CHAPTER II

India’s Security Threat
The Concept of security has always been under debate as what constitutes security. There are different connotations attached to this concept. It has gained importance in the third World countries as they still face the challenges and problems of security, a full proof security which encompasses all aspects of security viz economic, social environmental etc. But as far as military notion of security is concerned, they think that they have achieved much on this front of traditional security either by aligning with formidable military blocks or by strengthening their own military base. As far as South Asian security is concerned, the strategic environment of this part of the globe is far different from other part. However in this chapter, we will discuss about India's security threat. It will cover both internal and external factors of security threat. This chapter seeks to explain the security milieu of the Indian state and discuss the internal and external threats posed to it, in the light of the global security milieu in general and the South Asian regional security scenario in particular. This chapter will examine the concept of security from four important perspectives: military, non-military, societal and futuristic.

The end of the Cold War over a decade ago heralded a seminal change in the nature of threats to national security. For, the end of superpower rivalries, which had complicated regional conflicts in the third world, led to a diminution of these conflicts. On the other hand, ethnic, linguistic, religious and communal tensions, which were dormant and overlaid with cold war rivalries and the other colonial dominance over the third world got a fillip by the 'decompression’ effect of the end of the Cold War. Their release exacerbated domestic conflicts in developing countries deriving from a
plethora of ethno-nationalist, socio-economic and communal religions reasons. This is clear from the enumeration of major conflicts published annually by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) since the Cold War abated: it confirms that intrastate conflict its greatly outnumber inter-state conflicts. The SIPRI yearbook 2000 on Armaments, disarmament and international security, for instance, reports that out of 27 major armed conflicts raged in 25 countries during 1999, only two were inter-state conflicts, namely, Ethiopia, Eritrea and India-Pakistan over Kashmir. The mitigation of rivalries between the two superpowers and the disappearance of block politics thus shifted the focus of conflict from the external to internal sphere and, more certainly, to the third world.

International milieu in the post-Cold War era and particularly in the new century is shifting towards a more complex world order. The forces of integration and conflict are simultaneously at work while on one hand, there is consensus for peace and development, on the other; strife and conflict are disturbing the international balance. This global reality is also impinging upon the South Asian scene. There are several global themes that impinge on the correlation of forces in the region. The multi-ethnic societies of South Asia are witnessing new group identities searching for a political space. The state that have become monolithic in postcolonial period are grappling with forces of sub-nationalism. The forces of obscurantism are rattling the secular democratic polities the separatist tendencies have created inter-state conflicts and the security environment has got vitiated.
The question of security and insecurity in South Asia has assumed substantial prominence because of unresolved conflicts, economic backwardness and the reality of nuclear proliferation in the region while domestic politics in South Asia have become very challenging, the major source of instability in the regional security environment are still unresolved as far as conflicts between India and Pakistan is concerned. As rightly remarked by a former head of a Pakistani research think tank in the late 1980s:

When we study South Asia, we really recall looking at India and Pakistan for these are the protagonists of the subcontinent. Where these two countries are at peace with each other, South Asia by and large is at peace. If the two countries have troubled relations, South Asia is uneasy. When the two fight, South Asia trembles. Other powers of South Asia – five in number – have no external security problem and no threat from any neighbour except possibly from India). India and Pakistan determine in their war and peace the present and the future of the region.1

Even though India has not fought any major war since 1971. The Indian state cannot be regarded as major ‘secure’ or that it’s citizen enjoy greater security of life and property. If security can be measured in terms of vulnerabilities that threaten, or are likely to threaten the territorial integrity of a state, the stability of its institutions, and the security of the individuals living

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within its boundaries, India cannot be regarded as a secure nation today. For, it faces threat not only from external sources, especially Pakistan, but ethnic turmoil and separatist movements too are threatening the Indian State.

Though the British imperialism brought various princely states within the geographical boundary of India under one roof and it also generated nationalist upsurge through its repressive policies, yet fissiparous tendencies began to rise once the British left India. This country's big size and widespread socio-cultural diversities of its people apart, the introduction of competitive politics after the independence also impaired the growth of national unity and eroded the nation-building process, raising the specter of disintegration of the Indian state. The linguistic re-organisation of the states in 1956 followed by the adoption of the two-language formula for the conduct of official business at the center, and, between the center and the states – in the wake of widespread anti-hindi agitations in Madras (TamilNadu) and other Non-Hindi speaking states – to some extent blunted the edge of linguistic regionalism. But the problem was far from resolved, as was shown by the creation of the states of Punjab and Haryana, on linguistic basis, by splitting the former state of Punjab, or, by the tensions between the Bengalese and the Assamese in Assam during the 1980s.

The agitations for autonomy statehood launched or intensified in various parts of India during the last decade of the 10th century – for example by the Nepalses-speaking population living in Darjeeling, West Bengal, the tribes living in the mineral-rich districts of Jharkhand, the Bodos living in
Assam, the Reangs in Mizoram, the hill tribes in Uttranchal or tribal region of Madhya Pradesh – caused enormous damage to life and properties. These movements forced the Union government to create new states of Jharkand, Chattisgarh and Uttaranchal. But this has lent a fresh impetus to demands for creation of more states in various parts of the country in general and Maharashtra (for Vidarbh), Andhra Pradesh (for Telangana) and Assam (for Bodoland) in particular. These demands are basically, the result of a feeling of economic deprivation/exploitation of the people living in these regions and, are, in many cases, compounded by the perceived threats to ethnic identity. While it is debatable as to whether these demands could be met by creating new states, as this may lead to more such demands, the federal and state governments must however address their grievances by devolution of greater financial and administrative powers to identifiable regions within the existing states, without impairing the unity of India.

The failure of the Indian State in addressing the genuine problems of its citizens has resulted in the disenchantment with the government. As has been rightly observed by Bhashyam Kasturi: A bureaucracy that is neither responsible nor accountable a political leadership that has little of governance and general public apathy, are often the cause for self-inflicted problems that sometimes have the capacity to become threats to national security.²

Linguistic and regional challenges to national integrity apart, caste and religious divisions are also straining India's security. The cross cutting

² Bhashyam Kasturi, "India" in P.R. Chari (ed.), Perspectives on National Security in South Asia: In search of a New Paradigm, [New Delhi, Manohar, 1999] p.146.
societal divisions have, of course, blunted the edges of these divides. Religious consciousness among followers of a particular religion, for example, reduces their regional or caste identities or caste loyalty reduces religious and regional divisions among followers of a particular state. This is especially true in the case of the rise of caste consciousness among dalits belonging to various parts of India. The development of federal policy: functioning of mainstream political parties, cutting across-religious/caste boundaries, and a basic reorientation of communal relations, following changes in the traditional stratification between the Hindu and Muslims have also partly mitigated these conflicts.

However the fact remains that India is still in the process of nation-building to narrow the divisions between different sections of society is a major challenge in this direction. Society in India is driven with divisions so deep that sometimes it stretches one’s credulity to think of it as one country. But one country it very definitely is and its internal contradictions are responsible for the dynamic which in India at any point in its history. 

However, the weakening of political parties through factionalism and splits, the erosion in the strength of the Congress, which has been the only political party with an all-India organizational base, have not only created political uncertainties, but also given rise to a new brand of coalition political opportunism, bereft of any ideological mooning. Communal and casteist forces have been the major beneficiaries of these developments, the deepening of the caste divisions in the name of social justice to divert

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attention from the misrule, strengthening of separatism among minorities to use them as 'vote banks' leading to chain reaction by Hindu nationalists and Muslim communalists clearly points towards threats to the stability and security of Indian state.⁴

Unfortunately, however our press and leaders only highlight the dangers of Hindu communalism ignoring the threats posed by minority community to national security to its only one example, when the police investigations after the terrorist attack on the American Center in Kolkatta early 2002 unearthed Aftab Ansari's diabolical criminal network in Muslim dominated areas. West Bengal Chief Minister Budhadeb Bhattacharjee showed rare candour in promptly naming the Pakistan's inter service intelligence (ISI) as the culprit and pointed finger at unauthorized madrasas (schools teaching Islamic orthodoxy).⁵ But his party CPI (M) chose to treat a soft ground.

Though communal and ethnic tensions have strained India's security in most parts of the land, Kashmir and the Northeast provide the most formidable challenge to the Indian union at the dawn of the 21st century after subsiding of the Sikh separatism in Punjab through fatigue and judicious use of carrot and stick policy. While some specific problems had generated these

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⁵ According to a Bengali daily, there are 541 unregistered madrasas in a single district of North Dinalpur, and that there have been an increase of 389 madarsas and 553 mosques during last six years. Reportedly at least five percent of these madarsa-mosques are involved in anti-national activity, as cited by Abhijit Bhattacharya, "Upsetting Faint Balance of Social Harmony", Pioneer (New Delhi)April 13, 2002. Internet Edition www.dailypioneer.com
movements, the role and responsibility of the Indian Government and external powers in fomenting these trouble spots cannot be negated.\(^6\)

The militant secessionist movements that began in Kashmir since the end of the 1980s were the result of a series of political developments that led to a progressive attenuation of Kashmir's autonomy, guaranteed under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.\(^7\) The process began in 1950s, and was carried to its extreme after the outbreak of insurgency in the valley. Political corruption in the State and the mismanagement of its economy also contributed to the people's disenchantment with the policies pursued by the successive Governments in Kashmir in collusion, as the critics saw it, with the Government in New Delhi. The attempts to treat Kashmir as a rebellions province, suppression of the normal political process, and the measures taken by the security forces to counter terrorism – all these contributed to a sense of insecurity among the people and their alienation from the government, that helped the growth of secessionist movements, especially in the valley.

But neither in the Punjab nor in Kashmir could militancy be sustained without the active help and encouragement of forces in the neighbouring circumstantial evidence of Pakistani involvements in India's internal conflicts in Punjab during the 1980s and subsequently, in Kashmir. Pakistan has conflict with India to destabilize Indian polity by providing support to the


militants. It is also one way of taking revenge against India for its role in the liberation of Bangladesh. Pakistani Intelligence agencies – particularly the ISI – have also allegedly been involved in aiding the insurgents in India's strife-torn North-east.\textsuperscript{8}

For nearly fourteen years now, the Indian forces have tried to suppress, Pakistan backed secessionist movement in the Kashmir Valley. The hope about a turn-around in the situation after the installation of an elected government in the state under the leadership of Dr. Farooq Abdullah in 1996 were soon belief Mr. I.K. Gujral who made a serious attempt to improve ties with India's South Asian neighbours first as Foreign Minister and then as Prime Minister, failed to persuade the Pakistani regime to see reason though he achieved. Considerable success in the case of other neighbours such as Bangladesh and Nepal Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, who tried to move the Gujral doctrine beyond the river Sultej to establish peace, security and prosperity in the region also got rebuff in the form of Kargil intrusion. Pakistan sabotaged the peace initiative by an Islamic militant outfit active in Kashmir, Hizbul Muzahheedin, which tried to strike a deal with the Indian Government in July 2000.

Undoubtedly by these setbacks, the Vajpayee Government once again made a bold initiative towards bringing peace in the troubled valley by making a unilateral declaration of ceasefire during the Islamic month of Ramzan in November 2000 and then inviting the Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf to Agra for a Summit meeting in July 2000. Unfortunately,

\textsuperscript{8} CTBT Obsession to Basic Strategies\textsuperscript{9}; Trishul (Willington), Vol.12, No.2, Spring 2000, pp.65-73. p.92).
Islamabad rebuffed all these peace moves by engineering attacks on the Kashmir Assembly in October 2001, Parliament House in December 2001 and Kalluchak massacre in May 2002. This has forced New Delhi to mobilize its armed forces against Pakistan. Though the International efforts led by the US have prevented war between two-nuclear-armed neighbours, situation is still far from normal. One can only hope at this juncture the growing fatigue among the militants and pressure of external powers especially the US can make Pakistan see the writing on the wall.

The situation in the Northeast too continues to be alarming. General Shankar Chowdhury, the former Chief of Army Staff, made a pointed reference to this during this visit to the region in 1991, soon after assuming officer-Northeast has a long history of insurgency, and almost all the states in the region are now, plagued by the insurgency problem. It offers a classic illustration of Ayoob’s categorization of the security concerns of post-colonial societies, emerging from the divergence between the ‘loci of authority and power’. Problems have been complicated further by the region’s poverty its strategic location – surrounded by Bangladesh in the West, Myanmar in the east and China and Bhutan in the north-cultural diversity, inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflicts, unsettled territorial disputes, and, the involvement of external powers. While the Chinese, aid to the insurgent groups in the north-east has ceased following improvements in the India-China relations since the end of the 1980s and the Vajpayee’s Government’s pragmatic move to cement ties with the ruling regime in Myanmar ignoring its authoritarian

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9 Sanjay Hazarika, “the Wages of Ad Hocism : Trauma in India's North-east” in Raghavan ed., Comprehensive Security : Perspectives from India's Regions (New Delhi, 2001), pp.28-45.
character has passed the way for India-Myanmar cooperation for controlling fronts border terrorism in the region, militants of this area are getting assistance from other external sources.

As has been mentioned earlier, Pakistan is actively fomenting trouble not only in Kashmir, but also in the Northeast. Reports suggest that Pakistan’s ISI has been supplying a large quantity of arms and ammunition to various North-east terrorist outfits from the stockpiles of the Khmer rouge of Cambodia the markets of Thailand and then transported to Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh, eventually to be used on the Indian soil. The recipients were separatist organizations such as the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), and Bodo groups. The Government of Bangladesh has also been accused of providing sanctuary to insurgent groups in the Northeast. There was some improvement in the situation during the Awami League Government of Sheikh Hasina wazid, who put pressure on the insurgent groups operating from Bangladesh. But with coming back into power of Begun Khaleda Zia, who had openly declared support for the various militant groups in the North-east india calling them as “freedom fighters”, situation is again grim there. In Bhutan despite the government’s periodic announcements that it will not tolerate the presence of militants on its soil and its efforts to persuade them to leave, situation there remains unchanged. In Dec. 2001, the ULFA said it was closing down some of its camps, but in fact they were shifted deeper.

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10 The Hindu”, New Delhi, 18 Feb. 2002.

inside Bhutan.\textsuperscript{12} As the hills of Bhutan give the outfit for better logistics sanctuary than the flat terrain of Bangladesh, the ULFA is not likely to leave Bhutan unless New Delhi puts enough pressure on Thimphu to flush them out and takes other measures such as fencing on the entire 260 km stretch of the Indo-Bhutan border and providing the responsibility of guarding it to the Border Security Force.

The process of 'internationalization' of internal conflicts in South Asia is facilitated by two factors: (1) geographical contiguity of most of the South Asian region, and the absence of any natural barrier separating the states, particularly in the Indian sub-continent from each other, and, from states in the adjoining regions (e.g. Myanmar from India); and (2) the presence of people belonging to the same ethnic/religious groups cutting across the territorial boundaries of independent states. For example, India has long borders with Myanmar and insurgent groups operating in Nagaland and Manipur have often crossed over to Myanmar after committing crimes in India and in the absence of coordinated moves by the Indian and Myanmar's governments led to the worsening in of the security situation in the North-east region.\textsuperscript{13}

The internalization of internal conflicts South Asia is thus a reflection in the region, marked by the lack of mutual trust and understanding. 'Proxy Wars' have indeed become a part of the intra-South Asian diplomacy. Since India is the largest of all the States in the region and has common land

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{The Hindu}, New Delhi, 3 February 2002.
\textsuperscript{13} Nalini Kant Jha, \textit{Internal Crisis and Indira Gandhi's foreign Policy} (Patna, Janaki Publisher 1985) P-58
borders which most of them (except Sri Lanka, separated by a narrow strips of water, and the Maldives), it has become the most vulnerable to the ‘proxy wars’, indulged in by its estranged neighbours, particularly Pakistan, and the prime target of their criticisms for all their domestic problems. A partial explanation for this may be found in the fact that, except for Pakistan India is too large in size, and militarily too powerful for most of these states, consequently, most of them feel overawed by India and are suspicious about its motives. For Pakistan, such feelings have been further accentuated by historical legacies. Unfortunately, India has not always tried to allay the fears of her neighbours. It is only in recent years that Gujral and Vajpayee regimes have embarked on a bold and imaginative policy of extending hands of cooperation to South Asian neighbours without accepting immediate return. And as stated earlier, New Delhi had achieved considerable success in improving its ties with smaller neighbours except, of course, Pakistan. Security of South Asian States is also being threatened by two other ominous developments, namely, proliferation of small arms and weapons, and traffic in drugs, which have assumed dangerous proportions since the 1990s and are likely to test Indian defence establishment in the new century. The Indian subcontinent borders on two of the most notorious centers for growing narcotics – the Golden crescent (along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border) and the Golden Triangle (in the Myanmar-Thailand border) – and, consequently, smuggling them through Indian, Pakistan and Nepalese territories in collusion with a section of the political and military bureaucratic
elite has become a flourishing business the region through which drug traffic flows is inevitably afflicted by endemic violence and conflict.\textsuperscript{14}

What is more threatening, there is a close contact between the drug-traffickers, arms smugglers and various insurgent groups which has created serious problems not only for India's security, but also for the security of other states of the region.\textsuperscript{15} Illicit trade in drugs and small arms, is no doubt, a global problem. So far as South Asia is concerned, proliferation of small arms may be said to be a fall-out of the war in Afghanistan since large quantities of weapons sent by the USA for Afghan mujahideens during the 1980s, soon found their way in the 'bazaar' in Pakistan, with the connivance of the security officials. Many of these weapons — quite sophisticated and lethal—ultimately reached the militants in Punjab and Kashmir. The quantity of arms seized by the security forces in Kashmir during 1991-92 was enough to equip a force of 20,000 terrorists with such weapons as Kalasnikov assault rifles, grenades, rockets, and rocket launchers, machine guns, ammunition and explosives. The incident of arms dropping in Purulia in Dec. 1995 exposed not only the lapses in India's security system, but also the dangers that may be posed to the state by the action of international arms smugglers, in collusion with local agents. Pakistan, which aided and abetted the smugglings of arms by the terrorists in Punjab and Kashmir, is now experiencing the consequences of its own lax gun control measures. In Karachi alone, there is a large supply of Kalsnikov rifles over which, the

\textsuperscript{14} S. Balaji, "Terrorism and Narcotics Trafficking in South Asia" in Nalini Kant Jha et.al., eds. \textit{Peace and Cooperative Security in South Asia} (New Delhi, Anmol,1999), pp.367-72.

\textsuperscript{15} Sreedhar and T. Srinivas, "The Illegal Drug Trade, Asian Experience", \textit{Strategic Analysis} (New Delhi), Vol.20, No 45, August 1997,P-58
government has little control and these have been freely used in the ethnic violence in Karachi.\textsuperscript{16} As stated by the US secretary of state, Collin Powell, during his New Delhi trip is June 2002, terrorists belonging to Al-qaida network have fled to Pakistan after the destruction of their stronghold in Afghanistan by the combined forces of the US and Northern Alliance last year. They were reportedly behind the Karachi bomb blast near the US Embassy.

It is however, pertinent to note that though internal strife’s have been exacerbated by external interference, the roots of conflict lie within the state, and unless, the problems that lead to the alienation of the people are attended to, these domestic threats to security are likely to plague Indian security environment in different ways. It is in this context that the issue of good governance assumes utmost importance for ensuring the security and stability of the Indian state as well as its people.

The fact that a crisis of governance exists in India and that the state has witnessed away in parts of its territory is too obvious to be an arguable proposition. Instances of the lack of governance and misgovernance are too many to mention. They are manifested by persuasive nepotism and corruption, misappropriation of state funds, absence of transparency and accountability in public administration, lack of respect for the rule of law or ethical behaviour in public life, and the reluctance to delegate administrative financial powers to grassroots organizations. An overemphasis on rights and negation of Indian tradition that premium on duties (dharma) due to wrong

interpretation of secularism have made the ruling elite insensitive to sufferings of people. The result is a propensity of the state to roll but not to govern, which signifies inhumane governance. This situation will deteriorate when burgeoning globalization ensures that market geopolitics penetrates the country in collaboration with its rentier classes, the worship of profit can only worsen human security and humane governance.

There are two ways in which the deepening crisis of governance in India would exacerbate its security problematique. First, by accentuating the immobility of the state in tackling its increasingly difficult challenges to national security, especially human security, in a region which is getting slowly but steadily nuclearized. Instead, an easy propensity obtains in the Indian state to strengthen the forces of repression – police, paramilitary and armed forces, intelligence services – rather than wrestle with the basic questions involved in providing human security and humane governance. That requires improving the quality and responsiveness of the administration.

Secondly, criminalization of politics and politicization of crime have become synonyms in India. The entry of criminal elements into the legislative chambers and union and state cabinets should be a cause for deep concern. It would explain the continuing deterioration of law and order in the country - a basic function of the state – and the mobility of the state to arrest and prosecute criminal with political connections or politicians with criminal antecedents. The state is part of the problem, not the solution any more, to ensure human security.
The Vohra Committee Report had collected the views of several officials in the ministries concerned and intelligence agencies on these issues. It cites them to inform that there has been a rapid spread and growth of criminal gangs, armed ‘senas’ (armies), daring mafias, smuggling gangs, drug peddlers and economic lobbies in the country which have, over the years, developed an extensive network of contacts with the bureaucrats/Government functionaries at the local levels, politicians, media persons and strategically located individuals in the non-state sector. Director, Intelligence Bureau (DIB) has stated that the network of the mafia is virtually running a parallel government, pushing the state apparatus into irrelevance. The various crime syndicate mafia organizations have developed significant muscle and money power and established linkages with governmental functionaries, political leaders and others to be able to operate with impunity.\(^{17}\)

It is thus clear that the institution concerned with the inner processes of governance have been infiltrated, which must affect national security. The likelihood of foreign nationals influencing the governance processes from outside cannot be ignored since transactional crimes are growing at a rapid pace. The question now become germane is: what can be done to ensure that security and governance are synchronized to ensure the common will. A counsel of despair suggests that in a democracy the people ensure that they get the Government they want, if they elect criminals to the legislature this means that they find such persons congenial.

\(^{17}\) The Hindu (Chennai), 21 November 2000.
Not long ago, when a newly appointed Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh was asked how he could possibly improve the law and order situation in the state with 22 ministers in his cabinet possessing criminal antecedents, his nonchalant reply was, "I don't bother about the ministers' past. After joining the Government, they are not indulging in crimes and are ready to help suppress criminal activities." He added (in reply to another question) "the MLAs who are described as criminals have been elected by the people. They are no longer criminals". A few days later an MLA belonging to the ruling party was killed. The situation in Bihar is no better. What happens in Bihar and UP has immense consequences for India, both due to their weight in the national polity and their influence over national politics: This has not decreased significantly after the excision of Uttaranchal and Jharkhand. But it can no longer be argued that what happens in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar is unique. According to statistics collected by the Election Commission at least 40 MPS and 700 MLAs faced criminal charges that included murder, dacoity, rape, theft, abduction and extortion. And the weight of India in the regional polity ensures that such occurrences spread into its neighbours and on action-reaction modality ensues, indeed the situation in some parts of South Asia closely resembles what obtains in Bihar and UP.\textsuperscript{18}

Unfortunately the higher judiciary which has though played significant role in enlarging human rights jurisprudence in India\textsuperscript{19}, has failed to appreciate the actual cause of crime-politics nexus in India. This is evident

\textsuperscript{18} ibid.

\textsuperscript{19} Nalinikant Jha, "fifty Years of Human Rights Jurisprudence in India", in T.S.N. Sastry, ed., \textit{Fifty Years of Indian Political System} (New Delhi, Anmol 2000).P-27
from a recent ruling of the apex Court that directed the Election Commission to inform voters about criminal record of candidates seeking election to federal or provincial legislatures. But will proving information to the voters regarding the doubtful antecedents of candidates curb the criminalization of politics? This presumes that the voters are unaware of the candidates' dubious reputation: this is difficult to believe, since the local population cannot be deemed to be collectively gullible and ignorant about a candidate's lack of qualifications and character. Obviously there are other compulsions underlying their choice of candidates with criminal proclivities. This might include intimidation, lack of suitable candidates, divisive class, caste and communal loyalties, and so on, these make the criminal record of the candidate irrelevant.

In fact, the decay of political parties and the withering away of their grassroots relations with the people lead to the politics of manipulation replacing the politics of mass appeal. The limited purpose of the new class of politicians is to derive legitimacy through the ballot box; once elected, their exercise of power, is designed to seek personal and group advantage by cornering the resources of state. The need to garner illegally acquired funds and the influence of criminal elements to procure power illuminates the problem – of criminalization of politics; this problem worsens when the criminal elements demand, in return, immunity from legal processes and their 'rightful' share of state's resources from their clients in the political, bureaucratic and police administration. Inability of two might governments of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka to nab an old and ailing criminal Veerappan,
clearly shows that the malady is not confined to Bihar and UP, but it is prevalent, more or less, in other parts of India as well.\textsuperscript{20} 

In essence, the nexus between corrupt individuals and political parties to appropriate the state defines the crisis of governance in India and underlies the resulting enfeeblement of state and human security. Political will is needed, which is missing, to reverse this situation. A conspiracy of silence by the people will only accentuate the draft into political and administrative anarchy. More voices must be raised consequently to recognize and understand this bonding of insecurity and misgovernance, and to search for ways to reverse this situation. 

India, in the wake of the severe challenges posed to the security of the country, emerges as an unevenly developed state. It has the characters of a hard state, but its 'softness', to quite an extent, is palpable on account of its intellectual ineptness in understanding the dimensions of internal security in their totality. As a result, its counter strategy becomes primarily unidimensional, depending on a misappropriate use of force. 

In the ultimate analysis, therefore national security and good governance are inseparable. That is why, in ancient India the promotion of welfare of people was regarded as the supreme duty (dharma) of a king. Unfortunately an overemphasis on rights at cost of duties has contributed to the crisis of governance in the country. In this sense, domestic sources of insecurity are more potent threats to security than external threats. This is

not deny the existence of external threats to India's security. But acquisition of military power or the use of force alone cannot guarantee security and stability of the country. The government's job has been quill praiseworthy in establishing a National Security Council. But it is still non-functioning. To make a holistic review of India's security environment the NSC must be headed by a full time National Security Advisor without letting up on conventional aspects of security, the government has to work hard on the intangibles, which will result in lasting peace.

While a discussion of internal threats shows their seriousness it would be unrealistic to think that external forces will stop engaging in wars of attrition against India that wars include covert and proxy wars, narco-terrorism and economic pressure. The post-cold war environment calls for a reassessment of threats and their nature. Old alliances remain but with a new form. With the USSR no longer present to provide a countervailing force. India has been forced to search for new allies, and assert itself in the new world order. The character of regional threats emanating from China and Pakistan is beginning to change. This is partly due to the internal dynamics in those states, and partly due to the greater confidence within India of its capability to handle the military dimensions of these threats. What is new is the covert linkages between China and Pakistan exemplified by the transfer of nuclear and missile technology. The military threat from China has receded in the last decade with the signing of CBM agreements in 1993 and 1996. But the 1962 experience and its nuclear dimension requires that India be prepared. While China would like to leave the resolution of the boundary alignment to future generations, it seems this is the right time for India to
push for border demarcation. China is a medium term threat and the issues that could lead to confrontation are economic competition, limited border conflict in Tibet, marl time rivalry in the Indian Ocean over Myanmar, arms transfers to Pakistan and last, but not the least, a repetition of the 1987 Sumroding Chu crisis.

In the case of Pakistan, covert military action cannot be ruled out. But the experience of the last decade, which has witnessed proxy wars in Kashmir, but internal turmoil in Pakistan, reveals that there is a definite possibility of the latter nation falling into chaos. Further, if the Army were to return to power in Pakistan, this would influence its decision-making vis-à-vis India the main threat to Pakistan as seen from India is lack of democratization and de-feudalization.

The end of the Cold War, has placed greater emphasis on national threat assessments in terms of interest, this may not be holistic. This is particularly apparent in areas such as nonproliferation and disarmament. The prime illustration was India’s statement during the CD debate on the CTBT in Geneva in 1996. India’s position on the need to keep the nuclear option ‘open’ was articulated in terms of national interests and regional security environment. India’s external threat perception is emerging in an extended neighbourhood complex, as foreign policy makers are viewing the world from a larger perspective. The future must view this matrix in an integrated fashion and with different assessing agencies providing the inputs. What will be decisive in future is the ability of the state distinguish the ‘signal’ from, the ‘chaff’.
Two illustrations are provided to appreciate the changing nature of threat perceptions and responses there to. The collapse of the USSR meant that India needs to find economic and political partners who can take forward regional cooperation. India has revived its ties with Israel and wishes to participate actively in the Asian Regional Forum. Its selection a Full Sectoral Dialogue partner reinforces the new reality that India and South-East Asia need each other. Both these developments are the end results of clearly though-out processes, which implied rethinking old strategies, and extending India’s reach beyond its traditional boundaries. The external dynamic cannot be divorced from domestic factors and the nuclear program. This is evident from the increasing pressure by the US on India to cap its missile and nuclear programme. This has had a dual impact. On one hand, India pre-Pokhran II was arguing that the NPT and CTBT were not really disarmament measures and that they only perpetuate the hegemony of the nuclear haves, is now willing to sign the CTBT. Further, there is an articulation of domestic interests that weigh upon India’s nuclear option.

This has its contradictory moments. While statements by the Narasimha Rao government declared that India had no intention to test, there was the disclosure that India was preparing for a test in Pokhran at the end of 1995. This confusion can be attributed to an awakening in the establishment to two facts. One, the necessity of linking threats with interests. Second, to correlate public statements with the internal assessment of the establishment. A word of clarification here. It is not as if this corroborative enterprise is taking place for the first time. Prior to the NPT and CTBT debates external assessments were made use of by government
the difference on this occasion was the intensity of the debate in media and elsewhere and its impact on policy making.

The entire exercise came full circle on 11 and 13 May 1998 when India conducted five nuclear explosions in Pokhran. The reasons for the tests was the threat from nuclear China, nuclear Pakistan and nuclear US. Additionally, it was stated that the Sino-Pak nexus in the transfer of nuclear and missile technology had to be factored into India's security concerns. The essence was that the tests were required to meet India's legitimate security concerns post-Pokhran II much time has been spent on damage control and while some progress has been made it looks more likely than ever before that India will sign the CTBT under certain conditions. The view that the Pokhran tests were conducted due to threats from the neighbourhood and beyond is only part of the answer. It was partly political and diplomatic, the BJP led government perceiving political gain from the tests and diplomatic and scientific pressure to test before the entry-into-force clause in the CTBT becomes effective in 1999. In this sense, a nuclear paradigm for South Asia has emerged, but whether the government is able to interlink this with a national security paradigm remain to be seen.

India's perceptions of threats are currently centered on Pakistan's efforts to capture Kashmir, abetting and encouraging terrorism in Punjab and North-eastern states. The conventional threat from China has receded during the last decade. India's nuclear tests have awakened China to South Asia, but statements from India have generated strong Chinese reactions to Pokhran II. This remains a diplomatic challenge for India. But apprehensions
of Pakistan's designs and nuclear capability figure much higher. The supply of arms to Pakistan by the US is against Indian interests. It is a truism that Pakistan has used American arms only against India in all the wars. The presence of US forces and her nuclear capability in the Indian Ocean region also creates anxieties regarding US intervention in South Asia.

Russia was virtually an ally till yesterday, and helped India to grow militarily. But India is no longer certain of Russia's continued military or diplomatic support. India has no territorial ambitions in South Asia, but she wants to be recognized as a major power with a voice in regional and global affairs. Her current economic and military programmes appear geared toward achieving this end. The Pokhran tests and the acquisition of nuclear weapons are part of this ambition. Past inhibitions had prevented India from testing nuclear weapons, and objections to the CTBT were mainly designed to keep her nuclear option open. There is however little chance of India emerging as a major nuclear weapon power in the foreseeable future, due to lack of resources, despite the conducting of its nuclear tests in May 1998, and claims to have become a nuclear weapon power.

After examining the security environment around India and her security challenges the experts opines that Pakistan remains a major external threat. Since the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan there has been a dual problem confronting India vis-à-vis Pakistan. There is the problem of Kashmir which will not go away. First, because Pakistan changed its strategy of directly seeking acquisition by military means after 1989. Promoting a proxy war in the state has resulted in a low-intensity war that
continues till date; Pakistan is no finding this conflict to control. Secondly, Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan has serious implications for Indian security in terms of destabilizing regional security and affecting the stability of Pakistan. Both these issues are of concern to India.

The threats to Indian security have extended beyond South-Asian region. While China and Pakistan remain the immediate threats, the surrounding region provides several sources of threats like unrest in Afghanistan spilling over into India and Pakistan. The insurgencies in Myanmar and the ascendancy of Maoist Forces in Nepal have serious security implications for India. Globally, the disintegration of the erstwhile USSR has left India without a counterweight to the US. Additionally, it brought to a dramatic halt the supply of arms from the USSR. This of course has gradually started again, but the problem of ensuring a steady supply of spare parts and ancillaries continues. India faces newer security threats in the form of economic and military pressure from the US on its nuclear and missile programs. The 1992 US pressure on Russia's Glavkosmos Corporation to stop the sale of cryogenic engines to India was an example of this US pressure. The US efforts to stop Prithvi deployment, and Agni missiles test through selective newspaper leaks, apart form the US administration's constant reminders that a missile race would harm the security of the region. Proves the US intervention in India's security affairs.

21 The Washington Post had two inspired leaks – one in December 1995 about a possible Indian Nuclear test at Pokhran and Second in April, 1997 about Prithvi missile being removed to Jallandhar. The Hindu, New Delhi, April 23, 1997
The Pokhran-II tests in May 1998 witnessed India identifying China as ‘enemy number one’. Additionally, India sees the US as an indirect threat in terms of nuclear weapons in Diego Gracia, and its efforts to control the global nonproliferation agenda. While the rationale behind the tests was correct, keeping in mind that India was being hemmed in from all sides, there is still a gap in presenting this as a credible national security doctrine. This requires a compressive review of the existing parameters within which threat perception is made. This means India has to find a new paradigm of security based on deterrence, something that it held back from doing in the past.

Seemingly the current threats, both internal and external, impinging on Indian security can be broadly listed as follows:

- Pursuit of political goals in the region at the cost of economic cooperation.
- A sluggish economy, coupled with unchecked growth of population.
- Lawlessness, due to an inefficient administration; coupled with growing unemployment.
- Incompetent leadership and corruption in high places.
- Activities of separatist groups.
- Inter-caste and inter-religious antagonist within society.
- An archaic and outdated administrative set-up that has remained almost unchanged for a century.
- Rise of Hindu, Muslim and Sikh fundamentalism.
- A hostile Pakistan and its nuclear capability.
- Unsettled borders with China and China's nuclear capabilities.
- Danger of intervention by the US nuclear capable forces in the Indian Ocean.

The external factors that impinge on Indian security are both area and issue related the major factors are the North-South economic divide, the
issue of nuclear proliferation, US military dominance, Russian links and Pakistan and Chinese political and military power. In addition there is concern (and perhaps only concern) about environmental change, population pressure, and global terrorism responses to them are only evaluated when it affects society and polity because the existing non-integrated approach to threat recognition. For instance, information was available for several years before the outbreak of narco-terrorism in Punjab, about the inflow of drugs and weapons but not many gave it serious thought.22

Internally, there is a great focus on economic change but little thought is being given to the resultant social changes, and its likely effects on national security. Communalism and ethnic violence is still being handled as a law and order problem. Further, the large sub-national movements are being viewed as representing separatism political support to this exclusivism that leads to violence and secession is overlooked and often leads to breakdown of administrative systems, as in happening in North-eastern States. The variety of threats and the large number of departments and agencies assessing them has led to information being treated as power and held closely. This is a characteristic of most bureaucracies. But in India's case this tendency has done more harm than good. This is due to the fact that information hoarding leads to centralization and the by-passing of institutions that are established for the purpose of coalition and to act as the channel of communication between the executive and assessment agencies. For instance as an institution that JIC is supposed to collate all the

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22 This point was made by K. Subrahmanyan intervening during a discussion of mechanism for national security decision making at the Delhi policy group on 11 November 1997 in New Delhi. Subrahmanyan was responding to a paper presented by M.K. Narayanan on 'Security Management: Processes and Structures' in New Delhi., The Hindu, New Delhi, November 15,1997.
information that comes from all the intelligence agencies and to provide policy and position papers to the government this is only in theory. In practice, the JIC gets by-passed as it has no statutory powers to compel other organizations to route all information through its offices.\textsuperscript{23}

The geo-political threats that engage India's attention currently are both global and regional. In the former group are global economic pressures in terms of multinational institutional aid. Sanctions in the post-Pokhran-II period were held out as a threat and inducement for India to join the global non-proliferation regime. This is linked with India's efforts to integrate its economy with the world economy. Newer threats such as transnational terrorism, environmental degradation and information warfare, have been identified, but not enough qualification has been undertaken nor responses identified.

Military threats are regional and China and Pakistan remain priority areas. But, that apart, there is a realization that the internal dynamics of these states also affect India, particularly in Pakistan. To elaborate this point, it must be mentioned that internal peace and stability in Pakistan is affected not only by drug and mafia politics but also by events in Afghanistan. This combined instability due to internal and external factors, could affect India particularly Punjab and Kashmir.

While defence expenditures has been declining the world over in the post-Cold-War era, and this is true to India also, the peace dividends have not come to South Asia The proliferation of missiles and nuclear weapons in the region has increased the potential for insecurity. In addition, non-state

actors are playing an increasingly transnational role, which requires greater cooperation between nations, not confrontation with regional security becoming a collective phenomenon the question arises how the region can find, ‘stability’. As historical dispute still persists in the Indo-China and Indo-Pak contexts, therefore, it becomes imperative to review national interests. In the Sino-Indian context there has been some bilateral movement, but the postures adopted by India identifying China as a major threat and providing the raison deter for the Pokhran tests had the adverse impact of cooling relations with China.24

Regional problems generally replicate global patterns, but in some cases they remain localized. Population pressure unemployment and poverty are problems that are basically regional in nature. But the importance according to them is very low at present. The same applies to global issue like those related to the environment. The present Indian paradigm is largely internalized. The existence of some form of security policy is often alluded to but is rarely visible.25 The explanation for this could be that disparate strands of thought obtain in government but lack integration. Lack of coherence is a matter of amenity. That is why visibility is important.

The threats faced by India form a dual internal threats has not been matched with adequate responses. This point is reemphasized because several interpretations and pronouncements made reveal that India lacks a

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clearly defined national security policy. Internal threats in the form of terrorism in Punjab, J&K and insurgency in the states of northeast are of primary concern. External threat arising from China and Pakistan could take the form of military and economic competition. The latter applies mainly to China. Allied to this is the threat from the US in the form of political and economic pressures to curtail India's military preparedness, and specifically to curtail the nuclear and missile programs.26

The emerging scenario suggests that internal security will gain priority over external threats. This is not to suggest that external threats have reduced in scale or intensity. For example, the Sino-Pak nexus in the last two decades has proceeded for beyond military exchanges. Today it comprises missile and nuclear technological cooperation.

To conclude we can say that the future threats that India will fall, will arise in several dimensions and each will require a response that is in line with the state and social formation. An outline of national security is emerging as India enters the 21st century. Some prioritization of items on the agenda should emerge. This is essential since after all, allocation of resources is also a constraint. A security paradigm that is more people oriented, military security that calls for leaner forces with higher technological inputs, and regional and collective security providing the basis for international system of cooperation is imperative. It is this paradigm that India must seek.