Chapter - II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This Chapter deals with the need for review of the related literature, important research studies and a critical review.

The survey of related research literature is an essential aspect of research studies. A summary of the writings of recognized authorities and of previous research provides evidence as to what is already known and still unknown and untested. Past knowledge helps to eliminate the duplication of what has been done and provides useful hypothesis and helpful suggestions for significant investigation. The published literature is a very good source of hypothesis. It also helps the investigator to interpret the significance of his results. A review of scholarly literature can acquaint one with the methodological procedures, which have been used. Hence an attempt is made here for reviewing the related research literature.

Study of Literature and Reports of Committees:

Arnold J Heidenheimer (1970) has mentioned that it is difficult to talk of the dimensions of Corruption. As the Santhanam Committee itself admits: In the nature of things it is not possible to give even a rough estimate of the number of corrupt government servants or the amount of money or value or percentage of illegal gratification that may be involved. Increase in complaints, investigation, prosecution, departmental
proceedings and punishment may mean more intensified fight against corruption than any increase in it. The Kripalani Committee on Corruption confirms similar practices in the Railways. Corruption has spread far beyond the limits of general administration to the police and even the judiciary. The problem of corruption in the police has been conceded by various police commissions. A secret investigation carried out by Anti-corruption Bureau of the Delhi Police revealed that the Police refused to register 65% of the crime cases in the capital. An official of Anti Corruption Branch had a taste of the treatment the police gave to the public when he visited a station incognito. He was manhandled when he insisted that his complaint be registered. It is significant to note here that the Santhanam Committee being prevented from looking into incidence of corruption in the ministerial and judicial ranks, either through the limitations of its terms of reference or special circumstances, did not feel confident to give the benefit of the doubt to these sectors. The working of the Special Police Establishment, the Anti Corruption Bureau and Vigilance Section throughout the administration has provided a sad picture of corruption. It is pertinent to remember that these anti-corruption agencies have not been working with uniform zeal and hence the figures given do not tell the whole story in this sector. Rampant corruption in all walks of public life has been adequately proved by the various commissions of inquiry set up from time to time. How far it has reached in politics is a matter for conjecture.
Ramanathan S (1970) has analyzed that Corruption is not new to Indian Administration even under the British Control. Since 1947, the Indian leaders have attempted to stamp out Corruption but it has continued to be the chronic feature of Indian Government. Some of the steps taken by the Government to eradicate corruption are the DSPE Act 1946, the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, the creation of SPE and the AVD. Shri Santhanam considers that the effect of these efforts have been diminished by the influence of a number of factors. Shri Santhanam feels that one of the major ways by which corruption can be controlled and public life purified is by fighting the unscrupulous agencies. The legal position with regard to Corruption is strict and there are hardly any loopholes. Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code defines Corruption as “whoever being or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for any other persons, ........................”. The Hyderabad Economy Committee Report (Chapter XV) states that the reputation of an officer can be taken as an indicator as to whether he is corrupt or not. According to Shri A D Gorwala, it is preferable to have a tribunal for enquiring into corruption cases. When Shri C D Deshmukh former Finance Minister for India suggested this idea, Shri Nehru, the then Prime Minister of India was against it on the ground that a permanent tribunal would demoralize the services. Shri Gorwala suggests, one or two experienced detectives be appointed, as clerks to observe secretly the “modus operandi” of the officers and subordinates and if incriminating reports are received,
then suitable action could be taken. In connection with the attempts to curb corruption in India, it is interesting to refer to two important cases of corruption in India, which have received wide publicity. One relate to Shri Pratap Singh Kairon, Punjab Chief Minister and Shri Biju Patnaik, Chief Minister of Orissa. There were 21 charges against Shri P S Kairon and the first charge has 32 sub-sections. There was no charge of corruption but that Shri Kairon misused his official position to enable his family members to enrich themselves. The Commission of enquiry consisting of Shri Sudhir Ranjan Das former Chief Justice of India was appointed by the Government of India on 1st November 1963. The Das Commission report released on June 21, 1964 found that Shri P S Kairon had abused his influence and powers for personal benefit. The Commission did not suggest any specific action on the report and the Governor Hafiz Mohammed Ibrahim accepted the resignation of Shri Kairon Chief Minister and his cabinet. The second case is related to Shri B Patnaik the Chief Minister of Orissa and Shri Biren Mitra. The cabinet sub-committee which examined the report of the CBI pronounced on March 4, 1965 that they conducted government transactions not in keeping with normal standards of public conduct and there was improper use of authority. The Prime Minister pleaded in Lok Sabha on Feb 22, 1965 that in view of the fact that both Shri Patnaik and Shri Mitra had submitted their resignations, the matter be allowed to end there.
Halayya M (1975) has stated that everyone knows what Corruption is; but it is difficult to define it in exact terms. According to the Oxford English Dictionary the word “corrupt” means “influenced by bribery, especially at the time of elections”. Encyclopedia Britannica gives the meaning of corrupt practice as follows: “includes bribery; but has reference to the electoral system”. The word “corruption” is generally defined in the context of specific normative standards. According to the Santhanam Committee, the term includes all “improper or selfish exercise of power and influence attached to a public office or to a special position one occupies in public life”. The following are the agencies in India through which Corruption is being sought to be eliminated: - (i) the Special Police Establishment; (ii) The Vigilance Organizations with Departments; (iii) The Central Vigilance Commission; (iv) The Central Bureau of Investigation.

Special Police Establishment was created by the Government of India in 1941 to investigate cases of bribery and corruption in the War and Supply Department as the Defence Department was then known. The activities of the Establishment were extended to the Railways by the end of 1942. In 1946 the SPE was transferred to the Home Department which is now known as Ministry of Home Affairs. In 1953, an Enforcement Wing was added to the SPE to deal with Offences relating to export and import regulations. With the establishment of the CBI in 1963, the SPE became a part and parcel of the former. The Committee on Prevention of Corruption (Santhanam
Committee) 1964 recommended that the SPE be strengthened and its powers enlarged in order to make it an effective organ is government’s anti-corruption drive. With the acceptance and implementation of the recommendations of the Committee on Prevention of Corruption regarding the strengthening and granting or more powers to the SPE, this agency has become more effective as compared with its position prior to 1964. The Vigilance Organization consists of two branches -- (a) The Administrative Vigilance Division of the MHA; (b) the Vigilance Units attached to respective Ministries or Departments and their counter parts in Public Sector Undertakings. The Administrative Vigilance Division was set up in the Ministry of Home Affairs in August 1955. The division is charged with the function of providing the necessary “drive, direction by the individual Ministries and Departments”. In their work of rooting out Corruption, Secretary and Head of Departments are assisted by Vigilance Officers in the attached and sub-ordinate offices. The Public Sector Undertakings have their own Vigilance Officers. Railways have a separate Vigilance Organization. In case, the Ministry does not accept the recommendations of the SPE, the Administrative Vigilance Division mediates. As regards Departmental Enquiries, the advice of the UPSC is usually sought for the nature of punishment. In other cases, the concerned Ministry takes the final decision without consulting the AVD or the SPE. The Central Vigilance Commission was set up in Feb 1964. The CBI was set up on 1st April 1963. We have had a number of Commissions and Committees on Corruption:-- (i) the Railway Corruption Enquiry
Committee 1954-55 under the Chairmanship of Acharya Kripalani; (ii) the Vivian Bose Commission 1962; (iii) the Committee on Prevention of corruption under the chairmanship of Santhanam – 1964; (iv) the Wanchoo Committee on Black Money – 1971. We have laws to combat corruption--- Section 161 of Indian Penal Code reinforced by Section of the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1958; Central Government Conduct Rules.

Mansukhani H L (1979) has analyzed that Integrity, as a term of suspicion, was used only in extreme instances. So much so, that its sparse use itself lent that term its proper sense and purpose. Every establishment division is under an undefined suzerainty of a “vigilance cell”. The “vigilance angle” is supposed to be a sharp and acute angle, which scrutinizes even the ability of an officer to read a rule on the contemplated charge of a lapse. This vigilance cell has blossomed, to that the office telephone is tapped, the door man attendant trained to look, peep, hear and report an occasional lunch or dinner taken at the state hotel investigated as to how its bill was paid for fixing up a “lavish hospitality” charge, if one could be so foisted.

Now we have vigilance officers in every ministry and every department drawn from the common ranks of the Civil services or brought on deputation from the CBI. We have a high powered awe-inspiring body called the Central Vigilance Commission, with parallel bodies in all states. It was recognized in 1947 and that is how the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, placed on the statute book in that year. The mushroomed
organizational structures of “vigilance” have cramped the very sense of civility in the Civil Services, through its own crucible. Vigilance has thus become a routine, but organized, “public eye” that keeps a mindful watch on the everyday life and doings of all civil servants, through corridor gossip, anonymous complaints. It is however, this new horizon of “vigilance” and its valiant variants that echoes the bells with the shrill ring of “corruption” over a wide area.

Ramakrishna P V (1981) has mentioned that starting with Bakshi Tek Chand Committee appointed in 1949 to review the working of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and the measure of success achieved by the Delhi Special Police Establishment in combating corruption, the Government have set up various committees from time to time to assess the extent of corruption in public services. The appointment of the Santhanam Committee in 1962 has been a landmark in the crusade against corruption. After making exhaustive enquiries the Committee submitted a comprehensive report on all aspects of the problem and suggested various measures in several directions to effectively combat the evil of corruption. Most of the recommendations made by the Committee have been accepted by the Government and they are being implemented.

Based on the recommendations of the Santhanam Committee, the Anti Corruption laws (Amendments) Act, 1964 was enacted with a view to make the Anti-Corruption laws more effective and to ensure speedy trial of cases. By this Act very important amendments were made to the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, The
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, The Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944, the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, the Indian Penal Code 1860 and the Code of Criminal Procedures, 1898. Lot of case law has grown during this period and the Supreme Court as well as several High Courts has pronounced several important judgments on the case relating to bribery, corruption and criminal misconduct. There is no commentary on this subject subsequent to the enactment of the Anti-Corruption Laws (Amendment) Act, 1964, on account of which those who are engaged in Anti-Corruption work are very much handicapped.

The subject matter of the book has been divided into six parts. The first and second parts contain exhaustive commentaries on the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and the Criminal Law (Amendment) act, 1952 respectively, while the third and fourth parts deal with offences by or relating to public servants punishable under sections 161, 162, 163, 164, 165 and 165-A of the Indian Penal Code, and offences of abetment, attempt and conspiracy under Section 107 to 116, 120-A, 120-B and 511 of the Penal Code. The fifth part contains the DSPE Act 1946 with commentary, the notifications issued by the Government of India under sections 3 and 5 of the Act and the Constitution and functions of the CBI. The sixth part deals with the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 and the case law there under. There are also useful appendices containing Anti-Corruption Laws (Amendment) Act, 1964, the Anti-

Shriram Maheshwari (1981) has stated that the Central Government has since 1947 set up 18 committees and commissions specifically to enquire into one or more segments of public administration or even the totality of it with a view to modernizing the administrative system. The areas and aspects of public administration covered some even more than once includes prevention of corruption, both political and administrative. One of the important surveys made by the administrative reform committees as well as by other bodies is the Survey of Corruption in the railways, under taken by Acharya Kripalani in 1955-57. The sixties was a period of rampant with rumors about scandals and corruption in public administration. More than any other single feature, corruption in the public services was causing grave concern to public spirited citizens. Parliament could not remain oblivious of it, and it mounted a demand for an examination of this problem. It ultimately won the battle by securing the appointment, in 1962 of a committee under the chairmanship of K Santhanam, to review the existing arrangements for checking corruption in the public services and to advise on anti-corruption measures. In pursuance of the recommendations made by the Committee on Prevention of Corruption, the central government set up, in February 1964, the Central Vigilance Commission headed by a Central Vigilance Commissioner. There was a growing awareness of the widespread prevalence of corruption in public administration,
but it was left to the S.R Das Commission of Inquiry against Punjab’s Pratap Singh Kairon to provide for the first time an officially authentic glimpse into it in its report published in 1964. The Das Commission cites numerous instances of special, undue favours shown by civil servants when dealing with Kairon’s sons and relatives. Though the Das Commission of Inquiry against Pratap Singh Kairon (1964) and the Santhanam Committee on Prevention of Corruption (1964) appeared in the same year and covered more or less the same area, their subject matters were different. The former was a case study of a single situation and besides, was directed against a state level political executive. While this report provided a glimpse into the dynamics of corruption in India, active public concern ceased with Kairon resigning from his office and thus accepting his guilt, the Santhanam Committee on the other hand was that corruption existed in a large measure in public administration in India.

Chakrabarti N K (1985) has mentioned that while talking about corruption it is not very readily reckoned that in any society the level of prevalent corruption will only be that which the society would be prepared to tolerate. The Kripalani Committee while investigating into the prevalent corruption in the Railways tried to make an assessment as to how the different sections of people in the society, both officials and non-officials were viewing at the problem of corruption prevailing in the country. They interviewed a large number of people and obtained feed-back information from people connected with railway working. In keeping with the recommendations of the Kripalani
Committee, Vigilance Units were set up in each of the Zonal Railways in 1956, headed by a Senior Scale officer functioning under the overall control of the Senior Deputy General Manager. A separate Vigilance Engineering Cell was created in 1957 in each of the Zonal Railways consisting of a Senior Scale Railway Engineer and a Railway Accounts Officer. This cell was entrusted with the investigation into complaints pertaining to engineering works. A post of Senior Scale Stores Officer (Vigilance) was added to this Vigilance Cell of each Zonal Railway in March 1965. The post of Senior Deputy General Manager was subsequently upgraded to that of a Deputy Chief Vigilance Officer in January 1969.

Malhotra K L (1988) has discussed that one of the main functions of the State is maintenance of law and order, right to equality before law and to prevent abuse of power given by law and ensuring correct application of law. This can be ensured by watchfulness, caution and vigilance.

Corruption has always existed in one form or the other. It was rife in British public life barely 100 years ago and in the USA till the beginning of this century. In primitive and medieval societies scope for corruption was bare minimum. Few authorities existed for collection of taxes, administration of justice but not according to any written laws, administration of justice but not according to any written laws. So long as they were loyal to the existing methods, they amassed wealth, and were praised rather than censured. Wartime controls provided ample opportunities for bribery, corruption and favoritism.
Vigilance means “watchfulness” or to bring awareness. It is an integral part of all government Institutions. Mere development will not be enough; its fruit should be shared equitably. Public servants with inadequate strength of character tend to succumb to temptations by traders willing and capable to corrupt public servants. Perhaps high watermark was reached during the 2\textsuperscript{nd} World War.

Corruption among the public servants has been there from time immemorial. It has always existed in one form or the other, although its shape, dimensions, textures and shades etc. have been changing from time to time and place to place. According to Kautilya’s Arthashastra, there are forty ways of embezzlement. What is realized earlier is entered later and what is realized later is entered earlier. What is payable is not paid and what is not payable is paid. What is taken in the treasury is removed. Kautilya further says that just as fish moving under water cannot be possibly found out either as drinking or not drinking water, so government servants employed in government work cannot be found out while taking money for themselves. It is possible to ascertain the movement of birds flying high up in the sky but it is not possible to ascertain the movement of government servants of their hidden purposes. It is impossible not to taste the honey or the poison that is placed at the tip of the tongue, so it is rather impossible for the government servant not to eat up at least a bit of king’s revenue. It is a worldwide phenomenon, not confined to India alone. Corruption has progressively increased both horizontally and vertically. It may not be possible to root it out
completely at all levels but certainly it is possible to toll it down or to contain it within tolerable limits. There was a time when we had to bribe for the wrong thing done. Now the time has gone when we have to bribe for getting right things done at the right time.

Prasanna Gettu (1989) has concluded that Corruption has no doubt spread its tentacles into the public life. The present situation is such that people are aware of the various corrupt practices that exist in government departments. They see the evil proliferating and know also the sources, causes and consequences of corruption. If only they have the will and commitment to fight this evil, a clean government might emerge. They seem to tolerate survivalist type of corruption while at the same time condemn consumerist corruption. The public have lost faith in the present democratic form of government, which has failed to curb corruption even though it may not eradicate it, completely. The “generation gap” certainly exists as far as the views on corruption are concerned. The older generations have a completely different outlook as compared to the younger generation. They do not accept the existing system – social, economic and administration. It is surprising, however, how much a mere individual inspired by sincere motive can achieve by percept and personal example in such matters; but ultimately, it is mass communication media like newspapers and also educational institution that have to play the decisive role. This is the subject to which our leaders, if they are really serious about tackling the problem, must give immediate and serious consideration. What India needs today is a moral revolution.
According to Ravindran G (1990), when one thinks of the debate Indians have had on the issues of Communalism and Corruption over the past nine years --- the deadly seriousness, heated duals and cynical overtones – it becomes concomitant upon one to believe that we have never seen anything like it before. Perhaps in all fairness, the Indian Press too, has never seen anything like it either. The issues of Communalism and Corruption, after all, had put the entire political fabric under a strain never felt before. By steadily weakening the centre’s authority over the Country’s several constituents. The degree of salience of public opinion on Communalism and corruption appears to be clearly at odds with the importance reflected in the amount of coverage devoted to these issues in India Today. Press Opinion, then presumably negates at least some of the impact which a poll showing that communalism and corruption average better to be major problems for Indians might have upon a political influential attempting to gauge public opinion on these issues. It is probably true to say that the issues of communalism and corruption in India have been subject to two predominant tendencies; a stable and even increasing acceptance of anti Congress (I) views; and increasing gains in political power by parties committed to making electoral capital of theses issues, faced with the knowledge of these tendencies, India Today covers the issues of Communalism and Corruption in a manner that fully runs down the Congress (I) Party.
Robin Theobald (1990) viewed that in India the fight against corruption goes back at least to Lord Cornwallis (appointed Governor-General in 1786) and his insistence that Company servants abandon involvement in commercial transactions confining their activities to public business. Whilst petty corruption – ‘speed money’ – is tolerated in modern India by the recognition that probably nothing can be done about it, various attempts have been made to keep in check abuses by senior or ‘gazetted’ public servants. Official concern about corruption intensified after independence had brought a massive increase of state involvement in the economy thereby greatly expanding the opportunities for graft. Since 1964 a Central Vigilance Commission with branches in each ministry has been the principal watchdog over the civil service. Branches report suspected abuses to the Central Commission who pass on cases to a special department of the police, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The Bureau investigates and brings suitable cases before the courts. The fact that the Bureau acquires resources on the basis of the number of convictions it secures is supposed to be some kind of guarantee against the lethargy that is often attributed to such institutions elsewhere. Despite strenuous efforts the CBI has not been able to increase the number of convictions of corrupt public servants even though opportunities for abuse continue to increase. Weighing this record against the alleged extent of corruption in contemporary India, one may liken the position of the Central Vigilance Commission to a thumb in dyke that crumbles irreparably under the swell of a ‘sea of corruption’.
Syed Hussein Alatas (1990) has described that in India corruption has been held in contempt since at least 1000 BC, as it has been in China and Ancient Greece. The Laws of Manu laid down that the king should not act on greed, and should not be extortionate in taxation, he must appoint trustworthy officials to collect money, the king who oppresses his kingdom shall be killed, together with his family and that corrupt officials who accept bribes from the villagers are to be banished and have their property seized. This was the opinion of Indian sages and political thinkers throughout the ages. The great Mauryan Prime Minister, Kautilya (4th century BC) was apprehensive of corruption and its effect on the administration and the country. Indian political philosophy has always stressed the protective function of the state. Somadeva a Digambara Jain teacher of the tenth century declared that bribery is the door through which come all manner of sins. If the king is a deceiver, he shall be deserted and shall not live long.

In 1962 several Members of Parliament referred to the growing menace of corruption in the administration. A Committee was formed by the then Minister of Home Affairs, Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri, headed by a Member of Parliament, Shri K Santhanam. The final report of the Committee was presented to the government on 31 March 1964. The report was written in a milieu of corruption which had even extended to schools, colleges and courts. It had grown to such a proportion that a large majority of people doubted whether it could be eradicated: corruption was all pervasive. “In our
Country,” said Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, then President of India, “moral life is shaken to its foundations. Love of wealth and power has gained wide acceptance. Most of us live on the surface of life with no moral earnestness.” There is hardly any corner of Indian life which has not been defiled by corruption. It has been suggested that the total systematic corruption prevailing today was brought about by the Second World War. The Santhanam Committee Report pointed this out. In India, according to the committee, the immense war effort involving large scale government expenditure for war supplies provided opportunities for corruption. During the days of British imperialism, cheating the government was popularly regarded as patriotic. Removing light bulbs and other fittings from train compartments, protecting offenders from the police, income tax evasion, all these were supposed to prevent the colonial government from grabbing Indian money. After independence in 1947, the habit of cheating the government continued.

Hoshiar Singh and Mohinder Singh (1993) has narrated the statement of Lal Bahadur Shastri, the then Minister of Home Affairs in the Lok Sabha: “Since we know most of the problems (of corruption), the real point is to take remedial action.” In pursuance of the statement, the Committee of Prevention of Corruption, known as the Santhanam Committee was appointed in 1962 by the Government of India with K Santhanam, MP as its Chairman. The Committee submitted a comprehensive report on March 31, 1964, had made 137 recommendations; out of these, 106 were accepted by
the Government of India. The Santhanam Committee recommended that the Central Vigilance Commission should have three Directorates, Directorate of General Complaints and Redress, Central Police Organisation and Directorate of Vigilance. The proposal of a Directorate of Central Police Organisation was considered unnecessary for the CVC. The Commission is headed by the Central Vigilance Commissioner to be appointed by the President of India for a period of six years or till the age of 65, whichever is earlier. The Committee on Prevention of Corruption made comprehensive suggestions to strengthen and make more effective, the Vigilance Organisation in each Ministry/Department. An officer in each Ministry/Department, designated as Chief Vigilance Officer, looks after the vigilance work. Each State has a State Vigilance Commission, headed by the State Vigilance Commissioner, who has the status of a High Court Judge.

The real remedy for the evil of corrupt practices lies in creating a clean and healthy atmosphere in which every person holding a prominent position in the political, social, religious and even educational spheres shall follow a certain standard of conduct, a life of austerity and simplicity, and imbibe the good values of our country.

Subramanian S (1994) has discussed that a liberal Democracy is dependent for its survival on its capacity to ensure probity in public life and to deal with terrant without fear or favour. Corruption is a natural by-product of an environment where political power is derived from numerical support. Instances of political corruption are not lacking
in other democracies, but what makes them great is that their capacity to deal with the corrupt severely, - when exposed. What has been the Indian experience? When monumental corruption of politicians were brought to light by a vigilant Press and an alert opposition, people in authority swept them under the carpet and scuttled all worthwhile probes. The fact that after 47 years of Independence, we do not have an independent machinery like an ombudsman or the Lokpal to deal with corruption of politicians speaks volumes about our lack of sincerity in dealing with political corruption.

Steps have already been indicated to ensure the autonomy of the CBI. There should be no bar for the CBI to ‘trap’ a corrupt politician; conduct raids and to register, suo motto, cases. Private complaints should, however, be referred to the Lokpal in the first instance and investigation taken up only after obtaining the approval of the Lokpal. This is to ensure that frivolous complaints are not taken up by the CBI. Success of these measures would depend upon the moral stature and ethical commitment of the Lokpal. President of India should appoint the Lokpal only after consulting leaders of all political parties, Speaker of Lok Sabha and Chairman of Rajya Sabha. This will ensure that Lokpal commands the respect of one and all. Lokpal could be a single or multi-member body. It would function on the lines of Supreme Court of India.

Subramanian S (1996) has mentioned that Santanam Committee on Prevention of Corruption - 1962, submitted its report in 1964 and felt that prevention is better than cure and made farsighted and far reaching recommendations by suggesting the creation
of the Central Vigilance Commission and the internal vigilance set up for all government organizations and departments. The committee felt that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of purity, integrity and efficiency of any Ministry, Department and Public Sector undertaking should rest with the Secretary of that Ministry or the head of the Undertaking and suggested the appointment of a Chief Vigilance Officer in all Ministries and undertakings to assist and advise the head, on vigilance matters. The CVO was made responsible for implementing all anti-corruption measures, deal with all vigilance matters and to act as a link with other agencies like the CBI. He was expected to conduct regular and surprise inspections of sensitive points in the organisation, review and streamline the procedures which afford scope for mischief and corruption. He was expected to initiate necessary measures for the prevention, detection, prosecution or departmental punishments for the corruption and other malpractices. He was expected to maintain close cooperation with the CBI and to coordinate all action in respect of the anti-corruption cases pertaining to his charge. With this very impressive charter of duties, the CVO, in practice, was hamstrung in his work and was required to have the blessings of his Head of the department in every one of his moves. Santhanam committee perhaps could not foresee a spectacle, when heads of the organisations themselves would lack probity and in many instances work against the interests of the organisation! The autonomy enjoyed by the CVO was merely on paper and he was required to take the approval and consent of the head for all his actions. Any well
meaning effort on his part to bring in probity was interpreted as obstructionist and against the commercial interests of the organisation. Thus, the CVOs started playing safe and contented themselves with processing routine cases of failure to comply with conduct rules and other cases of misfeasance. They steered clear of real corruption cases and when it became inevitable, passed on the baton to the CBI. If all the CVOs in the Ministries and the Departments, which were involved in the myriad scams that have come to the notice in the recent past, have only performed their duties as expected of them, most of these scams would have come to notice earlier and perhaps some of them could have been prevented.

The Central Vigilance Commission should be made a statutory body. It should be made a multi member commission. It should be headed by a serving Supreme Court Justice and have as its members former chief executives of Public Sector Undertakings and Banks. Its advice should be made binding on the disciplinary authorities. Like the CAG, the CVC should also submit periodical reports to the Government and the Parliament on the Vigilance efforts and wrong doings coming to notice. The Central Bureau of Investigation has its hands too full and is unable to pay proper attention to cases of misappropriation, embezzlement and breach of trust etc. A separate wing of the CBI to deal with these types of cases in the Government Departments and the PSUs should be created and placed under the direct control of the CVC.
Vinod Pavarala (1996) has mentioned that the subject of corruption has been an integral part of India’s economic, political and social life since achieving independence from Britain in 1947, and probably even before. Political and bureaucratic corruption at different levels of the government has been seen as plaguing implementation of development programs and policies. Various state governments and the central government have from time to time declared their intentions to control the phenomenon and have created special agencies such as the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) and the Lokayukta, seemingly too little avail as the obsession with corruption and measures to counter it continues. The problem has been the concern of various commissions of inquiry and government committees, including the oft-quoted Committee on the Prevention of Corruption (also known as the Santhanam Committee after its chairman) and the earlier Railway Corruption Enquiry Committee of 1955. In India the most significant law concerning corruption, one that legally draws the boundaries between corrupt and non-corrupt acts, is the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (amended in 1988). The law seems to apply specifically to actions involving ‘public servants’ in the pursuance of ‘public duty’. ‘Public duty’ is defined as ‘a duty in the discharge of which the State, the public or the community at large has an interest’ (PCA 1948[1988]). It is clear from this that the legal view of corruption encompasses a combination of the notions of ‘public office’ and ‘public interest’.
Daniel Kaufmann (1997) has explained stated that the king's adviser perpectively hinted at the link between illiberal trade, bureaucratic harassment at the border, and corruption. And he understood that corruption encompassed far more than bribery: The theft of public revenues was explicitly addressed. By contrast, in more recent times a revisionist view has held that corruption may not be inconsistent with development and at times may even foster it. In the late 1970s, Nathaniel Leff of Columbia University argued, for example, that "corruption may introduce an element of competition into what is otherwise a comfortably monopolistic industry....[and] payment of the highest bribes [becomes] one of the principal criteria for allocation....Hence, a tendency toward efficiency is introduced into the system." Likewise economist Francis Lui, in a 1985 issue of the Journal of Political Economy, asserted that "bribing strategies...minimize the average value of the time costs of the queue....[and the official]...could choose to speed up the service when bribery is allowed."

While this coarse variant of the revisionist view is less frequently proposed today, more subtle versions still abound. These contemporary versions wrap corruption in a cloud of ambiguity. Ambiguity, for example, is said to cloud corruption's meaning in different cultures, implying that what is viewed as corruption in the West would be interpreted differently within the customs of emerging economies. Ambiguity also characterizes the revisionist assessment of corruption's effects on economic growth, fuelled by the fact that some of the Asian tigers have both phenomenal growth and high
levels of corruption. Then there is ambiguity about the "true commitment" of élites to root out corruption in their country, as well as about whether anything can really be done to eliminate corruption. Finally, ambiguity emerges in discussions of the effects of market reforms on corruption. Nobody disputes the ethical failings associated with corruption. Yet the ambiguities about corruption, its causes, its effects, and its cures cause many to wonder whether fighting it should be a true priority or merely a rhetorical one. Not in dispute is the fact that fighting corruption has become a rhetorical priority. In recent years, an explosion of papers, conferences, and newspaper articles has covered this topic. Many writings suggest that corruption has acquired epidemic proportions in a vast number of countries. Civic society is clamouring to address the issue in many places. Nongovernmental organizations such as Transparency International provide Web sites full of information on cross-country corruption indices. The World Bank, which is poised to take concrete action, can also deliver technical assistance programs to help reorganize customs institutions, develop transparent and effective treasury departments, and spearhead procurement and auditing reform within governments. Pilot programs could be initiated rapidly, in collaboration with Transparency International and domestic institutions that want to take the lead in a cleanup effort. Supporting Transparency International's public education and information role in publicizing individual countries' track records on corruption is also likely to have high payoffs. Finally, international institutions should take steps to
encourage participatory approaches in these countries in order to build consensus for anticorruption drives and associated reforms. Civil society is likely to be a major ally in resisting corruption. More and more, it is this ally that seeks concrete support from Western agencies and countries in actively combating corruption.

Chitkara M G (1997) has mentioned that the Santhanam Committee appointed during September 1962, frankly admitted that it was expected of the Civil Servants that in governance of the Country, the followers of Gandhi would set a standard of integrity that might justify popular expectation in both political and administrative field but this hope has not been realized in full measure. It was hoped that “this solid and hard core of honest public servants” could serve as a base for doing a lot of cleansing of our public life. The Santhanam Committee on the Prevention of Corruption of 1962 came out with a detailed analysis of the problem and recommended various political and administrative measures. There are no follow up action in the real sense. The Administrative Reforms Commission of 1966 recommended the setting up of the Lokpal and the Lokayukta, the former to enquire into complaints against Ministers and Secretaries while the later to deal with all other public servants. The Santhanam Committee also stressed the need for creating a social climate against corruption, which luckily has been sufficiently generated. The Administrative Reforms Commission in its interim Report placed before the Parliament in November 1966, has favoured the setting up of such that “the answer to general outcry against inefficiency and
maladministration and corruption lay not in mere justification of the administration, but in the provision of a machinery which would examine such complaints and thereby held to present the correct image of the administration before the public.”

Chitkara M G (1998) has analysed and found that number of cases of corruption in the state have been documented during the critical decades after Independence when Nehru was Prime Minister: nor were cases of corruption absent in the Centre itself. It was in response to the concerned expressed in Parliament on the growing menace of Corruption in Public Administration that the Government of India set up a Committee of MPs and Officials, under the chairmanship of Mr. K Santhanam in the closing years of the Nehru period, to undertake a comprehensive inquiry into the problem. In its restricted meaning of bribery or abuse of power for illegal gratification, Corruption is as much a forbidden act in terms of laws as assault, theft, robbery and murder. The Indian Penal Code listing primarily the main stream offences and enacted by the British rulers during the 19th Century, also enlisted bribery as one of the offences and prescribed punishment for its, vide Sections 161 to 165. On the eve of Independence, a separate and specific legislation was enacted to deal with corruption Act, 1947 covered different facets of Corruption that had come to notice, especially in course of large scale supply of defence and other materials to Government of India during the Second World War. Needless to say, the provisions of this Act, As well as those of the Indian Penal Code, were aimed at curbing corruption among government servants because there was no
question of political corruption before the transfer of power to politicians. But the terms “public servant” used in the Act was wise enough to include Ministers in its purview. The Aiyar Commission of 1967 which enquired into allegation against Bihar Ministers recommended for investigation into specific charges of Corruption against some of them. The Central Bureau of Investigation investigated these charges and on giving prima facie evidence filed charge-sheet in court against three of them, under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.

Naunihal Singh (1998) has examined that a person who accepts illegal gratification is punishable for offence under the IPC as well as the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (which replaces the PC Act, 1947). These penal sanctions operate only after the corruption actually occurs.

Measures for tackling the problem of corruption may be broadly classified under three heads – Preventive, Punitive and Promotional. A Special law to deal with Corruption was first enacted in 1947 in the form of Prevention of Corruption Act. It defined certain categories of public functionaries as public servants under the Act and spelt out the punishment for different acts of bribery and corruption by such public servants. It was comprehensively amended in 1988 to include some more public functionaries under the definition of “public servant” for the purpose of the Act. In the early years after Independence, the Government’s keenness to root out corruption, was reflected in several administrative measures that were taken to discipline the conduct of
public servants and effectively monitor their performance by the hierarchical command structure in each department. The Santhanam Committee set up by Parliament in 1962 examined this matter and made a number of recommendations for strengthening the Vigilance and Anti-corruption machinery in the Government. In the late fifties and early sixties the DSPE had successfully investigated some cases involving high functionaries. The Government dealt with the reports of these investigation promptly and effectively and a climate was brought about which was conducive to the containment of Corruption in all public services. During the years of the Second World War (1939-45), the scope for corruption in the Central Government increased enormously with the handling of large contracts for construction works and supplies connected with defence. It was then, a special investigating unit in the War Department to handle all enquiries relating to corruption. The Unit expanded later as the DSPE and was given a statutory basis on the enactment of the DSPE Act of 1946. In its expanded from the DSPE, was named the Central Bureau of Investigation and has been functioning as such from 1963 under the control of Central Government.

In 1955 the Central Government introduced a scheme of having a Chief Vigilance Officer at the top level in each department assisted by the Vigilance Officers down the line at Middle level to assist the head of the Department in providing guidance and maintaining a contract drive for the effective handling of all corruption complaints. On the Santhanam Committee’s recommendation a Central Vigilance Commission was set
up by the Central Government by an executive decision embodied in a Resolution in the Ministry of Home Affairs dated 11.02.1964. The new CVC with a corresponding role is for directing and supervising vigilance and anti corruption work with the Shape. This will include monitoring the work of State Anti Corruption Bureau, also in the same times as proposed for the Central Vigilance Commission in regard to the Central Bureau of Investigation.

Jeremy Pope (1999) has discussed that as the corrupt grow more sophisticated, conventional law enforcement agencies are becoming less able to detect and prosecute complex corruption cases. Furthermore, in a system in which corruption is endemic, conventional law enforcement mechanisms may themselves harbour corrupt officials and they will tend to lack the sophistication and expertise essential to the task.

In recent years, governments have sought to bolster detection efforts by introducing independent Anti-Corruption Agencies or Commissions. Given that prevention is always better than prosecution, a small investigative and monitoring unit with appropriate authority and independence from politicians (where much of the problem can lie) may be much better placed to ensure that effective preventive steps are identified and taken.

It is, of course, possible to combine such an Agency with the office of the conventional Ombudsman (as in Uganda and Papua New Guinea). Others would argue that there is a clear distinction between the two roles: that the Ombudsman is there to
promote administrative fairness and that this is best achieved by winning the confidence of the bureaucracy. An Agency which is also charged with the investigation and prosecution of civil servants is more likely to be feared than trusted. Outstanding examples of successful anti-corruption agencies are to be found in Singapore, Hong Kong, Botswana, Malawi, South Africa (under the post-apartheid government) and Australia.

As noted, an anti-corruption agency is often viewed as wielding a "big prosecution stick", but in practice its most important function can lie in corruption prevention. This is a core function of the agency in the Bill now before the National Assembly. By building up managerial and systems skills, a professionally-staffed agency is able to audit anti-corruption arrangements in government departments and public works contracting, and sharply reduce the opportunities for corruption to take place. There can never be a society which is both free and wholly corruption-free; but levels of corruption can be kept to tolerable levels. Anti-corruption agencies in many parts of the world have developed techniques which they are willing to share with fellow professionals, and so Nigeria would be placing itself in a position to benefit immeasurably and quickly from a deep well of international experience in this particular aspect of anti-corruption reform.

The anti-corruption strategy adopted by President Olusegun Obasanjo is a well-thought one. Indeed, given the support of all sections of the Nigerian nation it can be successful. As per this strategy, there are four distinct "limbs":
• Leadership (which he is addressing through the Code of Conduct for Ministers and in many other ways);

• Institutional strengthening and reform (of which the Bill under discussion forms an important part)

• Strengthening of laws, practices and procedures (again, in which the Bill plays a part); and

• The wider environment (e.g. civil society, private sector and the like and in which meetings such as this form an important part).

**Prasanna Gettu (1999)** has concluded that Corruption in general, indicates dishonest dealing/s by a person or persons who hold a position in a public office – In simple terms, it is the attainment or attempted attainment of gain, whether it be monetary, material goods or fulfillment of emotional or psychological drives or illegal methods. But the act of an official, who is duly empowered to deal with such offences and who does not give any cognizance to or allows them to take place, or deals with the culprits liberally, can fairly be regarded as Corruption. Definitions which are conventional, or situational specific, describe corruption in terms of violation of particular laws. In India, the PC Act (1988, amended in 1991) penalizes the public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration, in respect of an official act. Section 8 of the Act holds that, “whoever accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept, or
attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for inducing by corrupt or illegal means........”. The uprooting of bribery and corruption in India was the declared objective of the Special Enactment of the PC Act, on the 11th March 1947 (amended Act 1988 and 1991). The Bakshi Tekchand Committee was set up in 1949 to review the working of the PC Act, 1947 and to make recommendations regarding any improvements that might be considered necessary in law as well as in regard to the machinery for enforcing them, to assess the extent of success achieved by the SPE in combating corruption and to make recommendations regarding continuance, strengthening and the like of the SPE. The Railway Corruption Inquiry Committee under the chairmanship of Acharya J B Kripalani, was appointed in Oct 1953. The Administrative Vigilance Units in the Ministerial department came into existence. The Vivian Bose Commission was appointed in December 1956. In 1962 the Committee on Prevention of Corruption was appointed under the chairmanship of Shri K Santhanam.

Ramesh K Arora (1999) has mentioned that a Significant concern of administrative reforms in India has been the integrity of public (and not just the civil) servants. The unity of politics and administration in matters of rectitude is a well – accepted doctrine. Though there have been sporadic efforts in the realm of strengthening the fabric of integrity in public life, such as the Railway Corruption Enquiry Committee headed by the veteran leader J B Kriplani (1955) a more
comprehensive attempt in this sphere was made by the Committee on Prevention of Corruption, which was chaired by the noted parliamentarian, K Santhanam. The setting up of the Vigilance Commission in the Government of India and strengthening of anti-corruption departments following the recommendations of the Santhanam report have been useful steps, but most of the measures adopted for cleansing public life have fallen far short of the requirements. The half-hearted administrative measures have not been backed by strong political initiative and in the absence of a supportive socio-economic and political environment, the administrative reform efforts undertaken to improve the level of integrity have met with very little success. The problem of combating corruption in public life continues to be challenging. The existing machinery comprising the Vigilance Commission, Lokayuktas, and the Central Bureau of Investigation does not seem to have delivered satisfactory results in checking corruption in the public systems. There is need for launching a renewed attack on corruption through special drives, surprise checks, effective follow-up, rigorous supervision and regular monitoring. However this is one area where the efforts being made fall far short of the ideal requirement.

Narasimhan C V (2000) has mentioned that a fundamental principle in anti-corruption work enunciated by the Santhanam Committee on Prevention of Corruption (1964) is that the responsibility for keeping a department clean and free from malpractices rests squarely on the Head of the Dept. himself, and he has to discharge
this responsibility with the assistance of his own staff down the line. In departments, which are more prone to malpractices because of the nature of their functions and contacts with the public, the Head of the Dept. is to be assisted by a Senior Officer designated as the Vigilance officer for the department. It is the special responsibility of the vigilance officer to maintain a close watch on the performance of the department at different levels especially from the vigilance point of view, and periodically modify the working procedures to minimize the scope for malpractices and harassment to the public. The Head of the department and his vigilance officer should not feel that the CBI or the State Anti-corruption Bureau is there to take care of all vigilance matters. The CBI and the State Anti-corruption Bureau are essentially meant to look into cases which prima-facie merit investigation for a possible prosecution in court and also cases which would require the examination of witnesses and records outside the department which the departmental vigilance officer himself may not be able to do effectively.

Though the set up of vigilance officers has been conceived with excellent objectives on paper, the system will not work well in practice if the wrong type of officers are designated as vigilance officers. The most important first step in this whole exercise is the careful selection of good, well-motivated and enthusiastic officers as the Vigilance Officers at different levels in the department, under the control and direction of a Chief Vigilance Officer at the top. The Central Vigilance Commission, the CBI and the State Anti-Corruption Bureau will be able to assist and advise in this matter. In the
organisational hierarchy the Chief Vigilance Officer should be placed directly below the Head of the department, with no one coming in between. Similarly, Vigilance Officers down the line should be placed directly below the Head of the Unit to which they are attached. The rank and status of Vigilance Officers may be suitably raised to secure this hierarchical arrangement.

**Narayanasamy N, Boraian M P, Jeyaraju M A (2000)** have analysed that we have enough material on Corruption. There are Bibles on Corruption: “The report of the Santhanam Committee on Corruption”, “Corruption in India: Agenda for Action”, brought out by the public Affairs Centre of Bangalore and the Administrative Reforms Commission’s Report of Shri Morarji Desai. There is nothing in them that needs to be mentioned again. Everything that one can conceive of is in those three Bibles. The Santhanam Committee (1962) observed that there is large consensus of opinion that a new tradition of integrity can be established only if the example is set by those who have the ultimate responsibility for the governance of India, namely the Ministers of Central and State Governments. Ministries are necessarily the leaders of the political party which succeeds in obtaining a majority in elections based on adult suffrage. There is a wide spread impression that failure of integrity is not uncommon among ministers and that some ministers who have held office during the last 16 years have enriched themselves through nepotism and have reaped other advantages in consistent with any notion of purity in public life. According to the Santhanam Committee, the law of
corruption is (i) war time controls and scarcity, post-war flush of money and consequent inflation; (ii) the rapid expansion of governmental activities in new fields; (iii) decline in real income of salaried classes and (iv) growth of monopolies and the rise of the managerial class. The Santhanam Committee reported that two of the major contributory factors for the growth of corruption are first, the partially acknowledged unwillingness to deal drastically with corrupt and inefficient public servants and secondly, the protection given to the services in India, which is greater than that available in the more advanced countries.

Shahi M P (2000) has mentioned that Corruption is a serious problem affecting the entire society at all levels and in all sectors. It is also the most obvious social concern—a theme of everyday discussion and debate. The nature of corruption was politico-administrative, involving collusion between the politicians and the higher level civil servants. This is amply confirmed by two reports which appeared in the early sixties—the report of the Commission of Inquiry against Pratap Singh Kairon, the Chief Minister of Punjab, 1964 and report of the Committee on Prevention of Corruption, 1964. While the S.R Dass Commission report is a case study indicting Kairon of corruption and amassing wealth by abuse of official machinery in which civil servants connived. The Santhanam report is more generalized and concludes that the regime of regulations based on controls and licenses provided the congenial environment for amassing riches by the unscrupulous elements in politics. Corruption in public life is not entirely
unattended in India. Sections 161 to 171 of the Indian Penal Code first enacted in 1860 were designed to curb it. In the very year of its Independence, India put on the statute book The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. To deal with high level administrative corruption, the Santhanam Committee had recommended setting up of independent Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) keeping ministers out of its purview, but bringing all public servants of the Central government and its PSUs within its jurisdiction. This Commission was to be headed by a high level CVC with the same measure of autonomy, independence and status as the Comptroller and Auditor General of India or the Chief Election Commissioner.

Suresh Govindarajan (2012) identified various strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats exist in the establishment and functioning of Central Vigilance Commission vis-à-vis the important recommendations of the Santhanam Committee. He found great opportunity exist in converting the Central Vigilance Commission itself as the most sought after institution of Lokpal by making suitable modifications. He also highlights the recommendation of the Santhanam Committee to establish the Regional Offices of the Central Vigilance Commission.

Vittal N (2000) has stated that the forces of corruption in our country pose to individual and organizations that want to fight it. Everyone in India pays lip service to the principle of honesty. We belong to the land of Gandhi for whom truth and non-violence were the fundamental principles of existence. Our nation’s motto is Satyameva Jayate.
Therefore, at the level of lip service, we are all for truth and honesty. Our government believes that truth will prevail and all our religions advocate that we should tell the truth. But, the reality is that India is one of the most corrupt countries in the world.

According to him, the first challenge in fighting corruption is to establish an objective pecking order of the level of corruption as perceived by the public. Like Transparency International, the NGOs and the professional bodies in India must be encouraged to grade all organizations, under the purview of the CVC, according to levels of corruption. This will have the following advantages: (a) If the study is objective, it will pre-empt the kind of drama enacted by the DDA employees this year and Delhi customs last year; and (b) this will enable the CVC to draw an action plan with the right priorities in the tackling of corruption.

Corruption flourishes in our system because of five basic reasons. These are: (i) scarcity of goods and services; (ii) red tape and complicated rules and procedures; (iii) lack of transparency in decision-making; (iv) legal cushions of safety for the corrupt under the ‘healthy’ principle that everyone is innocent till proved guilty; and (v) tribalism or biradari among the corrupt who protect each other. The popular phrase is ‘thick as thieves’ not ‘thick as honest people’.

Corruption is like malaria, handled by either giving medicine to those affected or by preventing the breeding of mosquitoes. Many of our rules and procedures breed corruption. Orders have therefore been issued to check and simplify procedures. The second step is empowering the public and bringing in greater transparency. The orders of
the CVC with regard to checking corruption are in the public domain. They can be easily accessed through the website of the CVC. One such order has been referred to earlier. Another is that every office should have a board stating, ‘don’t pay bribes. If anybody asks for a bribe, you can complain to the CVO, CVC.’ This way one can educate the public who come to every small office of the GOI and other organisations like banks and public sector undertakings that there is a way out if they do not want to pay bribes.

The CBI, with the revised position of the CVC, is today in a position to take independent action. A corrupt politician, whether in power or not, is as liable for criminal suit under the Prevention of Corruption Act as any other citizen. It should, therefore, be possible for the CBI to bring corrupt politicians to book. For this we first need to beef up the CBI’s strength. Second to speed up investigation procedures and third to improve and speed up the prosecution processes.

Prevention, after all, is better than cure. In mechanical engineering we talk about preventive, predictive and breakdown maintenance. When it comes to business frauds, it is always better to adopt preventive and predictive maintenance principles rather than the breakdown maintenance principle, which is like locking the stable doors after the horse has bolted. The need for training in computerisation and using information technology for enhancing the level of security in the financial institutions becomes especially important because ultimately, as Oscar Wilde said, the thief is the artist and the policeman only a critic.
Srivastava C P (2001) has mentioned that when Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri became the home minister in 1961, the prevention of corruption and the observance of integrity throughout the governmental machinery became a part of his responsibility. Shri Shastri knew that corruption was on the increase and that even some politicians holding high public office in government has not been able to resist temptation. He soon came to the conclusion that his entire subject in all its ramifications needed to be studied by a high-level committee which could be asked to make specific recommendations. Shri Shastri was able to persuade Shri Nehru, to agree to the appointment of a committee to enquire into the problem of corruption and to recommend specific measures for dealing with every relevant aspect of this problem. He appointed in 1962 a committee with Shri K Santhanam, MP as chairman. Shri Shastri requested the Committee to forward interim reports as soon as the examination of any aspect of the problem was completed in order to enable the government to proceed urgently with further action as required. The Committee proceeded with its task with the requisite thoroughness and dispatch. It examined a large number of witnesses including two central cabinet ministers, two chief ministers, two state ministers, a number of secretaries to the Government of India and other senior officials. It submitted several interim reports and a final report on 31 March 1964. A Central Vigilance Commission was established under a Central Vigilance Commissioner to supervise and coordinate all vigilance work throughout the machinery
of central government. The existing Special Police Establishment was re-organised, expanded and named as the Central Bureau of Investigation.

**Gour N D (2003)** has stated that the objective of the study is about the need for a strong vigilance organization in the PSEs with a set of rules to regulate the conduct of the employees of the undertakings.

Vigilance has to be looked upon as one of the essential components management. It is as important a segment in an organization like Finance, Personnel, Technical and Marketing. If the vigilance set up is effective in an organization, it will certainly ensure the functioning of the other segment like Finance, Personnel, Technical and Marketing in an efficient way. It has therefore to be given a rightful place in the management.

The objective of vigilance is to ensure that the management gets the maximum out of its various transactions. In the field of purchases, it should get the quality product at competitive rates. In the field of sales, it should get the maximum realization for its products at the minimal selling cost. In the field of personnel, it recruits the best talented people and keeps the morale of the people high. Likewise, in anyone of its transactions, it should endeavour to get the best. Unlike in private organizations (mostly individual concerns) where individuals whose interest are totally centered round on the profitable functioning of the organization, in public sector organizations it is
rather difficult to inculcate that culture without a vigilance set up. The presence of a vigilance set up will enable the management to enable the presence of that culture.

To conclude, it may be said that all these procedures could work well only if there is a total commitment and honesty on the part of management in implementing them. Let us therefore dedicate ourselves to be honest to implement the vigilant procedures effectively to make these public sector undertakings function in an effective way so that they could reach the commanding heights in the economic and social development of the country.

Kashyap R K (2003) has stated that the Chief Technical Examiner’s Organization works under administrative control of the CVC. It deals with Technical matters including technical examination of works undertaken by various organizations, Ministries, Departments and Public Sector Undertakings etc.

The Public Accounts Committee, in 1947-48 recommended to set up an interdepartmental committee to examine the question of setting up an independent inspection agency for Technical examination of expenditure of Central Public Works Department works.

The Committee, set up in May 1948 recommended introduction of an organization on the pattern of Chief Technical Examiner and Chief Surveyor of the works in the Central Public Works Department.
Public Accounts Committee, in year 1956 reiterated and pressed for setting up Chief Technical Examiner’s Organisation and Central Government issued formal order for creation of Chief Technical Examiner’s Cell in the then Ministry of the Work Housing and Supply in May 1957.

As per recommendation of Committee on Prevention of Corruption under the Chairmanship of Shri. K. Santhanam, the jurisdiction of Chief Technical Examiner was extended to cover the construction works undertaken by other Ministries/Departments/Public Sector Undertakings etc. and Chief Technical Examiner’s Organisation was placed under the administrative control of the CVC in 1964.

Chief Technical Examiner may carry out Intensive Examination of any work of any magnitude, yet, considering its limited resources, it generally examines works of larger size only. The quarterly progress reports of all important works are sent to the Chief Technical Examiner organization in January, April, July and October every year by the concerned Public Sector Undertaking/Department. The Chief Technical Examiner’s Inspections are mostly done with prior intimation so that concerned Engineers, Planners, Designers and the tender accepting authority may clarify their points. After intensive examination is carried out by the Technical Examiner of the Chief Technical Examiner’s Organization, inspection report is sent to the CVO of concerned Department/Ministry/PSU.

Suresh G (2003) has mentioned that every action has an equal and opposite reaction”, says Newton in his third law. Newton needs a rebirth to explain this law,
when it comes to corruption. Let us apply the third law of Newton to corruption, particularly, bribery. Bribery means “the act of giving or taking bribe” that is what is the dictionary meaning for bribery. Therefore, it is an act and as such according to Newton this act or action is bound to have an equal and opposite reaction. There are two aspects involved in the reaction part. One, there will be an equal reaction and two, the equal reaction will be in the opposite direction too. If we look at Bribery, it is quantified only in terms of its cash value. Similarly, the expected benefits out of paying a bribe can also be quantified only in terms of its cash value. Obviously, the cash value of bribery is necessarily less than the expected cash value of the benefits, out of paying bribes, that too by manifold. Otherwise, the act will no longer be termed as bribery and may, perhaps, be called as ‘Charity’. Therefore, the reaction to the act of bribe is not equal to the very act, in terms of its cash value. Then how is it balanced, to prove Newton to be right? It is the opposite reaction to the act of bribe, which strikes the balance to conform the Newton’s third law. There are various elements perceived, which contribute to this opposite reaction. With due respect to Newton and in order to sound alarm to bribe takers, the equation for bribe could be derived as follows:

\[ c = b - [d (r+pf)+v] \]

Where

\( c \) is the cash value of the bribe
b is the cash value of the expected benefit

d is the probability of discovery or detection

r is the reputation

p is the probability of punishment

f is the ‘cost’ of punishment

v is the values and conscience

Unfortunately, even though the bribery involves two sides, i.e., bribe givers and bribe takers, it is only the latter who contribute more for the opposite reaction to the act of bribe, in terms of Newton’s third law. As is evident from the above formula, on the reaction part, except the element ‘b’, all other elements concern only the bribe takers.

Vittal N (2003) has analyzed that the Santhanam Committee recommendations of 1962 led in 1964 the Government of India to set up the Central Vigilance Commission under an executive order and continued for 34 years in that position. The CVC was essentially an advisory body. The Supreme Court in the Vineet Narain case on December 18, 1997 ordered that the CVC must be selected by a committee consisting of the Prime Minister, the Home Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. In the light of this order, the Central Vigilance Commission Ordinance was promulgated on August 25,
1998. A Bill was introduced to replace the Ordinance on December 7, 1998. As this could not be passed, a fresh Ordinance was issued on January 8, 1999. A genuine attempt has been made by the government to make the CVC into an effective instrument to check corruption. The independence of the CVC, who is appointed by the President, is ensured by the Ordinance, assuring four year tenure. There are a number of detailed procedures in every government department which are breeding grounds for corruption. Section 8(1) (g) of the CVC Ordinance 1999 says that the CVC will “exercise superintendence over the vigilance administration of the various Ministries of the Central Government or corporations established by or under any Central Act, Government companies, societies, local authorities owned or controlled by the Government.” The statutory powers of the CVC and the power of superintendence if interpreted liberally can really create an environment by which the CVC can monitor the activities of departments and organizations under his jurisdiction and ensure that effective prevention of corruption is made through law. It is true that the Prevention of Corruption act, 1988 provides for confiscation of assets of a public servant which are in excess of his known sources of income but such forfeiture can come about only after the public servant is convicted for the relevant offence (section 13 (1)(e)) under the Act. There is also in vogue a pre-independence law, i.e., Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance 38 of 1944 which provides for attachment of properties of a public servant who is
accused of corruption. Ultimately, it is not the laws that matter but the extent to which they are implemented, that are relevant.

Jai Narain Sharma (2004) has mentioned that in 1949, the Dr.Bakshi Tek Chand Committee was appointed by the Government of India to review the working of 1946 DSPE Act and to assess the efficacy of the Special Police Establishment in Combating Corruption. In 1953, the Government also appointed a Railway Corruption Inquiry Committee under the chairmanship of J B Kripalini, which also made useful recommendations in combating corruption in the Railway services. With reports of growing Corruption amongst politicians, ministers and in the Civil Services, the then Home Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri took the initiative and appointed a committee comprising six members of parliament under the chairmanship of Dr. K Santhanam. It was asked to make recommendations to curb corruption in public life. As desired by Shastri, the Committee first submitted an interim report, and the concluding report in March 1964. However, even before the final report was received, steps were initiated to constitute the CBI and the Central Vigilance Commission. The former was instituted on 1st April 1963. The proposal to set-up the CBI had of course been mooted and considered in same detail as early as 1948. Item 8 of the Union list of the Seventh Schedule in the Constitution included, “Investigation alongwith Intelligence”, but no action was taken for fourteen years. The nation owes it to Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri, ably assisted by the then Home Minister L P Singh and the first Director of the CBI, Shri D P
Kohli, to give concrete shape to the recommendations of 1948 and for having set-up the Central Bureau of Investigation.

**Gunnar Myrdal (2005)** has mentioned that nevertheless, a commonly expressed opinion in India is that “administrative corruption, in its various forms, is all around us all the time and that it is rising.” The findings of the Santhanam Committee as to the prevalence of corruption in different branches and levels of responsibility will be reported below, in the text and in footnotes. If a comparison is made with conditions in the colonial era, the usual view of both South Asian and western observers is that corruption is more prevalent now than before independence and that, in particular, it has recently gained ground in the higher echelons of officials and politicians. There seems to be rather general agreement that in the recent year corruption in South Asia has been increasing. The Santhanam Committee report speaks of ‘the growth of corruption’ and of the need to arrest ‘the deterioration in the standards of public life’; the assumption that the recent trend of corruption in India is upwards is implicit in the whole report. Recognition of the very serious effects of corruption in South Asian Countries raises the practical problem of what can be done to eradicate it. In all South Asian countries there have from time to time been anti corruption drives and anti-corruption legislation. In recent years there has been, particularly in India, a growing public anxiety about corruption. The Indian Home Minister, Gulzarilal Nanda, regarded the task of eradicating corruption as his ‘main occupation’ for some time and opened his
house for daily sessions to receive complaints about corruption. The important Santhanam Committee report was an outgrowth of this movement. While restricted to general judgments about the actual facts of corruption and their causes and effects, based on the committee members’ own information and the testimony of numerous witnesses that create opportunities for malfeasance and making recommendations for reform. It urges simpler and more precise rules and procedures for political and administrative decisions that affect private persons and business enterprises and also closer supervision. The main theme of these proposals is that discretionary powers should, in so far as possible, be decreased.

Dutta N K (2006) has mentioned that after an incisive scrutiny of the working efficiency of the Indian Penal Code, the Santhanam Committee on Prevention of Corruption, 1962 recommended for amendment of provisions under Section 21. Recommendations were also made by the Committee for amendment of Section 5 of “The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947”. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 provides ample power to the administrative machinery to prosecute and book those who are involved in corruption. The Delhi Special Police Establishment has been functioning under the Central Government and its jurisdiction extends to all the States and Union Territories. On the establishment of the Central Bureau of Investigation from 01.04.1963, the SPE has been made one of its divisions. The SPE has been made as a special agency for making inquiries and investigations into certain specified offences. In
addition to Police Establishment, Vigilance Organisations at the centre as well as in States are functioning for implementing anti-corruption activities. With a view to strengthening the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and to make the existing anti-corruption laws more effective, the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 has been repealed in 1988. The Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 was amended in 1964 based on the recommendation of the Santhanam Committee. In June 1962, the Government of India constituted a Committee on Prevention of Corruption, headed by K Santhanam, MP. In the unanimous report, the Committee found that the ultimate source of corruption were (i) Ministers (ii) legislators (iii) Political parties and (iv) Industrialists and Merchants who seek favour from these three. In the sixties the Government instituted the Direct Tax Enquiry Committee, popularly known as Wanchoo Committee to have a fresh look at the matter. This committee mainly adopted the methodology of Kaldor and later submitted its report in 1971. Since the publication of the Wanchoo Committee report on 24th December 1971, “black money”, “parallel economy” and “unaccounted income and wealth” have been a matter of continuous discussion at both political and economic levels. Corruption in public services is a well known fact to the common people of India and abroad. But its dimension as it is today is a matter of speculation only.

Vittal N (2007) has mentioned that India is rated as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. It is a country of one billion people and is the largest democracy
in the world. The issue of fighting corruption in such a vast country is indeed a challenge. The issue of corruption has been a subject of debate in the public life of India, almost practically since Independence in 1947. One of the major corruption scandals, which arose in the late 50s at the time of Mr. Jawahar Lal Nehru as the Prime Minister, was the so-called Mundra scam. This was a stock market scam where funds of the government were apparently misused by some unscrupulous speculators through the Life Insurance Corporation of India to fix the stock market. The then Finance Minister Mr T T Krishnamachari had to resign and corruption became a major issue of national concern. A committee under former freedom fighter, Mr K Santhanam was appointed to go into the issue of corruption and make recommendations. The Santhanam Committee submitted its report in 1962. In 1964, as recommended by the Committee, the Central Vigilance Commission was set up. It was to be a single member body and headed by the former Chief Justice, Justice N Srinivasa Rao of the Mysore High Court (now called Karnataka High Court). The Central Vigilance Commission was not a statutory body and was supposed to advice the government on action to be taken in the cases of corruption involving senior public servants of the Government of India and its organizations. From 1964 to 1998 there were ten CVCs. Apart from Justice N Srinivasa Rao, other CVCs were either senior diplomats or retired civil servants. The commission continued to be a single member body and its basic function was to be an advisory body. In 1998 there was a dramatic change forced on the organization of the CVC
because of a judgement of the Supreme Court of India on 18th December 1997. This judgement was delivered in connection with a case relating to a major corruption and foreign exchange scandal called, the Hawala Scam. A journalist, Mr.Vineet Narain, filed Public Interest Litigation in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the investigative agencies of the Government of India namely, the CBI (which is like the FBI in the United States) should be shielded from the external influences and another investigative agency of the Government, called the Enforcement Directorate, which looks in to foreign exchange violations and money laundering issues also was to be immunized from external influences. In order to achieve this goal, the Supreme Court directed the government that the Central Vigilance Commission must be made into a statutory body instead of being only an advisory body operating on the basis of an administrative notification. The CVC must be able to exercise supervision over both the CBI and the Enforcement Directorate. The court also directed that a committee consisting of the Prime Minister, Home Minister and Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha, the Lower House of Parliament must select the CVC. The CVC was to be given a term of four years and he could be removed only by the President. The CVC will be reporting to the President annually and would give a report which is placed on the floor of the Parliament. The CVC will also head a committee which will make recommendations of the panel of names for appointing as the Director, the CBI and other senior officials in the CBI.
Tummala Krishna K (2009) has stated that the Santhanam Committee confirmed as far back as in 1964: "The sudden extension of the economic activities of the Government with a large armory of regulations, controls, licenses and permits provided new and large opportunities (for corruption)." N. Vittal, former Central Vigilance Commissioner (CVC), wrote: “Nearly half of those who avail services of most often visited public departments of Government in the country had the first hand experience of giving bribe at one time or the other. In fact, as high as two thirds of people think that corruption in these offices is real. However, one third think corruption is more exaggerated. And yet, 80 per cent of people are passive and hardly 20 per cent had ever complained about such corruption to any. It is interesting that while 50 per cent of the people reported that they had bribed, only 20 per cent took the trouble of complaining. This also highlights the need for sensitizing the public about the dangers of corruption.”

In 1955, an Administrative Vigilance Commission was created within the Ministry of Home Affairs (later located within the Department of Personnel & Training) with the responsibility to provide direction and coordinate the various efforts of the Ministries to deal with corruption.

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 consolidated the IPC along with all the Amendments. A new concept of “public duty’ was added, and penalties were enhanced. It also sought expeditious trials, and stipulated that no court shall stay the proceedings on the grounds of any error or irregularity in the sanction granted unless in the opinion
of the court it has led to failure of justice. The Act listed (a) offences of bribery and other related offences and penalties; (b) abuse of authority by favoring or harming someone, without any pecuniary consideration or gratification; (c) obstruction or perversion of justice by unduly influencing law enforcement; and (d) squandering public money.

Besides the Administrative Vigilance Division, there are three other institutions at the Union (federal) level: (i) the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC); (ii) individual vigilance units in each of the Ministries and Departments of the Government of India, central public enterprises and other autonomous organizations; and (iii) the Central Bureau of Investigations (CBI). The CVC advises the Government of India on all matters pertaining to the maintenance of integrity in administration, and supervises the CBI and other vigilance administration agencies. The CBI is the principal investigative agency of the central government in all anti-corruption matters. The arrangements vary from State to State, which have either Vigilance Commissions (eg. Tamil Nadu, West Bengal) or the Lokayuktas (or both such as the case in Andhra Pradesh).

The Reforms Enquiry Committee Report (1924) states that Dyarchy introduced under the Government of India Act, 1919 gave rise to numerous problems leading to discontentment, even unhappiness in the nationalist leadership. In 1924, the Government of India appointed the eight-member Reforms Inquiry Committee under the chairmanship of Alexander P. Philips, the home member in the Government. The task before the Committee was to inquire into the difficulties arising from the working
of the Government of India Act, 1919. The main focus of the Committee was thus constitutional and political and certainly not administrative. At the same time, it must be said that the Report did deal with certain administrative matters.

The Reforms Enquiry Committee, which submitted its Report in 1924, examined the working of the Government of India Act, 1919. However, it also discussed the interaction between the bureaucracy and the newly inducted popular ministers, which took place in a limited sphere in the provinces under the Government of India Act, 1919. The question that concerned the Committee was whether the civil servants in India extended full loyalty and co-operation to the ministers in carrying out their tasks. The relationship between the popularly elected minister and the permanent civil servants is of deep significance to public administration in India. The Committee was not unanimous in its views and therefore, presented two reports-the majority report and the minority report.

The minority report was signed by Tej Bahadur Sapru, M.A. Jinnah, Sivaswami Iyer and R. P. Paranjpye. It reflected the nationalist viewpoint on the vital question of interaction and adjustment between the national polity and the bureaucracy. It felt that as the All-India services were in the past mainly responsible for policy-making, this combination of political and administrative functions in the bureaucracy made its members the target of popular criticism.
The majority report which more or less reflected the British viewpoint on the subject gave the answer in an emphatic ‘yes’ and found the Constitutional system satisfactory. It was of the view that the civil servants loyally cooperated with the ministers in working the reforms of 1919.

The minority report signed by nationalist leaders did not agree with this view and reflected a strong feeling of distrust of the bureaucracy not conducive to efficient and good administration. It denounced the All India Services in no uncertain terms. This report is notable for the nationalist’s opposition to the all-India services (majority report). All India services were an anathema to the nationalist India but after independence, the same institution became India’s dream and ultimate choice.

The Government of India Secretariat Committee Report (1937) states that significant move towards constitutional advancement demands suitable retuning of the country’s public administration. Such a disciplined pattern of response consistently marked the behaviour of the Government of India. The enactment of the Government of India Act, 1919 was followed by the appointment of the Llewellyn Smith Committee in 1919 to examine the administrative consequences of the Act. The passage of the Government of India Act, 1935 necessitated a comprehensive examination of the country’s new constitution from the administrative angle in order to make public administration fit for the new goals. The Government of India greeted the Government of India Act, 1935 enacted by the British Parliament, by appointing two committees-the
Maxwell Committee on Organisation and Procedure and the Wheeler Government of India Secretariat Committee.

The Government of India set up the Government of India Secretariat Committee in 1935, which submitted its report in 1936. It consisted of three members including its Chairman Sir Henry Wheeler, other members being C.P. Ramaswami Anjou and James Rae, L.M. Trivedi was the Committee’s Secretary. All were civil servants by background. The Wheeler Committee was called upon to examine the staffing pattern in the Secretariat, the method of office procedure, organization of clerical personnel and to make recommendations to make the whole system ‘more efficient and expeditious’ under the constitution of 1935.

The Government of India Act, 1935 provided for provincial autonomy in place of dyarchical system in the provincial Government, which had been introduced under the Government of India Act, 1919. The Wheeler Committee sought to assess the impact of the change under the Government of India Act, 1935 on the workload of the central Government.

The Wheeler Committee commended the system of staffing of the central secretariat by officer’s drawn from the provinces but found the tenure system being evaded in practice. The Wheeler Committee did not agree with the Lewellyn Smith Committee recommendation for the appointment of an Inspector of Office Procedure to streamline the internal management of office. It recommended a periodical
deputation of an experienced officer with special aptitude for this type of work, who should overhaul an office, particularly one demanding additional personnel.

Public Administration including the Civil Service must necessarily undergo re-structuring and re-programming when the overall national goals of governance change. The Government of India Act, 1935 the last Constitution introduced by Great Britain, was a formal move towards federation in India. The Wheeler Committee examined the effect of the introduction of provincial autonomy on the work of the Government of India (read Secretariat). The Secretariat, the seat of top management in the Government, is the theme of the present Committee and as such the entire report running into 33 pages is worth reading.

The Reports on the Re-Organisation of Central Government (1945-46) states that it has been the British Government’s policy to take India towards responsible Government and tow moves had already been made in this regard-the Government of India Act, 1919, and the Government of India Act, 1935. The Second World War, which broke out in 1939, made further constitutional changes in India even more imminent. The top management in Indian Government was pretty sure of significant changes in the country’s political status and was getting ready for the new role. The Second World War ended in 1945 and the Government of India responded to the changed situation by appointing a senior Civil Servant, Richard Tottenham, to examine the re-organisation of the secretariat system in India.
Tottenham submitted four reports covering the following topics; 1) Reorganisation of Departments-Defence Department; 2) Interim Proposals for the reorganisation of the Government of India; 3) Bifurcation of Labour Department; and 4) Re-organisation of secretariat of these, the fourth report is the most momentous one: it comprises barely twenty-seven page.

Richard Tottenham visualized a new role for Government in the post-war era. He considered it desirable ‘to renounce the old conception of Government as regulatory, policing and taxing mechanism, and openly to adopt the conception of Government as the nation’s common instrument for expanding its social and economic welfare in all those spheres where individuals or private associations cannot achieve equally effective results.

Describing the respective functions of the different grades of officers Tottenham wrote: ‘The general system is that of the “filter.” It is the duty of each grade of officer to dispose of as much work as he can and see that only the most important cases reaches the top officer. ‘He insisted on an agreed nomenclature for each grade and for the charge of each grade.

Tottenham was in favour of retaining the tenure method of recruiting secretariat officers but sought the broadening of the sphere of recruitment by drawing officers from all services and not exclusively from the Indian Civil Service. Also, it is also significant that he suggested a modification in the tenure system staffing.
Inter-change between the executive and secretariat fields, and the tenure system that goes with it, is of great value up to a certain stage in a man’s career. After that stage-and I would put it at anything between fifteen and twenty years’ service-it should be quite clear in which of the two fields that man’s talent lies. If it is in the secretariat field, he should remain there, and there should be no question of sending him back to his province, except to serve in the provincial secretariat. It seems to me equally wrong, although exceptional cases may be quoted to the opposite effect, to take into the secretariat any man with over twenty years’ service (or possibly rather less) who has had no previous secretariat experience and has shown that his talent lies in executive administration.

The Report was written in 1946 when old order in India was ringing out and new order was to ring in. Tottenham was clairvoyant. Public administration of the future was to be development oriented. He pinned his hope on the secretariat and lower formation, which were in sad condition even at that time. The secretariat has too many grades but each grade is performing work, which used to be carried out by the lower grade in the past. He wanted appropriate rehabilitation of the grades in the secretariat. He particularly wanted to improve the role and status of the deputy secretary.

The Report on Public Administration (1951) mentions that India became independent in 1947, an event which called for re-definition of the goal of Public Administration in India. The goal of governance changed but the instrument for implementation of the
goals was inherited from colonial rulers lock, stock and barrel so to say. The new state had to find out the state of health of the inherited administrative legacy. A. D. Gorwala was appointed by the Government to examine India’s public administration.

Astad Dinshaw Gorwala, of ICS background, was an untiring crusader for values in administration; and a continuing deteriorating of moral values is the uppermost messages in his Report on Public Administration submitted at the instance of Planning Commission set up by the Government of India. The Planning Commission set up in March 1950 to formulate the nation’s five year plan and formally entrusted with the responsibility for revamping the administrative system was naturally curious to find out the state of health of India’s public administration. This task was assigned to A.D. Gorwala, who submitted his Report in 1951 in which he confidently asserted: ‘In a democracy, there can be no successful planning without a clean, efficient and impartial administration.’

In 1950, the Planning Commission asked A.D. Gorwala to make a study of public administration in India to suggest measures for administrative reform to suit planned development of the country. Gorwala submitted his report in 1951, in which he enunciated the following broad objectives to guide and inform improvement in public administration:

- Giving first place to first things and making the best use of the best people; arranging priorities, in policies and optimum use of personnel;
- Insisting on standards of integrity, implicit and explicit; not only the reality of integrity but also the demonstrable appearance of integrity;

- Promoting mutual understanding, proper readjustment of human relations involved in Government and administration;

- Reorganising the administrative machine so as to ensure greater speed, effectiveness and responsiveness; and

- Arranging for proper training and planning proper recruitment for the long term.

Gorwala’s Report on Public Administration was the first report on public administration as a whole after Independence, which is general in nature. Gorwala was convinced that the inherited public administration of the country should be updated and reformed: it should be mended, not ended. The Report presents a purist’s view of public administration.

The Railway Corruption Enquiry Committee Report (1955) was constituted in 1953 to enquire into corrupt practices in railways and suggest measures for eradicating them with a view to promoting efficiency and introducing healthy moral tone in the railway administration. Acharya J.B. Kripalani was the chairman of the Committee. The Committee took two years to complete its task.

The Committee viewed the evil of corruption against the larger social and economic setting. It is well known that poverty becomes starkly visible when it finds
itself pitched by the side of conspicuous prosperity, and this co-existence inevitably begets either corruption or revolution.

The two recommendations of the Committee, namely, introduction of departmental catering on important railway stations and replacement of the Watch and Ward Department by a railway protection force, were implemented by the government.

Though the Kriplani Committee was focused on the railway sector only, it was independent Indian’s first committee to examine the pathological problem of corruption on the railways in all its aspects. The comment of the committee --- ‘no department of the government, central, state and local, is today (that is, in the fifties of the twentieth century) free from this evil’ --- should make us sit up and introspect.

The Committee on Prevention of Corruption (1962) - While discussing the budget in 1962, the Lok Sabha expressed its indignation at the growing menace of corruption in the public services.

As a result, Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri, the then home minister, announced the appointment of a Committee under the Chairmanship of K. Santhanam to go into the causes of corruption, to study the existing organisation and set-up of vigilance units in the ministries and department of the Government and to suggest measures to make them more effective. They were also asked to suggest changes in law, effective
conduct rules and disciplinary rules for Government servants and measures calculated to produce a social climate both amongst public servants and the general public so that bribery and corruption may not be allowed to flourish.

Analysing the causes which have led to the increase of corruption the Committee pointed out that one of the main reasons for the increase in corruption was that the climate for integrity had been rendered unhealthy by war-time controls and scarcity, post-war flush of money and consequent inflation. The Committee also mentioned that the Government had to assume new responsibilities at a time when the administrative machinery had been considerably weakened by wartime neglect and departure of a large number of experienced officers, which necessitated rapid promotion of personnel lacking in requisite experience, character and ability. The rapid expansion of Governmental activities in new fields involving huge expenditure, afforded the unscrupulous elements in public administration and public life opportunities for acquiring wealth by questionable methods. The Committee drew attention to the decline in real income of various sections of the community, particularly of the salaried classes, a larger part of which is found in Government employment, which contributed significantly to the increase in corruption. Another factor was rapid advance of technological and scientific development which facilitated the emergence of a ‘mass society’ with a large rank and file and small controlling elite, encouraging the growth of monopolies, the rise of the managerial class and intricate
institutional mechanisms. Strict adherence to a high standard of ethical behavior is necessary for an honest functioning of the new social, political and economic processes. The inability of all sections of the society to appreciate this need, results in the emergence and growth of white collar and economic crimes and renders enforcement of laws more difficult. The Committee also felt that this type of crime is even more dangerous not only because the financial stakes are higher but also because of irreparable damage that is done to public morals. The Committee also mentioned that corruption could exist only if there is someone willing to corrupt and capable of corrupting. It pointed out that both this willingness and capacity of corruption is found in the industrial and commercial classes. These maintain an army of liaison and ‘contact’ men, some of whom live, spend, and entertain ostentatiously. These agents in their dealings single out public administrators of weak character and exploit them. The Committee emphasise that if anti-corruption measures are to bear fruit, it must be recognised that it is important to deter this practice so as to eliminate corruption in the public services.

With a view to improving the social climate, the Committee felt that a new tradition of integrity can be established only if an example is set by those who have the ultimate responsibility for the governance of India, namely, the Ministers of the Central and State Governments. The Committee, therefore, recommended a Code of Conduct for Ministers similar to the one drawn up for the Chief Ministers of all states. The
allegations against ministers should be promptly investigated and a separate Committee should be set up to inquire into allegations against them. This Committee should consist of at least one member of high judicial office, and should have powers to direct the Central Bureau of Investigation to investigate and give a report of the case if necessary. The Committee recommended that political parties should be asked to give details of the accounts of their receipt and expenditure and this should be published annually and audited. Refusal by any political party to comply with these conditions should debar it from getting recognition from the Election Commission.

The Administrative Reforms Commission (1970) - The Hoover-like (Hoover Commissions of the USA to study its Federal Government) Administrative Reforms Commission in India was appointed in January 1965 "to examine the public administration in this country and to make recommendations for reforms and reorganisation with a view to ensuring the highest standards of efficiency and integrity in the public services, and for making public administration a fit instrument for carrying out the social and economic policies of the Government." The following were the major areas allotted for the consideration of the Commission:

- The machinery of the Government of India and its procedure of work;
- The machinery for Planning at all levels;
- Centre-State relationships;
- Financial Administration;
- Personnel Administration;
- Economic Administration;
- Administration at the State level;
- District Administration;
- Agriculture Administration;
- Problems of Redressal of Citizens' Grievances.

Shri Morarji Desai was appointed the chairman of the Commission but in March 1967 he became the deputy Prime Minister and his place was taken up by K. Hanumanthaiya. The Commission submitted 20 Reports. It was wound up in January 1970, its work having been completed. The Commission made 537 recommendations.

From the review of literature as discussed in this Chapter, Vigilance has been broadly related to the following areas of public administration:

- Maintaining integrity in administration
- Probity in public life
- Fight against corruption
- Providing good governance

The studies undertaken both at National Level as well as International level in the area of Anti-Corruption through these review establishes that the research problem of this
Study, viz. ‘Origin and Uniqueness of Vigilance in India’ is in fact unique and not discussed anywhere in any of the literature / reports studied through this review.
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