CHAPTER-III

TOWARDS LAHORE RESOLUTION

In the previous chapter we have noticed how the failure of the 'coalition talks' in the United Provinces provided the Muslim League an opportunity to popularise itself amongst the Muslim masses. Side by side, with the failure of the 'talks', some other developments were taking place that provided further opportunities to the League to attack the Congress, and to gain popularity amongst the Muslims. One such move was the launching of the 'Mass Contact Programme' by the Congress to popularise itself amongst the Muslims. Some others were; the Wardha scheme of Education, the singing of Vande Matram as National Song, the imposition of Hindustani as the national language and the Vidhya Mandir Scheme. All these moves on the part of the Congress, despite the good intentions behind them, proved to be the 'miscalculated moves', and the Muslim League leaders were prudent enough to strike at the weak points of these moves. The chapter takes into its fold the manipulation of the events by the Muslim League for its benefit, the increasing strength and popularity of the League, and the passing of the Lahore Resolution in 1940.

I

Seeing the poor performance of the Congress, so far as the Muslims were concerned, in the 1936 elections,
the leaders decided to try to become popular with the Muslims. The Congress decided to work upon a new scheme of education which was formulated at the Haripura Session of the Congress in February, 1938, and which later became popular as the Wardha Scheme of Education. It was admitted that the existing system of education in India had failed since its objectives were 'anti-national', and 'anti-social'. The aim of the new education policy laid down by the Congress were to be: 1. Free and compulsory education for seven years on a nation-wide scale; 2. the medium of instruction to be the mother tongue; and 3. the education should lay more emphasis on handicrafts and productive works. To carry on this policy, an All-India Education Board was created under Dr. Zakir Hussain and E. Aryanayakam, with Gandhi as the overall supervisor, with powers to frame its own constitution, to raise funds and perform all such acts as may be necessary for the fulfilment of its objects. The creation of this Board was in accordance with the Report of the Education Committee headed by Dr. Zakir Hussain, which was submitted in 1937. It was stressed in the Report that any scheme of education, "designed for Indian children will in some respects radically differ from that adopted in the west. For unlike west, in India

the nation has adopted non-violence as the method of peace, for achieving all-round freedom. Our children will, therefore, need to be taught the superiority of non-violence over violence. The Report also pointed out the need of imparting technical education which would help, in solving the economic problem of the country.

To the Congressmen, there seemed nothing objectionable in the 'scheme' that should alienate the Muslims, or undermine their position. But in practical business, the scheme was bitterly opposed to by the Muslims, and the Muslim League at once took the matter in its hands. The decision of the Congress to appoint, "a Hindustani Board with powers to... prepare an exhaustive scheme for the development of Hindustani," was viewed by the Leaguers as an attempt to enforce Hindi at the cost of Urdu. Speaking at the Patna Session of the League in December, 1938, Jinnah said that the Congress motives, "of advocating Hindustani was to suppress Urdu." It was propagated that the Wardha Scheme of Education was carefully designed to destroy Muslim culture in India and to impose Congress domination. And the brain behind all this was, "Mr. Gandhi, and it was Mr. Gandhi alone who destroyed the very ideals with which the Congress started its

4. I.A.H. 1938, Vol.II.
5. Ibid.
career, and converted it into a communal Hindu Body."⁶
The Congress claim that a prominent Muslim like Dr. Zakir Hussain, who, it was impossible to believe, "will include in the scheme anything that can hurt Muslim Culture,"⁷ was rebutted by the League saying that the, "mere fact that the Principal of Jamia Millia at Delhi has taken a prominent part in the preparation of the 'scheme' does not prove that it is not unsuited to the Muslims."⁸ The text-books did not suit the Muslim needs. The situation in India was so complex that no scheme on a nation-wide scale could work, and that for different provinces there were needed different educational patterns. League's main objection towards the scheme can be summed up as follows: The scheme was calculated to destroy Muslim culture gradually but surely; that it was intended to secure the domination of Hindu culture and League;⁹ that it imposed Congress Party aims, especially Ahimsa; that it neglected religious education; that under the guise of the name Hindustani, the scheme intended to spread highly Sanskritised Hindi and to suppress Urdu; and that the text books sanctioned by some Provincial governments praised the Hindu religion and, "harrass, neglecting and often criticising the Muslims."¹⁰ And to some extent the

6. Ibid.
8. The Eastern Times. Lahore, 7 July, 1938.
League was justified. It was pointed out, not only by the Muslims, but also by some Hindus that, "the Congress in general and Mahatma Gandhi in particular have been a bit unfair to the Muslims in this (language) respect. They have been laying too much emphasis on Hindi and ignoring Urdu." Even the Jamait-ul-Ulema, a pro-Congress body, did not like the contents of the Wardha scheme much. It was pointed out that the basis principles of the scheme were un-Islamic. "The Wardha Scheme also emphasises the philosophy of non-violence, and presents it as a creed. We have adopted this philosophy of non-violence as a policy. This can not be accepted as a creed. This is against the teachings of Quran which encourages the Muslim to Jihad."  

Closely linked to the Wardha Scheme of Education was the Vidya Mandir Scheme of the Congress, which was launched to promote education amongst the masses and which formed a part of the Wardha Scheme. The Scheme was followed more rigorously, in the Central Provinces, and the Congress decided to inaugurate it from 26 January, 1939. The Muslims, naturally did not like the proposal and threatened to launch a civil disobedience against it. Khan Bahadur Siddiq Ali Khan declared that, "we are not opposed to

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11. Satish Chandra of Bara Banki to Dr. Ashraf, 23.4.37.  
A.I.C.S. F.No. 41/1937.  
12. Quoted in Mushir-ul-Haq, Muslim Politics in India.  
education of any community but we do want that the Government itself should not invite a communal scheme, or inflict on us an alien culture." The adoption of Vidya Mandir Scheme means the dominance of one culture over another," declared Khan Sahib Bahadur Rahaman. The Andhra Muslim League Conference, held on 30th January, 1939, deplored the religious bias of the Congress Government and opposed the introduction of Wardha Scheme and Vidya Mandir Scheme demanding that an educational scheme for the Muslims should be drafted in consultation with Muslim representatives. The feeling that the Congress wanted to spread Hindi and undermine Urdu as well as the Muslim culture was widespread throughout India. Dr. Ashraf reported to Dr. Zakir Hussain that in various parts of the country, "the propaganda for Wardha Scheme is combined with Hindi Prachar (preaching)," and that, "this is not the spirit in which your committee formulated the proposals." Another point of attack on the Congress by the Muslim League was the singing of Vande Matram as the National Song. The song written by Bankim Chandra Chatterji appeared in Chapter X of his book Anand Math, and the

15. The Times of India, 6 July, 1938.
17. Dr. Ashraf to Zakir Husain.9.4.38.A.I.C.U.F.No.068/ 1937-38.
context in which it was written was essentially anti-Muslim. In no circumstances could the song be recognised by the Muslims as their National Song since with the passage of time "it has become linked with idolatary and anti-Muslim feelings." The very name Vande Matram was enough to hurt the feelings of the Muslims, and therefore the suggestion that the song should be modified by omitting some of the objectionable lines, could hardly meet the case, "for over fifty years the book of Bankim has been read and resented by generation of Muslims and the song itself became stamped in their minds with the bitter spirit of insult to Islam and Muslims which permeates in the Anand Math. However, expurgated or standardized, Muslims can never reconcile themselves to a single line of that song." 

The Young, Muslim Association of Surat passed a resolution on 1st August, 1937, saying that the India's so-called National Anthem, Vande Matram, "has become obsolete, is in a provincial language, revolts against modern unitarian sentiments and entirely lacks touch of chivalry, the sin-quo non in such songs." 

whereas the song itself was not linked by the Muslims, the alleged way of its imposition in the educational institutions added fuel to fire. In the schools, Muslim pupils were rather forced to sing it, since

19. Ibid.
20. A.I.C.C. F. No. 18/1937.
they could not defy the order of their teachers. Criticising the Congress policy in imposing the song, Jinnah said: "What did the Congress do when it got power? With all its pretensions it straightway started with Vande Matram. It is admitted that Vande Matram is not the national song. Yet it is sung as such and thrust upon others. It is sung not only in their own gatherings, but Muslim children in Government and Muslim schools are compelled to sing it." Even the British officials realised that Vande Matram had no claim to be recognised as the National Song, and that the British Government should not give any encouragement to it. Realising the gravity of the situation, and the bitter atmosphere created by the song, G.B. Pant wrote to Nehru on January 8, 1939, that the Congress committee might like to suggest some other nation songs such as 'Hindustan Hamara', 'Jai He' as equally suitable, and, "we should avoid making this a matter of controversy as far as possible and private instructions to this effect will be sent." The issue of National Flag also increased the resentment of the Muslims. The 'tricolour' gradually became associated with the Congress. At many places violence occurred when 'tricolour' was hoisted in meetings.

21. The Times of India, 6 July, 1938.
Congress stand was that the 'tricolour' was a national flag because its columns and shape etc., "were determined after careful consultation with leaders of all communities in the Congress...its columns were...determined to represent various communities, green being for Muslims and minorities." 27
But despite this, the Muslims on the whole resented the flag and its hoisting on the public building. The Bihar Government, in an attempt to appease the Muslims, conducted an enquiry to rectify the grievances of the latter. The Government, so read the Report, never encouraged the singing of Vande Matram, or hoisting the tricolour over the buildings of any educational buildings or forced any student to sing Vande Matram. What it had done was to remove the ban on the singing of the song and hoisting the flag that existed earlier, and now it was up to the owners of the buildings to hoist or not to hoist the flag. The Government, it was made clear, had issued instructions to the school headmasters that, "the hoisting can only be with the permission of school or college authorities, as the case may be, and presumably with the general support of all sanction of the students." 28
But the report clearly showed that the Government did not want to take any serious steps in this direction, and Muslim

students were forced to submit to the will of the majority—the Hindus—, and the owners of the buildings, who in most case were Hindus. And even if the Congress Government realised the mistake, and suggestions were made that, "the national flag should not be hoisted whenever there was any real opposition," the harm was done. "The National Flag was furled, but it had flown. The National anthem was hushed, but it had been sung...No non-Congress villager in a Congress province is likely to forget the way these young congressmen walked down the street."30

Despite the instructions and declarations of the Congress High Command that the Party sought to protect the interests of Hindus, Muslims and others alike, the Congress leadership at the provincial and local levels remained conservative in its attitude. The sincere pronouncements of the leaders like Gandhi and Nehru at the National level, remained confined only upto the High Command level, and the local leaders behaved as if the Congress Raj meant a Hindu Raj, and quite often treated the minorities badly.

With the increasing transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands, "Muslims have dissociated themselves more and more from the Congress and its policy and programme. Muslims alone are not to blame. The Congress and a section

30. R.Coupland. The Indian Problem. Pt.II.p.106.
of its leadership cannot absolve themselves of their share of responsibility for this deplorable state of affairs. Another contemporary writer, Robert Aura Smith, makes it quite clear that the Congress was equally to be blamed for this state of affairs. "The lack of a corresponding attitude on the part of majority party in India has been one of the greatest handicaps to political growth...The Indian nationalist (Congress) thesis that no bread is better than half a loaf has necessarily resulted in political starvation."  

II  

The main issue of a nationwide conflict between the Congress and the Muslim League was the Muslim Mass Contact Programme, launched by the Congress in 1937. The plan to approach the Muslim masses was chalked out by the Working Committee on Minority Rights at the Calcutta Session of the Congress in October, 1937, and the aim of the 'mass contact' was declared to be, "to protect the religious, cultural and other rights of the minorities of India so as to ensure for them in any scheme of Government to which the Congress is a party, the widest scope for their development and participation in the fullest measure in the political, economic and cultural life of nation." As such

33. Haripura Session of the Congress. See India. 1938.
there was nothing in the scheme that would have threatened the Muslims, but the Muslim League at once became alarmed and launched an attack on the Congress. Jinnah, denouncing the Mass Contact programme said in 1937: "The Congress move under the guise of establishing mass contact with the Muslims is calculated to divide and weaken and break the Mussalmans and is an effort to detach them from the accredited leaders. It is a dangerous move and it cannot misguide anyone." 34 A.S. Khan, President of the Young Muslim Association, criticised the move of the Congress, and appealed to the Muslims not to join it, "This move", said he, "is unfortunate and ill devised and a great menace to the solidarity of the already divided Muslim community." 35 Addressing a huge Muslim gathering at Bombay, Jinnah requested the Congress: "For God's sake, do not waste your time and money in bullying the Muslims; the Muslims will not be bullied." 36 The United Front which was necessary for the future of the country, could not be achieved, it was urged by the Leaguers, by the proposed Muslim Mass Contact Movement by the Congress, pointing out that this move of the Congress was bound to be a failure, Shaukat Ali declared: "Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and his friends of Congress are now going to start the mass contact with

35. The Times of India, 6 May 1937.
36. Ibid., May 24, 1937.
Muslims for their own selfish ends. I have been all my life in contact with Muslims in all provinces of India and I know how they feel. I have no fear that the Muslims will be easily misled.\textsuperscript{37}

The Congress leaders could not understand why the League was opposed to this move on their part. For, according to them, to approach the masses was, "the first function of every organisation,"\textsuperscript{38} and that the mass contact movement was in existence for many years. It was also stated that the mass contact was, "never thought of in terms of Muslims only or confined to them. It was thought of in extending the organisation and influence of the Congress among all classes of people."\textsuperscript{39} Like Nehru, Dr. Ashraf believed that the communal problem did not exist in India and that the basic issue was an economic issue. He argued that the Muslim League leadership was, "closer to imperialist interests than ever before and is in fact allied with it in various degrees. The only real demand of this communal leadership is that the Congress should lower its flag."\textsuperscript{40} Dr. Rajendra Prasad pointed out that the Congress was a mass movement for past twenty-five

\textsuperscript{37} The Statesman, May 11, 1937
\textsuperscript{38} Nehru Papers, Pt. III, F.No. 262-63.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., Pt.I, Vol.39.
\textsuperscript{40} Dr. Ashraf's speech at Lahore, 17.6.39, A.I.C.C. F.No. 48/1938.
years and it was difficult to understand, "how it becomes an offence on the part of the Congress if it tries to reach the Muslim masses also, unless it is assumed that the Muslim League alone has the right to speak to a Muslim in India and nobody else."\(^{41}\) On 10th November, 1937, Nehru wrote to Nawab M.D. Ismail Khan: "...we are a political organisation working for political ends, which of necessity must be alike for Hindus and Muslims, as well as other religious communities."\(^{42}\) The Congress was firm in its belief that it was the only organisation that represented the Indian Nationalism and that the Muslim League was, "confined to a religious group; it is like others of its kind essentially a religious or communal organisation,"\(^{43}\) and also that it was not necessary for every Muslim to join the Muslim League. "The mere fact" it was said, "that a person is born Muslim or professes the faith of Islam does not surely mean that he must also confirm to the political policy and programme of the Muslim League. If he disagrees with its policy, as large number of Muslims do, he must inevitably seek some other political organisation."\(^{44}\) The League’s objection to the Congress Mass Contact Programme, it was pointed out, "was not political.

\(^{41}\) *K. Prasad, op. cit.*, pp. 149-49.

\(^{42}\) *The Times of India*, 4 July, 1938.

\(^{43}\) Ibid., 4 May, 1937.

\(^{44}\) Ibid.
It is communal and hence the confusion of thought and action....He (Jinnah) is not speaking politically but communally.\textsuperscript{45}

Jinnah and the Muslim League continued the attack on the Congress, and countered the latter's attack by saying, "that the very fact that the Congress approached the Muslim League to enter the negotiations for a settlement on the Hindu-Muslim question, it pre-supposed the authoritative and representative character of the League, and as such its right to come to an agreement on behalf of the Mussalmans of India.\textsuperscript{46} Jinnah also argued that, "some Musulims in the Congress does not and cannot represent the Musulmans of India for the simple reason that their number is very insignificant."\textsuperscript{47} On 30th November, 1937, Nawab Md. Ismail Khan informed Nehru that, "the patience of the Muslims is well-nigh exhausted, and if they, therefore, hit back, it may be occasionally below the belt, you should not be greatly horrified,"\textsuperscript{48} and inquired: "Can the Congress have the temerity to deny that its own propaganda amongst the Muslim masses have been, free from these blemishes? Had it not...in the mass contact movement utilised to the fullest extent the religious and spiritual influence of the eminent Muslim

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{46} Jinnah to Bose. 2.6.38. I.A.H. 1938. Vol.II
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} The Times of India. 4 July '38.
theologians, and through them done its best to exploit
the religious sentiments of the ignorant masses in every
conceivable manner?" The Congress claim that the League
was a religious body and acted on the communal plane and
that the Congress was only a 'political party', was attacked
by the League on the grounds that while trying to enlist
the Muslims to the Congress camp it sought the help of
Ulemas, "who are held in high esteem not because of their
extreme political views but because of their religious
erudition and spiritual attainments." Jinnah, speaking
at the Lucknow Session of the League in 1937, said: "On
the very threshold of what little power and responsibility
is given, the majority community have clearly shown their
hands that Hindustan is for Hindus, only the Congress
masquarades under the name of nationalism." Under the
guise of the Mass Contact, said the Leaguers, "the Congress
High Command was determined to force their own culture on
others and establish Hindu Raj."

The Congress, not much caring about the League,
started the Mass Contact Movement, with Dr. Ashraf as its
incharge. It sought the help of some prominent Muslims in
its ranks and files to achieve its goal. At the Working
Committee Meeting of the Congress at Haripur, in February,

1938, it was decided that Maulana Azad would visit the Punjab as well as the N.W.F.P., "at an early date and to confer with the Congress workers there and to advise them about their future work and organisational activities." The Maulana also wrote inspiring articles in Urdu, advocating the cause of the Congress that were distributed amongst the Muslim population. Attempts were made to utilise the students for enlisting the Muslims to the Congress camp. Speaking before the Punjab Youth Association at Lahore on 15th June, 1937, Dr. Ashraf said: "Create a strength with you. Learn how to fight and suffer for the independence of your country. For when we fight next, we must fight with the ardent hope of fighting to a finish." Similar attempts were made by Dr. Ashraf in Kashmir, Benaras, Guntur, Cownpore, and Agra, when he tried to organise student unions and conferences for the propaganda work amongst Muslims. Attempts were also made to organise Muslim Conference at various places, and through them to convince the Muslims of the Congress policy and programme. These conferences were believed to be necessary for enrolling the Muslim masses and also very useful one. These informal conferences it was thought, would be, "effective means of

55. See *Ibid.* It contains letters from and to Dr. Ashraf from these places. Also see *A.I.C.C. F.No. 54/1937.*
56. Dr. Ashraf to S.A. Brelvi, 29th May, 1937. *A.I.C.C.F. No.G-68/1937-38*
developing Congress work in the villages and provinces.\(^{57}\)

It was expected that the Congress Muslims, when they would talk to the masses would prove helpful in illuminating the economic needs of the time, and would wean them to the Congress camp. And after holding small 'conferences' it was proposed to hold a 'big Conference' in which, "Maulana Abul Kalam Azad...will explain his programme of social work amongst the Muslims."\(^{58}\)

The Mass Contact Programme was a non-starter right from its inception. The Muslim masses, so it seems, were not willing to join the Congress camp. In a public meeting of the Muslims at Yeotmal, Berar, under the Presidentship of Nawab Sirigul Hassan of Mamdot, it was said that the mass contact move was, "unfortunate and ill-devised and a great menace to the solidarity of the already divided Muslim community,"\(^{59}\) and the Muslims were asked not to join the Congress at all. At a meeting at Allahabad, held on May 11, a resolution denouncing the Congress mass-contact was adopted.\(^{60}\) In North Malabar, a meeting of the Young Muslim League held on 7 June, 1937, under the Presidency of T. Mustafa Sahib, expressed faith in Jinnah's leadership and resolved not to join the Congress unless there was an agreement, "on honourable terms" between Jinnah and the

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57. Dr. Ashraf to Gaunda Majumdar, 7th May, 1937. See Ibid.
58. Dr. Ashraf to Dr. Abdul Hamid Quazi, 20.5.37. A.I.C.C. F.No. 25/1937
59. The Times of India, 27th May, 1937.
60. Ibid., 13th May, 1937.
Congress. The Pudiyangadi Muslim Society and Heading Room, passed a resolution on 7th May, 1937, stating that the Muslims, "should not join the Congress as a body," and that no attempt should be made by the Congress to force the Muslims to join it. On August 8, 1937, Maulana Hasrat Mohani declared: "I have accepted the leadership of Mr. Jinnah and will work under him as a soldier....I appeal to all the Muslims of India to organise and unite under the banner of the All-India Muslim League." In 1938, the Shia sect of the Muslims in the Punjab, whose strength was about eight lakhs, after a hot discussion over the issue of joining the Congress or the League, decided to join the Muslim League. The Bombay Provincial Muslim League, meeting at Ahmedabad in March, 1938, adopted a resolution, "deploring the plight of the Muslims in the Congress areas," and declared that the Muslims had absolutely no faith in the paper resolutions passed by the Congress at Karachi, Faizpur and Haripura. In the United Provinces, the mass-contact Programme movement not only resulted in alienating the Muslim Leaguers, but also led some other sects of the Muslims to become pro-Leaguers.

The Muslim Welfare Society, for instance, passed a resolution at its meeting held on 20th May, 1937, which stated

61. A.I.C.C. F. No. 16/1937
62. A.I.C.C. F. No. 18/1937.
63. A.I.C.C. F. No. 47/1937
64. The Times of India, 1st March, 1938.
65. Ibid. 2nd March, 1938.
that the "suspicion of the Muslim minority that their interest is not safe under the Congress Government is strengthened into belief," because the latter could not and did not stop the attack on the Muslims. Speaking at the Muslim University Union on February, 1938, Jinnah declared that the Congress and the Maulvis who were equally reactionaries had tried their best to subjugate the Muslims but the Muslim League, "has set you free from the reactionary elements of Muslims and... (has) creat(ed) the opinion that those who play selfish game are traitors." The Muslim League also tried to work amongst the masses to neutralise the attempts of the Congress, and in Bombay and many other places, the need to formulate concrete schemes for the social, economic and educational amelioration of the Muslims by the League was emphasised. The Bombay Presidency Nawjawan Conference, at its meeting on 20th February, 1938, fully supported the policy and programme of the Muslim League and also requested the other groups to follow the suit.

The Congress mass contact programme was equally denounced by the Andhra Muslim League Conference held on

66. A.I.C.C. F. No. 16/1937
67. Jamil-ud-Din, op. cit.
68. The Times of India. 5 July, 1938.
30th January, 1939, at Pithapur, and by the Bihar Muslim League Conference held at Patna on 13th March, 1939.  

Speaking at the Bombay Muslim League Conference, held on 16th May, 1939, Sikander Hayat Khan expressed his belief that the Congress wanted to establish a Hindu Raj in the country and to undermine the position of the Muslims and other minorities. "The political trend in the country," said he, "has confronted the 90 million Mussalmans of India with one vital question. Are we content to loose our identity and to be relegated to the position of a political pariah, or do we want to live in this country as a free and self-respected people? There could be only one reply to this question from the Mussalmans...and that reply has already been given in clear unequivocal terms by our distinguished leader Mr. Jinnah." Attempts were also made by Jinnah and other leaders of the Muslim League to induce new energy and strength to the League. In the Punjab, a committee of 30 members was set up by Jinnah to organise the Muslim League in the Province under the charge of Sir Sikander Hayat Khan. Earlier, in May 1937, it was decided that substantial changes should be made in the constitution and composition of the Muslim League. The Lucknow Session of the League abolished the office of the

70. India, 1939, Vol.I.  
71. Ibid.  
72. The Times of India, 8 August, 1938.
permanent President of the League, and it was thought useful that, "the League should form a pyramidal structure, starting from a broad based network of primary units or leagues. The primary units will be the town or tehsil committees. Any Muslim who desires to do so may join a town or tehsil committee on the payment of four annas. The primary units will elect district committees or leagues and they, in their turn, will elect a specified number of representatives to provincial leagues." It was one of the duties of the provincial Leagues, now onwards, to see that the rural population had adequate representation in the League. The All-India Muslim League Council had the power not to recognise any district or primary League, if the latter did not show any sign of improvement. The necessity of these changes was explained in these terms: "In making our proposals, some of which are undoubtedly radical, we have been greatly impressed by the insistent demand of Muslims that the League should be made more popular and democratic, so that its membership may be open to, and within reach of every Muslim, however humble and poor. We are in complete sympathy with this demand and in framing our proposals, we have kept this in view." The League also opened Anjumans at various places.

73. The Times of India. 3 May, 1937.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
and they were used as a platform to further the cause of the organisation. At a meeting of the Muslims at Kurla on July, 1938, several speakers deplored the state of the Muslims in various parts of India and exhorted them to become the members of the Muslim League; and at the same meeting Jinnah emphasised the necessity of opening as many Anjumans as possible. In Sind as many as 40 branches of the League had been opened by July, 1938, and its total strength had reached about 15,000. Speaking at the special Session of the League at Calcutta on 17th April, 1938, Jinnah said: "During my tour in different parts of India I found a tremendous political awakening and enthusiasm among the Mussalmans and there is an insatiable desire amongst the people to come under the banner of the All-India Muslim League." At a meeting of the Working Committee of the United Provinces Provincial Muslim League, in April, the committee called upon all the "District, City and Primary Leagues to hold meetings at least twice a month to propagate the view of the Muslim League in their respective areas."

76. Ibid. 28 May, 1938.
77. Ibid.
80. The Bombay Chronicle. 11 April, 1938.
Mr. Abdul Waheed Khan as Convenor was appointed to suggest the ways and means to carry out the economic programme of the League. And all these attempts were made to record a rapid progress of the Muslim League, and to see to it that the Congress did not succeed in its attempts to gain following amongst the Muslim Masses.

However, the attempts on the part of the Muslim League to counteract the Congress was not the only reason of the failure of the Congress Mass Contact Programme. Other reasons too were there. One main reason for the failure of the Congress was the lack of resources and funds. It was more or less a one man's show, and Dr. Ashraf, though capable and hard working he was, could not make himself available at each and every place. Consequently, he had to put down many requests to visit a number of places where he was urgently required. The result was that the Mass Contact Programme could not make the desired progress. No Muslim leader in the Congress was capable enough to carry out the work efficiently—leaving aside Ashraf and Azad. Also, the lack of resources combined with the lack of leadership, was responsible for the failure of the programme. The Secretary of the Young

81. Ibid.
Muslim Party, Meerut, informed Nehru on 27 August, 1937, that the Congress was not paying sufficient attention towards the Muslims in the city. "How many posters and pamphlets have been issued? How many leaders have called to Meerut for this object? How many Muslims have been enrolled here as Congress members? As far as I think, the Congress diary is nearly blank." 83 Similar complaints were made by A.G. Lunge from Sholapur, 84 Radhalal Gupta from Aligarh, 85 Secretary, U.P. Provincial Congress Committee, 86 Secretary, Bengal, P.C.C. 87, Shaik Galiab Sahib, Secretary Muslim Mass Contact, Andhra, 88 Asstt. Secretary, Bihar Provincial Congress Committee, 89 and so on.

Coupled with these causes of the failure of the Mass Contact, were the grievances of the Muslim community—real or imagined—which they presumably suffered under the Congress regime in the provinces. On 14th February, 1939, Sir Sikander Hayat Khan wrote to Nehru that the Muslims in the Punjab were becoming cautious of the Congress policies because of, "the high-headedness of the majority community in some Congress provinces," and stressed that, "the fact

83. A.I.C.C. F.No. 47/1937.
84. A.I.C.C. F.No. 42/1937.
85. A.I.C.C. F.No. 11/1937.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
89. A.I.C.C. F.No. 42/1937.
remains that the atmosphere of suspicion and even bitterness pervades in some part of the country, and what is needed is concerted efforts on the part of any one who has the interest of the country at heart to try to dispel the doubts and misgivings which are responsible for the present unfortunate tension." Speaking at the Bombay Muslim League Conference held on 6th May, 1939, Sikander Hayat Khan expressed his fear that the Congress wanted to establish a Hindu Raj, and to undermine the position of Mussalmans and minorities. Comparing the situation in Bengal, where there was a Muslim ministry with the situation in the Congress Provinces, Fazlul Haq, speaking at the Special Session of the League held in Calcutta in April, 1938 said: "In Bihar, 'salami' has been retained at 8% while in this non-Congress province of Bengal, it has been abolished altogether. In Bihar, the right of Zamidar to realise rent through certificate still obtains, but here it has done away with. Here in Bengal, we have also stopped enhancement of rent for a period of ten years but in Bihar no such relief has been given to the poor tenants. That is the picture in Bihar and this is the picture in Bengal, and yet the Congress call themselves better friend of the masses than we in Bengal coalition and the Muslim League."  

90. **Nehru Papers.** Pt. I. Vol. 49.  
As early as 1937, speaking at the Lucknow Session of the League, Jinnah pointed out that the Congress thought, "if a few crumbs are thrown to the Muslim masses, in their present disorganised and helpless state, you can manage them. They are solidly mistaken if they think that the Musalmans can be imposed upon. . . . The third opinion is that there is no light to be seen through the impenetrable darkness but as the Congress goes on acquiring strength and power, so the past promises of blank cheque remain unfulfilled and unsigned."\(^92\) It was also pointed out that, "the Congress Muslims, who have identified themselves with the Congress in toto, have lost their mornings with their own co-religionists altogether. They are a class who yield no influence practically upon their co-religionists."\(^93\)

The signing of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact in 1937 was another important victory for the Muslim League. The Muslims (Unionists) had been able to form a strong stable ministry in the Punjab after the 1936 elections, and Jinnah wanted to come to some sort of understanding with the Unionist Party, to further the strength of the Muslim League. The Annual Session of the League was held in Lucknow in October, 1937, and it was here that the Pact

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93. Note by Maghbir Sahai, 21 April, 1937, AIOCC, No. 41/193
was signed on 13th October. The text of the Pact was as follows:

"Sir Sikander Hayat Khan had consultations with Mr. Jinnah today, after which he attended the meeting of the Council of the All-India Muslim League by special invitation. At the meeting the following statement was made:

(a) That on his return to the Punjab, Sir Sikander Hayat Khan will convene a special meeting of his party and advise all Muslim members of the party who are not the members of the Muslim League already to sign the creed and join it. As such they will be subject to the rules and regulations of the Central Parliamentary Board of the All-India Muslim League. This will not effect the continuance of the present coalition of the Unionist Party.

(b) That in future elections and by-elections for the Legislature after the adoption of this arrangement, the groups constituting the present Unionist Party will jointly support candidates put up by their respective groups.

(c) That the Muslim member of the Legislature who are elected on, or accept, the League ticket, will constitute the Muslim League Party within the Legislature. It shall be open to the Muslim League Party so formed to
maintain or enter into a coalition or alliance with any other party consistent with the fundamental principles of the policy and programme of the League. Such alliances may be evolved before or after the elections. The existing combination shall maintain its present name, the 'Unionist Party'.'

At the same session, Fazlul Haq of Bengal and Muhammad Saadullah, Premier of Assam declared their support to the Muslim League. The presence of both Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, and Fazlul Haq at the Lucknow Session of the League was another sign of the increasing strength of the League. The Muslim Leaguers interpreted the Sikander-Jinnah Pact as virtually merger of the Unionist Party with the Muslim League. The impact of the Pact was to be felt later on, as we shall see in the following chapters, but it was concluded because the Punjab Premier in 1937 was publically criticising the Congress policies particularly towards the minorities.

Gradually the Congress leaders realised that the Mass Contact Programme could not do any good to the Congress cause. On 8 January, 1939, G.B. Pant wrote to Nehru

95. I.A.R. 1937, Vol.II.
96. C.Khaliquazamn, op.cit., p.259.
advising him that the Congress should stick to its old policies and creed, of representing, "the masses of India regardless of caste and creed," and that, "it is not necessary to lay any emphasis on the Muslim Mass Contact." Similar request was made by V.M. Tiwari to Nehru on 7 January, 1939, expressing his belief that the Mass Contact Programme would do no good to the Congress. In a Report from the Government of the Central Provinces, it was pointed out, that, "the self-seeking Congressites by always presenting a bright picture of their actions and deeds are trying to ensnare the simple minded and poor Muslims and are always concealing their darker side which is extremely ugly and hateful." The bye-elections for the Muslim seats held in the U.P. in 1938, revealed the failure if the Congress Mass Contact Programme and also the increasing influence of the Muslim League. Out of five seats of Jhansi, Bijnor, Moradabad, Seheranpur and Bullandshahr, reserved for the Muslims, the Congress could capture only one seat of Bijnor, the remaining four captured by the League. The Congress working Committee meeting at Bardoli from 11 to 14 February, reviewed the whole situation created by the Mass Contact Programme because, "the course of events and the development of political situation raises new doubts which required

100. *AICC. F.No. B-9/1938*
elucidation," and summed up by saying that the Congress, "has however, come to the conclusion that at present no useful purpose will be served by making such a declaration, and this might even at this stage, result in delaying the very communication, which they essentially desire, namely a satisfactory settlement that is acceptable to all concerned. The Committee, therefore, do not make any further statement on this subject at present." 102 The Muslims were apprehensive of the Congress Raj because the Congress committee acted as if they were the actual rulers of the country, and quite often interfered with the official business. Whatever little progress the mass Contact made was counteracted, so it seems, by the high-headedness of the Provincial Congress leaders. The 'rural development scheme' for promoting sanitations, education, etc., though entirely a public enterprise, was controlled thoroughly by the Congress and the training camps, "were school of politics rather than agriculture." 103

The Congress Working Committee, meeting at Delhi from 22 September to 2 October, admitted that, "the Congress Committee interfere with the ordinary administration of the country's affairs seeking to influence the officials and other members of the services." 104 It was pointed out that no real progress

104. I.A.R. 1938. Vol.II.
was made in the Congress Provinces and that the provincial needs were often set aside. The orders were passed down from the Congress High Command and the provincial and local leaders carried them, without worrying such about their impact. "The main effect of dictatorship of the High Command, however, in the present context, was to heighten Muslim fears. Appointments and resignation of ministers were controlled...programmes and legislation were, so far as possible, uniform throughout the seven provinces...This monolithic regime was sustained by strict party discipline not only over ministers, but also over the Congress members of the Legislature, with the result that the parliamentary debates often became formal and unreal." 105

It is valid to argue, therefore, that there was a contradiction in the Congress policies during the years 1937-39, so far as the Muslims were concerned, and this contradiction and confusion resulted in alienation of the Muslims from the Congress and increased the strength of the Muslim League. The Mass Contact could not bring any real gain to the Congress because of these contradictions. Slowly but surely, the Muslim League was making headway in Indian politics. "The large as well

105. Hedson, H.V. The Great Divide, pp.7 -74.
as the influential attendance at the Session of the Muslim League,\textsuperscript{106} in 1938, was the proof of the growth of the political strength of the Muslim League. Another proof of the League's strength were the results of the bye-elections in the United Provinces in 1938 in which the League captured four out of the five seats. There was some truth in Jinnah's claim in 1937, that the League's work, "within a short time of six months...was very hopeful and there is no need for us to despair."\textsuperscript{107}

The Pirpur Committee Report,\textsuperscript{108} published in 1938, brought forward the subjective grievances of the Muslims. The report attacked the close-door policy of the Congress and stressed that the type of Government working in Britain did not suit the Indian sub-continent. It was pointed out that the Congress did not want any settlement with the Muslims of the country and that a vicious circle was created. "The communal problem can only be solved when India is free; India can only be free when the communal problem is solved. Such a circle can lead us nowhere, and will make the country a pray to any foreign exploiters." And further that, "the communal problem remains unsettled not because the communalism of the Minorities, but because of the

\textsuperscript{106} The Leader. Allahabad, 29 December, 1938.

\textsuperscript{107} Jamil-ud-Din. op.cit., Lucknow Session of the League, 1937.

\textsuperscript{108} For the full text of the Report. see Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadurai. (Ed), Pt.I.
communalism of the majority. In each province, it is for the majority community to win the confidence of the minority and this can be done by deeds and not words."
The refusal on the part of the Congress to enter into a coalition with the Muslim League was criticised in the Report, and it was alleged that the Congress wanted to establish a Hindu raj, under the guise of nationalism. "The Muslims think that no tyranny can be as great as the tyranny of the majority." It was stressed that, "the flag, the anthem, the reverence paid to Mr. Gandhi, the emphasis laid by Mahatma Gandhi himself on co-protection, all these are evidence of a deliberate and far-reaching attack on the civic and cultural rights of the Muslims community..." The Congress, according to the Report, had denied the Muslims their due share in the public services, and no fair treatment could be expected from them in future.

The resignation of the Congress Ministries in 1939 over the war issue, provided an opportunity to the League leaders to prove the validity of the aforesaid grievances. In a letter issued from Bombay on 2 December, 1939, Jinnah requested the Muslims all over India, "to observe Friday the 22nd December as the 'Day of

109. Ibid.
110. Jamil-ud-din. op.cit.
Deliverance' and thank-givings as a mark of relief that the Congress regime has at last ceased to function." A resolution was also framed that emphasised the belief of the Muslims that the Congress was not working for the interests of the Muslims and that it had failed to, "safeguard the interests and rights of the Mussalmans and other minority interests." The enthusiasm with which the 'Day' was celebrated all over India showed, that there was some element of truth in Leagues complaints. At Lucknow, a huge Muslim gathering attended the Juma (Friday) prayers on 22nd December and the above resolution was carried out. Similar meetings were held in Bombay, Calcutta, Lahore, Madras, Patna, Hyderabad, Karachi and Aligarh, to celebrate the 'Deliverance Day'.

The Congress apprehension that it was a "mischievous move" calculated by Jinnah to create sensation and that, "it would result ultimately in communal riots in several places," did not prove correct and the 'day' passed off peacefully all over India and no serious incident was noticed. It seemed that the Muslims were really celebrating some festival and the Muslim localities were thoroughly illuminated in the evening. All this went

111. Ibid.
to show how apprehensive the Muslims had become towards the Congress, and how relieved they felt at the termination of the Congress Ministries.

Whatever might have been the grievances of the Muslim community, and it may or may not be true that the Congress failed to rectify them, there seems another reason that led to the 'parting of ways' between the Congress and the League. To put it in the words of Prof. R. Coupland:

"The Congress, however genuinely national and non-communal its intentions might be, was a Hindu organisation. It was not such that its Muslim membership was relatively small and included few Muslims of outstanding ability and influence. The psychological and philosophical background of Congress movement, its mode of thought and conduct, the quality of what was known as 'Congress mindedness', were essentially Hindu, emphatically not Muslim. The doctrine of Ahimsa in particular was at least as alien to Muslim as it is to most Western minds."

The introduction of the 'provincial autonomy' in 1935 had reacted adversely on Muslim community,

117. R. Coupland. The Indian Problem. Pt.II.
especially in the United Provinces and Bihar. It is to be admitted that under the new situation, the U.P. and Bihar Muslims were rapidly losing their former political and cultural predominance. Though numerically in small number in both these provinces, the Muslims yielded, before the advent of the Congress Government, an influence far in excess of their number. The United Provinces enjoyed the reputation of being the nerve-centre of Muslim India, and the prosperity of the Muslims of Bihar, "formed a pleasant contrast to the poverty of the Muslim population in the C.P. and Madras." With the formation of the Congress Ministries, the Muslims could not even maintain their existing status and position. The Federation part of the Act of 1935, if ever materialised, the Muslims feared, would be all the more harmful because any government at the Centre would be dominated by the Hindus. The fears of the Muslims were expressed by Jinnah speaking in the Bombay Legislative Assembly, when he said that, "the Congress Party is not only hostile to the Muslim League, but they are inimical. Therefore, I say to them that co-operation between you and us is not possible. But they will say: 'All right we are the largest number here! Yes, you may be the largest number; you may

be more advanced; you may be stronger economically, and you may think that the counting of heads is the final judgement. But let me tell you...that you alone (British), or this organisation alone or both combined will never be able to destroy that culture which we have inherited, the Islamic culture, and that spirit will live, is going to live and has lived."119 In a statement issued in 1939, Jinnah once again made it clear that the real threat to the Muslims was the threat of the Congress Raj that proved to be a danger for their existence as a religious and cultural group. "Before the war was declared," said he, "the greatest danger to the Muslims of India was the possible inauguration of the Federal Scheme in the Central Government."120 The new Constitution of India framed by the Assembly elected for the purpose, would be against the interest of the Muslims and the Muslim League, and its protection against the Congress Raj, because the Assembly would be dominated by the Hindus. "No Court could be asked to determine, for example, whether as the Moslems were a 'nation' or a 'community' or to weigh the merits of Pakistan."121 By 1939, it can be said, the 'actual' grievances of the Muslims under the Congress Raj combined with their 'subjective' grievances, made any

119. Jamil-ud-Din. op.cit.
120. Cambridge History of India. op.city., Vol.VI.,p.82.
understanding between the Congress and the Muslim League, difficult if not impossible. The speculations about the future made the Muslims more and more dubious in their attitude.

III

The Lahore Resolution: 1940.

The most notable outcome of the increasing differences between the Congress and the Muslim League, as mentioned above, was The Lahore Resolution of 1940, of the Muslim League, that for the first time demanded a separate homeland for the Muslims of India through the platform of a political party, and which became the mandate of the League for the years to come. However, the Lahore Resolution was not the first of its type that envisaged the scheme of dividing India into two or more parts. The idea had developed gradually since the times of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and various plans were presented from time to time in this connection. Let us, therefore, first have a look at these proposals, and then study the 1940 Resolution.

John Bright was probably the first person to suggest the division of India into two parts, since he thought that in a distinct future, it would ease the
transfer of power from Britons to Indians. In 1833, Wilfrid Soawen Blunt suggested in Calcutta that in his view, "practically all provinces of Northern India should be placed under Muslim Government and those of Southern India under the Hindu Government." He thought that the British should remain there as the 'supreme power', and to maintain their power, they should station British troops in each of the Provinces. However, these ideas of dividing India were formulated because of administrative convenience and there was little consideration of the Muslims as a separate religious or cultural identity. It was only in the second decade of the 20th century, as the Muslims became conscious of their separate identity, that the idea of dividing India on religious lines was born and matured. The Government of India Act of 1919, clearly gave the impression that the Government was now thinking of transferring power to Indian hands gradually, and this created a feeling of uneasiness amongst the Muslims as regards their share in the future Government. The failure of the Khilafat Movement, and the breakdown of the Hindu-Muslim unity, at least taught the importance lesson to some of the Muslim leaders: that Hindu-Muslim differences

123. Khalid B. Sayeed, op.cit., p.103.
were too deep to be bridged over by passionate profession of friendship and even by a united action in the political field. Never again the two communities were to combine forces against the British Government. Religion was essentially at the base of the Khilafat Movement, and this was a triumph for 'Muslim nationalism' for it provided a base on which other unities could be built—as the League did later.

The Suddhi and Sangathan movements, moreover, started in some parts of India further led the Muslims to become cautious of their separate identity. Criticising the moves, Haja Ali said at the Bombay Session of the League in 1924, that the politician, "is the leader of the helpless masses in the sense that he knows when it suits his purpose, how to put them on the wrong path," and that, "it is open to serious questions whether the Shuddhi movement was not launched at a highly inopportune time and whether the methods employed were not of a questionable character."124 At the same Session, Mr. Muhammad Ali, while stressing the need of introducing certain educational and economic reforms in the N.W.F.P. expressed the separatist tendencies when he said: "If a line be drawn from Constantinople to Delhi on the map of world it would be found that atleast

124. I.A.H. 1924, Vol II.
right up to Saharanpur there was a corridor of purely Muslim people, or the Muslims were in a clear majority." 125

He further said that if the frontier men or those across the border were not as peaceful as the Indians would wish, it was because the Indians had created insecurity in their minds about their freedom. The tendency of the Muslims to consider themselves as a separate identity was also clear from the speech of Sir Abdur Rahim at the League Session at Aligarh in 1924. He defended the attitude of the Mussalmans towards their co-religionists and criticised a section of the Hindu population whose mischievous activities he thought were a serious challenge to Islam and a grave menace to the political status of the Muslims. 126

At the same Session a resolution was adopted that stated that: "Any territorial redistribution that might at any time be necessary shall not in any way effect the Muslim majority in the Punjab, Bengal and the North-West Frontier Provinces." 127

The Nehru Report of 1928 gives another evidence of the apprehension of the Muslims whereby it was recorded that since the Muslims were in a minority in India, they would get the right to dominate in some parts of India, just to check the fear of the majority likely to subjugate them in the rest of the country. But no clear idea was

125. Ibid.
126. Ibid. 1925, Vol. II
127. Ibid.
formulated at this time. It was in 1930, at the Allahabad Session of the All-India Muslim League, that Iqbal presented his scheme for a separate Muslim State within or without the British Empire, to safeguard the interests of the Muslim. Justifying his idea for a separate Muslim State, he said: "The units of Indian society are not territorial as in European countries. India is a continent of human groups belonging to different races, speaking different languages, and professing different religions....The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India is, therefore, perfectly justified."\(^{128}\) Suggesting the creation of a separate Muslim State he said: "I would like to see the Punjab, North West Frontier Provinces, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-Government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India."\(^{129}\)

There were two important points in Iqubal's scheme. Firstly, Iqbal only thought of the North-West India and made no mention of North-East India, i.e., Bengal. This may be so because of the mixture of separatist

\(^{128}\) I.A.H. 1930. Vol.II.

\(^{129}\) Ibid.
and nationalist tendencies in him, and along with the interests of the Muslims of India, he also thought of the rest of India. "I therefore demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim state in the best interests of India and Islam. For India it means security and peace resulting from an internal balance of power; for Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian Imperialism was forced to give it to mobilize its laws, its education, its culture and to bring them into closer contact with its original spirit and with the spirit of modern times."  

Secondly, the scheme put forward by Iqbal was based on the notion that so far as Islam was concerned, no one could think of separating religion from politics. "Is it possible to retain Islam as an ethical idea and to reject it as a policy in favour of a national politics in which religious attitude is not permitted to play any role?" The answers to this question, according to him, could not be anything but no. And it was this idea of the combination of religion and politics that later became the guiding principle of Jinnah and the Muslim League, for by appealing to the religious sentiments of the Muslims, Jinnah could achieve his political ends successfully. In a letter to Jinnah, Iqbal wrote that the Muslim poverty

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130. Ibid.
131. Ibid.
could only be solved by the law of Islam and that required the creation of a separate Muslim State. "After a long and careful study of Islamic laws," wrote he, "I have come to the conclusion that if this (Islamic) system of law is properly understood and applied, at least the right to subsistence is secured to everybody," and that, "In these circumstances it is obvious that the only way to a peaceful India is a redistribution of the country on the lines of racial, religious and linguistic affinities."\textsuperscript{132}

If Iqbal was the first person to give a clear idea of a separate Muslim State, Choudhry Rehmat Ali gave birth to the word PAKISTAN. In 1938, he wrote in an article: "Pakistan is both a Persian and Urdu word. It is composed of letters taken from the names of all our home-lands—Indian and Asian. That is (the) Punjab, Afghanistan (N.W.F.P.), Kashmir, Iran, Sind (including Kachah and Kathiawar), Tukharistan, Afghanistan and Baluchistan. It means the land of Pak—

pure and clean."\textsuperscript{133}

With the passing of the Government of India Act of 1935 and the 1936 elections, the idea of a separate

\textsuperscript{132} Cambridge History of India. op.cit., Vol.VI.p.810
\textsuperscript{133} quoted in Khalid. B. Sayeed. op.cit., p.105.
homeland for Muslims became more and more popular and firm. At the Working Committee of the Muslim League in March, 1939, Dr. Syed Abdul Latif presented his scheme which proposed to divide India into four Muslim zones and eleven Hindu zones. It was stated that the Muslims could not accept the Act of 1935, since it was, "framed on the assumption that India is a composite nation, which it is not and does not promise to be," "and that, "the democratic majority Government which it has established in most provincial units and aims to establish at the Centre, will in reality be a Government of a single majority nationality, viz., the Hindus, on whose sufferance the other nationalities will have to live," and also because, "it will reduce the Muslims perpetually to the position of a helpless minority at the Centre and in most of the British Provinces, as well as in all but a few of the several hundred of Indian States." The four Muslim zones according to him, were: 1. The North-west Block consisting of Sind, Baluchistan, the Punjab, the N.W.F.P., and the Indian States of Khairpur and Bhawalpur; 2. The North-East Block of Eastern Bengal and Assam; 3. The Delhi-Lucknow Block, extending from the Eastern border of Patiala to

Lucknow; and 4. The Deccan Block, embracing the State of Hyderabad. The rest of India was to be divided into eleven cultural zones. It was also provided that, "the Muslims outside of the areas covered by the four main Muslim zones, viz., those living in Rajputana, Gujrat, Malwa, and western Indian States may concentrate in Moslem Indian States situated in these areas and a newly constituted free city of Ajmer which under the scheme will become a culturally homogenous for Muslims." The scheme provided for a weak, Centre restricted to defence, foreign affairs, commerce and communication, but the residuary powers were to be vested in the Provinces.

Another scheme, known as the 'Confedracy of India', was formulated by Sir Muhammad Shah Nawaz Khan of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League, who proposed to divide India into five parts, namely: 1. the Indus Region; 2. Hindu India; 3. Rajputana and Central India, jointly known as Rajputana; 4. the Deccan States; and 5. Bengal. Transfer of population from one Province to other was thought very expensive and the scheme made no mention thereof. On the whole, the scheme was hazy, uncertain and was silent over many important issues.  

135. Ibid.
In July, 1939, Sir Sikander Hayat Khan presented his scheme which envisaged a two-tier Federation—a regional and an all-India Federation. India was to be divided into seven following zones:

1. Assam, Bengal, States and Sikkim.
2. Bihar and Orissa.
5. Bombay, Hyderabad, Western Indian States, Mysore and C.P. States.
6. Rajputana, States, Gwalior, Central India States, Bihar, Orissa States, C.P. and Brar.

Each zone was to be provided with a Legislature consisting of the representatives of both British Indian and Indian States in that zone. The Central Legislature was to comprise of the representatives in the various regional legislatures, and the 'Central Federal Assembly' was to constitute 375 members. The Muslims were to constitute one-third of the total representatives in the Federal Assembly. One representative from each zone was to be appointed to the Federal Executive, which was to be headed by the Viceroy and again one-third of the appointees were to be Muslim. The Federation was to have control...

over Defence, Foreign Affairs, Communication, Currency, Customs, etc., The residuary powers were to be vested in the Provinces.

In March 1939, Choudhry Khaliquazzamn and M. Siddiq met the Secretary of State, Lord Zetland in London, and told him that the Muslims were against the Government of India Act of 1935, and against a strong federal Government as laid down in that since it would definitely harm the Muslim interests. When asked whether they had any alternative suggestion, they proposed that India should have, "three or four federation of provinces and states which would be co-ordinated by a small central body of some kind or the other." They made it quite clear that the Muslims wanted autonomous Hindu and Muslim Federations with a weak Central Government where they equally shared power with the Hindus. On 5 November, Jinnah demanded assurance from Lord Linlithgow that the 1935 Act would be wholly reconsidered and that no constitution for India would be enacted without the consent of the two major parties i.e., the Congress and the Muslim League.

In an article published in 'Time and Tide' of 13 February 1940, Jinnah wrote: "Two-third of its

139. The Statesman. 7 November, 1939.
140. For the Full Text, see I.A.R. 1940. Vol.I.
(India) inhabitants profess Hinduism in one form or the other as their religion, over 77 million are followers of Islam; and the difference between the two is not only of religion in stricter sense, but also of law and culture. They may be said indeed to represent two distinct civilisations. They are in fact two different nations." Further he wrote that, "a constitution must be evolved that recognises that there are in India two nations who both share the governance of their motherland." At the Council Meeting of the All-India Muslim League, held on 25th February, 1940, at Delhi. Jinnah said: 'People ask me what is our goal. If you do not understand even now, then I say you will never understand what our goal is. Great Britain wants to rule India. Mr. Gandhi wants to rule India, and the Moslems—we want to be free.'

It was amidst these circumstances that the historic Lahore Session of the All-India Muslim League was held on 22nd March, 1940. Speaking at the first day from the Presidential Chair, Jinnah explained that, "the problem in India is not of an inter-communal character, but manifestly of an inter-national one," and that, "the only course open to us all is to allow the major nations separate home lands by dividing India into autonomous

141. ibid.
national States." He explained at length the differences between the Hindus and the Muslims and declared that "to yoke together two such nations under a single State, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a State." He emphatically made it clear that, "Muslims are a nation according to any definition of a nation and they must have their homelands, their territories and their State. We wish to live in peace and harmony with our neighbours as a free independent people."

On the second day of the session, i.e., on the 23rd March, 1940, Mr. Fazlul Haq moved the resolution that became the famous 'Lahore Resolution.' The resolution read:

"Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., that geographical contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should

142. See Ibid. League Session of Lahore.
143. For the Full Text of the Resolution, see Ibid.
be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the north-western and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign."

The resolution further read: "we have stated definitely and unequivocally that what we want is not merely a tinkering with the idea of federation but its thorough overhauling so that the federation may ultimately go."

Supporting the Resolution, C. Khaliquzzamn said that the British Government were the first one to be responsible for this move since it was they who declared India to be a nation. After the British, Congress and the majority community were responsible for the Muslim demand for separation. "The working of the provincial part of the Act of 1935 in the Congress provinces during the last three years has finally decided the question of separation...The Muslims have now realised that their existence is in danger and if they want to maintain their identity, they must struggle for it."144.

144. Ibid.
The resolution was the clear manifestation of the growing fear and apprehension of the Muslims that their interests were not safe and secure under the Congress Raj. Or atleast the leaders of the Muslim League wanted to make the Muslims feel so. Thus, Mr. Abdul Hamid Khan of Madras declared that in the struggle for freedom the Muslims had co-operated with the Hindus in the hope that the freedom of India meant freedom for every inhabitant in the country, but their belief had been believed by the conduct of the Congress during its regime of two and a half years in seven out of eleven provinces. It was also alleged that the Muslims did not want to leave the Congress, and nor did they do it. But the Congress had left the Muslims by changing its creed and methods.

An important feature of the Lahore Resolution was that its language was very vague, and no specification as to the areas that were to be separated from India was made. The other schemes afore mentioned, had given clear idea of the areas that their authors wanted to be grouped into a separate Muslim State or Zone. Lord Mountbatten is reported to have said to the Leaders of the Muslim League that the areas of Pakistan as envisaged in the Lahore Resolution, did not include the entire Province.

145. Ibid.
of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam because, "the Resolution specifically used the term 'areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-western and Eastern zones of India.' The reasons for the vague language of the Lahore Resolution can be that the League leaders were themselves in confusion of their majority and strength as the Punjab and Bengal. The other reason can be that Jinnah did not want to give any clear idea of the areas that were to be included in the Muslim State so that later on he could have more chances for a bargain—as we shall see in the following chapters, specially during the Gandhi-Jinnah talks and the Simla Conference.

However, the Lahore Resolution provided the Muslim League with a new strength and vigour. "The session was successful and it claimed to usher in a new era of awakening for the Mussalmans as the result of a new reconstruction in the policy of the League. The goal of the League has now definitely defined on independent Muslim India comprising autonomous and sovereign units." There is at least some element of truth in the statement, since the opposition of the Congress to

146. The Cambridge History of India, op. cit., p.833.
147. Amrit Bazar Patrika, 26 March, 1940.
the British Government in her war efforts and the necessity of recruiting more soldiers for the war, which the Muslims could provide, had made the Government more considerate and sympathetic towards the League. It was pointed out by some critics that Jinnah was encouraged to move the Resolution because he was encouraged by the Viceroy and his friendly attitude after the war was declared. The British were now ready to concede to Jinnah the bargaining power he had sought. As it was, the resolution was a personal triumph for Jinnah and was intended to solve his immediate problems. It gave him a definite stand from which he could bargain with the Government and the Congress in the near future. It was designed to catch the fancy of the Muslim middle class and the Muslim civil servants who could now think of sharing the political, economic and administrative powers in a Muslim State with comparative ease and less competition from their Hindu rivals. Likewise, the Provincial Muslim leaders now became mild in their opposition to Jinnah for they had to think hard before adopting any definite line of policy against him. If the Muslim State ever materialised, its obvious head would have

been Jinnah, and they could think of their fate if they persisted in their opposition to him. The Lahore Resolution gave the Muslim League a new ambition and a new creed. From the date, the resolution was adopted, all attempts at reconciliation between the Congress and the League—as we shall note—founders on this issue of the creation of a separate Muslim State. Now a renewed stress was laid on the two-nation theory and communal differences were exaggerated with redoubled energy. The Bombay Muslim League Conference held on 24th May, 1940 declared: "We have demanded a place in the Indian Sun where we will be able to establish a laboratory wherein we may experiment in peace the greatest experiment ever tried," and also that, "the Muslims of India have at least an idea to live for and to die for." 150