Relations among states engross a vital place in the realm of international politics. The tumultuous nature of international politics purports a comprehensive understanding of the pattern of bilateral relations among states. The ambit of country's relation with its neighbours involves political, economic, social, cultural, psychological and historical factors. A systematic analysis of the complexion of relations among two states entails a methodical survey of the history of their relations in a chronological order. Hence, it is felicitous to understand the history of Indo-Pak relations, so as to comprehend the nature of their relations. The present chapter attempts to analyze the history of Indo-Pak relations since partition.

Partition

The salvage of partition gave birth to, two mutually hostile countries India and Pakistan. Hence, the substratum of Indo-Pakistan animosity can be traced to the appalling events which marked the split of the sub-continent.

The lamentable partition of the subcontinent was an outcome of a perennial ripening of repugnance between Hindus and Muslims. Though both the communities lived together as a fraternity imbibing a
composite culture, the ambivalent religio-cultural ethos and the deleterious political forces that operated at the time of British imperial regime perturbed the harmonious relations between the two communities. These two antecedents acted as catalysts for accretion of difference between the two communities. "Their hostilities originated in the long period of Muslim rule over India, which lasted nearly a thousand years before the advent of European colonial powers." But even after this, the composite and secular framework of Indian society was able to sustain its properties as a multi-cultural and pluralistic society.

The advent of British marks a watershed in Indian history. "Before the arrival of the British in India, Hindus and Muslims lived in peace with each other. Maybe in somewhat specified social compartments, quite akin to the customs yet, accommodating each other's religious beliefs." When the British took over the centerstage of Indian society, it was divided on communal lines. They fashioned their policies towards India on the basis of the principle of divide and rule. The first expression of this can be seen when Lord Curzon divided the province of Bengal. This British action went a long way in determining the future status of Indian subcontinent.

Besides this, the British introduced the system of a separate electorate and reservation of seats in the popular assembly on the basis of communal lines. Their sinister move crystallized a mutual antagonism between the two communities. So, the advent of the British
witnessed an unprecedented cultural altercation which ultimately led to the geo-political separation of people who had imbibed a composite culture. Further, regarding the conflict between India and Pakistan which has a pronounced ligature with the rueful events leading to the partition of Indian sub-continent. "Some have suggested that the conflict has a primordial basis and is rooted in the divergent and essentially antithetical world views of Islam and Hinduism." This antipathy is deeply entrenched in the turbulent times of the British rule in India. At the outset, when the British introduced western education, only a few progressive Hindus came forward to take advantage of the development. Muslims showed feelings of inertia, because they nurtured abhorrence towards the British. They were obsessed by the notion that the Englishmen had wrested the throne of India from them. This led to their inhibition towards western education and they desisted from participating in the mainstream of socio-political affairs under the British regime. On the other hand, the Hindus came forward to take western education and they got opportunities to participate in the lower strata of British administration. Their socio-economic status witnessed a phenomenal uplift. Apart from this, the British preferred the progressive and liberal Hindus rather than the orthodox and conservative Muslims. All this went a long way in widening the rift between the two communities.

At this juncture some of the Muslim elites felt that the Muslims were lagging behind the Hindus. It was felt that the Muslims must have
to accept the challenges of the hour and modernize through the means of western education. The forerunner of these elites was Sir Sieed Ahamed Khan, who sniffed a threat to Muslim identity. He urged them to modernize by embracing western education. It seems that Sir Sieed's aim was to make Muslims more Islam-conscious rather than broad-minded secularists. This appears to be the first heedful step towards Muslim separatism to arouse a sense of unity among Muslims and to preserve the identity of their culture. Sir Sieed became instrumental in the inception of several organizations prominent among them being Mohamadan Anglo Oriental College, which is known today as Aligad Muslim University. This institution became the hub of Muslim resuscitation. Sir Sieed was the first Muslim extremist who expressed a fear from the ghost of Hindu Raj. That is from the domination of Hindus if India was to be freed from the colonial yoke. Here lies the seeds of Muslim separatism, which propelled Muslims to demand a separate geo-political status distinct from that of Hindus. In other words, the former Prime Minister of Pakistan Liaquat Ali Khan, articulated: "Pakistan came into being as a result of the urge felt by the Muslims of the sub-continent to secure a territory. However limited were Islamic ideology and way of life could be practiced and demonstrated to the World." The formation of Muslim League is a benchmark in the string of events leading to India's partition. In the course of events, the League became a platform for Muslim leaders to voice their claims. The League became a cornerstone of the movement for the creation of a separate homeland for Muslims.
Two Nation Theory

The partition of Indian sub-continent can be traced to the "historical logic of the two-nation theory"\(^5\), which forms a chief source of friction between Hindus and Muslims. The roots of separatism can be found in the jarring ideological predilections of Hindus and Muslims. Their proclivities were embodied in the vituperative framework of the "two nation theory". "The two-nation theory which became a dividing line of India's partition continues to be a principal source of conflict between Pakistan's Islamic ideology and India's secular nationalism."\(^6\)

The two-nation theory states that Hindus and Muslims are two different communities and hence two different nations are required to house them. Initially the Congress ventilated vitriolic opposition to this obnoxious principle. But it appears that the compulsions of political forces active at the time might have compelled it to accept partition without endorsing the two-nation theory. Thus the two-nation theory was a prominent source of separatism between Hindus and Muslims and the same resulted in the nettled relationship between India and Pakistan.

Congress Muslim League Divergence

The interplay of virulent political forces and a tug-of-war between the Congress and Muslim League played a vital role in the process of partition. The establishment of Congress in 1885 and the Muslim League in 1906 marked the beginning of a new chapter in the
socio-political history of India. The inter-party interaction between the two parties which was characterized by an intense quest for power and a crisis of identity, shaped the course of events leading to the split of sub-continent. The ideological divergences created such implacable relations between the two that unison between the two became preposterous. The politics of separatism practised by the Muslim League and the dominant approach displayed by the Congress generated an intense political heat and social tensions, which culminated in the horrendous events of 1947. Analysing the Congress-Muslim League nuances as a factor leading to the widening gap between Hindus and Muslims, Padron Moon viewed: "There opened between the League and the Congress a breach destined to grow ever wider and to lead inexorably to the partition of the country and the massacres of 1947." Apart from this, the colonial rule in India, has had a historic role in vandalizing multi-cultural edifice of the subcontinent. The wrecking tactics adopted by the British imperial regime went a long way in creating cleavage in the multi-cultural structure of Indian society which led to the fomenting of separatist tendencies. The 'divide and rule' policy of the British exemplifies the fact. After the British countered the united revolt of the Hindus and Muslims in 1858, the colonial government apprehended the perils of Hindu-Muslim unity for their perpetual existence in the sub-continent. In fact, they engaged in activities to rupture the Hindu Muslim unity. The first expression of this policy was seen when Lord Curzon divided Bengal in 1905. Though Lord Curzon claimed it as an administrative necessity, it had an
ostensible aim of breaking the Hindu-Muslim unity. "The partition of Bengal was devised to divide people on the basis of religion and put Muslims against the Hindus." The next significant development in the sequel of events leading to the partition is the demand for a separate electorate for Muslims. When constitutional reforms were introduced under Lord Morley and Lord Minto, a delegation led by Agha Khan demanded a separate electorate for Muslims. Though initially this demand was turned down by Lord Morley, later Lord Minto realized it, and the British accepted the demand to propitiate Muslims. Thus a separate electorate for Muslims was introduced in the constitutional reforms of 1909. Even after this, there was no bluster for a separate homeland for Muslims. The unity between the two communities remained unblemished.

The Lucknow Pact which brought out a joint declaration of the Congress and Muslim League bears a testimony to this. The Lucknow Pact "had succeeded in bringing the Congress and Muslim League together to a common platform to fight the British." The enduring unity of the Hindus and Muslims persisted even at the time of Khilafat and Non-Co-operation Movements. This era can be designated as the era of Hindu-Muslim fraternization. But in the 1920s the communal wrangle took a grievous pattern igniting communal strifes that culminated into the partition of country. "Never before communal question assumed such dangerous dimensions in the country, as it did in the 1920s." The publication of Nehru report marks a watershed in
the sequences ushering in partition. This report counselled to obliterate the provisions relating to separate electorate and reservation of seats for Muslims. It weighted in favour of a strong center. It was conspicuous that it did not merit admiration from either the Muslim League or the All India Muslim Conference. The Muslim leaders articulated that Nehru report manifested a Hindu domination. The Nehru report was the doom of co-operation between the Hindus and Muslims.

The blueprint of a separate homeland for Muslims first appeared in the leaflet published by a young undergraduate student of Cambridge, Rahamat Ali. His friends called it ‘now or never’. In this Rahamat Ali coins the name Pakistan as a land of the pure for housing Muslims and to celebrate Islamic way of life. Rahamat Ali’s design of Pakistan consisted of the Punjab, Afghanistan, North Western Frontier Province, Kashmir, Sindh and Baluchistan. It is pertinent to observe that even at this juncture the geo-political map of Pakistan remained nebulous. As aptly pointed out by Mushirulla Hasan: “There was, after all, no blueprint of a future Pakistan in the 1930s, no Islamic flag, no visible symbol, no common platform, no shared goals and objectives. Rehamat Ali’s scheme nurtured in Cambridge was an illustration of obscurantism and political eccentricity. It caused much political embarrassment back home and was dismissed as chimerical and impractical”.
The grant of a separate electorate on communal basis which was proposed under the communal award issued by Ramsay MacDonald, the then Prime Minister of Britain, on August 4th 1932, in the wake of Constitutional reforms, acted as a catalyst in accentuating schisms between Hindus and Muslims. Mr. MacDonald corroborated his move on the basis that the two communities failed to arrive at a concordance. Thus "the communal award, 1932 of the British Government, further widened the gulf between the Hindus and Muslims." The period from 1937 to 1940 proved to be very critical in the history of the movement for a separate homeland for Muslims. This crucial period was a curtain riser for a palpable idea of a separate Muslim homeland. The movement for Pakistan that had a clear-cut visibility during this period was the Muslim League. It was the legitimate spokesman of a beleaguered community. During this time an immense political heat was generated, due to the obduracy of the Congress to accept the Muslim League as the sole representative of Muslims in India. Its refusal to form coalition governments in the Hindu majority provinces, particularly the United Province, after 1937 elections, vexed the differences between the two communities. The Sindh Muslim League Conference of 1938 at Karachi, evolved a constitutional framework for the political independence of Muslims. This was the first organized expression of the separatist politics practised by the League, which ultimately led to the partition of sub-continent. The All India Muslim League's Conference of 1940 was a turning point in the history of the movement for Pakistan. The famous Lahore resolution adopted, also known as the Pakistan
resolution, voiced its claims in favour of a separate homeland for Muslims. Commenting on Pakistan resolution B. R. Ambedkar said: “on 26th March 1940 Hindu India was startled to attention as it had never been before: on that day the Muslim League at its Lahore session passed a resolution. The resolution contemplates that the areas in which Muslims predominate shall be incorporated into independent Stats.”¹³ Thus the Lahore resolution gave a clear picture of the urge of Muslims for a separate homeland.

In August 1940 Lord Linlithgow offered a plan which is popularly known as the ‘August Offer’. This proposed to set up a constitution making body and it assured full safety to the minority in any future constitutional arrangement. This offer received an applauding response from the League though the Congress reprehended it strongly.

The failure of Cripps Mission led to the Congress’ launching of Quit India Movement. The Muslim League did not support the movement and it exploited the situation for carrying its propaganda to mobilize Muslim opinion for the creation of a separate nation. In 1945 the Atlee Government sent a three-member mission called ‘Cabinet Mission’ consisting of British cabinet ministers. The mission aimed at negotiating with Indian leaders for framing a constitution for India and transfer political power to them. The mission’s plan endorsed the creation of a united India, but it vouched the complete safety of Muslims in India. The mission devised a plan to create a three-tier political structure, consisting of the central government, the regional
unions and the provinces. According to the plan, India was to be divided into three major regions - section A consisted Madras, Bombay and UP, and section B consisted Bihar, Orissa, NWFP and Sindh. And section C consisted of Bengal and Assam. It proposed a central government in charge of defense, communication and foreign affairs. The British created such a plan that anything can be deduced from this. Jinnah aspired to gratify a long cherished dream of the Muslims for a separate homeland from this and the Congress hoped to have a united India from the British. The pre-condition of the plan was that the Indian leaders must accept ministerial offices in the responsible government formed under the plan with a proposal to create two Muslim majority provinces with full autonomy demand to a considerable extent. They anticipated the creation of a separate homeland for Muslims and they accepted the plan. On the other hand, the Congress opposed the plan, because, according to the plan, the grouping of provinces was mandatory. The Congress government was functioning in NWFP which would be shifted to section B and the Hindu majority province of Assam was to be shifted to section A which was not acceptable to the Congress. So the Congress accepted the proposal and demanded that the grouping of provinces must not be obligatory. This made the Muslim League to withdraw from the plan and it observed a 'direct action day' under the leadership of Jinnah. This was the last nail to the coffin, with all hopes of bringing together the two communities dwindled, the prospects of India emerging free and united petered out and the partition of India became more likely.
The movement for Pakistan was authenticated when in 1946 the Muslim League adopted a Pakistan resolution in Karachi. These events ignited communal frenzy that ultimately culminated into the horrendous events of 1947 and the mass migration which was unfamiliar to human history. At this moment India was on the verge of a civil war, even the Congress which championed the idea of a united India, came to terms with the degenerating communal situation and socio-political order. At this grave moment, Lord Mountbatten came to India. And "On 23rd March the Muslim League observed the 'Pakistan day'," Mountbatten came to an inevitable conclusion that the only solution for the political impasse prevailing in India was partition. The V.P Menon plan was framed containing modalities for the partition. Lord Mountbatten got it approved by the British government. The essence of V. P. Menon plan was that the provinces of Punjab and Bengal were to be divided to create Pakistan. To ascertain the popular verdict the issue was to be placed before the legislative assemblies of the two provinces on the condition that if any one assembly votes in favour of partition both the provinces were to be divided. The question of NWFP was to be decided on the basis of referendum. So was the case with the Muslim majority district of Sylhet. The position of Sindh was to be decided by a special meeting of the legislative assembly of Sindh. The issue was put to vote in the assemblies and they voted in favour of Pakistan. The referendum in NWFP went in favour of Pakistan and the same was the case with Sylhet. A special meeting of the legislative assembly decided to join Pakistan. As soon as the plan was prepared Lord
Mountbatten broadcast it on June 3rd this is known as ‘June 3rd plan’. Though the plan met with adverse criticism, it was accepted as an inevitable evil. A boundary commission was appointed under the chairmanship of Sir Cyril Radcliff in order to demarcate the geographical limits of both the countries. On 4th July 1947 the independence of India bill was introduced in the British parliament and it was passed by a majority and the independence of India act came into existence on 18th July. This act gave provision for the creation of two independent and sovereign nations, India and Pakistan and the British colonial links were to be dismantled. This act came into force on the appointed date of 15th August 1947. Thus two hundred years of colonial rule came to an end with the emergence of two independent countries India and Pakistan. Thus the appalling events which marked the course of events leading to the partition of the sub-continent, engraves in itself the genesis of Indo-Pakistan antagonism. “The traumatic days of partition undoubtedly left behind deep scars on both sides, but an explanation of Indo-Pakistan hostility is limited to that short period in the life of an ancient land at once begs a broader and more fundamental question. What deep-seated compulsions caused the Hindus and Muslims to split the sub-continent which geographically forms a single unit.”

Significance of Indo-Pakistan Relations

“The story of Indo-Pakistan relations is by and large one of the mutual animosity and confrontation, though there were agreements on
The British imperial regime divided India to appease the Muslim community. Partition was a political weapon used by the British, to prevent the emergence of a strong and undivided India. In such a short span of more than fifty years India and Pakistan have fought four wars, concluding several agreements. All this proved to be futile in terms of improving their bilateral relations. Myriad bilateral disputes have been solved or they are on the verge of being resolved. "But the winds of change seems to have bypassed the sub continent." India and Pakistan are the pillars upon which the affairs of South Asia are determined. Indo-Pakistan relations have a profound impact over the socio-economic and political spheres of whole of South Asia. The relations between the two affect the entire South Asia because the region is largely Indo-centric. "Indo-Pakistan relations have been a major factor in the politics of South Asia and through it in the power politics of the world." India is the largest and most developed country in South Asia, and Pakistan shares with it a common history, culture, geographical similarities and economic problems which warrant co-operation between the two.

If both countries engage in prolific collaboration, they can play a decisive role in the affairs of Asia in particular and in the world in general. Zafarulla Khan, the first foreign secretary of Pakistan, remarks: "Pakistan and India if stood together could play in world affairs almost a decisive role". But it is lamentable that Indo-Pakistan relations are marked by a state of mutual antipathy and ultimately
South Asia has become a hot bed of intrigues and a hub of super power politics. In view of these considerations, it is pertinent to understand the major events occurred in the last nearly six decades. Perhaps, this will help to analyse the complex problems of India and Pakistan relations.

Problems Arising out of Partition

After independence, India and Pakistan have faced a number of problems, because "British India broke up in haste since the U.K. was then exhausted after the second world war and the former imperialists had only one thought to get rid of huge India's endless problems".20 The leaders of Pakistan advocated partition on the plank of 'two-nation theory', but the Congress leaders spurned it accepting partition just on the basis of some kind of territorial self-determination. Actually, the British government did not take any expedient measures to deal with the problems such as communal riots, demographic shifts, minorities issues, demarcation of boundaries, disposal of evacuee property, sharing of assets and military between India and Pakistan.

The primary question was of demarcation of the boundaries of Punjab and Bengal, in order to stipulate the geographical limits of both the countries. For this purpose an Indo-Pakistan boundary commission was appointed, under the chairmanship of Sir Cyrill Radcliffe on 30th June 1947. The commission gave its report on 12th August 1947, which, in turn, led to several problems. To solve these, the Indo-
Pakistan boundary disputes tribunal was set up with Alghat Buggi as its chairman. The Buggi awards were published in 1950 and both the countries accepted them.

First Kashmir War

One of the most ruffled international territorial disputes that had a significant impact upon the security situation of the region bringing imprinting ramifications upon the course of global affairs, is the issue of Kashmir. The bilateral dispute between India and Pakistan over the issue of Kashmir not only induces a grave security threat to South Asia but also poses serious implications to the affairs of global politics. The Kashmir issue has become an exasperated problem having momentous bearing on the defence and foreign policy of both India and Pakistan. The imbroglio ushered in, as a result of partition, as the British left India with a legion of partition problems. The political independence in the sub-continent brought with it the territorial dispute of Kashmir. After the end of British rule, Kashmir had remained an independent princely state. Pakistan, since beginning nurtured an irredentist policy towards Kashmir. Meanwhile in October 1947 there was a tribal insurrection in Poonch region of Kashmir. The Pakistan army nabbed the opportunity and finessed an intrusion into the territory. The security forces of the crown were not competent to counter tribal incursions backed by Pakistan military. In such a predicament, Raja Hari Singh approached the government of India for help. After the king signed the instrument of accession, the Indian military was deployed for
operations in Kashmir. An open war began between the armies of India and Pakistan. At this juncture, India took the matter to the UN, and the latter ordered for the immediate withdrawal of militaries of both the countries and the tribal intruders and declared a cease-fire in Kashmir. In the meantime, the intruders were able to hold on to approximately 33 per cent of the territory in Kashmir and declared it as Azad Kashmir (free Kashmir). The Pakistan government backed revolutionaries to establish an interim government in Azad Kashmir and since then the territory is under the control of Pakistan government. This event paved way for the emergence of a prominent issue which has jeopardized peaceful relations between India and Pakistan. Even after more than five decades of their existence Kashmir remains a labyrinth. The nature of defence and foreign policy of both India and Pakistan is determined by the matrix of their bilateral relations. The entire gamut of their relations is predicated upon one single issue that is Kashmir. All other problems of Indo-Pakistan relations, like terrorism, tensions along the border arms race, presently nuclear issue are the appendage of Kashmir conundrum.

Pakistan's Military Alliance with the US and Indo-Pakistan Relations

Cold war politics started influencing Indo-Pakistan relations after Pakistan joined the military alliance in 1953. The Pakistani decision was entirely against the fundamental principles of India's foreign policy, which centered around non-alignment advocating an
independent foreign policy characterized by non-involvement in power blocks and non-participation in wars. But with Pakistan's decision to join military alliance, the flames of cold war permeated into the parameters of South Asia. Pakistan's move compelled India to upgrade its military strength and divert its resources from developmental purposes to procurement of defence technology. The Pakistani action might be the offshoot of its urge to acquire military parity with India and it appears that the "failure to solve Kashmir issue had brought about a US-Pakistan military agreement in 1953 and had presented a threat to the whole of South Asia". Apart from this the "Primary motivation for Pakistan's alliance may have been the internal factors of the country, rather than its foreign policy needs". Whatever may be the impulse stimulating the Pakistani policy decision, it led to serious ramifications on the nature of Indo-Pakistan relations, which provoked a fierce arms-race between India and Pakistan that ultimately culminated in both the countries going for nuclear weaponization in recent times.

Sino-Indian War of 1962 and Indo-Pakistan Relations

"In Indo-Pakistan relations China too fell out with India and Indo-Pakistan relationship became a part of Sino-Indian syndrome." In 1962 there was a war between India and China on the Aksai Chin, which had long ranging repercussions on the Sub-continent. The encounter gave a staggering blow to India's core doctrine of Non-alignment. It was a major jolt to the Panchasheel principles which were
the cornerstone of bilateral relations between India and China. The event indicated India's weak defence and strategic policy. It called for a structural re-orientation of India's defence and foreign policy. The most important impact of Sino-Indian war was on the affairs of Indo-Pakistan relations. It brought significant influence upon the equations of triangular relationship of India, China and Pakistan. India's debacle in the war gave Pakistan an opportunity to re-examine the direction and objectives of its foreign policy. India's weakness which was exposed in the war became a strength to Pakistan. Pakistan looked towards China for military and strategic assistance and China reciprocated. China started to support Pakistan on various issues of India-Pakistan relations, for instance, "although the Peoples Republic had not, at that time, made its view point on Kashmir clear in any official statement up to 1962, it leaned towards Pakistan's claim"\(^24\) \(^{24}\) The Sino-Indian conflict indirectly contributed to the worsening of India Pakistan relations and was partly responsible for their clash in 1965. \(^25\)

**Dispute Over the Rann of Kutch**

The western border of India with Pakistan begins at the mouth of the river Sir Creek. There is a dispute over the first 104 kms of the border. India contends that the border should be at the median of the navigable channel of the river. Pakistan asserts that the border should be along the left bank of the river. The area between Gujarat and West Pakistan along the western border separating India and Pakistan is known as the Rann of Kutch. "The great Rann extends from a north-
south line for about 400 kilometers." Since partition there was a
dispute between India and Pakistan on the sovereignty over the Rann of
Kutch. This dispute crystallized into an armed conflict in 1965.
Pakistan took the opportunity and exploited the instability created due
to the war at the western front and extended the war to Kashmir.
Pakistan did this on the notion that, after the Hazratbal incident the
situation in Kashmir was volatile and it could be maneuvered for its
own advantage. The hostilities in the Rann of Kutch was ended due to
the good offices of the British prime minister, Herald Wilson, and India
and Pakistan concluded an agreement in June 1965. The war in Kashmir
was brought to an end by a ceasefire arranged by the UN. The twenty-
one days war between India and Pakistan in 1965 ended in an impasse,
with the parties failing to gain any mileage from it.

Tashkent Agreement of 1966

After the wrangle at the western front the relations between India
and Pakistan had gone into a cold storage and the peace making process
appeared to be very exacting. "The Tashkent meeting between prime
minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and president Ayub Khan had been
brought about by the dexterous diplomacy of the Soviet leaders." Specially the Soviet prime minister Alexy Kosygin. Thus India and Pakistan signed the historic Tashkent agreement in 1966. "No doubt the Tashkent meet was a historic moment and with Soviet assistance a breakthrough had been achieved. An atmosphere of cautious optimism prevailed, for the first time some hope was entertained that India and
Pakistan might be able to turn from the path of conflict and strive to live in amity and peace. But this did not happen: the peace process begun at Tashkent was derailed due to various reasons. At the first instance there was a divergence of perception between India and Pakistan regarding the nature of Tashkent agreement because the 1965 war had ended in a stalemate with neither party gaining any vantage over its opposite camp. On the other hand, the battle unmasked the relative superiority of Indian military as against that of Pakistan. This posed a principle challenge to the Pakistani coterie which enticed the latter to resort to greater imports of military hardware and sophisticated weapons from the US, USSR and China. In addition to this, an attempt was made to forge a triangular axis between the US, China and Pakistan, which would have been a grave threat to the security of South Asia. As a result, the diplomatic ties between India, China and Pakistan were strained. The relations between the two dropped to a wretched position only to be revitalized after Shimla agreement.

**Indo-Pakistan War of 1971**

There was a striking difference between the wars of 1948, 1965 and the war of 1971. Whereas in the previous conflicts a war was caused due to the initiative taken by Pakistan, owing to its false optimism revealing its claims on Kashmir. But the antecedents of the third armed conflict between India and Pakistan of 1971 were engraved in the domestic politics of Pakistan and the failure of the federal set up within Pakistani polity. Pakistan consisted of two wings East Pakistan
and West Pakistan. The East Pakistan primarily contained a population dominated by ethnic Bengali stock. While the population in West Pakistan was primarily Urdu speaking, there was a persistent Bengali-Urdu dichotomy, in Pakistan since its inception. On the other hand, there was a glaring regional disparity between the two wings of Pakistan. Not to speak of East Pakistan was a neglected region. The majority of resources were allocated to West Pakistan. The top layer of the politics, administration and military in Pakistan was dominated by men from West Pakistan. All this ushered in a strong urge for autonomy in East Pakistan. In the mean time, the 1970 general elections were held for both the national assembly of Pakistan and the provincial assemblies of East Pakistan. The results of the elections were phenomenal, bringing a landslide victory both in the national and provincial assembly for the Awami League of East Pakistan headed by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. But both the military junta and the People’s party headed by Z. A. Bhutto, declined to accept the poll verdict. Bhutto’s obstructionism and non co-operation impeded the commencement of democratically elected government under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Bhutto argued that the government should be formed on the basis of a power sharing arrangement in a coalition government of Pakistan People’s Party and Awami League. But this was not acceptable to the leaders of East Pakistan. In the mean time, widespread demonstrations and protests began in East Pakistan. General Yahya Khan declared a marshal law to counter this in East Pakistan. The situation became grievous and a full-
scale civil war broke out in East Pakistan. The Pakistani government launched a military crack-down in the name of 'operation search light'. 'The operation' was mainly directed towards the Bengalis of East Pakistan. The military took recourse to ruthless violence, which resulted in the open declaration of liberation movement by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and he called for the creation of an independent country Bangladesh. At this juncture, there was a heavy influx of refugees into Indian territory from East Pakistan. It is estimated that nearly ten million refugees were found in the north-eastern States of India. This posed a serious threat to the socio-economic and political stability in India bringing major implications to its defence and security. India pressed Pakistan through diplomatic channels to bring a solution to the problem. But Pakistan did not give a proper heed to Indian admonitions. In such a predicament, the Indian leadership decided to favour East Pakistan. Hence, India had to resort to military action only because to safeguard its security interests. Thus what was purely a domestic problem of Pakistan was transformed into an open war between India and Pakistan. In the ensuing war, India defeated Pakistan and East Pakistan was liberated emerging as an independent nation. With the defeat of Pakistan the ideology of 'two-nation theory' which was the foundation upon which Pakistan was created, met with a serious jolt and with this Pakistan's claims on Kashmir demolished. On the other hand, the demonstration of Indian military superiority as against Pakistan's rendered any military offensive from Pakistan untenable.
Shimla Agreement of 1972

To arrive at a post-war settlement, the prime minister of India Mrs Indira Gandhi and president of Pakistan, Z. A. Bhutto met at the summit meeting in Shimla which took place from June 28 to July 2, in 1972. The Indian objectives for the summit aimed at persuading Pakistan to accept bilateralism as the sole mechanism for figuring out all outstanding disputes between India and Pakistan. Refurbishment of diplomatic ties which were dismantled in 1969, repatriation of the prisoners of war and Pakistani approbation to the principle that all existing frontiers with India are impregnable. Pakistan had the following key objectives for the summit- to secure the release of 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war and prevent Bangladesh from holding trials upon them for war crimes. To recover 5,000 sq miles of its territory which it had lost to India in the western sector and ensure that its long standing position on Kashmir dispute was not basically mutated. But the bilateral dialogue in Shimla was not so successful. The agreement paved way for the repatriation of prisoners of war and restoration of diplomatic ties between the countries. It was agreed that bilateralism would be the chief mechanism for resolving all contentious issues. One of the most significant outcome, of the summit is that after pledging themselves to abjure from use of force in finding a favourable solution to Kashmir issue, the two sides agreed to reaffirm the 1948 cease-fire line dividing POK and the mainland of Kashmir into the line of control and they agreed to transform it to a *de jure* international border. In the
Shimla talks, Bhutto assured his Indian counterpart that he would take active steps to integrate POK and other parts of the erstwhile princely State of Kashmir which were on the side of Pakistan into the federal setup of Pakistan. Hence, in over a quarter of a century of the history of Indo-Pakistan relations, which were characterized by hostilities and belligerent foreign policies, Shimla agreement was the most sanguine event, an aura of optimism dawned in South Asia which up till now was lackadaisical under the darkness of antagonism. But this was not to last for long, until Bhutto was in power in Pakistan. He made noble exertions to follow upon the principles of Shimla agreement. During the regime of General Zia-ul-Haq the spirit of Shimla agreement was not considered seriously in the making of foreign policy of Pakistan. Consequently, India and Pakistan relations declined to a nadir.

Pakistan's Proxy War in Kashmir

Pakistan's fiasco to fulfill its cherished dreams of merging Kashmir into Pakistan even after three open wars induced the coterie in Pakistan to espouse to odious methods to accomplish the task which remained incomplete at the time of great divide. The demonstration of the superior military capability by India against Pakistan in the 1971 war acclimatized the convictions of the Pakistanis that, acquisition of Kashmir from India through a conventional military confrontation is a remote contingency. Hence Pakistani policy makers decided in favour of an unconventional warfare and launched a proxy war against India in Kashmir. For this Pakistan devised a two-pronged strategy, initially to
exert pressure along the LOC by intense trance-border firing and then to encourage large-scale infiltration and sabotages at vital places in Kashmir. All this was directed to destabilize India internally and create an aura of insecurity in the region. The key objective of Pakistan's strategy was to wage a low intensity war; the degree of violence in the war was calculatedly kept low in order to facilitate a low cost and a less risky war which would not transform into a full scale war. Pakistan wanted the nature of proxy war to be protracted, the aim being to demoralize Indian security forces and erode their conventional military superiority by their perennial engagement in counter-insurgency operations. In this regard, Pakistani initiative of procurement of nuclear weapons has been a great stimulus which has animated the policy makers of Pakistan to mould such a military strategy in order to realize their cherished goals. The ISI has been playing a vital role in the ongoing proxy war in Kashmir. The intelligence agency of Pakistan had gained immense proficiency in organizing guerrilla warfare through terrorism and sabotage as options and it is now involved in funding and training militant groups to carry out terrorist activities in Kashmir. "The low intensity conflict continues unabated since Pakistan sponsored militancy first erupted in Kashmir valley in 1989-1990 and cries of Azadi [independence] rent the air. Pakistan's aim is to destabilize India by all possible means. Protracted proxy war and sustained political and diplomatic offensives are part of a well-crafted strategy to keep India in internal squabbles and impose a heavy burden on Indian economy."29 Due to Pakistan's nefarious designs India has to
pay a heavy price in terms of civil and military casualties and today
catastrophe and insecurity have become the order of day in Kashmir.
But for all this only Pakistan cannot be blamed. It is “self evident that
a foreign power can sow the seeds of insurgency only when
discontentment and descent are wide spread among the people and the
situation is ripe for exploitation. Due to decades of poor governance,
eglect, compounded by rampant corruption, cynical nepotism,
alienation from national mainstream and political mismanagement, the
situation in Jammu and Kashmir was as bad as could possibly have been in 1988-1989.”30

Indo-Pakistan Relations in the Post Cold War Period

The end of Second World War marked the beginning of a new era
in the history of mankind, the event signaling the commencement of a
cold war between the two giant super powers of the times. The US and
the USSR. For nearly five decades global affairs were dominated by
these two super powers. Indo-Pakistan relations did not remain
secluded from the dynamics of cold war politics. When Pakistan joined
the military alliance with the US, South Asia was enveloped in the mist
of cold war. The massive military assistance proffered to Pakistan by
the US, compelled India to upgrade its defence capability in the light of
its security interests and this appears to be one of the primary reasons
for the growth of an arms race between India and Pakistan. The
relatively favourable posture of the US towards Pakistan in the matters
of issues concerning Indo-Pakistan relations instigated India to look
towards the USSR for support. In this regard, the Indo-Soviet treaty of peace, friendship and co-operation invigorated the cementing of bonds between the two countries. After this, India received an unflinching support from the USSR, specifically in matters relating to its disputes with Pakistan. The expression of the positions of the two super powers apropos India-Pakistan affairs can be seen in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. At the time of the post war settlement, the US sponsored a resolution in the UN Security Council to declare India as an aggressor. But the USSR exercised its power of veto in favour of India. This indicates the orientations of the super powers with regard to Indo-Pakistan affairs. It can be opined that the involvement of two super powers in the affairs of Indo-Pakistan relations was fundamentally motivated by their interests. One of the reasons for the US forming a military alliance with Pakistan is to build the latter as a regional surrogate to curb the Soviet expansion in the region and not to build it against India. In the same way the Soviet support to India seems more to be a counter reaction to the American action rather than its interests in the issues of Indo-Pakistan relations. However, it can be noted that both super powers have remained neutral in their stance regarding Kashmir issue.

The demise of the Soviet Union terminated the turbulence of cold war and recorded the opening up of a new chapter in the political history of modern world. The end of cold war brought about systemic changes in international politics, the bipolar international system was
transformed into a unipolar world with America emerging the sole super-power. In view of this, it was speculated that Indo-Pakistani relations would witness qualitative changes. But it is a paradox that the texture of bilateral relations of India and Pakistan remains the same, characterized by unmitigated hostilities. This has happened because the impact of cold war on the contentious bilateral issues of India and Pakistan such as their Kashmir issue was not much. However, America continues to be influential in the affairs of South Asia to a considerable extent. After the collapse of USSR, Russia is not so keen to play an important role in the chemistry of Indo-Pakistan relations. The pendulum swings towards triangular relations between India, Pakistan and the US. After the end of cold war, a basic shift was sighted in the American policy towards South Asia, because now in the changed environment the US did not need Pakistan as a regional surrogate for its anti-communist operations and it is expected that America will have an unbiased attitude towards the issues of Indo-Pakistan relations and there are some positive signs in the direction. Firstly, when India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, America displayed an unprejudiced approach when it was square enough to equally condemn and impose sanctions against both India and Pakistan. Similarly, at the time of Kargil crisis, American support to India was specific and Pakistan was reprehended for violating the LOC. But American economic interests in Central Asia are still keeping it tilted towards Pakistan for logistical and strategic support. This was evident when Pakistan played a significant role as a base for US operations in Afghanistan, after the
September 11 terrorist attacks. American interests in Afghanistan is likely to continue as the latter can play a strategic role in the enterprises of the US in Central Asia. In this regard, Pakistan has a vital role as it provides logistical and strategic support to sustain American ventures. It can be inferred that in due course of time the US factor will be one of the significant ingredients in determining the nature of Indo-Pakistan relations in the changed international situation.

Indo-Pakistan Relations after Nuclear Tests

The arrant animosities and an exasperated deadlock over the contentious issues of India and Pakistan have created a restive environment between the two countries. The hostilities, which sprung up at the time of partition of the sub-continent, persist as protracted and strained bilateral relations. The political history of Indo-Pakistan relations is replete with an account of extravagant funding towards defence purposes, only to alleviate the threat perceptions from each other. Most of the problems of Indo-Pakistan relations have emerged as a result of the consternation engendered by the two-nations regarding a menace to security from each other, which constrained them to intensely weaponize and ameliorate their military strength. The paucity of confidence upon each other ushered in a cadaverous arms race between the two countries that has peaked into a nuclear arms race. One of the primary causes for the nuclearization of India and Pakistan was the stalemate over Kashmir issue, which impelled Pakistan to resort to procurement of nuclear weapons in order to counter India's
superior military capability. The course of the nuclearization of subcontinent was in its embryonic stage when in the 1950s and 1960s leaders in Pakistan specially Z. A. Bhutto, embarked upon attaining nuclear capability for gaining preponderance over India to bring favourable solutions for Kashmir issue. The military defeat of Pakistan at the hands of India in 1971 and India's conducting of nuclear tests at Pokhran in 1974, acted as catalysts in accentuating Pakistan's process of nuclearization. On the other hand, India encircled in a nuclear neighbourhood with China emerging as a declared nuclear power in 1964 and Pakistan having a furtive nuclear capability was compelled to make endeavors to obtain nuclear weapons. Apart from this, the Sino-Pakistan nuclear axis simulated dire consequences for the security of India. In the 1970s and 1980s there was a covert nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan and the undeclared nuclear status of the two caused much frictions between them. It presented a grave security threat to the entire region with Pakistan intimidating to use its nuclear caliber. At this time an environment of uncertainty prevailed over the whole of South Asia. However, the obscurity was terminated when India and Pakistan traversed the precincts and conducted nuclear tests in May 1998. India after a chronic ambiguity and constricted restraint, outstripped the bounds and conducted five nuclear tests on May 11th and 13th May 1998 at Pokhran. It carried out the nuclear tests in two stages at the same venue. "India conducted three underground nuclear tests, signaling its entry into the exclusive club till now comprising five big powers. The people of India now have a credible nuclear
deterrent, it was officially stated. On 13th May 1998 two more nuclear tests were conducted. The obvious aim of these tests was diverse from those of the tests carried out in 1974. While the official statement as claimed in 1974 the nuclear tests were conducted for peaceful purposes, the government’s position after the Pokhran II nuclear tests was explicit. The official pronouncements made it specific that the tests were focused towards the development of nuclear weapons. In the mean time, for Pakistan achieving parity with India in military strength was the primary motivation driving its defence and foreign policy. India’s Pokhran II nuclear test presented a major challenge for the policy makers and strategists in Pakistan. Hence Pakistan did not desist from exhibiting its nuclear capacity and it carried out six nuclear tests in the third week of May at Chagai range Baluchistan province. The nuclear testing by India and Pakistan has brought a long lasting implication for their defence and foreign policy. It has snowballed the already intricate nature of their bilateral relations. The immediate effect of the tests is the outbreak of a ghastly nuclear arms race between the two countries, threatening their security and endangering the security environment of South Asia. It prefigures an imperilment for the entire mankind. Further, the nuclear testing has brought vicious impact on Kashmir issue and the region has become vulnerable as if a nuclear flash point. "One of the conspicuous consequences of the nuclear blasts by India on May 11 and 13, 1998 and by Pakistan later, is internationalization of Kashmir issue." Nuclear weapons have become a new source of tension between India
and Pakistan and the event revitalizes the fact that mistrust and misconception are the fundamental tenets governing the ruffled Indo-Pakistan relations. So “Nuclear explosions detonated by India and Pakistan, changed the geo-strategic environment in the region. These explosions will have far reaching effects at the regional and global level.”

**Bus Diplomacy**

In the 1990s the amplitude of discord between India and Pakistan increased due to several reasons. At the first instance, the outbreak of militant activities and proxy war carried out by Pakistan in Kashmir worsening Kashmir issue. The process of dialogue had not seen qualitative development and because of the events in Kashmir, the nature of the dispute was misconceived by the people of two countries leading to their degeneration.

Moreover, nuclear testing by India and Pakistan and the subsequent developments further pushed the bilateral relations between the two countries, to a dejected and a squalid posture. In this crucial moment the BJP led coalition government under the leadership of prime minister A B Vajpayee took confidence building and diplomatic measures to pacify the relations between India and Pakistan. The first significant step in the direction was the decision to start a new bus service from New Delhi to Lahore, the concept being to boost and uplift the declining stature of bilateral relations. But the move was a
diplomatic innovation, in order to brace people to people contact and to bring a communality of interest between citizens of two countries. The notion was that the new step would facilitate the citizens of two countries to fathom the exact nature of disputes between their countries, so that a broad framework could be evolved for discovering feasible solutions to their perennial conflict. “It is a very small step, the plan for a bus service between New Delhi and Lahore, but not less exciting, for that in a situation where in people-to-people contact, were snapped almost completely, its symbolic significance is not to be minimized.”34 The ingenious step was positively received by Pakistan and after a few weeks of official deliberations, “India and Pakistan on 12th February 1999, signed a formal agreement for New Delhi-Lahore bus service*.35 The noble endeavor of the Indian government was embellished with the announcement that the prime minister of India A. B. Vajpayee would travel to Lahore in the maiden run of the newly launched bus service and this became like icing cakes and cookies. It was hoped that the little step taken in the right direction would make a soothing impact upon the pyretic milieu of Indo-Pakistan relations. It was felt that, “Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s bus trip to Lahore across the Attari Wagha border marks the beginning of new dawn in Indo-Pakistan relations”.36

Lahore Declaration

On 20th February 1999, the prime minister, A. B. Vajpayee took the historic bus journey to Lahore and reached Lahore at 1600 hours on
the 20th. In the 24 hours of his stay in Lahore, Vajpayee met not only the leaders of Pakistan but also the people of Pakistan. In his meeting with his counterpart Nawaz Sharif, the Indian prime minister discussed various significant issues such as the dangers of nuclear accidents, military build-up along the borders and Kashmir issue. The talks culminated in the signing of Lahore declaration on 21st February 1999. The agreement as it stated: “The prime ministers of the republic of India and the Islamic republic of Pakistan, sharing a vision of peace and stability between their countries and the progress and prosperity of their people are convinced that the development of harmonious relations and friendly co-operation will serve the vital interests of the people of the two countries, enabling them to devote their energies for a better future.” It committed the two countries to take immediate steps to reduce nuclear accidents and unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. The declaration states that the two countries will discuss principles and tenets for implementing confidence building measures in the ambit of both nuclear and conventional weapons capabilities in order to prevent conflicts. The declaration contained an assurance by both the countries regarding the no first use of nuclear weapons’ striving for a no war pact, reduction of tension along the border and the peaceful resolution of Kashmir issue. One of the immediate outcomes of Lahore declaration was that the then foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan, K. Raghunath and Shamshad Ahmad, signed a memorandum of understanding [MOU] in the presence of two prime ministers. The memorandum expressed: “The two sides undertake to provide each
other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests and shall conclude an agreement in this regard." However, the Lahore process turned to be a fiasco, the jubilant optimism that dawned at the time when a bilateral agreement was reached between India and Pakistan at Lahore after a hiatus of nearly three decades, was doomed in the recreant act of Pakistan in Kargil which again prostrated the geniality of relations between India and Pakistan. As noted by Devesh Kapur: "At the end of 1999, India’s relations with Pakistan were at a nadir not seen since 1971. The optimism that marked Vajpayee’s historic Lahore visit in February 1999 proved short lived, when Pak intruders were found occupying the high mountains well within the Indian side of the line of control, in the Kargil sector of Kashmir".

The Kargil Crisis

The relentless attempts of Pakistan to seize Kashmir persisted, even after it was vanquished to the hilt in 1971 at the hands of India. The proxy war launched in Kashmir by Pakistan in the late 1980s reached the meridian, when Pakistan made a blatant effort to physically occupy the strategic heights of Kargil sector in Kashmir valley. Pakistan’s fourth war in Kashmir is a manifestation of the frenetic passion of Pakistan to change the geo-strategic position of India in Kashmir to its own advantage. Pakistan’s misadventure in Kargil came as a surprise to India, because after the signing of Lahore declaration, the perception in the Indian coterie and media was that Indo-Pakistan relations had been brought back on rails. But this proved to be
paradoxical. The diplomatic initiative so magnanimously launched was in tatters when intruders perforated the line of control and captured the mountains of Kargil sector. The Pakistani government keeping close nexus with militant groups of Kashmir forged a fractious venture in Kargil. The Pakistan deed in Kargil was dubbed by veteran South Asian observer Steven Cohen: “Brilliant militarily but disastrous politically caught India by surprise.”40 One of the primary reasons for the outbreak of Kargil conflict is the intense trans-border firing taking place between the troops of India and Pakistan since 1971. Further the truculent terrorist activities taking place in the region had created a war like situation. The latest crisis is nothing but an escalation of the already existing tension in the region. The Kargil intrusion does not connote a detached event. Infiltration across the line of control when the snow dissipates in the summer is not an unprecedented happening. “Nor the Kargil fixation of the Pakistani military is secret to the Indian armed forces and the intelligence set up. Since the war of 1971, shelling across the line of control has been a regular affair.”41 But the Kargil crisis was distinct from the regular intrusions because it was an obvious attempt made by Pakistani army to physically occupy the territory on the Indian side of Kashmir. The most fundamental causes of Kargil crisis include the geographical difficulties of the region. The Kargil sector is the second coldest place on earth. Being the highest military sector in the world, the defence of Kargil poses a serious challenge to Indian security forces. Such bottlenecks have not only led to the recent Kargil crisis but the recurring of more Kargil type
intrusions is always impending. Some other causes of the crisis were the lacuna in India's intelligence set up and the failure of surveillance technique. But it is a contorted view that the outbreak of conflict in Kargil was basically due to the failure of intelligence. It seems that the lack of co-ordination between the administration, military and intelligence contributed to the Kargil crisis. Above all, the most significant cause was that the intuitions of Indian elite regarding the motives of Pakistan were inaccurate. The Indian coterie demonstrated a lack of insight when it was under the fallacious notion that after the Lahore peace initiative and the declared nuclear status of both the countries, Pakistan would not engage in a military venture with India. But this proved to be fallacious and India again confronted with an unprovoked incursion from Pakistan in Kashmir.

The Indian military in liaison with air force launched a severe offensive against the intruders. The operation Vijay as it was called, aimed at driving out the intruders without crossing the line of control and ensuring that the issue was not internationalized. In this regard, Indian army maintained a strict military restraint. Thus, after nearly three months of military operation the Indian security forces were able to drive out the intruders and recaptured the seven strategic heights of Kargil sector. But for this, the nation had to bear a heavy loss in terms of the lives of soldiers and it imposed a severe economic burden upon the country. Declaring the success of Operation Vijay on 14th July 1999 the Indian prime minister said: "Operation Vijay was a great success
fought at the cost of approximately 400 dead and over 600 injured. We owe it to these martyrs to learn from the mistakes made, so that assaults on our sovereignty do not become a recurring feature." In the Kargil crisis India not only achieved a military victory, but the win at the battle front was crowned by a diplomatic victory for India. The nation got an unequivocal support from the international community and the diplomacy and policy of military restraint followed by India was widely acknowledged by international community. On the other hand, Pakistan received a scathing response from the international community for its defiant action in Kargil. It was severely condemned for its infernal war crimes, for disrespecting the LOC, augmenting tension on the border, profaning the spirit of Shimla accord and the Lahore declaration and Pakistan was diplomatically isolated. Thus, the Kargil crisis was a trouble turned into a boon for India, in terms of international support it got specially from the US. The Kargil crisis brought complex implications for Indo-Pakistan relations. India lost all the faith it had on Pakistan because of Pakistan's perfidy despite of India's abiding exactions to promote peace in the region. The mood in the Indian coterie and public after the Kargil crisis can be summed up in the words of Muchkund Dubey, a former Indian foreign secretary: "India has taken a tough stand on resuming the dialogue with Pakistan, it has been announced at the prime minister's level, that there would be no talks until Pakistan stops cross border terrorism. Non-official quarters have even suggested the snapping of ties with Pakistan, including the withdrawal of the most favoured nation treatment to that country."
The security situation in Kashmir further worsened after the Kargil crisis, the intensification of combat operation of the security forces and the increased military build up along the borders with Pakistan in Kashmir posed dangerous consequences for the region. In the end, “Despite numerous similarities between the Indians and Pakistanis that favour a closer interaction and friendly ties between them, there are a few issues which have set them wide apart. Kashmir definitely ranks the top most among the subjects of discord between the two. Kargil has of late assumed a prominent position in the list of those matters, seeking to perpetuate Indo-Pakistan division.”

The Agra Summit

The enduring efforts on the part of Indian government to bring an amicable solution to the contentious disputes between India and Pakistan, continued in spite of repeated failures. The air of pessimism which loomed over South Asia, after the tempest in Kargil and Lahore fiasco, was replaced with revived optimism when the then prime minister Vajpayee invited Pakistan president General Pervez Musharraf for a summit meeting in July 2001. Amidst an animated debate in the public and political circles, regarding the rationale of Vajpayee government for holding the proposed summit in a moment when democracy in Pakistan was in shambles and the country was under international isolation after its Kargil misadventure, the prime minister boldly went ahead with his initiative. The decision of the prime minister received a lot of admiration and hopes were expressed that the
summit would open new vistas for establishing a harmonious relationship between the two countries. The antagonists debated the logic of holding a summit meeting with general Musharaff who had master minded the Kargil misadventure and in addition to this he was not a democratically elected head of Pakistan. So the validity of Musharaff as the leader of Pakistan was questioned. But these arguments did not stall the peace initiative and the summit meeting was fixed to be held on 15th and 16th July 2001 and the venue was the historic city of ‘TAJ’ Agra. The reason for holding the summit in Agra indicated the will of government to bring an atmosphere of informality to the deliberations of the summit. It is pertinent to examine the primary motivations driving the decision of Vajpayee led government to invite Musharaff for a summit level meeting. P. S. Jayaramu opines: “Prominent among them being the keenness to maintain a continuity in peace process, after the government’s decision not to extend the ceasefire in the Kashmir valley, and pressures by the international community specially the US government to initiate a dialogue with Pakistan broke off after Kargil war. They would have driven the prime minister towards this major foreign policy initiative.” For general Musharaff the invitation was a boon in disguise because he got a much needed legitimacy as the leader of Pakistan, and it enabled him to show to his opponents at home and abroad the validity of his regime and tell them that he and his regime was making efforts to resolve the impasse with India.
The Agra summit began with a high note, on 15th July 2001. But before the commencement of summit there appeared several portents, casting a shadow on the deliberations and marring the spirit of summit. At the outset there was no unanimity between India and Pakistan over the issues to be discussed. If India emphasized that cross border terrorism is the prominent issue among other issues like the border dispute in the agenda Pakistan asserted upon the single point agenda of Kashmir. This divergent approach to summit forestalled the signing of a joint declaration at the end of summit. Another factor that marred the essence of the spirit of deliberations is the differences between the countries over the issue of participation of Hurriyat in the summit. While India opposed any third party entry in the dialogue process, Pakistan indicated its willingness to involve the Hurriyats in the summit by inviting them for tea party hosted by Pakistan’s high commissioner. The summit began with the then Indian prime minister Vajpayee and Pakistan president general Musharaff holding a private meeting for about an hour. Later delegation level meetings were conducted. But even after two days of intensive deliberations, the two countries were not successful to bring out a joint declaration, because of their differences over Kashmir and cross border terrorism and the summit had to be continued for the third day. But even this proved to be futile and the summit had to be called off without signing any agreement. The critics call the summit a failure, because India went into it without any structured agenda and that is why general Musharaff highjacked it by his single point agenda of Kashmir and hence the
peace initiative of Vajpayee government was a failure. But this is a very pessimistic viewpoint. It can be said that the summit was not a failure but to put it in the words of India's former foreign minister Jaswanth Singh it was inconclusive. The summit was not a total failure, its utility lies in the fact that it facilitated the maintenance of continuity in the peace process providing a broad framework for future dialogue.

**Indo-Pakistan Relations after 11th September 2001**

On 11th September 2001, the US came under ghastly terrorist attacks on Washington, New York and Pennsylvania. It is reported that these terrorist strikes were masterminded by Osama Bin Laden who had the backing of Taliban regime of Afghanistan. When the US's requests to the Taliban to hand over the culprit were fruitless, it resorted to military action against Afghan government which led to the dismantling of Taliban regime. The event ushered in the reviving of US-Pakistan rapprochement, because the US required Pakistan for providing logistical and strategic support in its operations against Afghanistan. Thus Washington indicated a tilt towards Islamabad and this was a golden opportunity for the military establishment in Pakistan as general Musharaff could get legitimacy to his military Junta from the west. Further it was felt that the US-Pakistan relations, which had reached a nadir after Kargil crisis would be revitalized. Hence, Pakistan decided in favour of supporting the US operations in Afghanistan. These developments brought about complex implications for the affairs of
South Asia, specially on the bilateral relations of India and Pakistan. After the international coalition against terrorism was formed under the leadership of US, it was hoped that the situation in Kashmir would witness qualitative changes as the terrorist structures in POK would be forced to be closed. It was hoped that Pakistan would take concrete steps to end fomenting of terrorism from its soil. But it is an irony that no improvement has been sighted. The terrorist activities in various parts of India remain unremitting. In this context, it can be opined that Pakistan has not come under the pressure of US. This is due to US's clement attitude towards Pakistan because of the latter's strategic importance for present and future engagements of the US in the region. It may be viewed that the US may be more liberal in terms of giving military assistance to its cold war ally for its own strategic interests in the region. Thus the post September 11 scenario has brought intricate effects on the bilateral relations of India and Pakistan. In this regard, the triangular relationship between India, Pakistan and the US will be a major determinant of the nature of Indo-Pakistan relations in the future. The tensions between the two countries have been aggravated because of these antecedents and there is every likelihood that the atmosphere in Kashmir may worsen, as there is every chance after the US operations in Afghanistan, that the terrorists driven out of Afghanistan may permeate into Kashmir if Pakistan does not adopt adequate measures to avert such probabilities. Thus “The most conspicuous consequence was an upsurge of tensions in Kashmir, leading to clashes
between India and Pakistan which have been locked in dispute over Kashmir for over 50 years."46

**Terrorist Attack on India’s Parliament**

On 13\(^{th}\) December 2001 Indian minds met with a shock when the heart of Indian democracy and emblem of the country’s sovereignty and strength, Parliament complex was attacked by five terrorists belonging to the Pakistan based militant outfits Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba. The event sent an air of consternation in the sub-continent and the two nuclear neighbours were on the verge of another lethal war. The consequences of this were inconceivable. Indo-Pakistan relations that had been recovering from the jolt of Kargil crisis were exposed to a convulsion that perturbed all hopes of restoring an environment of cordiality between the two countries. The top leadership in India expressed anguish and there was an open pronouncement that the fight against terrorism had reached its final stage and the bounds of India’s patience had been crossed. The Indian administration handed over a list of twenty terrorists who were suspected to be sheltered in Pakistan and demanded their extradition to India. But Pakistan did not act in a manner that was coveted by India and Pakistan’s procrastination exasperated Indian leadership. The ensuing events forced the weather between India and Pakistan reach an ebb and the two countries were at the brink of a hazardous war which would have had disastrous consequences not only for the region but also for the entire globe. “Both countries ordered the biggest mobilization of their armies in
fifteen years up to a total of one million troops on each side of the border. The international community including the US watched these developments with an awful surprise. The Bush administration urged the leadership in New Delhi to maintain restraint. Although the international community expressed profound disquiet over the matter, it showed a sense of disclaimer. “In fact, India’s attempts to build a persuasive case to the world community against Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorism appeared to evoke only lukewarm international resonance.” Fortunately, for South Asia the situation did not flare up into a full scale war and Indian military build up only became a political brinkmanship without any desired outcomes. Instead it increased the economic burden because the center had to incur heavy expenditure for stationing a mammoth army at the border. The event ushered in the straining of all diplomatic ties between the two countries and all the transport and communication links were blocked, including the stopping of Samjauta express, Delhi-Lahore bus service and air roots. The year 2002 was marked by rigorous military exercise and heightened tension for India and Pakistan. Anyway wise counsels prevailed due to demilitarization and the stress got relaxed gradually.

**Srinagar Peace Initiative**

On April 18, 2003, the then India’s prime minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, in the capital of Jammu and Kashmir Srinagar, retrieved the peace process which had been tumbled after the terrorist attacks on parliament and offered to hold a dialogue with Pakistan if the latter
reciprocated by showing an inclination for discovering ways and means for attaining a lasting harmony between the two countries. The diplomatic move of the prime minister brought in renewed expectations on both sides and the step received a remarkably positive response from all quarters in India and Pakistan. The then Indian prime minister, Vajpayee made a candid decision, considering the psychological torment which he had to undergo after the Lahore and Agra initiatives were miscarried. "A dramatic transformation seems to have come over the India-Pakistan discourse, with prime minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee's third and final call for friendship with Pakistan made in Srinagar on April 18. What else one should make out over the recent threat of Vajpayee to retire if the latest peace move did not succeed." 49

The prime minister declared that this was his last bid to give peace a chance and to find an ultimate solution to bring amity in the region which is embroiled in a inveterate pugnacity between the two countries. The Indian leadership which had borne an obstinate posture after the December 13 terrorist attacks and had declared that there will be no dialogue with Pakistan until cross border terrorism ended, displayed a splendid ductility in offering the new peace initiative. Both India and Pakistan have been able to manumit themselves from their hard line positions and obsessions. There is an indication of a sensational change in the texture of relations between the two countries, from the probability of a collapse of diplomatic bonds and outbreak of a military conflict. The emphasis has turned to a willingness on the part of both sides to resolve all dominant issues. Both countries have come to terms
with the fact that contentious issues like Kashmir cannot be settled instantly and there is a fruition regarding the need for devising a step-by-step approach in order to bring a structured framework for a sustained dialogue. The initial move in the peace process saw the declaration by the leaders of both the countries to restore diplomatic links, revive all transport connections and resume sports ties. However the dialogue process has been very slow and still there is no symbol of resumption in the transport links. This is inevitably due to the perpetual series of terrorist violence in Kashmir in spite of the on-going peace process, which has forced the Indian leadership to remain clinging to their strongly held position that there will be no talks until cross border terrorism ends. But India moved away from its rigid stance, when it promulgated Deewali peace offer, consisting a package of twelve confidence building measures drafted by the cabinet committee on security for normalizing relations with Pakistan. “India took Pakistan and the diplomatic community based in New Delhi by surprise when it announced on October 22, a 12-point proposal to resume the peace process with the neighbouring country.”50 The proposed measures include, starting a bus service from Srinagar to Muzaffarabad [capital of Azad Kashmir], restarting the Ferry service between Mumbai and Karachi which was stopped at the time of 1965 war and introduction of new rail/bus service between Khokra-Par in Rajasthan and Munnabao in Sindh. The package spelt the desire on the part of Indian government to start talks on the resumption of Samjauta express and increasing the frequency of buses from Delhi to Lahore. Apart from this, the then
India's foreign minister, Yashwant Sinha proposed the setting up of a hotline between the coast guards of the two countries. The proposals fall in the line of May 6 proposals made by Pakistan's prime minister, Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, which had not been accepted by India. Jamali also had proposed for the increase of the frequency of Lahore-Delhi bus service. Anyway, Pakistan accepted the Indian package but with some controversial conditions. For instance, regarding Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service, Pakistan insisted that the check posts must be manned by UN forces and the people on both the sides must carry UN documents. Whatever it may be, it can be said that India and Pakistan have once again given themselves another chance for bringing amicable solutions for the long-standing contentious issues between them. Now it is left to the leaders on both the sides to move towards constructive engagements, not allow the on-going peace process to derail and strive for a composite dialogue on all issues which will culminate into a summit between the two countries.

Thus an analysis of the history of Indo-Pakistan relations right from the time of partition, unveils the fact that the schisms which existed between Hindus and Muslims got crystallized at the time of partition due to various deleterious forces and resulted in the division of sub-continent and the new State for Muslims. Pakistan was carved out from the Muslim majority areas of the Indian territory.
Since India's independence and institution of Pakistan, the bilateral relations between the two countries has been characterized by unremitting hostilities, ultimately creating the region into an ignition point and always bludgeoning to flare up into a conflict. The four wars between the two countries exemplify this fact. Though there were moments, wherein there appeared a thaw in Indo-Pakistan relations, the inherent animosity never seems to have slackened. Several issues played their own part in accentuating tension between the two countries. Some of them have been resolved through mutual agreements but still there are a few venomous issues that mould the form and substance of Indo-Pakistan relations. The most significant issue is Kashmir in Indo-Pakistan relations for the last fifty-five years. Cross border terrorism has emerged as a direct outcome of Kashmir dispute and the nuclear arms race between the two countries has transpired due to mutual distrust and repugnance. By and large the relations between India and Pakistan rest upon the plank of these major issues. Hence, the establishment of peace and harmony between India and Pakistan reclines on the amicable solution of these issues. After the general elections of 2004, the Congress led UPA government has assumed office at the center.

Pakistan said: "It is expected the new government in India to take forward the peace initiative and work towards a resolution of all outstanding issues between the two countries including Jammu and Kashmir."
History of Indian Political Parties

After a brief survey of the history of Indo-Pakistan relations, it is pertinent to examine in short the history of the origin and growth of major Indian political parties.

The Indian National Congress

"The Indian National Congress is the oldest political party in Asia and one of the oldest non-communist party in the world." The Indian National Congress was born on 27th December 1885, with W. C. Banarjee as its first president. Its chief architect was Allan Octavian Hume, a member of civil service under the British colonial regime. Initially the Congress began as an association of the urban educated and professional classes chiefly aiming at gaining privileges from the British colonial government. The Congress got transformed from an intellectual organization of the elite minority to a popular organization, after the advent of Gandhi. He gave a mass character to the Congress and the organization became the most significant mechanism to strengthen the movement for India's freedom struggle which witnessed a triumphant termination due to the central role of Congress and its leadership. After independence, Mahatma Gandhi debated the idea of Congress continuing as a political party. Rather he intended that the organization should dedicate itself to social work. But Congress Working Committee outrightly declined to accept the proposal and decided in favour of Congress becoming a political party.
The successful termination of India's freedom movement, mainly engineered by the Congress enabled the organization to emerge as a strong force in the Indian political system. The Congress party captured political power and provided a stable government both at the center and almost all the States. The charismatic leadership of Pandit Nehru ensured that the Congress remained at the pinnacle of political power without being challenged from outside. The hiccup that Congress had to experience was when India had to suffer a debacle in the border war with China in 1962. This event shook the political eminence of Nehru and his leadership was sharply criticized both from within and from outside Congress. Hence, for a more effective functioning of the organization, a new strategy called Kamraj Plan was devised. The demise of Pandit Nehru in May 1964 entangled the Congress in a crisis for leadership. However, the unanimous election of Lal Bahadur Shastri for the premiership resolved the crisis. Anyway, the Shastriji's leadership was abrupt and due to his death in 1966, the party was again confronted with the question of Shastriji's successor. At this juncture, there occurred an open competition between Indira Gandhi and Morarji Desai over the issue of succession. Indira Gandhi was able to succeed in the contest by virtue of support from the old guard of the party. The senior Congress leaders selected Indira Gandhi on the notion that it would be easier to control her rather than her senior rival Morarji Desai. But Indira Gandhi disproved the convictions of her colleagues in the party by depicting her dictatorial style of functioning.
The fourth general elections brought a sharp decline in the strength of the Congress. In the AICC meeting held at Bangalore in January 1969, the differences within the party leadership between Indira Gandhi and the old Congressmen was unveiled, ultimately resulting in the break up of Indian National Congress in December 1969.

“If the division in 1907 between the liberals and the extremists was not out of principles and policies, the split of 1969 was the result of the conflict of personalities and their struggle for power and supremacy.”53 Due to the split, Indira Gandhi’s government slumped to a minority and she had to seek the support of communists for the survival of her government. This split gave birth to Congress [O] which contained several senior leaders of the undivided Congress party. The Congress [O] merged into Janata party at the time of 1977 general elections. The Congress was able to recoup its position in the Indian politics after 1971 mid-term polls. This was fundamentally due to Indira Gandhi’s charisma. At this moment there arose an air of political discontent because of various reasons. Prominent among them were the failure of monsoons in 1972 which led to inflation in 1973, the Gujarat agitation, the J.P. movement and the dictatorial style of functioning of Indira Gandhi. This destabilized Indira’s government and Indira Gandhi resorted to take an unprecedented step of imposing national emergency, suspending the entire democratic edifice. But
Indira Gandhi justified her action on the pretext that the step was essential for restoring order and stability in the country.

"A momentous and unexpected, but epoch making change occurred by the fall of Indira Gandhi’s emergency regime through the ballot box." The 1977 general elections were a historic one for the Indian political system. This brought for the first time, a non-Congress government at the center and for the first time the Congress was functioning as an opposition party in the parliament. In 1978 the Congress experienced another split, dividing Congress [R] into Indira Congress and the Swaran Singh’s Congress. Political parties being named after personalities was an unprecedented phenomenon in the history of Indian polity. The Congress underwent a split twice in the time of Indira Gandhi and on both the instances, the challenge to the supremacy of Indira Gandhi was the primary issue. In 1979 again there was a split in the Congress. The then chief minister of Karnataka, Devaraj Urs led a break away group to form Karnataka Congress party. The Karnataka Congress merged into Congress [S] later. It was designated as Congress [U] and Devaraj Urs became its national president. The fall of Janata government brought back Congress party under the leadership of Indira Gandhi to power with an overwhelming majority. The assassination of Indira Gandhi paved a way for her son Rajiv Gandhi to lead the party in the general elections of 1984 and the ensuing elections brought astounding success for the Congress. By virtue of sympathy wave prevailing due to Indira Gandhi’s
assassination, the Congress gained over 400 seats in the Lok Sabha, which did not happen even at the time of Nehru. Rajiv Gandhi provided a stable government for a full term.

In the general elections of 1989, the Congress emerged as the single largest party. But it was not able to muster an adequate majority to form the government. Hence, Rajiv Gandhi declined to form the government and preferred to function as the opposition leader. The Janata Dal coalition government was formed and it did not last long. Mid-term polls were announced in 1991. At this juncture, the Congress had to experience a major shock, when Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated on May 21, 1991. Rajiv Gandhi was succeeded by P. V. Narasimha Rao, and the Congress emerged as the single largest party in the Lok Sabha. But the Congress did not have the absolute majority. Hence, Narasimha Rao had to run a minority government with the help of some minor parties like the JMM and the independents. Of course, it was able to complete its full term in office. The 1996 general elections resulted in a hung Lok Sabha with no party getting a clear majority. The Congress lost heavily and the BJP emerged as the single largest party and formed a coalition government which lasted for thirteen days. Then the united front government was formed. At this time the failure of Congress in the elections and the entanglement of its senior leaders including Narasimha Rao in scandals, compelled Narasimha Rao to step down. Sita Ram Kesari became the president of the party. Congress
functioned as an opposition. The mid-term polls of 1998 and 1999, resulted in BJP's emerging as the single largest party and it formed coalition government at the center. Meanwhile, the Congress experienced an intense turmoil. It had to confront the crisis of leadership and after Sita Ram Kesari, Sonia Gandhi was made the president of the party much to the discontentment of several top party leaders. This ushered in another split in the party when three top leaders of the party, Sharad Pawar, P.A.Sangma and Tarik Anvar broke away and formed their Nationalist Congress Party under the leadership of Sharad Pawar. This gravely weakened the party. Further, the sudden and unexpected deaths of senior leaders, Madhav Rao Scindia and Rajesh Pilot enfeebled the Congress. Presently, under the leadership of Sonia Gandhi, the party is trying to attain resurgence. In the general elections 2004, Congress led United Progressive Alliance [UPA] has returned back to power.

Bharatiya Janata Party

The springs of the Bharatiya Janata party can be traced to its parental links with the former Bharatiya Jana Sangh. Hence, it is pertinent to look at the history of Jana Sangh to facilitate a proper understanding of the origin of BJP. Some important events of 1948 ensued the emergence of Bharatiya Jana Sangh. It is significant to take note of these events in order to discover the sources for the origin of party. At the first instance, the banning of Hindu Maha Sabha by the government after the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi due to the
alleged nexus of the assassin with these associations bear the initial antecedents leading to the birth of Jana Sangh. Further, the immediate reasons ushering in the materializing of the Jana Sangh were that firstly S.P. Mukerjee the founder president of the party denounced the Hindu Maha Sabha on the ground that his proposal for open membership for non-Hindus was turned down. The most vital cause in this regard was the resignation of S. P. Mukerjee from Nehru’s cabinet as a protest against Nehru-Liaqut Ali Pact of 1950, regarding equal rights for the minorities in India and Pakistan. So Shyama Prasad Mukerjee established a new party the Bharatiya Jana Sangh with the support of the RSS. “The Bharatiya Jana Sangh stood for the rebuilding of India on the basis of Bharatiya Samskriti and Maryada, culture and tradition. It wanted to build political, social and economic democracy on the principles of Indian culture.”

The formal launching of Jana Sangh was made on 21st October 1951 with Shyama Prasad Mukerjee as its first national president. “In the first general elections the Bharatiya Jana Sangh contested 14 seats and won 3 seats.”

Its picayune position in the parliament after the first general elections constrained the party from playing any pivotal role in the parliament. The death of S. P. Mukerjee brought a serious jolt to the party and it made a considerable impact on its electoral performance. During the first four general elections the party made steady headway in terms of its numerical strength. In the second general election in
1957, the party contested for 130 seats but won only three seats. Similarly, in 1962 the position of the party made a considerable amount of progress, when it won 14 seats out of 196 it had contested. It was in 1966 general election that the party was able to gain a prominent position in the parliament when it won 35 seats and the party emerged as a major force in the opposition. After this the party was able to become a partner in coalition governments in several States. It is said: "The Jana Sangh was sharing power in the governance of Punjab and it supported the non-Congress government in Haryana."57

The position of the party slumped down after 1971 Lok Sabha elections and the assembly polls of 1972. The party was able to win only 22 seats out of 157 seats for the Lok Sabha. The expulsion of Balraj Madhok from the party in 1973 due to internal squabbles gave a severe blow to the party. Madhok and his supporters formed a new party, the Rashtriya Lok Tantrik or National Democratic Sangh.

Since independence efforts were on for uniting non-Congress parties. The position of the opposition parties was contravened and they had no momentous role to play. In the 1970s, the time was ripe for the unification of non-Congress parties, as several events in the period led to a drastic change in the political scenario of India. They include the defacement of economic development, mishandling of famine, Gujarat agitation, the JP movement, the dictatorial regime of Indira Gandhi, the decision of Allahabad High Court declaring the
election of Indira Gandhi as unconstitutional and the imposition of national emergency in 1975. These events catalyzed the process of unification of the non-communist and non-Congress parties to come together and formed the Janata Front to form a common forum to work together in both the houses of parliament. These four parties merged together under the leadership of Jaya Prakash Narayan and formed the Janata party. "The new party, Janata party contested 405 seats out of which it won 295 seats in 1977 general elections."

Hence, the Janata party had achieved a clear cut verdict to form the government at center. The party formed the government under the leadership of Morarji Desai. But the tenure of Janata government was abruptly ended, as the party experienced a split due to internal strifes and Morarji Desai. The Janata party formed the government under the leadership of Charan Singh with the outside support from the Congress. But even Charan Singh's government was short lived. In this way the Jana Sangh played a pivotal role for nearly three decades in the Indian political process as a strong force in the opposition and as a coalition partner with non-Congress parties by participating in Janata government at the center and in several State governments.

The Origin and Growth of Baharatiya Janata Party

"Bharatiya Janata party came into being as a result of the split in the Janata party in April 1980 on the issue of dual membership." The Jana Sangh was created by drawing a cadre out of the ranks of the
right wing extremist organization RSS. The nexus between the Jana Sangh and the RSS, continued even after the party joined the Janata front. This became a major irritant within the ranks and files of Janata party and subsequently the issue of dual membership was first raised by Babu Jag Jeevan Ram and later reiterated by Charan Singh. The Jana Sangh leaders held the notion that their membership of the RSS was not an issue. The Janata party parliamentary board, in its meeting on March 12, 1980, decided that no functionary or legislator of Janata Party should participate in the routine activities of RSS. The Janata party national executive, in its meeting on 3rd and 4th April 1980, declared that any member of Janata party having links with RSS must dismantle their connections immediately or else face a disciplinary action. Top leaders, A.B. Vajpayee, L. K. Advani and Nanalji Deshmukh opposed this decision. "This led the erstwhile Jana Sangh members of the Janata party and some others to leave the Janata party and form a new party called the Bharatiya Janata Party with A.B. Vajpayee as its president."

Assuming the role of the president, Vajpayee accepted the commitment of the new party for upholding the principles of secularism, unity in diversity and protection for minorities. He called upon the opposition parties to come together and stand firmly against the authoritarian regime of Congress. In the general elections of 1980 and 1984, the BJP did not figure well in terms of attaining a formidable parliamentary strength in order to play any influential role
in Indian polity. The party came to the forefront only after the 1989 general elections when it won 86 seats emerging as a potent force in the parliament. The BJP supported Janata Dal coalition government led by V. P. Singh from outside. “Much popularity to the Bharatiya Janata Party came when it started to involve itself in the controversial issue of Ram Janma Bhumi.”

In this connection, the BJP began a massive campaign under the leadership of its president Lal Krishna Advani. For this Advani took up a Rath Yatra which began at Somanath on 25th September 1990 and it was scheduled to reach Ayodhya on 30th October 1990. The BJP Karsevakas wanted to begin the construction of Ram temple at the controversial site in a symbolic manner. In the mean time, there arose strong protests from the Congress and other opposition parties regarding the on-going developments. They exerted immense pressure on V.P. Singh government to stop the BJP led Hindu nationalist campaign. Under duress the government ordered the halting of Rath Yatra and the arrest of L. K. Advani. This resulted in the withdrawal of support to the government by the BJP, which led to the fall of V.P.Singh government. Later on, Chandra Shekhar formed a new government with the support of Congress, but that government did not last long and mid-term poll was held in 1991. In that election the BJP won 120 seats and functioned as an opposition party.

The 1996 general elections proved to be an ice-breaking for the BJP, because for the first time, the party emerged as the single largest
party in a hung parliament. The party had won 161 seats out of 471 contested for the Lok Sabha. As per the convention, the president invited the BJP under the leadership of A.B. Vajpayee to form the government. Vajpayee government formed but it lasted for only thirteen days due to its inability to get the required support for proving its majority in the Lok Sabha. “The Bharatiya Janata Party maintained its regional core of support in the Hindu belt, but it failed to expand its electoral base in the South.”

After this, the United Front government was formed under the leadership of Deve Gowda, but even the UF government did not last long in spite of changing its prime minister. Hence, after Gujral’s government was defeated on the floor of parliament by a no confidence motion, mid-term polls were declared in 1998. With 182 seats in the Lok Sabha, the BJP once again emerged as the single largest party forming a coalition government with some regional parties which included All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam [AIADMK], Biju Janata Dal [BJD], Shiromani Akali Dal [SAD], Trinamul Congress, Sivasena, Pattal Makkal Katche [PMK], Haryana Lok Dal [HLD], Haryana Vikas Party [HVP], Lok Sakti, Arunachal Congress, Murumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam [MDMK] and some independents. The Telugu Desham Party [TDP] had declared to remain neutral. The BJP led coalition government won the vote of confidence in the Lok Sabha on 28th March 1998. The government had to face grave challenges in order to mitigate the demands of its
coalition partners. Hence, the government lasted only for a year and it collapsed when the AIADMK withdrew its support. Thus, the Lok Sabha was dissolved and fresh elections were declared. "From the highly fragmented parliament produced by India's 12th general election, the Bharatiya Janata party led a heterogeneous coalition of smaller parties to form a minority government."63

Before the 13th general elections the BJP formed a grand alliance consisting of twenty-four parties called the NDA, which was a pre-poll alliance. The BJP contested the elections with its coalition partners under a common manifesto. In the ensuing election the BJP led alliance emerged as the largest group in the lower house and it formed the government under the leadership of A.B. Vajpayee. The NDA successfully completed the full term in the office and elections were conducted in April-May 2004. However, the NDA did no succeed in getting a majority to form the government and it is functioning as the opposition party. The emergence of BJP led NDA alliance marks a watershed in the history of Indian polity, because after the transformation from a one party dominant system the country has entered into the phase of multi-party system and BJP's successful completion of a full term in office has exhibited the fact that a viable coalition is a feasible phenomenon in Indian political system. A scholar states: "Thwarted by the logic of collective action and by a predominant party to avoid sectarian divisions, Bharatiya Janata Party's ascendency was far from inevitable. It is product of shrewd
political maneuvering by the Bharatiya Janata party elite in a politico-economic environment, that was ripe for change."

The Janata Party

The Janata party emerged as a reactionary movement to the intense political turmoil which began with the split of Indian National Congress in 1969. This was because of Indira Gandhi's imposition of national emergency in 1975. The political crisis was ended when national emergency was called off and fresh elections were declared. The ensuing elections marked a watershed in the history of Indian polity. For the first time a non-Congress government was formed by a conglomeration of five parties called Janata party.

The genesis of the Janata party can be traced to the deep felt urge since independence in some quarters for uniting non-Communist forces to form a formidable political front. The germs of the idea can be traced to 1967, when Lohia called for the unification of opposition parties to put an end to the rule of Congress. This led to the formation of an alliance of non-Congress at the time of 1971 elections. But the alliance did not get much success. After the 1971 general election, the Congress [O], Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Bharatiya Lok Dal and Socialist parties had formed the Janata front to work together for a common purpose. The creation of Janata party was announced by Jaya Prakash Narayan in 1977. Once at Bombay he declared that he was forming a new party consisting of Congress [O], Bharatiya Lok Dal,
Jana Sangh and the Socialist party. Babu Jag Jeevan Ram, a senior Congress leader, denounced the party as a protest to the imposition of national emergency and declared the establishment of a new party Congress for democracy, which merged with Janata party later. The Janata party came to power at the center after the 1977 general elections and formed the government under the leadership of Morarji Desai. “The emergence of Janata party, as an alternative to Congress party, ending the thirty year rule of the Congress for the first time since independence, is a land mark in the history of India.”65 However, the unity of the party was short lived and there occurred a split in the party and Charan Singh formed Janata party [S]. With this Morarji’s government fell short of majority and it had to resign. Charan Singh formed the government, but even it was short lived as it lost the confidence of the house and he resigned in a few months. Hence, this brought an end to the short stint of non-Congress government at the center and Congress came back to power after the 1980 elections. Since then Janata party has been suffering from splits ultimately leading to the disappearance of the party from the mainstream of national politics.

Janata Dal

The decline of the Janata party was coupled with splits in the party. The Jana Sangh members broke away and formed the BJP. Apart from this, Charan Singh, broke away with his supporters and formed Janata party [S] in 1988. Some factions of the party like, Lok
Dal [B] and the Jana Morcha formed a unified party called Janata Dal. The decision was endorsed at the Bangalore convention of the leaders of these parties held in October 1988. In this conference the policy and programmes of the party were drafted and accepted. V.P. Singh was elected as its first president. The Janata Dal, CPI, CPI [M], Telugu Desam, DMK and Congress [S] formed a national front on August 6, 1989 under the leadership of N. T. Rama Rao. The national front sphere headed by Janata Dal came to power at the center in 1989, with the outside support of BJP, under the leadership of V. P. Singh. But personality clashes between V.P. Singh and Chandra Shekhar, the differences with BJP over the Rath Yatra of L. K. Advani and the Mandal issue led to the decline of the V. P. Singh’s government. The BJP withdrew its support and the government had to resign due to want of a majority. Chandra Shekhar formed the government with the outside support of Congress. But Congress withdrew its support due to the differences over the issue of the arrest of Prem Singh and Raj Singh, who were found moving suspiciously near the residence of the then Congress president Rajiv Gandhi. The Congress withdrew its support because Chandra Shekhar government procrastinated over initiating an enquiry in the matter. The crisis ended with the resignation of Chandra Shekhar’s government and fresh elections were declared.

In the 1991 general elections, the Congress emerged as the single largest party and formed the government. The Janata Dal
suffered splits in its ranks and was inhibited from playing any crucial role and remained as an opposition party. The 1996 general election produced a hung parliament with the BJP emerging as the single largest party and it formed the government. But the government lasted for only thirteen days and it had to resign due to want of majority. National front and Left front floated a thirteen party coalition called United Front led by Janata Dal and formed the government with Janata Dal leader, H. D. Deve Gowda as its prime minister. The government had the outside support of Congress. But Deve Gowda's government did not last long when the Congress withdrew its support owing to its demand for a change of leadership. The government lost its confidence vote and resigned in 1997. Congress was ready to extend its support once again to the United Front subject to the condition that there should be a change in the leadership. Thus the United Front formed the government under the leadership of I. K. Gujral. Even the Gujral government did not last long when the Congress withdrew its support in 1998. It had to resign owing to its defeat in the confidence vote. General elections were declared and the BJP led coalition government came back to power. But for only a period of one year and when its ally AIADMK withdrew its support, the government resigned. In the 1999 elections the BJP led coalition NDA was able to muster an adequate majority and it has completed its term at the office. Meanwhile, Janata Dal has suffered a total collapse due to fragmentation in the party.
The trouble started with the party split in its stronghold, Karnataka and two factions were formed, Janata Dal United and Janata Dal Secular. The key reason for the split was the personality feud between Rama Krishna Hegde and Deve Gowda. The efforts of veteran leader S. Nijalingappa to unite the two factions proved futile. Further, another strong leader of the party, the chief minister of Bihar, Lalu Prasad Yadav, broke away from the party and formed the Rashtriya Janata Dal. With this the foundations of the party were totally wrecked and presently the Janata Dal has not remained a significant force in not only in the Indian polity but also in the regions of its stronghold like Karnataka. With numerous fragments of the Janata Dal mushrooming, the party has lost its identity. Here, it can be said that the personality clashes and the lack of a coherent political ideology have doomed Janata party to a position from which the prospects of its resurgence seems to be absurd.

The Communist Parties

The Communist party of India was born on 26th December 1925. It was a part of the Congress at the time of freedom movement. But the Communist party of India held divergent views with Congress regarding the second world war. The CPI supported the British war efforts calling it people's war and it criticized the Quit India Movement launched by the Congress as a reaction to the war. The CPI tarnished its own image by giving support to the separatist demand of the Muslim League for Pakistan. In the first general elections the CPI
emerged as the largest opposition party in the Lok Sabha, the position of which was maintained up to 1962. The Communist party first formed the government at the State level in Kerala in 1957. The Indo-China war of 1962 was an epoch making event in the history of CPI. The event unveiled the differences within the party because a section in the party was reluctant to call China as an aggressor, while the majority of members supported Nehru government. Ultimately there occurred a split in the party leading to the formation of Communist party of India [Marxist]. In the 1967 elections, the CPI won 24 seats and the CPI [M] won 19 seats. In 1967, the Communist party witnessed another split and the Naxalites formed their own party CPI [ML]. The two Communist parties differed in their assessment of the people scenario in India. The CPI considered the Congress government's policies under Indira Gandhi as progressive. But the CPI [M] held the view that the Congress represented a capitalist interest. After the split of Congress in 1969, the CPI supported the minority government of Indira Gandhi and this support persisted up till 1977 including its support to the declaration of national emergency of 1975. In the 1971 general elections, the CPI won 23 seats and the CPI [M] won 25 seats. In the 1977 general elections the CPI was an ally of the Congress and the CPI [M] was an ally of Janata party. But it did not join the Janata party, because it opposed the Jana Sangh members, who were the members of Janata party being associated with the right wing extremist organizations, the RSS. In spite of ideological differences between the two Communist parties, on
national and international affairs, both have achieved a working relationship. This tendency towards the unity of two parties led to the split of CPI and its chairman, S. A. Dange resigned from his position as a protest against its alliance with the CPM, Congress [U] and Lok Dal. Owing to this a section of CPI, broke away and formed an All India Communist party, which claims to be the genuine Communist party of India after the 1989 general elections. Both the CPI and CPI [M] supported the national front government. Again in 1996 the CPI joined the National Front-Left Front combine and formed the United Front government. After the decline of National Front, the CPI with its allies has not remained a third front in Indian polity. Anyway with CPI [M], it has remained a strong force as the opposition in the Indian political system.
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