


64. Christmas, Humphrey, *op. cit.*, p. 34.


Chapter –VI

THE IMPACT OF BUDDHIST THEORY OF CAUSATION ON THE HINAYANA

136
THE IMPACT OF BUDDHIST THEORY OF CAUSATION
ON THE HINAYANA AND MAHAYANA SCHOOL

Buddhism, in its earlier Hinayana phase and later Mahayana phase, is surviving across South-Asia and East Asian Countries. Hinayana well established in Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam, Burma etc. The later phase Mahayana is flourishing in Japan, Korea, Mangolia etc. The historical division of Buddhism occurred about a century after Buddha’s Mahaparinirvana. Subsequently, Hinayana broke up in eighteen cults. Each cult has its particular views. Of the eighteen cults, eleven held orthodox views with certain differences and the remaining seven headed by the Mahasanghikas held semi-Mahayanic view. They paved the way for the advent of Mahayanism but their conception of Buddha Kaya was vague in form.¹

Four Theoretical formulation of Buddhist thought have mainly sustained through historical vicissitudes. The first two belong to Theravada, or Hinayana Buddhism viz. Vaibhasika and Sautrautika and the last two belong to Mahayana namely, Madhyamika or Sunyavada and Yogacara or Vijnanavada. This four-fould classification of Buddhist philosophy is based upon two chief questions – one is metaphysical
concerning the nature of reality and the other is epistemological
concerning the knowledge of the reality. In response to the question “is
there at all any reality, mental and non-mental”. Three different answers
were put forward. They are as follows:-

(i) Madhyamika hold that there is no reality, mental and non-mental, that
everything is void (sunya), which is the only reality. It is neither
positive in nature nor negative, nor both. It is indefinable and in that
sense has no character.

(ii) Yogacara hold that only the mental is real which an idealist point of
view is. They are the only reality.

(iii) Vaibhasika and Sautrantika are realist. They hold that external objects as They
appear to our senses are independent of the intellect.

These four school representing the four important standpoints are highly
significant and relevant philosophical perspectives, even in the light of
contemporary western thought. Before we define the conception of
causation of these schools, we feel that we should once again give an
outline of Buddhist theory of Dependent origination..

The central focus of the Buddhist theory of causation is to establish
that things of this world have only Dependent origination and hence are
impermanent and productive of suffering. We are well aware that all
philosophical enquiries are addressed to removal of suffering. However,
from the Buddhist point of view it is not possible. Until and unless we do
not understand the real nature of Dharma which includes not only material
elements of the universe but also mental. The term Dharma has been used
in a variety of ways. But in the Buddhist context it is used as these ultimate
entities which possess their own intrinsic nature, so they are quite distinct
from their groups (skandhas). In other words, Dharma are the ultimate
entities, mental and material having specific characteristics of their own,
they are produced out of cause and conditions. These entities are non-
eternal and move towards their own destruction, including even consciousness (cit); are momentary and are destroyed in the every moment of their production. Thus, the formula is fixed, unchangeable and this conditioned nature of things is key to eternal truth. All human beings realize it in this life. It was the solution to the problem of life and world. The application of the theory of Dependent origination has been adopted by Hinayanist to show all things have preceding causes and conditions as such they are without any substance. It is used by Mahayanist to accept that the world, being a relative existent, is unreal like the objects seen in the dream. This school highly appreciated the teachings of Buddha to convey the formula of causation. But they are not interested in the significance of its casual connection or link as their cardinal tenet was dharmasunyata or non-existence of everything. They appreciated the method of analysis of all worldly things as suggested by the satyas.

(a). Vaishesika on Causality

The evolution of the Buddhist thought, in its phase, took place from vaibhasikas to yogacaras. The Vaibhasikas bring in a transcendent and objective tendency of the Buddhist thought, modified by psychological interpretation of intellectuality. The Vaibhasikas like Buddha presented universe as grounded in a complex psycho-moral process. Buddha is deeply conscious of the limitations of the intellectual modes, chose the method of disciplined ‘silence’, or triadic disciplined conduct (sila), meditation (samadhi), and insightful understanding (prajna).

Gautma Buddha was well aware of the two orders of experience, viz. conditioned and unconditioned or transcendent and apparent; he suggested that present universe was an aggregate of psychophysical processes, which cannot be traced to simple conceptual basis as a substance or subject. The core of which is deeply psycho-moral, the basis of the Universe is continuous transience (anitya), non-substantiality, anatma and sorrow and the ground consequent relationship (pratityasamtpada) a process from
ignorance to consciousness and so on. Vaibhasika follow the same principle of Buddha which is basic ignorance, proneness to desire, it is the sphere of the conditioned order of experience. Vaibhasikas contrasted with Buddha, the freedom from ‘ground consequent’ relationship and the latter order of experience is Nirvana. They deviated a little from Buddhist path. There main intention is the clarification of the Buddha attitude of Psycho- moral attitude. It is not only Vaibhasikas modified the Buddhist path. But other schools, all re-introduced the discursive or logical method in Buddhist thought.6

Vaishesika posit a sphere transcendent of particulars which associate with the causal process, account for the conditioned order of experience and when dissociated from the causal process account for the unconditioned experience. This association is due to the psycho-moral propensity, bhavana/tanha, and the dissociation is due to the triadic discipline of Sila, Samadhi and Prajna. In this way we can say that Vaishesika School was deeply conscious of meditative psychological techniques of the Buddha. They have no direct motive to account for the present Universe or transcendental one in any theoretical sense. Their main concern is psycho-moral discipline; their two orders of experience are to demonstrate alternatively the undisciplined and disciplined conditions.7

Beside, these psycho-moral disciplines Vaibasika want to clarify the Buddhist philosophy regarding the theory of causality. They further explain that when we proceed to deal with ultimate elements they can be divided into two categories namely subjective and objective. They state that everything consists of Skandhas (aggregates) which or of the five kinds; Rupa, Vedana, Samjna, Samkara and Vijnana. By Rupa Vasubandha says, “All things possessed of form, whether past, present and future, whether internal and external whether distant or near all constitute rupa”.8 And the second category of the subjective classification of the universe is Ayatana. The term Ayatana has been defined by Vasubandhu in
his *abhidharmakosa* as the passage of production *citta caitaiska dharma.* In other words, he says that no consciousness can be produced independently. There must be sense organs and sense objects to produce it. Consciousness is not an eternal element, but is a non-eternal mental factor produced out of certain pre-existent material elements. These *Ayatana* are of twelve kinds; six sense organs and the six sense objects, such as organ of Sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, mental objects which are called ‘*mana Ayatana*’. These twelve *Ayatanas* have their existence in the universe and there exists nothing which is not included under any of these.

Another subjective classification is called ‘*Dhatu*’ which possesses its own intrinsic nature (*Salaksanam*); it is a conscious factor so all the twelve *ayatanas*, which are the necessary factors of consciousness are also included under *Dhatu*. These *Ayatanas* in the same order of consciousness are, produced out of the functioning of sense-organ and sense-object of vision. Similarly, Consciousness is produced by the sense organs and sense-objects of hearing. Conscious is also produced out of sense-organs and sense objects of smell. Consciousness is also produced out of sense objects of taste. Consciousness is also produced out of sense organs and sense objects of touch. And finally consciousness caused by the inner-sense organ and inner-sense object, is called *manovijnanadhatu*. When we take up the problem from an objective point of view, the entire universe is a product of mutual combination of *Dharma*. This *Dharma* has been divided into two broader heads.

**(a) Samskrta Dharma**

**(b) Asamskrta Dharma**

**(a) Samskrta Dharm:** According to this point of view, those elements which are caused, conditioned, mundane, non-eternal, changing and active mutually combine to form the cosmic world. *Vasubandha* believes that *Samskrta-dharma* included the five *skandhas* viz. *Rupa*, *Vedana*, *Samjna*, *Samskaraskara*, *Vijnana-skandhas*. This *Samskrta-dharm* have been called
in *pitakas*, common path of the world, that is a path that we have gone through in the past, is being followed at the present time, and will go through in future. All the composite objects are produced out of an aggregate of causes and conditions. It is not by a single cause. They are included under five *skandhas*, are capable of being free from bondage of *samsara*, and have been in existence from the past and will continue in future.

(b) *Asamskrta Dharmas*: Those elements, which are uncaused and unconditioned, eternal, unchanging, transcendental and inactive, and which does not combine to produce anything. They are ‘immutable dharma’. *Sthaviravadin* brings out that *Asamskrta-dharma* is called *Nirvana*. It is to be realized through the annihilation of the cause & conditions which lead to birth and deaths. All these are *anasravas* that is free from *malas*, *raga*, *desa* and *moha*, are pure and unmixed. These are self-existent without depending upon any cause and conditions. These are not subject to any change. Hence, these are *margasatya* referring to the truth concerning the path leading to the cessation of suffering.

(b) **Sautrantika on Causality**

After discussing the conception of causation according to *Vaishesika* school, now here we are to discuss the second realistic school known as Sautrantika. They extend the idea of Vaishesika in a different line, advocated that the particulars or the elements are never intuited in any discrete way. Experience is always a relational process. According to Vaishesika, both these realities have their independent existence, they bring in a notion of causal process besides, their postulation of the discrete entities (*dharmas*). Sautrantika assume that Vaishesika are plunged into another theoretical postulation of dissociating oneself from the causal process to examine the ‘unconditional experience’ (*Nirvana*) instead of drawing attention towards the process of postulation of the *dharmas*, in association or dissociation from the causal process. Sautrantika specify the
original position of the Buddha where there is simply an affirmation of a presented order of the ‘conditioned experience’, which can be triadic discipline mention by Buddha. They suggested that the presented order of the conditioned experience is ground-consequent relationship. They never accepted any argument that the Universe although relative, phenomenal or conditional experiences a void. All such theories are neither relativist nor sceptic.14

Sautrantika analyses the process of the most efficient method of direct cognition (pratyaksa) and indirect cognition (anumanu). In the process of verification of truth, the term pratyaksa is the foundation of the Sautrantika philosophy.15 He also believed that external worlds exist but its existence cannot be directly certified by our senses, it is inferred out of the multiple forms in which our consciousness experience the world. They said that reality of the external world is cognized through inference. All the forms are seen on citta and the mind perceives these forms. And as forms cannot come to exist, on the citta without corresponding objects in the external world, what they meant that form enters the citta through sense organ.16

An object which is never seen/verified by sensation, is brushed aside as mere verbal(sabda) or conceptual(Kalpana). Only the senses give the right information about the five objects which are real, consist of the conglomeration of atoms.17

Thus, Sautrantika, denied the conception of static moment (sthiliksana) on the other hand, they were compelled to accept the theory of indirect perception. They asserted that both the object and consciousness are without duration, there cannot be direct perception of the external object.

The discourse on the Abhidharmadipa refer to the argument put forward by Darstantika as follows:
The organ and objects of the five sense – consciousness, being cause of the latter, belong to a past moment, when the object (rupa) and the eye-exist, the visual consciousness is non-existent. When the visual consciousness exists, the eye and the objects are not existing. In the absence of their duration (sthiti) there is no possibility of the cognition of the object.\textsuperscript{18} 

Hence, Sautrantika contends that the subject is capable of receiving an impression of the likeness of the object. What is directly cognized is this impression of the object, not the object itself, which by the time of cognition is outdated. The object is merely inferred on the basis of the sense impression. This is called the representative theory of perception.

According to Sarvastivadins, an object of perception is an aggregate of atoms. They believe that atoms exist individually. There aggregation is not a unity (eka) it is the multiplicity (aneka). The Sautrantika argue that the external object is not directly perceived. They spoke of the atoms that go to form an object. They maintained that the atoms are indivisible units which can mingle together to form an object. While the Sarvastivadins believe in the aggregation (samyoga) of the atoms, the Sautrantika upheld the coalescence sanyoga of atoms.\textsuperscript{19} 

In fact, for the interpretation of the theory of causality, the noticeable difference between early Buddhism and these later schools arose with the acceptance of the theory of moments (Krana), which made it difficult for the scholastics to explain causal continuity. The appearance of the conception of substance (svabhava) in the Abhidharma traditions is most beneficial for sarvastivadin to define the problem of continuity of the phenomena, which they analysed into momentary existence. For supporting this argument, four different theories were forwarded by prominent teachers of Sarvastivada – Dharmatrater, Ghosaka, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva. Firstly, Dharmatrata upheld a theory of change of existence.
He contended that *Dharma* passes through three periods; there is change of existence (*bhava*) not of substance. He showed with the example of gold, which may be seen in various forms and shapes, while gold itself remains unchanged. *Secondly*, Ghosaka accepted a theory of change: the past dharma, possessed of the characteristic of pastness, but disposed of the characteristic of presentness and futurity. *Thirdly*, Vasumitra’s admitted a theory of change of condition; he held that a dharma passing through the three durations of time; past, present and future, is determined by the causal activity (*arthakriya Karitra*). He said that if the causal efficiency is present, it is called the present; if the causal efficiency is no more, it is called the past; if the causal efficiency is not yet manifest it is called future. And *finally*, Buddhadeva recommended a theory of change. A dharma is said to be past in relation to the present, future, while present in relation to the past, future, and future in relation to the past and present. The way a woman who is a mother in relation to her daughter is a daughter in relation to her own mother.\(^{20}\)

According to these theories, there is only one aspect of a dharma that changes and remaining other features remain unchanged. The unchanged is the substance of a thing. It is maintained that ‘existence’ (*astiţva*) or substance of ‘everything’ remains unchanged during the three periods: past, present and future. In these theories we notice that substance remains unchanged was used to explain the connection between cause and effect. For instance, a mango seed gives rise to a mango tree and not to any other tree. The ‘mango-ness’ of the mango tree exists because that ‘mango-ness’ was found in the mango seed. It is clear that ‘mango-ness’ is the substance or ‘own nature’ which connects the seed and the tree. Hence it is the theory that came to be known as the identity theory of causality (*Satkaryavada*) is identical with the Sankhya causation, based on primordial substance (*Prakrti*) considered to be the substratum of everything.
Sautrantika oppose this theory of substance or own nature, calling it a theory of ‘self’ (*atman*) in disguise. By rejecting the theory of substance and accepting a theory of moments, they held that existence is merely a series of moments, one moment following another without pause and gap. A seed is nothing but a series of point instances. They had to clarify the origin of series – how a seed series gives rise to a tree-series. But the question is how the seed-series, being non-existent comes into existence (*bhavati*). In the *Abhidharmakosa-vyakhya* of Vasubandhu refers to a statement in the *Paramartha-sunyata-sutra* which is quoted by Sautrantikas who rejected that a *dharma* can exist during the past and future. The statement is as under:

*When the organ of vision (eye) is produced, it does not come form some other place; when it disappears it is not going to be stored up in another place (consequently) a thing becomes, having not been before; having become, it ceases to be.*

Moreover, *Siksasamuccaya* of Santideva points out that, “a thing becomes having not been before and having become ceases to be, because it has no substance”. According to this interpretation we understand that, *Sautrantika* were impelled to recognize the production or arising of an effect that did not exist prior. Their position was similar to the non-identity theory of causality in *Vaisesika* School of (*asatkaryavada*). Its only valid form of causality put forward by Sautrantika would be contiguity or immediate succession. It also has affinity with the causality stand British philosopher Hume who analyses existence in terms of momentary impressions. It should be remembered that in early Buddhism existence was not commuted in terms of moments, as admitted by Theravada and Sautrantrika schools. In the early Buddhism, it meant as an answer to the metaphysical question that implied the existence of the effect within the cause, it was not problem to establish a connection between cause and
effect because of their theory of moments. Although these schools accepted a theory of the same reason but denied a connection regarding cause and effect because of their theory of moments. A strict adherence to the theory of moments, in Indian context, was more metaphysical than empirical. It led the Sautrantika to take this problem. It is not only in Sautrantika. In the same way, Hume, because of his theory of moments was constrained to refuse any form of causality other than mere antecedence. Both of these problems were taken up by the Advait-Vedanta of Shankara and Buddhist philosopher of Nagarjuna.

Finally, we conclude that Sautrantika adopted a practical doctrine, because they attempted to solve the problem of human concern and avoided indulging in fruitless metaphysical problems. They operated upon given facts or events, proceeded to investigate the causes and conditions which give rise to them. It is a philosophy of very dynamic thought process. They maintained that these objects are cognized through senses and consciousness and proclaimed that neither eye sees, nor mind knows, but there is a relation of cause (hetu) and condition (pratyaya) in between them. Their philosophical thought resembles to Buddha found in Rupa-Kalpana or Svalakasana as a material forces which stimulate the senses. In this way, they accepted the principle of universal flux of object of senses make it entitled to be called critical realism. They only accepted five senses (Rupa, Sabda, gandha, rasa, sparsa) as real and other (substance, universal, past future, space) are mental and verbal constitution. He is also called a Darsitikas that means the expounder of empirical examples for the verification of truth. It was reaction against authoritarianism, mysticism, agnosticism, scepticism and non-causalism, which was repudiated by way of empiricism and logic (pratayksa-anumana), its philosophy, on the contrary shakes the very foundation of idealism by turning the wheel of knowledge from mere mentality to objectivity.

(c). Madhyamika on Causality
Madhyamika school shows the true nature of the Buddhist philosophy and traces all the phenomenal experiences both subjective and objective. It was the first system in Indian philosophy to draw the distinction between the two standpoints; phenomenal (samvrti) and the ultimate (Paramartha). They lay great stress on the role of the intellect in the fabrication of universe. The concept although elevated to the status of ultimate Reality by the exponents of the vijnanavada, the latter does not go so far as to award ultimate reality to consciousness.

The Madhyamika philosophical system arose in the second century A.D. It was expounded by redoubtable Nagarjuna, as it evolved out of the teaching of Buddha. According to Mahayana, Madhyamika system is regarded as incompatible development within the Buddhist philosophy. They think that they can represent the legitimate interpretation of the original teaching of the Buddhism. The law of interdependence of origination is universally acknowledged by all the Buddhist school to be the essence of the teaching of the Buddha. But the Nagarjuna the exponent of Madhyamika did not accept the causal interpretation of the universe (Pratityasamutpada) as held by Vaibhasika of the Hinayanist Buddhism which is associated with a psycho-moral notion of causality. Nagarjuna views on causality have been considered in the background of the Vaibhasikas and Sautrantikas, who preceded Nagarjuna’s thought. They understood that the interdependent origination to mean the temporal succession of the momentary and discrete existence which was itself in unreal. To follow the tradition of the Theravadins, who flourished after the Buddha Parinirvana, is to follow the order of their experiences modified by their psycho-moral mode of reflection. Vaibhasika suggested that the particular discrete elements do not exist or do not exhibit substantial character. This is to suggest that these are two orders of the experience; apparent and transcendent. The apparent order exhibits the manifesting character of the elements in association with the causal process, the root of which can be discerned in the basic ignorance. This ignorance is a psycho-
moral propensity expressed differently as ideation bhavana, desire, will cetana, force, samskara etc. According to Sautrantika if the presented universe is wholly relational, phenomenal and durational then how can we justify the particular discrete entities? They state that in the interlinked universe only the temporal expressions of the particular can be discerned. They developed a phenomenal or skeptical attitude with regard to the particular dharma.24

Nagarjuna plunged himself in the current of the Sautrantika thought of the relational universe, against the discrete entities in association with a causal process. He says that relative existence is not a mere ‘temporal existence’, it has to be constructed from a permanent basis. He also considers the problems of discrete entities and the origination for how can anything be discrete or how can anything emerge when everything is interlinked? He meant that originality/emergence rest on the notion of causality, it is interlinked with the notion of existence and of the energetic relations. In the relational situation, for example, such phenomena as cause, energy, temporal sequence etc. cannot be treated apart from another.25 He suggest that in an interlinked universe there can be no discrete entities (dharma-Nairatmya) or discrete intellectual forms. The interlinked universe is –“undifferentiated existence and experience”26 (dharma kaya)in which there is nothing disappearing nor anything appearing, nothing has an end nor is there anything eternal, nothing is identical with itself, nor is there anything differentiated, nothing moves neither hither nor thither.”27

Hence, when we compare to Nagarjuna’s critical standpoint about the Ultimate Level, with Bradley’s philosophy of the twentieth century, who tries to detach himself from the intellectual modes, we find Nagarjuna’s view of ‘Undifferentiated Whole’ is not Bradley’s ‘Absolute’, because it is neither supra-relational nor non-relational. His undifferentiated basis is one with relational order of experience. The apparentness or relativity aspect
without a basis is a ‘vacuity’, a ‘sunya’ because the transcendental basis is full or complete meditative experience, its apparent or relational aspect only an undisciplined experience, the conception of relativity is not for the denial of relativity, it is an admission of a normal untrained and undisciplined psychological condition. They will not like to halt at an intermediate psychological consciousness, even when it is taken as a transcendent process beyond the causal process of an apparent situation.  

However, Nagarjuna precisely indicates the point of view of the Madhyamika in the following stanza found in the Mulamadhyamika-karika “declare that whatever is independently originated is emptiness sunyata. It is conceptual designation of the relativity of existence and indeed the middle path”.  

He says that dependent origination is identical with ‘sunyata’ and its conventional term is called the middle-path. It is kept in mind that which depend upon another, viz. cause and conditions for coming into existence, is really non-existence or unborn. Such a thing cannot have any real origination. This non-existence in nothing but sunya. we must realize that Sunyata as really non-origination/dependent origination is same as the middle path. The only reality accepted by this school is called void or sunyta.  

The term ‘Sunyata’ may be explained as that which has no cause and condition and is beyond thought and concept, that which is not born, that which is without measure; while the absolute is free from all the modes of limitation and cannot be thought by our consciousness. Thus, because of avidya inherent in human mind, it manifest itself in the phenomenal world, it is avidya that makes attributes which do not exist. The knowledge of truth is called Mahavidya and its opposite is avidya. It is because of sunyata that everything is possible in the phenomenal world and without it nothing is possible. Aryadeva says, “it is due to sunyata that activity, in the regular order of all the mundane and supermundane of thing.
All the phenomenal dealing will remain unexplained if not everything is anything but Sunya. In the Prajnaparmita text, the concept of Sunyāta is translated as ‘emptiness’ or void. The word has two basics meanings. Firstly, it is relativity of the all things and secondly, whatever is leftover has its own existence. Some of them say that this definition have does not any sense. That which is left is unconditioned and the unconditioned is beyond all the categories of discursive reason. But in the prajnaparmita literature is mentioned that nothing at all can be asserted of the conditioned in that all conditioned things are phenomenal and relative, and substantially unreal. It meant that even dharma has no unconditioned or genuine existence. According to this radical statement, leave no place for any fundamental differentiation between the world of phenomenality and the realm of the absolute truth. Both of these terms are conceptual fabrications of the mind. There is no separation, no distinction, no obstacle between noumenon and phenomenon. There is only the illusion produced by the mind, which creates the false bifurcation.

However, when we understand the phenomenal side of existence, Sunyāta is veiled by illusion (maya) and it is responsible for the differentiation of all things. Although we are not supposed to be able to say anything about it, many terms of a descriptive nature are used as signs to point beyond themselves, that which is left is inexhaustible and boundless; it can never be destroyed. It cannot become extinct. The path of its discovery is the denial of all things but the unconditioned itself can never be denied. Thus, the perfection of wisdom is the total understanding of Sunyāta. “The absolute”, writes Murti, “is only real it is the reality of Samsara, which is sustained by the false construction (Kalpana) the absolute look at through the thought forms of constructive imagination in the empirical world.” In the mula-Madhyamaka, the chief work of Nagarjuna, he said that, the two truth viz. ‘relative’ and ‘absolute’ are nothing but emptiness, which is the real teaching of the Buddha. Whereas on the everyday plane of existence his teaching is true in any ordinary
sense – It is qualified by the relative circumstance of illusionary existence. However, Nagarjuna through the evolving history of Buddhism, sought a path between antinomies of reason, every view is shown to be self-contradictory and the revelation of the Truth is left to the operation of the intuitive insight.\textsuperscript{34}

In fact, Nagarjuna’s main contention is that it was not the intention of the Buddha to set out the ultimate phenomena or elements, which in some metaphysical sense did exist, or to define their immutable nature by implication. He was opposed to the tendency of the abhidharma discussion to hypostatize certain philosophical concepts to superimpose metaphysical construction on the real universe that did not correspond to them. According to him the \textit{Mulamadhyamaka-karika} presented the exact interpretation of the Buddha teaching where he denied all speculative opinions (\textit{drst\textbar{i}}) and propounded no such opinion himself, only an empirical account of the conditioned origination and the way to happiness. Nagarjuna through rigorous analysis concludes that there is no basis for any of the speculative opinions because all the existing phenomena’ (\textit{Bhava}) are empty. They are empty in the sense that there is nothing permanent in them such as soul, about which it could be argued whether it was eternal or not, infinite or not, and so on. There are no phenomena at the ultimate level of truth. He refuted the doctrine of the ‘\textit{own nature}’ of the phenomena as contrary to the \textit{Tripitaka}. If ‘own nature’ he says, were related to cause and conditioned it would be artificial, and if there is no ‘own nature’ then there can be no ‘other nature’. How can there be any existing phenomena. If existing \textit{Bhava} can be denied than ‘non-existing’ \textit{abhava} also cannot be affirmed. Those who see ‘own nature’ and ‘other nature’, existing and non-existing do not see the doctrine of Buddha.

According to this methodological principle of Nagarjuna, ‘phenomena exist’ and phenomena do not exist. Phenomena have their own nature and have their other independent attributes. It certainly does not
follow that he denied both these ideas. He rejected each extreme view, each speculative opinion both eternally and non-eternally, infinitely and finitely. He continued to suggest that if not everything were empty then there would be neither origination nor cessation, from which it would necessarily follow that according to him Phenomena dependent on conditional origination. It is understood only of empty phenomena, not of ‘existing phenomena’ (bhavan”).

Here we have quoted as argument about the Pratityasamutpada of Candrakirti a commentator of Nagarjuna, who is known as “madhyamika Karika”. He described the doctrine of dependent origination as said by Nagarjuna – began with the two interpretations of the word Pratityasamutpada. The first one is that Pratityasamutpada means the origination of non-existent (abhava) depending on (pratitya) reason and cause (hetupratyaya) and other interpretation. The origination of every destructible individual is causally originated. He opposed both these views. The second meaning does not suit according to Pali scripture. For it does not mean the origination of each and every destructible individual, but the origination of specific individuals depending upon certain specific conditions, if we interpret the maxim of Pratityasamutpada as this happening that happens that would not explain any specific origination. All the origination is false, for a thing can originate neither by itself nor by others, nor by the cooperation of both nor without any reason. To suppose that it is originated by other would also mean that origination was of things already existing. In the light of this point of view, we could have darkness. Since a thing could not originate from itself or by others, it could not also be originated by a combination of both of them together.

It is, therefore, to be acknowledged that whenever the Buddha spoke of this so-called dependent origination it was offered as an illusionary manifestation appears to intellects and senses stricken with ignorance. According to Pratityasamutpada ‘this being that is’ what is really meant, is
that things can only be indicated as mere appearance one after another for they have no essence or true nature. The real meaning of the Pratityasamutpada is that there is no truth, no essence in all phenomena that appear. They are neither produced nor destroyed. They are merely the appearance of illusion (maya). The void or Sunya does not mean pure negation, for that is relative to some kind of principle. It simply means that none of the appearances have any intrinsic nature of their own (Nihsvabhavatvam).\(^{36}\)

In the above evolution of the sunyata/dependent origination then we draw attention towards Madhyamika school of Sunyavada. It’s dialectical approach shows that every category or doctrine leads to contradiction. It urges that earlier Buddhism was critical by halves, it was right in denying the reality of substance (Pudgalanairatma) but it was dogmatic when it converted Nairatmya into a doctrine of the reality of discrete momentary entities Breaking up the real into a series of rigid self-sufficient entities does not make for the production of one thing from another; there is no dependent movement or change, the effluent becomes a fortuitous emergence. As Nagarjuna says, “if you take entities to exist by themselves (Svabhavat), you take them as unconditioned, uncaused”.\(^{37}\) If things are dependent on each other, as the doctrine of Pratityasamutpada should mean they are relative to each other in nature.

Therefore, Buddha has taught the doctrine of momentariness not as ultimate proposition, but as a step leading to relativity (sunyata). We know that Pratityasamutpada as the central doctrine of Buddhism means according to the Madhyamika, the dependence of things on each other, their having no nature or reality of their own (nissvabhavatva/sunya) Hence the Madhyamika dialectic was born immediately of the criticism of two radical points of view – substance view and modal view. When we critically analyse the position occupied by the Madhyamika philosophy, it is similar to that of Advaitism of Shanker, and Kant in modern European philosophy.
According to Shanker, Madhyamika is revolutionary interpretation of Buddhism. It deepened Buddhism by analyzing fully its implications. It attempted to synthesise the teaching of the Buddhist scriptures by the adoption of the transcendental (Paramartha) and the phenomenal (Samvrti) standpoints and texts are divided into nayattha and nitastha corresponding to Shankara’s distinction of para and apara srutis.

In Western Philosophy, Kant tried to synthesise the diametrically opposed views about knowledge advanced by continental rationalist and British empiricists. A similar conflict in Indian philosophy emerged by the clash of atma and anatma views. The dialectic is the consciousness of this conflict in reason. Kant reconciled the two trends, Rationalism and Empiricism. Both are species of dogmatism and the critique of their solution as revealing this dogmatism. Likewise, the Madhyamika characterizes both the atma and anatma views as dogmatic (drsti). They critically analysed this situation. Each drsti reveals its inner contradiction according to Madhyamika. Prajna (intutional insight) is the abandonment of all drsti. Hence, both Kant and Madhyamika can justly be credit with having initiated the critical phase in philosophy in their respective spheres. They radically critiqued the entire philosophical enterprises itself. They arrive at the devastating conclusion that speculative metaphysics is untenable.38

The Mula-Madhyamakarika is one of the important works of the Nagarjuna. In the initial statement he opposes each of the four metaphysical theories of causality propounded by Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools during the period of Nagarjuna. These theories are as: (i) Self-causation or Self-production, (ii) External causation or production by the external factor, (iii) both self-causation and external causation, (iv) Non-causation.39

When Nagarjuna analyses the nature of causal relation, he says, “the own nature of the existents (bhava) is not found in the causes
There are certain references to point out that Sarvastivadin school of Buddhism as well non-Buddhist school of Sankhya hold the theory of ‘self-becoming’, things are produced out of themselves. This school is generally known as ‘identity theory’ (Satkaryavadas). According to Sankhya Prakrti is the ‘primordial matter’ out of which world evolved. The cause and effect are identical in essence, because they are made of prakrti. This prakrti is sometimes called Svabhava ‘own nature’. It seems that Sankhya conception of evolution, to be systematic exposition of the idea presented by Uddalaka during the Upanishad period, the difference as pointed out by Sankara that Being (sat) of Udataka is salient while the prakrti of the Sankhya is insentient, the Udalaka looked upon cause as a more ‘sentient being’. While for Sankhya school cause is considered insentient, yet in both the cases the basis is the same to illustrate the dialectical procedure of the first of the four theories mentioned by Nagarjuna. It was the theory founded in Atma Traditions, the Sarvastivadin themselves fall in this category as a result of the conception of ‘substance’ (svabhava). They advocate that cause and effect are related by the way of ‘own nature’ (svabhava) implies that this ‘own nature’ is the substance (dravya) that survives through past, present and future and is therefore permanent and eternal. They believe that Substance (dravya) exist (asti) during past, present and future.

Therefore, we can say that Sarvatvadin and Sankhya theory of causation falls into the category of ‘self-causation’ that come to be known as identity theory of (Satkaryavada). To take the other alternative if the Sarvastivada theory of causation is a parallel form of the identity theory of Sankhya school which of the Buddhist school accepted a theory similar to the non-identity theory (asatkaryavada) of the Vaisesika School. When we saw the conception of Dharma presented by the Sautrantika, it is based on the theory of moment. They recognized only two moments nascent (utpada) and cessant (vyaya) and rejected the static moment (Sthiti-krama). Each moment was considered to be different from the other. No underlying
substratum like the (Svabhava) was postulated. They maintained that there was only a series of moments that succeeded one another, the causation of the each individual moment being reducible to invariable antecedence.\footnote{41}

The fourth alternative that things are produced neither from themselves nor form the others etc. hat is they emerge at random can be disposed of easily, it falls to the ground through sheer inanity. If a reason is assigned, there is a manifest self-contradiction between what we assert and how we assert it for we have a conclusion to be cogently and causally, derived.

After enumerating the four different theories of causation, which were formulated by Abhidharma and later yoga-cara school and also Sankhya school, Nagarjuna said that substance (svabhava) of the existence (bhava) is not to be found in the different causal factors or correlations (pratyaya). He has very successfully made use of the dialectics to prove the inherent contradiction in both the theory of Satkaryavada of the Sankhya school and non-identity theory of the Vaibhasika school of Sarvastivadins. For in the case of Satkaryavada ‘substance’ Svabhava was a metaphysical principle, Just a ‘self’ or soul (atman) of the Upanisads. Candrakirtti elaborating on Nagarjuna’s point of view that if ‘substance’ or ‘own nature’ of the effect were to be found in the cause, the production would be rendered meaningless. For there would be mere self-duplication not the emergence of the prominent factor which is not already existent. Having criticized the Satkaryavada, Nagarjuna goes on to refute the non-identity theory of (asatkaryavada) He pointed out that substance own nature cannot be ‘other nature’ (parabhava) this meant that non-identity theory of causality would be meaningless unless one accepts the theory of substance. For Nagarjuna, the rejection of the identity theory of Sarvastivadin and Sankhya does not lead to the acceptance of the non-identity theory of the Sautrantika or Vaibhasika. According to him both these theories are metaphysical assumption. Professor Murti summarises the teaching of Buddha and
Nagarjuna. He says that both Nagarjuna and Buddha attempted a supra-sensuous ultimate reality, an absolute (Parmartha) which is inexpressible in terms of concepts or the causal theories such as self-causation (Sayam-katam = Svata utpatti) and external causation (Paramkatam=Parata utpatti) fail with regard to the empirical facts and especially with regards to the suprasensuous. Our analysis of the early Buddhist thought in (chapter 4th) Buddha did not accept an extraempirical or suprasensuous reality which is inexpressible. He rejected pre-buddhist causal theories such as self-causation and external causation, not because they failed with regard to suprasensuous, but because they were based on certain metaphysical assumptions which emphasized certain aspects of experience to the neglect of others. It would be unfair to attribute of Buddha (Prasanga) method having rejected the metaphysical theories, he did not remain silent. According to him ultimate reality is indescribable. He presented his own thesis in the (Pratityasamutpada) Dependent origination or in a simple word theory of causation, it is empirical theory about the world including common person and as well as enlightened ones.42

Moreover, in early Buddhism, we noted that they do not contribute to a theory of absolutism. They do not require a transcendental reality. They appealed to experience in order to eliminate metaphysics, while in Madhyamika thought they applied the dialectic method to solve the conflict between ultimate and phenomenal realities. Nagarjuna himself anticipated the objections subsequently raised by the opponents:

(i) If everything is empty there is no origination and destruction that would be to accept the nonexistence of the four noble truths.

(ii) In the absence of the four Noble truths there would understand (suffering) nor elimination (of the cause of suffering) nor cultivation (of the Part leading to the
cession of suffering) nor realization (of the cessation of the suffering).

If these are non-existent than also the four “Noble ‘fruit’ does not exist”.

In answer to the objection, Nagarjuna refers to the two levels of the truth, and state that ultimate reality (Paramartha) cannot be communicated without resorting to the conventional (Samvrti) and without the understanding of ultimate reality cannot realize the state of Nirvana. He gives an intelligent explanation of the problem raised by the opponent, the corruption of causality according to Nagarjuna is pure relativity and this relativity is synonymous with emptiness or sunyta. He said:

There is no dharma, whatever which is not casually conditioned i.e. not relative, no dharma whatever exist which is not empty.

If all existence is not empty,(i.e.if it is not causally conditioned), there is neither origination nor destruction you must therefore wrongly conclude that four noble truths exist.

According to this argument it is very clear that every dharma is relative and it is also empty. There is no dharma that is not relative. If one accepts the (asunya) non emptiness as a result one has to reject origination and destruction.

Nagarjuna, unlike Buddha, gave up appeal to experience. He was quite aware that Pratityasamtpada was the central tenet of Buddhism and the Buddha enlightenment consisted in the discovery of the causal principle. But he retained one aspect of the theory of causation i.e. the idea of relativity. After that, Nagarjuna raised the principle of causation from empirical level to absolute.

Finally, when we conclude the dilute approach to Nagarjuna, we indicated that constituted the thesis, antithesis that enabled Nagarjuna to
formulate his dialectic. The metaphysical theories of causation presented by the Sankhya and Sarvastivadin constituted this i.e. the assertion of substance and the causal theory of Vaisesika and Sautrantika provided the anti thesis i.e. the negation of substance may appear to be similar to the early Buddhist theory. When Nagarjuna writes that philosophical atmosphere was so polluted by the speculative metaphysics that either he had to accept causality along with beliefs in substance or rejection of substance in early Buddhist thought. This dilemma encountered by Nagarjuna made him to resort to transcendental standpoint to reject all metaphysics. We saw earlier from the Transcendental point everything in the phenomenal/conditioned (Samskrta) world was considered unreal in that everything is relative, so are the permanence (nitya) and impermanence anitya, defilement (Samklesa) and purity (Vyavadana).

In the Nagarjuna point of view, this aspect of causation is used to deny the reality of the phenomenal. The conception of relativity implies only a denial of self-existence (Svabhava). He took each concept and showed how it is relative. In the philosophical atmosphere in which he lived he could not maintained that something arose as a result of causes, because the question would have been raised whether the cause which arose indered or not. Therefore, he was compelled to give up the idea that causation explains ‘arising’ (utpada) and ‘passing away’ (Nirodha); instead of these, he maintained that causation explains only relativity. In early Buddhist thought the conception of causation was employed to explain all the worldly experience including Nirvana. In the Madhyamika thought the conception of causation explains the relativity of the phenomenal world.

(d). Yogacara on Causality

Yogacara school is also known as Vijnanavada. It denies the objective character of the external world and posits an infinite number of idea (Vijnanans) each are momentary and self-contained. It has been used
in the idea of an inner perception of the highest truth, through the practice of *Yoga*. Buddha himself laid emphasis on the discipline of the body and mind, the only means of achieving the highest aim. It is the discipline of mind in order to realize the absolute truth. According to Yagacaras, *Alayavijnana* is the only reality. We have to realize that all the objects of the universe are nothing but the forms and manifestations of Vijnana.\(^{45}\) In the *lankavatara-sutra* it is mentioned that “all things are nothing but mind” (*citta*).\(^{46}\)

However, Vijnanavada accepted the basic idea of Madhyamika but there was a reaction against what appeared to some as its extremism and the unqualified negation of the phenomena. The idealism of Yogacara School has to be a significant modification of the Madhyamika Sunyata on a constructive basis. They contend that the reality of consciousness (*vijnana*) must be accepted as it cannot be denied at all, while the duality of subject and object with which it is apparently infected must be considered non-existent. The *Sunyata* applies to this unreal aspect. They maintained two contentions: *vijnana* is real, not apparent; *vijnana* alone is real, not the object. The first is against the Madhyamika, for both the knowing consciousness and the object known are relative to each other, and therefore nothing in themselves, i.e. unreal. The second is against realists, who uncritically accept the object as real on a par with *vijnana*. Both these views are extreme positions, and the Vijnanavada steers a middle course between them. Buddhism had been oriented to subjectivism. They denied the objective reality of many of entities which are commonly taken as real, the whole, the permanent and the universal, and had them reduced to mere ideas (*Kalpana*). The realism reaches its fruition in the Vijnanavada; not only certain forms of objects are, but objectivity itself is the works of creative thought. Vijnanavada as a *nihsvabhavata-vada* rejected the duality of subject and object with which consciousness is apparently infected. The Madhyamika too is a *nihsvabhavada*, for things are mutually dependent in their nature and nothing in themselves. The
phenomena are unreal (sunya). The difference between two is--Madhyamika considers the logical constitution of the thing and finds it lacking in essence. The vijnanavada view is psychological in that the object cannot stand by itself, it is nothing without the consciousness on which it is super-imposed (Parikalpita). It is vijnana that can undergo modification, and purify itself by getting rid of the superimposed duality.47

Although idealism as such was not unknown, it developed gradually from the second century A.D. with the writings of Asanga and Vasubandhu. The Sandhi-Nirmocana-Sutra and lankavatara-sutra represent the earlier unsystematic phase of Yogacara thought. While, the more systematic form is found in the Vasubandhus – Vijnaptimatra Siddhi, which consist of two parts. And the Asanga works are treatises by such as Abhidharmasamuccaya, Mahayanasangraha, Maitreyanatha’s, Mahayansutralankara and Madhyantavibhaga.48 Asanga was the sytematiser of the idealist doctrine. In the Mahayanas utralankara, who, appears as a strong partisan of Mahayana, covering the whole field of Buddhism. He has given the theory in a new way. He said that ultimate reality is neither existing nor non-existing, all the object are mere ideas, thoughts. All are phenomena yet are not phenomena. It is thusness (tatha) neither existing (bhava) nor non-existing, therefore undetermined. Reality on the one hand is appearance. It exits on the other hand as real. Therefore existence and non-existence is affirmed with reference to an illusion. The Madhyantavibhaga, the most essential work of Asanga, where he discriminates the means from the extremes. They have given their own conception of what is meant by avoiding the extremes, ‘it is’ and ‘it is not’.

All Buddhists agreed that they were to be avoided but they disagreed as to precisely which the extremes were. For the Madhyamika doctrine on the one hand and that of the early school of (especially the Sarvastivadin) on the other are actually themselves the two extreme opinions which the Buddha intended to avoid. Vasubandhu points out that this contradicts the
opinion that all phenomenon have no own nature in the sense of being completely non-existent; here the imaginer is understood to exist with its own nature it also contradicts the opposite opinion that various phenomena exist, by referring to them as unreal. Asanga continues to suggest that no duality occurs in it, but emptiness does occur (exist), while the imaginer occurs (exists) in emptiness. The imaginer is consciousness (vijnana). Emptiness is synonymous with thusness. The point of existence, ultimate reality, the element of phenomena, the emptiness can be defiled not in reality but by the imaginer. If it were not defiled all being would have been freed. The Dharmadharmaṭavibhanga continues the philosophical discussion as an account of the discrimination of phenomena (dharma) and the nature (dharmata). Every phenomenon is dependent on the one hand and mere dependent phenomena on the other, is ‘nature’, which is thusness. There are two characteristics of the phenomena of sandhinirmocana.

Hence, the Yogacara School appropriated the phenomenology of the early realistic Buddhism and yet radically modified it to incorporate it within the fold of idealism. In the appearance of objectivity is an illusion. There is no objective dharma. There is no substance apart from the consciousness of it nor can the external modes be deemed as real. But when consciousness gets phenomenalised by being infected with the idea of objectivity it acquires various forms and modes. They do not form an integral part of consciousness, but nor can they be granted an independent status. They are involved only in its phenomenalised state. They belong only to the empirical realm. Therefore, object itself is nothing but a mode of existence of consciousness. The whole of the objective world is reduced to consciousness, the objective distinction between sense data, between visual and sound must be incorporated as the distinction between moments of consciousness. Consciousness itself appears in these forms and therefore respective moments are distinguished only by them. Each moment of consciousness is thus a complex constituted by so many dharmas which
nevertheless are not distinct and independent realities, all these are fused into the central unity of consciousness.\(^{50}\)

In fact, Vasubandhu, is the chief exponent of *yogacara idealism*. At the initial stage, he was also a commentator of the Sautrantika. His older brother Asanga later on, converted him to new faith. The philosophical justification of the *yogacara* idealism is found in *Sandhi-nirmocana-sutra* and the *Lankavatara-sutra* as well as in the works of Asanga and Maitreyanatha. The Vimasatika of the *vijnaptimatratasidhi* is devoted to a refutation of the Realist position and philosophical enquiry of the idealist standpoint. He begins his work by stating the basic premise of the idealists that everything is “ideation only”.

He enumerates *four* kinds of objection a realist would raise against his theory.

(i) If the external object does not exist in reality but is a mental projection only, it is not possible to account for spatial determination.

(ii) If the object is mind-made, then such temporal determination will be without satisfactory explanation.

(iii) The indetermination of the perceiving stream of consciousness could not be explained, if one were to deny the real existence of the external object. If the object is a mental projection, it can be determined in term of (be seen) that stream of consciousness (that individual).

(iv) If the object is only a mental representation, the fruitful activity caused by object cannot be explained.\(^{51}\)

In the above *four* arguments, it seems that Vasubandhu does not resort to an analysis of the epistemological problem associated with realist position. He refuted the realist thesis by using dialectical or metaphysical
assumption which for him appeared to be more compatible with basic teaching of Buddhism. He proceeds to explain why Buddha spoke of the twelve ‘ayatan gateway’ representing the subjective and objective aspect of experience. He points out that actual fact of consciousness is manifested as an external object. It arises out of its own seed and then manifests itself as an external object. He also tries to justify one of the most important claims of the Mahayanists Reality was analysed by Buddha into twelve gateway of cognition in order to our belief in an external and unchanging self (atman), which is theory of non-substantiality of pudgala-nairatma which was upheld by the Hinayanists; denying the reality of external object. Mahayana claimed that they supersede the Hinayanists because they advocate non-substantiality of dharmas. This is real justification of Vasubandhu to clarify the idealist philosophy of Yogacara Buddhism.

In the Yogacara causal correlation, he has attempted seven characteristics of primary cause one of which has subdivided into twenty form, six were related to the six hiatus (cause) enumerated by the Sarvastivadins. The other, Prabheda, has twenty subdivisions of which first ten are mentioned in Madhyantavibhaga bharya of Vasubandhu and last ten are in Bodhisattvabhumi. But Hetu-paccaya as the ‘primary cause’ is the first of the twenty-four forms of causal correlation specifying in Patthana similar importance in yogacara and sarvastivadin. But when we see the early Buddhist philosophical thoughts, we find that psychological motive such as greed, hate, aversion, confusion, etc. are the root of evil behaviour of man. The Pathana cities these psychological motives as an example of primary cause. The motives are compared to the root of tree which feed and nourish the other parts of the tree just as greed, hate/aversion are the primary cause to proceed to evil behaviour.

According to Yogacara School, there is store-consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) which serves as a receptacle of the ‘seeds’. But how the cyclic evolution takes place is clearly stated in Trimsika of Vaubandhu
commentary. In the *Trimsika*, Vasubandhu gives a systematic exposition of the idealist philosophy, along with Madhyamika thought, because it was most popular in for Eastern Countries where Buddhism found its’ hospitable atmosphere. According to *Trimsika*, false belief in ‘self’ (*atman*) and ‘real element’ (*dharma*), is due to the evolution of consciousness (*vijnan-parinama*). This evolving consciousness undergoes a three fold modification as: (i) the resultant (*vipaka*), (ii) egocentric mental operation (*manana*), (iii) ideation or consciousness of external objects (*visaya-vijnapti*).\(^{52}\)

The first of there is represented by *Alaya-vijnana*, ‘store consciousnesses. It is called ‘resultant’ (*vipaka*) which serves as a receptacle of seed (*bij*) such as dispositions (*vasana*) of good and bad actions. Thus the *alaya* is the receptacle of all the dispositions (*vasana*) which as seeds, ripen and produce their fruits. It is the basis of all the conscious and unconscious processes, it is the primary cause of the active consciousness, it develops contact (*sparsa*) mental activity (*manaskara*), feeling (*vedana*), sensation (*samjna*) and volitional activity (*cetana*).

The second form is the evolution of *manas*. It is the seventh form of consciousness according to the yogacara list; it is different from *mano-vijnana*, mind consciousness which is one of the six types of sense consciousness having their respective objective support (*alambana*). According to the *Trimsika*, depending upon the store-consciousness and having it as the support, the consciousness called *manas*, which is nature of the cogitation, function, association with four types of defilements: perception of the self (*atma-drsti*), confusion with regard to the self (*atma-moha*), self-pride (*atma-mana*), and self-love (*atma-sneha*). This is the second characteristic, in which *manas* comes to be associated with the false belief in a self.

The third characteristic of the evolution of the consciousness of the six fold object is form (*rupa*), sound (*sabda*), odor (*gandha*), taste (*rasa*),
tangible object (spvastarya), and the concept (dharma). These forms are recognized by the external objects, but it is not produced by the activity of external objects. They are mental projection. Thus the perceptions of self (atma) and the material basis of external objects (dharma, i.e. material elements, Abhidharma) is due to false imagination. These have no reality whatsoever.

However, consciousness, though fundamentally one, has various stages in the process of evolution. In early Buddhism consciousness is accepted as pure and contentless, and it was counted as one single dharma. The differences were imported in it by extraneous factors, five external and one internal. The last Alaya, vijnana added by the yogacara and completely changed the significance of the dharma-phenomenology and indeed the ultimate metaphysical pattern itself.

For the manifestation of the mental phenomena, Buddhaghose admits that there is nothing in this world that will not become an object of consciousness; the five sense forms of sense consciousness that are produced by external stimuli serve as objective support for the five forms of sensory perception, all forms of mental coefficients. However, for Yogacara School that did not accept the reality of the external objects, the consciousness contains within itself the ingredients of the subject-object relation and represents one stage in the evolution of consciousness. Adipati-paccaya is the influential cause, it represents the efficient cause because it exerts influence over effect. In the Pali Abhidhamma distinguishes two forms of influential cause: objective and subjective. The first accounts for the impressions created by external objects. These impressions do determine to a great extent the nature of our cognitions. Not only the impressions but also the nature of sense organs, themselves effect the character of the cognition. It is not meant that all relations are genetic or intrinsic. In many cases, it is possible to discern interdependence rather than genetic interaction. These reciprocal or co-relative causes were
formulated to account for such convention. Yogacara consider this relation a characteristic of primary cause, they call it ‘co-existence’. Co-existence is explained as the function of a phenomenon that exists with another phenomenon and serves it by the way of objective support, such as mind and mental concomitants. According to Asanga the two forms of consciousness, Alaya-vijnana and pravrttii-vijnana are reciprocal causes. The interdependent does not mean genetic interrelation but rather, mutual interdependence among existents, a static set of reciprocal dependencies’. These dependence causes are defined as the basis for the existence of some other phenomena. But the relation is slightly different from the two preceding paccayas. For example, the earth is dependence cause of the growth of a tree. The earth does not arise with the tree, as in the case of the conascent cause, nor does the earth depend on the tree for its existence, as in the ‘co-existent or reciprocal cause. In the psychological sense, the six gateways (ayantana) of the sense perception serve as dependence causes for the six forms of cognitions (vijnana). Hence, according to this definition it is seen that a separate corresponding cause does not appear in the Sarvastivadin classification, it is included in the yogacaras tradition functioning as a supporting cause.53

However, the discrimination (vikalpa) of consciousness into subjective and objective aspects is caused by factors inherent in the store consciousness (Alaya-vijnana), the consciousness that itself appears as the subject and object, and is the sole reality. The discrimination of the subject and object carries more reality than the consciousness of self. While the self and the object have no real existent, the consciousness, which appears as subjective and objective aspects, has relative existence (Paratantra). These differences appear to be unreal as perfect knowledge is attained and the consciousness appears in its true value without any discrimination whatsoever. Thus, according to Yogacarins, the ultimate reality is (Parinispanna). Unlike the Madhyamika who recognized the two levels of reality, only the conventional Samvrti, and ultimate (paramartha), the
idealistic recognized three levels of reality or nature. Existence (*samsara*) is explained in the form of the ‘store consciousnesses’. Moreover ‘the evolution take place in the following manner: As the seeds mature in the store-consciousness then the evolution of *manas* take place. And the third transformation, the evolution of the perception consciousness (*pravrttit-vijnana*) consists of the subject and object discrimination that leads to the activity of good and bad behaviour. As a result the accumulation of dispositions (*vasana*) which are stored up in ‘store consciousness’ and serve as the seed for the repeated evolution of *manas* and the sixfold perceptive consciousness. This enlightenment comes when we realize that everything is mere ideation (*Vijnaptimatra*) according to *yogacaras*.

He who grasps an object has not real *Vijnaptimatra*, while realizing that everything is *vijnaptimatra*, one has to eliminate all forms of grasping as said in *Trimsika*:

> When consciousness is without an objective support, then consciousness is established in *vijnaptimatra*, since in the absence of anything to grasp, there is no grasping.

> When (he) is without thought, without objective support, his knowledge is superabundance. There is ‘turning away’ from the objective, through the abandonment of the two kinds of weakness (i.e. the belief in a self and the belief in real element).

> That is the realm without defiling tendencies (asrava), inconceivable, good, permanent, and happy with released body, this is what is called the dharma (body) of the great stage.\(^{54}\)

According to *Trimsika* statement, we indicated that *vijnanatimatra* or ultimate undifferentiated reality is equated with the *dharma* of the Buddha. Through the attainment this state we, follow the practice of the
career of a bodhisattva, fulfilling the six perfections and acquiring omniscience (Sarvakarajnata). This state is Buddhahood. It is dharma of the great sage.

Thus, finally we conclude that Madhyamikas too contributed greatly to the development of the yogacara, the Madhyamika analysis of the concepts leading to the view that they do not designate any reality or that they don’t reveal the true nature of phenomena was welcome by yogacaras, while, denying the external objects has any reality. But the yogacara view is different from Madhyamikas in contending that mind or consciousness is real, since the Absolute is looked upon as being a non-dual and non-conceptual and transcendental worldly experience. The Yogacara asserts that it is realized in the highest state of yogic rapture where there is indiscriminate consciousness without subject and object dichotomy.

REFERENCES

3. Ibid., pp. 143-43.
6. Sarkar,Anil Kumar, Changing Phase of Buddhist Thought, (Bhartiya Bhawan, Patna,1968), pp. 4-6.
7. Ibid., pp. 6, 8.
10. Ibid., p. 398.
11. Anguttara-Nikaya. IV.1.1, c.f, Mishra, Umesh, op.cit., p. 400.
12 Abhidarmakosa, 1.7, cf. Ibid., p. 400.


