Chapter 2

SAMŚAYA AS APRAMA
2.1. LAKŚANA (DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS) OF SAṂŚAYA (DOUBT) EXPLAINED:

Saṁśaya is a kind of apramā or non-veridical cognition according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Saṁśaya is an uncertain or indeterminate cognition of some object. It is the cognition of conflicting notions (vimarśa) with regard to the same object. It is the mental reference of two or more contradictory properties to the same object. In it, the mind oscillates between different alternate characterisations of some given object. It consists in an alternation between different conflicting notions with regard to the same object. In case of doubtful cognition or saṁśaya, there is really no doubt regarding the subject, in the sense that the cognizer is sure of its existence but there is uncertainty regarding its characterization. Here the cognizer fails to give a proper character as what it actually is. When one has a saṁśaya or doubtful cognition about an object, the object is apprehended but not fully and clearly and whatever is known about it suggests a number of incompatible properties as possible predicates of it. But those properties being incompatible, all of

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1 samāna-anekā-dharma-upapateḥ vipratipatteḥ upalabdhi-anupalabdhi-avyavasthāh ca viśeṣa-apekṣāḥ vimarśāḥ saṁśayāḥ, — Nyāya-sūtra - 1.1.23.
them cannot be predicated to the thing perceived, and in the absence of the knowledge of any characteristic which show the presence of one of the incompatible properties in the thing, the cognizer is not in a position to affirm of the thing any one of the properties in particular. Thus he is in a state of doubt, that is, he cannot make up his mind in favour of any of the alternatives. Hence, doubt has been spoken of as incomplete or indecisive cognition (anavādhrānaṇātmaka). But doubt is not merely the absence (abhāva) of assured cognition (niścaya). It is not mere negation of knowledge. It is a positive state of cognition of mutually exclusive characters in the same thing and at the same time. Doubt is an indefinite cognition (anavādhrānaṇātmaka pratyakṣa), which characterizes an object in mutually conflicting ways. Something is seen, but there does not arise a fixed notion about it whether it is one thing or another. For example, some tall thing is perceived, but one cannot decide whether it is man or a post. In a doubtful cognition two or more interpretations of an observed datum are offered, but the mind does not arrive at any fixed decision. Thus doubt is marked by a lack of assurance or belief. And for this, doubt is not valid knowledge, because it lacks belief or firmness which is an essential mark of validity. Doubt neither asserts anything nor denies it positively. It is not a judgement, but a questioning attitude of the mind making no claim to truth.


In the first *sūtra* of the *Nyāya-sūtra*, Maharshi Gautama mentioned sixteen categories or *padārthas* and *saṃśaya* or doubt is the third category of the *Nyāya* philosophy. After *pramāna* and *prameya*, the category of *saṃśaya* (doubt) arises. When a cogniser is not sure about something whether it is this or that — this state of cognition is doubt. For example, the cognition like, 'Is it a stump or a man?' Perceiving a standing something from a distance, a person takes it as the stump of a tree or again as the figure of a human being. This cognitive state is the state of 'doubt' or 'uncertainty'. It is the cognition of a single something as having the feature which are peculiar to the stump of a tree and again of that something as having the feature which are peculiar to a human being. These features are 'incompatible' (*viruddha*) in the sense that they cannot belong to the same thing, yet undeniably they are presented alternately as the features of the selfsame thing. The state of mind is then one in which features are presented as characterising something when they donot actually characterise that something. And for this reason, it is a kind of *aprāmāṇa* or non-veridical cognition (*anubhava*). In this way we find that in *saṃśaya*, the two incompatible features which appear to characterise the selfsame thing are both of a positive nature. But that need not always be the case, one of the feature may be positive while the other may be negative in nature.

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In the opening ṣūtra of the Nyāya-sūtra, Gautama declares that the right knowledge (tattva-jñāna) of the sixteen categories (padārthas) like pramāṇa, prameya, etc. leads to the ultimate good, i.e., liberation. But a very pertinent question may arise at this juncture: Is the knowledge of each of the sixteen categories mentioned by Gautama directly conducive to the sumnum bonum? If the reply is in the affirmative, still question persist: can it be possible? How, e.g. the right knowledge of jalpa, vitanḍa or chala be directly responsible for the sumnum bonum? In this connection, Vatsyāyana explains the real meaning intended by Gautama. Of these sixteen categories, the knowledge of what Gautama technically calls prameya is directly conducive to the sumnum bonum. (Prameya literally means any object of the right knowledge. But Gautama restricts its use to only twelve such objects). The knowledge of the other categories being greatly helpful for the knowledge of the prameyas is also an indirect cause of liberation. In other words, the knowledge of only one of the above categories (i.e. prameya) is the direct cause of the liberation while that of the other categories is indirectly so. 7

The separate mention of ‘doubt’ etc. among the sixteen categories of the Nyāya-sūtra is useless because being appropriately included under pramāṇa and prameya, these are not completely different from them. 8 But

8. Ibid.
for the benefit of mankind four branches of study — each having its unique subject-matter, are prescribed, of which this study of logic is the fourth and its unique subject-matter consists of these categories, viz., doubt (samsāya) etc. Without the separate mention of these, it would have been mere 'study of the self', like Upanisad. Therefore, by mentioning the categories like samsāya etc. it is shown to have its unique subject-matter. Vātsyāyana admits that these fourteen categories are not in fact excluded from pramāṇa and prameya.⁹ According to him, there is still definite justification for the separate mention of doubt, etc. in the sūtra. In the interest of human welfare, four branches of learning are recommended. These are Trayi (veda), Dandāni (state-craft) Vārtā (agro-economy) and Ānvikṣikī (logic). Each of these has its unique subject-matter (prasthāna). The unique subject-matter of Veda consists of the Agnihotra sacrifice etc. of State-craft, the king, minister etc. of the Agro-economy, the plough, etc. So far as the subject-matter of Logic is concerned, it includes the fourteen categories — doubt and the rest. The specific mention of the topics coming under the subject-matter of logic is necessary so that Logic is not confused with some other branch of learning. Without the mention of doubt etc. as forming the unique subject-matter of Logic, we run the risk of identifying it with Upanisad. Besides, the

unique subject-matter of a branch of study should be exhaustively enumerated as such doubt etc. are in need of separate mention. Among these, Nyāya has no relevance for objects that are unknown, nor for those that are known for certain. What, then, has its relevance for? It has relevance only for those objects about which there is doubt. As it is said by Gautama, "Final ascertainment (nīrṇaya) is the ascertainment of an object through (consideration of) thesis (pakṣa) and anti-thesis (pratipakṣa) which result from doubt (vimarṣa)."

Here vimarṣa means doubt, thesis and anti-thesis means the application of nyāya, ascertainment of the object means nīrṇaya or right knowledge (tattva-jñāna). This doubt (samsāya) is the general acquaintance with an object which is a sort of definite knowledge. This means that nyāya has relevance only for that the nature of which is known in general but not known specifically or definitely. Thus, e.g. the hill may be known in general but there may be doubt whether it contains fire or not. In this way, a thing may be known in general but its specific nature may remain undetermined. In so far as it remains undermined, it becomes an object of doubt. And in so far as it is an object of doubt, it becomes an object of the


11. vimrṣya pakṣa-pratipakṣābhyaḥ artha-avadhāraṇam nīrṇayaḥ, — Nyāya-sūtra, 1.1.41
application of nyāya. Without there being any doubt, there is no scope for
the application of nyāya. Thus doubt (samśaya) forms a part of nyāya. In
the Nyāya-sūtra, the word ‘vimrśya’ is indicative of doubt because Gautama
clearly says, "vimarśa is samśaya". Besides, the words thesis (pakṣa) and
anti-thesis (pratipakṣa) used in the sūtra (1.1.41.) are to be taken in the
sense of the employment of nyāya. In short, the sūtra defining nirṇaya also
indicates that doubt is the basis of the employment of nyāya. The goal of the
nyāya method is a nirṇaya, a certain conclusion. Such certitude or decision
presupposes a previous indecision, and hence, uncertainty and doubt.
Therefore, a philosophical thesis is not what is dogmatically asserted, but
rather what is arrived at through the process of proper inquiry. This means
that initially there will arise a doubt because of the conflicting alternative
views suggested by the situation or by what we already know prior to the
investigation or inquiry. Here the philosopher is not asked to force himself
into the position of a sceptic who has to doubt whatever and whenever it is
possible to doubt. But it is the situation itself which will put the philosopher in
a state of doubt. This doubt is causally conditioned by an awareness of the
conflicting views regarding particular subject-matter and a sense of wondering
about the truth of the matter. As Vātsyāyana commented: "The Nyāya method
is applied to neither an ascertained thesis nor an unknown thesis or object.
The method is applied to a thesis that has been a matter of doubt."\(^\text{12}\) If we

already know the answers, philosophical activity ends and if we donot have any idea about the question itself, philosophical activity cannot begin.

Doubt or *samśāya* is the 'contradictory apprehension about the same object' (*vimarsa*), which 'depends on the remembrance of the unique characteristic of each' (*višeśapekṣa*). This (doubt) may be due to: (1) the 'apprehension of common characteristics' (*samānadharma-upapatti*), (2) the 'apprehension of the unique characteristic' (*anekadharma-upapatti*), (3) 'contradictory assertions about the same object' (*vipratipatti*), (4) the 'irregularity of apprehension' (*upalabdhi-avyavastha*) and, (5) the 'irregularity of non-apprehension' (*anupalabdhi-avyavastha*).\(^{13}\)

The word *samśāya* in the *sūtra* stands for what is defined and the word *vimarsa* (contradictory apprehensions of the same object) gives the general definition. The word *višeśapekṣa* is used to signify that, on the one hand, the perception of the specific characteristic dispels doubt, while, on the other hand, its recollection is a necessary pre-condition for doubt. The remaining words in the *sūtra* refer to the five forms of doubt, each having its special cause.

Vātsyāyana says that doubt is *anavadharaṇa-jñāna*, i.e., indecisive cognition. It is indecisive not in so far as the cognition points to something

\(^{13}\) *samāna-anekadharma-upapatteḥ vipratipatteḥ upalabdhi-anupalabdhi-avyavasthātaḥ ca višeśa-apekṣaḥ vimarsaḥ samśayaḥ*, — *Nyāya-sūtra* - 1.1.23.
as barely 'that' (idam). But it is indecisive in so far as which of the alternatives (koṭi) stating its nature is appropriate for it. Therefore, doubt cannot be defined as knowledge other than the decisive one. Though a piece of unitary knowledge, doubt is composite in nature. It is not indecisive in so far as it points to something as barely 'that'. It is indecisive in so far as the alternative characteristics of the object are concerned. The etymological meaning of the word vimarsa stands thus: 'vi' meaning contradiction and 'marsa' meaning knowledge. Thus vimarsa, literally stands for contradictory knowledge, means here contradictory knowledge of the same object. Some of the representatives of Navya-Nyāya argue that in the case of doubt one of the alternatives is necessarily negative (abhāva-koṭi) and the other positive (bhāva-koṭi). One may doubt: is it not a pillar? Here two mutually exclusive alternative possibilities are there. First of all 'this is not a pillar' and secondly, 'this is a pillar'. Thus, there is no doubt without both the negative and positive alternatives. According to the older Naiyāyikas, however, there are cases of doubt where all the alternatives are positive. For example, one may doubt whether 'is it a pillar or a person'? Here two alternatives are there: (1) this is a pillar and (2) this is a person. Both the alternatives are positive. But as a matter of fact, there are four possibilities of doubt, two of which are negative and two positive. These are: (1) this is a pillar, (2) this is not a pillar, (3) this is a person and (4) this is not a person.

2.2. CLASSIFICATION OF DOUBT (SAṂŚAYA):

Vātsyāyana explains the five forms of doubt mentioned in the sūtra. The first form of doubt is the 'contradictory knowledge' (vimarśa) about the same object due to the apprehension of 'common characteristics' (samāna-dharma) and which depends on the remembrance of the special characteristic of each (viṣe sāpekṣa). It arises from the perception of such properties as are common to many things, as when we perceive a tall object at a distance and we are not sure if it be a man or a post or a tree-trunk, because tallness is common to all of them. Here we fail to affirm definitely either of the alternatives and has the cognition of the form: what is it? Such an indecisive cognition is doubt. Therefore, doubt in its first form is the contradictory knowledge about the same object depending on the remembrance of the distinguishing characteristic of each. The second form of doubt is due to the apprehension of the unique characteristics of many objects. By the word 'many', here it is intended to mean objects of similar as well as dissimilar nature. Doubt is due to the apprehension of the characteristics of such manifold objects the unique characteristics being perceived in both types of objects — both similar and dissimilar. For example, when the cognition of sound makes us doubt if it is eternal or non-eternal, since it is not found in eternal objects like the soul and the atom, nor in non-eternal things like water and earth. The third form of doubt which is due to 'contradictory statements about the same object' (vipratipatti). The word 'vipratipatti' means
contradictory assertions about the same object. By contradictory is meant opposition (virodha), i.e. the 'impossibility of existence' (asaha-bhāva). For example, there is an assertion: the soul exists. And there is the other: the soul does not exist. The co-existence of existence and non-existence is impossible in the same locus. Nor is there any ground for proving either of the alternatives. In such circumstance, the failure to ascertain the truth takes the form of doubt. Fourthly, doubt may also be due to the irregularity of apprehension. One apprehends water in the tank etc. where it actually exists. One also apprehends water in the mirage where it does not actually exist. Therefore, after apprehending an object somewhere and in default of any proof determining the existence or non-existence of the object, one doubts whether the object apprehended is actually existent or non-existent. Fifthly, doubt may also be due to the irregularity of non-apprehension, as when we are not sure if the thing we cannot see now really exists or not, since the existent also is not perceived under certain conditions. Therefore, after non-apprehending somewhere one doubts whether the object non-apprehended is actually existent or non-existent.

The first form of doubt is due to the perception of common characteristics. Phanibhūṣana explains how such doubt arises. In the insufficient light of the evening, the visual sense of somebody comes in

contact with either a person standing still at a distance or a similar looking post. He fails to perceive in it the distinguishing mark either of a person or of a post, but simply perceives the characteristics common to both, viz., a certain height and breadth. Therefore, he has the doubt about the object before him: Is it a person or a post? The specific cause of such a doubt is the perception of the merely common characteristics of the two. The second form of doubt is due to the apprehension of the unique 'characteristic of many objects' (aneka-dharma). But what is meant by 'the characteristics of many objects'? Vātsyāyana says that by this is meant the unique characteristic of an object which differentiates it from other objects, both similar and dissimilar. For example, the unique characteristic of the substance earth is smell. By this it is distinguished from other substances like water etc., as well as from other categories like quality etc. The unique characteristic of sound is 'being caused by disjunction' (vibhāgajatva). From the perception of this unique characteristic there arises the doubt: Is sound a substance or a quality or an action? "The Vaiśeṣikas maintain that the disjunction may as well be produced by another disjunction and as such 'being caused by disjunction' can not be the unique characteristic of sound. But Uddyotakara argues against the possibility of disjunction being produced by another disjunction. Disjunction is always the result of movement."\(^\text{16}\)

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differs from Vātsyāyana and claims that there are, as a matter of fact, only three forms of doubt, viz., those due to (1) the apprehension of an object with common characteristics, (2) the apprehension of an object with a unique characteristic and (3) the apprehension of contradictory statements. Gautama uses the expression 'due to the irregularity of apprehension and non-apprehension' to characterise all these three forms of doubt rather than to indicate any fourth or fifth form of doubt. This expression really means the absence of any definite proof to establish or to reject any of the alternative comprising the doubt. Kanāda says, "Doubt is due to the apprehension of common characteristics, the non-apprehension of the unique characteristic and the remembrance of the unique characteristic". Though Uddyotakara tries to explain it as inclusive of the second form of the doubt mentioned by Gautama. Śaṅkara Miśra categorically asserts that according to Kanāda doubt has neither three nor five forms, it has only one form. Apart from doubt, Praśastapāda mentions a form of knowledge called anadhyavasāya (indefinite cognition) which is also produced by the apprehension of unique characteristic. According to Śaṅkara Miśra, this corresponds to the second form of doubt mentioned by Gautama. However, Phanibhūṣana comments that from Kanāda's Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, it is clear that according to him doubt

17. upalabdhi-anupalabdhi-avyavasthāt aḥ, — Nyāya-sūtra - 1.1.23.

18. sāmānya pratyaksādviśeṣā pratyakṣādviśeṣasmitasyo ca samśayāḥ — Vaiśeṣika Sūtra - 2.2.17.
is only of one form. But Gautama clearly discusses the five forms of doubt in his śūtra, as supported by Phaṇībhūṣaṇa from the detailed examination of doubt in Nyāya-śūtra.\(^{19}\)

However, let us try to explain the nature of 'koṭi's of saṁśaya. According to the old Naiyāyikas, the 'koṭi's or alternative properties which appear to be possible predicates can all be positive (bhāva) in nature. Whereas most of the Nava Naiyāyikas hold that the one alternative must be positive or bhāva in nature and the other its absence or abhāva. But both the schools of Nyāya agree that the 'koṭi's of a saṁśaya must be incompatible, for that follows from the very laksana (defining characteristics) of saṁśaya. Incompatibility may mean both contrary and contradictory. Naiyāyikas also have two senses of viruddha. These are (1) svarupata-viruddha and (2) tadabhāvavyapyatvarūpa viruddha. The first one can be equated with 'contradiction' and the second one with 'contrary'. Now, if the 'koṭi's of a saṁśaya are to be incompatible in the first sense only, then the Navya-Nyāya view would have to be accepted, because only bhāva and the corresponding abhāva are svarupatah viruddha or contradictory. On the other hand, if the second sense of viruddha is also allowed in the sense of the koṭis of saṁśaya then the old Naiyāyikas view would also be acceptable. Because two positive properties like manhood and treeness have

\(^{19}\) Phaṇībhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa, ibid., P. 263.
tadabhāvavyapayatva rūpa viruddha between them, as wherever manhood is present, absence of treeness is also present and the like. But the Navya-Naiyāyikas do not allow this sense of viruddha for the koṭis of saṁśaya. They would argue that if the koṭis of a saṁśaya are all positive then they will be incompatible in the sense of being contrary. The type of saṁśaya which we are considering here is caused by the cognition of samānadharmā. For example, a particular height is said to be the samānadharmā of the koṭis — manhood and treeness because it exists in the locus of manhood as well as in the locus of treeness. Now if we have saṁśaya in the form 'Is that a man or not?' the koṭis are manhood and absence of manhood. But what is the locus of absence of manhood. All the things except man can be the locus of the absence of manhood. But the particular height does not exist in all those things. So the locus of the absence of manhood which is also the locus of a particular height, etc. is to be identified as a positive thing with a definite nature. And so we are to go beyond the mere negative character of the koṭi. We have actually before our mind some positive koṭi, like treeness, etc. which is contrary to the other koṭi, but for some reason we may prefer to replace it by the contradictory of the other koṭi when we express the doubt.\(^\text{20}\)

2.3. COMPARISON BETWEEN NYĀYA VIEW OF SĀṂŚAYA AND CARTESIAN DOUBT:

It is interesting to compare the Nyāya theory of sāṁśaya (doubt) with Cartesian doubt. Doubt plays a significant role in the philosophy of Rene Descartes. It is an indirect proof of truth, a proof by reductio ad absurdum. If once we accept that certain knowledge which is clear and distinct can not be doubted we can take a stock of such knowledge in our mind. The mind can be compared to a lumber room with probabilities as well as certainties. We may doubt each and every one of them. We may doubt the propositions obtained from experience and mathematical truths as well. We may go where the doubt leads us. Descartes finds a number of principles which enjoyed high status in the field of knowledge specially philosophy where no two persons agree — that melt away at the magic touch of this doubt. But the self can not be doubted. For in every act of doubting, the self is pre-supposed. As a thinker, it is there. Thought implies a thinker. Doubt implies a doubter. 'I think therefore I am (cogito-ergo-sum).' Descartes' doubt applies in the first instance to anything and everything in the world and also to any and every knowledge and experience. In his first 'Meditation' and also in 'The Principles of Philosophy' Part-I, he gives us the grounds of his universal doubt. These doubts are:

(1) The senses are often found to mislead us. We can not therefore place absolute confidence in them, for 'it would be imprudent to trust too much to what has even once deceived us.'

(2) Secondly, "in dreams we perpetually seem to perceive or imagine innumerable objects which have no existence".

2(a) There are, Descartes argues, "no certain marks by which the state of waking can ever be distinguished from sleep", i.e. from the state of dreaming.

(3) With regard to the supposedly self-evident truths of mathematics, it is often found that men fall into error even in such matters, and regard as self-evident what is really false.

(4) There is a final argument which we would be clear from the remarks to follow is of the highest importance. We possess a free will and we are therefore free to withhold our assent from whatever is doubtful. In otherwords we may suspend our belief in whatever is not "manifestly certain and undoubted."

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25. Descartes, *op.cit.*, P. 166.
Descartes' doubt, though universal is not destructive, and yields a principle which is indubitable, it is said to be only an instrument, a method. A distinction is made between methodical doubt and experimental doubt and it is claimed that Descartes, since his doubt is only a methodical one, is neither a sceptic nor a nihilist. An experimental doubt differs from the methodical one in being experienced as a psychological fact. The methodical doubt is a logical tool for quite certain about the truth or falsity of a proposition. It is an attempt to evaluate the truth or falsity of knowledge which it naturally takes for granted. "It is not knowledge so much as knowledge about knowledge". 

Whereas the experimental doubt seeks to ascertain, the methodical doubt seeks to confirm. As such it is very different from scepticism. Scepticism is essentially a conclusion about knowledge, the conclusion either that there is none or that there can be none. However, methodical doubt is not a conclusion about knowledge, it is an injunction to be obeyed in the hope of attaining knowledge. "Although not the same as scepticism its adaption might easily lead us into scepticism, for we may fail forever to find a propositional that cannot be doubted." 

Doubt has a positive significance. It is out to destroy everything but in the end it destroys itself as it hits hard upon the certainty of self-existence.

Further, doubt implies freedom of thought. Descartes' doubt was never an 'end' but only a 'means'.

The Nyāya account of doubt gives us some important truths. As a mental state, doubt is shown to be different from both 'belief' and 'disbelief'. It neither affirms nor denies anything, but only raises a problem for thought. As such, doubt should also be distinguished from 'the mere absence of belief'. In doubt, however, we think of two or more alternatives in regard to the same thing. It always has, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika would say, some koṭis which become contradictory when referred to the same subject. According to the Nyāya, doubt is never a definite cognition but an indecisive questioning attitude towards an object. It is not a judgement at all. It does not assert anything. When we are in doubt about anything we do not really know nor do we claim to know what it is. We can not even say that 'it must be either this or that'. All we can say is: 'Is it this or that?' It is on account of this that doubt is neither true nor false. It is not error also. It carries with it no definite assertion of any character with regard to its object. It makes no claim to be a true judgement of the object and so the question of its falsity or contradiction does not arise. Doubt is not valid knowledge (pramā). It may sometimes have the character of presentation (anubhava) of an object. But it has neither

29. Belief means a thing that one accepts as true or real. Disbelief means the lack of belief or inability to believe.
the mark of being an assured definite cognition (asāraṇḍigdha) nor that of a true correspondence with the object (yathārtha), and so, does not lead to successful activity.\textsuperscript{31} Doubt makes no claim to be a true judgement of the object and so the question of its falsity or contradiction does not arise. The value of doubt lies in its being a great impetus to study and investigation. It is the starting point of a critical knowledge of object. In this sense it may be said to be the beginning of philosophy.\textsuperscript{32} Knowledge is often arrived at through a process of this kind, initiated by a doubt and sustained by inquiry. Hence, doubt is the precursor of knowledge. The output of the Nyāya philosophic method is a decision or certainty (nirñaya). The process is set in motion by doubt and ends in a decision. What is decided would be claimed to be knowledge at least by the investigator, if he is satisfied. The end product takes the form of a mental episode called pramā, 'knowledge' (a knowledge episode). It is such a cognitive episode (jñāna) as hits the mark. It is this 'truth hitting' character of the episode that turns the cognitive episode into a knowledge episode, a piece of knowledge.\textsuperscript{33}

As J. N. Mohanty observes, "In so far as this doubt has falsity as one of its prakāras, the doubt is an apprehension of falsity in the belief, and therefore on the Nyāya rules would serve as a pratibandhaka to the

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\textsuperscript{31} S.C. Chatterjee, \textit{Ibid}, P. 31.  \\
\textsuperscript{32} S.C. Chatterjee, \textit{Ibid}.  \\
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appropriate practical behaviours. Normal practical behaviour would therefore be impeded by universal scepticism. Descartes and Husserl do not apprehend this possibility but on the other hand assure us that their doubt would leave the practical Lebenswelt untouched. There must then subsist a radical difference between the two doubts. They must then be not merely different kinds of doubts, but as doubts different". 34 The same radical difference comes to light if we examine what Descartes means by 'whatever is doubtful'. In one sense, a thing is doubtful if it is an object of doubt. But this is not the ordinary meaning of the expression. Secondly, if doubt meant to be, in fact, an object of doubt, then Descartes' decision to withhold assent from what is doubtful would be trivial then he would be asking us to doubt what is being doubted, which is actually pointless. Hence, doubtful means to be a possible object of a doubt. Nothing possesses any property or properities which make it liable to be doubted. There is nothing by itself is doubtful. At the same time, everything is a possible object of valid knowledge. Suitable epistemic conditions may however produce in a person doubt about anything. But in the philosophy of Descartes, there is an important sense, in which a thing may meaningfully be called doubtful. Descartes doubt is the starting point for indubitable truth. This is the sense that the thing could have been otherwise, that its contradictory is possible or a case of contingent.

But there is no such categorisation of things or facts or propositions into contingent and necessary in Nyāya Philosophy. The Nyāya knows no distinction between what is in fact true but might not have been and what is necessarily true, between the a-priori and the a-posteriori, or even between analytic and synthetic truths. Bare logical possibility or counterfactual conditionals donot interest it. It gives a logic of facts. Therefore, it would not approve of a universal scepticism based on the notion of logical possibility. "Should we then say that here is an overall limitation of the Nyāya logic, whose symptoms show themselves in all aspects of it far beyond the narrow subject-matter of the present paper? Perhaps it is so. It may also well be the case that doubt (or saṁsāya) in one sense is exactly what the Nyāya means by it, and for it the Nyāya logic is well adapted. At the same time, philosophical doubt, doubt in the reflective level, falls beyond its scope. And the two doubts, it may well be, are not only different kinds of doubts but are as doubts different. One and the same logic can not do justice to both. Descartes may be said to have erred on the opposite side, when he sought to extend the logic of ordinary doubt to philosophical doubt."\textsuperscript{35}