CHAPTER - II
CLASSICAL THEISM - THE QUESTION OF ITS COHERENCE - I

We have seen in the previous chapter that the philosophical picture of TS's thought presented in the secondary literature is an incoherent blend of several strands of thought, and the dominant strand is that of classical theism. It is for this reason, that it is necessary to examine the coherence or otherwise of classical theism and then to take a fresh look at the primary source of TS so as to determine whether it really supports classical theism. In order to examine the coherence or otherwise of classical theism let us first take the concept of eternity and temporality in connection with Christian theism.

A. ETERNITY AND TEMPORALITY:

In Christian theism none of the divine attributes is more perplexing than the attribute of eternity. Eternity is generally understood, following Boethius, as "the complete possession all at once of illimitable life"; this understanding is shared by a majority of Christian theologians, Anselm, Aquinas and others, and is commonly understood by them as entailing timelessness and immutability. Recently it is held by Swinburne, Kenny, Wolterstorff and others that the notion of timeless and changeless eternity is incoherent. For around the concept of eternity many significant issues in the philosophy of religion are emerging. These are, to mention a few, incompatibility between divine timelessness and divine omniscience, between divine immutability and divine omniscience, between God's immutability and the efficacy of petitionary prayer, between divine foreknowledge and human freedom. The emergence of these issues has prompted Swinburne (1977: ch 12) to modify that concept.
and Kenny (1979:ch 4) to abandon theism altogether. Similarly, Wolterstorff (1982:77-88) rejects the concept as incompatible with biblical theology. Mullatti (1983) and Roberts (1983) give a suitable interpretation of the concept which preserves coherence among the related issues. Stump and Kretzmann (1981:429-458) and Zeis (1984:61-71) also analyze the concept in order to make it free from the difficulties. Lewis (1984:73-79) holds that the concept cannot be of Christianity; that it is a cowbird's egg in the nest of Christian theology. My purpose here is to discuss the problem relating to the concept, as also the main solutions offered to them so far. My conclusion would be that these solutions, though sophisticated and interesting, will not do, and the concept remains incoherent.

The problems relating to the concept can be grouped in three ways: problems from simultaneity, those from indexicals and those from personality. Let me discuss first the concept as it is presented by the Christian theologians and then these three classes of problems.

Boethius defines eternity (in The Consolation of Philosophy Book V. prose 6) thus: "Eternity, then, is the complete possession all at once of illimitable life....Therefore, whatever includes and possesses the whole fullness of illimitable life at once and is such that nothing future is absent from it and nothing past flowed away, this is rightly judged to be eternal, and of this it is necessary both that being in full possession of itself it be always present to itself and that it have the infinity of mobile time present [to it]". (Rand:1973A:422.8-424.31).

Boethius further clarifies (in De Trinitate, ch. 4) that for God "always has to do with present time. And there is this great difference between the present of our affairs, which is now, and of the divine: our now makes time and sempiternity, as it were running along; but the divine now, remaining, and not moving, and standing still, makes eternity" (Rand:1973B: 20.64-22.77).
As Stump and Kretzmann (1981:431-434) point out, there are four ingredients in this definition. One, an eternal being has life. Two, the life of an eternal being is unlimited; i.e., it is beginningless and endless. Three, such a life involves duration (here duration is to be understood with reference to the fourth element). Four, the eternal being possesses all of its life at once, and hence is atemporal. There is no succession in the life of an eternal being, and thus no change, for change requires succession. Time and eternity are "two separate modes of real existence" (434).

This then is the generally accepted Christian concept of eternity. Let me now turn to the problem it gives rise to.

The problem from simultaneity: If God being eternal is timeless and changeless, how can he be related to temporal events and things? Temporal things are simultaneously present to God because he is simultaneously present with all the times, past, present and future. There is no past, present and future in his life; there is only one instant of time for him, that is, present, and past, present and future things are present to him all at once; and therefore his relationship with the past, present and future things is simultaneity, for they are all simultaneously present to him. It is to be noted that the concept of simultaneity is implied by, or is an ingredient of, the concept of eternity.

Now, the problem of simultaneity is this: As Kenny says, "simultaneity as ordinarily understood is a transitive relation. If A happens at the same time as B, and B happens at the same time as C, then A happens at the same time as C. If the BBC programme and the ITV programme both start when Big Ben strikes ten, then they both start at the same time. But on St. Thomas' view, my typing of this page is simultaneous with the whole of eternity. Again, on this view, the great fire of Rome is simultaneous with the whole of eternity. Therefore, while I type these very words, Nero fiddles heartlessly on." Therefore, Kenny
argues that "The whole concept of a timeless eternity, the whole of which is simultaneous with every part of time, seems to be radically incoherent" (1969:264:38-39). Swinburne (1977:220-221) has endorsed the problem from simultaneity and argues that the concept of timeless eternity is incoherent. Stump and Kretzmann (1981:429-458), however, take the opposite position and argue that the concept of simultaneity is coherent, and that it can with consistency be ascribed to God. In support of this argument they give interesting analysis of the concept of simultaneity. They admit that the relationship between what is eternal and what is temporal must be established by some species of simultaneity. But they think that a coherent characterization of such a relationship can be made by their definition of eternal-temporal (ET)-simultaneity. The definition of ET-simultaneity given by them is this: Let \( x \) and \( y \) range over entities and events. Then: (i) for every \( x \) and for every \( y \), \( x \) and \( y \) are ET-simultaneous iff (i) either \( x \) is eternal and \( y \) is temporal, or vice versa; and (ii) for some observer, \( A \), in the unique eternal reference frame, \( x \) and \( y \) are both present - i.e., either \( x \) is eternally present and \( y \) is observed as temporally present, or vice versa; and (iii) for some observer, \( B \), in one of the infinitely many temporal reference frames, \( x \) and \( y \) are both present - i.e., either \( x \) is observed as eternally present and \( y \) is temporally present or versa." (1981:439)

But as Lewis (1984:73-79) argues, despite this analysis, ET-simultaneity given cannot, with consistency, be ascribed to God, because it involves many difficulties. One, the statement in (ii) - a temporal \( y \) is "observed as temporally present" by an eternal \( x \) - does precisely mean that "an eternal \( x \) eternally observes that a temporal \( y \) exists, and knows that \( y \) stands in certain temporal relations, not to \( x \), but to other temporal entities or events." (Lewis:1984:74). For, according to Stump and Kretzmann, "it cannot be said that an eternal \( x \) observes a temporal \( y \) now because, in that case, there would be succession in the observations of \( x \)." (Lewis:1984:74). In short, "(ii) clearly involves the idea that an eternal \( x \) eternally
observes a y which does not itself exist eternally (Lewis: 1984:74). Now the question is: What is it that x observes? Is it something that comes to be? It cannot be so, because then x's observation would come to be, as a result x would not be eternal. "But a great many things do come to be; thus, so must the observations of them. So it just is not clear how an eternally observed object (or alternatively: an object observed in eternity) can be observed as temporally present. In fact, on the view under consideration, it turns out that all temporal events and entities are observed as temporally present to an eternal observer, so the phrase "as temporally present" cannot be taken to refer to what is presently going on in the world. This suggests an important deficiency in the knowledge of any eternal being..." (Lewis: 1984:74-75).

Two, the "as" in the statement in (iii) - some x is "observed as eternally present" to a temporal y — is misleading. For it suggests that the eternality may be an observable property of an eternal entity in the way that squareness is an observable property of baseball diamonds: but this is wrong-headed, because the eternality of an entity can no more be observed than its (say) omniscience or perfect goodness" (Lewis: 1984:75).

So the statement in (iii) can only mean that "at some t, y observes x (that is, x is observationally present to y) and y knows that x is eternal"(Lewis: 1984:75). Here is a problem: the two putative facts are incompatible. Because a temporal observer cannot observe anything without bringing that thing into the temporal series. "The observations of temporal observers, at least, occur in time; and the objects of those observations must also exist at some time, or there simply will not be any observation to be made. If this is correct, then, if temporal y observes eternal x at t, x exists at one and same time as y. But it cannot be said by y at t that x exists now. Furthermore, if y observes x at t₁ and later at t₂, y can with propriety assert at t₂ that x has existed or did exist at t₁. But this, according to Stump and Kretzmann cannot be said of an eternal entity (Lewis: 1984:75)."
"In other words, to allow that an eternal x can be observed by a temporal y is to give up the claim that x is eternal. This becomes clearer when one considers that the event of y observing x at t is identical with the event of x's being observed by y at t. So Stump and Kretzmann are trying to have theological cake and eat it too when they write that "if x and y are ET-simultaneous, x and y are not temporally simultaneous; since either x or y must be eternal, it cannot be the case that x and y both exist at one and the same time within a given observer's reference frame" (439). Temporal observers and their observations occur in time and thus any eternal x must exist at the same time that any temporal y observes x. This suffices to show that the proposed definition of ET-simultaneity is incoherent". (Lewis:1984:75)

II

We have seen that classical theism is incoherent with reference to the concepts of Eternity and Temporality. Let us now take a fresh look at the primary source of TS in order to determine whether it supports this aspect of classical theism.

So the question is, Is God eternal for TS? As an answer to this question, we have the following vacanas of TS:

(i) "When neither beginning, middle or end was, nor [beginning] nor [non-beginning], seed nor qualities: when neither partite was nor Impartite; nor Principle nor cosmic eggs and such, nor worlds upon worlds, then Thou only wast: the eternal immaculate Supreme Thing. (Mahālinga Guru Śivasiddhesvara Lord!) (SJ:10)

(ii) The many great saints, "embodiments of Immaculate Consciousness, born in the eternal, perfect Parasiva, as light is born from light..." (SJ:55)

(iii) If you contend these three (i.e., Śiva, Māya, and soul), are [eternal], "then māya and soul too are liable to birth, existence and death. Śiva alone is [eternal]. being free from birth, existence, death. Therefore, it's ignorance to say that creatures and their bondage are eternal..."
If you should scan it with the supernatural eye, the Śiva-Principle alone is [eternal]; the rest [temporal]..." (SJ:69)

(iv) "If the creature, the bondage and impurity, māya and karma, were to be from [beginningless], then say that none was to be the maker of the world, that it existed ever, eternally. If you say that the world for ever was, then say that the five acts [of Śiva] - creation, preservation and destruction, veśānga and benediction, are a lie. If creation, preservation and destruction belong to Śiva then this entire world was born out of His mere thought. However, to say it was eternally, is a Pāṣupata Saiva view, and not a Vīraśaiva's; the latter view is: though the profound sea manifests itself in foam and ripples, waves and spray, can they appear outside the sea? Embodied creatures, from a blade of grass to Brahma, have sprung from Paraśiva's sea, and there they disappear... (SJ:71)

(v) "Before all worlds upon worlds were, Thou only, O [beginningless] Paraśiva wert I say, I, rising from that formless Paraśiva, was the Gaṇeśvara called Nirañjana. Before the pageant of Māyā was born; ere knowledge and ignorance were, I was the Gaṇeśvara called Nirmala ere body was..." (SJ:87)

(vi) "When the primordial seed had not yet dawned, nor māya's energy was born when consciousness had not raised its head in the Paraśiva-principle; when Nāda, Bindu and Kalā had not evolved from consciousness; when Nāda, Bindu and Kalā, becoming one the embryo of consciousness was not yet shaped; when neither Void nor the Absolute Void was yet, nor Impartite was yet so named; then Thou only wast, eternal, immaculate, inconscient of Thyself..." (SJ:15)

(vii) "... before the body was, and soul and māyā - these three - the Paraśiva-principle, eternal and unsullied, was; ..."(SJ:68)
(viii) "The formless Śiva-principle, Existence-Consciousness-Bliss, Eternal, Perfect, of its own accord, became the Mahāliṅga, ... in the Liṅga-heart, as the tree grows out of the seed, with the Liṅga uniting with its own Icchā-dākṣi, becoming the author of the world's beginning, existence, end and turning into the Partite and Impartite, he shines as Sadāśiva himself, ... thus Śiva's eightfold person, that is, earth, water, fire, air, sky, the sun and moon and soul, the entire world arose ... that is ... the meaning of the world ..." (SJ:67)

(ix) "As the ground of the action and the dissolution of all things movable and immovable, unsullied, stable, the Liṅga of the nature of the Supreme, all-in-all, omniscient, changeless, etern, embodying these five symbols, is the majesty of the Mahāliṅga, which is "Atom of atoms, largest of the largest", atom to atoms, vastness to the vast, look you. Śiva Mahāliṅga Guru Siddhesvara Lord!" (SJ:35)

Now, the above vacanas of TS mean the following points:

(1) Eternity is one of the attributes of God (SJ:10,55,69, 71,87,15,68,67,35). He is beginningless, free from birth, existence and death. The other attributes are consciousness, omniscience, existence, bliss, perfectness, creativity and benediction, etc. (2) God existed before the world, or worlds upon worlds, come into existence. The latter have beginning, middle and the end, whereas God is free from all these. (3) From God the world, or worlds upon worlds and the individual beings, have come into existence and they disappear into him at the end. (4) God alone is eternal and all others, such as soul, māyā, etc., are temporal. He is free from, and all other are liable to, beginning, middle and end. For, one, others are liable to birth, existence and death, and God is free from these. Two, if the world exists eternally, then none would be the maker of it, and five acts, creation, preservation, destruction, and benediction belong to none. But God is the maker of the world and the five acts belong to him. (5) The world comes into existence by God's will. (6) God himself becomes the world as
The answer to the question, "Is God eternal for TS?", as it is evidenced from the vacanas, is positive. Further, the question is, whether TS conceives God's eternity in the sense in which Christian theism does. The answer is negative. TS's concept of eternity is different from that of Christian theism. For, as we have seen earlier, and as Stump and Kretzmann point out, there are four ingredients in the definition of eternity given by Boethius. TS's concept of eternity is the same as that of Boethius except the fourth ingredient. That is, one, TS conceives, as Boethius does, that an eternal God has life. For, in every vacana of TS we notice that he addresses God as Thou. And TS offers his prayer to God (SJ:1-9), understands that God has fivefold function: creation, preservation, destruction, veiling and benediction (SJ:71). This is possible only when God has life. Two, TS conceives, as Boethius does, that the life of an eternal God is unlimited, i.e., it is beginningless and endless. TS says "... Śiva alone is eternal, being free from birth, existence, death..."(SJ:69); "Before all worlds upon world were thpu only, O [eternal] Paraśiva wert!... " (SJ:87); "... Thou wast the basis of all principles, baseless Thyself; thou wast the source of all principles, Thyself without a source; because Thou wast the Unbegun..."(SJ:31). This means that life of eternal God is unlimited. Three, TS conceives, as Boethius does, that such a life involves duration, but TS differs from Boethius who understands duration with reference to the fourth element. Fourth, Boethius conceives that eternal being possesses all of its life at once, and hence is atemporal. There is no succession in the life of an eternal being, and thus no change, for change requires succession. But for TS, eternal God does not possess all of his life at once, there is succession in the life of the eternal God and thus change in him. Because (i) TS says that: The highest thing, having thus become the Impartite Liṅga-sthala through its own spontaneous sport, just as liquid ghee be
congealing is turned into solid ghee, so creating in Himself infinite forms and principles, infinite billions of cosmic eggs - all, all these, enwombing them in Himself, dissolving them in Himself, He attained the Mahāliṅga-sthala, ..." (Sutra of Mahāliṅga-sthala)

"... This entire world was born out of His mere thought ... though the profound sea manifests itself in foam and ripples, waves and spray, can they appear outside the sea? Embodied creatures, from the blade of grass to Brahma, have sprung from Paraśiva's sea, and there they disappear. Therefore, ... the world exists by the mere act of Linga..." (SJ:71)

"... The dissolution of earth is in water; that of water is in fire; of fire in air; of air in space; of space in soul; of soul in Mahāliṅga. All these, in Mahāliṅga being born, in Mahāliṅga only shall dissolve; in it all embryos shall dissolve; all principles, the Śiva-principle alone, which is the basis of dissolution and of progress, is eternal..." (SJ: 72).

"The inconceivable Thing, for the creation of the world, by dreaming of its consciousness became partite. There are two modes - the downward and the upward mode; by means of the downward mode, Hari, Brahma and soul, indeed all worlds, were born; and by the power of that supramental light, which is fulfilled by his own upward consciousness, the Pramathās, the Rudrās, and all such great cohorts sprang. Thus ... creation is ... in two ways" (SJ:73)

The above vacanas of TS would mean that the eternal God possesses in himself all the worlds, not as actual, but as possible worlds as possible and actual worlds as actual. And in the process of creation, God is making the possible worlds into actual. Thus there is a succession in the life of the eternal God. The eternal God includes the changing world and thus change becomes part of his nature.

(ii) For TS, God has different states, to mention a few: Sarva-sūnya-nirālamba state, Sūnya-liṅga state, Nihkala-liṅga state, Mahā-liṅga state, Anga-linga-dhāra state, etc.
These states in the eternal God are possible, because (a) he includes the changing world, and
every change in the world would make him exist differently; (b) he has fivefold functions
creation, preservation, destruction, **well**ing and benediction - (SJ:71) and he exists
differently when he performs these functions; (c) he has will (SJ:67), and he exists differently
when he exercises his will. Thus there is change and succession in the life of God, according to
TS.

If TS's concept of eternity differs from the Christian concept of eternity, as is indeed
shown above, then it is free from the problem from simultaneity. The problem from simultaneity
arises when the question of the relation between eternal God who is changeless and timeless
and temporal things arises. Since TS's God being eternal involves change and succession, then
there is no problem from simultaneity. Temporal things, for TS, are not simultaneously
present to God, because he is not simultaneously present with all the times, past, present and
future. There is past, present and future in his life, there is not only one instant of time for him,
that is, present, but also past and past and future; and past, present and future things are not
present to him all at once, but as successively, i.e., past things present to him as past, present
as present and future as future; in short, possible things are present to him as possible and
actual as actual. Therefore, his relationship with the past, present and future things is not
simultaneity but successivity, because they are all successively present to him. It is to be noted
that the concept of successivity is implied by, or is an ingredient of, TS's concept of eternity,
whereas the concept of simultaneity is implied by, or is an ingredient of, Christian concept of
eternity.

**B. ETERNITY (TIMELESS) AND OMNISCIENCE:**
In the previous section, we examined the coherence or otherwise of classical theism with reference to the concept of Eternity and Temporality and concluded that it is incoherent and TS's text does not support it and is free from contradiction.

In the present section, we shall examine first classical theism with reference to the concept of Eternity (timeless) and Omniscience and then see whether TS supports it in this context.

I

Let us begin the discussion by considering the problem of indexicals in relation to the concept of timeless eternity. In traditional Christian theism, God is not only eternal but also omniscient. That God is omniscient means that he knows everything that is true. In other words, for every proposition P, if P is true God knows that P. The problem raised in this connection by Prior (1962:114-129) is that the concept of timelessness and omniscience are incompatible. The problem is based on the evident truth that if there is an instant of time there is more than one instant of time; and there are time-dependent propositions which can only be known at certain time. Therefore, if God is to know such propositions, he cannot be timeless, and if he is timeless he can know only those propositions which are themselves timeless; and the problem in question is of incompatibility between the supposition of God's timelessness and his omniscience. It is for this reason that Prior argues that the concept of timelessness is incoherent. This argument is endorsed by Kretzmann(1966:409-421), Wolterstorff (1982:77-98) and Kenny (1979:Ch.IV). But this argument is criticized by Castaneda(1967:203-210), Pike(1970:Ch.5), Swinburne(1977:162 ff) and Mullatti(1983). My purpose here is to argue that the position of Castaneda and others writing in similar veins is unsound, that the problem cannot be mitigated, and that the concept of timelessness is incoherent.

Prior says that "God could not, on the view I am considering, know that the 1960 final examinations at Manchester are now over; for this isn't something that He or anyone could
know timelessly, because it just isn't true timelessly. It's true now, but it wasn't true year ago (I write this on August 29th, 1960) and so far as I can see all that can be said on this subject timelessly is that the finishing date of the 1960 final examinations is an earlier one than August 29th, and this is not the thing we know when we know that those exams are over. I cannot think of any better way of showing this than the one I've used before, namely, the argument that what we know when we know that the 1960 final examinations are over can't be just a timeless relation between dates because this isn't the thing we're pleased about when we're pleased that the exams are over" (1962:116).

\[ \text{It is now } t_1 \text{ and } \text{at } t_1 \text{ it is } t_1 \text{ are two different propositions. The former is not equivalent in meaning to the latter. The former is true at } t_1 \text{ whereas the latter is true timelessly. And a person, whether omniscient or not, who knows the latter would not necessarily know the former and would necessarily not know if he is timeless; for he could not be present on the occasion on which it is true. If God comes to know that It is now } t_1, \text{ then his coming to know this would by synchronous with the onset of time } t_1, \text{ and thus he is not timeless. This position is accepted by Kretzmann (1966: 409-21), Wolterstorff (1982:77-98), Kenny (1979:Ch.IV) and Helm (1980:211-221).} \]

As said earlier, Castaneda, Pike, Swinburne and Mullatti argue against the position of Prior and show that a timeless person can be omniscient, can know the time-dependent propositions such as 'It is now } t_1, \text{ Their argument begins like this: Suppose that } A \text{ knows at } t_1 \text{ the proposition 'It is now } t_1, \text{ If it is shown that at } t_2 \text{ B knows the proposition that } A \text{ knows at } t_1, \text{ it can be shown that a timeless person can also know the same time-dependent proposition. But to the question, can } B \text{ know at } t_2 \text{ the proposition that } A \text{ knows at } t_1, \text{ Castaneda's answer is that } B \text{ can certainly do so, but he cannot indeed express the knowledge in the same words as } A \text{ used at } t_1. \text{ But, just because } B \text{ cannot express the knowledge in the same words, it does not by}
knows that Y knows that P, then X knows that P; but, as Mullatti (1983:3) makes it clear, "it is a sort of transitivity only in the sense that it seems to have some superficial resemblance to transitivity proper". In a strict sense it is not transitivity of knowledge. We cannot say 'If X knows Y and Y knows Z then X knows Z', since the knowing relation is non-transitive. This 'sort of' transitivity of knowledge introduced in principle (P) can be extended to any finite number of terms as: if X₁ knows that X₂ knows that X₃ knows that ... Xₙ knows that P, then X₁ knows that P (n here is any positive integer).

From this principle it follows that if X knows that Y knows that 2+2=4, then X knows that 2+2=4. But sometimes the detachment of the expression of the form 'Y knows that' is not legitimate. This is so when one of the clauses '...' of (P) contains quasi-indicators. For instance, if 'Jones knows that Mary knows that her own house has three bed rooms' then it is absurd to say 'Jones knows that her own house has three bed rooms'; the latter is not a well formed formula. In such cases, the quasi-indicators may have to be replaced by other indexical devices for the reason that the subject of the sentence is now different. Therefore, what follows from the first sentence is 'Jones knows that Mary's house has three bedrooms'.

In this way Castaneda and others argue that B at t₂ can know what A knows at t₁. A knows at t₁ the proposition 'it is now t₁'. When B knows at t₂ what A knows at t₁, B can report his knowledge by words such as "I know that A knew at t₁ that it was then t₁". We can report B's knowledge as: B knew at t₂ that at t₁ A knew that it was then t₁. Therefore, by (P) B knows at t₂ what A knew at t₁. Though B cannot use the indexical that is used by A, (P) captures the sense of the indexicals by means of quasi-indexicals.

It is to be noted that B's knowledge in question would be unsatisfactorily reported as the knowledge that 'at t₁ it is t₁'. For this is a tautology - "if any time is t₁, then it is t₁" - and is not the item of knowledge about which we are talking. The item of knowledge about which we
itself ensure that B cannot know at t₂ the proposition that A knows at t₁. How B at t₂ can know
the proposition that A knows at t₁ is shown by what Castaneda calls principle (P).

Indexical expressions are demonstrative or personal pronouns and adverbs, like 'I', 'you', 'now', 'yesterday', 'tomorrow', 'here', etc. and when these are used in a statement they pick
out people, time, place, etc. by their spatial or temporal relations to the speaker of the
statement. When I say 'I am healthy', 'You are handsome', 'Today is Friday', 'The kettle is
boiling here' the 'I' is the speaker myself; the 'you' is an individual picked out as the individual
to whom I am talking and of whom I am predicating the property of being handsome; the
'today' is a day picked out as the day on which I am talking and of which I am predicating the
property of being Friday; the 'here' is a place picked out as the place at which I am talking and the kettle
is boiling; respectively. On the other hand, expressions are called quasi-indexical when they are
used for picking out objects by their relation, not to the speaker, but to the subject of the
sentence or subordinate clause in which they occur. So when X says 'Y knows that he is
healthy' the 'he' refers not to the speaker, X, but to the subject of the sentence, Y. So also in
'X knew that it was then too late' the 'then' refers to the time of X's knowing. However, the
same fact can be known by two people. X and Y can know the fact that India won freedom in
1947, though they may express it in different words. For instance, I know that you have a car
and you know that you have a car. What we know is the same but we express it differently.

The principle (P) is formulated by Castaneda (1967:207) as: (P) If a sentence of the
form 'X knows that a person Y knows that ...' formulates a true statement, then the person X
knows the statement formulated by the clause filling the blank '...'.

As Mullatti (1983:3) holds "This principle trivially follows from what is usually described as
the classical conception of knowledge; namely that knowledge is justified true belief". Though
Castaneda claims that this principle (P) establishes a sort of transitivity of knowledge - if X
are talking is that a certain time is \( t_1 \) which A knows at \( t_1 \) and B knows at \( t_2 \); and it can be picked out in many and various ways, according to our location in time as "now" or "then" or "the time at which A thought it was \( t_1 \)" etc. (Swinburne:1977:165-166).

Now the question is: is the solution, given by Castaneda and others to the problem raised by Prior and others satisfactory? In other words, can the distinction between an item of knowledge and the sentence which expresses it be a proper solution to the problem? It seems to me that the solution is not satisfactory. Let me explain: There are two different propositions: "Today is Friday" (or "It is now \( t_1 \)") uttered by A on Friday (or at \( t_1 \)), and "Yesterday was Friday" (or "It was then \( t_1 \)") uttered by B on Saturday (or at \( t_2 \)). According to Castaneda and others, both express the same item of knowledge. But it is not so. This can be shown by Prior's argument stated earlier. Prior's argument is well summarised by Kenny (1979:46-47), who also agrees that it shows that Castaneda's solution is not satisfactory, in the following passage: "What I am glad about when I am glad that today is Friday is not at all necessarily the same thing as what I am glad about when I am glad that yesterday was Friday. Perhaps Friday is a payday, on which I always go out for a massive carouse with my friends. When it is Friday, I am glad today is Friday, but during Saturday's hangover I am not at all glad that yesterday was Friday. Moreover, the power that the knowledge that it is Friday gives me on Friday (e.g., the power to keep the engagements made for Friday) is quite different from the very limited power which is given me by Saturday's knowledge that yesterday was Friday unaccompanied by the realization on Friday that it was indeed Friday."

Further, the solution given by Castaneda is not satisfactory because, as Kenny says, "it is incoherent to regard 'Today' in 'Today is Friday' as a referring expression picking out a day; it is no more a referring expression than is the 'it' in the synonymous sentence 'It is Friday today'" (1979:46).
I conclude that the problem from indexicals cannot be solved, and thus the concept of
timelessness is incoherent.

II

Let us now consider the position of TS. The question is, Is God omniscient for TS? In
this regard TS says: (i) "Lo, I invoke Thee as the impartite, the self-subsistent without
support, Thyself the universal base, all-knowing, Lord of all, the universal goal, O
Mahāliṅgaguru Śivasiddheśvara Lord!" (SJ:28)

(ii) "As the ground of the action and the dissolution of all things movable and
immovable, unsullied, stable, the Liṅga of the nature of the Supreme, all-in-all, omniscient,
changeless, etreme, embodying these five symbols, is the Majesty of the Mahāliṅga, which is
'Atom of atoms, largest of the largest', Atom to atoms, vastness to the vast. Look you,
Mahāliṅgaguru Śivasiddheśvara Lord!" (SJ:35).

(iii) "... Has Śiva limited knowledge, or is He omniscient? ...Is it lie to say, He is
Omniscient? If he has limited knowledge, can you cite a scripture saying so? The thing alone
that is perfect and all-pervasive, thou art, thou only art peerless, beyond compare, O
Mahāliṅgaguru Śivasiddheśvara Lord!" (SJ:70).

The above vacanas of TS would mean that God is not only omniscient, but also having
some other attributes. But TS has not explained in detail, as the contemporary philosophers do,
in what way God is omniscient. It is obvious that "God is omniscient" means he knows
everything that is true. We have seen in the previous section (Ch.II.A) that God for TS is also
eternal. But here, the eternity is understood not in the sense in which Christian theism
understands, i.e., timelessness, but in the sense that it involves time and duration. So, for TS,
God is both omniscient and eternal which involves time and duration. If this is the case, then
the problem from indexicals is applicable to TS. Thus, God's eternity is compatible with his
omniscience according to TS. Eternal God who involves time, for TS, can know the time-dependent propositions. God, for TS, can know not only those propositions which are themselves timeless but also time-dependent propositions. Thus the conclusion is that TS differs from Christian theism in conceiving that God is eternal but involves time and duration and he is free from the problem from indexicals.

C. ETERNITY (CHANGELESS) AND PERSON:

In the previous sections we have examined the coherence or otherwise of classical theism with reference to the concept of (i) Eternity and Temporality and (ii) Eternity (timesless) and omniscience. It is concluded that classical theism is incoherent and TS's text does not support it and is free from contradiction.

In the present section we shall examine first classical theism with reference to the concept of Eternity (changeless) and person and then see whether TS supports it in this context.

Let us now consider the problem from personality in relation to the concept of changeless and timeless eternity. As Helm thinks (1980:216), the problem from personality is connected with the problem from indexicals. For, the "argument from personality, if it is regarded as sound, provides a reason for treating the argument from indexicals as relevant to the issue of God's timelessness, since otherwise it could be argued that the indexical argument is beside the point because God only needs to know the truth of tense-indifferent propositions. The reason why it is thought that God needs to know more than the truth of tense-indifferent propositions is that he observes and initiates changes in the universe. That is, he is a person" (Helm: 1980:216).
Personality is also a necessary character of God, in Christian theism. That God is a person is understood to imply that he has life, is conscious, is eternal, free, able to do anything, knows everything, is perfectly good, is the proper object of human worship and obedience, the creator and sustainer of the universe. The problem in question is that the notion of God as person, and that of timeless and changeless eternity are incompatible with each other.

Let us begin first with the problem of incompatibility between the notions of personality and immutability and then between the notions of personality and timelessness (in Ch.II.1). Swinburne (1977:211-215) argues for the thesis of incompatibility between personality and immutability in the following manner:

According to the notion of God as a person, he is the proper object of worship. Brings about this or that. Suppose that men worship God, and by doing so they change from not being worshipping to being worshipping. In such a case, does God also change? The notion of immutability rules out God acting and reacting because acts take place at particular times, in acting God changes from not doing a certain action to doing a that action. It does not rule out God at one time not being worshipped by men and at a later time being worshipped by men, for in such a case, intuitively, men change but God does not. But if God is a person, he should act, and react to men, and bring about this or that. Therefore, the two notions are conflicting with each other. This conflict could be avoided if one said that "all that God brings about he has chosen 'from all eternity' to bring about. The effects (e.g., the fall of Jerusalem, the fall of Babylon) which God brings about occur at particular times (587 B.C. and 538 B.C., respectively). Yet God has always meant them to occur at those times - i.e., there was no time at which God did not intend Jerusalem to fall in 587 B.C. When 587 B.C. arrived there was no change in God - the arrival of the moment put into effect the intention.
which God always had" (Swinburne:1977:214). "This view would need to be made more sophisticated to deal with the suggestion that God's bringing out one state of affairs, say A, rather than another, say B, was due to his reaction to the behaviour of them (e.g. men have behaved badly and so God gave them drought instead of rain). The view in question would have to claim that in such circumstances God had intended that A-occur-if-men did so-and-so, and that B-occur-if-men did such-and-such" (Swinburne:1977:214).

Swinburne objects to this that "If God had thus fixed his intentions from all eternity he would be a very lifeless thing; not a person who reacts to men with sympathy or anger, pardon or chastening because he chooses to there and then. Yet, ... the God of Old Testament, in which Judaism, Islam and Christianity have their roots, is a God in continual interaction with men as they speak to him, his action being often in no way decided in advance. We should note, further, that if God did not change at all, he would not think now or this, now of that. His thoughts would be one thought which lasted for ever"(1977:214).

Further, the conflict between personality and immutability can be brought out by claiming that a perfectly free person could not be immutable. "For an agent is perfectly free at a certain time if his action results from his own choice at that time and if his choice is not itself brought about by anything else. Yet a person immutable would be unable to perform any action at a certain time other than what he had previously intended to do. His course of action, being fixed by his past, he would not be perfectly free. Being perfectly free is incompatible with being immutable in the strong sense".

In this connection Swinburne thinks that "although the God of the Old Testament is not pictured as such a being, nevertheless a perfectly free person might act in fact only on intentions which he had had from all eternity, and so in a strong sense never change"(1977:214). However, Swinburne holds that "a perfectly free person could not be
immutable in the strong sense, that is unable to change" (1977:214). Further, Swinburne holds that "we could attempt to save the coherence of the supposition that God is both perfectly free and immutable ... by pleading that words are being used analogically, but there seems no need whatever for this manoeuvre here, because there is no need whatever for the theist to say that God is immutable in the strong sense" (1977:215). But many theists have wished to suppose that God is immutable in the strong sense. "Why should many theists have wished to suppose that God is immutable in the strong sense?" Swinburne answers that "The belief that God is immutable in this sense does not seem to me to be much in evidence in Christian tradition until the third or fourth century A.D. It came, I suspect, from Neo-Platonism. For a Platonist, things which change are inferior to things which do not change. Aquinas, claiming that God is altogether unchangeable, gives as one of his reasons that 'anything in change acquires something through its change, attaining something not previously attained. Now God ... embracing within himself the whole fulness of perfection of all existence cannot acquire anything'(Summa Theologiae, Vol.ii, Ia.q.I). Being perfect already he can lack nothing". However, Swinburne says "an obvious answer to this point is to suggest that the perfection of perfect being might consist not in his being in a certain static condition, but in his being in a certain process of change. Only Neo-Platonic dogma would lead us to suppose otherwise. That God is completely changeless would seem to be for the theist an unnecessary dogma. It is not, I have suggested, one implicit in the Old or the New Testament. Nor, I would think, is it one to which very many modern theists are committed, unless they have absorbed Thomism fairly thoroughly" (1977:215).

Lucas (1976) also argues for the incompatibility between personality and immutability. He says "Theologians, however, are tempted to wish an absolute changelessness on God. God they say, is the same yesterday, today and for ever, not only in all essential respects, but in all respects whatsoever. But such a changelessness is open to the same objection as timelessness.
namely, that it is incompatible with personality. Personality is dynamic, not absolutely static. God may stand as firm as a rock, but is not as unfeeling as a rock. We ascribe all the permanence and stability that we want to ascribe to God by means of the first sense of 'changeless'. It is only an improper use of theological superlative and St. Augustine's failure to rethink the Neo-Platonist doctrines he had earlier espoused that has led us to speak of God in an incoherent way, which makes Him out to be dead and finished instead of live and ever new.

II

Let us consider TS's standpoint in this context. There are three questions to be considered: (i) Does TS's God have personality? (ii) Is TS's God immutable? and (iii) Are the answers of TS to (i) and (ii) compatible? Let us take the question (i): As an answer to this question we have the following vacanas of TS:

1) "To knowledge inaccessible, God of Gods, three-eyed Great God, Great-souled and greatly knowing, and higher than the highest, great sin-destroyer, God, my only God, O, Hara, O Śiva, hail, I say, to Thee! Mahālingaguru Śivasiddheśvara Lord! O friend of bhakti, Lord of my soul, O Ocean of mercy to the sarāṇas, save me!" (SJ:2).

2) "... it is ignorance to say that creatures and their bondage are eternal. If you should scan it with the supramental eye, the Śiva-principle alone is eternal; the rest, impermanent ...

"(SJ:69)

3) "When worlds upon worlds were not... "thou only wast: the eternal, immaculate Supreme Thing..." (SJ:10)

4) "Thus, when the sarāṇa... himself understood the full meaning of the Supreme Thing in trying to define the sthala, it was at first found to be the sthala of the self-subsistent All-void"

(SJ:sutra of sarva-sīnya-nirālamba-sthala)
"Thus the stage of Absolute Void, which is the ineffable Supreme Thing, itself the self-subsistent All-Void, came to be; and it next became the stage of the Void Êîíã" (SJ:sūtra of Śūnyalinga-sthala).

"The supreme Thing that had thus become the ineffable Void, became of its own accord the self-begotten impartite Êîíã. To show how, we have next the Nîhkala-lîngâ-sthala" (SJ:sūtra of Nîhkala-lîngâ-sthala).

"The highest Thing, having thus become the Impartite Lîngâ-sthala through its own spontaneous sport, just as liquid ghee by congealing is turned to solid ghee, so creating in Himself infinite forms and principles, infinite billions of cosmic eggs - all, all these, enwombing them in Himself, dissolving them in Himself, He attained the Mahâlîngâ-sthala..." (SJ:sūtra of Mahâlîngâ-sthala)

5) "Lo, I invoke Thee as the impartite, the self-subsistent without support, thyself the universal base, All-knowing, Lord of all, the universal goal ... " (SJ:28). (See also SJ:67 for God as omniscient)

6) "Because, enwombing in Thyself six aṅgas and six Lîngas, six śaktis and six bhaktis all these, thou wast the Existence-Consciousness-Bliss, the eternal, all-pervasive Śiva-principle ..." (SJ:32) (See also SJ:69 for God as Saccidananda).

7) "... the single Śiva-principle, by mere vibration of its energy, divided into two; wherein Lîngâ-sthala is one; the other, Aṅga-sthala. And thus it operates as aṅga and Lîngâ, worshipped and worshipper ... " (SJ:39)

8) "... by that Lîngâ's act, worlds upon worlds, including the ideal cosmic egg, were born; thus by Thy mere thought the triple world was born; and thou art the cause of birth, existence, death ... "(SJ:67).

9) "The formless Śiva-principle, Existence-Consciousness-Bliss, Eternal, perfect, of its own accord, became the Mahâlîngâ ... in the Lîngâ's heart, as the tree grows out of the seed with the
Liṅga uniting with its own Icchā-śakti, becoming the author of the world's beginning existence, end ... " (SJ:67).

(10) God has five acts: creation, preservation, destruction, veiling and benediction (SJ:71).

(11) ... All these, in Mahāliṅga being born, in Mafiāliṅga only shall dissolve; in It all embryos shall dissolve; all principles; the Śiva Principle alone, which is the basis of dissolution and of progress, is Eternal ... " (SJ:72).

From the above cited vacanas, we can understand that TS's God has personality. That is, God knows everything, observes and initiates changes in the universe, is destroyer of the sin, is lover of devotion is merciful, protector of the devotees, is eternal, conscious, is dynamic and not static (he becomes the universe as the seed becomes the tree), is the proper object of human worship and obedience, perfectly good, does Ma, is free, creator and sustainer of the universe, has fivefold function, i.e., creation, preservation, destruction, veiling and benediction, etc.

Thus TS agrees with Christian theism in holding that God has personality.

Let us take the question (ii), Is TS's God immutable? This question is discussed in the previous section (Ch.II.A) where it was concluded that TS's God is eternal but involves change and time. Thus TS differs from Christian theism which holds that God is eternal but involves no change.

So far as the question (iii) is concerned, we can conclude that God's personality and his eternality involving change are compatible. Thus TS is free from the problem from personality whereas Christian theism is not so.

TS's God who is a person is the proper object of worship, brings about this or that. Men worship God, by doing so, not only men change from not being not worshippers to being worshippers, but God also changes, and the notion of God's eternity (involving change) does
allow God acting and reacting, bringing about this or that. Therefore, the two notions, God's personality and eternity (having change) are compatible with each other in TS's case.

D. ETERNITY (TIMELESS) AND PERSON:

We have discussed in the previous section (Ch.II.C) the coherence or otherwise of Classical theism with reference to the problem of Eternity (changeless) and person. We have determined that the classical theism is incoherent in asserting God as both changeless eternal and person. We have also concluded that TS does not support classical theism in this regard, and thus is free from contradiction.

In this section we continue the same discussion to see the coherence or otherwise of classical theism by taking the problem of God as both timeless eternal and person and see whether TS supports classical theism in this regard.

Let us first state the problem of incompatibility between the notion of personality and timelessness. Kneale (1960:99) brings out this incompatibility in the following manner. "Anyone who, like Boethius, speaks of eternity as 'the complete possession of eternal life all at once' seems to me to be running together two incompatible notions, namely, that of timelessness and that of life. For I can attach no meaning to the word 'life' unless I am allowed to suppose that what has life acts. No doubt the word 'acts' may itself be taken in a wide sense. Perhaps it is not essential to the notion of life that a living being should produce changes in the physical world. But life must at least involve some incidents in time, and if, like Boethius, we suppose the life in question to be intelligent, then it must involve also awareness of the passage of time. To act purposefully is to act with thought of what will come about after the beginning of the action." Therefore, Boethius's definition of eternity is a contradiction in terms.
In relation to this Helm says that "though this consideration is relevant to timelessness as such, to whether or not there could be a timeless conscious agent, it is not quite what is relevant to the question of whether or not God is timeless. For question here is not whether

(a) Whatever has life must have an awareness of time, but whether

(b) Whatever consciously brings about changes in the states of things in time must have an awareness of being time.

... So in saying that the agent in question must have an awareness of time Kneale seems to mean more than that the agent must have the concept of time. It obviously does not follow that if someone has the concept of something temporal or spatial that one is at that time or that place. It is possible for a person to have the concept of being somewhere else than the place he is at present, but it would be absurd to suppose that one had to be somewhere other than one was at present in order to have this concept" (1980:216)

The argument of Kneale is taken up and adorned by Lucas (1976:300-301). Lucas says "Eternity is not timelessness. For eternity is an attribute of God, and God is a personal conscious being, and time is an inevitable concomitant of consciousness. To say that God is outside time, as many theologians do, is to deny, in effect, that God is a person. The Absolute ..., the Form of the Good, or even perhaps, the Ground of our Being, may be outside time, and timeless in a full-blooded Platonic sense, but they are not persons: they neither see what we are, nor hearten into our prayers, nor care what we do, let alone ever intervene in the course of the world's events. If we think of God as a living person, who acts in the world or even who is merely conscious, we must seem to be ready to apply temporal expressions to Him. Because the applicability of temporal predicates of some sort or other is a necessary condition of activity, even the inactive activity of consciousness. A Timeless Deity may be the Truth; it may possibly provide us with the Way, or at least with a Goal; but it cannot ever be the
life ... To be alive, to be a person, to be conscious, to be active, one must be, in some sense, in time."

However, the argument showing incompatibility between personality and timelessness is endorsed by Swinburne, and he claims that timeless personality is incoherent. Swinburne points out that the difficulty with timeless personality is that "so many other things which the theist wish to say about God - that he brings about this or that, forgives, punishes, or warns are things which are true of a man this or that time or at all times. If we say that P brings about X, we can always sensibly ask when does he bring it about? If we say that P punishes Q, we can always sensibly ask when does he punish Q? If P really does ‘bring’ about or ‘forgive’ in anything like the normal senses of the words, there must be answers to these questions even if nobody knows what they are. Further, many of these things which the theist wishes to say about God seem to be things the doing of which at one time carries entailments of things being true at later or earlier times. If P at t brings about X, then necessarily X comes into existence (simultaneously with or) subsequently to P’s action. If P at t forgives Q for having done X, then Q did X prior to t. If P at t warns, Q not to do X, in such a way that Q has an opportunity to heed his warning, then there must be a time subsequent to t at which Q has this opportunity. And so on. So, superficially, the supposition that God could bring things about, forgive, punish, warn, etc. without his doing these things at times before or after other times (often, times on the human scale of time) seems incoherent". (1977:221).

But theists hope that the inner coherence of their claim that God is timeless, and its incompatibility with their claim that God is a person can be maintained by saying that many words are being used in highly analogical sense. For instance, when it is said that God is a ‘person’ or ‘brings about’ states of affairs, or ‘knows’ what happened yesterday ‘at the same time as’ he ‘knows’ what happens tomorrow and that he ‘knows’ all these things at and only at the same time as they happen, it could be claimed that the words involved here are being used
in a highly stretched senses. And therefore, there is no incoherence in the claim that God is timeless and no incompatibility between timelessness and personality.

To this Swinburne warns that "although a theist would be justified on occasion in using words in an analogical sense, nevertheless too many appeals to analogical senses of words would make sentences in which the words were used empty of contents" (1977:221-222). Therefore, Swinburne thinks that in this case the theist has no need to make such an appeal. "For ... the theist has no need to incorporate the doctrine of the timelessness of God into his theism. He can easily do without it and all the difficulties which it brings, and rely instead on the simple and easy coherent understanding of God's eternity which" Swinburne delineates (1977:222).

Most of the great Christian theologians from Augustine to Aquinas thought that God is timeless. But Swinburne thinks that this doctrine of divine timelessness very little in evidence before Augustine. The Old and New Testaments show no sign of it. It like the doctrine of immutability seems to have entered Christian theology from Neo-Platonism, and there from Augustine to Aquinas it reigned. Duns Scotus and William of Ockham seem to have rejected it. From 16th century onwards it seems to have returned to Catholic theology. Compared to this it seems to have had little influence on Protestant theology. Because Post-HegeLian Protestant theology explicitly rejects it. So also Tillich and Barth do (Swinburne:1977:217-218).

It is interesting to know the reasons why Christian theists wish to adopt the doctrine of timelessness in their system. One, Swinburne says, the doctrine of timelessness would provide backing for and explanation of the doctrine of God's total immutability. "For if God is timeless he is totally immutable." Swinburne (1977:218) says, Aquinas seems to have thought also that it does follow that if God is totally immutable, he is timeless: "something lacking change and never varying its mode of existence will not display a before and after" (Summa Theologiae vol.
ii, Ia. 10.1). According to Aquinas, God's eternity (in the sense of timelessness), "follows upon unchangeableness, and God alone ... is altogether unchangeable" (Summa Theologicae, vol.ii, Ia. 10.3). But Swinburne considers this as mistaken. He says, "A totally immutable thing could just go on existing for ever without being timeless - especially if other things, such as the universe, changed, while the immutable thing continued changeless. The change of other things would measure the passage of time during which the immutable thing changed not. Still, the timelessness of God would explain God's total immutability, if he was totally immutable. But we have seen no reason why the theist should advocate God's total immutability" (1977:218-219).

Two. Swinburne (1977:219) says the doctrine of timelessness allows one to maintain that God is omniscient in the very strong sense. "God outside time can be said never not to know our free actions, even though they may sometimes be future from our point of view. Since they are never future for God, he sees them as present and this does not endanger their free character. In view of the general Christian tradition that God's omniscience includes knowledge of future free human actions, the doctrine of timelessness does seem to have the advantage of saving the former doctrine against obvious difficulties". But Swinburne argues that the view that God's omniscience includes knowledge of future free human actions is easily detachable from the theistic tradition. (this we shall see in discussing foreknowledge and freedom)(see Ch.III.B).

Three. Swinburne says (1977:219-220) the doctrine of timelessness allows one to maintain that God is perfect. "A man, especially, modern man, might feel that the temporal being was such less than perfect in that his mere existence in time would mean that he was as it were, continually losing parts of his existence all the while. As today ends, tomorrow begins, the being has lost today - his existence today is dead and gone, for ever unrecallable ... But why does the continual passage of time mean loss for those who live in it? Obvious answers are - that they get older and so weaker that new experiences are not so exciting as old ones, and that
they draw nearer to death which, they fear, is the end. All of these are indeed proper reasons for regretting the passage of time; and if the passage of time had these consequences for God he would indeed have cause for regret. But these are mere factual consequences of the passage of time for mortal finite man; an omnipotent being need not suffer them. But still it might be felt, there are some consequences of life in time which even an omnipotent being would have to suffer. These are that the moment certain states, experiences, and actions are past, they are for ever unrepeateable. If he performed a certain action on one day, he could not perform exactly that action on another day - he could only perform one qualitatively similar. This is true of logical necessity. States, experiences, actions, etc. are individuated by the time of their occurrence. An 'action' is a numerically different individual 'action' from a similar action tomorrow, because of the criteria which we have for distinguishing one 'action' from another. But what real loss does this fact mean? If I can tomorrow have states and do actions qualitatively as similar as I like to those of today, why should the passage of time cause me regret? And anyway, even if this limitation is a logically necessary one for all beings in time it is one which a being who lives and acts, chooses and reacts in any thing like a literal sense will - of logical necessity - have to endure. Such a being may still be as close as it is logically possible for a being to be to being perfect" (1977:220).

II

We have seen that according to Christian theism, God is both person and timeless; that the notion of personality and timelessness are not compatible with each other. The argument for the immutability was developed by Kneal, Lucas and Swinburne. The conclusion is that the Christian theism is incoherent. We have also seen why Christian theists wish to adopt the doctrine of timelessness in their system.
Now the question is, Whether TS also holds that God is both person and timeless. If so, then his notion of God as both person and timeless is incoherent as Christian theism is.

So far as the notion of God's personality is concerned, we have evidences, as we have seen in the previous section (Ch. II. C), from TS's text saying that God is a person:

(I) TS addresses God as 'Thou' (SJ:10-16)

(ii) For TS God is the protector of, lover of, merciful to. the devotees (SJ:1-9).

(iii) God has the five acts - creation, preservation, destruction, veiling and benediction (SJ:71).

(iv) God has consciousness (SJ:39).

(v) God does लिला (sport) and the world and the individual beings are the result of this लिला (SJ:sūtra of Mahāliṅga-sthala).

From these points, we understand that for TS God is a person, he has life, he acts, by protecting the devotees, by loving them, by creation of the world, etc. God's acts imply that he acts with the thought of what will come about after the beginning of the action, and thus life involves intelligence. God is a conscious personal being, sees what we are, heartens into our prayers, cares what we do, intervenes in the course of the world's events.

So far as the notion of God's timeless eternal is concerned, as we have seen in the previous section, (Ch. II B), for TS God is eternal (SJ:69), but not timeless. Because, for him God is not "complete possession of eternal life all at once". For him God includes in himself all the possible worlds, and in the process of his लिला, the possible worlds become eternal (SJ:32, sūtra of Mahāliṅga-sthala). He argues that God alone is eternal, and all others are not eternal, because if others, e.g. the world are eternal, then God's five acts like creation, preservation, etc. become impossible. But God has the five acts. Thus the world is not eternal (SJ:69). The point here is that God's life is not complete possession of eternal life at once.
is in the process of possessing the actual worlds gradually. This means that TS’s God is eternal but involves change and time.

So far as the compatibility between TS’s notion of God’s personality and timelessness is concerned, we can conclude that they are compatible. God for TS is a person and eternal but not timeless. Thus TS differs from Christian theism in holding this.

E. ETERNITY (CHANGELESS) AND OMNISCIENCE:

In this section we continue the discussion, with the same motive as it was in sections A, B, C and D. of Ch. II, to determine the coherence or otherwise of classical theism by taking the problem of God as both changeless eternal and omniscient and to see whether TS supports it in this regard.

I

There is another problem from indexicals in relation to the concept of changeless eternity: the problem of incompatibility between omniscience and immutability, as they are necessary characteristics of an absolutely perfect being in Christian theism. Kretzmann(1967:409-410) argues for the thesis that God’s omniscience is incompatible with this immutability in the following manner.

(1) A perfect being is not subject to change:

\( \forall x (\neg (p \supset \neg Cx)) \)

(2) A perfect being knows everything:

\( \forall x (p \supset (p = Kx p)) [K \ldots \text{knows that \ldots}] \)

(3) A being that knows everything always knows what time it is:

\( \forall x \{ (p) (p = Kxp) \supset (p) [Tp \supset (p = Kxp)] \} ['T: \ldots \text{is of the form} \text{"it is now } t_0 \text{"}'] \)

(4) A being that always knows what time it is is subject to change:
\[(x)\{ (p) [T_p \supset (p = Kxp)] \supset Cx \}\]

\[\therefore (5) \text{ A perfect being is subject to change:}\]

\[(x) (Px \supset Cx)\]

\[\therefore (6) \text{ A perfect being is not a perfect being:}\]

\[(x) (Px \supset \sim Px)\]

\[\therefore (7) \text{ There is no perfect being:}\]

\[(x) \sim Px.\]

Kretzmann elucidates the premise (4) as: "Adopting ‘it is now \(t_n\)’ as a convenient standard form for propositions as to what time it is, we may say of a being that always knows what time it is, that the state of its knowledge changes incessantly with respect to propositions of the form ‘it is now \(t_n\)’. First such a being knows that it is now \(t_1\) (and that it is not now \(t_2\)), and then it knows that it is now \(t_2\) (and that it is not now \(t_1\)). To say of any being that it knows something different from what it used to know is to say that it has changed; hence (4)" (1967:410 fn)

In the above passages Kretzmann claims that a being that always knows what time it is is subject to change. Let us clarify whether he means by this change a real change or apparent change. To decide this, let us know what is change. There is a criterion to say that something \(x\) changes, which Geach (1969:71-72) calls the Cambridge Criterion (it is so called because it keeps on occurring in Cambridge philosophers of the great days, like Russell and McTaggart, according to which a thing \(x\) changes if and only if some predicate \(\Phi\) applies to it at time \(t_1\) and does not apply to it at \(t_2\). In other words, the thing called \(x\) changes if and only if \(\Phi x\) at time \(t_1\) has truth value true and \(\Phi x\) at time \(t_2\) has truth value false. Thus:

\[(x) [C_x = (\Phi x_{t_1} \supset \sim \Phi x_{t_2})]\]

Therefore, this paper has changed if, for instance, it was clean yesterday and not clean today. But this criterion is not applicable to all cases. For example, Socrates is not admired by Smith at
t_{1}$ and Socrates is admired by Smith at $t_{2}$. According to the above criterion it appears that Socrates has changed, but actually Socrates has not changed. Or Smith is taller than Adam at $t_{1}$ and Smith is not taller than Adam at $t_{2}$. Here, by the criterion, it appears that Smith has changed, but Smith actually has not changed, rather Adam has changed by getting taller. Therefore, the Cambridge Criterion which does not apply to all cases is held by Smith (1973:325-333), Geach (1969:71-72) and Swinburne (1977:212) to be unsatisfactory.

Smith (1973:325-333), who has brought out the distinction between Cambridge change and real change, has claimed that the former is satisfactory for non-relational predicates, but with regards to relational predicates it is unsatisfactory. The predicates like 'laughs', 'is hungry', 'is green', 'is square', etc. are all non-relational. And the predicates like 'hits John', 'thinks of the man in the moon', 'opens the door', etc. are relational predicates which express a relation to some individual. Now, in the given example, that something $x$ is related to $y$, $R_{xy}$, at one time and $x$ is not related to $y$, $\neg R_{xy}$, at another time we cannot say definitely which of the related individuals has changed, for, either $x$ may have changed or $y$ may have changed or both. For example, given the special relation $x$ is to the left of $y$ at one time and $x$ is not to the left of $y$ at another time we cannot say which has changed. Therefore, given $R_{xy}$, to say that $x$ has changed is to say that $R_{xy}$ at $t_{1}$ and $\neg R_{xy}$ at $t_{2}$ and that $y$ has not changed in between these times. Thus:

$$(x) \ (y) \ (Cx = [R_{xy}t_{1} \ \neg R_{xy}t_{2} \ \neg Cy])$$

Suppose John has not changed and John was taller than Jim at $t_{1}$ and John is not taller than Jim at $t_{2}$, then Jim has changed by getting taller. Therefore, in a relational predicate to say that something $x$ has changed, it is necessary to know that the other related things have not changed. One cannot say that $x$ has changed without knowing whether $y$ has changed or not.

We have considered what is real and apparent (Cambridge) change: with this distinction we can now decide that according to Kretzmann a being that knows what time it is is subject to...
real, but not apparent change. For, change is not only on the side of the object of knowledge, but also on the side of the knower. Kretzmann considers the objection that the change in the object of knowledge does not entail the change in the knower, and replies that "to 'know' the changing of any thing is to know first that P and then that not-P (for some particular instance of P), and a knower that knows first one proposition and then another is a knower that changes" (1967:411).

But Castaneda (1967:203-210) argues against the Kretzmann thesis of incompatibility. Castaneda says, Kretzmann's argument for the thesis of incompatibility: (i) depends "on certain features of indexical reference, i.e., reference to times, places, events, objects, or persons by means of demonstrative or personal pronouns or adverbs"; (ii) "relies essentially on the fact that a person's indexical references to times, e.g., by means of the word 'now', are ephemeral at different times of utterance 'now' refers to different times." (1967:203); (iii) raises the general question, "How can a person, whether omniscient or not, believe, know, consider or, in general, apprehend and formulate for himself and by himself a proposition or statement (I will use these terms as having the same referent) that contains an indexical reference by another person"; and (iv) assumes "that the answer to this general question is: 'In no way at all'" (1967:203-204). Further, Castaneda says that on the basis of this assumption Kretzmann claims that "every person knows certain proposition that no other person can know" (1967:204). But Castaneda thinks that "there is a perfectly accessible way of, so to speak, capturing another person's indexical references intact, so that one can formulate another person's indexical statement qua indexical. This way consists in the use of ... "quasi-indicators" " (1967:204).

In this connection it is necessary to consider what is indicator and quasi-indicator, which is done elsewhere (see Ch.II.B).

Castaneda considers Kretzmann's premises (4) If 'X' be the name of a being that Kretzmann is talking about, then premises (4) would be:
"(4a) First X knows that it is now $t_1$ and not $t_2$, and then X knows that it is now $t_2$ and not $t_1$".

(Castaneda:1967:204). "From (4a) Kretzmann infers that X knows at $t_2$ something different from what he knew at $t_1$", therefore, X's knowledge and X himself, changed from $t_1$ to $t_2$.

(Castaneda:1967:205).

In (4a) the indicator 'now' is used in oratio oblique (indirect occurrence) to make indexical references by the speaker. Therefore, "the occurrences of 'now' in (4a) formulate Kretzmann's own indexical references to times $t_1$ and $t_2$, respectively" (Castaneda:1967:205).

However, "according to (4a) X knew at $t_1$ two propositions about time, and at $t_2$ he knew two other compatible propositions about time (1967:205). For the two occurrences of 'now' refer to two different times, the proposition or statement formulated by the occurrence of the clause 'it is now $t_1$' in the sentence (4a) is different from, but not incompatible with, the statement formulated by the occurrence of the clause 'it is not now $t_1$' in (4a); and similarly the statement expressed by 'it is not now $t_2$' and 'it is now $t_2$' " (1967:205).

Now, Castaneda thinks that if X knew all four propositions at $t_1$, X may very well have known at $t_2$ exactly the same propositions he knew at $t_1$, and Kretzmann would err in inferring from statement (4a) that X's knowledge, and a fortiori X himself, changed from $t_1$ to $t_2$ (1967:205). But the question is, Can X know at $t_1$ the proposition that Kretzmann expressed by his use of the clause 'it is now $t_2$ occurring in (4a). "Indeed, can Kretzmann himself know at $t_1$ the very same proposition he expressed at $t_2$ by using 'it is now $t_2$' as part of (4a)?" (1967:205). Castaneda's answer is "yes". X at any time as well as Kretzmann at $t_1$ apprehend and know the latter's indexical statement at $t_1$ "it is now $t_2$" without being able to formulate it because the indexical statement at $t_2$ 'it is now $t_2$' cannot be used by Kretzmann or X or anybody else to make exactly the same statement at times other than $t_2$. The problem is about the indexical reference of 'now' which is personal, ephemeral and untransferable. But Castaneda...
gives a method for capturing another person's indexical references intact, so that one can formulate another person's indexical statements qua indexical.

Let us consider one part of Castaneda's answer, that is, X at any time as well as Kretzmann at t₁ can apprehend and know the latter's indexical statement at t₂: "it is now t₁?" Castaneda justifies this answer by employing the principle (P) (which is considered in detail elsewhere). (See Ch. II. B.)

(P) is "If a sentence of the form 'X knows that a person Y knows that ...' formulates a true statement, then the person X knows the statement formulated by the clause filling the blank '...'."

Suppose that Y knows at t₁ and t₂ respectively the four propositions that (4a) describes, can these be known at t₁ or at any time by X or Kretzmann? According to (P) they can know. To illustrate this:

At t₁, X knows (1) that at t₂ Y knows that it is now t₁ and not t₂, and (2) that at t₁ it is now t₁ and not t₂. This shows that X at t₁ knows all the four propositions that (4a) describes, knows not only two propositions at t₂ but also two propositions at t₁. In the same way, X can know all the four propositions not only at t₁ but also at any other time if he knows that t₁ is different from t₂.

Let us consider the other part of Castaneda's answer, that is, how can X formulate a proposition about another person's knowing a proposition that contains indexical references by that person. Castaneda wants to say that (4a) itself is enough to yield the answer. The indexical propositions in (4a) are Kretzmann's own indexical propositions, "since indicators in oratio oblique express indexical references by the speaker, and leave it open whether the person spoken about refers to the same objects indexically or not" (1967, 205-206). For instance, I say that "John believes that I have 120 rupees". Here I do not imply that John has made an indexical reference to me. And my sentences of the form "John believes that I
have a certain misleadingness, for, John cannot refer to me in the first person. Further, when Mary says "Yesterday John thought that it would be firing now (today)" Mary's statement contains her own indexical uses of 'now' (today) and does not imply that John referred indexically to the time at which Mary makes her statement. Therefore, Castaneda says "Kretzmann's statement (4a) above both formulates Kretzmann's own indexical references to t₁ and t₂ and does not imply that X referred to t₁ or t₂ indexically"; and "(4a) does not preclude the possibility that the four propositions that X is said to know may be nonindexical, i.e., contain no indexical references at all ...") (1967:206).

Further, Castaneda considers Kretzmann's point that "to know what it is at a given time, a person has to make some indexical references of his own that will put him into the stream of changes in the world, and that, thus, that person cannot be immutable", and says that we must be able to reformulate (4a) without mentioning or alluding to Kretzmann's own indexical references—i.e., without using the word 'now' in order to free from the difficulty (1967:206). Thus (4a) can be reformulated as:

"(4a) At t₁ X knows [tenselessly] that it is [tenselessly] then t₁, but not t₂, and at t₂ later than t₁, X knows that it is than t₂, but not t₁".

Phonetically the difference between (4a) and (4b) is very simple, instead of the word 'now' in (4a), the word 'then' is used in (4b). But semantically the difference is enormous: (a) 'now' does, while 'then' does not, express an indexical reference by the speaker: (b)'then' does, while 'now' does not, attribute to X an indexical reference to time t₁ in the first and to time t₂ in the second conjunct; (c) whereas sentence (4a) cannot be used by Kretzmann or anybody else to make exactly the same statement at times other than t₁ and t₂, sentence (4b) can be used repeatedly at any time by anybody to make exactly the same statement on each occasion of its utterance. Thus 'then' as used in (4b) is not an indicator: it is, in my terminology, a quasi-indicator. Among its syntactico-semantic characteristics are: (1) its appearing in oratio
oblique, i.e., in a clause subordinated to a verb expressing a propositional attitude; (ii) its having an antecedent not in the same oratio oblique, which in (4a) is 't₁' for the first occurrence of 'then' and 't₂' for the second occurrence; (iii) its not being replaceable by its antecedent with preservation of the proposition or statement formulated with the whole sentence ..."

With these considerations, let us see how X can formulate at t₁ the propositions about Y's knowing a proposition that contains indexical references by Y to t₁ and t₂. X can do so as: Time t₂ is later than t₁ and X knows at t₁ (1) that at t₁ it is then t₁ and not t₂, and (2) that at t₂ it is then t₂ and not t₁. Therefore, Castaneda says that X at t₁ knows all the four propositions that (4a) describes; if so it does not follow that X underwent change in knowledge from t₁ to t₂.

To sum up Castaneda's argument against Kretzmann: what is expressed by the propositions 'it is now t₁' and 'it is now t₂' could be known by a person who is outside either of the times in question; and therefore God's knowledge is compatible with his immutability.

Kenny (1979:42) points out that "changes in God's knowledge similar to that argued for by Kretzmann were regarded as incompatible with divine immutability by Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas argues that, as Kretzmann (1967:415) quotes from Summa Theologica (Book I, Q.14, art.15), "Since God's knowledge is his substance, just as his substance is altogether immutable, so his knowledge like-wise must be altogether invariable". The difficulty with Aquinas is, "once, God knew that Christ was yet to be born. But now he does not know that Christ is yet to be born (nacituras), because Christ is no longer yet to be born. Therefore, God does not know all that he once knew. And thus his knowledge seems to be changeable" (Kenny:1979:42).

Kenny (1979:42) says, Aquinas proposes a nominalist's solution to the difficulty: "Nominalists in the past (antique nominales) said that the propositions "Christ is being born", "Christ is yet to be born" and "Christ has been born" are identical, on the grounds that all three refer to the same thing, namely the birth of Christ, so that it follows that God knows
whatever he knew, because he now knows Christ born, which means the same as "Christ will be born"."

"This position of the old nominalists seems to resemble that of many modern logicians, according to which in a logically perspicuous notation tensed propositions should be replaced by timeless propositions containing an explicit time-reference, so that 'It is raining now in Oxford' is replaced by 'It is (timelessly) raining at 11.00 a.m. on 18th June 1978 in Oxford' (Kenny:1979: 42-43).

But, Kenny (1979:43) says, Aquinas rejects the solution given by nominalists by considering it as mistaken. It is mistaken because it conflicts with Aristotle's position that the same sentence 'Socrates is seated' is true when he is seated, false when he rises. Then Aquinas replies to the difficulty as: "It must be granted then that 'whatever God knew, he knows' is not true if the reference is to the propositions (si ad enuntiabilia referatur). But it does not follow that God's knowledge is changeable. There is no change in the divine knowledge through his knowing that one and the same thing at one time exists and at another does not; and in the same way, there is no change in the divine knowledge through his knowing that a certain proposition is at one time true, at another time false" (quoted by Kenny:1979: 43). "God's knowledge would thereby be changeable only if he knew propositions in the same way as we do" (Kenny:1979:43).

As Kenny says, "Aquinas agrees, then that God is mutable to the extent that if we take the objects of knowledge in its propositional expression then it is false that whatever God knew he knows; that is, we can formulate propositions such as that 'God knows that P' is true at one moment and false at another; as Aquinas's example shows, propositions need not be about time. They can be any significantly tensed propositions. But this, Aquinas claims, involves no real change in God because God does not think on propositions as we do. God's knowledge cannot
change either by his changing his opinion on a topic, or by the truth of the matter changing while his opinion remains unaltered (1979:43).

We have been considering Aquinas's solution to the difficulty. As Kenny says (1979:43) Aquinas's solution like Castaneda's response to Kretzmann, depends on the possibility of making a distinction between an item of knowledge and the manner of its expression. Let us consider this distinction.

It is true that an item of knowledge in general is identified and individuated by its expression in language. Kenny says (1979:43), Aquinas agrees with this, "since he believed both that knowledge was a disposition or state of mind (a habitus) and that dispositions were identified by the acts in which they were exercised or manifested (Summa Theologica, Ia, IIae, 54,2)". But an item of knowledge may have more than one possible expression in language. For instance, if A, who speaks only French, and B, who speaks only English, look out of the window at the rain, then they both possess the same item of information, that it is raining; but A can express it only by saying 'Il pleut' and B by saying 'it is raining'.

This distinction between items of knowledge and ways of their expression is considered by some philosophers to be the same as the distinction between propositions and sentences. 'It is raining' and 'Il pleut' are two different sentences but are, or express, only a single proposition. Therefore, they claim that synonymous sentences in different languages express only one proposition. Now, as Kenny says (1979:44), "Aquinas's solution to the problem about omniscience demands that a single item of knowledge should be capable not only of expression in different sentences but also in different propositions".

Accordingly, there can be a single proposition which expresses two different items of knowledge, for instance, A says to B 'You are hungry' and B says to A 'You are hungry'. Here A and B are each saying different things about the other person; and there can be a single item of knowledge which is expressed by two different propositions. For instance, A says to B 'I am
hungry* and B says to A 'you are hungry'; here A and B are each saying the same thing about
the same person. "Moreover, it may be that an item of knowledge which can be expressed by
one person in a certain proposition can only be expressed by another in a quite different
proposition. For instance, I know, as Boswell knew, that Dr. Johnson was a great lexicographer:
but, not having had the pleasure of being acquainted with the Doctor, I cannot express that
knowledge, as Boswell could, by saying "you are a great lexicographer" (Kenny:1979:44-45).
Then, Kenny is right in saying that these considerations support the suggestion made by
Aquinas that "there can be items of knowledge which an unchanging God can possess which
nevertheless cannot be expressed by Him in ways in which a changing temporal being could and
would express them" (1979:45).

As we know, Castaneda and Aquinas propose the solution to Kretzmann's problem, by
making the distinction between an item of knowledge and propositions which express it. Now
the question is, whether the way in which Castaneda and Aquinas make the distinction between
an item of knowledge and the propositions which it expresses permits a solution to
Kretzmann's problem. Kenny says, "If propositions are identified in the way suggested above,
then it is clear that many propositions are significantly tensed: 'It will rain' is a very different
propositions from 'It was raining', since one but not the other could be regarded as a translation
of 'pleubat'. If Aquinas's account is correct, then a difference of tenses must be regarded as an
instance of a difference of expression involving no difference in the knowledge expressed, so
that 'It will rain' uttered before a particular shower and 'It rained' uttered after can express a
single item of information" (1979:45).

Some philosophers believe that tensed sentences could be reduced to tenseless sentences
containing explicit temporal reference or quantification over times, so that their content could
be known by an unchanging, and even a timeless, being. For instance, a sentence 'The
kettle will boil' uttered at time t, should be understood as expressing a propositions at
some time \( t \) later than \( t_i \) the kettle boils (timelessly). But Kenny (1979:45) says that Prior has argued (1957, 1967 and 1968) that this reduction of tenses to times is impossible. For instance, the sense of "The kettle will boil" could only be caught by an analysis such as "At some time later than \( t_i \) the kettle boils and \( t_i \) is \textit{now}; and \( t_i \) is \textit{now} cannot in its turn be given a timeless analysis." Therefore, as Kenny (1979:45) says, if it is possible to reduce tensed sentences into tenseless sentences containing timeless verbs plus quantification over times, then their content could be known by unchanging being; but since it is not possible, the difficulty remains.

It is to be noted that Castaneda and Aquinas do not commit themselves too the reduction of tensed expressions to tenseless ones; even so they claim to have a solution to the problem. The essential elements of their solution are these: "'Today is Friday' (uttered on Friday) and 'Yesterday was Friday' (uttered on Saturday) are indeed two different propositions; but both express the same item of knowledge. God's knowledge is not expressed in propositions and so he can know the same item of knowledge permanently and unchangingly. It is only because we are temporal changing beings that we have to express the same item of knowledge first in one proposition and then in another" (Kenny: 1979:46).

But Kenny argues that the solution is not wholly satisfactory. "In the first place, it is incorrect to regard 'Today' in 'Today is Friday' as referring expression picking out a day; it is no more a referring expression than is the 'it' in the synonymous sentence 'It is Friday today.' Secondly, and more importantly, 'Today is Friday' on Friday does not express the same knowledge as 'Yesterday was Friday' on Saturday. This can be proved by the argument used by Prior ... : What I am glad about when I am glad that today is Friday, is not necessarily the same thing as what I am glad about whom I am glad that yesterday was Friday. Perhaps Friday is payday, on which I always go out for a massive carouse with my friends; when it is Friday I am glad today is Friday, but during Saturday's hangover I am not at all glad that yesterday was Friday. Moreover, the power that the knowledge that it is Friday gives me on Friday (e.g., the
power to keep engagements made for Friday) is quite different from the very limited power which is given me by Saturday’s knowledge that yesterday was Friday if unaccompanied by the realisation on Friday that it was indeed Friday” (1979:46-47).

"It was an essential part of Aquinas's reconciliation of omniscience with immutability that God’s knowledge was not exercised in thinking of, or uttering, propositions. For if God did indeed think in propositions, then knowledge such as knowledge of the time would undoubtedly involve change: the change, for instance, from thinking the true proposition ‘Now it is 12.50\(^{\circ}\) to thinking the true proposition ‘Now it is 12.51\(^{\circ}\). But there can be no general objection to the idea that someone may have a piece of knowledge without uttering, even in the privacy of the imagination, any proposition which expresses that knowledge: the great majority of the things we know at any given time is not, and could not all be, so expressed. What we know we can (barring impediments such as aphasia) express in propositions: but we are willing to attribute knowledge even to beings without language, as when we say that a cat knows that there is a mouse in the corner behind the skirtingboard. There is not, to be sure, in the case of divine knowledge any obvious analogy to the behaviour of animals on the basis of which we attribute animal knowledge; and this lack of analogy is not a trivial matter. But we might indeed imagine God giving even linguistic expression to knowledge of the time. We could perhaps conceive of a cosmic timekeeper on the model of the GPO speaking clock: a voice from the clouds that said, with unfailing regularity, sentences of the form, ‘Thus saith the Lord: at the third stroke it will be 12.52 precisely’ followed by three crashes of thunder" (Kenny:1979:47)

"Even such a fantasy, it seems, would not give substance to the idea that a changeless being might know the time. Merely creating, at the beginning of the world, a cosmic apparatus of the appropriate kind, would not by itself constitute knowledge of the time: the GPO engineers and the voice who recorded the speaking clock are not, by virtue of that very fact, apprised of the
correct time at every moment of the day. Whereas if we attribute to God in addition awareness of what the cosmic clock is saying at any given moment, we merely reawaken in fantastic form all the difficulties about changeless awareness of a changing world which we have been considering" (Kenny: 1979:47-48).

"If a changeless being cannot know the time, then it cannot know either what is expressed by tensed propositions. Knowing that 'Christ will be born' is true (roughly) throughout the years B.C. and that 'Christ has been born' is true throughout the years A.D. will not - pace Aquinas - enable one to know which of these two propositions is true now, unless one also knows the date Kretzmann's difficulty, then, is a serious one: it does not simply point to a tiny frivolous exception to an otherwise coherent claim that God knows everything that there is to be known. A believer in divine omniscience must, it seems, give up belief in divine immutability" (Kenny: 1979:48).

II

We have discussed above, by taking the problem from indexicals that classical theism is incoherent in affirming that God is both changeless eternal and omniscient. We shall now discuss TS's position with regard to this problem. As we have seen earlier, God is omniscient for TS (SJ:28, 70, 528, 35). The thesis that God is omniscient means that he knows everything. But the problem of incompatibility between omniscience and immutability does not arise in TS because, as we have seen in the earlier section (Ch. II. A and C), for him God is eternal but not immutable. For TS, there is an element of change in God's eternal nature. Because, for him, God is a person, a conscious being who acts, responds to the devotees' prayer, who transforms himself into (or creates) the world and maintains it, who does έρως (spontaneous sport) and as a result of which the world comes into existence, and so on. Since there is an element of change in God, it is perfectly compatible with his omniscience.
In the case of classical theism, the argument of incompatibility between God's omniscience and its immutability is based on the premise that "A perfect being is not subject to change." But in the case of TS, this premise is not accepted. For TS a perfect being involves change (how this is so can be seen subsequently (see Ch.IV.D)). Based on this assumption of TS we can put the argument of compatibility between God's omniscience and immutability on the following manner.

(1) A perfect being involved change.

(2) A perfect being knows everything.

(3) A being that knows everything always knows what time it is.

(4) A being that always knows what time it is is subject to change.

\[ \therefore \ (5) \text{ A perfect being is subject to change.} \]

\[ \therefore \ (6) \text{ A perfect being is certainly a perfect being} \]

\[ \therefore \ (7) \text{ There is a perfect being.} \]