Conclusion.
Conclusion

We delve into sino-Indian history animatory to draw from its wealth of experience, accumulated over two millennia, of very different approaches and vision of thinking acting, being relating a small but growing body of literature is in the processes of offering another understanding of relation between India and China. Using archives derived from monks, scholars, traders and emissaries deputed to animate the ideas and activities trafficked between the Heavenly and middle kingdoms these scholars have constructed a narrative and key project in this regards has been conducted by D.P.Challapadhyaya, Tan Cung, D.Devahuti and A.Rahman they have assembled a multi-volume work the trackes the intensive interactions among India, China, central, and west Asia, from the 8th century onwards. Amartya Sen comments on the broad historicity of Indian and Chinese interactions and collaborations in fields trade, religion, mathematics astronomy, philosophy, medicine and public health just to name a few: the intellectual links between china and India stretching over two thousand years have had far-reaching effects on the history of both countries yet are hardly remembered
today..., a broader understanding of these relations is greatly needed, not only for us to appreciate more fully the history of a third of the world’s population but also because the connection between the two countries are important for political and social issue today.

Economic difficulties during the 1930’s and 1940 led a number of Chinese people to migrate to India, among other places. Census reports estimated the Chinese population in India to be about 9214 in 1951, about 14,607 in the 1960’s the centrality of the “borderland” to the “capital”. Duahuang, now in northwest China, anchored “serindia” writes Tang Chung (2002:130) it provided a site for 7th century Indian and Chinese to meet exchange and flourish through Buddhism, leading to the notion of “nizhong you wo, wozhong you ni” (I in you and you in me ) (Chung 2002:130) a center of the cotton Industry given its introduction to the plant by Indian trader in exchange for Chinese silk other location like Tashkent transited caravans from the silk road to Kashmir and Punjab though the Khyber pass was a most important center of Buddhist learning and research frequented for that purpose both by the chinese and the Indian.
A focus on borderlands necessarily shifts our attention to other ways of life and living. Though patriarchy prevailed throughout borderland societies showed alternative venues for woman’s agency precisely gain their cultural mixing. Borderland trade enriched the lines of those there and beyond. Exotic commodities like cotton cloth, sugar, black pepper, pineapple, walnuts spinach, jackfruit, mango, sandalwood, turmeric, jasmine, medicines herbs acrossed from the subcontinent up north and northeast. Like wise tea, dates, chestnuts, flowed from the Chinese interior out to the world.

A cosmopolitan outlook extended beyond the borderland. Geographically, the silk road linked, Europe with eastern China, the maritime route between Chinese ports and eastern coast of Africa and a southern silk road linking southwest China with south Asia. In the 7th century, king Harshvardhana ruler of what is now northern India, and the Tang Emperor Tai Zong (626-49) engaged in a series of exchanges involving monks and scholars as well as trademan it was during this period that India and China enjoyed their most prolife profound and productive interaction. Religion pilgrimages from India brought knowledge of Maths,
Astronomy calendrical science and medicine to then in Tang Court the Tang Emperor Taizong… the emperor, then sent out a mission headed by Cai Yin to go to India and to Invite Buddhism to China (Chung 2002: 132).

It might take some time before the boarder issues are sorted out. Its good thing is that both countries are also eager to sort it out it is probably a question of ‘when ’and not ‘how’. The strategy of not letting the border issues to be obstacles in the overall improvement of comprehensive relation between the two countries have improved. The political and the social gap are being narrowed and overall relation is less emotional than they were around a decade back.

India’s foreign policy transformation, from non-alignment and an inward focus to proclaiming itself a major power and looking to project power outward has been driven by both external events – such as the 1962 war with China, the end of cold war, the balance of payments crisis, in the late 1980’s and early 1990s. and by the conscious decisions of leaders and policy makers including Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Vajpayee, Rao, and Singh – deciding that is in India’s best interest to look outwards and declare itself a major power, while
India is not yet fully the major power it certainly has all the capabilities and drives to become one of the new major power for the next generation.

Over the last few years, tensions have been brewing India and China over their long-held border dispute the source of the tension is multi faceted but driven in large part by China’s concerns with an emergent India and Beijing desire to consolidate its position on Tibet while military conflict between the two Asian giants is unlikely any time soon, recent Chinese moves illustrate a broader trend of muscular diplomacy from Beijing over its various territorial claims.

Some Indian analyst’s believes that China is pursuing a two – pronged strategy of lulling India into complacency with greater economic interaction while taking steps to encircle India and undermine its security. China is strengthening this to its traditional ally Pakistan and slowly gaining influences with other south Asian Countries.

Despite improvement in economic ties and trade relations border disputes continue to be devil Chinese-Indian ties. India accuses China of illegally occupying more than 14,000 square miles of its territory on its
northern border in Kashmir, while China lays claim to more than 34,000 square miles of India’s northern state of Arunachal Pradesh. India is a long-term host to the Dalai Lama and about 1,00,000 Tibetan refugees, although the Indian government forbids them from participating in any political activity.

Out of concern for Chinese sensitivities the Indian government placed restriction on Tibetan. Protesters in India last spring during the uprising in Tibet and Beijing praised New Delhi for preventing Tibetans from marching to the Tibetan capital - Lhasa.

The basic problem is two fold. In the undefined northern part of the frontier India claims areas equal to size of Switzerland occupied by China, for its region of Ladakh. In the eastern part, China claims an Indian occupied area three times bigger, including most of Arunachal. This 890 km stretch of frontier was settled in 1914 by the government, of Britain and Tibet, which was then in effect independence, and named the Mcmohan line after its creator Sir Henery Mcmohan foreign secretary of British, ruled India, China- which was offered mere observer status at the negotiation preceding the agreement.
The Mcmohan Line represents a dire humiliation. China also particularly resents being deprived of Tawana, which though south of the Mcmohan line was occupied by Indian troop only in 1951, shortly after China’s new communist rulers dispatched troops to Tibet. This district of almost 40,000 people, scattered over 2000 sq kilometer of valley and high mountains was the birth place in the 17th century of the sixth Dalai Lama. Tawang is a centre of Tibet’s Buddhists culture with one of the biggest Tibetan monasteries outside Lhasa.

Making matter worst, the Mcmohan line was drawn with a fat nib, established a ten kilometers margin for error and it has never been demarcated with more confusion in the central sector border India’s northern state of uttarakhand there are in all a dozen streched of frontier where neither side knows where even the disputed border should be when India and China relations are strained, this gives rise to tit-for-tat and mostly bogus accusation of illegal border incarsions

The end of the cold war and an internal economic crisis led to liberalization the economy under P.M.’s Rajiv Gandhi and Rao, resulting in increase engagement both in the region and with the west, and an improved
economy that enable India to increase its standing on world stage.

In India the official tenth five year plan (2002-07) projects 8% average rate of growth for the period of 2002-07 and given the lower average growth of 5.5% per year in the recent past legitimate queries have been raised about the feasibility of allieding and sustaining an average annual rate of growth of 8 % or more in the next couple of decades. India has future to go in integrating its economy with the world economy and in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) than China and both could have growth arugmenting effects. India’s domestic reform process, after having slowed down since the last nineties, is gathering moomentum. Clearly, with an augmentation of the forces of competition (domestic and international) and acceleration of the pace broadening and deepening of reforms, the target of 8% growth could be attacked and exceeded. Whether these necessary steps would come about is an issue: for example the overall fiscal deficit of all levels of government taken together, and not including the losses of SOE’s, was 10.4% of GDP in 2002-03 and is projected to be 9.8 % in 2003-04 these exceed the 9.3% reached in 1990-91 on the eve of the
macro economic crisis (world Bank, 2003, table 2.2) unless the fiscal deficit is brought down significantly, the prospects of reaching and sustaining 8% growth are dim. Progress in some vital aspects of reforms such as privatization, liberalization of restrictive labour and bankruptcy laws, reforms of electricity generations, transmission, and distribution has been chequered with steps forwards as well as setbacks.

Trade in goods and services China continues to outpace India in global integration In 2002, it was the worlds fifth largest exporter of merchandise, with a share of 5% of world exports China is tenth in consumers service export with a share of 2.5% (ibid, Table 1.7)

Its growth in the share of merchandise exports is phenomenal more than quadrupling, India is a distant 30th in world merchandise trade, with a share of 0.8% in 2002 A more disaggregated picture in term of the changes in the share of India and China of several labour intensive exports in the world as well as in the major markets of North America (Canada and US) and the European union reveals china’s success relative to India’s even more starkly.
Estimate of labour productively in manufacturing suggest that except in petroleum product and non-electrical machinery, the productively of Chinese worker is higher than that of an Indian worker by anywhere from 30 percent to 180 percent, depending on the product. Of course, these estimates must be treated with caution, given a number of factors including the heterogeneity of labour and of products within broad manufacture sectors possible biases in the exchange rates used to convert each country’s output to U.S. dollars, and the fact that the comparisons is confined to the productivity of a single factors, namely labours. Cost comparison also provided for Chinese and Indian manufactured goods, some of which both countries sell in third markets and some of which China exports to India. These comparisons indicate that China has lower costs in many products than India though once again one has to keep in mind that the exchange rate used might be distorted. It is no surprise that china has gained, and India has cost market shares in third markets. Unless India catchup and become internationly competitive, thus trend is likely to continue in the future.
Botterlier points out that in exports of commercial services, India lag less behind China being the 19th largest exporter, with a share of 1.5% although growth of China’s services and merchandise export for outpace average growth of world exports, its merchandise exports grew much faster than service exports, so that the share of service exports in total exports has fallen to one of the lowest such ratio for any major country in contrast, India’s services, exportes are growing at about double the rate of its merchandise exports and if current trands, continues the share exports in total exports will exceed 50% in a decade there is on services sector viz Information technology (IT) in which India has notably out stripped China. In the year 2002 India’s IT export were almost $10 billion compared with $ 1.5 billion from China.

India’s current foreign policy is derived by the need to continue to grow the economy to keep up with a large and growing population. The economy growth require large amount of energy, which has led India to pursuing a civilian nuclear power deal with the United states as well as closer ties to energy – especially oil and gas- rich countries in the Middle East and Central Asia. India is
still pursuing increased security from potential adversaries in the regions including Pakistan and China in order to pursue its security agenda India is obtaining military equipment especially from the United States but its major sources and tools of foreign policy, strength remain its soft power economic aid and trade cultural and social connection a tradition of democracy and a widespread diaspora.

There are many caveats to the recent improvement in their relationship as the world’s oil wells run dry many including sober analysis in both countries foreseen china-India rivalry redrawn operation on energy was, after all, as usual as it was tentative. More often Chinese state backed energy firms complete with all-comers for Sudanese oil and Burmese gas and win.

Rivalry over gas supplies is a bigger concern for Indian policy makers they fear china would be more able to “capture” gas by building massive pipeline overing water is already an object of contentions. Given that several of the big rivers of north India, including the Brahmaputra on which the million depend rise of Tibet. China recently building a dam on the Bramaputra which
is calls the Yarhung Tsangpo, to divert the river’s waters to Chinese farmers.

As for chindia, it can seem almost too native to bother about over 70% of India exports to China by value is raw material chiefly iron ore, speaking a colonial style trade relationship. That is hugely favourable to China. A profligating range of Chinese non-tariff barriers to Indian companies, which India plays a small part of this. The fault lies chiefly with India’s uncompetitive manufacturing.

India’s great priority is to create million of jobs for its younger, bulging and little skilled population. Which will be possible only if it makes huge stricks in manufacturing similarly, if China trails India in IT services at present, its recent investment in the industry suggest it does not plan to lag for long. India, a rising Asian and world power, asks whether that rise will be successful and compatible with U.S. interest. It explores the history of the Indian foreign policy. As it was transformed from the inward-looking and non-aliging movement through the end of the cold war, economic liberalization the development of nuclear weapons, improved relations with the west, and an outward focus
based on increasing India’s power, the three case studies examine the tools India is using to expand its influence the three key regions – soft power in southeast Asia, hard power including military bases in central Asia, and diplomatic efforts with the Middle East.

The main thing is that India’s foreign policy is primarily based on its interest in any given situation; in compliance with classic realist theory the United States should not assumed India will be a reliable ally as India will continue to act based on its own interests. India is on the rise toward becoming a great power and is developing all the tools for achieving that status. However, Indian policymakers have not yet developed a comprehensive grand strategy to allow India to truly achieve its potential. Negotiation conducted by high-level national elites (Nehru, Deng, Clinton, Gandhi, Jiang) among the three countries on for instance, The India-China border dispute establishing nuclear deterrents the war on terrorism relation with Pakistan and political and economic influence in the south Asia-Indian ocean region.

Balance of power becomes the prevailing principle of interaction among the U.S. India and China. The crux of
the new triangle is that each actor fear alignment of the other two against itself. This fear exists for all the three actors but is especially strong for the two weaker state actors, China and India.

India for its part seems to have three primary interests within the new triangle. The first is to prevent or abort Chinese – U.S. cooperation contrary to Indian policy objectives…. A second Indian interest seems to be to play on Washington apprehensive over china growing power to secure U.S. support, for strengthening Indian preeminent position in the South-Asian-Indian ocean region via transfers of advanced military technologies training in modern models of warfare, and so on… India may also play on a U.S. desire to co-opt India into the U.S. led system of global power in order to secure stronger U.S. support for Indian economic and military development finally Indian’s third interest within the new triangle is to play on Chinese fear of Indian participation in U.S. inspired “anti-China” schemes to make Beijing more understanding of Indian objection to Chinese activities in the South-Asian-Indian ocean region

What we all need is not just change “the rules” but displace “the game” altogether. One way is to recognize
the larger content of social relations that already exist and in the case of India and China these reflect millennia old encounters, exchanges, and flows.
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disappointment over the Indian national movement failure to declare support to
the allies (in the absence of a clear guarantee that India would attain freedom),
U.S. efforts remained unsuccessful.

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Appendix
China-India relations
Background

Pre-Simla British map published in 1909 shows the so called "Outer Line" as India's northern boundary.
The Indian government's 1954 maps unilaterally delimited the Sino-Indian border in the Aksai Chin

Geographical overview

Map of Eastern and Southern Asia.
Left, India, right, China, salute

Indian and Chinese officers at **Nathu La**. Nathu La was re-opened in 2006
Ceasefire

The revised map of the disputed territory of Kashmir following the Sino-Indian War; notice the now Chinese-administered Aksai Chin region.

The disputed areas in the eastern sector  The disputed areas in the western sector
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.

Chinese fishing nets in Kochi, Kerala, India Stele installed in Calicut by Zheng He (modern replica)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People’s Republic of China</th>
<th>Republic of India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9,639,688 km² (3,721,904 sq mi)</td>
<td>3,287,240 km² (1,269,210 sq mi)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>1,341,000,000</td>
<td>1,210,193,422</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Population Density</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>140/km² (363/sq mi)</td>
<td>358/km² (927/sq mi)</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Beijing</td>
<td>New Delhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Largest City</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai (19,210,000)</td>
<td>Mumbai (21,900,967)</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Government</strong></td>
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<td>Federal parliamentary constitutional republic</td>
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</tr>
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<td>$5.365 trillion</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP (PPP)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$9.712 trillion</td>
<td>$4.001 trillion[^10]</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>GDP (nominal) per capita</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4,000</td>
<td>$1,176[^11]</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>GDP (PPP) per capita</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$7,240</td>
<td>$3,290[^12]</td>
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<td>0.612</td>
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<td><strong>Foreign exchange reserves</strong></td>
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<td>2,400,000 (millions of USD)</td>
<td>587,000 (millions of USD)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Military expenditures</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>$98 billion (2009)</td>
<td>$37 billion (2011)</td>
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Global domestic credit growth moderated in Q1-2010—exceptions incl. China, India, U.S.
Banking-sector credit, median rate, % change, 3m/3m, annualized 60

Sources: IMF and World Bank
1993
- Nepal: 1.89%
- Sri Lanka: 5.2%
- Bangladesh: 1.13%
- India: 35.22%
- Pakistan: 44.22%

1999
- Nepal: 5.17%
- Sri Lanka: 4.4%
- Bangladesh: 7.22%
- India: 47.81%
- Pakistan: 23.34%

2003
- Nepal: 1.1%
- Sri Lanka: 2%
- Bangladesh: 1.73%
- India: 65.08%
- Pakistan: 20.86%

Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, op. cit.