CHAPTER - I

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In order to show how all schools of Yoga are based only on or give rise to, Indian philosophy and not on western philosophy it is necessary to show, in broad outlines at least, the distinction between Indian philosophy and Western philosophy. Because the philosophical doctrines that are the foundations of Yoga in general are uniquely Indian. There may be a few parallels between Western philosophy and Indian philosophy so far as individual doctrines are considered. For example, there may be a similarity between the doctrine of personal God as conceived in the Bhakti-yoga and in the theism of Descartes. But finding similarity between Indian philosophy and Western philosophy on such trivial grounds is like finding comparison between A and B on the basis of their ears. But taken collectively, the Indian philosophical doctrines that are the bases of Yoga find no parallels in western thought. Let us, therefore, concentrate on some very important points of differences between Indian philosophy and Western philosophy. However, while attempting to distinguish between the two systems of philosophy following points are to be taken note of:

(a) Just because a philosophy is western, we need not expect it to differ from Indian philosophy in all respects. To characterize Indian philosophy as wholly spiritualistic is as much wrong as to characterize Western philosophy as wholly materialistic. Nor can we say Western
philosophy is wholly scientific, rational and ethical, while Indian philosophy is wholly apologetic based on faith and mysticism. Such characterization is wrong because in both traditions we find realism and idealism, monism, dualism and pluralism, materialism and spiritualism. In both systems there are schools, which emphasize logic or ethics. In such a situation what we can at best say is that Western philosophy or Indian philosophy *generally* exhibits such and such tendencies.

(b) There are various aspects in each system of philosophy that are not in the other. Though we can enumerate many points of difference between Indian philosophy and Western philosophy we need not take into account all of them. It is enough if we take into account only those points, which are relevant to our purpose. We can cite two points for instance, which are not relevant:

(i) Western philosophy is adventurous in the sense that it is always ready to break away from the tradition in its pursuit of a better system. Thus modern philosophy is different in its approach and content from both ancient and medieval philosophy. Even within modern philosophy there is a significant difference between rationalism and empiricism, between either of these and Kant. This is because Western philosophy enjoys greater freedom in choosing its topics. Thus to the topics of early Greek philosophy such as cosmology, logic, ethics, aesthetics, topics of a wide variety, such as epistemology, sense data, language, medicine, environment, religion, politics, law, etc. have been added by modern philosophers as a result of which not only there is a marked development in the earlier topics, but also
new branches of philosophy such as philosophy of religion, philosophy of law, philosophy of medicine, philosophy of environment, philosophy of science, etc. have come into existence. We do not find such multidirectional growth in Indian philosophy, perhaps because of lack of freedom.

(ii) Western philosophy has linear history, i.e. each new school grew out of its predecessor, whereas all schools of Indian philosophy grew almost simultaneously.

With this in view let us concentrate on those points of difference, which enhance our understanding of Indian philosophy so far as it is the basis or result of yoga.

1. ORIGIN OF PHILOSOPHY

One of the most important points of difference between Indian philosophy and Western philosophy concerns the origin and purpose of philosophical enquiry. If we read the histories of Indian philosophy and of Western philosophy, it becomes clear that the latter is purely academic or theoretical, while the former is predominantly practical. While Western philosophy begins with curiosity about and wonder at the external world, Indian philosophy, as already noted in the previous Chapter (‘Introduction’), takes its birth in the awareness of perennial suffering associated with human existence. No doubt the wonder or curiosity, which is generally believed to give rise to Western philosophy, may not be childish but mature, but it is always an intellectual enterprise of the wise. It may even be above the stage where stories and mythologies are believed to
answer our curiosities. But even the questions of the wisest in the west have not addressed the problem of human existence so consistently and so exhaustively, as the Indian have done.

The early Greeks asked cosmological, psychological, political and ethical questions; the medieval philosophers were interested in theological questions; the modern philosophers in epistemological, and metaphysical questions and the contemporary philosophers in logico-linguistic questions.

But is it not a fact that Indian philosophers also asked cosmological, theological, epistemological and logico-linguistic questions? Nobody who has a good acquaintance with the different phases of the different schools of Indian philosophy can give a negative reply. The Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika exhibit overt interest in cosmological issues. While Sāṅkhya system elaborately discusses how the prakṛti evolves into the world, the Vaiśeṣika discusses how every thing in the world is reducible to atoms each having its own individuality. The Nyāya, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and the Buddhists engage in hair split analysis of language and in this they are in no way inferior to the modern philosophers of language. But these, though academically very important, are directly or indirectly related to man’s position in the universe. That the Indian philosopher’s discussions of the world is not a purely academic but one having practical relevance can be shown in the following way:

The world, which we are thrown into acts as an environment, which either causes happiness or causes unhappiness, depending on our past deeds (karma). Thus the kind of places we live in and the kind of people we come
in contact with, such as friends and enemies, teachers and students, bosses and colleagues, parents, siblings, etc., are inevitable sources of one's happiness and unhappiness. According to Indian philosophy in general, if it is not due to our past karmas, our happiness or unhappiness could not be explained.

The essence of the world we live in, so far as it is dead matter, cannot be changed, whereas we who come in contact with it, can either change its role or give it new forms, or can change our role in relation to it. In other words, according to Indian philosophy, material world is a world for us, an arena in which we have innumerable opportunities to mould our life-style in order to achieve our goal. In the process we may set an ordinary goal before us and lead a mean life to achieve it, or set a spiritual goal and lead a great life in order to achieve it. In either case, we are free, and are expected to exercise our freedom in one way or the other.

When the Sāṅkhya engages in cosmological questions its aim is that man must put these teachings to good use. A man who knows the secret of reality about himself and the world desists from craving for material acquisition and sensual pleasure. Nyāya, which discusses logic and epistemology, advocates that they are necessary for right knowledge about the world, which in turn is necessary for mokṣa. Pūrva Mīmāṁsā, which concentrates its focus on the analysis of the language of the Vedas, does so with the sole aim of teaching the essence of the Vedas. In short, no school of Indian philosophy considers its logic, epistemology, metaphysics, etc., as ends in themselves, although we can study them independently, if we want to do so, but as a means to liberation. Perhaps we hardly come across philosophical theories divorced from practical utility.
One can object that the ancient Indian philosophy originated in such a period in which the Indian mind had not still developed the capacity for abstract thinking and, therefore, could not separate pure philosophy from religion. This objection, if right, implies that ancient Indian philosophers were incapable of discussing philosophical issues without sifting them from religion and moral injunctions. That this objection is mischievous and holds no water can be easily shown by referring to two phases in the growth of Indian philosophical thought. In one of the Upaniṣads\textsuperscript{1} a clear-cut distinction is made between a philosopher who is interested solely in the theoretical discussions about Brahman and a philosopher who has realized Brahman in his mystic experience. The former is called \textit{Brahmavādin} and the latter \textit{Brahmavid}. Similarly, in the \textit{Kathopaniṣad}\textsuperscript{2} it is said that listening to lectures about Brahman does not lead to Brahman–realization. So even in the very early phase of the history of Indian philosophy, people were capable of discussing theoretical philosophical issues without reference to their practical use.

Just because Indian philosophy is described as religious or practical in distinction from Western philosophy, which is only theoretical or academic, it should not be construed that it does not have an academic part.

Indian philosophy has as intricate and complex metaphysical and epistemological theories as many others and that in fact these disciplines–epistemology and metaphysics – are an essential and necessary part of Indian philosophy, as they ought to be of any philosophy that claims to be a philosophy of life.\textsuperscript{3}
Of course this does not mean to claim that in Indian philosophy also we have Freges, Russells and Wittgensteins. So also the claim that Indian philosophy is devoid of academic discussion is cavalier and over-simplistic.

Since Hindu Philosophy is a philosophy of life, it divides the society hierarchically into four groups (varṇas), namely, Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya and Śūdra, and divides the life of each individual coming under each of these hierarchical groups into four levels, āśramās. Thus, for example a Brāhmin, in the first stage of his life, beginning from his eighth year, called Brahmacarya, must study the Vedas and other related things. Having finished his studies he returns to his parents and is obliged to repay the threefold debt. He has to marry and produce children, especially sons, so that his lineage continues. That is repayment of pitṛṇa–debt to forefathers. The second is repayment of the debt towards his teacher, i.e., what he has learnt from his teacher he must transmit to his students. The third is repayment of the debt to the god, who have provided him the means of maintenance. He has to repay this by performing sacrifices in the name of gods. In the third stage of his life, he, having transferred his responsibilities to his sons, departs to a forest with his wife. Where he reflects on what he has done and he should do to acquire the summum bonum. In the fourth stage he renounces the world, sends back his wife to their son, and concentrates his efforts on the highest goal. It is these people who normally produced Indian philosophical literature. However, this only means that production of philosophical literature requires leisure and peace of mind, and not that only people in the third and fourth stage produce them, nor that
kings and other people who owed their duties to their society have not produced philosophical literature. Jaimini, the author of Mīmāṃsā sūtras was perhaps not an ascetic; Rāmānuja who produced voluminous literature on the Vedānta led a household life for a long time. In sum, we can say that Indian philosophy, not only discussed the ideals of life, the highest reality, soul, etc. just as the Westerners have done, but, unlike the Westerners have prescribed the ways of leading the ideal life. Similar rules of life are laid down by Buddhism and Jainism also. What is more interesting is that even the Cārvākas speak of ideal life, although the ideal life for them is not religious life prescribed either by orthodox systems like Sāṅkhya, Yoga, etc. or by the heterodox systems, like Buddhism and Jainism. The crux of the point is that Indian philosophy cannot avoid reference to the problems of human life and the ideal life, which aims at avoiding them.

It is not enough to say Indian philosophy is practical oriented. Indian philosophy aims at transcending the limitations associated with human existence. In fact, it is precisely this aim that is the cause of philosophizing. Therefore, Indian philosophy must obviously be life-oriented.

2. DIFFERENCE IN THE MEANING OF KNOWLEDGE:

Even when it is pointed out that Indian philosophers are interested in the knowledge of one's own self and of the external world pragmatically unlike the Western philosophers who are interested in knowledge only academically (and not also pragmatically), the meaning of knowledge in these two contexts is vastly different. It is true that the content of knowledge as conceived by the Indian philosophers and that of knowledge as conceived
by Western philosophers are different. For example, it is maintained that the Western philosophers are interested in knowledge of external things. The external things may mean external world as, for example, in the case of Thales, Anaximanader, Anaximenes, Empedocles, Democritus, and other cosmological philosophers, or it may denote the nature, scope and limits, and criteria of knowledge; or it may mean the scientist's or philosopher's or religious man's language about the world, God, soul, etc. in the analysis of which the linguistic philosophers are interested. In short, the Western philosophers are extrovertive in their passion for knowledge. In direct contrast to this, Indian philosophers can be safely described as introvertive. Because they are pre-eminently interested in the knowledge of the self. They are also interested in the matters in which Western philosophers are interested, but these matters take back seat in Indian philosophy.

The bigger and more important difference between Indian philosophy and Western philosophy so far as the connotation of knowledge is concerned lies, not in the content of knowledge, but in the mode of knowing what is known.

Inwardness: Another distinction between Indian philosophy and Western philosophy concerns inwardness. The task of determining the nature of Indian philosophy and Western philosophy in terms of inwardness is necessitated by the general claim that Western philosophy is objective and outward and Indian philosophy is subjective and inward. But unless we determine the connotation of the concept of inwardness we cannot examine the truth-value of this sweeping claim.
Man can be studied from various angles — sociological, economical, political, and physiological, etc; but none of these studies pays attention to his problems, his feelings, his purpose, his ideals, and his attitude to the values, etc., which constitute the innermost core or essence of his life. Therefore, these studies can be regarded as outward. If there is a study, which pays more attention to the problems of his life, his ideals, etc., it can be called inward, and what else than philosophy can be called inward? Psychology, which also studies man’s feelings, purposes, etc., is outward, rather than inward, because it studies the behaviour of man from outside, i.e. as if it is some kind of an object. Moreover, such a study has no reference to his ideals, his goals, and his religious and philosophical background. Therefore, with this in view, we can ask, which philosophy — Indian or Western — is inward? This is an oversimplified question, because it implies that if all schools of Indian philosophy are inward, then no school of Western philosophy is inward, and vice versa. In this regard, it is advisable to take the advice of Prof. P.T. Raju, a noted writer on comparative philosophy:

Everywhere man feels the presence of reality both within himself and outside himself. Some may feel the presence of the external more strongly than that of the internal; others the presence of the internal more strongly than that of the external. But there are people of both types everywhere in the world. So everywhere both types of philosophy can be present. And both have elements of truth. But in some
cultures, and at some times, one may be so dominating and pressing that the other is suppressed or ignored; and philosophical inquiry develops as if the other does not exist or is only of secondary importance. Further, the tendency to interpret what offers less pressing problems in terms of that, which is more pressing, becomes strong. The best philosophies, however, should be those that give equal recognition to both the inward and the outward.4

If this is so then the question "Is Indian philosophy inward and Western philosophy outward?" loses its meaning and relevance. Therefore, it must be reformulated as: Which philosophy is more inward and which more outward?

Secondly, what characterizes a philosophy as outward or inward is not merely the topics, which it takes up for inquiry, but also the methodology it adopts. Let us examine a few important examples taken from Western philosophy and Indian philosophy.

Thales (7th century B.C.), Anaximander, Anaximenes, the earliest known Greek philosophers from Miletus, considered as more important the cosmological questions, like "What is the stuff out of which the whole universe including matter, life and consciousness is made?" "Does the world have an efficient cause or not?". "Is it mechanical or teleological?". It does not require deep insight or long deliberation to regard these questions as outward. Even the numbers, which Pythagoras regarded as reality having
objective existence, were outward. Pythagoras was a mystic, but it seems he
did not pay much attention to his inward experience. In his philosophy

"God was not yet conceived in the fullest spirituality, akin to
the spirit of man and lying somewhere deep within it." For
Pythagoras, "He (God) was not yet the ultimate Spirit or
Self, one of whose expressions is reason. This conception
could not be attained, because the human self was not yet
adequately grasped. The difference between mind and
matter, man and his environment was not yet sharply felt. In
Pythagoras there is much of the inward, but it is not yet
clearly grasped. He could see that reason is higher than
sense, but not clearly that it is inward."5

We could hope for some inwardness in the philosophy of Anaxagoras
(5th century B.C.), who was also a mystic. He believed that Nous
(comparable roughly to Brahman of Indian philosophy) is unlimited and
enters all living beings, thus distinguishing itself from the material things.
But he fails to probe it inwardly.

Heraclitus (fifth century B.C.) seems to be one mystic philosopher
who claims, "I have searched myself".6 Having searched it in his mystic
experience, he identified it with thought or Logos, and regarded it as the
ultimate reality. The suspicion that he might have mistaken the inner light
for physical fire is an irrational bias and does violence and injustice to his
intellectual prowess".
Neither the philosophy of Empedocles which asserted that only objects have beginning and end, while the material elements - earth, air, water and fire - out of which they are composed are beginningless and endless, nor the philosophy of Democritus and Leucippus which maintained that qualityless material atoms are the building blocks of the entire universe was inward.

The Sophists who for the first time asked cosmology-free philosophical questions taught a humanistic philosophy. They stressed the human side, especially the individual and subjective, to the utter neglect of religion and ethics. In other words, though they descended from cosmology to humanism, “On the whole the universality of the inwardness of man was missed by them”7 However, Socrates was another exception, the other and earlier being Anaxagoras. Of Socrates Hegel has this to say:

From this physical setting free of the inward abstract self from the concrete bodily existence of the individual, we have, in the outward manifestation, a proof of how the depths of his mind worked within him. In him we see pre-eminently the inwardness of consciousness that in an anthropological way existed in the first instance in him, and became later on a usual thing.8

Socrates believed that each man had in him (what he called) “daimon” which is the source of knowledge and that “because of the Logos was within each man”9 The only defect of Socrates was his failure to work out the inwardness philosophically, because he was more interested in the
objective concepts like beauty, justice, good, etc. and in man as if he were an external object, than an experiencing individual subject.

Philo, who might have been a contemporary of Jesus Christ, was a Jew and since he was a religious preacher rather than a philosopher, we notice in his philosophy a smaller role of reason and greater role of contemplation, "However, this contemplation was not scientific understanding or reason, as the Greeks would understand it, but intuition." In fact, "Philo was not satisfied with the rationalism of the Greeks, and felt it necessary to transcend it." The Greeks did not show how inwardly man could reach God and their faith in reason was too overwhelming. But we see a remarkable content of inwardness in Plotinous (204 A.D.) with whom is normally Neo-Platonism is associated.

The medieval philosophers who were mostly theologians and had a greater chance to stress inwardness also failed to do. St. Augustine, who earlier to Descartes had postulated, "I think, therefore, I exist" had realized the inadequacy of human reason in establishing the truth about God, soul, salvation, etc. and emphasized the necessity of inwardness. So his Christian philosophy depended heavily on inwardness, almost at the cost of reason, while St. Thāmas Aquinas upheld the supremacy of reason at the cost of inwardness.

The advent of Renaissance in the sixteenth century Europe was in effect the advent of age of reason. In other words, thinkers — philosophers, Natural scientists and Bio-scientists, Political scientists, literary people, and others— exhibited the tendency of adopting Greek logic and humanism, on
the one hand, and the new scientific spirit, on the other. Philosophers still tried to prove God, Soul, and other religion and metaphysical matters.

Though Socrates said "Know thyself" and Plato and Aristotle dealt with the essence of man, their philosophy cannot be considered as inward. Because they were trying to arrive at a conclusion regarding these matter (i) by means of reason and (ii) as if it were some kind of an object. On the contrary, the Upaniṣadic thinkers knew the essence of man and the world, by means of mystic intuition. Secondly, Western philosophy tried to know the essence of man as if it were outward object.

Western philosophy has become overwhelmingly scientific and outward looking. This aspect becomes obvious if we survey its growth from Heraclitus and Pythagoras to Logical positivists, physicalists and analysts. So we may say that this tradition succeeded in the emancipation of the object more than the subject, of matter more than the spirit, although it would be wrong at the same time to say that the tradition has had no spiritual philosophies and leaders.¹²

Now let us examine how a Indian philosophy is inward, and the claim "The main contribution of Indian tradition is the explication of the inwardness of man, the freedom of his spirit."¹³

Here two points need clarification. (i) Those who have studied only some aspects of Indian philosophy may think that Indian philosophy emphasises the inwardness of man to the utter neglect of the world.
They like, Albert Schweitzer may reach a hasty generalisation that Indian philosophy emphasises world-negation and life-negation in favour of inwardness. But while this may be true of Advaita Vedānta in a particular sense, it is not true of the other schools. (ii) It does deal with the outer world. But

as a philosophy of the whole life of man, it also exhibits a one-sidedness by not working out in positive detail of how inwardness and outwardness are related. It was not unaware of outwardness, but did not attach much importance to it. Its main interest lay in inwardness

The factor of inwardness is seen in Indian philosophy in two ways.

(i) Just as the awareness of pain and suffering is subjective and concrete, and not an object or simply an idea, so also the life (or 'existence' as the existentialists like to call it) of a man is not an object to him.

His existence is hence not a matter of speculation to him, but a reality in which his being is involved; he does not arrive at the truth of his existence as an objective certainty established by reasoning but encounters it in his 'subjective experience' in which 'knowing' and 'being' are one

Existentialism is averse to universal, abstract man; and even to universal, abstract suffering. It emphasizes the concrete, individual, subjective mode of man's existence. The idea of pain cannot, but the actual pain must, create the sense of urgency in me. I cannot react to unfelt pain,
just as a material object does not react. Therefore treating man or his problems in general is to exteriorize myself and, in effect, to dehumanize me. When Socrates, Plato, Descartes and others dealt with man’s soul, they were not dealing with a human individual, but abstract universal man. They emphasized the necessity of values like beauty, goodness, justice, knowledge etc., but they were trying to formulate definition, which are applicable to all men in all situation. They thought for others.

So instead of some others asking, "What is man? What is the meaning of man's existence?" etc. I should myself ask "Who am I?", "What is the nature and meaning of my existence?", "What are my potentialities and limitations?", "What should be the goal of my existence?". All these questions are not imposed on me from without, but emerge from my own introspection. Introspection is necessitated by the crises which the individual encounters in his day-to-day life and which force him to choose a way. Thus when man is faced with 'tāpatrāya', he is forced to choose a worldly way of avoiding them or a spiritual way of uprooting them. The question, which Arjuna faced in the battlefield, the question, which a Cārvāka asks about the aim of life, are two out of the numberless expressions of the same question. One can notice here that the individual does not look at these problems as external objects, or as somebody else's problems, but as his own immediately felt problems. Since they are immediately felt problems, which always vex him, or since they constitute the essence of human existence, he, as a rational and free agent, must
choose an appropriate way out. In this respect, he is superior to animals which lack both rationality and freedom.

(2) The recognition by the Indian philosophers of the distinction between empirical self (Jīva or Jīvātma) and transcendent self (ātman or puruṣa) is very important. The goal of all spiritual life is to realise the transcendent soul-substance. The transcendent soul-substance comes to be realized by the individual only when he turns 'inward' in yoga or dhyāna (meditation). The inwardness of the yogi is non-relational experience in which the individual is identified with ātman; it is an 'inwardness' deeper than the introspective reflection of the existentialists (Sartre and Heidegger) which is relational in character and is intended to disclose the nature of empirical self. The Hindu philosophical systems no doubt recognize the utility of introspective reflection for the purpose of analysing the empirical human existence; but that is not its ultimate purpose; it must finally make way for the deeper form of 'inwardness' (Yoga), which identifies the individual with the transcendent soul (ātman).

Inwardness in Indian Philosophy: "The predominant interest of all Indian systems, except the Cārvāka, and the early Mīmāṃsā Brahmanism, lies in the most inward reality of man. It is a human interest, but not humanistic, the latter understood in the sense of making the life of man as man here and hereafter as good as it can be. The interest of the Dharmasūtra of Jaimini is essentially humanistic and activistic, but as a philosophy it has come to occupy a place next to those systems that are primarily concerned with the most inward."
The philosophy of the Upanishads, which stressed inwardness, did not despise the mundane life. For example, the doctrine of āśrama and the concept of puruṣārtha, both suggest that man must marry, produce children, earn wealth and only at the evening of his life he must turn inward. But turning inwardness is more important than the preceding stages of life, such that

philosophy became the philosophy of inwardness, not a philosophy of the whole life of man. It is not enough to say that this life has only secondary importance and must lead to the realization of the Ātman, which is of primary importance.¹⁷

But the clearest, the most important and the most influential philosophy of inwardness discussed in the Upaniṣads is that Ātman is the ultimate reality. The discussion in the Upaniṣads reveals that man is made up of five kośa’s (sheaths)—anna, prāṇa, mano, vijñāna and ānanda. The pupil is asked to realize inwardly that the essence of man is not body made up of food (anna), not breath (prāṇa), not mind (manas), not intelligence (vijñāna) but ānanda (bliss). This means that man is essentially bliss, and in order to realize it one must go beyond the four outer sheaths. The other attempt to show that ātman is the real and eternal is revealed in the doctrine of the four levels of consciousness, namely, waking (jāgrata), dream (svapna), deep sleep (suṣupti) and mystic experience (turiya). The doctrine attempts to establish that the soul is present in all these four states, as a subject. Just as we are not aware of ourselves during deep sleep, although’ the self is present in us, so also we are not aware of ourselves in death. The
doctrine which establishes the eternality and reality of ātman is the doctrine known inwardly that the self is Brahman, expressed in such maxims as “I am Brahman” (aham-Brahmāsmi), “that you are” (tat-tavam-asi), etc. In any case the Upaniṣads in general attempt to prove that the eternal reality cannot be realised by any means except meditative inwardness. The Vedānta schools only justify the necessity of inwardness exhorted by the Upaniṣads.

3. MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY.

Any serious and effective attempt at a distinction between Indian Philosophy and Western philosophy must first of all take into consideration the very meaning of the word “Philosophy”. A casual perusal of the histories of western and Indian philosophy reveals that people of different ages and of different races and different cultures have expected philosophy to function in many different ways. Let us first begin our inquiry into the western meaning of the term. Though the English word “Philosophy” is derived from the Greek root “Philosophia” (= “love of wisdom”), it has never retained its original meaning, for different reasons; (1) because, wisdom (‘sophia’) could be not only knowledge of reality which a philosopher was expected to possess, but also intelligence, which a wise carpenter, a wise merchant, a wise artisan possessed. But Pythagoras, who describes himself as a philosopher, distinguished “sophia sought by the philosopher (knowledge based on contemplation) from the practical shrewdness of a businessman and the trained skill of the athlete”.

The modern western conception of philosophy as characterized by critical discussion owes its origin to Plato (Apology, 22) and his
characterization automatically denied his predecessors' conception that philosophy is (unexamined) wisdom. However, Plato also held that philosophy is direct knowledge of "true Reality", by which he meant intelligible world as distinguished from the ever-changing sensible world. Direct knowledge, according to him, ought to be true unlike opinions and beliefs. Similarly, 'true Reality' in his opinion was not that of philosophers at all, for they never knew what should be the ideal of human life. Since a philosopher knows true ideals, he also knows how to live.

Contemporary philosophers question the Platonic conception and the modern and general opinion, that philosophy is knowledge of ultimate reality. Their objections are (i) that the existence and nature of ultimate reality is a scientific, not a philosophic, question and (ii) that whether there is an ultimate reality is itself if at all a philosophic question.

Epicureans, Stoics, Sceptics, agreed that the main aim of philosophy is to achieve peace of mind and so, Cicero (a Roman) defined philosophy as "art of life".

Even if Nyāya philosopher is considered as doing no more than dealing with logical fallacies, his task should be regarded as advice to avoid fallacies either in daily life or in discussions.

Not only the Indian philosophers, but also the other early Greek philosophers used the word 'Philosophy' to refer to cosmology and politics, but also to ethics and metaphysics. Aristotle meant by philosophy not only logic, metaphysics and ethics, but also anatomy and politics. Aquinas who
moved in the footsteps of Aristotle, his master, Bacon, Hobbes and Descartes - all defined philosophy in encyclopaedic terms, as did Leibniz and Wolff. To be sure, they did distinguish between 'moral' philosophy, 'natural' philosophy, 'civil' or political philosophy and 'first' philosophy or metaphysics. But in general they used "philosophy" as often to refer to what we now call "science" as to refer to what we now call 'philosophy'." 19 With the advent of logical positivism, contemporary analytic philosophy and Existentialism philosophy has undergone tremendous transformation. For the logical positivists the task of philosophy lies in determining the truth-value of proposition, especially by the standard of what they called "meaningfulness", which itself depends on empirical verification. They did not propose any new theory of reality, nor did they reject any: they simply brushed aside all metaphysical, ethical and aesthetic issues on the ground that they were meaningless. The contemporary analytic philosophers are interested in analysing our concepts and language from logical point of view rather than proposing new philosophical theories. The existentialists who condemn all their predecessors for their negligence of man as an individual and subject emphasise human existence as the central issue of philosophy.

Now, what do the Indians mean by philosophy? The Indian counterpart of "Philosophy" is "darśana" or "mata". The word 'darśana' means 'look' or 'vision' – vision of reality. Thus in "Saḍ – darśana" the word darśana means six views (of reality) – the six being Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pūrva Mīmāṁsā and Uttara Mīmāṁsā (Vedānta). Although darśana was earlier restricted to Hindu darśana, i.e. philosophical schools
based on the Vedas, later it seems to cover non-Vedic philosophical schools, namely, Carvaka, Jainism and Buddhism also. In this case darshana or view does not denote empirical perception, such as perception of colour, smell, taste, etc. for these are not realities, but intellectual perception of what underlies the smell, taste, etc. This means the conception of reality could be theistic or atheistic, spiritual or materialistic and therefore these could be methods of arriving at darshana of reality. Mata, means opinion. So Bauddhamata or Baudhā darshana means Buddhist philosophy.

Taken in this sense Indian philosophy does not differ from Western philosophy. But, in addition to this, Indian philosophy does surely have a feature, which distinguishes it from Western philosophy – so far as the meaning of the word ‘darshana’ is concerned. The word ‘darshana’ is also used to denote mystic intuition. Thus, for example, when the mystic perceives his own spirit in the mystic (turīyā or Yogic) state, he affirms the existence of spirit which is different from matter. A Saṅkhya or a Yoga philosopher may then profess a philosophical doctrine of plurality of souls; an Advaitin of Śaṅkara’s type may conclude that that soul is Brahman, one, indivisible, infinite, featureless and formless, neither cause nor effect; that that alone is real and plurality of souls is a myth; a Viśīṣṭadvaitin may interpret that experience in terms of the doctrine that all individual selves are parts or qualities or bodies of Brahman. The difference between the two interpretations of the word darshana is this: in one, reason, without the help of mystic intuition, plays a dominant role; in the other mystic intuition, which is regarded as knowledge par excellence, is interpreted variously.
Sometimes the word “tattvājñāna” is substituted for “darśana”. But it connotes clearly, not opinion (mata), but knowledge of reality (“tattva” = essence), derived from mystic experience, rather than sense experience or critical reasoning.

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7. Ibid., p.25.
10. Ibid., p.35.
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13. Ibid., p.11.
14. Ibid., p.11.
17. Ibid., p.181.