

## CHAPTER IX

### RESUME

After a detailed study of the arthālamkāras, we can now review the treatment of arthālamkāras in Rasagaṅgādhara.

Jagannātha has defined poetry as 'word conveying charming sense'. He has also said that the charm in the sense arises only when there is a connection with the suggested sense. The alankāras embellish the suggested sense, which thus is the essence of poetry and which consists of rasa, vastu and alankāra. The alankāra should be the result of poetic imagination and should be the cause of delight of the appreciative readers. The alankāra should always be beautiful and should be flawless. The function of alankāra is to give rise to camatkṛti. Camatkṛti is defined as a peculiar delight which is experienced by the Sahrdayas or appreciative readers in their hearts. An alankāra may also beautify an alankāra. Even a suggested alankāra can also embellish. Contradiction lies, not between vyaṅgyatva and alankāratva but between pradhānavyaṅgyatva and alankāratva. The word 'alankāra' is relative. It presupposes an alankārya, which naturally, is principal, and to which it is subordinate. When an alankāra is principally suggested, it ceases to be an alankāra, becomes alankārya and is called alankāradhvani. Figures like Samāsokti or Aprastutprasamsā are instances of Uttama Kāvya. Figures like Rūpaka or Dīpaka are

instances of Madhyama kāvya. Instances of śabdālaṅkāras where the strikingness of sense is subordinate to that of words <sup>are</sup> Adhama kāvya. The instances where the strikingness arises only from figures of words, and where the strikingness arising from sense is absent, do not deserve to be called kāvya. Though the function of alaṅkāra is to embellish the kāvya, the alaṅkāras do not form the essence of kāvya. The function of alaṅkāra is only to embellish the suggested sense, which is the soul of kāvya.

Jagannātha's concept of alaṅkāras shows that he fully accepts the dhvani theory propounded by the Dhvanikāra. The classification of kāvya and the classification of arthālaṅkāras into Uttama and Madhyama poetry is based on the position of the suggested sense. Jagannātha however does not follow the Dhvanikāra blindly and questions sometimes the esteemed authority of the Dhvanikāra. Ś'abdasāktimūladhvani is a variety of dhvani according to the Dhvanikāra. Jagannātha examines Ś'abdasāktimūladhvani and arrives at the conclusion that it should be treated as a variety of guṇībhūtavyaṅgya.

Though a profound scholar in Navya-nyāya, Mimāṃsā, and Vyākaraṇa, he holds that Alaṅkārasāstra has its own province, and Ālaṅkārikas are free to have their own views. Though sādṛśya is not different from the common property according to the Naiyāyikas, Jagannātha

number of alamk̄aras. He, for example, believes that Tulyayogitā and Dīpaka may be treated as varieties of one figure and that Vyāghāta may be included into Vyatireka and that the third variety of Viśeṣa is not distinct from the figure Nidarśanā. But he treats Tulyayogitā and Dīpaka as separate alamk̄aras, and admits the third variety of Viśeṣa. He thus generally prefers to follow the tradition. His respect for the ancients is the reason for this attitude.

Jagannātha's treatment of alamk̄aras is systematic.

His definitions of alamk̄aras are perfect and he carefully sees that the definitions are neither too narrow nor too broad. He explains the significance of each and every word of the definition in Vṛtti. Precision and clarity are the remarkable characteristics of his style. His insistence on perfection sometimes drags him to hair-splitting details and discussions. He demands perfection from others and takes eminent writers like Mammāta, Ruyyaka, Jayarath<sup>a</sup>, S'obhākara, Vidyānātha and Appayya to task for their lack of precision. He does not spare even the Dhvanikāra.

He has introduced śābdabodha in the treatment of some important alamk̄aras. Thus the śābdabodha in the treatment of figures like Upamā, Rūpaka, Parināma and Utpreksā very clearly brings out the

subtle distinctions and shades of difference in the various subdivisions and expressions of an alaṅkāra. As all the illustrations in the Rasagāṅādhara come from his own pen, they have the advantage of being very exact, transparent, and apt.

The style of the Rasagāṅādhara frightens at first the student with the use of highly technical words of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā but once one gets accustomed to it, the Rasagāṅādhara impresses by its clarity, precision, logical acumen, originality, and depth of thinking. The work reveals not only Jagannātha's mastery over Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa, but it also shows him as an able controversialist, who maintains his own views and refutes the views of his opponents, sometimes putting them on the horns of a dilemma, sometimes showing them logically absurd. The interpretation of verses cited by others for illustration also shows his taste for the good and the beautiful.

Jagannātha does not seem to attach importance to the principles adopted for classifying the figures. He, like most of his predecessors, accepts the classification given by Ruyyaka. He follows Ruyyaka in assigning order to the figures also. Ruyyaka systematically lays down the principles adopted by him in classifying the figures and in assigning order to the figures. Jagannātha mentions the principles at only three places. Either he does not attach importance to the

principles or he thinks that they are too obvious. The classification of arthālamkāras is significant. Jagannātha's treatment of alankāras can be said to be imperfect so far as this important point is concerned. Another defect may also be noted. Jagannātha, on the one hand, shows a tendency to reduce the number of alankāras, and introduces new alankāras on the other hand. The logician in Jagannātha cannot help this contradiction, which, as is already seen, arises because of the failure to recognize the subjective aspect of pratibhā.

However intelligent, a writer cannot but be influenced by his predecessors. Jagannātha is influenced by the views of the Dhvanikāra, Mannata, Ruyyaka, Śobhākara, Jayaratha and even Appayya.

A study of the treatment of arthālamkāras will be incomplete without a note on two controversies. The participants of the first controversy are Ruyyaka, Śobhākara, and Jayaratha. Ruyyaka's views are controverted by Śobhākara. Jayaratha, defends Ruyyaka. Besides defending Ruyyaka, Jayaratha also criticizes Śobhākara for some new alankāras introduced by him. Jagannātha examines the views of all the three with an unbiassed mind, draws the essence of the controversy and forms his own opinions.

The participants of the second controversy are Appayya, Jagannātha and Nāgesā. Appayya's definition and illustrations of alamkāras and views are criticized by Jagannātha. Though Jagannātha is justified at many places, he is unfair and unjust to Appayya and unnecessarily criticizes him sometimes. So does Nāgesā, the commentator on Rasagaṅgādhara. He defends Appayya. Instead of interpreting the Rasagaṅgādhara, Nāgesā is more interested in defending Appayya and in criticizing Jagannātha. Nāgesā's criticisms of the views of Jagannātha are mostly biased and prejudiced like Jagannātha's criticism of the views of Appayya.

Sōbhākara is referred to as Ratnākara in Rasagaṅgādhara which shows that Jagannātha calls the author by the name of the work. The views and definitions mentioned in Rasagaṅgādhara as held by Ratnākara are found in Alamkāraratnākara, written by Sōbhākara. The Alamkāraratnākara is an important work and needs the attention of scholars.

The sentences quoted by Jagannātha (in his criticism of Ananvaya) from Alamkārasarvasva are found, not in Alamkārasarvasva, but in Vimarsinī. It can be inferred that Jagannātha possessed a corrupt text of the Alamkārasarvasva, where the scribe must have mixed the remarks in the commentary with the text of Ruyyaka.

Jagannātha's concept of alaṅkāras brings out two things. He has said that Pratibhā should be the cause of the alaṅkāras. Pratibhā is generally understood as the poetic imagination. Again, it is very often insisted that an alaṅkāra should be charming, and that it becomes charming only when it delights the hearts of the appreciative readers. When thus, the cause and the effects of alaṅkāra are taken into account, we can say that Jagannātha means that the imagination of the poet, when communicated to the readers, should give them delight. In fact, the poet communicates his emotions and ideas to the readers through his poetry, and the communication brings delight. The poet as well as the reader has his own place and importance in poetry. Aristotle says in his Rhetoric (1.3): "For a speech is composed of three things: the speaker, the subject on which he speaks and the audience he is addressing." The same is true of poetry also. Sanskrit poetics, however, generally concentrates on the form of poetry. The theories of alaṅkāra, rīti, and dhvani take into consideration only the formal aspect of poetry. The importance of the appreciative reader is fully recognized by the ancients. 'Sadyah paranirvṛti' is the chief aim of poetry. Writers like Lollata, Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta have offered analytical explanations of the delight experienced by the reader or the spectator. The poet, however, is generally neglected in Sanskrit Poetics. Kuntaka and Ruyyaka have brought out the importance of the poet, when they have

said that alamkāras should be the result of poetic imagination. By accepting kavipratibhā as the cause of alamkāras, Jagannātha accepts the importance of the poet. His definition of camatkṛti brings out the importance of the appreciative reader. Both the poet and the reader have their places in Jagannātha's concept of alamkāras, which, therefore, is free from the defect of ignoring the poet. The function of poetry is to delight. Imagination - an important factor in poetry - is beautiful only when it delights the sahrdayas. This is quite consistent with the other function, namely embellishing the suggested sense.

Jagannātha's concept of alamkāras, again, heightens the value of imaginative poetry. Figures like Samāsokti or Aprastuta-prasamsā were considered as instances of Madhyama kāvya. They are beautiful instances of Allegory, Personification etc., and the suggested sense, though subordinate, is the source of charm in these instances. Jagannātha, with his keen eye for the beautiful, recognized them as instances of Uttama kāvya and improves upon the traditional classification. Similarly, the Arthacitra kāvya is raised to the level of Madhyama kāvya. Jagannātha's classification recognizes the beauty and importance of imaginative poetry.

Tradition says that Sanskrit kāvya had its origin in the sorrow of Valmiki. Valmiki saw one of the Kāraunca birds pierced by an arrow, and his sorrow took the form of a verse. The tradition shows

that

poetry springs from emotion. But, over and above emotion and ideas, poetry requires beautiful form also. Poetry, then, involves artifice and technique. As poetry is an art, the ancient Sanskrit critics were right when they emphasized the beauty of form in poetry. But this does not lessen the importance of emotions.

Language is the dress of thought. The more beautiful the form, the more impressive the thought. The language of poetry is different from the language of everyday life. In this connection, Cleanth Brooks says: "the word is strictly speaking a metaphor." Figurative language is the poet's endeavour to give an artistic shape to his emotions. Instead of describing the emotions directly, the poet may convey them through images or alamkāras. The alamkāras have therefore, two aspects: emotional and intellectual. Ānandavardhana has fully realized the emotional aspect of alamkāras and therefore he says ' alamkārāntarāṇi hi nirūpyamāṇadurghatanānyapi rāssamāhitacetasaḥ pratibhānavataḥ kaverahampūrvikayā parāpatanti. ' As, however, the subjective aspect of kāvya is lost sight of, the emotional aspect of alamkāras also is generally lost sight of.

Jagannātha, however, shows his awareness of the emotional aspect/alamkāras twice. In discussing Kalpitopamā he says that the poet primarily imagines separate objects and then imagines the association of these objects. In ' tvayi kepo mamābhāti sudhāmsāviva pāvakaḥ ', the

poet primarily imagines the moon for the face and the fire for anger. The existence of fire on moon is possible only in the poet's imagination. The comparison of the expression of anger on face with fire on moon then becomes possible. Again, in his discussion on the *S'ūbābedha* in *Rūpaka*, he says that the poet perceives objects like face-moon only by his free will, though such objects do not exist in nature. This perception arises because of some properties which are common to the face and the moon. This bears remarkable similarity with what the Western critics say about images and imagination. Skelton says : " the primary images, the reflections of the actual world of the poet, produce secondary images which are reflections of them. It is as if the images..... reveal the laws of vision, creating in the process other images, which though caused by the primary ones, exist in themselves alone. The primary images one can control; one can perceive them as reflections of actuality, can define them, measure them, and equate them with concepts. The secondary images cannot be defined or analysed, unless we are able to do so from the standpoint of the primary images, rather than from that of actuality."

Like literature, Poetics and Rhetoric also have no frontiers. The concept of *alankāras* is very much alike to the concept of images of the Western critics. Semantically the terms image, metaphor, symbol, allegory etc. are lessely covered by one comprehensive term '*alankāra*'.

Like our ancients the Western neo-classicists held that figures were the ornaments of language. H.J.C. Grierson, however, protests against the way the ancient Western critics spoke on figurative language. He says: "The ancient writers on rhetoric spoke of them too much as mere ornaments of style, to be added or taken away at will and were content to make long lists of them with an elaborate nomenclature, and to illustrate their use from poets and orators. They spoke, as Professor Saintsbury has put it, as though the figures were a sugar which you sifted into the pudding in greater or less quantity as you thought well. Their definitions were superficial and left quite unexplained the fact of their being used at all." Modern Western criticism, however, considers images as an integral part of the poem. Rene Welleck and Austin Warren say: "like metre, imagery is one component structure of a poem ..... it is a part of syntactical or stylistic stratum. It must be studied finally not in isolation from the other strata, but as an element in the totality, the integrity of the literary work." The modern Western criticism holds that the poet makes the reader see by means images. This idea is very well brought out by contrasting simple gait of walking with the elaborate and artistic, rhythmic movement of dancing by Paul Vallery. He holds that the rhythm, the gestures, the whole artistic movement- all this is not intended to decorate human movement but to create a profound aesthetic experience in the audience. This shows that the Western criticism deals more with the emotional aspect of

alamkāras, unlike the ancient Sanskrit poetics which deals more with the intellectual aspect of alamkāras. The divisions and subdivisions of figures like Upamā or Vyatireka, or the treatment of the variety of Samāsokti where the behaviour of objects described in science are superimposed, show that only the intellectual aspect of figures is taken into consideration. Like ancient Sanskrit poetics, Western criticism accepts figures based on similarity, contrast, association etc., and some of the Sanskrit alamkāras bear striking resemblance to Western figures of speech. (Appendix III). The Western critics, however, have thought much about the figures Simile, Metaphor, Allegory etc., and have analysed the mental processes of the poet when images come to him.

When Jagannātha claims for originality, we expect from him that the serious drawback of ignoring the poetic experience be absent in his work. He, however, defines kāvya more or less in the traditional way. The other questions connected with kāvya are also dealt with in the same way. To a certain extent, this drawback is absent in his treatment of alamkāras.

Being himself a poet, Jagannātha can very well analyse the figures like Rūpaka or Kalpitopamā. He shows an inkling of truth when he recognizes the poet's mental states underlying the expressions of

Rūpaka and Kelpitopamā. He is aware of the emotional aspect of the figures, but prefers to treat the figures in the traditional way, concentrates on the intellectual aspect of figures, and ignores the subjective aspect of Pratibhā. The realm of imagination however, is boundless and hundreds of alaṅkāras cannot exhaust its province. Had Jagannātha concentrated more on the emotional aspect of the figures, he could have saved the ancient Alaṅkāras'āstra from a very serious drawback.