CHAPTER THREE

THE METHOD: THE HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY
3.1.0. The Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Its Etymological Background

It has been shown in the last chapter how Heidegger has redefined phenomenology in the lines of his own particular conception of philosophy. Now, it has to be seen how the salient features of hermeneutic phenomenology contribute positively as a method suitable for the explication of the meaning of Being.

The term 'hermeneutics' is not strange to the academic world. Though it was associated with the Biblical exegesis for long, it has emerged as a term with considerable critical power in contemporary philosophical scenario. The current application of the term covers a wider field including philological methodology, methodology of Geisteswissenschaften, existential understanding, interpretation of cultural products, and so on. The various fields of application give ample evidence to the manifold ways of understanding hermeneutics.
For the etymological meaning of the term 'hermeneutics', it has to be traced back to its Greek origin. The generally held view, with which Heidegger also seems to agree, is that it is derived from the name 'Hermes', the messenger god of the Greeks. As a messenger Hermes carries messages from the gods and delivers it to the mortals to whom it is destined. What is expected from Hermes, therefore, is to transmute that which is conveyed, through an adequate medium which guarantees the comprehension by mortals. The mission of Hermes, therefore, demands a two-fold function. First, it is imperative to understand and interpret for oneself the content of the message, so that an effective communication is ensured. Second, Hermes is supposed to be conversant with the language of the mortals, so that he can translate the message without distortion.

The two Greek terms, _hermeneuein_ (verb) and _hermeneia_ (noun), generally translated as 'to interpret' and 'interpretation' respectively, can be traced back to the same Hermes as far as the etymological meaning is concerned. Hermeneutics as a theory of interpretation can take various directions of meaning like 'to say', 'to explain', 'to translate', and so on. In all these different shades of
meaning, there is an underlying spirit of interpretation, i.e. bringing a thing or a situation from unintelligibility to understanding.

In Heidegger’s view the very function of philosophy is to interpret, as the following passage suggests:

Hermeneutics means neither the theory of the art of interpretation nor interpretation itself, but rather the attempt, first of all, to define the nature of interpretation on hermeneutic grounds.

Interpretation is 'laying open' of that which is implied. For Heidegger, interpretation opens up the existential structures of Dasein and thus finally the manifestation of Being. Being, therefore, becomes the 'text' to be interpreted. It brings to understanding the lost meaning of Being by examining the mode of existence of Dasein.

3.1.1. Conceptual Background

Hermeneutic phenomenology, to a great extent, is the outcome of the blending of two philosophical traditions - hermeneutics and phenomenology - both inheriting a rich and varied tradition of critical perspectives at their disposal. There is no single theory or thinker to be seen
as representing the various dimensions of hermeneutic phenomenology. What is found, instead, is an array of critical concerns and perspectives which provide an apparently unitary character to it.

The prominent thinkers, to cite a few, who made substantial contribution to phenomenology are Edmund Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur, and so on. Schleiermacher and Dilthey are the two notable thinkers in the hermeneutic tradition. Those who felt the need for hermeneutic phenomenology are Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer and et al. Hermeneutic phenomenology could wield considerable impact on contemporary continental thought, because it helped to see the perennial problems of philosophy in a new light. Two important concepts - history and language - which run like dual leitmotifs in the hermeneutic tradition had a significant role in reinforcing critical power to this movement.

Hermeneutic thinkers univocally assert that human intellect can never be conceived as a 'wordless' and 'timeless' source of knowledge. All spheres of knowledge is limited and conditioned by linguistic and historical concerns. Language and history, therefore, can be viewed as
'transcendental conditions' that render possible any forms of knowledge. The hermeneutic approach is distinct from other forms of enquiry at least in three respects. First, the linguistic and historical framework of all understanding precludes apodictic certainty regarding the availability of uniform conditions for the genesis of knowledge. Second, it accentuates the futility of being engaged in identifying different fields of knowledge and stipulating uniform rules for their functioning. Third, since intelligibility being grounded in linguistic sphere, there is sufficient room for accommodating changes in contrast to transcendental accounts which base intelligibility in the private sphere of a pre-given and essentially changeless subject.

It is generally held among the hermeneutic philosophers that all our understanding takes place within a temporal framework. There is no understanding outside time; we are historical or our historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) remains as a conditioning or limiting principle for all aspects of our life. It is not an exaggeration even to say that we are our history. If all our knowledge claims are historical, it amounts to saying that there is nothing absolutely true sub specie aeternitatis. It presumes
at the same time that truth has to be determined contextually taking into consideration the ideals and practices of the present. There is no understanding that takes place in a historical vacuum; on the contrary, it appropriates the past and builds the present on its ground with an orientation towards the future. All actions and moments of knowledge are mediated by various dimensions of time. It means that understanding is not an event taking place at an isolated moment in a remote corner of mind. Rather there is a constant mediation of past, present, and future. Hans Georg Gadamer clearly expresses this view when he says:

Understanding is not to be thought of so much as an action of one's subjectivity, but as the placing of oneself within a process of tradition, in which past and present are constantly fused.

Our understanding, however, has an array of hidden possibilities. It is our task and great privilege to explore them. Since our knowledge is essentially limited and historically conditioned, it is our lot to await the new perspectives that may open up at any moment of time.

Along with the temporal dimension of our existence, we are endowed with the rare capacity to use
symbols. Linguistic environment is a distinctive feature of our mode of existence. It is through the medium of language that the knowledge of the past is handed over to the present. Language limits or conditions our understanding in the sense that we often fail to break the barriers created by a particular linguistic tradition that might have formulated a specific form of understanding. Linguisticality (Sprachlichkeit) of understanding is a limit that has to be reckoned with. However, it is not our aim to suggest that we are caught up in the clutches of relativism, but to point out that whatever be the amount of self-criticism we unleash, the understanding gained is never exhaustive and final. The inherent finiteness of language shatters any attempt to transcend its limits once and for all.

Our knowledge of the world is encompassed by language and the first element of understanding occurs not in a mind free of words, but in the context of a speech community and within its conventions and usages. Understanding never takes place in a pure logical space of mind. On the other hand, it is generated in a public place of discourse where tradition plays a significant role.
Gadamer conveys this idea when he reminds us:

Language is not only an object in our hands, it is the reservoir of tradition and the medium in and through which we exist and perceive our world.

3.2.0. Dasein and its Encounter

Heidegger, as Husserl before him, envisages phenomenology to be a science of origins, a science with radical tendency. It is their common objective to go 'back to things themselves' (Zu den Sachen selbst). However, the divergence in their methodology exemplifies the fact that there was only an apparent convergence in their thought, and a parting of ways was inevitable. Heidegger sets his goal not for an apodictic certainty and absolute foundation for knowledge in the Husserlian fashion; rather he lays emphasis to the power of questioning that threatens the presuppositions of all theoretical enterprise. This being the case, philosophy does not have to start from 'intuition'; rather it can well be guided by understanding. The phenomenological description, for the same reason, need not be grasped as the elucidation of the essences; rather it is an encounter with phenomena in the light of understanding. The center of reference is no more the
subjectivity, but Dasein encounters things in their existential situations. So Heidegger has got serious reservations about the Husserlian programme of thought. The difference in their perception of the role of phenomenology expedited the move from the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl to the hermeneutic phenomenology. One significant move in this direction takes its root from transcendental subjectivity and proceeds to the existentiality of Dasein.

3.2.1. The Nature of Consciousness - Husserl and Heidegger

Heidegger observes that the Husserlian analysis of consciousness is based on an idealized and abstract subject in the fashion of many others in the western metaphysical tradition. The idealistic tendencies prevalent in Husserl may give only a distorted picture of human existence. An adequate picture may emerge if it is viewed as Being-in-the-world. It is a fundamental mistake, holds Heidegger, to trace all phenomena back to human consciousness, that is to say, to the inner recess of transcendental subjectivity.

It was the search for the realm of apodictic certainty of rigorous knowledge that finally led Husserl to
the notion of consciousness. According to this view, everything is constituted in consciousness and there is nothing outside the stream of consciousness. The primary datum for Husserl, therefore, is consciousness, whereas for Heidegger it is Dasein, which is an embodied consciousness and having an awareness of its basic state as Being-in-the-world. Husserl understands consciousness in terms of its cognitive character and, therefore, his approach is primarily epistemological. Heidegger, on the other hand, understands consciousness as basically interpretative in character and, therefore, his concern is fundamentally ontological.

3.2.3. The Factual Existence of Dasein

Heidegger strongly holds the view that facticity of Dasein is more fundamental than the transcendental ego and, hence, rejects the Husserlian view that facticity is a datum of consciousness. Dasein's relation to the world, which is primordial, calls for an existential interpretation. "If the 'I' is an essential characteristic of Dasein, then it is one which must be interpreted existentially." Heidegger bases phenomenology on the understanding of the hermeneutic of facticity. The
phenomenological description, therefore, begins with Dasein, the concretely existing phenomenon, which has the essential state of Being-in-the-world.

The factical existence, because it is factical, always remains in the world. Heidegger, therefore, is able to ask Husserl a query: "Does not a world in general belong to the essence of the pure ego?" The facticity of Dasein cannot be dissolved into the constituting accomplishments of a subject. The disclosure of facticity is equiprimordial with the moment of Dasein's coming into existence. The state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit) as a mode of disclosure of Dasein's facticity announces the fact that it has always been in the world. It is not possible, as Husserl thought, to grasp things in their pure and pristine givenness. They can be comprehended only within the basic state of Being-in-the-world. It amounts to saying that the constituting accomplishments of consciousness are primordially associated with things already existing in the world.

3.2.4. Dasein as Being-in-the-world

The basic structure of Dasein is to be in the world. In other words, Dasein is defined in terms of its
worldhood. The fundamental ontology, therefore, sets its goal in understanding Dasein in its essential relation to the world. Heidegger considers that to work out the idea of the world is one of the important functions of philosophy. Husserl in his later writings moved close to such an idea and it can be seen in the notion of Lebenswelt. For Husserl it was an attempt to encounter the phenomenon as it announces itself prior to every scientific investigation, which may finally lead back to the immediacy and primacy of original experience.

Heidegger believed that we cannot gain genuine knowledge of essences simply by universal comparison and classification. He insists that, since the world itself is constitutive of Dasein, one must have an insight into the basic structures of Dasein in order to treat the world-phenomenon conceptually. The existential analytic of Dasein is intended to meet this purpose.

Being-in-the-world is a unitary phenomenon. It means that Being-in-the-world is a constitutive structure. As a constitutive structure, it permits the parts to form a whole and not vice versa. The constitutive whole we speak about is different from the state of an ordinary physical
object. The physical object has various aspects whereas an object of phenomenological enquiry has a cluster of meanings. The various aspects that constitute a physical object are due to a single noematic Sinn. On the other hand, Dasein is multi-noematic and its constitutive elements are noematic Sinne with horizons. It is significant to note that the multi-noematic Dasein is the primary datum for the hermeneutic phenomenology of Heidegger, whereas for Husserl the description remains at the level of pure consciousness which is devoid of a world.

3.2.5. The Essence as Existence

Dasein is what it is only in existing. It amounts to say that man's substance is not spirit conceived as a synthesis of soul and body; it is, rather, existence. Dasein is not an 'I' which constitutes every being while lacking the characteristics of a being in its own case. Dasein exists along with other beings, but at the same time it is not a Being-present-at-hand. The primordial relation with Being gives a distinctive status to Dasein when compared to other beings. The 'thereness' of Dasein is made possible by the existential spatiality of Dasein. The existential spatiality, in turn, makes room for the
manifestation of Being. The 'thereness' of Dasein shows that it is endowed with possibilities which an ordinary object lacks.

Phenomenological examination of essence is one-sided for it considers essence as *eidos*, that is to say, essence is equated with genus and is supposed to be apprehended in a generalizing universalization. In existential understanding, the notion of essence brings in the lost significance by considering the existential elements also as a part of a coherent whole. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger grounds the 'intuition of essence' in understanding. It shows that Heidegger rejects the Hueserlian claim that every essence or Being is an *eidos* given in intuition.

Heidegger aptly points out that Husserl's method cannot penetrate fully into the original mode of Dasein's existence. When it is said that Dasein alone exists, it refers to the way Dasein stands out from all other beings that are in the world. Though Husserl claims to go back to the depth of subjectivity, the idealized subject of Husserlian thought can never lead to the essence of Dasein.
It means that the subjectivity in its most essential meaning is bypassed.

3.2.6. The Historical Dimension of Dasein

Heidegger understands phenomenological investigation as historical. Dasein is historical because its existence is factual. If Dasein is historical, it leads naturally to the conclusion that Being "is itself historical in character." Phenomenological investigation, therefore, has to ground itself always in history, for every investigation is determined by history. The investigation must make a serious attempt to uncover the origin which is historically bound and must remove all the impediments which may conceal this foundation from our perception. The question of the meaning of Being is raised precisely to examine history anew and, thus, to permit Being to manifest itself.

The above function of phenomenological enquiry can never be fulfilled in the Husserlian thought. Since phenomenology is historical, Husserl cannot have a radical new beginning. There are certain limits which the Husserlian phenomenology imposes upon itself. Husserl
forgets to acknowledge the inner and irremovable limit in the historicity of understanding. The questions which philosophy raise and the answers that are obtained are historically determined. New perspectives and dimensions may occur at any point of time in the history. It means that since our understanding is limited and historically conditioned, there is no final and absolute knowledge in matters pertaining to all branches of knowledge.

3.3.0. Understanding and Interpretation

It is in a special sense that Heidegger uses the term understanding (Verstehen). It is not used in the ordinary sense of the power to grasp the meaning of some expressions. It does not refer to theoretical or cognitive capacities. Understanding is different from discursive knowledge at least in two important respects. First, understanding is non-cumulative, whereas knowledge is progressive and cumulative. Since Heidegger does not make a difference between the act of knowing and description, understanding is pre-theoretical as well as theoretically articulated interpretation. Secondly, understanding cannot be transmitted. When one articulates understanding, what can be expected is that similar articulation takes place in
others as well. It implies that there is no new knowledge other than what is already there.

For Heidegger, understanding is Dasein's mode of existing with a projective character. It is the capacity to be aware of one's own possibilities for Being. It is a mode or constituent element of Being-in-the-world. Understanding is the ground for all interpretations. It is co-original with one's existing situation and is present in every act of interpretation. It is ontologically prior to every act of existing.

3.3.1. Understanding and Possibilities

Dasein is engaged in understanding and, therefore, it is a form of disclosedness. Dasein's potentiality-for-Being (Seinkonnen) is disclosed in understanding. Heidegger asserts:

Dasein is the possibility of Being-free for its own most potentiality-for-Being. Its Being-possible is transparent to itself in different possible ways and degrees.

In understanding Being becomes transparent in terms of its meanings that are disclosed. The disclosure also makes it possible to see horizons where possibilities actually come
into view. In the face of one's possibilities, understanding is one's awareness of how I am and how I might be. One may fail sometimes to actualize what is manifested by the possibilities. But it is the freedom to become my possibilities that actually characterize the Being of my understanding. My potentiality-for-Being depends on the execution of the possibilities that lie ahead and thereby to partake in the disclosure of Being. Since understanding is the disclosure of my possibilities, it is equally correct to say that my understanding is the Being of my potentiality-for-Being.

3.3.2. The Fore-structure of Understanding

In interpretation the 'as-structure' is made explicit. The possibility of interpretation presupposes the fact that there are certain aspects comprehended in advance of the actual moment of interpretation. It means that every instance of understanding is based on a fore-having (Vorhabe), a fore-sight (Vorsicht), and a fore-conception (Vorgriff). When a particular action is executed, there is already in us some comprehension of the future event, however vague it may be. What is, thus, dimly understood is appropriated explicitly keeping in mind the
relation that prevails between a particular action and its larger context of performance. Fore-having refers to this entire range of involvements, which are given prior to an explicit understanding. The interpretative understanding is guided by a future event. The interpretative action assimilates the pre-given with a view to materialize the project that lies ahead. The fore-sight refers to this aspect of interpretation. Interpretation occurs on the basis of a conceptual scheme which is already determined, whether as fore-shadowed in the thing to be understood or imposed from without. This conceptual anticipation determining all interpretation is called fore-conception.

The above examination shows that interpretation is not a presuppositionless grasping of something already given. Projective understanding manifests an essent in its possibility against the background of the totality of significance. Dasein's projects are carried out on the basis of these significant situations. The fore-structure of understanding becomes more clear when it is examined in close relation to meaning. Meaning or sense is the formal framework of what is disclosed by understanding and then articulated through interpretation.
3.3.3. Understanding as the Ground of Interpretation

It has already been mentioned that understanding functions through the projection of possibilities. Interpretation works out what is projected in understanding. In other words, interpretation makes explicit what is given prior to every thematic statement, which actually forms the ground of understanding. In Heidegger's words: "Any mere pre-predicative seeing of the ready-to-hand is, in itself, something which already understands and interprets." Interpretation is made possible when understanding appropriately understands and interprets the understanding. Interpretation is not something derived from understanding; on the contrary, interpretation is grounded existentially in understanding. In a nutshell, interpretation is simply the rendering explicit of understanding. Viewed from this perspective the whole of Being and Time, as Heidegger clearly points out in the beginning of the text, is an interpretation with its definite goal to make explicit one's vague awareness of Being.
3.3.4. Meaning and Understanding

Understanding operates always within a set of already interpreted relationships, a relational whole. The implications of this for hermeneutics are far reaching, especially when it is connected with Heidegger's ontology. Dilthey had already asserted that meaningfulness is always a matter of reference to a context of relationships. It indicates that understanding operates within a 'hermeneutic circle' rather than proceeding in an ordered progression from simple and self-sufficient parts to a whole.

For designating this fabric of relationship, which is the ontological ground of intelligibility, Heidegger uses the term "meaningfulness". According to Heidegger's view:

Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself. That which can be articulated in a disclosure by which we understand, we call 'meaning'.

Articulation is a mode of interpretation. When a particular phenomenon is disclosed, and if it is possible for one to understand and articulate, then it is designated as meaningful. It indicates the fact that meaning is the formal existential framework of disclosedness. Heidegger says succinctly:
In so far as understanding and interpretation make up the existential state of Being of the 'there', 'meaning' must be conceived as the formal-existential framework of the disclosedness which belongs to understanding.

As an existential structure, meaning is something which Dasein alone has. Meaning is an existential of Dasein and not a property attached to entities. Dasein alone can be either meaningful or meaningless. Everything in the world is meaningful for Dasein, for everything else is by virtue of Being-in-the-world. In other words, the meaning of Being can never be contrasted with entities, because an entity becomes accessible only as meaning.

3.3.5. The As-structure of Interpretation

Heidegger explains the nature of interpretation by dealing at length with the understanding of the world. Things are always seen either as this or as that. Interpretation makes explicit the word 'as'. The as-structure of understanding is based on Dasein's seeing the world as ready-to-hand (Zuhandenheit). Dasein becomes aware of entities as ready-to-hand on the ground of the significance or meaningfulness presupposed in the disclosure of world. In other words, the circumspective look of
Dasein lifts a thing out of its vaguely comprehended background making it into a utensil. This results in knowing the utensil explicitly as something in-order-to. This in-order-to comes from the world as ready-to-hand, not from a world detached from the object, and this leads Heidegger to say that meaning is not something attached to an object.

Understanding something in this manner (i.e. as something) is due to interpreting it. That which is rendered explicit is the as-structure of a particular being. This may happen at a pre-predicative level even before it is formulated into a propositional form. The as-structure is a primary cognitive mode; and cognitive faculties of understanding are based upon, and are secondary to, existential aspects. Cognitive knowledge is privative for it is a derived mode of the primary and originally simple and direct interpretative perception.

3.4.0. Towards a New Interpretation of Intentionality

The radical phenomenological approach makes Heidegger to redefine some of the basic notions we employ in everyday philosophical discussion. In Being and Time,
Heidegger lashes out a severe criticism of the traditional conception of man as a 'knower'. If man is viewed primarily as a knower, remarks Heidegger, it can provide only a distorted picture of human existence. Heidegger, instead, proposes a different way of looking at man and the world. He envisages a participatory engagement with the world. This is what Heidegger means when he says that knowing is a founded mode of Being-in-the-world.

Our relation to the world, therefore, has to be subjected to serious evaluation. It is in this context Heidegger critically examines the intentionality principle proposed by Husserl. A considerable number of the pages of The Basic Problems of Phenomenology are devoted to the elucidation of intentionality. The discussion begins in the context of a possible description of the ontological constitution of perception. Heidegger's exposition starts with a preliminary remark on what perception is. In his view perception is

the perceptual directing of oneself toward what is perceived, in such a way indeed that the perceived is itself always understood as perceived in its perceivedness.
This assertion may appear to be an empty tautology. What is conveyed by this contention is that both perception and perceivedness belong together in the latter's perceivedness. It implies that the triadic moments - perceiving, perceived, and perceivedness - constitute the core of intentionality.

Heidegger deplores in this context the failure of philosophers from scholastic period down to Husserl for not giving a clear exposition of the notion of intentionality. He finds the urgent need to conceive intentionality more radically. The radical starting point must be Dasein, for to Dasein alone belongs the understanding of Being. Being makes possible every comportment toward beings. In other words, the comportment towards beings belongs to Dasein, which we ourselves are. Comportment has the structure of directing-oneself-toward or of being-directed-toward; and this structure is called intentionality in the Heideggerian thought.

Every comportment is a comporting-toward or every perception is a perceiving-of; and this subjective pole of intentionality is designated as intendere or intentio. In the same way, every comporting toward as well as every
being-directed-toward has its specific 'where-to' of the comporting and 'toward-which' of the directedness. This 'where-to' and 'toward-which' belonging to the intentio is called intentum. Intentionality comprises within itself both intentio and intentum. The diversity of intentio or of intentum leads to diversity in comportment.

Now, it has to be described how intentionality is grounded ontologically in the basic constitution of Dasein. The task that is laid before us is to pursue this structure of Dasein's comportments with regard to perception. The task is challenging because the notion of intentionality is heaped up with misinterpretations which mainly arise from preconceived epistemological or metaphysical standpoints. Heidegger points out:

The most dangerous and and stubborn prejudices relative to the understanding of intentionality are not the explicit ones in the form of philosophical theories but the implicit ones that arise from the natural apprehension and interpretation of things by the Dasein's everyday 'good-sense'.

Due to these misinterpretations the enigmatic phenomenon of intentionality always remains obscured and is never adequately apprehended. There has to be a radical shift from what hitherto has been done in phenomenology. We
have to conceive intentionality more radically, and as a first step towards this goal, the misinterpretations that are thriving around have to be identified and eliminated.

3.4.1. Two Misinterpretations of Phenomenology

In *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* Heidegger identifies two misinterpretations which are due to naturalistic attitude. The first misinterpretation can be explained as follows: Intentionality refers to a relationship that exists between subject and object, or two independent beings. Here the relation is between two extant entities. For example, when a window is perceived, we consider the window as the extant object and the human being who perceives it as the extant subject. If either of the term of relation is absent, there is no possibility of a relation.

The intentional relation can be extant, as a relation only if both the relational members are extant, and the relation subsists only so long as these relational members are themselves extant.

It also implies that, if the subject alone is given, there is no possibility of an intentional relation.
The above mentioned natural way of looking at intentionality is a serious misinterpretation. It lacks "the nature as well as the mode of being of intentionality." The wrong conception is due to the fact that here the intentional relation is attributed to the subjective pole.

Intentional relation to the object does not first fall to the subject with and by means of the extantness of the object, rather the subject is structured intentionally within itself.

The question regarding the extantness of the object is of significance, because the characteristic feature of 'directed toward' is intrinsic to the very constitution of the subject. It is not, however, necessary as we generally understand, that the object must be extant:

...perceiving is intrinsically, in its own structure, constituted by this relation, whether that to which it comports as object is or is not extant.

Intentional relation, therefore, is a priori and it is pertinent to the nature of intentionality, irrespective of the fact whether the object is actually extant or not. The intentional relation does not arise first through the actual
extantness of objects but lies in the perceiving itself, whether illusionless or illusory.

An important question arises from the above exposition. How does intentional experience, belonging as it does to the subjective sphere, relate to transcendent objects? The second misinterpretation arises in this context. This misinterpretation is related to the sphere of intentum, or that toward which the comportment directs itself. If it is conceded that intentionality is a basic feature of experience and that experience belongs to the sphere of the subject, it naturally follows that immanent experiences must be directed to the subjective sphere itself. But such a conclusion is based merely on theory and does not permit the phenomena to show themselves. It is wrong even to conclude that we are directed to sensations or representations. A concrete example may help us to examine what really happens when we encounter an experience. When we see a chair, definitely, we are not directly confronting any sensations or representations. On the contrary, we are directed to a being extant over there. Even when a perceptual illusion takes place the same is the case. It means that perception is always directed to that which is
intended. The transcendence really takes place within the domain of intentionality, and never in the isolated world of subject or object. This misinterpretation is an outcome of viewing the subject and its immanent sphere totally independent of the object and its transcendent sphere.

3.4.2. The Structure of Intentional Relation

Our exposition of intentionality must go beyond the natural view, and must help the phenomenon to show itself. Intentionality is one of Dasein's basic ingredients of constitution. Heidegger says:

The statement that the comportments of the Dasein are intentional means that the mode of being of our own self, the Dasein, is essentially such that this being, so far as it is, is always already dwelling with the extant.

Heidegger is very keen to make the difference in Dasein's way of existing. Dasein alone exists, and its mode of existence is not like that of any entity. Capacity for intentional comportment is the differentia in the realm of existent and extant beings. It is, therefore, meaningless to hold that intentional experiences are encapsulated within the subject:
The idea of a subject which has intentional experiences merely inside its own sphere and is not yet outside it but encapsulated within itself is an absurdity which misconstrues the basic ontological structure of the being that we ourselves are.

The cognitive acts are not interior to subject, as Kant thought of; rather the cognitive acts are structured intentionally in their ontological constitution. The cognitive faculty is not a terminal pole between an external object and internal subject. What is significant is the relation that exists between them.

We have discussed the two misinterpretations of intentionality in the context of our attempt to elucidate the triadic moments in perception. The above exposition makes it clear that perceivedness belongs to Dasein's intentional comportment. Perceivedness as such is neither subjective nor objective even though the perceived being, the extant entity, has the character of perceivedness.

This perceivedness is a remarkable and enigmatic structure, belonging in a certain sense to the object, to the perceived, and yet not itself anything objective, and belonging to the Dasein and its intentional existence and yet not itself anything subjective.
The methodological maxims of phenomenology must be our guardian in this context. It cautions us, says Heidegger, not to flee prematurely from the enigmatic character of the phenomena, nor to explain it away by the violent coup de main of a wild theory but rather to accentuate the puzzlement.

A rigorous phenomenological approach will permit the phenomenon to show itself, and the unity of perception and the intentional comportment of Dasein can be revealed only in this method.

3.4.3. The Horizon-phenomenon

Another important insight in Husserlian phenomenology which Heidegger radicalizes is the horizon phenomenon. Heidegger differs from Husserl when he assigns the sense of horizon even to present (in-order-to) along with past (in-the-face-of-which) and future (for-the-sake-of). Husserl does not consider the present having any horizons. But Heidegger's notion of horizon starts with, and moves around, the present and that which is immediately given. The horizon-phenomenon helps Heidegger to show the implications of the question of the meaning of Being in a profound way.
A satisfactory definition of horizon-phenomenon may be near impossible to start our discussions. The very nature of the phenomenon does not permit a description in the ordinary sense. But the underlying view behind this notion is that all perception, in fact all human praxis, takes place within horizons, i.e. within the presence of a field of objects. Every perceptual event necessarily presupposes a horizon though it may remain abstrusive. Horizon is the offing against which every objectification is made possible. The world, in its absence, may cease to be significant at all.

The notion of horizon primarily refers to a determination which we may find in physical or mental level. Ordinarily this term is used to refer to the extremity of the visual field. In this sense, horizon is the possible limit of the vision. Thus, in physical geography we speak of apparent horizon, where the reference is to the dividing line between the earth and the sky.

Horizon, in the context of phenomenology, carries a meaning similar to the above. What is significant from the phenomenological point of view is that consciousness, having established a limit or boundary to the world of
perception, constantly tries to 'transcend' it. Consciousness always tries to go beyond the realm of actual experience. Therefore, we find that every object of perception within its visual field presents itself with the signification: 'transcendent'. Whenever we look around, we see horizons. But the horizon always recedes, even though there is no gaze without a horizon.

Horizon hides a mystery, but it is revelatory in its care. It is a mystery in the sense that there is a simultaneous process of 'showing' and 'withdrawing' in every instance of the presence of a thing. It can also be said that there is an element of concealment in every act of presencing. That which is yet to be revealed is given along with the present, but hiding certain dimensions of the phenomenon. "Profiles are presented, but always with a significance that there is latent and implicit another profile which is not present." In this analysis a thing is viewed from the objective side and we find that it is multidimensional. But viewed from the subjective side, it is an opening to the world or to the visual field. There is a close connection between these two aspects in the sense that this opening is given always along with the finitude of perspective.
Heidegger's elucidation of horizon-phenomenon does not stop with the explication of the visual field and the thing encountered. He speaks of that which exceeds the field of presence. He calls it region (Gegend) keeping well in mind the difference it has with the visual field. The visual field is something present whereas the region is absent in the technical sense. The openness of the region is not perceptible, but it surrounds the visual field. It permeates the visual field, but at the same time goes beyond its limits. The visual field which is given to our gaze is perceivable. The region is not due to any gaze, but accompanies every object of our gaze. "We say that we look into the horizon. Therefore the field of vision is something open, but its openness is not due to our looking." The region may escape our notice for it is not explicitly given to us.

The Husserlian analysis of horizon mentioned above is based on the correlation between the noesis and the noema. There is an intentional act which is directed to the world of objects. The noematic description is based on a noetic analysis where the bipolar structure of consciousness is focused on. The horizon-phenomenon is not amenable to a
phenomenological description in the Husserlian model. The region is describable in the noematic sense, but we fail to give an answer to the question: What is the noesis correlated with it?

In the Heideggerian analysis of horizon-phenomenon, it has to be noted that there is no focal point other than the noematic object. There is no noesis with corresponding features of the noema. What can be said utmost about noesis is that it is the centre of our intentional awareness. But Heidegger goes one step forward and says that it can be named in a sense relating to releasement or letting be and waiting. His concern for the characteristic ways of the manifestation of the phenomena led Heidegger to do away with the Husserlian view of consciousness.

Heidegger locates the phenomenon in the totality of relations. We find a network of relations among the center, the expanse, the limit or boundary of the visual field and finally that which lies beyond the visual field. It is through these cluster of relations that Heidegger tries to describe the phenomenon. The description does not say whether the phenomenon is located within the field of vision or beyond it. Since there is concealment and
unconcealment accompanying each phenomenon, we are able to say only that it is within the openness of the phenomena. Presencing and non-presencing are equally significant aspects of the phenomenon.

The region is closely related to the field of vision and helps us to locate the things within the field of vision. In other words, the region gathers the given and gives a place to that which appears.

The region gathers just as if nothing were happening, each to each and all into an abiding, while resting in itself. Regioning is a gathering and re-sheltering for an expanded resting in an abiding.

The horizon-phenomenon as well as the model of description employed helps Heidegger to avoid reification or objectification of region. Representational thinking, which finally leads to reification, can never comprehend the region. "Probably it cannot be represented at all, insofar as in representing everything has become an object that stands opposite us within a horizon."