"I had all but finished the article on Diplomacy on 11 September 2001 when a few miles away the terrorist attack on the Pentagon, shortly preceded by the attack on New York, (This) suddenly changed the world around me. It seemed at that moment that anything that could be said about the past would seem hopelessly irrelevant in view of the drama of the present and the uncertainty about the future. It took time to realize that it is precisely at times like these that we need to reaffirm our connection with the past in order to bring perspective to the present and seek guidance for understanding what the future may bring," is how V. Mastny summarized his observation on the event of 11th September 2001. this is also true of many of us, whose life and ways of looking at the terrorism changed in the aftermath of 11th September 2001. strangely, this also had its effects on Diplomacy in general and for American diplomacy in particular for the world around.
There were new players, alignments, and issues but as yet no new rules. America's role in the new world order was equally unclear. Militarily, it enjoyed a preponderance of power unprecedented in modern times, but military force seemed less relevant and usable in the post Cold War era, and in any event, Americans were less disposed than at any time since the 1930s to employ it. Among elite's, there was vigorous debate as to the principles and purposes of U.S. foreign policy in the new world order. Among the mass public, there was indifference and apathy towards diplomatic movements.

Thus, the confusion of 2001 and the peace in the early 1990's with stability seemed to be within reach left many perplexed with the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union it was felt that a major cause of international tension had been removed if it did not eliminate altogether, the dreadful threat of a nuclear holocaust.
As explained in the earlier chapters, the emergence of democracies and market economies in the former Soviet satellites, Latin America, and even in South Africa offered the promise of a new age. The victory in the 1991 Persian Gulf War of a powerful allied coalition, working under the aegis of the United Nations, seemed to hail the triumph of Woodrow Wilson's dreams of collective security where peace would be maintained through international collaboration. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, President George Bush proclaimed the birth of a new world order under American leadership. State Department official Francis Fukayama went further, exulting in the end of history, the absolute triumph of capitalism and democracy over fascism and communism and the promise of a just and peaceful world composed of stable and prosperous democracies.

It did not take long for such prophecies to be exposed. At worst they seemed to be absolutely folly. The reality however was that the end of the Cold War had brought problems as well as blessings. Ironically,
victory had an unsettling effect on the Western democracies, and they entered the postwar period less confident about their basic institutions and values than at any time since World War II. Demobilization in the United States brought profound difficulties of readjustment for an economy that had been geared to war for five decades. Economic stagnation among the industrial democracies posed the possibility of trade wars.

In international politics, the end of the Cold War gave birth to conflict rather than to peace and harmony. The Cold War had imposed a crude form of order on inherently unstable regions of the world, and its end unleashed powerful forces that had been constrained for years. Especially in Central Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia, national loyalties gave way to smoldering ethnic rivalries and secessionist movements. Most prominent were the brutal war between Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in the former Yugoslavia and the conflict between Sunnis, Shiaites, and Kurds in the Middle East. As New York Times
reported in early 1993 forty eight such conflicts had scattered across the globe. Pessimists such as senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York warned of a new era of discord and disorder. "Get ready for fifty new countries in the world in the next fifty years," he admonished, "most of them born in bloodshed." Wilson's ideal of self determination seemed to have returned with a vengeance, threatening to tear the world apart rather than bring it together.

Other pessimists predicted even more gloomy scenarios. Some warned that the Cold War struggle between East and West would give way to a new conflict between North and South, between the haves and have-nots of the world, the West and the rest. Runaway population growth in the developing countries portended a possible disastrous drain on already scarce resources, enormous environmental problems that would afflict the entire globe, and the rampant spread of crime, disease, and war. Some commentators warned that international migration would be the greatest problem of the twenty first century and foresaw an
assault on the borders of developed countries through massive emigration. Others predicted that the anarchy had already gripping Africa and that it would spread across the globe, the chaos in less developed countries eventually contaminating the developed ones. Although such scenarios appeared unnecessarily gloomy and even based on a false nostalgia for the order of the Cold War, it seemed clear that the end of history was not in view. Conflict and disorder would characterize the post Cold War period.

The United States responded uncertainly to these changes. Americans recognized that there could be no return to isolationism in a world shrunken by technology and bound together by growing economic interdependence, but after forty years of international commitment and massive cold War expenditures they yearned for relief from the burdens of leadership. As in the aftermath of World Wars I and II, they preferred to concentrate on domestic problems, and support for foreign policy ventures waned. Memories of the Vietnam debacle lingered years
after the event, adding yet another restraint against global involvement. The outlines of the new world order were fuzzy at best, and Americans lacked a blueprint for dealing with it. The absence of an obvious threat to national security removed any compelling inducement to take the lead in solving world problems.

The halting response of the Bush administration to the new order that it once had hailed foreshadowed the difficulties of the post Cold War era. After its firm leadership in the Persian Gulf War, it did little to address longer range but still pressing problems in the Middle East. Its response to the mounting crisis in Bosnia suggested its uncertainty. Despite warnings from some quarters of a new holocaust and its own bold rhetoric, it did nothing to halt Serbia's ethnic cleansing. State Department spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler asked, 'Where is it written that the United States is the military policeman of the world?' But the administration appears never to have decided whether it was really committed to the new world order.
under American leadership that its rhetoric had proclaimed, or, because of domestic needs, it preferred retreat and retrenchment. But little did the administration realize that it had created enmity among the Muslim nations and Muslim Communities by his engagement in Iraq and Iran. The administration never thought of looking towards what was quietly emerging as a new phenomena in the International order the TERRORISM, with its home in Afghanistan. These ignorant steps of American engagement, their forgotten memories of their support to those who fought against Russia in their Ideological Bethel had all left the wounds of promises of American dreams made, slowly brewing in to bitterness of 'Hate America' Syndrome nourished by safe heaven for centuries by old Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan the forgotten land.

Despite the fact that America’s experience as an imperial nation produced mixed results. Some Americans basked in the prestige that accompanied great power status. Others were more concerned with the negative side of imperialism a brutal guerrilla war in the
Philippines, the tarnishing of America's ant colonial heritage, the expense of maintaining colonies, and the failure of sizable foreign trade to develop in colonial areas. Above all, the policies of imperialism often put the United States at cross purposes with the current of nationalism, which would become the dominant international force in the twentieth century.

Thus, America could tip the balance between the evenly matched Allied and Central powers. The decision to intervene in the middle east thus, marked what Daniel Smith has called a Great Departure in American diplomacy.

From the defeat of the treaty by the senate in 1919-20 till date the shift in diplomacy is America has been to remain aloof from European affairs. But Diplomats could not ignore the fact that the United States had become the leading creditor nation and that administration during the 1920s had to work towards tried to bringing this gap between isolationism and activism in world affairs by emphasizing economic
diplomacy and disarmament. Their hope was that general prosperity and stability, orchestrated through Diplomatic leadership, would bring lasting peace. These hopes were dashed by the paralyzing effects that the Great Depression had on the victors of World War I.

Not long after the end of the Second World War, U.S. and Western relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated rapidly, giving rise to what historians have termed the Cold War. As early as 1946 former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill described Europe as divided by an Iron Curtain which separated the free nations in the West from the captive peoples in the Communist controlled East. Historians have vigorously debated the reasons for the outbreak of the Cold War. Some have traced the origins of the conflict to the long standing ideological tension between the two powers and the political collapse of Europe in the wake of World War II.
After an uneasy period of adjustment following World War II, the United States and the USSR became implacable enemies. The main area of confrontation was in Europe and Asia. Following the Communist takeover of China in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War the next year, the United States mobilized its resources to contain communism on a world wide basis.

During the past quarter century the United States has been forced to reevaluate the extent to which its diplomatic, economic, and military power can influence and shape world events.

The Vietnam War, America's longest and in some ways most tragic conflict, demonstrated the limits of its power. One lesson of the Vietnam War was that the world is not divided into two camps headed by the Soviet Union and the United States. A third camp, or "Third World", of intensely nationalistic and neutralist oriented nations has emerged since World War II. This phenomenon was apparent long before
Vietnam, but that conflict dramatized the importance of the Third World for many Americans.

In Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, Third World nations, some rich and some poor, exerted an increasing influence on global affairs. The United States has been challenged to adjust its foreign policy to accommodate this sweeping change in international power relationships since 1945.

Lester D. Langley and James W. Harper analyzing American foreign policy and diplomatic style in these Third World regions maintained the fact that the United States face even more difficult problems and challenges in the future, especially if it fails to peddle on without diplomatic missions and the support of diplomats world over.

However, American foreign policy in the twentieth century has undergone great changes that seem to be accelerating as the century progresses. The nation has achieved important successes in world
affairs and also has experienced failures. It has gone from the position of relative novice in international politics to world leader. There is no turning back to the tranquil period of American isolationism of the nineteenth century. The searching question is how America will this country use its energy and resources to confront the difficult international problems that will challenge the nation in the future including Terrorism thus, along with the American perspective on diplomacy, diplomacy parse also experienced a shift.

**Diplomacy as an anti terrorist Policy: Retroaction**

In recent years a debate concerning the nature of Diplomacy has stirred considerable controversy among political scientists and historians. Reduced to its simplest terms, the debate has centered on the question of whether or not Diplomacy could be an attractive instrument of change across the globe.
Historians view diplomacy in the 1920s as weak, halting, and timid and claimed that it contributed significantly to the breakdown of the international order in the 1930s which, in turn, resulted in World War II.

Revisionists such as Carl Parrini and Melvyn P. Leffler, who have followed the lead of radical historian William A. Williams, maintain that diplomacy was extremely active in international affairs in the 1920s and that it is diplomacy that did not leave nations like the United States to follow. Isolationist policy and forced its leaders, vigorously pursue international objectives of peace, stability, and prosperity through a variety of diplomacy rather than through binding treaties and political commitments.

The debate over whether or not diplomacy in the 1920s was isolationists is of limited usefulness because it is more semantic than real.
To this extent, it can be said that a mood of isolationism that existed in the United States during the 1920s had its effect on diplomacy. Recent scholarship on the diplomacy of the postwar decade has provided several clues which help to clarify the nature of diplomacy. These studies indicate that the 1920s were a transitional decade in the shaping of twentieth century diplomacy.

The strategy of economic diplomacy relied on two concepts that were in evidence throughout the decade: 1) that independent business experts should help shape diplomacy because of their skill in this area and their objectivity in the face of political pressures; and 2) that economic and political agreements should be voluntary, based on mutual benefit and the enforcement power of public opinion.

The main thrust of America's European diplomacy, during the years of post war however, directed toward the problem of postwar reconstruction. With stress on lasting peace through diplomatic
consultation caught the imagination of diplomatic leaders in the post war period.

Business as well as political leaders stressed that the scientific advancements in communication, transportation, and technology made in the early part of the century and accelerated by the war would lead to a prosperous world society linked together in peaceful effort. Economic, rather than political, forces would shape the future, and governments should pursue policies that conformed to the movement of economic forces rather than impeded them. As the leading industrial and creditor nation, the United States would play a vital role in shaping post war events if a coherent policy of economic diplomacy could be implemented was the thought of the era.

The use of independent business experts to implement diplomacy was based in part on the experience of the progressive Era and the war, which showed that scientific management of governmental problems was more efficient, more equitable, and
served the public interest. As Michael Hogan has pointed out, this form of public/private power sharing in diplomacy "conformed that it avoided wasteful and undemocratic state capitalism, and guaranteed a more efficient and peaceful management of world affairs.

In confronting the problem of European reconstruction along with many other diplomatic issues of the 1920s, American leaders relied heavily on economic diplomacy, voluntarism, and the use of business experts to achieve their goals.

This diplomatic strategy was first put to the test in confronting the problems associated with European reconstruction. Much of the continent was devastated by the both the military and economic effects of the war.

The approach to the problem of European reconstruction was to use patience and economic diplomacy, and that diplomacy which was the world’s leading instrument of negotiations among nations, was
to play an important role in it. As expected, for the Diplomatic guild used the Dawes plan and Locarno pacts to achieve the singular triumph of their economic diplomacy in Europe. In addition to their reliance on economic diplomacy Diplomatic leaders believed that international disarmament would help guarantee worldwide security and stability.

In light of the events of the 1930s and 1940s, many historians laid emphasis on furthering economic diplomacy and disarmament, however the failure of economic diplomacy to generate an expanding commercial system, gave way to deteriorating state for Diplomacy in the world.

Thus, the policy of economic diplomacy to preserve political stability contrasted sharply with different nations in different parts of the world.

Despite the success of economic diplomacy, supported by public/private power sharing, voluntarism, continental self sufficiency, and
disarmament and its rejection of direct military commitments, contemporary observer. A seemingly futile nuclear arms race has rekindled interest in and look toward diplomacy as a viable option to get over these problems too.

The increasing interdependence of the world economy has reemphasized the importance of economic diplomacy in particular and Diplomacy in general underscored the necessity of public/private power sharing in solving many international economic as well as political problems. The oil crisis of the 1970s has renewed some interest in continental self sufficiency. Even the concept of Diplomatic voluntarism, which was anathema to post World War II leaders, is again spoken of as a viable, although limited, strategy in the recent era of détente.

Thus, the current reconsideration of diplomatic strategies, the world has overvalued the usefulness of voluntary Diplomatic agreements and underestimated the value of military commitments. Attempts to bring about
meaningful disarmament were in many cases naive and illusory. The reliance on public/private power sharing worked well in some instance, most notably the Dawes plan, but was poorly coordinated in other cases, such as in the Young plan negotiations. In retrospect between 1920s and 1970s one could say was a transitional decade in the making of diplomatic efforts, in which new the strategies in diplomacy it is learnt were said to be innovative and relatively updated and should prove to be effective.

Diplomacy: its Legacy

It is therefore altogether appropriate to ask in what ways the legacy of the Cold War has influenced diplomacy as the profession and art of conducting international relations. Has diplomacy become more or less needed, useful and feasible whatever the impact of the Cold War on Diplomacy, has that impact been ephemeral or lasting what does the experience of the 40 year conflict, still vivid in our memory, presage for the future of diplomacy in changed
world. In what ways have the events of 11 September 2001 and their aftermath changed the perspective.

In the fall of 1939, as Europe plunged into the Second World War, there existed on the surface a solidarity in the Western Hemisphere. In the past decade, Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt had done much to alter the image of the United States as a predatory Anglo Saxon nation in Hispanic America. Under Hoover the country had dramatically retreated from the empire that it had created in the Caribbean after the war with Spain, under Roosevelt it had repudiated intervention as a means of settling its disputes with hemispheric countries and to some degree accommodated its policies to nationalistic Latin American governments seeking greater control over foreign companies operating in their domain. Roosevelt became a popular figure in Latin America. Some of them, he once declared, referring to its people, think they're just as good as we are and they are.
In 1938, at the Pan American Conference in Lima, delegates who a decade before had condemned U.S. intervention in Nicaragua supported a vaguely worded resolution calling for a united hemisphere Canada excepted to meet any external threat. Shortly after the outbreak of the European war in the following year, they met again in Panama to deal with the economic problems brought on by the war, and, following Roosevelt's personal recommendation, to declare the Western Hemisphere south of the 49th parallel off limits to belligerent activity. As Hitler's armies swallowed up western Europe in the summer of 1940, hemispheric conferees met in Havana and announced that European possessions in the Western Hemisphere could not be transferred to a non American state. Already the United States had undertaken a vigorous defense program for the vulnerable Caribbean and its strategic lifeline, the Panama Canal. After Pearl Harbor yet another special conference was called to line up Latin American nations behind the United States against its global enemies Germany, Italy, and
Japan. By then, most already had broken diplomatic relations with the Axis powers and would shortly declare war.

Beneath this apparent harmony there were discordant signs. The United States declared that its purpose in waging war was the elimination of dictatorial regimes such as Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's Italy, and Hirohito's Japan, yet its Latin American allies were hardly examples of decent democratic regimes committed to Roosevelt's Four Freedoms of speech and worship, from want and fear. In the Caribbean, which almost slavishly followed American policy, strongman governments prevailed in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. In the larger countries, whose commitment was even more crucial to American policy, there were blatantly anti-democratic governments. Although supportive of the war effort to the extent of sending an expeditionary force to Europe, Brazil had in Getulio Vargas what some American observers considered a Brazilian Mussolini, and Argentina, which
did not join the Allies until the war was virtually over, exhibited a defiantly pro German stance.

The complaint Latin American governments, expecting Washington to be grateful for their support by opening its coffers, learned shortly after ward from Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey that they must still look to private investment for their needs. The continent received some public aid, but it was a pittance compared to the millions poured into western Europe. In 1952, when revolutionaries took over Bolivia and nationalized the tin mines, the Eisenhower administration subsidized the new government in large part to prevent a sharper turn to the Left. A few years later Eisenhower responded favorably to Panama's pleas for greater economic benefits from the canal. Not until after Vice President Richard M. Nixon was stoned and spat upon by leftist demonstrators in Lima and Caracas in 1959 did the U.S. government finally acquiesce in the region's insistence on an inter American development bank, a proposal that it had been making for twenty years.
On January 1 of that year, Castro had triumphed in Cuba. From its beginning, the Cuban Revolution became intricately intertwined with U.S. Policy toward Latin America. Ultimately, it would dramatically affect the Soviet American relationship as well. Ironically, when Castro first came to power, many observers in this country welcomed the political change. After all, the end of the 1950s in Latin America looked like the twilight of the tyrants. Peron had fallen in a military coup in Argentina in 1955, Manuel Odria, the Peruvian chieftain, in 1956, and Gustavo Rojas Pinilla and Marcos Perez Jimenez, Colombian and Venezuelan strongmen in 1957 and 1958, respectively. Even the supreme tyrant of the Caribbean, El Benefactor Trujillo of the Cominican Republic, although still in power in 1959 and the opposition of Costa Rica's leader Jose pepe Figueres. Throughout the region it appeared that a new generation of civilian leaders, who believed in political honesty and progressive rule, was taking over. Even under Eisenhower, and certainly under Kennedy, the United States realized
that its policies must accommodate these changes. In this view, then, Castro looked very much like the guerrilla warrior fighting for the restoration of constitutional rectitude in a corrupt society.

In Cuba, unlike any other Latin American Country, the triumph of the revolution meant ultimately not only a break with the old order but also something more significant: a break with the United States. How this came about it still a controversial story. Castro's detractors those Americans such as Vice president Nixon, or the professional classes that fled the island in the early 1960s argued that he was, as he declared in late 1961, always a Marxist Leninist and fully intent on communizing the island. In a variation on this theme, tough minded liberals who saw Castro as a social reformer contended that he betrayed his own revolution by letting ideologues such as Ernesto Che Guevara chart Cuba's course. His defenders in the United States mostly academics and elsewhere in Latin America argued just as vehemently that the American decision to use economic and,
ultimately, military measures to overthrow Castro drove him into the waiting arms of the Soviets.

In the early 1960s, Washington's amenable attitude toward military governments and dictators had noticeably cooled. What the United States wanted and what Latin America needed were left of center civilian governments, but there was a limit to how far left a country might shift before it incurred America's displeasure. Kennedy set the priorities early on after the assassination of Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. Our choice, he told an aide, are a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo dictatorship, or a Communist takeover. We should strive for the first, but we can rule out the second until we're sure we can avoid the third. Using such logic, he condemned the military when it took over in the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Peru, and Argentina in 1962-63, but in the same period he quietly acquiesced in its seizure of control in Guatemala, where Arevalo was on the verge of returning to power, and it British Guiana, scheduled for independence,
where the United States had to choose between a popular pro Soviet leftist, Cheddi Jagan, and an anti Soviet leftist, Linden Forbes Burnham. Kennedy met with Jagan but remained suspicious and persuaded the British to delay their departure until 1966 when Guyana, with Burnham as leader, became independent.

Lyndon B. Johnson inherited not only Kennedy’s Vietnam policy but his hemispheric policy as well, and, as in Southeast Asia, Johnson put his own peculiar imprimatur on it. Of all recent American leaders, Johnson should have been the best informed about Latin America’s political, economic, and social problems, about the Hispanic Psyche and its values, and about the U.S. Latin American relationship. After all, he had grown up in the hill country of south central Texas only one hundred miles or so from the Mexican border in a state heavily influenced by Hispanic culture. Still, his was a warped cultural education, he saw Mexicans harassed for years in a political and economic system that regarded them mostly for their cheap labor and their votes in an
election. In the campaigning of 1960, Kennedy had won by a razor thin margin. In Texas, Mexican voters in the southern countries had been hastily corralled by rural Democratic bosses and transported to the polls to give Kennedy and Johnson a victory. In dealing with Hispanics, Kennedy, who had been virtually uniformed about Latin America before the 1960 campaign, was noticeably simpatico. His successor once laid out his philosophy with, predictably, an anecdote that was vintage Johnson. I know Mexicans, he declared, they’re good neighbors, But you’ve got to lay down the rules when they get to the front gate. If you don’t before you know it they’re up on the front porch.

Johnson has been harshly judged by Latin Americans not only for his role in the Dominican intervention but also for his uncritical response to the military takeover in Brazil in 1964, which demonstrably slowed that country’s spiraling inflation but did so at a noticeably severe political price. Investors who had grumbled for years about inefficient Alliance programs and inept leftist governments welcomed
Johnson's appointment of Thomas Mann as coordinator of hemispheric policy because Mann had a businesslike approach to the region's issues. Yet it must be remembered that Johnson maintained financial commitments to the Alliance even as the Vietnam War was annually consuming more and more of his budget and time. He could be charitable with Hispanics, such as at the Chamizal ceremony that took place on a strip of land between El Paso and Juarez that after a century of dispute was being turned over to Mexico, or as spokesman for the international Great Society as he stood under a blazing border sun with the president of Mexico and talked about some vast cooperative program for the Mexican and American peoples, to the noticeable indifference of the Mexican leader.

Nixon referred to his Latin American policy as the new partnership. Economic barriers began to fall as he announced that a new General System of Preferences (GSP) would govern inter American trade. For the hard pressed Caribbean nations, which usually exported one or two products, GSP meant greater access to the vital
U.S. Market. Much of the goodwill was offset, however, when Congress, infuriated over the 1973 oil embargo, took revenge on all members of the Organization of petroleum Exporting Countries, including Venezuela and Ecuador, by denying them trade preference. The effect on Venezuelan American relations was predictably harsh.

One year or so before Nixon resigned there was a thaw in Cuban American relations brought on by Castro's irritation over skyjackers and, more important, by Congress's urging. Nevertheless, relations deteriorated just as quickly when Cuba dispatched troops into Angola and Ethiopia. Rebuffed by congressmen alarmed over another Vietnam, Kissinger announced that Cuba was simply doing Moscow's bidding in Africa. This statement was only partially correct. True, the island nation had been fully incorporated into the Soviet bloc, but its role in Africa went beyond the carrying out of the Kremlin's designs. Cuba's cultural background is African as well as Hispanic; thus, Castro declared
that Cuba must participate in liberating African peoples from the last grasp of imperialism. In 1979 the Cubans began dispatching the first continuum bringing more than twenty thousand, with half of them black. To Washington, these words were very much Marxist rhetoric, but they had a noticeable impact in the Caribbean, where black power movements had surfaced in the early 1970s and people were becoming more sensitive to their African past. Buba’s relations with the Lesser Antilles, negligible in 1970, grew rapidly in the course of the decade.

Even those countries once considered surrogates defied the United States. Tiny Panama, under Omar Torrijos, threw out the 1967 canal treaty proposals and demanded a new agenda. He united all Latin Americans against the United States on the canal issue and even brought the UN Security Council to Panama to deliberate on the subject. Although every president since Kennedy had declared that one day the canal should be Panama’s there was still the issue of dealing with the powerful canal lobby. Before the
fight was over and President Jimmy Carter and Torrijos were sitting side by side to sign new treaties providing for ultimate Panamanian ownership, the canal’s defenders fought a final battle to preserve the most visible symbol of America’s imperial past.

The Malvinas war, which for a few weeks alerted the American people to the hemispheric crisis, just as quickly passed into obscurity. The dramatic U.S. invasion of Grenada in October 1983, presumably undertaken to prevent over six hundred American medical students from becoming hostages to a radical regime that had seized power from pro Cuban governments, also did not convince Americans that they must shift away from gloemma in dealing with Latin America. In the late 1930s, as war approached in Europe, the Roosevelt administration had exploited public fears about German influence in Latin America to break down isolationist sentiment. Defense of the hemisphere became a popular theme during the war, but the United States had a different purpose than had
Latin America in promoting inter American unity. It was moving toward globalism, and it needed reliable allies in the region for its future commitment in the world. Their country's fundamental political, economic, and cultural interests lay with Western Europe, Americans decided, even as it participated in the Rio Treaty and the OAS. Obsessed with the Soviet threat in the postwar years, the United States relinquished much of its commitment to the Western Hemisphere idea, the cumulative beliefs of generations that held that the future of the hemisphere lay in republican governments whose goal was the betterment of their own peoples lives. As Kennedy said, the United States must strive for decent, democratic regimes. He believed that the American political and economic system, despite its flaws, offered the developing Latin American nations a preferable alternative to Castro's Cuba.

In some respects the 1984 Kissinger Committee report on the Central American crisis restated Kennedy's priorities of democracy, economic
development, and social justice, yet, as he himself had shown in his dealings with Latin America, the top priority in U.S. policy was strategic denial. In other words, the U.S. approach to the Western Hemisphere sought always to deny, or at least to limit, the influence of no hemispheric powers. After the 1960s strategic denial declined in importance in U.S. calculations the Nicaraguan Revolution and the guerrilla insurgency in El Salvador, profoundly influenced by the Cuban Revolution, challenged U.S. hegemony in a region historically considered our own back years. In the 1980s, however, the Reagan administrations efforts to achieve a military solution usually expressed as low intensity warfare ran afoul of contradictory and even hostile counter forces. The Sandinistas in Nicaragua proved that they could defy the United States, the Salvadoran guerrillas demonstrated that they could hold their own against a government heavily dependent on U.S. military support, most Latin American and even usually sympathetic European allies were opposed or indifferent to what they considered a misplaced U.S.
preoccupation with Central America, and most important, Congress doubtless expressing widespread public doubts grew disenchanted with the hard line approach. In the late 1980s, Central Americans began to take control of their own destiny with high level negotiations to end the decade long strife. In 1990 the Sandinistas lost the Nicaraguan presidency with the surprising electoral victory of Violeta Chamorro, and a few years latter a fragile cease fire came about in El Salvador.

As President Bush turned over Latin American policy to Bill Clinton, the prospects for a democratic and prosperous hemisphere were, paradoxically, both heartening and ominous. Unlike the 1960s there was no Soviet or Cuban challenge, and authoritarian government had given way to democratic regimes espousing pluralistic politics and free market economic models. Yet, despite the promise of a new era, Latin Americans in the 1990s confront social inequities in many ways as grievous as those denounced by Kennedy in 1960, as the economic reforms
have produced limited results. Populist appeals, whether from the Right or the Left, resonate in such circumstances. Narco politics is as threatening to democracy as Marxist ideology ever was. In Peru and Haiti, harassed governments defy the international community, the OAS, and the United Nations. In the summer of 1994, as desperate Cubans piled on makeshift rafts to leave a failed socialist economy where nutritional levels have fallen to precarious levels, Castro proved again as he had during the 1980 Mariel boatlift that the Cuban government, however weakened, could nonetheless exercise influence over U.S. immigration policy.

What the United States confronts in Latin America, then, is an opportunity to join with other governments in dealing with these issues and, in the process, to forswear the unilateral solutions of the past for a reasoned, collective strategy. What both the United States and Latin American governments may face by the year 2000 however, is a hemisphere riddled with seemingly intractable problems economies that
cannot be managed by traditional political means
societies of misery in the midst of progress,
governments whose policies are determined less by
purpose than by budgets, and nation states so
fragmented by racial, ethnic, and cultural divisions
that social cohesion and attachment to country are as
fragile as they were at the moment of independence. In
such circumstances the democratic, prosperous Latin
America imagined by the proponents of a North American
developmental policy after World War II may remain a
fanciful dream.

The Middle East, Oil, and the Third World

After World War II, Americans became accustomed
to new words describing the world in which they lived.
During the late 1940s they learned that they inhabited
a bipolar world dominated by the United States and the
Soviet Union. In the mid 1950s the phrase "Third
World" crowded its way into the headlines. The Third
World countries, most of them located in Africa or
Asia and most of them former European colonies or
spheres of influence, sought a neutral or nonaligned path following neither the United States and its allies nor the Soviet bloc. Dominated by a consuming desire for full national independence, often facing staggering economic problems, and having regional rather than global interests, these nations posed major challenges for American foreign policy.

No region of the globe was more typical of the Third World or more challenging than the Middle East. Before World War II most of the region had been under various forms of European Control, and even nominally independent nations such as Saudi Arabia and Iran often felt the pressure of outside influence. Economically most of the region was backward, underdeveloped, and feudal, and it depended on foreign economic assistance. Even the newly discovered oil wealth went largely into foreign hands. After World War II the nations of the Middle East moved rapidly from political dependence to independence, and the formerly subsidized Arab oil states emerged as one of the world's dominant economic forces. Most
important, the region’s chief political conflict the Arab Israeli confrontation dominated all diplomacy and helped to transform the United States into a Middle Eastern power.

In the last fifty years the United States has become the major foreign participant in Middle Eastern affairs. This transformation in policy constitutes one of the most dramatic changes in modern American diplomacy and a major chapter in its relations with the Third world. In 1900, America’s interests in the Near East were modest. Its limited trade centered on exports of petroleum, chiefly kerosene, to a region whose vast oil deposits had not yet been discovered. Its diplomacy focused on protecting American nationals, securing opportunities for Christian missionaries to proselytize in the Moslem region, ad supporting American Jews who wished to spend their last years in Jerusalem. In all matters political and economic, the nations diplomacy took a backseat to European activity. Although America’s involvement increased between 1900 and 1945, as manifested by oil
concessions in Saudi Arabia and growing support for a Jewish national homeland in Palestine, it deferred to Britain in the region until after World War II.

Several factors intensified this involvement after 1945. One was the growing importance of Middle Eastern oil. Fearing a postwar shortage of oil, State Department officials, during World War II, had moved to increase U.S. influence in the region. The February 1945 meeting between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia symbolized America's growing interest in this strategic and oil rich region. Moreover, it became apparent that Britain, weakened by the war, would be unable to perpetuate its dominance in the area after the global conflict. As in other areas of the world, the United States took steps to replace Britain as the stabilizing force.

The Cold War also helped to alter traditional American policy. Tension between the United States and the Soviet Union first occurred in the Middle East during 1946 when Soviet troops refused to honor a
wartime agreement to evacuate the northern third of Iran, which they had occupied during the war. The Russians demanded oil concessions similar to those that Iran had granted to Britain, aided Iranian Communists in the Azerbaijan region, and threatened to make the country a Soviet sphere of influence, if not a satellite. The United States moved quickly to support the Tehran government, and eventually the twin pressures of American opposition and Iranian resistance forced a Soviet retreat. For U.S. Policymakers, however, the Middle East had become yet another region threatened by Soviet expansion. A second Iranian crisis occurred in the early 1950s when Premier Mohammed Mossadegh sought to nationalize the British owned oil fields. Britain threatened an invasion, and the Western oil companies initiated a boycott of Iranian oil that threw the country’s economy into chaos. Fearful that Mossadegh was a front for Soviet influence, the United States responded to the crisis with a central Intelligence Agency intervention that led to his overthrow. The agency helped to restore Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi to power
in 1954. Thereafter, American policy was aimed at bolstering the shah as an anti-Communist bulwark in the region. Spurred by visions of restoring Persian greatness, Reza Pahlavi cooperated with the Western powers, working out an oil takeover agreement with the British in 1954 and joining defense arrangements such as the American supported Central Treaty Organization (CTO) in 1956.

Perhaps the most important cause of increased U.S. involvement in the region was the creation of the state of Israel in 194. This dramatic event aroused the deepest animosities of the peoples of the Middle East, caused four major wars and hundreds of incursions and terrorist attacks, and spun a web of diplomatic problems still not untangled. The Holocaust had galvanized Western opinion behind the old idea of a homeland for the Jewish survivors of the ghastly Nazi exterminations. As Seth Tillman has noted, however, this support of Zionism conflicted with America's economic stake in Arab oil and its strategic interests in aligning the Arab states
against the Soviet Union. Moreover, when the Palestinians dispossessed by Israel made their own demands for nationhood, they, like the Israelis before them, appealed to the venerable American principle of self determination.

America's domestic racial problems were another obstacle in dealing effectively with the countries of the Third World. These nations were largely nonwhite, and during the 1950s and 1960s, when the plight of black Americans gained international attention, racism at home undercut U.S. efforts to pose as the champion of freedom, equality, and democracy abroad. Moreover, racial prejudice, combined with economic and political considerations, made the United States slow to condemn racism in nations such as South Africa and contributed to a tendency to disparage Asians and Africans in general. With regard to the Middle East, this attitude could be seen in a consistent and often distorted portrayal in the American Press of Arabs as backward, primitive desert dwellers who were not as
The Suez crisis of 1956 and the resultant Anglo French invasion of Egypt in October of that year ended any American hopes of using England and France as anti Soviet surrogates in the Middle East. Furious at Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, in part caused by an American refusal to sell arms to Egypt or finance the Aswan Dam, England and France plotted a joint invasion with Israel. The European states intervened under the pretext of protecting the canal. Israel, eager to avenge escalating guerrilla raids that had been launched from Gaza, swept toward Suez, but the Anglo French effort was plagued by poor planning, inept leadership, and uncertain objectives. The invasion foundered when the United States publicly criticized its allies and the Soviet Union threatened to rain down rockets on the European attackers.

The Suez fiasco marked the end of Anglo French control in the region and forced Eisenhower to play a
much more active role there. The president took the lead in effecting a British and Israeli withdrawal and, with the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1958 congressional authorization for the United States to aid any country in the Middle East threatened by communism, sought to enhance his authority to act in the area. Nevertheless, Eisenhower's preoccupation with Soviet intentions caused him to forego any serious effort to negotiate an Arab Israeli settlement in the wake of Egypt's military humiliation by Israel and Arab appreciation of America's condemnation of the Israeli attack. The result instead was an uneasy truce with UN peacekeeping forces separating the Israelis and Egyptians.

During the remainder of his administration, Eisenhower actively sought to align the United States with the Pro Western governments in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. He invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine on only one occasion in 1958 in the wake of a successful anti Western coup in Iraq and an abortive one in Jordan. Later that year the pro Western
Lebanese government claimed that it was threatened by outside aggression. When battle equipped U.S. Marines hit the beaches near Beirut, however, they found only bikini clad swimmers and hot dog vendors. It became clear that the conflict in Lebanon was a result of internal strife, and the troops were withdrawn. Despite his administration attempts at peacefully bolstering its influence in the Middle East, by the time Eisenhower left office in 1961 it was apparent that Moscow's weight in the area had grown. Soviet military advisers with the armies of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq had replaced those from the West, and Soviet funds financed the Aswan Dam and propped up the Syrian economy. Moreover, the revolutionary nationalism so loathed by Dulles was a growing force from Algeria to Yemen.

Under John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, American policy toward the Third World changed. Whereas Eisenhower had often granted economic aid in hopes of securing short term political support in selected neutralist countries, Kennedy and Johnson
sought to provide economic assistance with less regard for the recipient's ideology, with the intention that by promoting independence and nationalism Soviet influence might be checked. Both presidents intended to show that assistance came without strings and was aimed at the betterment of the people. The most dramatic example of this approach was the Peace Corps, which sent thousands of young Americans to underdeveloped areas to attempt to improve living standards. Also, during the 1960s the commitment of the U.S. government to rights for its own minorities blunted much of the earlier criticism of the country as a racist society. Meanwhile, as Russian contacts with people from the nations of Asia and Africa increased, stories of Soviet maltreatment of Third World students and brutish behavior in these areas made Russians appear no more free of racial prejudice than Americans.

During the Kennedy and Johnson years, Middle Eastern developments were overshadowed by the Cuban missile crisis and the Vietnam War. The region was far
from calm, however. Israel concentrated on building its economy and military with the support of the more sympathetic Democratic administrations in Washington. Beneath the surface Arab resentment seethed, and American dependence on cheap Middle Eastern oil rose during a period of unparalleled economic growth. This uneasy political status quo was shattered by the Six Day War of 1967. A variety of events including the removal of UN observers, border incidents, and threats to shipping prompted Israel to launch a full scale attack against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. In less than a week June 5-10, Israeli troops routed all three rivals, seizing Gaza and the Sinai from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. Despite massive military aid and training provided by the Soviets, the Egyptians and the Syrians were crushed. Apparently, political pressure from the United States and a need to consolidate its conquests stopped Israel from taking the capitals of all three Arab nations, Now their humiliation was complete, leaving legacy of jokes about Arab incompetence and causing Americans
wistfully to contrast the decisiveness of Israel's victory with their own quagmire in Vietnam.

The Just as the Egyptian Israeli treaty was being hailed as a major triumph, American diplomacy suffered a stunning reverse in Iran. After the restoration of the shah in 1954, U.S. relations with Tehran had grown increasingly close. The shah seemed like the kind of Moslem we could live with his oil flowed west, he joined pro Western military alignments, and he even maintained diplomatic relations with Israel. Even when the shah took positions in conflict with American interests, such as his leadership in establishing OPEC, he compensated by spending much of his oil revenues in the United States. Richard Nixon was determined to make Iran the linchpin of his administrations Near Eastern policy. The shah was encouraged to purchase huge quantities of the latest U.S. Weapons, American businessmen rushed in to build new Iranian cities, and U.S. Intelligence agencies placed some of their most important installations in his country. Reza Phlavi
was delighted to cooperate, regarding American support as the key to establishing his country's dominance in the Persian Gulf, if not the entire region.

The shah's newfound prominence obscured the wrenching changes taking place within Iran as oil wealth and foreign development propelled the country from backwardness to modernity in the space of two decades. This rapid growth provoked both leftists and rightists. Leftists, educated in the West, deplored the sha's authoritarian rule and called for a popular based government. On the Right, Moslem leaders deplored the erosion of traditional values and the secularization that appeared indistinguishable from Westernization. By the end of the 1970s these forces burst forth into what became one of the bloodiest revolutions in modern times. The shah was deposed, and the charismatic Moslem fanatic, the Ayatollah Khomeini, gained control of the government.

Initially, the Carter administration misread the depth of opposition to the shah. As the revolution
grew, memories of the Vietnam experience led the United States to refrain from massive intervention in support of the shah and to seek contacts with the revolutionaries. Unfortunately, U.S. ties to the past were all too visible in Iran, and the revolutionary rage was virulent in its anti Americanism. This rage erupted in November 1979 with the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran and the kidnapping of over fifty U.S. diplomats and embassy employees. The ensuing hostage crisis poisoned the American mind against Iran. As diplomacy dragged on and a rescue attempt failed, the crisis undermined the ability of the Carter administration to continue the Camp David process. It also played a major role in the defeat of Carter in the process. It also played a major role in the defeat of Carter in the 1980 election. When the hostages were finally released, Americans seemed disposed to let the dust settle and await further developments within Iran.

The hostages were released as Ronald Reagan took the presidential oath in January 1981, thus freeing
his administration to return to the central question of Arab Israeli relations. Although Reagan had campaigned on a platform of closer support for Israel and much of his rhetoric resembled that of Dulles, his administration was soon pursuing essentially the same approach as that of Kissinger and Carter. Dependence on Arab oil and a desire to support anti Communist Arab states such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia balanced the political commitment to Israel, and the new administration was soon supporting a policy of major arms sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia as well as to Israel.

Reluctantly, the United State was forced to confront what had become the major block to Arab Israeli peace the Problem of the Palestinians. The 600,000 refugees of 1948 had become the 4 Million Palestinians of 1980, spread throughout the Arab world and vehemently insistent in their demand for their own homeland. The Palestinians had first relied on Arab states such as Egypt to champion their cause, but by the end of the 1960s they became more self
assertive. By 1968 the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) under Jerusalem born Yassir Arafat emerged as the leader of their nationalism. Dedicated to an Arab state in Palestine and hostile to the very existence of Israel, the PLO resorted to terrorist attacks on Israel and Israelis to gain attention to its cause. By 1974, Arab states recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians, and Arafat made a dramatic appeal at the United Nations, which accorded his organization observer status during the same year.

Palestinian nationalism forced U.S. leaders to weigh the old American principle of self determination against the nation’s traditional policy of support for Israel. Complicating the foreign policy debate was strong domestic political support for Israel. Well educated, influential, and with a high voting rate in key states, American Jews consistently pressured legislature and executive alike on behalf of Israel’s position and contributed impressive amounts of private financial aid. By the 1980s, as Noted earlier, these
Jews were joined by Protestant fundamentalists who saw the Jewish state as a fulfillment of biblical prophecy and urged virtually unquestioned support for Israeli governments refused even to consider negotiations with the PLO, and American leaders who sought to support or even establish contacts with the PLO risked the full fury of politically powerful Israeli supporters within the United States. Increasingly in the 1980s some Palestinian settlement seemed a keystone of any durable Middle Eastern peacemaking.

Although the Iranian hostage crisis and the Palestinian question captured American public attention, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan held far greater international and strategic implications and accelerated what historian H.W. Brands aptly characterizes as "full immersion" by the United States in the region during the 1980s. The Carter Doctrine of January 23, 1980, warned that outside attempts to control the Persian Gulf menaced vital U.S. in tourists. It implied that nuclear
weapons might be used to block threats to crucial areas such as Saudi Arabia. Carter backed his doctrine with a much higher defense budget, the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force, and covert assistance to the Afghan rebels. Reagan continued these policies. As the decade unfolded, the USSR's unsuccessful war against the Moslem mujahideen and growing internal weaknesses undercut its influence in the Middle East just as the U.S. profile rose.

President Regan initiated his full immersion with the rhetoric of a renewed Cold War. Unfortunately, his approach suffered from his inexperience and from divisions among his key advisers. In 1982 the Palestinian issue led to Reagan's first crisis in Lebanon. This once peaceful nation had become the major PLO base during the late 1970s Palestinian raids, Israeli retaliation, and fragile cease fires followed in rapid succession. Lebanese sovereignty succumbed to raids by guerrillas against Israel and strong Israeli counterstrikes against guerrilla bases in Lebanon. Moslem Christian
hostility ignited a bloody civil war while a Syrian occupation originally aimed at ending the civil strife became itself a source of instability. The final blow fell in June 1982 when Israel, determined to end the use of Lebanon as a base for terrorism and seeking to defuse growing Palestinian unrest on the West Bank, launched a full scale invasion driving all the way to Beirut. The resultant civilian deaths caused by American made Israeli weapons and the massacre of Palestinian noncombatants by Israel's Christian Lebanese allies prompted a major negotiating effort by Washington and the dispatch of U.S. Marines to Lebanon as part of an international peacekeeping force.

Neither the Israeli vision nor U.S. intervention brought peace to Lebanon: cease fires, truces, conferences, and fighting followed in seemingly endless succession. Unable to bring its power to bear and stung by incidents such as the terrorist bombing of the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut in 1983, the Reagan administration withdrew its forces in 1984. Israel did likewise in 1985. The
Lebanon episode left a weakened PLO, further fractionalized by the growing appeal of Islamic fundamentalism. Most disturbing to Reagan himself, whose election had owed much to the hostage humiliations of 1980, U.S. intervention provoked new terrorist incidents and captures of Americans. Terrorism was so rampant that Time magazine considered the masked terrorist as its symbolic Man of the Year in 1984.

Rhetorically, Reagan denounced terrorism, opposed deals with terrorists and their sponsors, and condemned nations such as Syria, Iran, and Libya for supporting killers and hostage takers. Several incidents with Libya, culminating in a bombing attack in 1986, amplified the tough, no deals line. Secretly, however, the administration had embarked on one of the most bizarre dealings in recent diplomacy. Hoping to open a door to Tehran and free American captives, officials led by National security Council operatives William. McFarlane and Oliver North facilitated the sale of hundreds of missiles to Iran and provided
intelligence information on its enemy, Iraq. In return, Tehran was to persuade its terrorist allies to release the hostages. The effort drew the opposition of the secretaries of State and Defense and liberated only three hostages in exchange for hundreds of missiles. The initiative, however, persisted for nearly two years, partially because the participants secretly and illegally diverted funds from the arms sales to aid the Contras, a rightist group opposing the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The exposure of this “Irangate” episode forced the resignation of several key Reagan advisers, sparked congressional hearings reminiscent of Watergate, and left serious doubts about the president’s competence in international affairs, if not his leadership and memory.

By 1994 chances for peace in the region were the best since 1945, and perhaps the best since the Balfour Declaration on Palestine in 1917. Many problems remained, however, developing and nurturing trust after decades of suspicion, violence, and hatred
promised to be a slow and difficult task. The region's penchant for violence and terrorism, instability in many governments, and the still unmeasured appeal of Moslem fundamentalism all remained reasons for caution. Yet the striking diplomatic revolution of the 1990s along with the absence of an outside power to move in troubled waters allowed ample reason for optimism.

The 1990s also marked the obsolescence of the term Third World. Even before the end of the Cold War the usefulness of the concept had waned. The striking divergence in economic status, national interests, and political alliance among the nonaligned nations made generalizations difficult and concerted policy toward them all but impossible. During the 1980s nonaligned countries had still gathered at meetings and sought unified policies in international bodies, but local conflicts often overrode common global positions. Wars and boundary disputes between countries such as Iran and Iraq, and Ethiopia and Somalia, were far more important to these nations than maintaining identical
positions on Israel, nuclear arms, and economic development. China's rapprochement with the United States and its rise as an economic power had eroded its role as a spokesman for the underdeveloped lands. In areas as far apart as Angola, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan, the United States and China often adopted similar policies.

The success of OPEC, whose members had claimed emerging nation status, created economic rifts within the Third World. Oil rich Saudi Arabia, for example, and few economic interests in common with destitute Bangladesh. The rampant worldwide in flation of the 1970s caused largely by the astronomical OPEC price hikes produced greater economic hardship in developing countries than in West. The very economic fragility of many non aligned states also undermined attempts at collective positions. The collapse of common OPEC production and pricing agreements in 1985 and subsequent failures to revive the organization's power during the next decade highlighted the divisions even among oil producers.
The end of the Cold War accelerated the replacement of the term Third World with the term North South in the international lexicon. The ideological concept of the Third World, describing those nations that wished to be nonaligned between East and West, gave way to a focus on the world's North South economic and developmental division between the industrialized nations, mostly in the Northern Hemisphere, and the less developed have not states south of the Equator. This new focus promised that much diplomatic attention would concentrate on problems of environment, population growth, development, and exploitation of global resources.

American attitudes concerning the Third World had changed in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Selected areas such as the Persian Gulf involved vital interests, but in general U.S. policy toward underdeveloped countries during the 1970s and 1980s had emphasized political activity over military intervention since any consideration of involvement in
Angola, Iran, and El Salvador encountered fierce opposition cries of "not another Vietnam." The Carter administration downplayed ideology, and even the Reagan administration, whose rhetoric sounded like a return to the days of Dulles, if not John Wayne, seemed reluctant to launch a full-scale military action. Even the volatile and emotionally charged issue of terrorism evoked only limited military responses from the United States. Underscoring the diminution of American activity was the reduction of economic assistance to developing countries. By 1984 the $4.87 billion in foreign aid amounted to less in constant dollars than the $2.47 billion expended in 1974. By the 1990s even economic assistance to former Soviet Union states to help dismantle their nuclear weapons encountered difficulty as the United States grappled with its own economic stagnation and deficit. Japan, Germany, and Saudi Arabia emerged as major sources of economic aid to underdeveloped regions.
The 1990s found the United States pulled in two opposite directions. Victory in the Cold War and Operation Desert Storm had left the nation as the only global military power. The triumph of liberal capitalist internationalism fostered a desire to engender democratic aspirations from China to Haiti. Advocates of various causes sought to enlist U.S. military support in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and elsewhere, yet the enormous economic problems within the United States and the rise of economic rivals such as Japan joined with still strong memories of Vietnam to buttress those who called for a cautious international role. Growing diversity within American society reinforced these contradictory international impulses and gave the United States significant potential for leadership in an increasingly non-European world, but it also evoked calls from groups of Americans who wanted policy to tilt toward homelands as diverse as Armenia, Bosnia, and Cuba.
After first reflecting on the plight of diplomacy in the twentieth century, I focus on three pertinent parts of the Cold War legacy. The first is the legacy of Western diplomacy of the early Cold War years, the most important result of which has been the integration of Europe, with NATO and the European Union, along with all that these institutions and the related procedures have come to mean for the conduct of international relations. The second is arms control diplomacy the most authentic part of superpower diplomacy which gave the Cold War its distinctive flavour and left behind both accomplishments and failures that profoundly influence our understanding of the traditional relationship between diplomacy and military power. The third part of the legacy to be considered is multilateral diplomacy, which grew during and out of the Cold War and began to reshape both the content and the style of diplomacy in ways never before encountered. Yet the long term significance of all these parts of the Cold Wars legacy remained unclear until the terrorist challenge provided a new point of reference.
The Plight of Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century

The twentieth century was not kind to diplomacy. The tragedy of World War I, the defining event of the bloody century, has been widely, if simplistically, blamed on the sinister machinations of what critics called the old diplomacy, a preserve of the classes that irretrievably lost their power and privileges as a result of the conflagration. But the new diplomacy that emerged from the ruins was hardly an improvement. Not only did the century see a second total war, which by definition meant failure of diplomacy and its relegation to a secondary place while the guns were firing, but the quality of diplomacy was also changed.

The pressure for openers and responsiveness to people's wishes, no matter how admirable and inevitable a consequence it was of World War I and the events that followed, coexisted uneasily with the confidentiality and specialization indispensable for
diplomacy. The memory of the secret treaties secretly arrived at publicized by the Russian Bolsheviks in their assault on the capitalist order, exerted an inhibiting effect on diplomacy. Whatever the merits of the substitute public diplomacy, often indistinguishable from propaganda, it was not a prescription for efficiency. The diplomacy of the interwar period is mainly remembered for its failures, World War II being the ultimate one.

But neither does the record of World War II diplomacy, pursued in trying consciously and self consciously to avoid the mistakes of the preceding years, shine in retrospect. Motivated by the memory of president Woodrow Wilson's distressing experience at the Paris peace conference, the well intentioned American insistence on avoiding during the war any commitments over the heads of the peoples involved that might later prejudge their future meant delaying settlements until these proved no longer feasible. The delaying did not preclude secret deals, to which the
British as well as the Soviets were more favorably disposed than the Americans, making matters worse.

The notorious Churchill-Stalin percentages agreement of 1944 tried vainly to determine with mathematical precision the inherently incalculable division of Eastern Europe into spheres of influence. The opposite flaw marked the Yalta agreement too vague rather than too precise to clarify its signatories' different intentions and expectations. Even though the agreement was not responsible for the later division of Europe as the Yalta myth would have it, it highlighted the failure of both the West and the Soviet Union to mutually accommodate their divergent interests and aims, thus making the division inevitable.

Ambiguity, whether deliberate to avoid difficult decisions or unintended because of poor preparation, was a flaw of World War II diplomacy that precipitated the Cold War a conflict none of its belligerents wanted or anticipated. To be sure, conflict between
the West and the Soviet Union was inevitable once their common enemy had been defeated, as indeed it had been ever since the 1917 Bolshevik revolution established the fundamental incompatibility of their respective political and social systems. But the intensification of the conflict into the total war that the Cold War came to be was something that astute diplomacy might have prevented.

The peace settlement with Germany that the victors had been aiming at never took place an unprecedented failure of diplomacy after a major war. The peace treaties with Germany’s European allies, which recognized faits accomplis without reversing the slide to hostility, were no diplomatic feats. Nor was the later peace treaty with Japan, which fell short of inducing the country to come to terms with its militaristic past, causing problems with its neighbors even half a century later.

In view of the dismal record of diplomacy from World War I through to World War II it was only
natural that afterwards an attempt would be made to build on different foundations. The Cold War, and the Soviet threat that came with it, provided the foundations that was necessary for diplomacy to blossom once again.

The spate of diplomatic activity in the middle of the century which laid the foundations of the transatlantic alliance and united Europe was unprecedented. It unfolded in the unique setting of what Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad has termed the American empire by invitation. This was the setting in which the United States wielded its vast preponderance by pursuing enlightened self interest to the benefit of other nations, both friends and former enemies, aiming with their encouragement at the creation of an international system that would accommodate and eventually supersede diverse national interests. This was the golden age of American diplomacy, the age of George Kennan, George C. Marshall and Dean Acheson.
It was also a golden age of European diplomacy, that of Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer and Paul Henri Speck the founding fathers of a new Western European community that was built with a skill and wisdom rarely seen on the continent since the nineteenth century. The new spirit of solidarity among nations on the notoriously fractious continent, epitomized by French German reconciliation, was a signal achievement of Western diplomacy starting as it did with a cooperative rapprochement of the elites and subsequently filtering down to the general population.

To some extent, Western diplomacy did the right things for the wrong reasons. Its achievement was made possible by a perception of Soviet threat that we know today was much exaggerated. That perception rested on often misleading parallels between the familiar Nazi threat and the novel Soviet threat. To its credit, however, the West's diplomacy was not primarily geared to the possibility of war the customary task of diplomacy in earlier times but to the avoidance of war through the building of new
cooperative structures that could defeat the enemy in peaceful competition.

This new kind of diplomacy helped create the great international organizations NATO and the institutions of united Europe which proved their functionality and resilience in adapting to changing circumstances. NATO's transformation from a strictly military alliance into an instrument of military and political coordination in conformity with the 1967 Harmel report ensured the alliance's longevity. No less important than the new structures and processes were the feelings of common purpose and habits of cooperation that enable North America and Western Europe to jointly wage the Cold War, win it, and overcome it as well. The willingness and ability of their nations to accept limitations on their sovereignty for the sake of a common higher good was a signal diplomatic innovation that remains the Cold War's abiding legacy.
Important though diplomacy was in drawing the West together, it proved inadequate for managing the East West confrontation that was at the heart of the Cold War. The inadequacy reflected the overwhelming importance attached to ideological considerations during the early years of the conflict, considerations that could not readily be addressed by diplomatic means. The ideologically grounded belief in the fundamental incompatibility of the respective interests left little room for diplomacy, particularly after the two blocs confronted each other in a real war in Korea. The day in 1951 when the armistice negotiators there stared at each other for 135 minutes without uttering a word may be regarded as an all time low for diplomacy.

The end of the Stalin era heralded a weakening of ideological constraints on diplomacy, although ideological preconceptions never entirely disappeared from the Soviet theory and practice of international relations. They continued to shape for several more years the diplomacy of China and other communist
states outside the Soviet sphere of control, though not nearly so much that of the United States and even less of Western Europe. The overall decline of ideology as a determinant of East West rivalry coincided with the progress of decolonization, which brought the Third World as a force in its own right into an international system defined for centuries by the First Western world and, more recently, by its confrontation with the second world dominated by the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{13}

The Soviet Union preceded the West in grasping the importance of neutral and nonaligned countries for the revival of diplomacy. Khrushchev's diplomatic forays into the Third World extended the scope of the Cold War beyond the rigidly defined division of Europe into the 'gray' areas where the lines had not been so frozen, leaving more room for diplomatic maneuvering. The results were sometimes disastrous for the countries concerned, but this rise of diplomacy at least gave the East West rivalry a relatively manageable dimension just as the Cold War was becoming
less manageable as a result of its nuclearization. Advances in nuclear armaments, particularly the advent of the hydrogen bomb and intercontinental ballistic missiles, which posed the threat of mutual annihilation, pushed East West diplomacy into directions for which it was not prepared.

The Pitfalls of Arms Control Diplomacy

The possession of advanced nuclear weapons and their means of delivery in quantities far exceeding those of any other nation defined the superpower status of the United States and the Soviet Union and thus marked the onset of a peculiarly skewed diplomacy. Superpower diplomacy tended to reduce other nations to important bystanders while moving the two rivals into uncharted seas propelled by their overcharged concern with the dire, yet otherwise unknowable, implications of their ever expanding nuclear arsenals. They both became increasingly preoccupied with esoteric calculations of possible, though hardly probable, uses of the doomsday weapons
that neither side wanted to use yet both craved to possess and enhance.

Detached from particle realities, the arms control agreements that eventually ensued from the expanded East West diplomatic activity were largely exercises in futility that distorted the understanding of the relationship between military power and diplomacy. They tended to divorce military considerations from political purposes, thus neglecting the cardinal requirement of effective policy, which has been recognized in theory ever since the days of Carl von Clausewitz in the early nineteenth century, and in practice long before. Superpower diplomacy was initially notable for its failures, later partly compensated for by modest accomplishments.

American insistence on negotiation from strength, understood as military strength, was not conducive to diplomatic interaction at a time when
the definition of military strength became increasingly elusive. But neither was Khrushchev's attempted use of nuclear weapons for diplomatic blackmail, which led to the Cold War's climactic crises in Berlin in 1961 and in Cuba the following year. Neither of these was a glorious occasion for diplomacy.

The Berlin crisis was overcome by 1962, though not resolved, through the internal workings of the Soviet bloc stabilization of the walled off East Germany rather than by diplomacy. During the Cuban missile crisis, a looming catastrophe was averted by means of the superpowers emergency management that bypassed established diplomatic channels and practices. Foreign ministries and their resources were notable for their absence as the crucial decisions were left in the hands of the protagonists and their ad hoc staffs. The highly personalized superpower diplomacy could at most be credited with mastering crises that it had created in the first place.
Only after the sobering effect produced by this brush with disaster did arms control diplomacy come into its own and yield results the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963 and the Nonproliferation Treaty five year later. These proved to be its most lasting achievements, attuned as they were most closely to practical realities. The treaties sought to restrain the development of ever more and better nuclear bombs as well as their acquisition by additional countries in return for the promise by the superpowers to build down their own arsenals. Although the promise was poorly kept as long as the Cold War lasted, it began to be implemented afterwards. And proliferation, though not blocked, was at least kept within tolerable limits while standards to contain it were established and widely recognized.

The more esoteric later treaties, hailed in their time as major arms control accomplishments, appear diminished in retrospect the anti ballistic missile treaty that vainly sought total security in total vulnerability, the SALT agreements that slowed down
but did not reverse the growth of the nuclear arsenals, the 1972 Moscow treaties that bred the illusion of detente and its later disappointment. With reliance on irregular back channels, catering to the Soviet predilection for secrecy and for special agents rather than diplomats, superpower diplomacy was at odds with the democratic spirit that had been the strength of Western diplomacy in the early Cold War years. Superpower diplomacy, like its foremost practitioner, Henry Kissinger, harked back to the nineteenth century rather than looking forward to the twenty first.

The 1972 ABM treaty, undeservedly made topical three decades later by the United States drive for National Missile Defense, exemplifies the misconceptions that led arms control in the wrong directions.

The protracted and unproductive mutual and balanced arms reduction talks as well as the on and off Geneva talks about the reduction of intermediate range nuclear forces were symptomatic of the
The Cold War left behind the spurious notion that it had remained cold because of the alleged balance of terror between the two potential superpower combatants, implying that otherwise they would have succumbed to an irresistible urge to attack. This was an exceedingly crude premise on which to build diplomacy. Preoccupation with strategic stability based on obscure calculations of nuclear postures made conventional military power more difficult to integrate with diplomacy. The very notion of a war declared and conducted in accordance with
international law, whose norms and procedures have been refined over centuries to mitigate the cruelty of war and facilitate its terminations, became a conspicuous casualty of the Cold War. Hamstrung by the nightmare of a nuclear holocaust, the Cold War mentality hampered legitimate use of force, thus building a precarious foundation for security's new architecture.

The Advent of Multilateral Diplomacy

There was, however, a countervailing tendency in effect. Arms control was not the most rapidly expanding area of diplomacy once the Cold War loosened up in the 1960s. That distinction belonged to the diplomacy conducted within the framework of the United Nations after the unproductive disarmament negotiations had left that framework to become the arms control negotiations later in the decade. The expansion of UN based diplomacy was linked to the concurrent progress of decolonization, which altered both the style and the substance of diplomacy.
Decolonization brought into being scores of newly sovereign countries that had previously been objects rather than subjects of diplomacy. They became part of the international system that the West had developed and defined over 300 years since the peace of Westphalia. Their particular interests and priorities began to shape that system, and with it its diplomacy, in ways extraneous to both the traditional great power rivalries and the more recent Cold War rivalry. The influx of the new nations into the UN placed them in positions of influence out of proportion with their power as measured by traditional standards. The creation and growth of a host of specialized UN agencies and programs was largely the result of Third World input. The resulting diplomacy may have done little to alleviate the staggering problems of newly independent nations in the short run, but it established a diplomatic agenda that drew greater attention to them in the long run. As long as the Cold war lasted, however, the intrusion of its rivalries obstructed that agenda.
While the United Nations expanded the scope of diplomacy the most significant diplomatic innovations did not take place within the unwieldy and heterogeneous framework of the world organization but within the more manageable and homogeneous regional framework of Europe, in conjunction with North America. The precondition for such innovations was the onset of East West détente in itself not so much an accomplishment of diplomacy as its catalyst, inspired by the spreading conviction that expanding areas of common interest allowed more room for diplomacy. That conviction was more deeply held by smaller nations of both power blocs than by their superpower patrons, who were preoccupied with nuclear posturing.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe the Helsinki process was expressive of the instinctive belief the new realities, conducive to overcoming the Cold War, could be created in Europe by multilateral diplomacy. Ironically, the idea of a security conference had originally been conceived by the Soviet Union with the goal of preventing the
creation of any new realities deemed harmful to Soviet interest. Whatever the original intentions and expectations of its participants, the conference nevertheless became an engine of change, driven by the Western European states that had learned to act in concert as members of a community, assisted by the neutral and nonaligned countries similarly acting as a group, and supported by the United States despite its initial scepticism.

The CSCE’s distinctive contribution to diplomacy is clearer in retrospect than it was at the time, when its efficacy was underrated by mistakenly applying to it the canons of Realpolitik. With its assumption of the sovereign equality of all its members, the conference allowed different states to exercise more diplomatic leverage than warranted by conventional standards of power politics, not to mention superpower politics. Ingenious diplomatic innovations made this possible.\(^{14}\)
The conference started as a process rather than an institution. Besides the new style of membership, it introduced a new style of negotiation in stages that required consensus at each stage before proceeding to the next. It added periodic follow up conferences, which reviewed and compelled compliance. The process expanded the notion of security and made it more malleable, including and emphasizing its nonmilitary dimensions from human rights to trade and other issues increasingly relevant to the security of states and their citizens. Helsinki established the revolutionary principle that the manner in which states treat their own citizens is a legitimate subject of international scrutiny.

The expansive agenda of multilateral diplomacy anticipated the future by looking beyond the bipolar system constrained by the nuclear stalemate. It assumed that securing the political and economic well being of peoples could become a more important determinant of international order than the competition of states for power and influence. Such an
assumption did not ignore military issues indeed, it was the CSCE that eventually broke the logjam of negotiations about cuts in conventional forces and armaments. It provided the framework for the withdrawal of the oversized armed forces from the heart of Europe, on whose presence the Continent's stability had supposedly been resting. It laid the diplomatic foundations for the alternative regime of military restriction and obligation that has since underpinned Europe's security.

Post Cold War Diplomacy

Diplomacy made no negligible contribution to managing the initial transition to a multipolar international order. However, when the Cold War ended in a fashion that devalued military attributes of power, the future role of diplomacy did not appear immediately clear. Leaving aside fantasies about the end of history and with it presumably also of diplomacy as a tool of conflict management, there was a prevailing sense that a very unusual era had came to
an end. The unanswered question was whether its termination would lead to a return of the seemingly more normal international order or disorder that had preceded it, or else to something entirely new.

At the beginning of the decade, pessimists saw the demise of the bipolar order as a prelude to a Hobbesian struggle of tall against all, with even Europeans reverting to their old habits of fratricidal warfare, with diplomacy to match. This was the dire prophecy of American political scientist John Mearsheimer in 1990, oddly reiterated even ten years later, thus indicating the persistence of the misnamed realist theory of international relations, itself a product of the Cold War. More plausibly, optimists could see in the restoration of multipolarism a return to more manageable conditions, resembling those of the nineteenth century concert of Europe, which had kept order until what perceptive historians have described as the avoidable accident of World War I. According to John Mueller, the experience of the two world wars made another major war obsolete a state of affairs
that might be seen as providing new opportunities for diplomacy while not necessarily ruling out minor wars.

It soon became obvious that both the pessimistic and the optimistic views were oversimplified, as their extreme predictions failed to materialize. As always, there were continuities and discontinuities, the relative importance of each being notoriously difficult to gauge for contemporaries. With the Cold War receding in memory and international crises predictably occurring, it was not easy to reconcile the fact that the world had become indisputably safer with feelings of insecurity that nonetheless persisted. In theory, conventional wisdom grasped the need to prepare for new security challenges that could not be easily predicted in practice, diplomacy, with its proclivity to respond to what is rather than to what might be, did not prepare itself well for the task. This did not mean, however, that it was entirely devoid of accomplishments.
The part of the Cold War's legacy that underlay transatlantic cooperation, particularly NATO, and Europe's integration was treaties governing numerous aspects of international life, which are generally observed since it is in their signatories best interest to observe them. The highly specialized diplomacy developed to sustain this system involved unexciting everyday matters and fine tuning rather than crisis management, providing drupe with unprecedented stability and giving an example emulated in other parts of the world as well. Such different projects as the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) were unmistakably influenced by the experience of the European based transnational organizations and their diplomacy, born of the Cold War and perfected since.

The diplomacy that led to the enlargement of NATO in 1997 and the alliance's first shooting war in former Yugoslavia two years later suffered from residual Cold War thinking. Bringing into the alliance
three former Warsaw Pact members was inspired by the old NATO of the Harmel report that envisaged coordinated political action with preparations for defence. Yet the alliance could no longer respond to the same demonstrable military needs or serve as the primary instrument of political cooperation once the Soviet enemy was replaced by feeble Russia. In groping for NATO's new mission, its diplomats misjudged the intentions of Serb dictator Slobodan Milosevic by attributing to him similar constraints as those that had motivated Soviet leaders a misjudgment that plunged the alliance into a war for which it was unprepared. If in the end its generals nevertheless won the Kosovo war, this happened despite rather than because of the diplomacy that had tied their hands.

The post Cold War diplomacy found it difficult to come to terms with military power. With a lack of clarity about the value of the nuclear weapons inherited from the Cold War, their dismantling through diplomatic interaction between United States and the successor states of the former Soviet Union proceeded
in fits and starts. Nor was it clear how much conventional forces was needed and how, if at all, it was to be used; the United States, though possessing the armed forces most extensively involved around the world, paradoxically displayed the greatest unwillingness to expose them to harm. The diplomacy of peacemaking and peacekeeping was notable for small successes and larger failures, although it did establish itself as an indispensable part of the international landscape.

The 1990s marked an uneven progress of the multilateral diplomacy born of the Cold War. Already the coalition building in the Gulf War against Iraq highlighted its growing importance, albeit without lasting consequences. The United Nations expanded the range of its activities even as the result fell short of the expectations. The Organization for security and Cooperation in Europe, diminished in importance while expanded in scale, did find a role for itself in crisis prevention and crisis management. Concern about being excluded from the benefits of globalization
provided incentive to those governments that might need it, such as China, to become more constructive diplomatic partners. In a stark exception to the trend, however, at the turn of the millennium the unilateralist proclivities of the Bush administration threatened to bring the United States into diplomatic isolation before the terrorists unwittingly came to the rescue.

Thus, the attack clearly gives any reader a clear picture of the power position influence of diplomacy prior to 11th September 2001.

Diplomacy its: Prospects:

In the above paragraphs we have examined as to how the attacks on New York and Washington affect the Cold War's ambiguous legacy that had permeated the diplomacy of the preceding decade. Has the legacy been reaffirmed, repudiated, or rendered irrelevant. At first, it was difficult to tell because of bewilderment about the elusiveness of the new threat,
doubts about the adequacy of a military response to it, and uneasiness about the fragility of the Western way of life. Legitimate as such concerns remain, subsequent developments allow for at least tentative answers. Three landmark events that followed the attacks of 11 September 2001, all linked with the Cold War, may serve as symbolic points of reference: Europe's adoption of a common currency, America's military victory in Afghanistan, and China's entry into the World Trade Organization.

The advent of the euro has belied those who doubted that a united Europe could possibly survive the end of the Soviet threat that had prompted its integration. The common currency, which compels cooperation among the states that use it, is the fruit of diplomacy dating back to the creation in the Cold War's darkest years of the Coal and Steel Community, designed to make it materially impossible for France and Germany ever to fight each other again. Nor have those sceptics been proven right who believed Europe's integration would necessarily spell the end of
Atlanticism another of the Cold War's landmark accomplishments. Transatlantic diplomacy has been invigorated by the terrorist challenge, as it had been by the Soviet challenge.

Not only was NATO's article five providing for common support to any member under attack invoked for the first time, bringing European aircraft to patrol American skies, but more importantly Western law enforcement and banking systems have been brought together to an unprecedented degree. None of this, to be sure, abolishes the diversity of interests among states nor does it preclude unavoidable disputes in the new area of cooperation that now extends from the Pacific to Western Europe and beyond into the territories of the former Cold War enemies. Yet the tools and procedures of diplomacy have become available to contain and manage conflicting interests and marshal them to constructive purposes the tools and procedures created and developed by Western nations during the Cold War. This is the part of its diplomatic legacy that has been reaffirmed.
The American military victory in Afghanistan, which came as a surprise to even experienced observers, ended the illusion of a warless world that many hoped would supersede the Cold War. At the same time, it confirmed the irrelevance of nuclear weapons for the maintenance of peace, laying to rest the illusion that the spectre of mutual assured destruction may be good for diplomacy because it inhibits resort to arms. The terrorists readiness to use weapons of mass and indiscriminate destruction has rather made it plain that those weapons are the problem, not the solution. And the resort to arms that destroyed the terrorist infrastructure by using new precision conventional munitions, less indiscriminately destructive and more easily attuned to political goals, may at least indicate the beginning of a solution by restoring a balance between military power and diplomacy.

You have no idea, George F. Kennan told students at the National War College in 1946, how much it
contributes to the general politeness and pleasantness of diplomacy when you have a little quiet armed force in the background. With its defence spending exceeding that of all conceivable rivals combined and its military deployed around the world, the United States, to be sure, wields more than a little quiet military force in the background. Yet as a democracy, to quote Kennan again, it cannot use its forces as an offensive threat. It cannot manipulate them tactically, on any extensive scale, for the accomplishment of measures short for war. America's rise to the only military superpower has expanded both the room and the need for diplomacy.

Having repudiated the inhibitions on the use of force that had been hampering diplomacy since the Cold War, the struggle against terrorism did not render irrelevant but rather has highlighted the Cold War's legacy of multilateral diplomacy. Not only has it made clear the pitfalls of unilateralism, even for a superpower, but it has also paved the way beyond the necessary use of force. During the Cold War, the CSCE
successfully established the principle that the internal affairs of sovereign states are a legitimate concern of the international community because of their relevance to security. By impressing this linkage on the unwilling Soviet leaders, the resulting multilateral diplomacy of human rights helped alter their regime and end the Cold War. Since then, having accepted the linkage more willingly by their decision to entre the World Trade Organization, the Chinese communists opened their country to the workings of multilateral economic diplomacy. Both human rights and economic diplomacy will have to be vigorously applied in Arab countries and others that have been the breeding ground of terrorism before this scourge can become distant memory the way the Cold War is now.

Thus, the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 made painfully clear, the treaty designed to deter putative nuclear aggressors proved notably ineffective in deterring genuine terrorists and that quintessential Cold War treaty should best have been left alone as a relic of another era.
Thus, the Sojourn of Diplomacy Since the early years of civilizations to the present 21st century has been one of the "negotiating" and "problem shooting" exclusive.

In this lengthy thesis attempt is made to understand Objectives which are four fold;

1. To understand and assess the magnitude of the problem of terrorism.
2. To visualize, the potential and the prospects of terrorism as a political instrument.
3. To understand, the capabilities and the limitations of "Diplomacy", as a tool to counter terrorism.
4. To measure the tenacity of anti terrorist policies Vis a Vis diplomacy to countering the acts of terrorism.

In the first three chapters as mentioned methodology historical and content analysis methods were employed. And the analysis made and inference drawn have been consolidated in the last chapter where the forth objective has been kept in focus.
The above method supported us to go in for further analysis of documents. Analysis of episodic records*, speeches, media materials, foreign affairs materials, Governments reports, were analyzed using procedures adopted in content analysis methods. Thus, a sincere attempt was made here to bring together the cream of thought regarding the inter relationship between diplomacy and terrorism.

This, in fact is a completely unbroached area of study which has immense potential for further research. Although, at the outset it might appear to be difficult to pursue this research in terms of quantifying the effects of diplomatic accomplishments, it would no doubt, greatly contribute to the dearth in literature both in the areas of understanding of terrorism and in the area of diplomacy. This study was carried out having the following hypotheses, since most of the Doctoral dissertations in Indian Universities are persuaded on the basis of hypotheses.

* such as memoirs correspondence etc.
The hypotheses drawn were

1. That diplomacy has regained its prime position, and influence as an instrument of foreign policy in the wake of the campaign against terrorism.
2. That diplomacy has succeeded in its efforts at creating a new world order by establishing a network of information for collective effort to fight Terrorism in the post cold war scenario.

In our analysis it is clearly proven the diplomacy after the cold period has regained its prime position in wake of anti terrorist campaign as can be evidence in the contents explained in the first three chapters. However in the case of the second hypothesis the narration in the thesis clearly exhibits the diplomacy as instrument of foreign policy has definitely made in impact in creating a new world order based on the principles of collective efforts thus supporting the second hypothesis.
References