CHAPTER II

LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND REALITY

Language is a necessary condition for philosophical thought. It is impossible to think, to believe, to act or to be conscious without a language. Hegel wrote in his preface to his *Science of Logic*: "It is in human language that the forms of thought are manifested and laid sown in the instance"\(^\text{25}\).

Language is something which is spoken; it is an instrument by means of which something is said, with its uses as to make propositions, ask questions, issue orders, describe, name, express emotions etc. This makes language different from sounds that are made by other species for instance the parrot. Consider for example: if somebody says that he or she promises to complete the task tomorrow, it means that the person knows what he means by the word "promise", whereas in the case of the parrot it would be just the sound (in which case the parrot is performing the phonetic act). This phonetic act of the parrot may be explained as stimulus-response process. It would be inadequate or

inappropriate to regard or explain a person's utterance of a sentence as a stimulus response process.

A person who speaks something performs what is called in Austin's sense an "Illocutionary Act". The parrot for instance does not perform any illocutionary act but on the other hand is performing only the phonetic act. Some instances of illocutionary acts are to make a promise, to ask a question, to issue a command, to make a report, to give a description, to name, to identify, to warn, etc. Thus language becomes an instrument which may be used to perform illocutionary acts. Language always speaks of the language user. The condition for a language user is to be able to perform an illocutionary act. Micheal Dummett stated that "language is the expression of what the speakers want to express, that is, their thoughts and experiences. It is commonplace to hold that language is a medium of communication and also a vehicle of thought".26

Not only is language the condition for the philosophical thought, but it is also a necessary condition for thought. In Noam Chomsky's words, "possession of human language is associated with a specific type of mental organization".27 The earliest roots of language are traceable to the use of natural signs within primitive patterns of communication. How does language arise? Does it arise from

communication? Is language the evolutionary product of relatively primitive patterns of animal communication? There seem to be different answers and suggestions put forth by different thinkers.

Language and evolution are the two terms that are of great importance. If language plays a key role in the emergence of human thought and understanding, then evolution theory provides the scientific explanation of the emergence and development of human life. Though they are important they are often misunderstood and the relation between them has not been fully clarified. There is no systematic theory of language, and for the psychological side of human evolution, the subject still largely depends upon Darwin’s contribution, in spite of its criticisms.

To relate language theory and evolution, one has to seek the area where they meet. In evolutionary terms, this is called “adaptation” (a term that covers all that mediates between life and the world around it). Learning of all sorts and all higher forms of knowledge is the result of behavior which is sign mediated. This is dependent on signs and signals that enable animals not only to communicate and receive information from one another, but also to acquire information from their environment. It is this complex pre-existent and inter-related factors such as perception, behavior, signs, signals, learning ability, communication that sets the
stage for language. Even before language originates, one has to realize that it is a complex, emergent phenomenon, the nature of which can be understood only within the evolutionary context.

In every sense, language is a synthetic phenomenon, unlike any pre-existent forms of perception, behavior or communication out of which it is compounded. This is confirmed by the fact that language is clearly a late arrival on the evolutionary stage serving no immediate vital need. That its function is not directly causal but symbolically mediated. It is dependent not only on a physical stimulus as such, but also on some stimulus that is interpreted as significant of something else. Each of the organs involved in the production and interpretation of language has a biological function which is prior to and independent of its function in the buildup of language.

The recent attempt to make language as readymade endowment rather than the end product of complex learning process is to ignore both of the complexity of language and the nature of evolutionary processes. Most of the language theories fail to grasp that language is neither genetically determined nor empirically given. It is neither a readymade system to be passively acquired nor a form of behavior to be simply mimicked. It is something that is to be built up out of perception, behavior and experience of each individual, with whatever he or she receives from
the other members of the same speech community. It is only in such a process that
verbal forms of any language acquire meaning. The forms that differ from one
language to another have no intrinsic meaning. They are devices established by
use and convention which in addition to their utility for communication, are the
means by which each individual learns well or ill to monitor, reflect on or
understand his own experience.

Therefore, if we are to explain the origin and nature of language we must
turn not to genetics or neurology, which are the preserves of few, but to much
more familiar areas of experience. Before approaching the language problem, it
becomes necessary to throw light on evolutionary theory. "Evolution" is an area
that covers not only the fossil record of reptiles but also their survival and
extinctions. The evolutionary theory went through a rough time in the 19th century
that also continued in the 20th century. Opposition to the evolutionary theories was
stronger in the philosophical circles. Wittgenstein for instance, affirmed that the
Darwinian Theory has nothing to do with philosophy and called evolution as
"hypothesis of natural science". The influence of Wittgenstein was carried
further. Even Karl Popper, philosopher of science, stated that he did not regard
highly the explanatory power of the theory of evolution, which he described as a
metaphysical research programme. Others emphasized all the higher mental
faculties and attributed them to some area of the brain; or more modishly, to the genes. David H. Lorenz for instance, assumed that "language learning is based on a phylogenetic programme which ensures that the child's innate power of abstract thought is integrated with the vocabulary that belongs to the cultural tradition"\textsuperscript{28}.

All these speculations were anti-evolutionary in character. The emergence of higher faculties and complex behavior cannot be explained in the above way. Evolution, at all times is concerned with the higher forms of life interacting with their environment. Environmental factors are as important as the purely psychological ones. One complex and uniquely human kind of mediation is language, which is not only a means of social communication, but also a vehicle of thought, as well as the instrument of analysis. Culture, is thus transmitted from one generation to another not by genes, but with language and derivative symbolisms. Thus, all human culture and thought pre-suppose the existence of human language. All the functions of language are rooted in human speech, it emerges out of prior forms of behavior and perceptions and it develops to become an indispensable constituent factor in human consciousness and rationality. If

anyone tries to exclude man from the evolutionary scheme then it betrays lack of understanding of the most basic principle of evolution, namely that everything in evolution is a special case.

The truth is 'the theory of evolution' is a well established theory. But many of the contemporary thinkers consider it is as inadequate not only because its principles and mechanisms have not been clarified but because in this incomplete state the existing principle and mechanisms are made to do service where they clearly do not apply.

Contrary to the popular view is the modern theory of evolution that focuses on 'genetics' which dates back to the 1960s. The most important aspect that needs to be appreciated about this theory is the basis that it adopts to understand all forms of life including our own. This theory becomes an education in itself as, it accounts for all that is peculiar to life, and not just its physical basis but also genetic origins. This can also be seen in Darwin's work 'Origin of Species' with two other notable studies, "one dealing with human evolution, the other with those forms of animal and human behavior that culminates in the emergence of language"29.


29 Cf.,.... ibid
The main deficiency of contemporary evolutionary theory is its failure to account for the two most dramatic evolutionary shifts, the emergence of animate intelligence and of human rationality. But it had an advantage in the sense that it helped to solve both the above problems at the same time, as rationality could be explained only in terms of language theory, and the origins and functions can be explained only in terms of more general principles of animal intelligence.

Again, 'evolutionary theory' is often regarded as a myth. It was believed that evolutionary thinking was the invention of Darwin or his immediate predecessors, which was implicit in totemism and primitive mythology. It was influenced by Greek naturalism and all other such schools of thought. Another error is the belief that evolution theory is descriptive and incomplete. This reveals total incomprehension of the nature of theory.

Evolutionary explanation must explain novel and extremely complex development in terms of a mix of factors that are heterogeneous and incommensurable that no other person dares approach. Such explanation is achieved by showing that each of these factors is a necessary pre-condition for the emergence of some given development. The emergence of human language, consciousness, mind and reason must be explained in a similar way.
Another important point in evolutionary theory is 'behaviour'; along with perception it brings us to a distinctive kind of adaptation, which concerns psychological forms of mediation between living creatures and their world. With behavioral feedback and perceptual information we may call it knowledge. Knowledge is the chief evolutionary advantage of all higher forms of life. Therefore, there is a need to provide a theory of human knowledge that will clarify its origin in simple forms of semantic behavior and sign perception that combines and produce language, and clarify also how language first creates the possibility of conceptual thought. There is no discussion of the evolutionary theory in epistemology. Epistemology is usually relegated to metaphysics, a discipline whose subject matter has never been satisfactorily defined and abandoned by theorists who are either ignorant of the evolutionary principle or resolutely opposed to it. A remedy to all this is a need for rational epistemology based on evolutionary principles. This rational epistemology will account for behavior and perception as the primary sources of learning and knowledge. There is also the need for evolutionary theory of language, the locus of all these – behavior, perception, learning and knowledge that can lay the foundations of human intelligence and rational thoughts.
There have been different discussions provided to the question as to how language originates and the relation between communication and language.

Origins of language are intelligible only in terms of certain prior and well established facts of morphology and neotony that are distinctively human. There are certain complex interrelated factors, without which neither language nor the human species would exist. Language theorists feel that language might have originated independently of speech, for instance in gesture. Such theorists fail to acknowledge the complex symbolic nature and function of language that emerge with the help of vocal signaling and speech. Sometimes, the origin of language is traced to the brain or to the genes; this seems to be quite unproblematic matter of anatomy and behavior. Language could not have originated before the development of the human mouth as organ and one can be sure here that it emerged at more or less the same time. The mouth provides the indispensable mechanisms of speech. The other behavioral and perceptual pre-requisites for the origin of language are equally unproblematic, that is easily located among more general forms of behavior and perception, both animal and human. All behavior, knowledge and higher mental faculties of thought and reason are built upon and always pre-suppose this physiological basis. Even, Aristotle, for instance, believed that “all higher forms of knowledge are built on pre-existent knowledge,
the origin of which is to be sought not in pure reason, but in perception, experience, memory and the ability to learn"\textsuperscript{30}.

With Descartes, Aristotle maintains that language is a species-specific characteristic. It is only the human beings among the sentient being that possess and use language. No animal species except humans display linguistic behavior in the sense of using appropriate contexts. Descartes, further argues that human mental activities, particularly in "the use of language" and exercise of the will could not be possibly explained or predicted by means of mechanical laws. As Descartes writes: "It is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid without even excepting idiots that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts, while, on the other hand, there is no animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be which can do the same"\textsuperscript{31}.

For Descartes, animals do not possess any reason at all. Human abilities "think", to decide and to use language creatively could not be accounted in any way for animals. To explain the distinctively human abilities Descartes used his notion of "innate ideas" that are there in an 'immaterial soul' or 'res cogitans' or 'a thinking subject'. That was conceived by him and his followers as to be utterly


distinct from the physical body. The human mind for Descartes was equipped by ‘God’ with a natural light of reason by use of which human beings could attain reliable knowledge of the natural world. Thus, Descartes denies that human language is evolved from the communicative system of animals.

Noam Chomsky, like Descartes maintains that the humans derive language from “Universal Grammar” which they possess innately. Chomsky supposes that is due to the privileged structure of the brain, something that species has acquired as a result of mutation. Language is not evolved, there is no continuity between language and animal communication. Chomsky argues: “A person who knows a language has mastered a set of rules and principles that determines an infinite discrete set of sentences each of which has a fixed form and a fixed meaning or meaning potential. Even at the lowest level of intelligence, the characteristic use of this knowledge is free and creative in the sense just described and in that one can instantaneously interpret an indefinitely large range of utterances with no feeling of unfamiliarity or strangeness....... if this is correct, then it is quite pointless of speculating about the “evolution” of human language form animal communication system”32.

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For Chomsky, 'animal language' or 'body language' is in his terminology called 'animal communication system'. The communicative mechanism of humans and the animals are radically different from one another. And thus he uses "language" as criteria to differentiate the communicative patterns of human beings from the rest. By this Chomsky, assumes that it is only humans that have this capacity to use language and nothing that is used by animals in their communication qualifies as truth that corresponds with the definition. The valid conclusion that can be drawn from his observation is that: "language itself, in a strict sense, has not evolved or gone through different stages of development and complexity; we cannot infer however,....human language has not evolved from forms of animal communication". If it is true that one does not encounter languages (in Chomsky's restricted sense) that differ in their level of complexity, extent and representative efficiency, one can conclude that language has not evolved. But the same observation does not seem to lend support to the thesis that language is not a transformation of something else, namely of systems of communication that do differ in complexity, extent and representative efficacy.

When meaning and communication, undergo an evolutionary development there arises the language. Language, as the end result of the evolution of animal

means of communication should have acquired other functions. But an evolutionary approach to communication and meaning does not mesh with Chomsky's positions, but it does not conflict with his reasons either. It remains unscathed by them. There seems to be a total absence of a background developmental preparation within the phylogeny of animal communicative patterns. In other words, how does the mutation responsible for the sudden emergence of language take place? There seems to be no reasonable account suggested and also the concept of "miracle" can hardly be underplayed.

Therefore to get a better idea is to discuss the natural and artificial types of communications that will correspond neatly with the divide between animal and human on one hand, and animal systems of communication and human language on the other.

At the lowest level or basis of evolutionary succession we find natural signs (indications) of the inanimate world, such as the sound of thunder somewhere meaning that lightning struck there. At the highest stage are linguistic utterances that are sentences with full meaning and reference. In between are forms of meaning created in different patterns of instinctive animal communication, the pre-linguistic intentional and pre-linguistic conventional types of communication.
Descartes stated that cognitive states and attitudes such as beliefs or intentions cannot be attributed to organisms (even to sentient being) unless they are manifested by language. These views follow directly from Descartes’ dualism which has always taken the thinking substance as independent from matter, so that such a substance proves to exist by criteria that makes no appeal to the physical world. In claiming something exists as a mental substance there is no need at all to use criteria concerning bodily traits. Every person, he says, has strong grounds for affirming its own existence as a mental entity, independent of the body, and there are chances of him knowing one another. Further, one cannot know the existence of other minds directly as how he knows his own mind. Though the behavior manifested by bodies and machine resemble, yet one cannot use such a resemblance as an indicator of thought, that would seem to be delusive. Automata do not function from the impulses of the individual soul associated with them. Therefore, the dualist implements criteria wherein a distinction is made between bodily behaviour that indicates the existence of thinking being and behavior that does not.

Interestingly even Russell acknowledges primacy of language when he says: "language comes first and thought follows in its footsteps." And once a

person learns to speak, language provides us with new psychological dimension that is quite distinct from animal reaction to stimulus or sign. This is also evident in Piaget's work on language development.

Jean Piaget made an attempt to organize the material collected around the concept of egocentrism. He examined language from the point of view of the subject and not from the cold external viewpoint of the objective observer. This led Piaget to attempt to arrange his material into two types of linguistic exchanges and stages in the development of the conversation among children aged from 4 to 7. This progression thereby could be compared with their verbal explanation, their understanding of order, cause, justification, reality, history, human action and rules and regulations.

For Piaget, language serves multiple functions along with the age. This implies that Piaget sees the development of language from the evolutionary perspective. Piaget argues "that the acquisition of language is a product of the development of intelligence during the sensori-motor period (0-24 months) and the associate capacity symbolic (or semiotic) representations. This occurs in the form of the semiotic function which includes symbolic play, deferred imitation and mental imagery. The onset of language is associated with the development of symbolic representation which is dependent upon the progressive and
internalization of sensory motor action scheme"\textsuperscript{35}. At first, language for Piaget is plainly "echolalia" or "repetitive". The child at this stage repeats what he or she has understood from the speech of others. Next, the child gets interested in his/her own linguistic production and repeats words for the pleasure of talking, which is then still "echolalia". Monologue takes place when the child talks to herself. This is followed by a collective monologue. Here the child uses the presence of others as a stimulus for his or her own verbal productions. These functions of speech are all egocentric as in contrast with socialized speech that serves other functions such as the exchange of information, criticisms, commands, request, threats and questions and answers. Having recognized the different functions of language, Piaget arranges the different types of conversations in the development sequence. Piaget recognizes that explanations given by one child is purely "egocentric" which means "explanation are not conceived by children between 6 to 8 years of age as an effort of decentration that is taking the position of someone which does not know"\textsuperscript{36}.

The child does not attempt to adapt her explanation to the viewpoints of others. For instance, a child of this age will tell a story without putting the


different sequences of the story in the right order. Rather the child will tell the story in the order in which she remembers the different passages that are neither logical nor historical. And accordingly, the necessary ordering of cause and effect will be altered. In sum, the child of this age behaves as if everyone already shares the same knowledge that s/he has. From the age of 9 to 11 years, the egocentric speech gives way to a form of verbal and conceptual syncretism that is characterized by a need for justification at any price. The child at this age immediately takes a leap from the statements to the conclusion. The child tries to link everything with everything.

Language enables an individual to communicate his thoughts to others. This is not simple. An individual may convey different modes of thought in different ways. At one point of time, the adult may use language to assert, at other times to state objective facts or convey information, for instance, ‘the weather is changing for worse’, ‘bodies fall to the ground’. Language is also used to express commands or desires, to criticize or threaten in words, to arouse feelings and provoke actions such as “let’s go”, “how horrible”, etc. On the other hand the function of the child’s language may be divided into two large groups namely the “egocentric” and the “socialized”. When a child utters an egocentric phrase, he does not bother to know to whom he is speaking nor whether he is being listened
to. The child here talks either for himself or for the pleasure of associating anyone who happens to be there at the moment. At this level, the talk of the child is "egocentric". This is partly because the child speaks only about himself, but chiefly because he does not attempt to place himself at the point of view of his hearer. The egocentric speech of the child is divided into three categories. (a) Repetition (echolalia) this involves the repetition of words and syllables. A child only repeats words for the pleasure of talking with no thoughts of talking to anyone, also imitates sound, even those which he hardly understands the meaning of. According to Claparede, "imitation is an idea motor adaptation by means of which the child reproduces and then stimulates the movements and ideas of those around him"37. (b) Monologue--in this the child talks to himself as though he were thinking aloud. He does not address anyone. (c) Dual or collective monologue--this is the most social of the egocentric varieties of child language. There is an outsider that is associated with the action or thought of the moment, but is expected neither to attend nor to understand. In this the child does not speak to anyone, he only talks aloud to himself in front of others- but here the child is conscious of the audience. This can be compared to the way certain men and women of a puerile disposition (certain hysterical subjects, if hysteria be described

37Ibid..... P. 71.
as the survival of infantile characteristics), who are in the habit of talking aloud as though they were talking to themselves but are also conscious of their audience.

Socialized speech can be distinguished into adapted information, criticisms, commands, requests and threats, questions and answers. In adapted information there is the exchange of thoughts with others. This is done by either telling his hearer something that will interest him and influence his actions or by an actual interchange of ideas by argument or even by collaboration in pursuit of a common aim. This takes place only when the child adopts the point of view of his hearer and when the latter is not chosen at random. Criticism includes all remarks made about the work or behavior of others, but having the same character as adapted information, in other words, remarks specified in relation to a given audience. Commands, requests and threats include a definite interaction between one child and another. Most of the questions asked by children call for an answer and can therefore be classed as socialized speech. By answers is meant answers to real questions that is with interrogation marks and not to command. Answers are given to those that contain information.

Critically viewed, Piaget does not define sharply the terms in his discussion and tends to vacillate among several distinct meanings, especially of egocentricism. Of the several meanings among which the term “egocentrism” wavers,
the most deeply entrenched appears to be that children take their own point of view to be absolute. To support this account, Piaget would have to point to a kind of behavior in which children attempt to communicate and fail because they think their point of view is absolute. He draws on two categories of observation neither of which involves this kind of behavior. The first category is the observation of talk that is self stimulative or in other ways directed to the self. This behavior is not egocentric in the sense Piaget wants to show that it is, because children are not trying to communicate. The second class of observation consists of cases in which children are clearly attempting to communicate but fail because they lack the ability to take the listener's point of view. Cases of this kind are not clearly egocentric in the sense that Piaget wants to show that they are, because it is not clear whether these children are taking their own standpoint to be absolute. On the one hand, Piaget says that when children are exhibiting the cardinal features of egocentric speech they do not want to, or are not trying tocommunicate, on the other hand, he also says that the communication embodied by such utterances is egocentric. Children are not speaking from the point of view of their audience and instead are taking their own point of view as absolute. If they are not trying to communicate, how can we say that their speech is egocentric, in the latter senses? If we want to say that this speech is egocentric, then we have to say either that if
the speech were intended as communication it would be egocentric, or that the intention itself is egocentric.

The weakness of the first alternative is obvious. The speech is not intended as communication. The second alternative is also problematic because it is not at all clear whether the children's actual intention is egocentric. These children are simply doing something other than communicating; part of this activity involves talking, when talking is conventionally reserved for communicating.

Another important aspect of language is its relation to thought processes that is how language and thought are related to one another. Gilbert Harman rightly stated that "Language makes thoughts possible. Learning language is not just learning a new way to put thoughts into words; it is also learning a new way to think". Again, there has been a long standing discussion on the relationship between thought and language in the western philosophy that can be traced back to Greek period. It is possible to identify certain broad traditions in the philosophical study of thought and language, traditions that have their representative in both psychology and linguistics. Plato and Socrates answering the question 'what do you mean by thinking?' reply: "As a talk which the soul has with itself about

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objects under consideration”39 This view indicates that there is a logical or ‘internal’ connection between thought and language: thought just is the discourse of the mind with itself. There are parallels between thought and language as recognized by the language theorists. Thought and utterances exhibit semantic parallels, not only are both entitled or meaning, reference and truth and falsity but the thought that ‘P’ and indicative statement ‘P’ produced in otherwise identical situations must have the same meaning reference and truth value. What makes language “language” in Dummett’s words is the idea of the philosophy of language. This is basic to all philosophy. The point above seems to be facts about language, our language, the language that we have and use in science and in everyday life. The general concept of language presupposes within the discussion of theories of meaning. For Plato and Descartes, who does the thinking is the ‘rational part of the soul’ rather than the whole human being. Many of the current debates on the relationship between thought and language bear their imprints on what the ‘Father of Modern Philosophy’ has said. Cartesian metaphysical framework interprets the idea of thought as something inner, hidden and private. The person starts from the inside, from our internal reflections and cogitations and then by a problematic and circuitous route move outwards, to the public world of

communication. This Cartesian Meditator has had a curious dual fate in 20th century, as majority of the philosophers have deeply suspected it. Descartes, however, devoted most of his career not to metaphysics but to science. In his scientific correspondence and in discourse Descartes unequivocally advanced the claim that there is no thought without language. And in arguing for this claim, Descartes creates language, throughout, as an objective interpersonally fixed phenomenon, subject to firm external criteria for what can count as its genuine instantiation and maintains that we are quite mistaken in attributing any kind of thought to non-human animals given that they lack genuine language. Though animals and other forms of animal life do not think, certain gestures that reveal are instances which the pre-philosophical intuitions of the great majority would classify as involving without thought. Descartes well known view, was that despite many apparent and distinct similarities between our behavior and that of animals, animals are not endowed with thoughts and there are no souls interactively united with animal bodies. To show that his view was correct and attractive, Descartes employed the criterion of linguistic behavior, wherein he stated that an organism who has the capacity for using a language is a conjoined with a necessary and sufficient condition for the possession of thought. In the sense of being united with a soul. In Descartes words: “In fact, none of our external actions can show
anyone who examines them that our body is not just a self moving machine but contains a soul with thoughts with the exception of spoken words or to her signs that have reference to particular topics without expressing them" 40. Hence, linguistic behavior indicates the presence of thoughts. And this is the reason why animals cannot speak like us. It is not because of deficiency in their relevant organs but because, they lack the faculty of thought. Descartes regarded speech behavior as necessary conditions for thinking as well the sufficient condition.

Descartes views were considered as inadequate and were faced with the following criticisms. First of all it makes the idea of thinking animals (and more generally, that of thinking machines) a genuine possibility, and thereby allows that animals and machines may possess souls (res cogitans). Second if there is reason for denying that the use of language is a necessary condition for the presence of thought in a physical entity, then there must also be reason to deny that language is the only certain sign of thought, or reason to allow that there are thinking beings whose thought is never manifested by a sign at all. In fact Descartes regards the use of language only as inconclusive evidence for the presence of thought, neither as a necessary nor a sufficient condition of it.

Therefore the two Cartesian claims the privacy of thought and the linguisticity of thought hardly look compatible. If thought is entirely and essentially private, then there seems to be no conclusive reason for restricting it to language users. For sometimes we know, cats and dogs might have inner mental life.

Cartesians may support their point by stating that retarded people invent some form of a communicative system clearly recognized by their caretakers, and hence even these individuals have a language. The same criterion of Cartesians may embarrass them as it will force them to acknowledge the so called 'artificial intelligence' of some machines as genuine thoughts. These may hardly be compatible with Descartes own purposes. He may agree that machines, like some animals may surpass humans in the efficiency of their skill in some narrowly restricted area of performance. But there is no proof that they have a faculty of thought. In yet other areas, the same machines or animals will be totally devoid of skill in contrast with humans whose abilities spread to all areas of practical concern. As Arde Denkel points out "although such machines might execute many things with equal or perhaps greater perfection than any of us, they would, without doubt, fail in certain others from which it could be discovered that they did not act from knowledge, but solely from the disposition of organs: for while reason is an universal instrument that is alike available on every occasion, these
organs, on the contrary need a particular action. Descartes, strongly blocks every possible justification that animals have a mind, and declares that such a thing is morally impossible. It is morally impossible that there should exist in any machine a diversity of organs sufficient to enable it to act in all the occurrences of life in the way in which our reason enable to act. By means of these arguments and views what Descartes wanted to prove is that it is only the humans that possess a thought and there is close proximity between language and thought. The view was further supported by other contemporary thinkers.

A stronger argument than Descartes' was put forth by Quine and his followers. Quine declared that when we attribute intentionality to the behavior of animals without speech, we commit the mistake of putting ourselves in their place, where such a thing is an unwarranted intellectualism. In Quine's own words: "we find ourselves attributing beliefs, wishes and strivings even to creatures lacking the power of speech, such is our dramatic virtuosity. We project ourselves even into what from his behavior we imagine a mouse's state of mind to have been and dramatize it as a belief, wish, or strivings verbalized as seems relevant and natural to us in the state thus feigned."
According to Donald Davidson, the attribution of intention and belief to creatures is valid only to the extent that such creatures manifest behavior that can be interpreted as speech. Any behavior involving less than the complexity of speech will severely undermine our intentional interpretation of such creatures. According to Davidson, without speech we cannot make fine distinction between thoughts that are essential to the explanations. When we attribute attitudes, we should ensure that all the expressive power of language can be used to make such a distinction. Davidson considers 'necessary condition' as an ascription of thoughtfulness (that is of intentionality), to the behavior of such a creature. But again the views of Donald Davidson's suffered criticisms. However, if Davidson's criterion is applied strictly to the behavior of animals, then no action that falls outside can be said to be intentional. If this is the case, then even simple actions of humans will be treated as unintended that may in turn result into disastrous consequences. Taking an example of an assassin's act of pulling the trigger may be classified as unintended, thereby making him free from any responsibility.

Much of what we do as thinking creatures and interpret actions fellow human beings can be at once intentional, non-linguistic and simple. For example: stretching the top shelf, opening the newspaper, chopping onions, do not embody...
intrinsic complexity. Moreover much of the communicative action we perform among ourselves, such as the smiles, glances, facial expression, postures, tones of voices and mannerisms we often display is structurally simple, yet non-linguistic, not carried instinctively. Such non-verbal communication plays a very important part in our life. Endorsing Davidson's thesis without proper qualification implies ignoring the liveliest aspect of our communal life. Therefore to obtain a useful criterion from Davidson's conditions we should firstly regard the capacity for behavior as complex as speech as a necessary conditions for a creature's ability to think. Instead of supposing that only speech behavior is thoughtful and intentional, we should require that only creatures that can produce behavior as complex as language can act by decision, can think and be responsible for their deeds. Under reasonably acceptable circumstances other behavior in such creatures should be recognized as thoughtful.

A similar question arises within the boundaries of human language. Why only articulate and most developed versions are taken as paradigms of language? There is no doubt that human language can be used most powerfully. Keeping the actual performance aside, why should one take, for example, a novelist's or philosopher's competence a paradigm of language? There are modest users of language, whose knowledge is restricted to not more than a few hundred words
and a limited number of grammatical forms. Their competence of language hardly exceeds the degree they are capable of making actual use of it in performance. Possession of language is not acquired all at once and as a whole. People learn only parts of language and may or may not extend their mastery to that of a literary person. Some individuals who lead simple lives in isolated environments can perform and follow only a fraction of a novelist's command of their language. Thus a person's linguistic performance does not reveal all his competence, which is his grasp of language conceived ideally. An individual competence cannot be identical with a complete and ideal grasp of language. There is a reason for thinking that language is the competence of man. An individual is not an idealized full-fledged system, but only larger or smaller parts of the full system. Consider the language of pre-linguistic infants. They establish their initial communicative interaction with their caretaker. Further, infants of about 12 months of age do not manifest behaviour based on beliefs and intentions as complex as those encountered in adults. We see that infants at such a stage of development engage in an intense non-linguistic communicative relationship, which is essential to the organization of their lives, for learning skills and acquiring the adult language. But many a times it so happens that pre-linguistic infants convey messages that are equal to that of adult's nonlinguistic behavior. This has been supported by the
developmental psychologist who states that infants who display behavioral tendencies such as insistence, rejection, request, joy and satisfaction bear a great similarity in tone of voice and emphasis to those of the adults. But there has been objection put forth by the followers of Davidson, where in they say that the types of behavior at hand are not complex at all, and furthermore, that in all likelihood pre-linguistic infants simple stimulate the actions of adult humans as even pets do -rather than behaving intentionally. From such a point of view only adults can be said to display such speech like communicative behavior, and consequently only they and not infants and animals can be credited with thinking.

In the words of Arde Denkel “in case of pre-linguistic children Descartes’ position, too, encounters difficulties. If, on the one hand, one regards the use of language as the sole evidence for the possession of thought , and on the other, insists that the same thing makes it possible to distinguish human from animals, logically one will be led to affirming that pre-linguistic children are soulless automata, and to treating them like sub-human animals. Such a consequence is a theoretical disaster”⁴³. It generates questions like how does the same creature soulless in the beginning, come to acquire a mind in due course? And how can soulless infants possess innate ideas? Descartes’ answer can be predicted, by

extrapolation from his attribution of innate ideas to infants who are not capable of expressing them in words. He would declare that language is in the minds of infants as a potential a capacity that will actualize with the child's acquiring maturity. Locke's answer to this kind of strategy has been that since we cannot do anything we have no capacity for, for anything we have achieved we must have had capacity for right from the beginning. Absurdly therefore, on Descartes' view everything we are capable of manifesting must be inborn.

Coming to Davidson's thesis, for the intentional explanation of non-linguistic behavior to be underdetermined by data available, the attribution of thought to the creature must indeed contain distinctions. What gives force to the thesis of underdetermination is the contrast between the subtlety of the content of thought and the relative simplicity of behavior. The more finely discriminating thought we attribute to a creature, the greater the number of alternative explanations we have of its behavior. But when we attribute thoughts and intentions to human infants, or to higher animals, we do not have to make fine distinctions. On the contrary, generally we do not conjecture that infants or animals think in the finer and more elaborate ways human adults do. Far from fulfilling the assumption that lends force to Davidson's argument (that is the attribution of finely discriminating thoughts and intentions), those who suggest
that a dog possesses some primitive form of belief that its master is home are highly unlikely to maintain that the animal is in a position to know that Mr. Smith, the bank manager is home.

In the beginning of the 20th century, the relation between thought and language was debated within a new context. In the seminal essay of Frege, "uber sinn und bedeutung" (1892) and his 1894 review of Edmund Husserl's 'philosophie der Arithmetik', the German logician Gotlob Frege insisted upon distinguishing between the objective content and the subjective performance of thinking. The former, that which can be thought, is capable of existing without a thinker, and of being the common property of several thinkers. The latter, the psychological episode in which the former is 'apprehended' or grasped, must have a bearer. The objective content of thinking, Frege called 'the thought' (der Gedanke), and he identified this with the 'sense' of a sentence, that which is capable of being true or false.

Frege conclusion was that over and above the things of the 'outer world' (material objects) and those of the 'inner world' (psychological phenomena) we must recognize a 'third realm' whose contents cannot be grasped by the mind until they are dressed in language. In this conception, thoughts can and do exist independently of our grasping them, thinking consists in grasping them with a
special mental capacity, and judging consists in taking the thoughts thus grasped to be true. The view is of language theorists not because it represents thoughts as linguistic, but because it construes thinking as coming to stand in a relation to ‘objects of thought’, these objects being the ‘senses’ of sentences, those things which are true or false.

As in the case of Russell: “To think, assume, believe, know, expect, remember, desire, hope, fear etc. are all different psychological relations to propositions, to believe that ‘P’ is to believe the proposition that ‘P’\(^44\). For him each thought consists of an object (the proposition to which it is directed) and an attitude (the manner in which the subject is disposed towards the object). Russell later on changed his mind about what propositions are and conceived each of them has linguistic and sometimes as non-linguistics.

Micheal Dummett also tried to draw the conclusion about the nature of philosophy itself. But Dummett was criticized and rejected the claim that the difference between ‘analytical philosophy’ and philosophies from continental Europe influenced by phenomenology can be traced to a contrast between the philosophy of language and the philosophy of thought. He traces, the idea that the basic task of philosophy is to analyze thought back to its 19\(^{th}\) century roots,

showing how the Kantian concern with representation was transformed by the ‘linguistic turn’ of the early 20th century instigated primarily by Wittgenstein.

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s “Tractatus Logico Philosophicus’ (first published in 1921) states “it is becoming clear why I thought that thinking and language were the same. For thinking is a kind of language. For a thought too, of course, a logical picture of the proposition and therefore is just a kind of proposition.”

In his picture theory, a proposition is both an expression of thought (3.1) and a logical picture of reality (4.01). On the ‘Tractatus” too a thought, is a logical picture of facts, which means that the though that p must consist of psychological elements arranged in the same way as the elements of the propositional sign “p”.

This theory of Wittgenstein was endorsed earlier by John Locke for whom the primary function of language was to communicate thoughts by using perceptible signs to effect a correlation between the ‘mental state’ of the speaker and that of the hearer. Though Early Wittgenstein insisted that thoughts do not consist of words he admitted that they are composed of ‘psychical constituents that have some sort of relation to reality as words. However, the relationship between pictures, language and thought is not transparent.

W.V. Quine, well known critique of the analytic and synthetic distinction has it that philosophy is continuous with linguistics and psychology in forming part of an amalgam known as 'cognitive science'. This lingualist view received its canonical defense in Fodor (1975). In his book, 'The Language of Thought' Jerry Fodor, aimed to resurrect the traditional notion that there is language of thought. Jerry Fodor explicitly tried to provide an underpinning for cognitive theorizing. He sets out for the first time, the philosophical and the methodological presupposition of the kind of psychology, arguing powerfully that contemporary cognitive theorizing clearly presupposes not only that there must exist a language of thought, but also that cognition consists in computative operations upon sentences of that language. R.C. Pradhan states that "Thoughts shares the structure of language and therby become intelligible. Without language thought itself would have lost its intelligibility."\(^{46}\)

Language and Reality.

The Language-reality connection is established, on the traditional view, via meaning, that is intention or connotation or sense. In this traditional view, which is usually given the names 'description theory of meaning' and 'sense theory of reference', meaning or intension or connotation or sense is a conjunction of

\(^{46}\) R.C. Pradhan, *Recent Developments in Analytic Philosophy*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 2001, p. 201.
properties or descriptions expressing this conjunction which is associated with a
term; and it is this conjunction or the description of it which determines what the
extension or denotation or reference of the term is.

The question of 'meaning' and theories of meaning have puzzled
philosophers over the years and a whole tradition of philosophical thought has
evolved as many philosophers have tried to grapple with these questions. There
are various questions raised with regard to the concept of meaning. How do we
understand what others mean? How do children learn the meaning of words? How
is the meaning of one term related to the other term? Do proper names have
meaning?

There are quite a few theories that try to answer the questions mentioned
above. The simplest one among all is the referential theory of meaning that takes
proper names as the typical unit of meaning. The meaning of a proper name is the
individual whose name it is. For example the meaning of the name 'Socrates' is
the designated individual. As a result, the concept of reference became central to
such a theory of meaning. Not only the referential theory, but all the traditional
theories regarded 'reference' to be central to the question of meaning. This was
mainly because philosophers thought that any theory of meaning to be acceptable
must explain how the connection between a word and its referent, that is, between
language and reality is established. Reference being, so to speak, is the paradigm of the connection between language and reality. Both in fact, the paradigm and the nodal point- a theory of meaning has traditionally been conceived as that very theory which explains how our language relates to reality.

Therefore in an evaluation of a theory of meaning in the traditional mode one needs to consider whether theory of meaning can serve the purpose of explaining reference or whether it serves to explain the language-reality connection. The traditional perspective of meaning is subject to criticisms in recent times.

Recent critics of traditional perspective have reservations against the view that reference is central to the question of meaning. These philosophers prefer to address the question in a different way, so as to avoid difficulties they found in addressing the question in a way which makes reference to be the central concern of the theory of meaning. This view evolved with the shift from atomistic theories of meaning to molecular and holistic theories of meaning. The most significant is Quinean thesis of inscrutability of reference. Quine’s ‘Inscrutability of Reference’, states that “no empirical evidence relevant to interpreting a speaker’s utterances can decide among alternative and incompatible ways of assigning referents to the word used; hence there is no fact that the words have one
reference or another. Although this doctrine is similar to indeterminacy of translation, they are not identical. This is because inscrutability of reference might be compatible with the different interpretations of the speaker all sharing the same truth-value, whereas indeterminancy according to Quine require that the different interpretations stand in no kind of equivalence, so that on one interpretation what is said might be true and on another false. Secondly, translation might be indeterminate even though reference is scrutable, if, for instance, it is a goal of correct translation to fix more than the references of terms.

There were many theories that made 'reference' central to the concept of meaning, but at the same time faced many difficulties. Taking into account the referential theory of meaning, which was the simplest among all considered meaning to be closely related with the question of reference. However it was criticized by Frege, where he says" two expressions may have same reference yet may differ in meaning." The other criticisms that were leveled against this theory were that not all items of language can be said to have reference. Most referential theories fail to explain what connects expression to their reference and

also how such a connection comes about without bringing in the role played by language users in establishing such a connection.

In the light of critics, it seemed that the ideational theory was a better and more adequate account of the connection between words and their referents. It was John Locke, an eminent advocate of the ideational theory among the classical theories who regarded meaning as "mental entities" (subjective ideas). This view of Locke was an inspiration that he took from Aristotle. Mentalist account takes meaning as something private that is as an entity inaccessible to any mind other than the one possessing it. Meaning is totally independent of the mind. Many affirm that meaning transcends the individual minds; it is shared by plurality of people. In Aristotle's view, abstract contents in our minds or in his preferred terminology "affections in the soul" are representations of objective entities.

Accordingly Locke believed our "words to stand also for the reality of things". Unless meaning had an objective aspect we would be incapable of breaking through the privacy of our minds and thus would fail to convey our thoughts to one another. For Locke, there is always an intimate relationship between thought and meaning. Thought becomes communicable to other individuals by a meaningful utterance, and the latter that are meaningful utterance

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exist because of our desire to communicate thoughts. The main concern of Locke’s enterprise was to explain how private and ‘mental’ thoughts are conveyed to others. It is in the context of communication that meaning manifest its empirical aspects. Meanings are reliably linked with observable features, and thought such links the private conditions of organisms are made public. These links constitute the most important feature of communication. The success of communication between individuals depends, therefore, on the existence of connection of which one term is an utterance and other qualifies as its meaning. Locke’s theory accounts for why there are meanings and how they relate to utterances.

In Locke words” “speakers make utterances (words or sentence) stand for ideas (representation) or thoughts (composed of such representations) that are identified as meanings (Signification). Words are sensible marks of ideas and the ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate signification. Words in their primary or immediate signification stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them.”

Austin, proponent of ordinary language philosophy, studies the relationship between language and reality and he says, “when we examine what

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50 Ibid...P 48.
we should say when, what words we should use in what situations, we are looking again not merely at words, but also at the realities we use the words to talk about. We are using a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of, though not as the final arbiter of the phenomena"51.

For this reason Austin thinks it might be better to use for this way of doing philosophy some less misleading name, than those above, for 'linguistic phenomenology. Further, Austin's methodological notion of 'linguistic phenomenology' has been proposed as a key to explaining the ordinary language philosophy, practiced both by Austin, Wittgenstein and their followers. The reference to linguistic phenomenology seen in Austin work titled 'a plea for excuses' where "he is attempting to make clear his understanding of the methodology of ordinary language philosophy. That methodology as he puts it, is one of examining what we should say when, and so why and what we should mean by it"52. According to Austin linguistic phenomenology, "is to be understood as a technique for grasping non-verbal, real distinctions by reflecting on the verbal ones"53.

51 J.L Austin, 'A Plea For Excuses' in Philosophical Papers, Oxford, 1961, pp. 123-52
Our object is to imagine the varieties of situations in which we make exercises and examine the expressions used in making them. Austin recommended two things, namely the thorough use of a dictionary and a study of psychology and its means of classifying actions and their explanations, which classifications may differ from those employed in ordinary language. This recommendation states that ordinary language is not a fixed body of usage but one which evolves and which also incorporates vestiges of superstitions, error and fantasy. While presenting a more elaborate explanation of linguistic phenomenology, he says "we are to grasp the realities and distinctions in the world by looking at the forms and distinctions of ordinary language and secondly, we are to prise words off the world so that we can both look at the world without linguistic blinkers and judge the adequacy of language."\textsuperscript{54} By this we sharpen our awareness of phenomena by looking at the language we use to talk about them. The above words of Austin state that we grasp the realities of the world through language and also look at the world independent of language, with language 'up against it'. In the actual philosophical practice, Austin opts for proposal one, while doing philosophy he appeals to what it makes sense to say rather than engaging in language-world comparison.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid ....P 291
Austin was aware and impressed by the problematic of the procedure, as it was evidenced by his ambivalence toward ordinary use, his reference to its occasional inadequacies and his explicit attempt to justify the appeal to ordinary use as the first if not the last.

Austin felt the need it is necessary to defend the practice of consulting what we say when against the charge of illegitimate ontolizing the charge of falsely assuming that language offers us a map (existential reference) of linguistic distinctions and types on the grounds that we have found these distinctions. Types worth drawing and marking in the course if our historical experience.

In his discussion Austin proposed to study language in order to get a better view of the world. But as he understood language as something grounded in experience and as something that might be compared with the world, he was concerned with the problematic of his method of linguistic phenomenology. He felt the need to give a prima facie justification for studying what we say when, while at the same time providing us with an extra-linguistic check in our verbal practices and an advance warning of the pitfalls involved in them. Austin realized the adequacy of words only as contingent matter. Austin failed though to provide a complete justification for studying what we say when, and prospects for the extra-linguistic check methodology.
A study of Jean Piaget's position may provide the missing links in linguistic phenomenology and consequently provide a better understanding of the relationship between language and reality.