

## CHAPTER V

### Figures based on Tarka-nyāya.

The fourth group consists of alamkāras based on tarka or reasoning. This reasoning should be a result of poetic imagination. Logical perfection is not necessary in the figures based on tarka. The figures Kāvyaṅga, Arthāntaranyāsa and Anumāna are based on tarka. Jagannātha starts the figures based on tarkanyāya without any remark about tarka.

(1) Kāvyaṅga:

Anumitikanāṭvāna sāmānyaviśeṣabhāvābhyām anāṅgitaḥ  
prakṛtārhopapādatvāna vivakṣitōrthāḥ Kāvyaṅgaḥ.

In Kāvyaṅga, the sense representing the reason brings out the sense which is the matter in hand. The words 'anumitikanāṭvāna anāṅgitaḥ' exclude Anumāna, where the hetu is a means for inference. The words 'sāmānyaviśeṣabhāvābhyām anāṅgitaḥ' exclude Arthāntaranyāsa, which is based on sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva. In Kāvyaṅga the reason(hetu) brings out the prakṛta. This characteristic excludes Upamā, where the prakṛta is known by similarity. The hetu or the reason should not be directly expressed by ablative or instrumental case. The hetu can

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give rise to charm only when it is suggested. This is signified by the words 'prakr. tārthopapādatvena vivakṣitah arthah.' The hetu may be represented by the sense of a subanta or by the sense of a tingta. The first is two fold: (1) it may be characterized by the sense of other words, or (2) it may be purely of the form of the sense of a subanta. In the first subvariety, either the sentence-sense, or the sense of only subanta may characterize the sense of a subanta directly, or indirectly. When the reason <sup>is</sup> represented by a tingta, it may be characterized by the sense of sentence or by the sense of only subanta, directly or indirectly. Jagannātha remarks that these divisions are given only according to the ancients. They are not striking by themselves. How can Kāvyaṅga be distinguished from Anumāna? In Anumāna, the anumiti consisting in the knowledge of the sādhya from the reason is a subject of poetic description. Though anumiti is present in Kāvyaṅga also, the poet does not intend to convey it to the readers. In Anumāna, the poet or the speaker draws the conclusion for the reader. In Kāvyaṅga the reader himself gets the knowledge of anumiti, due to some reason.

Appayya has defined Kāvyaṅga as 'samarthanīyasyārthasya Kāvyaṅgam, samarthakam.' This definition is not accepted by Jagannātha because the absence of sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva is not mentioned;

hence the definition is applicable to Arthāntaranyāsa. Nāgesa defends Appayya by saying that the word 'samarthaniya' excludes Arthāntaranyāsa as defined by the ancients. If the definition given by the modern rhetoricians is meant here, Appayya himself has said in his treatment of Arthāntaranyāsa, that the word 'sāmānyaviśeṣabhāvānālingita' should be added to the definition of Kāvyaṅga.

The examples cited by Ruyyaka to illustrate Kāvyaṅga are not proper, as the figure in these instances is not Kāvyaṅga, but Anumāna according to Jagannātha.

Jagannātha mentions a view according to which Kāvyaṅga does not deserve to be figure as it has no strikingness of its own. The reason and the inference drawn from it are established by themselves. They therefore, leave no scope for poetic imagination. Kāvyaṅga may give rise to strikingness when it is mixed with S'leṣa but then S'leṣa becomes the cause of strikingness and not Kāvyaṅga. Kāvyaṅga, therefore, is not an alamkāra; it is only the absence of a defect named Nirhetu, according to this view.

Bhāmaha, Dandin and Vāmana do not define Kāvyaṅga. Kāvyaṅga occurs, according to Udbhata, when something becomes the cause of recollection or experience. Mammata defines Kāvyaṅga as 'hetorvākya-padārthatā'. He says that the reason may be expressed in (1) sentence (2) many words or (3) only one word. Ruyyaka follows Mammata. He, however, gives four divisions of this figure: (1) when the hetu is expressed in many sentences, (2) when it is expressed in many words, (3) when it is expressed in one sentence and (4) when it is expressed in one word. Sobhākara calls this figure Hetu. He says that the Hetu may consist of (1) a sense of a word or (2) a sense of a sentence. The second may be śabda or ārtba. He says that the expressed sense may here be embellished by the suggested sense. Jayarātha says that the hetu expressed in sentence or words cannot give rise to any strikingness; hence Kāvyaṅga does not deserve to be a figure. Ruyyaka has defined it only out of respect for the ancients. Even when the suggested sense is present, the hetu expressed in a sentence or in words does not give rise to any strikingness. Kāvyaṅga therefore, should be included into Amuāna. Vidyānātha follows Mammata. He divides the hetu into vākya-ārtba-gata and padārtha-gata. Viśvanātha follows Ruyyaka in defining and dividing Kāvyaṅga. Appayya defines Kāvyaṅga as 'samarthaniya śyāthasya Kāvyaṅgam samarthanam.' He says

that the hetu may be mentioned in a sentence or in a word. Both the padārtha and the vākyaṅgārtha, depending on each other may also form the hetu. Sometimes objects mutually opposite, form the hetu. Appayya and Jagannātha elaborate the divisions of hetu in their treatment of Kāvyaśiṅga.

(2) Arthāntaranyāsa:

Sāmānyena viśeṣasya viśeṣeṇa sāmānyasya vā yatsemarthānam  
tadarthāntaranyāsaḥ.

When a general proposition corroborates a particular proposition or when a particular proposition corroborates a general proposition, the figure Arthāntaranyāsa takes place. Generally a general or a particular proposition is prakṛta and it corroborates a particular or a general proposition which is aprakṛta. The corroboration is possible in two ways: (1) by similarity and (2) by dissimilarity. The relation of samarthānyasamarthakabhāva gives rise to this figure. It may be expressed or may be known by the force or sense. Words like, hi, yat, yataḥ are expressive of corroboration.

An objection may be raised here. When a general proposition corroborates a particular proposition, the figure should be Anumāna as the knowledge of the invariable association of two objects described in the general proposition leads us to the inference of the association of two particular objects. The corroboration of a particular proposition by a general proposition should not therefore be considered as a variety of Arthāntaranyāsa. Arthāntaranyāsa, therefore, consists only in the corroboration of a general proposition by a particular proposition. This objection is not valid because the province of Anumāna is already clarified in the treatment of Kāvyaśiṅga. It may now be argued that the corroboration of a general proposition by a particular one is not different from the figure Udāharana. This argument is not correct because the two figures are quite distinct. Words like iva are not present in Arthāntaranyāsa. Such words are present in Udāharana. When the particular proposition corroborates the general proposition in Udāharana, only the part which is anuvādyā is particular; the part which is Vidheya or predicated remains general. Thus, the predicate of the general proposition and the particular illustration is the same in Udāharana. In Arthāntaranyāsa, both the parts-anuvādyā as well as vidheya - are particular. It should not be said that this distinction is very insignificant, for then,

Partivastūpamā will have to be included in Dr̥ṣṭānta and Atisayokti will have to be included in Rūpaka as the distinction between these figures is also very insignificant. Still, if the objector does not accept the distinction and insists that Arthāntaranyāsa should be included into Udāharana, then Jagannātha holds that, Udāharana should be included in Arthāntaranyāsa, as Udāharana is not accepted by the ancients, who include it into Upamā.

Arthāntaranyāsa does not require a sequence. Thus the statement corroborating may come first and the statement corroborated may come afterwards.

In Arthāntaranyāsa, the aprakṛta may corroborate the prakṛta. The prakṛta may corroborate the prakṛta. The prakṛta may also corroborate the aprakṛta but then the aprakṛta finally leads to the prakṛta.

Ruyyaka gives two more varieties of Arthāntaranyāsa: (1) when the cause corroborates the effect (2) when the effect corroborates the cause. These varieties are not accepted by Jagannātha, as they form the province of Kāvyaśiṅga. Jayaratha distinguishes Arthāntaranyāsa

from Udāharana on the ground that in Arthāntaranyāsa when the general proposition is supported by the particular proposition, the general proposition expects the particular proposition while in Udāharana, the general proposition is complete by itself and the particular, which is a part of it, is mentioned only to clarify it. This is not accepted by Jagannātha, who insists that the way of distinguishing Arthāntaran yāsa from Udāharana shown by him, should be accepted.

Appayya gives a new figure Vikasvara, which is defined as ' yasminviśeṣasāmānyaviśeṣāḥ sa Vikasvarah. ' Vikasvara thus, occurs when there is a particular proposition, then a general proposition and then once again a particular proposition. Jagannātha criticizes Appayya for admitting this figure. All the cases of Vikasvara can be covered by a Saṃsrṣṭi of Udāharana and Arthāntaranyāsa or by a Saṃsrṣṭi of the two varieties of Arthāntaranyāsa. Vikasvara, therefore does not deserve to be an independent figure. Nāgeśa controverts Jagannātha's view. He says that Vikasvara has an additional charm arising from inter-connection. Vikasvara, therefore should be admitted as a separate figure. Jagannātha seems to be justified in his criticism of Appayya. An additional proposition of a particular is too insignificant to grant Vikasvara a separate treatment.

Bhāmaha defines Arthāntaranyāsa as follows:

Upanyasanamarthasya yadarthasyeditādṛte

Jñeyah sōrthāntaranyāsaḥ pūrvāarthānugato yathā.

Bhāmaha's Arthāntaranyāsa is not based on Sāmānyaviseṣabhāva. Dandī holds that in Arthāntaranyāsa, the citation of another object should be capable of proving the object which is described. Dandī's Arthāntaranyāsa, therefore, is based on sādhya-sādhanabhāva. Dandī gives eight varieties of Arthāntaranyāsa, which are not accepted by the succeeding rhetoricians. Udbhata holds that Arthāntaranyāsa is based on samarthya - samarthakabhāva. He says that in Arthāntaranyāsa, the samarthaka or the samarthya may come first. He adds that words like hi may be present or absent in Arthāntaranyāsa. Vāmana says that the arthāntara should not be a hetu. Rudrata is the first to state that in Arthāntaranyāsa, either a particular or a general dharmī may be described and another similar dharmī - general or particular - is described in order to support it. Rudrata admits Arthāntaranyāsa based on dissimilarity also. Mammata follows Rudrata. His definition shows clearly that both sāmānyaviseṣabhāva

Vidyānātha follows Ruyyaka, but he says that the corroboration of an effect by a cause gives rise to Kāvyaṅga. The corroboration of a cause by an effect therefore, gives rise to Arthāntaranyāsa. Vidyānātha treats this figure among figures based on tarkanyāya. Viśvanātha follows Ruyyaka and gives eight varieties of Arthāntaranyāsa. Appayya treats this figure as based on tarkanyāya. He admits only sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva in Arthāntaranyāsa. He gives two varieties of Arthāntaranyāsa: (A) when <sup>pr</sup>aprakṛta corroborates the prakṛta and (B) when the prakṛta corroborates the aprakṛta.

Viśvanātha, Appayya and Jagannātha hold that Arthāntaranyāsa is based on tarkanyāya. Jagannātha here, differs from Ruyyaka, whom he generally follows. When the general proposition corroborates the particular, or when the particular proposition corroborates the general, the corroboration is based on some tarka, for a sāmānya consists of particular, and the particular forms a part and parcel of the general. Some logic is exercised when the sāmānya or viśeṣa is represented as supporting viśeṣa or sāmānya. Jagannātha is thus justified when he treats Arthāntaranyāsa as a figure based on tarkanyāya.

(3) Anumāna:

Anumitīkarāṇamanumānam. Anumitīkarāṇa or the instrument of anumiti is the knowledge of the reason (līṅga) as characterized by vyāpti. When it is described as a result of poetic imagination, the figure Anumāna takes place. The figure Anumāna may also be based on figures like rūpaka or Atisāyokti. Words like manye, sāṅke or avaimi convey anumiti if the sādhanā and sādhyā are present. The same words convey Utpreksā when the source - sādṛśyā is present.

Anumāna is expressed (vācya) when words like manye are employed. It is indicated by words like vakti or kathayati. It is pratiyamāna when neither is present and when the sādhyā is implied. Anumāna is suggested when the sādhyā is suggested by līṅga which only is mentioned. This distinction is possible only when Anumāna is understood as anumiti. If the figure Anumāna is understood as the instrument of knowledge, and if karāṇa is understood as the knowledge of līṅga, then the divisions into vācya, lakṣya etc. are not possible because knowledge is neither vācya nor lakṣya.

It must be said that Jagannātha has unnecessarily confused his treatment of this figure by introducing terms of Nyāya.

Bhāmaha, Dandin, Udbhata and Vāmana do not define Anumāna. Rudrata treats Anumāna as a figure based on Vastava and defines it as follows:

Vastu parokṣam yasminsādhyamupanyasya sādhanam tasya  
Punaranyadupanyasyedviparītam caitadanumānam.

He gives another variety of Anumāna, where the cause being powerful, the effect is described as not produced or produced in the past or in the future. Mammata does not admit the second variety of Anumāna given by Rudrata. He says that the subvariety of the first variety, consisting in the inversion of the order of reason and conclusion does not possess any charm. He therefore, defines Anumāna as

'sādhyasādhanayorvacaḥ.' Muṅgyaka follows Mammata. He holds that Anumāna may be based on figures, like Rūpaka or may arise by itself; it becomes charming because of the exercise of poetic imagination. Anumāna is based on pratyāyyapratyāyokabhāva. Anumāna thus arises when something not known or apprehended before, is made known by the hetu or reason. The figures Kāvyaṅga and Arthāntaranyāsa are

based on samarth, yasamarthakabhāva. The thing mentioned becomes the cause in Kāvyaṅga. Ruyyaka here says that he has admitted cause and effect relation in Arthāntaranyāsa only because it is admitted by Udbhata. Śobhākara says that when a thing which is known by some person by some pramāna but which is not known by others is made known to them the figure is Hetu (Kāvyaṅga). When the thing is described as known by one's own self the figure is Anumāna. The reason in Anumāna may be śabda or artha. The verse 'yatraitā lahari....' cited by Maṃmata and Ruyyaka as an illustration of Anumāna, is an instance of Asambandhe sambandha- variety of Atisāyokti according to Śobhākara. Vidyānātha admits Anumāna only when it is based on Rūpaka. The figure Anumāna can be distinguished from the Anumāna which is a pramāna, only when it is based on figures like Rūpaka according to Vidyānātha. Viśvanātha says that jñāpaka hetu gives rise to the figure Anumāna, while the nīspādaka hetu gives rise to the figure Kāvyaṅga. He admits a third kind of hetu- samarthaka hetu-which according to him gives rise to the figure Arthāntaranyāsa. Appayya treats Anumāna as a figure based on pramāna. Anumāna according to him, may be pure or mixed with other figures.