possessed 
of the superior power of vision perceives only visible 
objects, we may have excellent ears but cannot perceive 
colours with our ears. Further Kumārila maintains that 
though there are cases across such superior order of genius 
and memory in men nobody comes across such superior order 
of sense-perception as apprehends the transcendental 
objects.

Jayanta states that such objection is not so good. 
Because though dharma is transcendental to the sight of 
normal beings it is sensed by the sages. As regards 
Kumārila's contention that if a sage perceives a transcendental
object then he should also perceive smell, taste, etc., with his eyes.\textsuperscript{11} Jayanta pointed out here that it is not only vision but all the senses of the sages which are endowed with supernormal powers.\textsuperscript{12}

In conclusion it may be observed that Mīmāṃsakas do not accept the transcendental perception. However the Naiyāyikas maintain the \textit{yogaja pratyakṣa} is the third kind of perception, and it belongs to yogin only, by means of their superhuman powers they can perceive objects which are imperceptible to others.

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Notes and References

2. kathyatāṃ dharmadhiganipunayogipratyaksa
   siddhu kim pramānamiti. Ibid. p. 156.
4. sampatī nāma grdharaśa yojanaśatavya
   vahitāmapi dasarathanandanasundarīm
   dadarṣe iti rāmāyane śṛṣyate. Ibid. p.157.

cf: sabāspo vānarāḥ grdhraḥ pratyuvāca mahāsvanah
   itodvipe samudrasya sampūrne satayojane
   tasmillankā purī raṁyā niritā viśvakarmanā
   ihastoham propasyāmi rāvanam jānakīm tathā
   SVR. kiskindākande, 58th sarge, Sl. 1, 20, 29.
5. soyam darśanātisāyah śuklādi
   gunatisāya iva tāratāmya samanvita iti gamayati
   paramapi niratisāyaṃ atisāyam. Ibid. p. 157.
6. atas ca yatrāśya paraḥ prakarsah te
   yoginah īgyante. Ibid. p. 157.
7. nanu svavisayāntikramena bhavatu tadatisaya
   kalpanā, dharmastru caaksusah na visaya eva.
   Ibid. p. 157.
8. yatrāpyatisāyo drstāh sa svārthānatinilanghanāt
   dūrasūkṣmādirdstau syānna rūpe śrotravṛttītā. Ibid. p.157.
cf. SV. p.60. (codanā-sūtre) sl. 114.

9. ye'pi cātisāya drṣṭāḥ prajñāmedhā balairnrmām.
   stokastokāntatavena na tvatīndrya darśanāditi.

cf. SV p. 62. (codanāsūtre) sl. 121.

10. Yadyapi nāsmadādinayanavisayo dharmah
    tathāpi yogāndriyagamyo bhavisyati. Ibid. p.157.

11. ekena tu pramanena sarvajño yena kalpyate
    nūnam sa caksusā sarvān rasādīn pratipadyata. Ibid. p.157.

cf. SV. p.59. (codana sūre) sl. 112.1

12. rasādigrāhīnyapi yogināmindriyāhi caksur
    vadatisayavantyeveti na rasādisu caksṛ-
    vyāpārah parikalpyate. NM. pt.I. p.158.

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VI.1.3. Foresight perception (prātibhā pramāṇam)

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his NM, having discussed about the Transcendental perception (yogajāpratītyakṣa) introduces the foresight pramāṇa i.e. which he calls prātibhā pramāṇa.

Jayanta states that some times we foresee future events. For example, when somebody says: my brother will come tomorrow and it so happens that his/her brother comes, this is called prātibhā pramāṇa.1 Obviously this cannot be included in any of the accepted pramāṇa.

Thus Jayanta maintains that this prātibhā pramāṇa should be treated as a piece of valid knowledge, because, it is neither hallucinatory, nor a doubt, not even negated by its contradictory judgement, its source is not a defective sense organ.2

In this connection Jayanta further opines that, it may be turned out to be a false one, if it is negated sometimes its true contradictory judgement. But, if the brother certainly comes on the day predicted then will not it be a true one? Do the critics call it a true judgement.3

To this if the critics say that it is purely accidental4
then Jayanta replies that the plea of accidental correspondence does not hold good, because the real object has been truly revealed beforehand.  

Jayanta further mentions that if it is not generated by an object because, the brother who is the object referred to is absent at that time, certainly this argument would have held good if he had known his brother as present on that occasion, but he knows him as possible event in future, this idea of possibility, too, is an event of the present time. In this context, Jayanta questions the critics that, how can it is not produced by an object be tenable?

The critics may contend that there is no reason to hold that an object is grasped with a future characteristic feature, which does not exist now, but will come into being at a later period, and it will really the pre-negation (prāg-abhāva) of an object which is limited in time. How can a negative fact be related to a positive object? Since they are incompatible with each other by their very nature.

To this Jayanta answers that, this misdirected old criticism is not tenable; because, it is not the pre-negation of the contact of the person with home in question. This pre-negation is not incompatible with the person.
The brother, the substratum, actually exists; he is recalled in our memory, because he is anxiously expected at the time of the dinner, the brother who is thus recollected is presented to our consciousness in the form that he will come here tomorrow, the brother in question is one of the conditions of prophetic vision (pratibhājñāna)\textsuperscript{13}

In this context, it may be argued that it cannot be direct, because it is non-sensuous,\textsuperscript{16} But Jayanta states that, it is not correct objection, because the inner organ determines it,\textsuperscript{17} and the external object which has been perceived with eyes is only intuited by the inner organ,\textsuperscript{18} thus, there is no question of that there would have been no blind person in this universe.

In this context Kumārila objects: the foresight is non-perceptual; because, perception refers only to a present object,\textsuperscript{19} and states that an object which is present and comes in contact with our sense organ is only sensed.\textsuperscript{20} Moreover, it should also be noted that the differential of perception is that it apprehends a present object.\textsuperscript{21}

To this Jayanta answers that, an object with its future property is apprehended,\textsuperscript{22} for example, when "silver is perceived it is also perceived that it will last long."\textsuperscript{23}
Therefore, Jayanta concludes that the perception that my brother will come tomorrow reveals a future object,\textsuperscript{24} that is called foresight. (pratibhā pramāṇa)
Notes and References

1. api ca anāgataṁ jñāgataṁ jñānaṁ asmadāderapi kvacit pramāṇam prātiḥśam śvo me bhratā āgaṇtā iti drṣyate. NM. pt. I. p. 160.

2. na anarthajām na saṃdīghø na bādhavīdhurīkṛtam na dustakāraṇaḥcetipramāṇam idam iṣyatām. Ibid. p. 160.

3. kvacitbādhahayogoscet astu tasya apramāṇatā yatra aprādhyuḥ abhyeti bhratā tatra kimucyatām. Ibid. p. 160.

4. kākatāliyaṁ iti cet. Ibid. p. 160.

5. na pramāṇadarsitaṁ, vastu tat kākatāliyaṁ, iti bhavitum arhati. Ibid. p. 160.

6. anarthajām idāṁ jñānaṁ bhrātuḥ, tajjanakasya tataṁ asatvāt. Ibid. p. 160.

7. astitvena bhrataram grhniyāt kintu bhāvinām evam grhanāti. Ibid. p. 160

8. katham anarthajām tajñām? Ibid. p. 160

9. nanu bhāvitaya grhanam aghatamānām. Ibid. p. 160

10. bhāvitam hi nāma savadhīṁ prāga bhāvah. Ibid. p. 160

11. vastuvastunoh virodhāt. Ibid. p. 160.


13. svastanāgamanaviśistatvena prātiḥśat iti prātiḥśasya sa eva janakah iti. Ibid. p. 161

16. Indriyānapaksatvāt. Ibid. p. 161
17. manasaḥ eva tatra indriyatvāt. Ibid. p. 161.
20. sambaddhām varttamānaṁca grhyate caksurādīnā iti. Ibid. p. 161.

cf. pratyaksatvena tasyāpi vidyamānopalamābhanaṁ SV. p. 102, (prat) sl. 29.


cf. SV. p. 104. (prat) sl. 35.


23. rajatam grhyamānam hi ciraśthāyīti grhyate. Ibid. p. 161
24. tasmāt pratyaksmanagatagrāhi "śvo me bhratā āgantā" iti siddham. Ibid. p. 161.

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VI.2. Jayanta's Theory of Inference:

Except āraṇya all other systems of Indian philosophy accept that anumāna is a distinct pramāna of valid knowledge. Anumāna means in general the cognition coming into being after perception or parāmarśa. Let us see how does Jayanta define the anumāna?

Jayanta quotes the definition of anumāna from Gautama and proceeds to explain it. NS defines inference as:

"tatpūrvakam trividham anumānam pūrvat, ėsavat, samānyato drstamca." So, this indicates that the inference depends on perception admits of three kinds i.e., Pūrvavat, ėsavat and sāmanyota drsta.

It may be noted that Gautama, has not define anumāna as such, but he simply says that the anumāna presupposes perception it is of three types.²

According to Vātsyāyana the anumāna is the knowledge of liṅgīn arising after the knowledge of liṅga.³

According to Uddyotakara, the compound "tat-pūrvakam" contains the sense in three ways: 1. tām-pūrvakam, that means in which case the anumāna may presuppose all the
source of knowledges, tat-pūrvaham, meaning that it presupposes only the perception and implying that it presupposes perception of invariable relation between linga and lingin and the perception of linga in the present case. 4

Quoting Uddyotakara Jayanta states that, the knowledge of probandum is itself a means of knowledge and that is called anumāna. 5 According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, anumāna is the instrument of the knowledge of an unperceived probandum through the apprehension of a probans with five-fold characteristic features, together with the recollection of the relation of invariable concomitance between the two. 6

The five characteristic features are as follows. 7

1. The presence of the reason in the subject 8
2. The presence of the reason in the positive example 9
3. The absence of the reason from the negative example. 10
4. The reason being not contradicted by other sources of true knowledge. 11 and
5. The reason being not counter balanced by another knowledge. 12
The knowledge of such reason, possessed of these five-fold characteristics, is the proximate cause of the inference of consequence.\textsuperscript{13}

Therefore in this way Jayanta defines \textit{anumāna} and comes forward with a categorical statement regarding the structural analysis of the NS consisting in the preliminary account of \textit{anumāna}.\textsuperscript{14}

Jayanta defines the compound word in the following manner. "Tat" is a pronoun signifying the perception which is implied from the context.\textsuperscript{15} By pointing out a convincing ground for the preference of this alternative, Jayanta states that with the initial pronoun "tat" is in dual number, the definition of inference would not become too wide to comprise comparison the final ascertainment of a thesis etc.\textsuperscript{16} Further he states that to specify the perceptions i.e., the direct cause of inference is the perception of liṅga, and though the perception of universal relation is not its immediate cause, if exerts its influence through memory.\textsuperscript{17}

Here, one may raise an objection that, the perception which is supplied by the context is a non-supplied by the context is a non-specified (\textit{sarvanāman}) one, but the pronoun
"tat" indicates to it. So, how does the interpreter give the twisted meaning of it, i.e. two specific perception? Jayanta clears it that the reason is that which proves the object to be established through its similarity with the example. The reason is the instrument of inferential knowledge, hence, it is the object of the present definition.

Again an objection arises that of this specification of two perceptions, as that the context does not supply any specification for it, that it is still too wide since it applies to fallacies such as savyabhicāra, viruddha, etc. or that it is too narrow since it does not apply to that inference, which is known by means of verbal testimony etc.

Jayanta answers the first objection that the reason is the instrument of inferential knowledge. It cannot establish the object to be proved, if its similarity with the example is not cognized. That is why though supplied in general by context the perception are in fact specific.

About the second objection, Jayanta quotes Kumārila in his support, who states that when the reason itself being inferred, proves the object to be established it is proved by another fundamental reason that is perceived.
Jayanta states that if perception rightly discovers the relation of universal concomitance no fallacy of reasoning ensures the inferential knowledge generally depends upon perception but there is no hard and fast rule for that and other forms of knowledge also could constitute the condition for inference. As far as the allegation that the definition is too narrow is concerned, Jayanta meets it stating that perception is the basis of such cases of the inference etc., also.

Therefore Jayanta states that each step of five fold characteristic features is causally connected with others and that is why the old Naiyāyikas hold that the compound word "tat pūrvakam" constitutes the proper definition of inference.

Let us examine the meaning of the words contain in the sutra. According to śūtrakāra anumāna is dependent on perception and is of the kinds, namely, pūrvavat, śesavat and sāmānyotadṛśta. Jayanta interprets the word "pūrvavat" in the tripartite division of inference i.e., taking "vat" and holding that it is the universal concomitance between the reason and the consequence which is responsible for the establishment of one by another, and he says that "vat" is, the remainder of the suffix "vati" and interprets pūrvavat
likewise. Therefore whenever we discover the universal relation of concomitance holding between the reason and the consequence on the basis of our previous perception of the same homogeneous reason with the same homogeneous consequence, inference operates. In a kitchen, we find that smoke and fire co-exist. So while we perceive smoke in a hill we infer fire i.e. this smoke is fiery. Jayanta further maintains that the particular reason of the act of inference is similar to that of perception, which is perceived along with its details, establishes fire which is similar to the fire experience before.

Jayanta interprets 'sesavat' in two ways. He says that it is not really the cause i.e., it is merely a verbal statement that a cause is inferred from its effect, but, in reality the up-country which has heavy shower of rain, which is inferred from the abnormal swelling of the river, or a particular country may be the subject of inference, instead of the river holding that this country is in contact with another country which has heavy-shower because it has rivers with swollen stream.

Jayanta refers to Kumārila just to state that the subject of inference is both the consequence and the reason. It becomes the consequence when it is qualified by something which has not been established. It also acts
as the reason when it is qualified by something which has been experienced and determined before.\textsuperscript{32}

Jayanta further gives an alternative interpretation of "sesavat" also as in the case of pūrvavat, and he states that "vat" as the reminder of the suffix 'vati', propounding that the conclusion in this inference is arrived at through the method of elimination. There could be a number of rival suggestions to explain a cause underlying a fact. If all the suggestions except one provided regarding the cause of a fact are rejected, the remaining one is to be known as a cause, i.e., the inference is called sesavad.

Sāmānyatodrsta

According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa the meaning of sāmānyatodrsta is that when we infer the consequence from the reason which is neither a cause nor an effect, this inference is called sāmānyatodrsta.\textsuperscript{33} For example, the taste of a woodapple (kapittha) is inferred from its colour and so on. Colour and taste co-inhere in a wood-apple and they are not causally related to each other.\textsuperscript{34} Jayanta further states that the example for sāmānyatodrsta given by Vātsyāyana.\textsuperscript{35} i.e. "sun has motion" is not sound, because, reaching different places due to motion actually illustrates the inference of
cause from its effect. It is rather an example of 'śesavat'.

Jayanta gives an alternative interpretation of this term that when we infer the imperceptual object on the basis of concomitance between the universal of the antecedent and the universal of the consequent that is called sāmānyatodrsta inference, for example, we infer the existence of the organ of hearing from that of auditory perception.

Therefore the revised syllogism is nothing but an instance of the Śesavat type of inference.

In conclusion Jayanta mentions that if we simply insert the word, "yatah" in the definition, the definition would be: anumāna is that from which the knowledge of an object lying beyond the reach of the sense-organ, arises through causality of perception. And also Jayanta mentioned the following process on anumāna to clarify the point.

1. perception of the reason.
2. The remembrance of the universal concomitance.
3. Judgement that the subject of inference contains the probans which invariably concomitant with the probandum.
4. and, The judgement that the consequence is worth of being accepted or rejected.
Notes and References

1. tatpūrvakamca trividhanumānaṁ pūrvavacchesavat
   cf. NS. 1.1.5.

2. Ibid. NS. 1.1.5.

3. "tatpūrvakam" ityanena lingalinginoh sambandadarsnam
   lingadarsnam ca abhisambadhyahe. Lingalinginoh
   sambaddhayoh darsanenalīngasmrtivabhisambadhyahe,
   smṛtyā lingadarsanena ca apratyakṣo'rtho'numiyahe. NB. p.21
   4. Ibid. NV. 1.1.5., Ibid. NVTT, 1.1.5.

5. anumānamiti laksanirdesah, tatpūrvakam
   iti laksanān. NM. pt.I. p.185

6. pañcalaksanakallīngād grhitānnye smṛteh
   parokse līnginijñānam anumānam pracakṣate.

7. paksadharmaṁ, spaksadharmaṁ, vipaksā-
   dvyāvṛttih, abādhita visayatvaṁ, asatprati
   paksatvañceti. Ibid. p. 164.

8. sisādhyaisitadharmavisisto dharmo paksah
   taddharmatvaṁ, tadaśritatvaṁ. Ibid. p.164

9. sādhyā dharmayogena nirjnātaṁ dharmyantaram
   sapaksah tatra astitvaṁ. Ibid. p. 164.

10. sādhyadharmasamsparśa sūnyodharmo
    vipaksah tato vyāvṛtti. Ibid. p. 164.
11. anumeyāyārthasya pratyakṣaṇāgamena
vānapaharanaṁ abhādhitavisyatvāṁ. Ibid. p.164
12. samsāyabījabhūtenārthena pratyāṇumāṇatayā
prayujyāmāṇena anupahatavāṁ, astpratipaksatvāṁ. Ibid. p.165.
13. etaiḥ pañcābhīh laksanaṁrupapannāṁ
liṅgāṁ anumāṇakam bhavati. Ibid. p.165.
14. atha idānīṁ sūtramunusārāmaḥ tatpurvakamityādi. Ibid. p.185
15. tatpurvakāraṇāṁ yasya tat tatpurvakaṁpratyaksam
Ibid. p.185.

cf. "tapārvakaṁ" ityanena liṅgaliṅginoh saṁbandha darsaṇāṁ
liṅgadarśanaṁ ca abhisambadhyate. NB. p.21.
16. ta dve pratyakṣe anumānasyaiva
kāraṇaṁ na upamānādeḥ. Ibid. p.185.
17. liṅgadarśanaṁ tu svata eva tatkāram,
pratibandhagṝhi pratyaksam smaranadvārenā. Ibid. p.185.
18. naṇu pratyaksamātrasya prakṛtatvāt., prakṛtā-
vamāśītvaśca sarvanāṁnaṁ kuto'yaṁ
vīṣeṣapṛittilīṁnah? Ibid. p. 185.
19. udāharanasādcharyāt sadhya sādhanam hetuh. Ibid. p.185.
20. netureva cānumānaṁ yadiha lakṣyaṁ nirdītaṁ Ibid. p.185.
21. pratyakṣaṁadādvayaśpūrvakatvamanumā-
nābhāsesvapi savyabhicāraviruddhādiśu
sambhavatīti atīvyāptīh. Ibid. p. 185.
22. arthotpannaṁ avyabhicāri vyavasāyātamakamiti phala-
vīṣeṣanāṇaṁ sarvapramāṇesvanuvṛtteh. Ibid. p.185
23. yugapacca kvacinnästi vyäpärah śabdaliṅgAyoh
   ato návyapadesyätvavisēsanaṁ ihärthavat. Ibid. p. 185.

24. yatrapí anumitāt liṅgāt lingini grahanām bhavet
tatrāpi manulikaṁ liṅgaṁ pratyaksādevagamyate. Ibid. p. 186.

25. prādhānyābhīprāyena pratyaksapūrvakatvam ucyate na
   niyamārtham iti na avyāptih. Ibid. p. 186

26. tānī pratyaksādini pūrvam yasya iti. Ibid. p. 186.

27. tat pūrvacakapadameva kevalām anumānalaksanaṁ
   iti guravo varnayāṅcakr̥. Ibid. p. 186.

28. NS. 1.1.5.

29. yathā agnimānayam dhūmāh bahulapandu
tādidharmayogitvāt mahānāsāvadhṛta dhūmavāditi,
dhūma eva agnimattaya anumīyate. Ibid. p. 189.

30. kāraṇagatam unnatatvādīdharmajātaṁ ucyate,
tadeva liṅgamitī granthadosopaṁ na kaścit. Ibid. p. 189.

31. phalastvyām vācoyuktih kāryena kāraṇam
   anumīyate iti, paramārthathā
   tu dharmo dharmavatvena dharmavān
   anumīyate iti sthiti. Ibid. p. 190.

32. sa eva cobhayātmāyam gamyo gamaka evec
   asiddhenaikadesena gamyah siddhena bodhayāḥ iti.
   Ibid. p. 190.


33. sāmānayodrantu yat akāryakāraṇa bhūtālingaṁ
34. yathā kapithādau rūpeṇa rasānumānam. Ibid. p.19.
35. sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṁ vrajyāpūrvvakāṁ anyatra dṛṣṭasya
   anyatra darsanamiti. NB. p.22.
36. yatpunaḥ bhāsyakārena bhāskarasya
   desāntara prāptya gatyanumānam udāhṛtaṁ
   tadayuktam, desāntara prāptah
37. śabdavācyatvena ca va tasya gatipūrvvakatvaṁ
   anumīyate. Ibid. p. 192.
38. tasmāt sarvathā gatikāryatvānapaṁ
   sesavadevedamanumānam. Ibid. p. 192.
39. pratyakṣaśaphalapūrvvakāṁ pāroksārtha pratipattirūpam
   phalam yato bhavati tadanumānamiti. Ibid. p.186.
40. prathamaṁ pratibandhasmaranam. Ibid. p. 186.
41. tatah pratibandhasmaranam. Ibid. p. 186.
42. tatah keśānciṁmate parāmarśajñānaṁ. Ibid. p. 186.
43. tatah sāddhyārthapratītih. Ibid. p. 186.
44. tatah pratyaksalaksanāvasaravarnitena
   kramena heyavijñānaṁ iti. Ibid. p. 186.

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VI.3. Jayanta's Theory of upamāṇa:

The Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṃsakas, and the vedāntins accept upamāṇa as an independent source of valid knowledge. The term upamāṇa means comparison analogy or identification.

In this connection, let us see the theory of upamāṇa as expounded by Jayanta. Before going to discuss the Jayanta's view on upamāṇa, let us have the discussion of his predecessors and contemporaries, which he mentioned himself in his NM.

Referring to the earlier logicians (vrddha Naiyāyikas) he gives a verbatim account of Vātsyāyana's line of thought and Uddyotakāra's interpretation of the compound 'prasiddha sādhyasādharmya. As Jayanta states it, the old Naiyāyikas define upamāṇa as the statement of a reliable person asserting the similarity between a known and an unknown object, and resulting in the cognition of the relation of a name with the named.¹

For example, the citizen who has learnt the instruction, resembles in the forest, sees an animal similar to a cow, and then remembers the instruction of the forest that a gavaya is like a cow. Recollecting it he comes to know that the term 'gavaya' applies to it. i.e., this is denoted by the term gavaya. The knowledge of the relation between
the term and the object, denoted by it presupposes the term, and this is designed as a gavaya is called pramiti and the proxmate cause of it is called upamāna.²

According to the contemporary logicians, Jayanta states that, upamāna is sensuous cognition by a man of an unfamiliar things through a statement of a reliable person that the unfamiliar thing resembles a certain other thing familiar to him.³ For instance, the citizen perceiving an animal resembling a cow and cognizing it as gavaya is upamāna.⁴

According to Gautama the definition of upamāna is the means of cognizing an unknown object through its similarity to another well-known object.⁵

Further Gautama seems to be aware of the opponent's view that upamāna is not a distinct means of valid knowledge because the degree of similarity, i.e., perfect, great or partial is not precisely established.⁶ Gautama, however, states that upamāna does not depend upon the quality or degree of similarity, it requires the similarity of an unknown object with a well-known object and thus upamāna apprehends a thing which is not grasped through perception, inference or verbal testimony.⁷
According to Vatsyāyana the upamāna is the knowledge of an unknown object by means of its resemblance to a known object. But he used the term "sāmānyya" in place of "sādharmyā" and whereas Gautama defines upamāna as the means of knowledge (karana) and states nothing about the result of upamāna, (upamiti) but Vatsyāyana gives a clear cut exposition of upamiti as well. 8

Vātsyāyana further states that it is the cognition of the relation of a 'name' with the 'named'. 9 It may be understood that he supports the sūtrakāra in his assertion that similarity is the basis of upamāna and that the effect of similarity does not depend upon degrees, but upon its familiarity. 10 Therefore, according to Vātsyāyana the upamāna does not proceed on mere resemblance, but on well-known resemblance.

According to Udyotakara, the compound 'prasiddha sādharmyā as "prasiddham" sādharmyam yasya" or "prasiddhena vā sādharmyam yasya" qualifies the term gavaya i.e. the relation of denotation of a word and its meaning is upamāna. 11 He further introduce that the element of "vaidharmyā" as a basis of upamāna in addition to "sādharmyā" and he justifies his thesis by pointing but that the term "sādharmyā" in the aphorism is symbolic and it comprehends
Being conscious of the fact that the definition of upamāna as propounded by earlier logicians, has been subjected to severe criticism by the opponents of the Nyāya on the ground of appropriateness of its inclusion in verbal testimony, Jayanta points that, the instruction given by a reliable person plays only a secondary part here. The forester's instruction to a citizen who is desirous of knowing the gavaya would be regarded as verbal testimony. As in the case of inference, the known comes to the inferential conclusion not because of his words but because of his knowledge of the middle term, so, in the case of comparison also the citizen who identifies the animal does not merely know it as denoted by the term "gavaya" accruing in the statement of the forester, but apprehends it through the experience of its similarity to a cow. As the words help only in pointing out the efficiency of the perception of similarity, the statement here is not the immediate cause but only a pointer to another cause i.e. perception of similarity.

As regards the opponents charge that upamāna as contemplated by the Naiyāyikas can be included in perception, Jayanta opines that like the perception of smoke in inference, the knowledge of resemblance in upamāna leads the citizen to the cognition of an object which is not sensed, though
it contains sensible property. Hence it is a distinct means of knowledge. Perception is not competent to reveal the relation between a name and the object denoted by it, since the figure of gavaya only is apprehended by it.

Jayanta, however, has not given his own definition of upamāna. It may be observed that he follows Vātsyāyana and Gautama as he did not add anything to Gautama's aphorism. So, upamāna is the knowledge of an object to be ascertained by means of its similarity to a known object.
Notes and References

1. atra vrddhanaiyāyikah tavat evaṁ
   upamanasvarūpaṁ ācaksate, samjña
   samjñīsambandhapratītiphalam prasiddhe-
taroyoh sārūpyapratipādakāṁ atidesa vākyāṁ-
   upamānām. NM. pt.I. p. 205
   cf. 1. NS. 1.1.6
   2. NB. p. 23
   3. NV. p. 169.

2. aprasiddhasya prasiddhena gavā sādrśyabhīdhadhat
   tadvārakāṁ aprasiddhasya gavyasamjñābhideyatvaṁ
   jñāpayati iti upamānamucyate. NM. pt. I. p.205.

3. adyatanaṁstāvat vyācaksate srtātidesāvākyasya
   pramāturaprasiddhe piṇḍe prasidhhapiṇḍasārūpyajñānaṁ
   indriyajāṁ samjnasamjñīsambandhāpratipattiphalam
   upamānaṁ. Ibid. p. 206
   cf. 1. NSM. p. 351
   2. TS. p. 49

4. ayam gavyasabdavācyah iti. NM. pt. I. p. 206
   cf. 1. NSM. p. 353
   2. TS. p. 49.

5. prasiddha sāddharmyāt sadhyasādhanam
   upamānām. NM. pt. I. p. 205
6. ātyantaprāyaikadesaśādharmyāt upamānasiddhi. NS. 2.1.44.
7. prasiddha śādharmyat upamānasiddheḥ yatokta
dsānupapattih NS. 2.1.45.
8. praṃkṣṇāśtena sāmānyātpraṃkṣṇāpaniyyasya praṃkṣṇāpanam
upamāṇāṁ iti. NB. p. 23.
10. saṃākhyāsaṃbandhapratipattih upamānarthaḥ. Ibid. p. 23.
11. yā asau samjñāsamjñi saṃbandha pratipattih sah
upamānarthaḥ. NV. p. 531. NS. 2.1.48.
12. prasiddha śādharmyasya vaidharmyasya ca upamaṇa
heturvāt. Ibid. p. 529. NS. 2.1.45.
13. āgaṃḍāpi tat siddhiḥ na vanecarabhāṣitat
tatkākaṁ samjñino nāsti gavyasya hi darśanaṁ.
14. anumānāmpunarnātra saṅkāmapyadhirohaṇi
kva liṅgaliṅgisambandhāḥ kva samjñāsamjñitāmatih.
Ibid. p. 206.
15. pratyakṣaṁ tāvat evaitat visaye na krtasramaṁ.
vanaṣṭha gavyākārapariccheda phalam hi tat.
Ibid. p. 206.

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VI. 4. Jayanta's theory of Verbal Testimony:

Jayanta's theory of verbal-testimony based chiefly upon his introduction of divergent views regarding the interpretation and implications of Gautama's definition of verbal-testimony. According to Gautama Ābada is that, which is the instruction of reliable person.¹ Vātsyāyana explains the term "āpta" (reliable person) as signifying a person who has immediate knowledge of dharma i.e., the moral law, and who is capable of perceiving objects in their real form and who communicates real knowledge to others out of compassion.² This indicates that, according to him āpta can be any one, a rsi, or an ārya, or a mleccha, i.e., no cast bar performing the role of a trustworthy-person.

According to Uddyotakara, the definition of verbal testimony is that element of verbalisation which is important in this source of knowledge and which separates it from inference and perception.³

In this connection, let us see how Jayanta Bhaṭṭa interpretes the them 2āpta and upadeśa occurring in the aphorism of Gautama.

Jayanta opines that, Gautama maintains that without the inclusion of the term "āpta" the definition will become
too wide, because in that case it would apply to a word which does not produce true knowledge. Likewise, for the term upadesa he refers to the view that to delineate the nature of verbal testimony, and to make the definition self-sufficient and perfect, we have to borrow the words jñāna, artha, vyavasāyatmaka and avyapadesya from the aphorism which contains the definition of perception. Here the word jñāna represents the result of an assertion. The word "artha" reveals the nature of the resulting consciousness and the adjective "vyavasāyatmaka" express its form, the doubt is eliminated from there, and the adjective avyabhicāri excludes an error. Therefore he suggests the inclusion of these words in the definition of verbal knowledge on the same grounds on which these have been incorporated in his definition of perception. Therefore the definition of sabda signifies that an assertion which is productive of such knowledge as is neither memory nor doubt, nor an error is a means of verbal knowledge.

Jayanta examines the etymological meaning of the word "upadesa". He maintains that, it is that by which the knowledge of something is conveyed i.e., the apprehension of the meaning of an audible object through its instrumentality, which is the conventional meaning of the act.
Jayanta further states that, a word which is consisting of a number of sounds produced the knowledge of an object. If it is held that a word is that which conveys the knowledge of some other object, then a mark, such as smoke, etc., should also be called a word, and a word the meaning of which is not known may not be regarded as a word. And finally Jayanta notes that it is fact that to be aware of an object is to know it, still, to be perceived, to be inferred and to be denoted, are not synonymous with one another and it is the term upadesa which differentiates verbal testimony from the remaining means of knowledge.

Regarding the term "āpta" Jayanta quotes "Vātsyāyana" and states that, the terms, cikyāpayisa i.e. intention to impart, and upadestā i.e., the teacher in the bhāsa have special significance. So he says that, the first term signifies that, a person who is not partially disposed is āpta, and the second term signifies that he should be efficient in the art of teaching, i.e., he who does not have any of these qualifications cannot be a teacher (āpta). Jayanta further states that if the term "āpta" is not included, then tradition (aitihya) would not be distinct from verbal testimony, because, the element of assertion i.e., upadesa is common to both. In other words, the correctness of
assertain is vindicated with the incorporation of this term and consequently 'aitihya' as well as the deceptive sentence are excluded from the field of verbal testimony.¹²

Therefore according to Jayanta the definition of Śabda is a word by which the knowledge of something is conveyed, and which is uttered by a reliable person, (āptopadesāh śabdah).
Notes and References

cf. 1. NS. 1.1.7.

2. āptavākyām śabdah. TS. p. 50

2. āptahkhalu sāksātkrtadharma yathādrstasya
arthasya cikhyapayisayā prayukta upadeṣṭā. NB. p. 24

1. āptastu yathārthavaktā. TS. p. 50

3. indriyasambaddhesu arthesu yā śabдолlekhena
pratipattih sā śabドルlekhena. NV. 1.1.7.

4. upadēsah śabdah iti ucyamāne paryāyamātra

5. avyabhicāradivisānartha pratitiṇijanakah upadesah
śabdah iti uktaṁ bhavati. Ibid. p. 217.

6. abhidhānākriyā iti. Ibid. p. 218.

7. śrotragṛhyaavastukaranikā tadarthapratīh
abhidhānākriyā. Ibid. p. 218.

8. arthapratītih sa śabdah iti tu ucyamāne
dhūmaidrapi śabdah syāt, agrhitasāmbandhah ca
śabdah śabdattvam jahyāt arthapratipatteḥ akaranāt. Ibid. p. 218

9. tatpratītivīsesajanane ca śabdasya upadesatvam
ucyate. Ibid. p. 219.

10. dharma iti upadeṣṭavyah kaścidartho vivaksitah
sāksātkaranametasya yathārtha upalamābhānām. Ibid. p. 219.
cf. NB. p. 24
11. cikhyāpayisayā yuktaḥ yuktaḥ iti uktvā vītarāgataḥ, upadeṣa iti anena uktam pratipādanakauṣālaṁ. 


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VI.5. Jayanta's Theory of Negation:

Jayanta, in a way has to answer the following questions on the problem of absence (abhāva)

1) is abhāva to be accepted as a means of true cognition?
2) is absence a distinct source of valid knowledge?
3) How is an absence of something cognized?
4) How many kinds of absence are there? i.e. types of abhāva?

These points have been discussed and criticized by various philosophers of different schools at different times in different contexts.

The Naiyāyikas do not accept more than four instruments of true cognition, viz. perception, inference, analogy and verbal testimony.¹ And for cognizing absence they do not need a distinct pramāṇa or instrument, on the view that there is no object of true cognition as an absence.² Vātsyāyana remarks that since absence is found to be an object in many cases of true cognition, the argument that abhāva is not a means of true cognition because there is no such object of true cognition as absence, is not proper.³

Vātsyāyana further states that, this absence is proved
to be a prameya because, when cloths which are marked are not to be taken, those clothes which are not marked and are to be taken are marked, by the absence of marks of them. A man in the presence of both sorts may be told, "bring the unmarked clothes" and by means of absence of marks he will bring the cloths. Here, the cognition of absence of marks is the cause of his true cognition i.e., it is a prameya, which proves that the absence is a prameya i.e. an object of a true cognition.4

In this connection Gautama states that, if the opponents say, that there is no absence without the things being present first, then we answer that it is not tenable, because, the mark can be present on something else.5

To the opponents, Vātasyāyana states that, this is not correct that the hypothesis 'no-absence' without the things being present, because, the marks can occur on other things. Just as a man sees the presence of marks on other cloths, just so does he not see marks on the unmarked cloths. By seeing the absence of marks the man cognizes the object i.e., the unmarked cloths by absence.6

Vātasyāyana further clarifies that, if the opponent say that one can find those i.e., the marks on the marked cloths, and there is no reason for being on the unmarked
cloths, then Vātsyāyana says that, we are not saying that there is an absence of these very marks which are present, our opinion is that, when marks are present on certain objects, by referring to that fact one may recognize objects on which they are not present by the absence of marks.

To this Gautama and Vātsyāyana further states that, also, because there can be an absence prior to a thing's coming into existence, where an object is non found prior to its origination and where an object is not found after its destruction. That sort of absence of marks which occurs prior to the production exists in the cloths which are not marked with the marks, not the other sort i.e., destruction.

According to Uddyotakara abhāva is that, the cognition of the antidote through the cognition of the upsetting of the normal effect.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa has not given any general definition of abhāva, but, while he is refuting the Buddhist view, he states that, it is well known fact that there are two types of judgement, i.e. positive and negative, for example, there is a jar on this spot, and there is no jar 'on this spot' And also when refuting the Mīmāṃsakas view, he states that, a negative fact is to be objectively real and distinct, but one should not search for a distinct proof
for its illumination; because, it is revealed by perception
and similar other proofs already admitted by the Naiyāyikas.13
Therefore it may be understood from this opinions of Jayanta,
that according to him, abhāva is a reality, but, it can
be cognized through perception and that there is no need
of accepting anupalabdhi as an additional source of valid
knowledge as the Bhattas argued.

Jayanta further states that, a positive object is that,
which is the object of positive awareness, but a negative
one is that which is the object of negative awareness.14

Let us see the types of abhāva according to Jayanta.

According to Vātsyāyana, Gautama accepted two types of
absence, prior absence (Prāg-abhāva) and posterior (dhvamsa)
absence or destruction.15

According to Vacaspati Miśra, absence is of two types,
mutual absence or difference (anyonyābhāva), and relational
absence (samsargabhāva), and the relational absence is of	hree subtypes, i.e. prior absence, (prāg-abhāva) posterior
absence (dhvamsa) and constant absence.16 This view was a
almost accepted by the later Naiyāyikas.17

Jayanta Bhatta, on the other hand, strictly followed
Gautama and Vatsyayana, states that, there are two types of negation i.e. the negation of an object prior to its appearance pre-negation, (prāg-abhāva) and the destruction of the created object post-negation (dhvamsa)

Some other logicians are of the opinions that there are four kinds of negation, viz. pre-negation, (prāgabhāva), post-negation, (Pradhvamsābhāva), and absolute negation (itaretarābhāva), and absolute negation (atyantābhāva). Some other logicians hold that it is divided into six classes, i.e. the above mentioned four kinds with the addition of the two types i.e., the negation of an object confined to a limited place (apeksābhāva) and the negation of capacity (sāmarthyābhāva).

The definitions of these different types of negation are as follows.

1. The non-existence of an object before its coming into being is called prāgabhāva.

2. The cessation of the essence of an object which has come into being is designated as pradhvamsābhāva.

3. About the other types of negation, Jayanta states that they are not essentially different from prāgabhāva. Prāgabhāva in the shape of the non-appearance of an object
belonging to the other object which delimit the sphere of its appearance is called anyonyābhāva.\textsuperscript{23}

4. anyonyābhāva becomes atyantābhāvā, while it transcends all limitations imposed upon.\textsuperscript{24}

5. When it is restricted to a limited sphere, it acquires the designation of apeksabhāva.\textsuperscript{25}

6. If an object loses its capacity already belonging to it then sāmarthyābhava is no better than pradhvaṁśa. If it denotes the negation of non-existent capacity, i.e., future capacity then it is not different from prāgabhāva.\textsuperscript{26}

Jayanta concludes that, the destruction of an object which has come into being and the non-appearance of such an object constitute the two natural divisions of negation. The other types are merely artificial.\textsuperscript{27}

Jayanta further concludes that, the negative fact is a distinct kind of object of knowledge - a class by itself,\textsuperscript{28} and states that it has been also established that it is perceived by our sense-organs. The sage Aksapāda's classification of abhāva i.e. four kinds of proof is also sound.\textsuperscript{29}
Notes and References

1. **NS. 1.1.3.**
   cf. **NB.** p. 16, **NS. 1.1.3.**

2. **NV.** p. 86, **NS. 1.1.3.**
3. **NVTT.** p. 86, **NS. 1.1.3.**

2. na abhāvaprāmānyāṁ prameyāsiddhe. **NS. 2.2.7.**
3. abhāvasya bhūyasi prameye lokasiddhe vaijātyāducyate. **NB.** p. 140

4. **pratipattihetuṣca pramāṇamiti.** **Ibid.** p.141. **NS. 2.2.8.**

5. asatyarthe nābhāva iti cet na,
   anyalaksanopapatteh. **NS. 2.2.9.**

6. so'vam laksanābhāvāḥ pasyaṣna abhāvena
   arthāṁ pratipadyata iti. **NB.** p. 141

7. 1. tatsiddheh alaksitesu ahetuḥ. **NS. 2.2.10**
   2. yāṁ khalu bhavanti tesāṁ abhāvah
   3. vyāhata iti? **NB.** p. 141.

8. apeksamāno yesu laksanānāṁ bhāvaṁ na pasyati
tāni laksanābhāvena pratipadyata iti.
   **NB.** p. 142. **NS. 2.2.11.**

9. **NS. 2.2.12.**

10. **NB.** p. 142

11. abhāvo nāma pratyāṅkaṣya grhaṇāt
tadvirodhino grhanāṁ **NVTT.** p. 574, **NS. 2.2.1.**

12. idaṁ tavatsakalaprāṁisaṅkṣikāṁ samvedanaṅgyam
    upajāyamānaṁ drṣṭaṁ, iha ghaṭo asti, iha nāṣṭīti.
    **NM.** pt. I. p. 91
13. abhāvaḥ prameyam abhyupagaṁyate,
pratyakṣādi avasīyaṁnasvarūpatvāt na
pramāṇāntaraṁ ātmaparicchitayam mrōgaye. Ibid. p.81.

14. bhāvavat abhāvo'pi jñānajanaṁsamarthah Ibid. p.93.

15. abhāvadvaitāṁ khalu bhavati. NB. p. 142. NS. 2.2.12.

16. paramārthatastū prathamabhāve dvaitaṁ,
tādātmyābhāvaḥ, samsargabhāvascetī,
samsargabhāvo'pi prakṛtadhvamsātyantābhāvena
trividha iti cāsāro vidhā abhāvasya. NVTT. p. 587.

17. abhāvastu dvidhā samsargānyonyābhāva bhedatah
prāgabhāvastathā dhvamsah atyantrābhāva eva ca.
Kāv. 12.

cf. Ibid. NSM. p. 92.

13. sa ca dvidhaḥ, prāgabhāvaḥ,

cf. 1. prāgutpatteḥ abhāvopapatteḥ ca. NS. 2.2.12.
2. Ibid. NB. p. 142. on NS. 2.2.12.


cf. abhāvaḥ caturviddhah prāgabhāvaḥ, pradhām
sābhāvaḥ atyantrābhāvaḥ anyonyābhāvascetī. TS. p.6.


cf. prāk ca utpattah avidyamānata. NB. p.142.

22. utpannasya ātmahānanto pradhvamsa iti
cf. utpannasya ca ātmanāh hānāt avidyāmānata. NB. p.142.

23. na prāgabhāvadanye tu bhidyante paramārthatah

cf. 1. tatra alaksitesu vāsassu prāk utpattāh avidyamā-
   natālaksanām laksanānām abhāvah na itara iti. NB. p.142.

24. sa eva avadhisūnyatvāt atyantā bhāvatāmgaṭah.:
   NM. pt. I. p. 99


26. sāmarthyāṁ pūrsaiddhaṇcet pradhvaṁse tadabhāvadhiḥ
   no cet tarhi vīseso'sya durlabhah prāgabhāvataḥ. Ibid. p.99

27. utpannasya vināśo vā tadanupāda eva vā
   abhāvah tatvato'nya. Ibid. p. 99.


29. tasmādabhāvakyāṁ idāṁ prameyāṁ
   tasyendriyena grhanaṁca siddhaṁ
   atah pramāñesu jagāda yuktaṁ
   catustvāṁ etamūhiraksapādah. Ibid. p. 99.

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VI.6 Jayanta’s Theory of Samavāya

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa has given a clear picture of his view of the relation of samavāya while commenting on the relation of universals and its individuals. In this connection he introduces an opponent who claims that the very idea of relation between two inseparables is self-contradictory.

The opponent argues, that the vaisesikas define the relation of samavāya thus: It is such a relation as subsists between the container and the contained which are inseparably connected and is a source of the judgment that one rests on the other.1 Thus declares the Opponent: "How can inseparableness (ayutasiddhata) and relationship be reconciled?2 Only those objects which exist separately like a basket and Plum, or a man and a woman can be related to one another.3 Inseparable things, however, being one and identical which of them can be related to what?4

In this context Jayanta Bhaṭṭa has vehemently criticised the view of the Bhaṭṭas as holding samavāya as identity in difference and the same may be forwarded to meet the jannas as well.

Kumārila’s hypothesis amounts to this: What is universal is particular; what is one is many: What is
eternal is non-eternal and what is, is not. He says something which nobody has experienced. He may say so. But it does not sound well.\(^5\)

Jayanta further states that, "under the influence of various imaginations men being confused entertain the above hypothesis. Let them dwell in the domain of error.\(^6\)

Therefore Jayanta concludes that, the objects those are inseparably connected with each other cannot be taken as identical for the obvious reasons that the awareness of the one is different from the awareness of the other. The two objects which are held to be different space. In a mnemonic verse Jayanta summarises his position on samavāya thus:

"There is certainly a difference, between objects inseparably connected, which is proved on account of its being cognized by us, but the difference of the space occupied by two such things as parts and whole etc. cannot be accepted, and, therefore the relation of subsistence called samavāya must be postulated in such cases.\(^7\) In short according to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa our experience is the proof for accepting samavāya as a relation between two inseparables which cannot be contradicted. For, we directly apprehend part and its whole as two distinct objects. But they occupy the same space which amounts to say that one must be subsisting in the other."
It has become therefore, necessary to postulate a relation like *samāvāya* for the Naiyāyikas to explain properly the existence of one of the pair in the other. Here, Jayanta Bhatta has striken the very basic point of the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika position in relation to the relation of *samāvāya*.

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Notes and References

1. *ayutasiddhanām ādhāryādharabhūtānām yah*
   *sambandhah, ihapratyayahetuh saḥ samavāya*
   *iti yad ucyate. NM. pt. II. p.3.*

2. *ayutasiddhatā ca sambandhaśceti katham samgacchate.*
   *Ibid. p. 3.*

3. *prthaksidhe vastuni kunda-badaravadvanyam*
   *sambandhyetesaṃ, strīpuṃsavadvā. Ibid. p.3*

4. *ayutasiddhe tu ted ekatvād kim kena*
   *sambhandyate. Ibid. p. 3.*

5. *nānārūpam tvaiśkasya vírudham vadatā svayaṁ*
   .......... tadeva sāmānyaṁ sa eva viśesah, tadevaikam
   tadevānā tadeva nityam tadevaikam tadeva asti,
   neti, ca adṛstaṁ idāṁ ucyate, ucyamānaṁ api na
   sobhate, Ibid. p. 6.

6. *vicitravikalpa-prabandhavipralabdhabuddhayaḥ khalu*
   *evam manyante, bhavantu te, na tu ekaṁ vastu*
   *bahurūpam bhavitum arhati. Ibid p. 6.*

7. *pratiti bhedāt bhedo'sti desābhedastu na isyate*
   *tenātra kalpyate vṛttih samavāyaḥ sa ucyate.*
   *Ibid. p. 23.*

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VI. 7. Jayanta's view on Śakti

Jayanta in his NM refutes the hypothesis of śakti. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa states that the Mīmāṁsakas view, that śakti is responsible for the production of a particular effect, from a particular cause is wrong. He asked: what is the causal relation between the axe and the action of cutting. It is known from one's own experience or from the experience of others. Thus, the experience teaches one to lift an axe to cut a tree, but not a shoe.¹

For the production of the effect presence of causal factors are not enough, but the proper conditions. Regarding the non-production of the effect, Jayanta answered that it is not the potency of the cause being obstructed by the presence a gem, or the recitation of a mantra, but because of the disturbance in the causal factors.

To the objection, why no change is noticed in the nature of the cause Jayanta answers; How then the Mīmāṁsakas will explain the fact that poison does not kill a person when not consumed.?² If it is answered that the contact with blood is the cause of death, then on the same line, it can be answered that the absence of the chant. i.e., the obstacle is the necessary condition of an act of burning.³
Thus, for the effect to take place the correction of the causal factors along with other conditions are necessary. As Dr. Ray observes "Thus the Nyāya accepts in the sense of an operation, analysable into molar or molecular motion, but would emphatically reject if it is advanced in support of the notion of a mysterious causal power or efficiency."4

Jayanta holds that the sum total of the operation of the various causal conditions is effect - samuditasakala kāraka Kṅkara parisapanda eve, sāmagri kāryasāmagrikāryatve karyatvamastu kimantarālavārtinyā śaktyā.5

Jayanta refute the view that an imperceptible 'sakti is to be accepted as distinct and is known through inference. For the occurrence of the effect a proper sequence of procedure is necessary along with the absence of the obstacles.

Jayanta's contribution is being briefed by himself in the following kārikā.

svarūpādudbhātāṁ sahākāryaprabhītāṁ
na hi kalpayitum śaktaṁ śaktimanyāmatīndriyam

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Notes and References

1. tatra cchedanādāvanvayavyatirekābhyām
   vrddhavyavahārādvā, paraśvadādereva
   kāramatvamadhyavagacchāma iti dadeva
   tadarthināh upādādmahe na pādukādīti,

2. Svarūpaṁ tadavastham eveti cet,
   yadyevamabhaksitamapi visamkatham na hanyāt?
   Ibid.

3. tatrāṣya samyogādyapeksanīyamastīti
   cenmantrābhāvah api apektyatām. Ibid. p. 61

5. NM, pt. I, p. 62
6. Ibid. p. 61

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