Conclusion

The existence of syncretic elements in Gujarati culture are evident in various social and practices shared by the state’s 186 Hindu communities, 87 Muslim communities, the existence of various religious groups such Jains, Christians, Buddhists, Parsees, Sikhs and Jews for centuries and in its history of hosting various immigrants and people groups. However, there has been a marked increase in incidents of violence in the state along caste and communal fault lines particularly since the 1980s that has coincided with the increasing dominance in social and political bases of power of the Brahmin-Vania-Patidar upper caste and middle class combine and the phenomenal rise of the BJP led by Chief Minister Narendra Modi. So successfully has the BJP coalesced itself with the issues of the upper castes and Gujarat’s burgeoning middle class that any criticism of Chief Minister Narendra Modi whether with regard to displacement by development in the Sardar Sarovar Project over the Narmada river or displacement by communal violence in 2002 is effectively converted into an anti Gujarat issue picked up by the detractors of swarnim (golden) Gujarat.

However, in the state of Gujarat, in 2002, existing constitutional structures and the law were not guarantees of protection for the lives of its Muslim citizens. This study demonstrates how the movement of more than one and a half lakh Muslims at the time of the violence that occurred in 154 of 182 assembly constituencies in 16 districts in Gujarat primarily in north and central Gujarat and the continued existence of some Muslim families in 86 relief colonies in 10 districts of the state to date is a due case of displacement as described in the UN Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement and not voluntary migration as claimed by the Government of Gujarat. The existence of camps during the time of the violence that sheltered more than one and a half lakh Muslims, the return of some of the displaced to their looted, burned or broken homes in a continuing hostile situation, the forced return of others due to the closure of camps and the prolonged displacement of those who now live in “resettlement colonies” which are in fact make shift houses built not by the government but by Muslim organizations are tangible evidence of coercion in this population movement.
Muslims of all classes and castes felt insecure and compelled to flee to areas of concentration of their co-religionists when from the 28th of February 2002 to the following days of violence, existing arms of the state for protection of the lives of its citizens such as the police, fire brigade and ambulances were inaccessible to Muslim citizens as armed mobs led by right wing activists of the BJP and Sangh Parivar roamed the streets and villages of Gujarat with impunity without being challenged in any significant way by the police. The testimonies of victims of the violence themselves, in addition to a significant body of investigative independent and media reportage that reported and documented the violence, the NHRC’s reports as well as the testimonies of the state’s own functionaries such as then Director General of Police R.B. Sreekumar and most recently IAS Officer Sanjay Bhatt point to the state government’s complicity in the violence of 2002.

Muslim homes, businesses and places of worship were systematically attacked, more than one thousand were brutally murdered, women were raped and among the thousands injured many were left with life long disabilities. Chief Minister Narendra Modi leading the BJP government at the state called it a natural reaction to the burning of the train coach of Sabarmati Express, while the BJP led government at the centre put aside the demand for central intervention in the state through Article 355 of the Constitution after winning the vote on the opposition led censure motion over the events in Gujarat in Parliament, and allowed Chief Minister Narendra Modi’s to continue in power. To the attention at the national level in the Parliament, the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee replied that the violence in Gujarat was a state matter and that central interference would disturb the federal balance and to the international attention he sharply replied that it was India’s internal matter.

While lakhs of Muslims fled their homes at the outbreak of the violence when mobs went on rampage against Muslims residences and other property, more than one and a half lakh Muslims fled to camps run entirely by members of their own community. Two years after the violence there were an estimated 10-50,000 internally displaced living in relief colonies and even six years later, according to conservative official estimates, 20,940 Muslims continue to live in make shift relief colonies while an unestimated number of Muslims had left the state or shifted to areas of Muslim concentration in rural and urban areas of Gujarat. Meanwhile those who had indulged in acts of arson and even murder and rape continued to roam free for years after the violence.
For those displaced, before accepting assistance for rebuilding their houses if it came their way either through the government, faith based organizations or NGOs, a predicament that had to be resolved was whether they would return to their mood vatan (original place of residence) at all. Returning home, for a large number of those displaced would be returning to the site or the theatre of violence when at one time, all existing and known mechanisms of assistance and protection failed to deliver and although that moment of violence seemed to have passed, the actors and the site remained the same. The situation seemed even more intractable for the women who had been sexually assaulted or who had witnessed family members or friends being sexually assaulted. According to an independent report by a women’s panel who visited affected places in Gujarat from March 27th to March 31st 2002 and interviewed women who had been sexually assaulted, shocking and gruesome acts of violence against women and children had taken place that had been grossly under-reported by the police. They highlighted pamphlets that had been used and circulated and how these women’s bodies became a symbol of Hindu revenge. According to one estimate, at the very least, 300-400 women were victims of sexual violence during the 2002 violence.¹ The use of rape as a symbol of collective dishonoring is well documented. For the families of victims of sexual violence returning back to their home therefore seemed next to impossible and they continued to remain in relief camps.

In the aftermath of the violence more than the state that was implicated in the violence in the first place, and the NGOs who came together as citizens groups to make crucial interventions for relief and rehabilitation, it is Muslim organizations that have emerged as principal actors in relief and rehabilitation of displaced Muslims. The efforts of jamaati Muslim organizations such as the Gujarat Sarvajani Relief Committee which is a relief wing of the Tablighi Jamaat, the Islami Relief Committee which is a relief wing of Jamaat-e-Islami and the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Hind to provide for relief, rehabilitation and resettlement for the displaced in what should have been taken up by the state for its citizens, and their work among the displaced for the last nine years has resulted in their increasing influence. However, that this has not uniformly resulted in the loss of agency for the displaced is evident among others in

instances of demand for ownership of matchbox size houses in relief colonies by the displaced (which continue to be under the ownership of Muslim organizations that built it) and in issues of gender and worship.

This study demonstrates that displacement of Muslims in 2002 caused a violation of fundamental citizenship rights. The very fact of being displaced, i.e. being forced to flee in a situation where the only guarantee of security can be found neither in the law nor in the arms of the state machinery but among co-religionists, is a violation of the fundamental right to life guaranteed in Article 21 of the Constitution. Moreover, instances where Muslims were not being allowed to return to their homes were a violation of a fundamental liberty to reside in any part of the country guaranteed in Article 19e. From ethnographic work among the displaced in relief colonies it has emerged that the displacement of Muslims in 2002 caused a denial of basic social rights such as access to drinking water, sanitation facilities and most importantly steady livelihood options in the years since the violence.

People migrate and put up with much discomfort in search of livelihood however displaced Muslims in Gujarat have been forced to move to areas of Muslim concentration in villages and on the periphery of towns and cities making it difficult for them to even earn a living. Displaced Muslims in cities like Ahmedabad for instance who earned a decent living by petty trade in the densely populated areas of eastern Ahmedabad now find themselves in the periphery in colonies in Juhapura, Bombay Hotel and Vatwa areas which are proving to be as populated but where people have less spending power. In many instances earnings have also decreased due to the difficult location of relief colonies and narrowing options for livelihood in periphery.

In the absence of a framework to deal with large scale rehabilitation that was required after the violence in 2002, even the NHRC and other civil society members suggested that the existing mechanism of administration for natural disasters under the Gujarat Disaster Management Authority (GDMA) take up relief work for those affected by the violence as well. This suggestion was rejected by the Chief Minister Narendra Modi who also held charge of the GDMA. The Chief Minister also rejected the proposal for provision of land to settle the displaced that was made by the then Chairperson of the NCM as well as by a delegation of Muslim leaders that met him.

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The state government’s response in 2002 as in previous instances of violence was to provide relief in terms of food and ‘assistance’ to the riot victims in camps which it stopped supplying after June despite the continued existence of displaced in relief camps.

However, both the recently created disaster management authority for natural and man made disasters even if it had been pressed into operation and existing state practices of offering assistance gratuitously to victims of communal violence however equate communal violence with other exigencies such as fire, flood etc. Such existing practices of government action that have been followed as precedent do not even recognize the losses that displacement due to communal violence, such as what happened in Gujarat in 2002 entail. Moreover they do not do not fix responsibility on the state and allow the government to elude responsibility.

More alarming is the fact that even the justice system so far has allowed the state government to elude responsibility. During the violence in 2002 mobs of more than 5000 people roamed the streets with impunity committing crimes such as arson, theft, murder, rapes and burning and stabbings against members of the minority community. Despite the extraordinary situation of a prolonged breakdown of law and order where mass crimes occurred, according to the established system of law these offences were listed under the Indian Penal Code as criminal cases were treated as every other criminal case. This meant that the state of Gujarat that was responsible for the break down of law and order by its acts of omission and commission that resulted in these crimes in the first place, was also to be the prosecutor. Given that cases were registered as criminal cases where the charges are grave and punishments severe, the burden of proof is higher. Already the presence of large mobs creates fear among victims and affords attackers anonymity. Moreover, in the FIR which is the first and crucial step in the justice system, the police in a large number of cases merely recorded the attackers as mobs instead of individual names. For a large number of Muslim families in rural areas that had fled their homes at the outbreak of the violence, the return to their homes was enabled on the condition that they give up cases against the people they who had attacked them and threatened their life and property in 2002.

Not surprisingly within a few months of the violence, of the 4,256 cases registered, more than 2,108 had been closed including 1,960 as the police did not have
enough evidence to even file a charge-sheet. The Zahira Sheikh case illustrates the hostile environment in the state where a fair trial cannot be ensured and even as long as 8 years after the violence victims had to pursue their cases in court amidst an atmosphere of much hostility. Despite unprecedented interventions by the Supreme Court such as ordering the reopening of cases that were closed and the institution of the Special Investigating Team (SIT), punishment of the guilty is elusive even almost 10 years after the violence.

Moreover, in the established practice of criminal cases, victims do not receive compensation and a fine if any is paid to the state. In the existing framework of criminal cases lawyers and human rights activists have such as Teesta Setalvad counsel for Ehsan Jafri’s widow Zakia Jafri and Indira Jaisingh counsel in the murder of two British nationals on the highway in Prantij have sought to bring justice for the victims by naming Chief Minister Narendra Modi as one of the accused in their cases. This however may prove to be a long and winding wait towards justice for the victims of the violence.

People like Harsh Mander had advocated a South African style Truth and Reconciliation Committee to acknowledge the wrongs that had happened to initiate a process of reconciliation between the two communities. In the wake of apologies, albeit a few centuries late, by imperial powers like Unites States to the native Indians and Australia to the aborigines, a few thinkers have espoused apology, an admission of wrong done as the way forward in times where a polity has witnessed a community being subjected to barbaric violence. Thomas Hobbes on the other hand, had pointed out that suppression of memories of past wrongs was essential because if society is treated as a building made of stones then some stones that have an irregularity of figure take more room from others and must be discarded. 4

Further away from apology or public amnesia the government has sought to counter allegations by the media of displacement by commissioning it own study on the ‘polarization of population’. Until the intervention of the NCM in 2006 the GOG did not even acknowledge the existence of relief colonies. In its reply to the NCM the government acknowledged the existence of riot affected in what it called resettlement

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3 Interview with Ayyubbhai Sindhi, survivor of the Kidadi carnage, Al Falaha Relief Colony, Modassa, 22/3/2009. Ayyubbhai had been provided with police protection but up to 2009 had to face the hostility of the crowd outside the court when he appeared in court in relation to his case.

4 Thomas Hobbes. Pg 37
colonies. However, it insisted that those who lived there did so of their own choice. Displacement is therefore not just a humanitarian issue of providing for the needs of those affected by the violence, but an issue of the denial of fundamental rights of citizens and therefore an issue with political ramifications. For to acknowledge displacement would be to acknowledge the state government’s responsibility in creating the situation of displacement in the first place.

This study argues the events of 2002 had serious long term implications and that displacement caused by communal violence is not just an aberration in the life of a citizen. Some important trends that should not be ignored include the increasing ghettoisation and attempts by the Muslim community in Gujarat to safeguard the most basic rights and interests of its members such as security, healthcare and education facilities from within the community located in concentrations of Muslim population itself. A number of terrorist attacks in the years since the 2002 violence including the terrorist attack on Mumbai on the 26th of November 2008 have purportedly been carried out as revenge for the violence against Muslims in 2002.

The events of 2002 have brought into sharp relief the lacuna in the law in dealing with situations of mass violence. That the conviction in the Bilkis Bano rape case is considered to be the first in the case of communal violence is an indication of the serious lapse in the system. What should be a matter of great concern is that with this lacuna in the system incidents of mass violence such as what happened in Gujarat in 2002 can continue to occur.

Communal violence is not infrequent in India to the extent that scholars regard it as endemic to India. In the old city and working class areas of cities like Ahmedabad and Vadodara, as in the case of some other cities in India, where people live cheek by jowl in living spaces that have become over crowded over time, incidence of riots are not uncommon. The topography of cramped spaces with narrow streets, shared walls and additional living spaces constructed into already cramped spaces can make rioting easy, policing difficult and afford anonymity to trouble makers.5

In the significant literature on communal violence the partisan role of the state and the police has been recorded in a large number of instances in the significant

5 Interview with Professor Ansari on 17/12/2008 who moved from working class Gomtipur area to the upmarket Paldi area in Ahmedabad and Interview on with Jyotsna in Wadi, Baroda 23/2/2009
scholarship on communal violence in India. Retired police officers such as Vibhuti Narain Rai have also pointed out from experience that a riot cannot go on for too long if the Superintendent of Police and District Magistrate (DM) exercise their full powers that are already enabled by law. Despite this a large number of riots have occurred since independence including instances of major communal violence such as in 1984, 1992 and 2002. Even after the events of 2002 in Gujarat led to national and international condemnation, in 2009 the killing of Christians in Orissa led to displacement. Even though a senior bureaucrat in command position such as the district magistrate already has the power to call in the army, often bureaucrats as well as policemen take their cue from political bosses. Recently, member of the National Advisory Committee co chairing the drafting of the communal violence bill Harsh Mander has attested of his experience as a district magistrate that a riot cannot go on for more than a few hours without political support from somewhere.\(^6\)

Moreover, the government and the functionaries in charge of the arms of the state that are responsible for safeguarding the lives of citizens are not brought to book at their failure to maintain law and order. After a riot, it is mainly officers at the lower level that are transferred, senior police officers and district magistrates and more importantly, their political bosses are never convicted for their acts of omission and commission in cases of communal violence. As in the case of Gujarat, political leaders who play a role in inciting communal violence can be democratically re-elected and continue to hold constitutional posts.

Despite the serious violations of citizenship rights that displacement due to communal violence entails, the established government practice is of offering “assistance” and “relief” for the victims of communal violence that is far removed from the logic of reparation and that too is given gratuitously and not as a matter of right. The only relevant scheme for displaced in terms of housing is the central government scheme of Indira Awas Yojana, where riot victims find mention only with other exigencies arising out of natural calamities and other emergent situations like arson, fire, rehabilitation etc. and that too for a mere 5 per cent of the scheme’s central allocation.

Even in the state of Gujarat despite the several instances of communal violence particularly in Ahmedabad, there has been no evolution in the mechanisms

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of state response for the victims of communal violence that have been carried out through executive orders and government resolutions towards responses to specificities such as assistance, relief or a particular finance scheme. There has been very incremental increase of ‘assistance’ while the categories of assistance have by and large remained the same. The state response has been primarily been the provision of relief in camps and what is otherwise described as repatriation i.e. making the displaced return to the original residences from which they fled at the outbreak of violence. Even ‘The Gujarat Prohibition of Transfer of Immovable Property and Provisions for Protection of Tenants from Eviction from Premises in Disturbed Areas Act, 1986 which has been in existence since 1991 was a belated act for processes of segregation of spaces along communal lines that were already well on their way on the ground.

If debates in legislative bodies are an indication of government response then the issue of the displaced that find mention only once as hijrati in 1992 by a Muslim MLA while the deliberation of the houses in the Legislative Assembly on other instances of communal violence which primarily revolves around the number of deaths, injury, tear gas shells and bullets fired belies state response to communal violence as primarily a law and order problem. The analysis of state responses to situations of communal violence in Gujarat through a complex of government resolutions, housing policies, commissions of inquiries appointed after incidents of communal violence, reports of constitutional bodies such as NHRC and NCM, newspaper reports, court judgments, court cases and the state’s legislative assembly debates from 1960 to 2003 reveal that communal violence is regarded primarily as a law and order problem, where cases of mass violence are dealt with as other criminal cases and victims are at best given assistance gratuitously.

This study argues that displacement due to communal violence does not just raise humanitarian issues of relief and rehabilitation due to conflict between two communities but is a violation of fundamental citizenship rights. The colonial practice of viewing communal violence as sectarian violence between two communities has been carried forward in government practices since independence. However, such a framework that does not use the language of riots equates communal violence with other unavoidable and unpredictable exigencies such as flood, cyclone, fire etc, and does not hold the state accountable for its acts of omission and commission. Moreover the state’s practice of viewing communal violence primarily as a law and order
problem is blind to the intense insecurity created particularly for minorities. Instead of addressing the root of the problem that creates these insecurities the Congress government in Gujarat had enacted the Disturbed Areas Act 1985 which makes people’s desperate moves to ensure their security in the void left by the state of seeking homes among their coreligionists illegal.

In the significant scholarship on the issue, communal violence is seen as peculiar to India and displacement has been viewed as a peripheral consequence of it. However, as this study argues, displacement has a serious bearing on citizenship and must be viewed not just through the lens of communalism as a peculiar issue of Hindu-Muslim antagonism, but within the larger framework of citizenship rights.

Communal violence must be viewed as structural violence that requires systemic changes in order to prevent the violation of citizenship rights. Moreover, as this study demonstrates, displacement due communal violence creates a peculiar vulnerability and impoverishment that persists long after the events of violence have passed. Those displaced due to communal violence therefore require substantive interventions by the state to restore citizenship rights denied to them by the very experience of displacement due to communal violence.

In the light of the developments in Gujarat, the UPA government had, following its stated intent in its national election manifesto in 2004, highlighted the need for a comprehensive law to deal with communal violence. The Bill was first introduced in Rajya Sabha by the Ministry of Home Affairs headed by Shivraj Patil on 5th December 2005 and referred to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs for examination and report on the Bill.

The bill first introduced as the Communal Violence (Prevention, Control and Rehabilitation of Victims) Bill, 2005 and later rechristened the Communal Violence (Suppression) Act, 2005 and again the Communal and Sectarian Violence Bill, 2010 to its latest avatar ‘Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence (Access to Justice and Reparations) Bill, 2011’ is an indication of the gradual weighing up of some of the larger issues that dealing with communal violence entails that has thus far been seen primarily as a law and order problem to the negligence of the effects of communal violence that result in displacement and gross human rights and violations.

In its earlier versions, the bill which had been with a parliamentary standing committee headed by the BJP’s Sushma Swaraj since 2006 had for the prevention and control of communal violence mooted the provision of the declaration of certain areas
as communally disturbed areas and also for extraordinary powers to law enforcers to maintain public order. This was in keeping with existing state practices of viewing communal violence primarily as a law and order problem.

Far from generating optimism the earlier version of the bill was initially decried by academics, jurists and human rights activists for its vague phraseology and the fact that it makes it lawful for the state to take all necessary measures once an area is declared a communally disturbed area. As most of the provisions pertaining to prevention and control of communal violence already existed and which did not prevent either the repeated occurrence incidents of communal violence of human rights violations earlier, the purported intent of the bill to further empower officials in a riot situation met with much criticism. In its earlier version the bill actually strengthened the power of the state but did not establish accountability of state actors who can play a crucial role in the effects of communal violence.

Since 2010 after the Bill went to the National Advisory Council (NAC), due to concerns raised by civil society groups, its nomenclature was changed to ‘Communal and Sectarian Violence Bill, 2010’ to widen the scope of the legislation. Although the NAC rejected earlier sections of the Bill it retained the structure of the earlier Bill of creating new crimes and offences and creating accountability for public officials. Also, although due to the intervention of civil society groups and activists there was a shift in the Bill from empowerment to accountability of officials, there was a need to develop the rights of victims of communal violence such as those of internally displaced persons with regard to relief, reparation, rehabilitation and resettlement.

The revised version of the Bill sought to increase accountability and address the rights of the displaced. It retained provisions for the setting up of special courts to try offences under this law and provided for mechanisms to deliver relief and rehabilitation for victims of violence. The Bill also set up guidelines for assessment of compensation for losses suffered by individuals including loss of life, home, belongings, loss of livelihood, assessing compensation for injuries, impact of sexual assault or abuse on women.

Proposals to make the DM and Superintendent of Police (SP) accountable have been mooted in the past, however the final version of the Bill prepared by the

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NAC called ‘Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence (Access to Justice and Reparations) Bill, 2011’ communal violence bill, makes a fresh attempt to establish command responsibility whereby responsibility can be fixed to the person occupying the office. Some other important highlights of the Bill include enabling the central government to take over the powers of the state government in a situation of major communal violence by the insertion of a clause empowering the central government to invoke Article 355 by declaring a particular instance of communal clash as “internal disturbance”; the creation of a National Authority for Communal Harmony, Justice and Reparation to take charge in the event of major communal violence; the creation of mechanisms to determine and disburse compensation and importantly; the incorporation and extensive use of the category of Internally Displaced Persons to refer to those displaced by communal violence in the Bill.

Although the draft bill has been well received in some quarters, it has also been expressly criticized for a number of provisions that could prove to be very problematic. The bill has been criticized for its definition of 'communal and targeted violence' as an act that 'destroys the secular fabric of the nation.' This definition is central to the Bill, and all offences and rights of victims to justice and reparation would ensue only if the action warrants description as a communal and targeted violence as per this vague definition. The Bill also empowers the proposed Nation Authority for Prevention of Communal Violence to enter any building or place for inquiry and investigation of subject matters under its concern and to even seize or make copies of such documents.

The Bill has been criticized by the BJP for being anti-majority. The Bill's emphasis on minority communities to the exclusion of majority communities has been rejected by people of other political persuasions as well. The term "group", which, as per the draft Bill proposes to cover “religious or linguistic minority” in any state does not include a member of the majority community and therefore according to the BJP, is problematic and must be deleted. The BJP's principle criticism of the bill is that it privileges minorities and does not address situations when the minority community is an aggressor in a communal conflict. The NAC however argues that the Bills provisions are informed by the understanding that while existing laws already provide for justice in case a person from a majority community is harmed, this bill’s intent is to ensures that minority communities get access to justice.
The BJP’s opposition is also related to its position on communal violence as a law and order problem. In keeping with its earlier position in Gujarat in 2002 of maintaining the federal balance the BJP has argued that the central government not directly empowered to deal law and order situations which are a state subject. The central government’s jurisdiction, argues the BJP, should be restricted to issuing advisories, directions and forming an opinion under Article 356 regarding whether the governance of the state can be carried on in accordance with the Constitution before intervention as already exist in the Constitution. According to this argument, if the proposed bill becomes a law, then it would amount to the central government usurping the jurisdiction of the states to legislate on a subject which is within the domain of the state governments.

Gujarat’s economic growth since 2000 has often been projected as an assertion of the state’s return to normalcy and the success of the present Chief Minister’s brand of politics. The state’s domestic product (SDP) from the years 2000 to 2008 has to 10.76 compound annual rate of growth (CARG) as against India’s gross domestic product (GDP) for the same period at 7.68 CARG. Among the English media in Gujarat and even among some Muslims in other parts of India there is an opinion that the events of 2002 have received their due attention and condemnation and that Muslims in the Gujarat should leave the past behind and join in the economic development in the state. Gujarat may well be progressing economically and this is in keeping with the regions historical pursuit of economic growth. However, the state is not a corporation whole role is limited to profits. The ideal of citizenship as instituted by the constitution demands a universal access to rights to its citizens as full and equal members of the society. And in so far as the Gujarat polity at present denies it displaced Muslims equal rights, it denies them citizenship.

Despite legitimate criticisms the Bill on communal violence does in fact take a shy at question of maintaining the constitutional vision in a democracy against majoritarian impulses that has been a longstanding question in political science. However for historical reasons in the primarily associated with developments in the West, the question of protecting the rights of minorities within the nation state have dominated scholarship on citizenship especially in recent times, while the question of

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those displaced due to their belonging to a group has been the domain of refugee studies under international law. The UN Guiding principles are an important normative development in that they fix primary responsibility for the displaced on national governments. The category of internally displaced persons has made the language of rights available to the victims of communal violence.

While the draft ‘Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence (Access to Justice and Reparations) Bill, 2011’ has proposed far reaching changes that will not easily be approved by Parliament, the bill has raised crucial issues relating to communal violence. The draft Bill is an important attempt at introducing the rights framework in government response to the victims of communal violence. This however cannot be done at the cost of compromising other established civil rights. How responsibility for the displaced and victims of communal violence is fashioned in the proposed bill on communal violence and whether it will even see the light of day has repercussions not just for displaced persons or minorities but for giving depth and reach to the principle of citizenship in India.