INTRODUCTION

1. SUFFERING IS A FACT:

That man's existence is wholly permeated by suffering is too patent to be denied. What Buddha has said about suffering is worth repeating:

Now, this is the noble truth concerning suffering. Birth is painful, decay is painful, disease is painful, death is painful, union with the unpleasant is painful, painful is the separation from the pleasant and any craving that is unsatisfied, that too is painful" (Foundation of the kingdom of Righteousness)\(^1\)

Even if man's attempt to attain happiness is successful, the very realisation that it is not permanent is itself painful. It is true that there are moments of happiness in man's life. For example, he may forget miseries by consuming alcohol or some drug. While he is initially happy by this means, a frequent consumption of it may bind him inextricably to a habit. Once it becomes a habit, it fails in the long run to re-create the earlier intensity of happiness. For some people even the uninterrupted enjoyment may lead to boredom. It is more often the case that, because of the habit, the subject may lose physical and mental health, thus proving that search for temporary happiness may lead to permanent unhappiness. In other words, the moments of unhappiness are far more and deeper than those of happiness.

The problem of suffering was such an important topic for the ancient Indian philosophers that they have studied it carefully and have classified into three groups (tāpatraya)\(^2\) (1) ādhibhautika, (2) ādhidaivika and
(3) *ādhyātmika*. The evils caused by the physical nature directed neither by man nor God or gods, such as natural calamities, are the examples of the *ādhibhautika* evils. The evils sent by the gods and goddesses when they are neglected by their devotees, come under the second group of evils, whereas the evils that are due to man himself (for example gluttony leading to indigestion, uncontrolled consumption of sweets leading to aggravation of diabetes, etc.) are instances of the third kind. All men without exception suffer from one or some or all of these at one time or the other.

Philosophers like Śaṅkara, Nāgārjuna and Augustine may argue that evil of all kinds is only an illusion, or, at best, a privation, but they should also admit that illusion and privation are themselves an evil.

2. SUFFERING, A REASON FOR PHILOSOPHISING:

It is generally held that suffering is the dominant reason for philosophising in India. Actually the claim means, not that all those who suffer philosophise or are intellectually capable of philosophising, but that at least some men who realise that human existence is inevitably and inextricably associated with suffering begin at some time or other to ask philosophical questions about suffering and existence. These philosophical questions may take such forms as: Whence does man come and where does he go? Is human existence necessary? Is it the result of fortuitous and mechanical combination of some physical, chemical and biological forces, or is it teleological? Why has man to suffer from ignorance and other limitations? Are the miseries sent by some sadistic supernatural agency? Or, are they just the necessary results of the victim's hereditary and
environmental conditions, to which he is by chance related? Or, are they the necessary consequence of his own deeds (*karma*) done in the past? In other words, is man destined to suffer them perennially or is he in some sense free and capable of terminating them irrevocably? If he can, what are the ways and means of overcoming suffering once for all? Thus, while in the West philosophical questions arise from curiosity about and wonder at one's own external surroundings, in India they arise from the awareness of one's own suffering.

Complete freedom from miseries is not attainment of *svarga* (heaven) which is not permanent. Because the duration of man's life in *svarga* is proportionate to the quantity of merit (*punya*) he has acquired in his earthly existence. Once that is exhausted his life in *svarga* comes to an end and he is sent back to the earth where he is set free again to acquire either merit or demerit. Moreover, the denizens of heaven are not free from love and hate, anger and other human defects, which prevent them from enjoying absolute happiness in heaven also.

Complete cessation of suffering and its root cause, ignorance is called *mokṣa* or *mukti* (liberation or freedom). The spiritual discipline, which leads to such a freedom; is called Yoga. Yoga, however, does not necessarily mean the Yoga which is popularly known, namely, Patañjali's Yoga or Rāja-yoga, but any form of Yoga, such as Bhakti-yoga, Jñāna-yoga, Karma-yoga, and so on.
This means that there is a close relation between the awareness of suffering and Yoga, such that man would not be forced to take refuge in Yoga if he were not deeply affected by suffering.

This close relationship between awareness of suffering and Yoga presupposes four important philosophical doctrines (a) the law of karma (b) the doctrine of samsāra, (c) the idea of ignorance as the root cause of all evil and (d) the doctrine of mokṣa.

A. Law of Karma

All schools of Indian philosophy, except Cārvāka, accept the theory that our existence is determined by our deeds (karma). All the suffering and enjoyment are, according to the law of karma, the inevitable results of our past deeds. Our happiness or unhappiness is not accidental, or hereditary, but the results of what we did in the past. Past may mean the past time in this life or some past life itself. We may avoid actions, but not the results of post actions. None can alter or avoid the results of karma, nor even the intensity of the karma-results.

About the application of the law of karma to a particular moment of a particular individual soul (jīva) the Indian philosophical schools have two distinct opinions. The schools like Buddhism, Sāṅkhya, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, Jainism, maintain that the law of karma operates on its own without the control or direction of an omniscient and omnipotent God whose being they deny. They contend that the law of karma operates as mechanically as fire burns, in spite of the fact that it is accurate. Nobody can have an accidental or undeserved moment of happiness or unhappiness. If God cannot help in this matter he is superficial.
Theistic schools like Nyāya, Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita argue that the *karma* being insentient cannot operate so accurately and unfailingly and therefore requires God for control and direction. This God must be omniscient (such that he knows the moral quality of everybody's actions), omnipotent (such that nobody can defy his rewards and punishments) and an impartial and dispassionate judge of human actions (such that the virtuous are rewarded and the wicked are punished, appropriately and without exception). This means that man is happy (or unhappy) in accordance with his past *karma*. In other words, even God’s decree is not arbitrary. In fact, in the absence of an intelligent God the application of the law of *karma* would have been a chaos and therefore there would be unjustifiable injustice.

**B. The Samsāra (Cycle of Births and Deaths)**

Another philosophical concept, which constitutes the ground for Yoga, is the belief that the individual self which is a spiritual substance is different from the body which is material and that while the latter is subject to birth, growth, decay, disease and death, the former is completely free from all these changes. When the physical body dies the soul does not die, but moves on to another life where it gets a fresh body. Its getting a new body, living in particular circumstances in its new life, its happiness and unhappiness are all determined by the past *karma*. But his new existence is the result of his past *karma*, he has to suffer and in order to ward it off, he has to engage in fresh *karmas*. This means that he is bound to a wheel of births and deaths (*samsāra* or *bhavacakra*). According to all Indian philosophical schools, this *cakra* has no beginning. The speciality of this doctrine is that the soul is immortal whether it likes it or not.
This implies unfortunately for the sufferer that the unconditional immortality coupled with the law of karma takes away the consolation that his suffering comes to an end at death and that, therefore, he need not suffer any more. Because since his soul gets a new body in the next life after the destruction of the present body, his new life, like the present one, is also determined by the law of karma. In other words, his parents, friends, teachers, environment, and the kind of misery may be different, in the next life, but misery as such does continue in all his lives. Therefore, death is not the end of misery, but only a gateway for a new set of miseries.

C. Ignorance.

Another important philosophical foundation is the doctrine that man has been subjected to a beginningless metaphysical ignorance, which is the root cause of his perennial suffering in his earthly existence. This metaphysical ignorance, technically called avidyā, ajñāna, aviveka or bhrama, designates, negatively, absence of knowledge of the real nature of one's own self, the world, God, the highest values, etc. and, positively, the presence of wrong notions of one's own self, God, etc. This two-pronged ignorance generates in man self-centred passions devoid of time-tested values. "Craving for worldly pleasures or for happiness in heaven is at the root of all mischief"3 Haridas Bhattacharyya is harsher in his account of avidyā. He says:

The Indian traced all afflictions to avidyā – ignorance or confused thinking in which the distinction between the self and the non-self, the pure and the impure, the pleasurable and
the painful, the eternal and the evanescent is lost, and mistaking the one for the other, we pursue personal and social objectives regardless of spiritual danger and worldly suffering”.

Sometimes we treat our fellow-beings as if they are lumps of flesh that can be killed inch by inch to satisfy our capitalistic greed, or outright further our imperialistic ambitions, and not as sparks of the divine capable with suitable opportunities of contributing materially to the development of culture and advancement of civilisation. By a kind of “apathetic fallacy” we obliterate the distinction between man and nature, using the former as means and field of domination like the latter and never as an end in himself. ...

This is true not only between man and man, but also between communities and communities, and even between nation and nation. Here, man is not only forgetting the true ideal and his own duty towards others, but also pursuing wrong ideals by means of cruel methods. These cruel acts in turn have only earned him bondage with the samsāra.

According to most of the Indian philosophical schools, the metaphysical ignorance is beginningless, but not endless. When man becomes aware of the need to escape form the wheel of births and deaths, he will make serious efforts on the lines of Yoga, which promises him the redeeming knowledge.
Here two concepts need clarification – the concept of ignorance and the notion of knowledge. Ignorance does not mean absence of common sense or scientific or mathematical or philosophical knowledge. One may have any or some or all of these and yet be ignorant metaphysically. Metaphysical ignorance is the ignorance about truth and this provokes us to crave for fleeting sense pleasures and to do good and bad acts that bind us to *samsāra*. Similarly, knowledge does not mean wisdom or common sense or mathematics or science, or even metaphysics. It means knowledge that one gets from direct experience of reality. This direct experience of reality (*tattvajñāna*) is also called mystic or spiritual experience. Such a direct experience or first hand knowledge of reality alone can redeem man. Knowledge about Brahman, soul, world, etc. obtained from books or teachers is second hand knowledge and as such can at best be a map, but not a redeeming knowledge.

The explanation of the nature of knowledge, which redeems man from bondage, varies from school to school. While for Sāṅkhya-Yoga the right knowledge consists in realisation of the true nature of Prakṛti, its evolutes and the plurality of selves, for the Vedānta schools it consists in the realisation that man is potentially Brahman. However, the doctrine of Jīva as potential Brahman has been interpreted differently in the three schools of Vedānta. According to Gautama, the founder of the Nyāya school, when *tattvajñāna* (knowledge of reality) dawns, the different links of erroneous understanding, viz., *doṣa* (passions and other wrong desires), *pravṛtti* (wrong actions), *jānma* (rebirths), *duḥkha* (suffering), vanish.
D. Liberation (*mokṣa*)

Indian philosophy not only emphasises the ubiquity of suffering, but also suggests a way out. It is for this reason that it is called *mokṣa-śāstra* - science of liberation. Therefore, the charge that Indian philosophy is pessimistic is unjustifiable, as it is based on a wrong and inadequate understanding of Indian philosophy.

Liberation, technically called *mokṣa, mukti, nihsreyas, apavarga, nirvāṇa*, etc. is different from *svarga* or heaven, which also means cessation of pain and attainment of happiness. *Svarga* actually means a place away both from the mortal world and hell (*naraka*), where man, after his death, enjoys earthly happiness as a consequence of his merit (*punya*). But once his merit exhausts, he returns to the mortal world, whence he came and where he is free to earn again merit or demerit (*pāpa*). *Mokṣa*, however, means, negatively, a complete and permanent freedom from all kinds of suffering, and positively, attainment of inexhaustible non-sensual pleasure. One who attains *mokṣa* is free from the fear of being bound again in any form.

Liberation is also distinguished from life in Devaloka (world of gods and goddesses) or Pitṛloka (world of forefathers). Devaloka houses the Devas or gods and goddesses and is also called Pitṛloka, because our fathers and forefathers on account of their good deeds have entered there. In any case, the denizens are believed to enjoy happiness that is only an extension of earthly happiness, such as good food, good weather, etc.

Liberation is conceived in two forms. Advatins, Buddhists and Vīraśaivas believe that one must attain *mokṣa* when one is alive and such a
form of *mokṣa* is called *jīvanmukti* (liberation-in-life) whereas the Viśiṣṭādvatins and Dvaitins claim that *jīvanmukti* is by definition impossible. They insist that *mokṣa* after death, i.e., *mukti* without body (*videha-mukti*) alone is possible.

Like the idea of redeeming knowledge, the idea of *mokṣa* also differs from school to school.

In any case, liberation means freedom from all suffering, the chain of births and deaths, the results of all *karmas* and, most of all, ignorance which is the root cause of all suffering.

Liberation is possible only by one or the other form of Yoga and impossible without it. In fact, the way of life which man plans for realising an ideal or value, whatever it be, is called Yoga or *mārga*. “Yoga is derived from the verbal root *yuj* meaning ‘to join’. Yoga is that which joins a man to his ideal, i.e., enables him to realise his ideal.”

From the above discussion it follows that if man accepts only certain philosophical doctrines he has to turn to Yoga for relief from suffering. Now let us see how these philosophical doctrines are necessary for such a move. (1) If man had no perennial pain and suffering, or if his suffering were not deep enough, or if the moments of happiness were more than those of unhappiness, he would not have seriously thought of Yoga for overcoming them. Thus, for example, it is said that the Devas, who are believed to always enjoy happiness of one form or the other, have no need for Yoga. Similarly, the animals, which are not aware of their own or others’ misery, have no idea of overcoming them permanently by means of Yoga. All those who suffer, as
was earlier pointed out, may not raise philosophical questions about their suffering and existence, but it is a fact that those who have raised these philosophical questions have been driven to do so by their awareness of suffering.

(2) Let us suppose like the Cārvākas that man is just a physical body devoid of a spiritual substance, soul (ātman). This supposition leads to the only logical conclusion that man has only one life. This in effect implies that there is no chain of births and deaths, as there is no soul, which survives death of the material body. If this is so, all our suffering is restricted to the only life we have and would terminate at the end of that life. Similarly, if man did not believe in the law of karma, he would go mercilessly in search of material happiness – because he would in any case not be affected by the karma-results. In other words, his hedonism is clearly divorced from the necessity of Yoga.

(3) Suppose that man was not subject to beginningless metaphysical ignorance and that he had metaphysical knowledge. If that were the case, then he would need no Yoga, for he is always a yogi (practitioner of Yoga). But in actuality he suffers from avidyā and, therefore, he needs Yoga.

(4) Let us suppose, again, that man suffers perennially and is aware of it but had no hope of a permanent freedom (mokṣa) from it. In such a case, he would not go in search of any form of Yoga. For a confirmed pessimist like him, nothing terminates his suffering. If, on the contrary, he believed in the possibility of mokṣa and decides to attain it, he is bound to take up a steady and serious practice of some form of Yoga or the other.
Now, it can easily be noted that here philosophy does not mean what it means in the West. In the West philosophy is a purely intellectual enterprise, which can be practised within four walls. What it needs is just a rational mind capable of seeing things comparatively, analytically and critically. Even a cursory look at the history of Western philosophy beginning from Thales to the end of the eighteenth century will easily reveal that the questions that are asked by the Western philosophers are cosmological (e.g. “What is the stuff out of which the whole universe is made?”) or theological (e.g. “how can we prove the existence of God, possibility of immortality, etc. rationally?”) or epistemological (e.g. “What is human knowledge and how is it different from belief?”, “What are its scope and limits?”). However, for the ancient Indian philosophers philosophy is pre-eminently practical. It not merely analyses the problem of human life, but advocates a particular way of life as a solution to those problems. In Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad it is said that the learned should sit with erect body and having established the sense in the heart should cross the fierce ocean of saṃsāra by means of the boat called Brahman. This implies that the learned person is not a mere armchair philosopher, but one who is interested in overcoming the miseries of life. In other words,

“Speculative philosophy is obviously dominated by the orientation towards freedom . . . Nor can it be thought that all speculative philosophers in India conceive of speculation as itself a path to freedom, for several schools of Indian philosophy declare that a successful analysis of the nature of
things, though it may be a necessary condition for realisation of freedom for some people, is not a sufficient condition for anyone.\textsuperscript{8}

This proves, on the one hand, that mere faith without reason is shallow and on the other, that mere speculation without the matching practice is hollow.

This, however, does not mean that the ancient philosophers were absolutely repugnant to the other types of philosophical issues. In fact, all schools of Indian philosophy have engaged themselves in cosmological, theological, logical, epistemological and linguistic questions. But these questions are satellites revolving round the central issues of human life. For example, the question,

Hari, Om! The Brahman enquirers ask: Is Brahman the cause of the world? Whence are we born? By what are we supported? Where do we live? Tell us, you Brahman-realisers, by whom are we determined to be happy or unhappy? \textsuperscript{9}

means that the problem of creation or existence of the world is discussed only in relation to the question of human existence. The question of the nature of knowledge and error is discussed only in order to show how knowledge is essential to right view of the world and of life, which, in turn, is essential to the attainment of liberation.

3. NECESSITY FOR PHILOSOPHISING

One may object to theorising that suffering always leads to philosophising. (1) It is a fact that mere suffering does not generate in man
the urge to philosophise. All animals and most of the human beings who 
suffer do so without complaining. Therefore, the theory that suffering leads to 
philosophising is the result of hasty generalisation.

To this it may be replied that though it is true that all those who suffer 
do not ask philosophical questions, yet it is a fact that if there were no 
suffering, man would not have asked these philosophical questions.

(2) Again, it may be objected that the awareness of misery has led on 
many occasions to scientific and technological, rather than philosophical, 
inquiries. In fact, more and more suffering may incite some men to discover 
scientific or technological ways of warding off suffering as and when it 
comes. Since the renaissance modern world has seen a formidable 
advancement in both science and technology. Various kinds of gadgets have 
been devised to minimise human labour and to maximise his leisure, various 
kinds of medicines have been invented to fight the diseases that flesh and 
mind are heir to and to boost energy, health and longevity. But man, instead 
of attaining satisfaction by the increased use of these gadgets, vehicles and 
medicines, has only been caught in the quagmire of innumerable insatiable 
wants. Therefore, science and technology have brought more misery to man 
rather freeing him from it.

This does not, however, imply that scientific discovery and 
technological advancement have no value and that, therefore, their progress 
must be put an end to. It only means that what science and technology have 
done is not sufficient, and that there ought to be something higher than this. 
The wise conclude that our achievements, however great, are something short
of the supreme, and that, in fact, nothing at the mundane level can be supreme.

The endeavours of most men cease when they are satisfied with whatever they achieve. But to some men, remedies incomplete and tentative, or applicable only to individuals and groups of men, or of an ascetic character, or lastly of the nature of promises to be fulfilled after death, fail to appeal sufficiently. They ask whether all wants (including the craving for knowledge), and all fears, wherever found, cannot be perfectly satisfied or eradicated, in this life. They evidently aspire to an absolute or universal and verifiable solution to their question. For this purpose they seek a knowledge of all that exists. Exceedingly unpractical and unattainable as the quest may appear, those who pursue it nevertheless are known in India as philosophical enquirers.

Therefore, even if the deadly epidemic and other kinds of diseases such as typhoid, plague, small pox, etc. have been wiped out completely from the face of our globe and in spite of the fact that man has invented aeroplanes, ships, trains, telephones, etc. to minimise the troubles of mankind, there is no hope that other cases of suffering will not crop up. So the problem for the ancient Indian philosopher is not how to overcome this misery or that, but how to overcome misery as such, and it is this problem which sets him to philosophise.
The present thesis which deals with Yoga as a remedy to the problems of human existence presupposes certain philosophical doctrines, which are central to it. The discussion of these philosophical doctrines is arranged as follows:

In the “Introduction” it is shown that every man, however rich or well placed, encounters misery of one form or the other, that death is not the end of misery, because man has a series of rebirths in each of which, as a result of what he did in the previous birth he suffers and enjoys again; that temporary remedies, like moments of pleasure, do not eradicate misery as such; and that, therefore, man realises that Yoga is the only way to put a permanent end to misery.

Such a treatment presupposes the philosophical doctrines that there is a soul different from body, that man, by means of different forms of Yoga, can attain moksha.

Chapter First is intended to deal with the distinction between Indian philosophy and western philosophy, because it is Indian philosophy – that too a particular type of Indian philosophy – is closely related to Yoga. In this Chapter it is intended to show (1) that while western philosophy takes its birth in curiosity about the external world, Indian philosophy takes its birth in the awareness of perennial suffering associated with human existence; (2) it shows that western philosophy in its various chronological stages deals with outward things, as exemplified in the cosmological issues raised by the early Greek philosophers, theological questions asked by the medieval philosophers, metaphysical and epistemological questions raised by the
modern philosophers and logico-linguistic questions encountered by the contemporary philosophers. On the contrary, Indian philosophy in general is avowedly inward in that it raises such questions as, Who am I? Where did I come from and Whither am I going? It is for this reason that it is called ātmavidyā (science of the self). (3) While western philosophy in order to answer the philosophical questions depends solely on speculation (reasoning), Indian philosophy depends mainly on the Yogic intuition supported by reason. There may be exceptions on both sides. (4) The most important difference between the two is the difference between the emphasis they lay on the use of philosophy. That is, since western philosophy is not concerned with human life, it is of no practical use to them – its use is only academic satisfaction. Western philosophy does not induce us to lead a particular kind of life in preference to some others. In contrast to this, Indian philosophy is expressly of practical use. In fact, it aims to solve the perennial problems of human life.

Chapter Two deals with the dual relationship Yoga has with Indian philosophy. On the one hand, it is shown that how according to certain doctrines such as universality and perenniality of suffering drives man to Yogā and, on the other, it is also shown how Yogic intuition gives rise to the different schools of philosophy enshrined in the Upaniṣads, the Sūtra literature (such as Nyāya-sūtras, Vaiśeṣika-sūtras, Vedānta-sūtras, etc.), the commentaries thereon, the vr̥ttais, the Tikās, etc. The point emphasized here is that just as if the universality and perenniality of suffering, the substantiality of the soul and mokṣa as the final goal are not accepted then Yoga is not
possible, so also if Yogic intuition is not regarded as the infallible source of metaphysics, the different schools of Indian philosophy, such as Advaita, Sāṅkhya, etc. would not come into being.

Chapter Three is devoted to the discussion of the philosophical doctrines of soul and its immortality. Here it is shown that though the different schools of Indian philosophy (except Cārvākas and the Buddhists) conceive differently of the soul, they are all agreed that it is uncreated, spiritual substance, that it is the subject of all experience, that while the body dies it acquires a new body in the next life depending upon its deeds; and that it never dies or disintegrates. Here the Upaniṣadic, the Jaina, the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, the Vedāntic concepts of soul are dealt with and are contrasted with the Cārvāka and the Buddhistic concepts.

The Chapter Four dealing with the goal of human life makes a distinction between svarga (heaven), the goal conceived in the early Vedas and mokṣa (liberation), the goal conceived in the Upaniṣads. Here again the various concepts of liberation attributed to the Buddhists, Jainas, the Vedāntins, etc. are discussed.

"Philosophical Foundations of Yogic Schools", the central topic of the Thesis, forms the Chapter Five. This chapter deals with the different philosophical concepts which are the basis of each of the Yogic schools, such as Jñāna-yoga, Karma-yoga, Bhakti-yoga, Pāṭaṅjala-yoga, Bauddha-yoga, Kuṇḍalinī-yoga and Haṭha-yoga. This chapter attempts to show how without its own distinct philosophical concepts a school of Yoga would cease to be different from other Yogic schools or would cease to be meaningful.
1. Jñāna-yoga is defined as the pathway to realisation of featureless Brahman in this life by means of Jñāna(knowledge). The philosophical concepts involved in this Yoga are (1) featureless Brahman, (2) Jñāna as the pathway, (3) Brahman-realisation and (4) Jīvanmukti. It is shown here that Jñāna-yoga is impossible without these philosophical concepts as its basis. Nobody realises Īśvara (personal God) if he chooses Jñāna-Yoga. One who realises Brahman does so in this life only. So long as Brahman is infinite consciousness or ananta jñāna, the path of realisation of Brahman must also be knowledge (jñāna) and one who realises It cannot distinguish himself from It. Though the realisation of Brahman is mainly by knowledge (jñāna), the others, the auxiliary means, such as Karma-yoga, Bhakti-yoga, are also necessary; similarly, the aspirant must have spiritual motivation — mumukṣatva, the steadfast longing for the attainment of mokṣa (liberation) and spiritual attitude such as śama, dama, etc.

2. Bhakti-yoga: Bhakti-yoga may be defined as the pathway of devotion to the realisation of personal God. The presupposition of Bhakti-yoga are (1) personal God, (2) distinction between soul and God (3) unconditional surrender and (4) liberation-after-death (videhamukti).

The God of Bhakti-yoga ought to be personal God, not the absolute of Advaita. The Absolute of Advaita is nirguṇa (featureless) Brahman and nobody worships such a Brahman. One who worships and surrenders unconditionally and totally to God presupposes that such a God must be a person. To say that he is a person is not to say that he has a human personality. He is a person who has many attributes in an unthinkable
magnitude. So he is conceived as omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good, perfect judge of human conduct, a friend of the virtuous and enemy of the wicked, etc. He as a divine person rouses in the devotee the feelings of admiration, awe, fear, respect, devotion and surrender. If he, like nirguna Brahman, does not respond to the devotional call of the devotees, the latter do not adopt Bhakti-yoga.

One who worships a God – whatever his nature – must treat him as the wholly other. If the devotee does not think of himself as a mean weakling and of God as omnipotent, if he thinks of himself as equal or identical to God then the chances of his worshiping God are far less. Moreover, for Bhakti-yoga it is essential that without the grace of God nobody can achieve mokṣa.

More often than not the aspirant is expected to show devotion and surrender to the utmost possible extent. His devotion and surrender are free from all desires including that of mokṣa. It is a total, unconditional, selfless surrender.

Bhakti-yoga always presupposes that man is inferior to God who is wholly perfect. This implies that man (soul) is never identical to God. Even in the final stage of liberation the soul only temporarily unites with God, without losing its individuality.

3. Karma-yoga: By Karma-yoga we mean the doctrine of selfless action as enunciated in the Bhagavadgītā. Since the Bhagavadgītā is theistic, Karma-yoga enshrined it, includes all the philosophical doctrines of theism. Thus, Karma-yoga speaks of a personal God, as exemplified by Śrī Kṛṣṇa, who is puruṣottama, or superior to all souls including the liberated ones.
Though he demands unconditional and total surrender of the aspirant, he expects him to perform the duty expected of him in a selfless way. The culmination of Karma-yoga lies in the devotee’s diligent performance of his duty and offering the results thereof to the Lord.

The other philosophical doctrines involved in Karma-yoga are (1) that one must not avoid one’s duty even if it is as low as that of a sweeper or as ignoble as that of a butcher, or as dangerous as that of a soldier, because no duty is lower, no duty is higher; (2) that one must do one’s duty diligently without prejudice and perfectly; and (3) Karma-yoga leads to God-realisation (mokṣa).

It is also shown, however, that if Karma-yoga means just selfless action, as indeed the Sanskrit term ‘niṣkāma-karma’ means, then we can also practise it independently of and without reference to devotional theism.

4. Pātañjala-yoga: The aim of Pātañjala-yoga (popularly called ‘Rāja-yoga’) is to attain citta-vṛtti-nirodha (cessation of mental activities), leading to kaivalya (aloofness) of puruṣa (soul) from prakṛti. This then means that the philosophical doctrines involved in the Rāja-Yoga are prakṛti, puruṣa, bondage and liberation. Puruṣa, according to Pātañjala-yoga, is a spiritual substance, which in its bound state is associated with the evolutes of prakṛti, namely, the five gross elements which constitute the gross body, five subtle elements, such as smell, taste, etc., five sense organs, five motor organs and three internal organs (antahkarāṇas). The soul in itself is neither doer nor enjoyer, but because of ignorance it mistakes itself for a doer and enjoyer.
Once knowledge dawns, it realises its true nature and attains liberation which consists in its separation from prakṛti.

The attainment of liberation results from moral, psycho-physical and spiritual training. (1) Yama and niyama form the moral discipline, (2) āsanas, prānāyāma and pratyāhāra the psycho-physical training and (3) dhāraṇa, dhyāna and samādhi the spiritual training. All these eight limbs are essential for a successful cessation of mental modifications which in turn leads to liberation.

5. Bauddha-yoga: The early Buddhists conceive nirvāṇa (translated normally as “extinction”) as the final goal and recommend eight-limbed Yoga as the way to it. For them man is an aggregate of five aggregates (skandhas), namely, rūpa, vedanā, samjñā, vijñāna and saṃskāra skandhas. Each element of the five skandhas undergoes continuous change. Therefore, there is nothing called permanent self, independent of the sensations, feelings, etc. Liberation means decomposition of all the elements of all the five aggregates. To achieve this one must practise the Yoga of eight limbs, namely, samyag-dṛṣṭi, samyag-saṅkalpa, samyag-vāca, samyag-ājīva, samyag-karmānta, samyag-vyāyāma, samyag-smṛti and samyag-smādhi.

6. Hatha-yoga: Although Haṭha-yogic practices are sporadically mentioned in several Upaniṣads and many ethical wrings of the period before 600 B.C., a systematic exposition of the techniques of Haṭha-yoga is given in such leading classical texts as “Haṭha-pradīpikā”, “Gheraṇḍa-saṃhitā”, “ Śiva-saṃhitā”, “Haṭharatnāvalī”, etc.
Svātmārāma’s treatise on Haṭha-yoga, traditionally regarded as an authority, considers Haṭha-yoga and Rāja-yoga as interdependent and complementary to each other or as two aspects of one and the same discipline.

Though Haṭha-yoga texts do not exclusively deal with systematic philosophy, we do come across statements from which we can surmise some philosophical doctrine. Broadly, the philosophical position of Haṭha-yoga is as follows.

The Supreme reality, Śiva, is Absolute Spirit. Though present everywhere he is not accessible to ordinary perception or inference, because he is veiled by śakti with which he is in eternal inseparable association. In fact, Śiva in this system means Śiva eternally qualified by śakti. Śiva is consciousness, Being and Bliss, unity, permanence, while śakti is insentience, principle of change, activity, productivity and multiplicity. All the objects in the universe, the sun, the moon, the stars, the mountains, rivers, etc. are the different forms of the śakti. The constant changes taking place in man such as growth, decay, diseases, etc. in his body and emotions, feelings, thoughts, sensations, etc. in his mind, are all manifestations of śakti.

Man according Haṭha-yoga is a microcosm (piṇḍa). He realises at one time or the other that he must transcend the limitations and bondage and attain mokṣa, the blissful, unbroken peace and changeless, undifferentiated, consciousness. This state is attainable only in samādhi the ultimate stage of the Haṭha-yoga discipline.
Hatha-yoga has for its objective the union of the innate vital force (prāṇa) with the physical body, leading to self-transcendence.

7. Kuṇḍalinī Yoga: Kuṇḍalinī-yoga, the Yoga practised by certain sect of the Śāktas, is closely related to, or dependent on, Haṭha-yoga. This Yoga is known more for its complicated physiology than for philosophy. Its well-known doctrine is that in different parts of the human body there are seven centers of consciousness, called cakras or padmas. These are ādhāra, near the anus, svādhiṣṭāna, near the generative organ, maṇiṃpūraka, near the naval, anāhata, near the heart, viśuddhi, near the throat, ājīvā, between the eye brows and sahasrāra at the top of the brain. The aim of Kuṇḍalinī-yoga is to arouse the dormant kuṇḍalinī sakti, the coiled-serpent power, which lies in the ādhāra, make it move upwards and pierce the remaining five cakras before it finally unites with Paraśiva. This climax represents enlightenment, the ultimate goal of spiritual life. The whole process requires the aspirant to perform certain yogic postures, breathing techniques, mudrās, etc. as recommended by Haṭha-yoga.

In the final, Chapter Six, named Conclusion, an attempt is made to show (1) that some philosophical doctrines are common to all schools of Yoga, (2) that some philosophical doctrines are peculiar to certain schools of Yoga and (3) that some philosophical doctrines can be replaced by others without disturbing the scheme of moral, spiritual and other types of practices leading to liberation. An attempt is also made to disprove the theory that only certain philosophical doctrines, not others, are essential to spiritual life.
REFERENCES:


5. Ibid., p.97.


7. Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad 2. 8-9.


9. Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad, 1.1.