CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

It is evident from the fore-going chapters that TS believes that there is a God who is conscious, eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, perfect, blissful, free, creator and sustainer of the universe, perfectly good, the proper object of human worship, one who loves the human beings, etc. Our aim was to consider, with reference to this belief, three questions: (i) whether the belief is true; (ii) whether, we can know it to be true, and (iii) whether it is coherent.

Our aim was to lay emphasis on, not the first two questions but the last one. That is, what it means to say that there is a God and whether the claim that there is God is internally coherent. In other words, is it logically possible for there to be an entity possessing the attributes mentioned by TS. Our enquiry was the conceptual one, concerning the coherence of the group of attributes. Our aim was also to find out the pattern of TS's philosophy. That is, if the group of attributes ascribed by TS to God is coherent, then what is the pattern of his philosophy: Is it theistic, pantheistic, panentheistic or something else?

It is to be noted that the question (iii) cannot altogether be separated from the question (i) and (ii), (iii) is the necessary, though not sufficient, condition for (i) and (ii). That is, the coherence of the claim that there is a God, as a possessor of divine attributes mentioned above, is the necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the truth and knowledge of that claim.

Anyone who is interested in the question of the truth of the claim that there is a God, and of the knowledge of the truth of that claim, has to study first of all the coherence of that claim. If the claim that there is a God is to be true, and the
knowledge of the truth of that claim is to be possible then the divine attributes must at least themselves be coherent and jointly compatible.

The question is, under what conditions a claim is said to be coherent? A claim is said to be coherent if it makes sense to suppose it is true; if, in other words, it can be conceived to be true. It is to be noted that, a statement that makes a claim must be meaningful. A statement is meaningful if the words in it form a meaningful utterance (e.g. “Shouki blah nonil” is not meaningful because the words in it do not form a meaningful utterance) and are put together so as to form a grammatical sentence (the sentence “upon opens nervously Greece stone hope” does not make a coherent claim because although the words in it are meaningful they are not put together grammatically) (Swinburne:1977:2).

A statement though meaningful may not make a claim about ‘how things are’; instead it may constitute a command or a request, a wish or a question. A statement though makes a claim it may not be coherent claim: an incoherent claim does not make sense to suppose that what it claims to be the case is the case. For instance, sentences “John is over six foot tall and under five foot tall” and “My box is a cube with all its edges six foot long which is simultaneously in Keele and a hundred miles away”, though are grammatically well formed, they do not make claims which it is coherent to suppose are true (Swinburne:1977:2). For in whatever conceivable way the world was different from our world the claims made by these sentences could not be true claims. Merely because of what the words mean, whatever the world was like, there could not be a ‘John’ who was both ‘over six foot tall’ and ‘under five foot tall’. By contrast, ‘Mr. Thorpe is now Prime minister’ makes a coherent claim, though a false one. The claim is coherent because it makes sense to suppose that the world is such that it is true.” (Swinburne:1977:2).
Further, "A statement which makes a coherent claim can also be described as coherent. A coherent statement is such that we can conceive it, and any other statement entailed by it, as true. Any true statement is a coherent statement, and some false statements are also coherent. But an incoherent statement can never be true. As for falsity, some incoherent statements are false while the rest can be said to be neither true nor false. All inconsistent statements are incoherent and all of them are also (necessarily) false ("3x6=78"). All case of category mistake ("Honesty weighs 10 pounds", "Saturday is in bed", "Procrastination drinks quadruplicity") are incoherent but the question of falsity (or of truth) does not arise in their case. It can thus be seen that incoherence is a wider concept than inconsistency. It can also be seen that even incoherent statements are meaningful by our standard of meaningfulness." (Mullatti:1983:1).

It is argued by some philosophers, most notably by logical positivists, of recent years that religious statements are not meaningful and do not make claims about how things are, but rather express about how to live and how to pursue a certain course of life. As Mullatti (1983:1) points out, this argument "is misguided and arbitrarily restrictive is now too well-known to call for elaboration. Past-positive accounts of meaning (including that of later Wittgenstein), therefore, tend to be more liberal”. We have seen above one such account according to this account religious statements count as meaningful because their constituents are such and are grouped according to the rules of syntax of the language in question and they consist of well-ordered ordinary words used in their normal senses or are technical terms (such as ‘omnipotent’) defined by such words (Swinburne:1977:3 and Mullatti:1983:1).

It is true that religious statements though meaningful may not make a coherent claim. It is for this reason it is necessary to know whether the claims are coherent by taking each religious statement: this task has a very wide scope but here I had set for myself a very modest
task namely to enquire whether some of the religious statements mentioned by TS with reference to God's existence and his attributes are coherent or not.

We have seen that the usual interpretation of TS's thought by the secondary writers/authors is replete with inconsistencies and inaccuracies. It also suffers from a dominant classical theistic influence. Thus the aim of the thesis was also to discuss the coherence or otherwise of classical theism and whether TS's text supports classical theism.

Towards the main aim we have considered in Ch. II, whether it is coherent to suppose that God is eternal in the sense defined by Christian theists and whether TS's supports classical theism in this respect. Christian theologians - Boethius, Anselm and Aquinas - define eternity as timelessness and immutability. Our conclusion is that it is incoherent, as Swinburne (1977:Ch12), Kenny (1979:Ch.4), Wolterstorffer (1982:77-88) and others point out; and TS's text does not support classical theism in this respect either and is free from the contradiction involved in it. Because it conceives eternity as involving time and change. It is incoherent because (A) if God is timeless and eternal, he cannot be related to temporal events and things. But Christian theologians bring the relationship by the notion of simultaneity. According to this notion, there is no past, present and future in the life of God; but there is only one instant of time and past present and future temporal things are simultaneously present to him because he is simultaneously present with all the times: past, present and future. As Kenny (1969:264; 1979:38-39) argues, the notion of simultaneity leads to an embarrassing situation: it is a transitive relation. If A happens at the same time as B and B happens at the same time as C, then A happens at the same time as C. If the death of Mahatma Gandhi is simultaneous with the whole of eternity and the death of Buddha is simultaneous with the whole of eternity then the death of Mahatma Gandhi is simultaneous with the death of Buddha: which is radically incoherent. Swinburne (1977:220:221) endorsed this argument against the notion of simultaneity. But Stump and Kretzmann (1981:429-458) argue for the notion by giving an interesting
analysis of it. Even though, the notion is not free from the embarrassing situation, as Lewis (1984:73-79) points out. And TS’s text does not support classical theism because it does not conceive God’s eternality as timeless and is free from the contradiction involved in classical theism.

(B) The concept of timeless eternity defined by classical theism is incoherent because, God being eternal is also omniscient. To be omniscient is to know every propositions that they are true. But if God is timeless eternal, he cannot know time dependent propositions - like 'it is now $t_1$' which is true, and can only be known to be true, at $t_1$ - but can know only timeless propositions - like 'at $t_1$, it is $t_1$' which is true and can be known to be true, at any time; and thus he is not omniscient. (Prior:1962:114-129; Kretzmann:1966:409-421; Wolterstorff: 1982:77-98; and Kenny:1979:Ch. IV). But Castaneda(1967:203-210), Pike (1970:ch.5), Swinburne (1977:162ff) and Mullatti (1983) argue against this by introducing the principle (P). What (P) says is that if A knows that B knows that $x$, then A knows what B knows. If A at $t_1$ knows that B at $t_1$ knows that 'it is now $t_1$' then A knows at $t_2$ what B knows at $t_1$. But A can express his knowledge not as 'it is now $t_1$' but as 'it was then $t_1$'. Though A's expression is different from B's expression the knowledge that both have is the same. As Kenny argues (1979:46-47), this is not so; because the power that the knowledge that 'it is now $t_1$' gives to B at $t_1$ is quite different from the power which is given to A by the knowledge at $t_2$ that 'it was then $t_1$'. Therefore, since (P) does not formulate a true proposition in the case of human beings it will not hold true also in the case of God. However, TS’s text does not support classical theism because it does not take eternity as timeless, and a coherent account of it can be given.

(C) The concept of changeless eternity is incoherent, because God being eternal is also a person: he is worshipped, brings about this or that, observes and indicates changes in the
universe, acts and reacts to men, etc. These actions of God take place at a particular time, in doing them he changes from one position to another position; and thus he cannot be immutable (Helm:1980:216; Swinburne:1977:211-215; Lucas:1976:302). But Christian theologians can avoid the problem by saying that all that God brings about is an effect he has chosen from all eternity to bring about. The effects which God brings about occur at particular times when the effects occur there is no change in God. An argument against this is that God's bringing about one state of affairs instead of another is due to his reaction of the behavior of men. This again could be answered by the theologians that in such circumstances God had intended 'from all eternity' that A-occur-if-men did so-and-so, and that B-occur-if men did such-and-such'. Swinburne argues against this and says that then God would be a very lifeless thing which has fixed his intentions from all eternity and is not a person who reacts to men with sympathy or anger, pardon or chastening. However, the concept of changeless eternity also rules out God as perfectly free person.

But Swinburne says that in the Old Testament God is not pictured as immutable and as a perfectly free person who acts only on intentions he had from all eternity. That God is immutable has come into Christian tradition from neo-Platonism in fourth century A.D. Swinburne suggests that Christian theologians need not take the concept of changeless eternity, it is an unnecessary dogma. However, TS's text does not support classical theism because it conceives God's eternity involving change, and thus God's eternity and personality are compatible.

(D) The concept of timeless eternity is incoherent because God being eternal is a person he has a life, which acts, has accidents in time and has awareness of the passage of time (Kneale:1960:99). As Helm (1980:216) specified, whatever consciously brings about changes in the states of things in time must have an awareness of being in time. Lucas (1976:300-301) and Swinburne (1977:221) also endorses Kneale's argument. But Swinburne--
says that Christian theists have no need to adopt the concept of timeless eternity, they can do without it, it has no evidence in the Old and New Testament. Even though it has no evidence in the Old and New Testament theologians from Augustine to Aquinas hold that theist's God is timeless. They hold it because (i) they think that it supports God's immutability, but Swinburne thinks that it is not clear how it supports and why theist's God is to be immutable; (ii) they think that it supports God's omniscience: if God is timeless he can know future free actions of human beings; but as seen above, God is not omniscient. (iii) it supports God's perfection. But this also is not so. However, TS's text does not support classical theism because for TS God is not timeless eternal but involving time; and thus it is compatible with the concept of God as person.

(E) The concept of being changeless eternal is incoherent because God being changeless eternal is also omniscient. That is, as Kretzmann (1961-409-421) points out, it is incoherent to suppose that God is both omniscient and immutable. God who knows everything always knows what time it is; a being who knows always what time it is is subject to change. For such a being first knows that 'it is now t₁', and then he knows that 'it is now t₂'. To say of any being that it knows something different from what it used to know is to say that it has changed. But Castaneda (1967:203-10) argues against this. If one knows at t₁ both the propositions, then he can as well know them at t₂ or at any other time. If so, then he has not changed from one time to another time; for there is not change in the state of knowledge. But by the principle (P) one can know at t₁ both the propositions. But the expressions about it are different.

Aquinas also argues against the incompatibility, as Castaneda does. For Aquinas, God's knowledge is invariable since his knowledge is his substance which is immutable. But as Kenny (1979:42) argues, God's knowledge is also variable; for first he knows that Christ is yet
to be born, then he knows that Christ is born. To this Aquinas proposes a nominalist solution. 'Christ is being born', 'Christ is yet to be born' and Christ has been born are identical, since they refer to the same thing, namely the birth of Christ, but the expressions are different and thus there is no change in God’s knowledge. For whatever God knew he knows. For Aquinas, whatever God knew he knows is not true if the reference is to prepositions which express the same knowledge; but God does not think in prepositions.

Aquinas and Castaneda's solution to the difficulty is based on the distinction between an item of knowledge and the propositions which express it. An item of knowledge can be expressed in different tensed prepositions which refer to the same item of knowledge. As Kenny (1979:45) argues, their solution is not satisfactory. For, 'Today is Friday' (uttered on Friday) and 'Yesterday was Friday' (uttered on Saturday) are not two different expressions referring to the same item of knowledge, since 'Today' in 'Today is Friday' is not a referring expression picking out a day, and the knowledge we get at t₁ about 'it is now t₁' is different from the knowledge we get about it at a time other than t₁. For the power that we get from the former knowledge is different from the power we get from the latter. However, TS’s text does not support classical theism in this respect, because for TS God is eternal involving and thus it is compatible with God's omniscience.

Towards the main end, in Ch.III.A. in addition to considering whether it is coherent to suppose God as eternal, we have also considered whether it is coherent to suppose God as both omniscient and distinct from others. This is with reference to classical theism for which God is both omniscient and distinct from others. The conclusion is that it is not coherent. For, as Kretzmann (1966:409-421) argues, there are person-dependent proportions, like “Jones knows that he is in the hospital”, as contrasted to person-independent propositions, like “Jones knows that Jones is in the hospital”, which can only be known by certain persons (Jones), and God who is distinct from others cannot know such
propositions and thus cannot be omniscient. But Castaneda (1967:130-157,167:203-210), Swinburne (1977:Ch.10), and Mullati (1983) argue that theists' God can know also person-dependent propositions and thus can be perfectly omniscient, for instance if Smith knows that Jones knows that he is in the hospital then Smith knows what Jones knows. But, as Francks (1979:395-399) argues, Castaneda's and others argument is inadequate and thus the incompatibility between omniscience and theism is inevitable. That is, if Smith knows that Jones knows that he is in the hospital, Smith cannot know what Jones knows, not the fact of Jones' being in the hospital, but Jones' view, or perspective of his being in the hospital. The conclusion is that if God is to be omniscient he must include others within himself and cannot be distinct from others. However, we have concluded that TS's God is not distinct from, but includes within himself, the world and thus he can be omniscient. In this respect TS differs from classical theism.

Towards the main end, Ch.III.B., we have also considered whether it is coherent to suppose that God is both omniscient and perfectly free, or that God is omniscient and human beings are free. Proving the latter would enable us to prove the former. This is with reference to classical theism in which that God is omniscient is taken to mean that he knows all things including future events that they are determined, so that there could be no changes on the part of the knower and thus he is immutable. The conclusion is that it is incoherent.

That is, as Pike (1965:27-46) argues, God's omniscience is incompatible with human freedom: (1) God existed at T₁, and God believed at T₁ that Jones would do X at T₂, and it was within Jones' power to refrain from doing X at T₂; (2) it was within Jones's power at T₂ to do something that would have brought it about that God held a false belief at T₁. But Plantinga (1975:67) argues that this argument is based upon confusion: for him, (1) does not entail (2). but (2').(2') is, it was within Jones's power to do something such that if he had done it, then a belief that God did hold at T₁ would have been false; but if Jones had refrained from X at T₂,
then God would not have believed at $T_1$ that Jones would do $X$ at $T_2$ - indeed, He would have held the true belief that Jones would refrain from doing $X$ at $T_2$. However, Plantinga interprets the claim 'it is within Jones's power at $T_2$ to refrain from doing $X$' in terms of possible worlds: there is a possible world in which Jones refrains from doing $X$ at $T_2$. But, as Pike (1977:209-216) argues, Plantinga's interpretation is wrong. For, if the statement: 'it is within Jones's power to do $X$' - means there is a possible world in which Jones does $X$, then its negation 'it is not the case that it is within Jones' power to do $X$' would have to mean 'it is not the case that there is a possible world in which Jones does $X$', which is absurd. Thus, as Pike argues, Plantinga's analysis of human freedom in terms of possible worlds is only a necessary but not sufficient condition. If an adequate analysis of the human freedom is to be provided in terms of possible worlds, then the range of possible worlds has to be limited to some subset of all possible worlds, otherwise it leads to absurdity.

Further, Pike says (1977:215) that to determine whether something is within one's power, we have to take into considerations the past and the present conditions. But Hoffman (1979:438) argues that past conditions are not necessary to determine the given power. For, in the example, given by Pike to show that past conditions are necessary to determine the given power, 'it is not within our power to wear a red shirt yesterday', there is nothing to show that past conditions are necessary to determine the given power, rather there is something to show that past is not within our power to change. Past is not within our power is a logical truth. Thus, Hoffman argues that Pikes argument for the incompatibility is incorrect. Mullatti (1984) agrees with Hoffman in saying that the example of Pike does not show how past conditions are relevant to determine the given power; but holds that Pike has chosen this example unwittingly.

For Mullatti also, past conditions are relevant to determine the given power and one such
condition is God's fore-knowledge, which must be taken into account in deciding the given
power. Thus incompatibility is inevitable if we take this.

To the problem of incompatibility between divine omniscience and human freedom (i.e.
if God foreknows anything it will necessarily come to pass, and if human actions will
necessarily come to pass, then it cannot be free) Augustine's solution is that human
actions may be free even if they come to pass by necessity. For Augustine, an action is
free if it is within one's power. Something is not within one's power if (1) it occurs even though
he does not will to do it or (2) it fails to occur even though he wills to do it. Even though one
necessarily wills to sin, he nevertheless freely wills to sin, for the will is always within his power
and whatever is in one's power is free.

Rowe (1964:359-60) argues against Augustine and shows that the will is not within one's
power and hence is not free. For Augustine, "X is not in our power", if "X fails to occur even
though we will to do X". If we take X as "willing to refrain from sinning", the above statement
can be analyzed as my willing to refrain from sinning is not in my power because I fail to will
to refrain from sinning even though I will to will to refrain from sinning. From this Rowe shows
how the will is not within one's power, and thus is not free.

We can give another argument against the claim that the will is always within one's
power, and is free. In the given human nature, it is necessary for man to will to sin, but it is not
necessary for him to will to do particular sin. But God's foreknowledge includes not only that
man by necessity wills to sin, but also that he wills to commit a particular sin at a particular time.
Therefore this particular will is also necessary and hence incompatible with human freedom.

To the problem of incompatibility between omniscience and human freedom, Aquinas
also gives a solution. For Aquinas, the claim that if God foreknows anything, then it must
necessarily come to pass and this can be interpreted in two ways: (i) necessarily if God
foreknows that $X$ will happen then $X$ will happen; (ii) if God foreknows that $X$ will happen then necessarily $X$ will happen. But, for him, only (ii) yields the conclusion that man does not have free will but not (i); and God's knowledge implies (i) but not (ii). Thus there is no incompatibility. Rowe (1964:356-63), Kenny (1969:260-70) and Plantinga (1975:67) agree with Aquinas that all that theism needs is (i) but not (ii). But Kenny and Swinburne (1977:168) hold that even there is a difficulty with (i). If God is omniscient at $T$, he believes at $T$ all true propositions. To say that an action is free at $T_1$ is to say that it is ultimately determined by choice at $T_1$ and not necessitated by earlier states. But the action at $T_1$ cannot make the belief held by God at $T$ true or false; for it cannot affect the past state, affecting the past is logical impossibility (Swinburne: 1977:169).

For Kenny the difficulty with (i) is that, it is a conditional proposition, whose antecedent is necessarily true (because it is about the past); and whatever is implied by necessary proposition is itself a necessary proposition, and thus consequent is also necessarily true. Thus whatever is known by God is necessary truth. Aquinas tried to solve the difficulty by attributing eternal 'present' to God: by attributing so, antecedent in (i) would not become about the past and thus not necessary. But we have seen now the concept of eternal 'present' is incoherent.

It is for this reason Swinburne (1977:173) modifies his idea of God's omniscience as to make it compatible with not knowing future voluntary acts. Swinburne thinks that the antecedent statement in (i) is not totally about the past, it has the future reference. Future statements are contingent. Therefore they cannot be known by God in advance. However, TS conceives God's omniscience not in the sense that God knows all things including the future events that are determined, and thus there is a change on the part of knower and thus he is mutable. TS differs from the classical theists in this respect.
Towards the main end we have considered in Ch.III.C whether it is coherent to suppose that God is absolutely simple. This is with reference to Christian theism in which God is absolutely simple and a person. The conclusion is that it is incoherent. For as Stump and Kretzmann (1984:2) point out, the doctrine of absolute simplicity denies in God the possibility of distinction between: spatial or temporal parts, essential and accidental intrinsic characters, one essential character and another, and one accidental intrinsic character and another. The denial of the distinction implies certain problems. To mention a few: God's one essential character such as his knowledge, would be identical with his another essential character, such as his power and with his intrinsic accidental character such as God's talking to Cain; and his one intrinsic accidental character would be identical with his another such character, such as God's talking to Abraham, and with any divine acts, such as God's plauging Pharaoh's Egypt with a hailstorm. Even the designations of those attributes and actions themselves appear to be misleading. God's talking to Cain is evidently not really an action of God's but rather part of God's essence. However, God's talking to Cain is not part of his essence; it is his essence and god himself is identical with it.

These implications further lead the doctrine into embarrassing situations: (i) if each action of God's is in its detail identical with the divine essence, then God could not do anything other or otherwise than he actually does. (ii) Every temporal action begins and or ends, and if God is talking to Cain, then it would be an intrinsic accidental characters of him, which is impossible under the doctrine of simplicity.

But Stump and Kretzmann (1984:4) argues that it is a mistake to think that God's talking to Cain is an intrinsic characteristic. For it is rather the one thing that is God and is temporally in act has a variety of effects in time: a conversation with Cain at T1, a conversation with Abraham at T2, and the production of a hailstorm in Egypt at T3. Thus, God's only one eternal.
temporal, act in his intrinsic one, its various effects are to be understood as his extrinsic accidental characters.

Against this an argument is that God of Christian theology is a person who acts and reacts to men. In the circumstances in which he reacts to men, he first observes their behaviors and then gives responses to them. In such cases, God's one atemporal action will not work; his observation and reaction are the intrinsic accidental characters of God. It may be answered that in such cases God had intended from all eternity that something occurs if man does such and such and some other thing occurs if man does so and so. But as Swinburne (1977:214) argues God would become a lifeless thing not a person who reacts to men with sympathy or anger, pardon or chastening because he chooses to there and then.

Another argument against the doctrine of simplicity is that for this doctrine there is a single eternal action which is simultaneous with \( T_1 \) at which God talks to Cain, with \( T_2 \) at which he brings about a hailstorm in Egypt. But as we know, the concept of simultaneity is incoherent. However, TS's text does not support classical theism in this respect because God is not absolutely simple for TS. God for him is having distinction between special or temporal parts, essential and accidental intrinsic characters, etc., and it is coherent to suppose so.

Having arrived at these conclusions, we have considered in Chs. IV. and V. two question: If TS's position is not classical theism, then is it pantheism, panentheism or something other than these? And, Which one of the theories of God is coherent?

In East and West, regarding the belief in God, there are three thorough-going speculative theories of a religious dimension: the classical theism, the classical pantheism and the modern panentheism. Towards the main end we have considered which of these theories is coherent. The conclusion is that modern panentheism is the coherent one.
In classical theism and pantheism, the method of monopolarity is followed in defining God: in each pair of ultimate contraries - such as one and many, permanence and change, being and becoming, necessity and contingency, the self-sufficient or non relation versus the dependent or relation, the actual versus the potential - first member of the pair is considered as good or superior or admirable and is ascribed to God by denying wholly the second pair by considering it as bad or inferior. The only difference between classical theism and pantheism is that theists admit the reality of plurality, potentiality, becoming - as a secondary form of existence outside God which in no way constitutes his reality; whereas pantheism supposes that although God includes all within himself, still since he cannot be really complex, or mutable, such categories can only express human ignorance or illusion.

The question is whether the law of monopolarity is coherent. According to the law of polarity, it cannot be justified; one pole of the ultimate contraries cannot be taken off by itself separating it from the other pole; for, they are correlative, mutually interdependent; one pole of the ultimate contraries cannot be considered as superior and the other as inferior, otherwise values would be on one side of the categorical contrast and disvalues on the other side.

If both the poles are correlative, if by being together they lead a supreme case, if values would be on both the sides of the poles, then God can be coherently characterized by both the poles. This is the method of dipolarity, and its followers are panentheists, for whom God is characterized by both the poles, is having two aspects, essence and accidents.

The earliest insight of dipolarity is found in Plato; after him it has been neglected in characterising deity and instead monopolarity is followed. The reason for following monopolarity to identify God with "the absolute" or with the "purely" that is solely, actual, immutable and the like is the idea that if God in any aspect changes or is passive he would
scarcely be better than a contradiction in terms. But for dipolarists there is no contradiction if change is admitted in God. This is shown by answering the question what is meant by God.

In theology, “God is a name for the uniquely good, admirable, great, worship-eliciting being. What is expressed here is the superiority of God; which cannot be expressed by indefinite descriptions, but must be a superiority of principle, a definite conceptual divergence from every other being, actual or so much as possible. For, God’s superiority is a matter of principle is categorical one not merely of degree. And God is the conceptual ultimate of various attributes without arbitrary qualification.

The question is what is the conceptual ultimate form of basic attributes, such as existence, omniscience. With reference to the concept of existence, theologians’ answer is that God can or must be a being who exists necessarily, whose existence is so utterly secure that his nonexistence expresses neither a fact nor even so much as a possibility. From this monopolarists hold that the necessity of deity, which follows from categorical supremacy, refers to God’s existence, and what is meant from this is that everything in God’s total reality is necessary, that God’s total reality is necessary, that God could be in no fashion other than he is. But dipolarists (Hartshorne and Reese) object that the necessity of deity refers to his existence as an individual, it does not mean that everything in God’s total reality is necessary, but only that he could not fail to exist as himself. For categorical supremacy is a comparison of God with respect to other individuals, not of the actuality of God in contrast to what he himself might have been. The two claims are different: Monopolarists deny the possibility of different states in God, and assert that whatever is in God is actual; and dipolarists allow the possibility of different states in him through which he could be himself and could not fail to exist as himself.

The old Platonic objection to the dipolarists conception of the deity as changing is that if God is perfect how can there be change in him. Hartshorne & Reese (1976.9-10) answer that
God can be perfect as well as changing. That God is perfect means that he has no possible rival (no equal or superior) among individuals. He excels all others. He can also self-excel, through this he changes from his one state to his another state. The question is, if God is the conceptual ultimate of various attributes and values, how can he be really excelled by himself in another state. Hortshorne and Reese argue (1976:9) that this question assumes that these attributes do admit an ultimate form; as a matter of fact they do not. If so, God would not be perfect in the sense defined by Platonic, as God is eternally perfect, hence he cannot improve or in any sense increase in value.

What, then, is the conceptual ultimate form of omniscience? Omniscience means knowledge of all things. From this monopolarists idea is that God knows in eternity and in a wholly necessary way whatever and any time exists to be known. Hortshorne and Reese (1976:11) consider this idea as meaningless. For, the notion of an eternally fixed total content of "all time" is a contradiction in terms. Time is "objective modality"; it unites determinate, actual, past reality with indeterminate, potential, future reality. This union is perpetually enriched by new actualities, and there can, by the very meaning of time or process, be no ultimate totality of actualities for anyone to know (1976:11). As the content of "all time" is perpetually enriched by new actualities, divine knowledge of it will also be enriched perpetually. If so, God changes into another state of him. By admitting changes in God his prerogative of existing necessarily cannot be renounced. And for dipolarists, the necessity of existence means unlimited capacity to adjust successfully- with preservation of the individual integrity- or it means ability to adjust to all others. But monopolarists think that necessity of existence of God means no need to adjust to others. This leads to a consequence that every thing in God is on the same level of necessity, he would not be a concrete
individual rather an abstract universal or complex of universals. But for classical theists God is also concrete.

The conclusion is that there would be change in God, and admitting change in God would not lead to a contradiction. Just as to say that God is exclusively-necessary violates the law of polarity, to say that God is exclusively contingent also violates the law of polarity.

With reference to belief in God, there are ten doctrines in history. These can be distinguished by seeing answers to the questions: (i) Is God eternal? (ii) Is he temporal? (iii) is he conscious? (iv) Does he know the world? and (v) Does he include the world? Let us take positive answers to these questions as E, T, C, K and W respectively. There could be many possible doctrines, about the belief in God, resulted by the combination of one or more of the five factors, but ten doctrines out of them are historically important. They are:

(I) Quasi-panentheism, ETCKW, the supreme as eternal, temporal consciousness knowing and including the world, advocated by Ikhmaton, Hindu Scriptures, Lao-tse, Judeo-Christian Scriptures, Plato.

(II) Aristotelian theism, EC, the supreme as eternal consciousness, not knowing or including the world.

(III) Classical theism, ECK, the supreme as eternal consciousness, knowing but not including the world, advocated by Philo, Augustine, Anselm, Al-Ghazzali, Maimonides, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Channing, Van Hugel.

(IV) Classical pantheism, ECKW, the supreme as eternal consciousness knowing and including the world (so far as "real"), advocated by Asvaghosa, Sankara, Ramanuja, Spinoza, Royce, Jeffers.
(V) Emanationism, E, the supreme as the eternal beyond consciousness and knowledge, advocated by Plotinus.

(VI) Temporalistic theism, ETCK, the supreme as eternal temporal, consciousness knowing but not including the world, advocated by Socinus, Lequier.

(VII) Modern panentheism, ETCKW, the supreme as eternal temporal, consciousness knowing and including the world in his own actuality but not in his essence, advocated by Srijiva, Schelling, Fechner, Peirce, Pfleiderer, Varisco, Whitehead, Berdyaev, Iqbal, Schweitzer, Buber, Radhakrishnan, Weiss, Watts, Hartshorne.

(VIII) Limited panentheism, ETCKW, the supreme as eternal temporal, consciousness knowing or partially knowing, and partially including the world, advocated by James, Ehrenfels, Brightman.

(IX) Extreme temporalistic theism, T(C)(K), the supreme as wholly temporal or emerging consciousness knowing or partially knowing the world, and not including the world, advocated by Alexander, Berman, Ames, Cattell.

(X) Temporalistic theism, T, the supreme as purely temporal but not conscious and not knowing the world and not including the world, advocated by Wieman.

The question is, which of these doctrines is coherent. As we have considered, modern panentheism, in which the five factors are affirmed, is the coherent one. However, the coherent characterization of personality of God can be made by affirming all the five factors, ETCKW.

We can further sharpen the distinction between the doctrine of God by seeking an answer to the two questions: (i) Is God independent of the universe? and (ii) Is God perfect? Let us consider (i) For classical theism, God is independent universal cause of the universe; he can exist not only without the particular world, but also world as such; he can exist exactly as he is whether there is this world, or there is no world, or there is another world; the
universe is his extrinsic effect, it in no way constitutes his nature. For pantheism, God is not independent reality but the inclusive reality; he is not the ultimate cause distinct from the independent of cosmic totality; the universe is within the divine actuality and constitutes his very essence or irreducible nature. For panentheism, God is independent cause not of the world-as-such, but of the particular world; he cannot exist exactly as he is when there is another world, but exists differently; he includes the world and it constitutes his accidental nature. Classical theist's concept of cause-effect relation is called as 'radical' asymmetrical, and panentheist's concept of cause-effect relation is called as 'moderate' asymmetrical. As we have seen, Hartshorne argues that moderate asymmetrical cause-effect relation is coherent. But as we have considered, TS's concept of cause effect relation is also coherent one. According to this, cause can be independent of not only a particular effect but also any effect as such. But cause cannot exists as it is when there is another effect or there is no effects.

If we employ a symbol C for universal cause, i.e. for something that everything else requires, but which itself requires no other thing (leaving it open whether the class of "other things" is or is not required to be non-null, that is whether "moderate" or "radical" asymmetry of causal necessity is involved); and a symbol W for the all inclusive reality (leaving it open whether or not there is a fixed totality of the real, or an ever growing one containing new items each time it is referred to); then we can symbolically mention the position of classical theism, pantheism and panentheism respectively as C, W and CW.

Let us take the (ii) question: Is God perfect? God is perfect for classical theism, pantheism and panentheism, but each in their own sense. For classical theism and pantheism, perfect is what lacks no possible values, so that all possibility of increase in value is cut off. As we have considered, this idea of perfection is incoherent. For, all the value possible, or the sum
of all perfections may not itself be a possible, since there seem to be incompossible among possible values.

For panentheism, perfect means excellence; “God is perfect” means, he excels all conceivable others in values. But God who excels all others can excel himself, since he includes all possible and actual values, he will acquire new values when possible values are actualised.

Here there are two distinctive ideas of relation of surpassing: self-relation and relation to others. The idea of self-relation has two forms: non-reflexive and reflexive. Non-reflexive means not surpassing or being surpassed by self (with no possibility of change for better or worse). Reflexive means with some possibility of change whether for better or for worse or both. The idea of relation to others has three forms: Zero, Some, and all (conceivable) others. If we club together these two ideas we will have six possible ideas of relation.

(A) Minimal being:

(i) n: Superior to no others and non-reflexive.
(ii) i: Superior to no others and reflexive

(B) Middling or imperfect being:

(iii) a: Superior to some others and non-reflexive.
(iv) r: Superior to some others and reflexive

(C) Maximal or perfect being:

(v) A: Superior to all others and non-reflexive.
(vi) R: Superior to all others and reflexive.

Here, (v) is the classical idea of perfection and (vi) is the panentheistic idea of perfection. As we have considered, panentheistic idea of perfection is coherent one.

Towards the main end, we have considered the concept of God implied by the concept of worship. If a philosopher is to give a meaning to the word God he used, if he is to
formulate the concept of God, he has to depend upon, or take into consideration, the religious sense of God. In religion, God is one who is worshipped. Further, in order to determine the concept of God, we have to depend upon the concept of worship. For, there is a link between the two concepts.

(1) The definition, "God is one who is worshipped" expresses the superiority of God. As we have seen the superiority of God which is a categorical one and can only be expressed by superiority of principle, is admitted by both monopolarists and dipolarists. But monopolarist think that only first pole of the ultimate contrariety such as necessary and contingency, admit the superiority of principle and thus superiority of God can be expressed only by the first pole. Dipolarist think that both the poles of the ultimate contrast admit the superiority of principle and thus superiority of God can be expressed by both the poles, such as necessary and contingent, actuality and potentiality, eternal and temporal. As we have seen, dipolarists position is coherent and thus the concept of worship implies the dipolaristic concept of God.

(2) To worship is to do something consciously. As the act of worship deepens, the individual's consciousness widens up to the level of infinity. At this heightened level there is an unity between individual's wholeness and cosmic wholeness, and this cosmic wholeness is deity. Worship integrates the individual. The integral individual is responding to reality, is correlative to the inclusive wholeness in the world of which the individual is aware and thus wholeness is deity. The implied concept of God from the concept of worship is that God is inclusive wholeness of the world.

(3) To worship God is to love him with all one's heart, strength, mind, soul; i.e. to love him with all one's aspects. It is also the case that we have to love our neighbours. If our love to neighbours is to be an element of loving God, God must be all-inclusive.
The concept of God as love and all-inclusive is also implied by the concept of worship. To worship God is to love God with one's whole being; and what we wholly love must also be love, be the divine love for all creatures, and be all-inclusive. For it is impossible to love an unloving being. We have considered that the concept of God derived from the concept of worship is panentheistic.

Towards the main end we have considered whether Whitehead's idea of God is coherent or not. We have considered that it is coherent and panentheistic. Classical ideas about God are involved in the fallacy of misplaced concreteness which has two forms: one, God is identified with sheer perfection; two, with sheer actuality, cause. Let us symbolize AA for "God is sheer perfect," "CC for God is sheer cause". God is sheer relative and sheer world inclusive can be symbolized respectively as RR and WW. God is perfect and relative can be symbolised as AR and he is cause and world inclusive as CW. We have considered that God is AR and CW is the most adequate theory. But is Whitehead's God AR-CW? Yes. (i) For Whitehead God is the chief exemplification of all the metaphysical principles who form a set of contraries or ideal opposites. Every actual entity including God is dipolar. God is both good and evil; for he is the fellow-sufferer, he suffers evil. contradiction that arises from affirming God is both good and evil, can be avoided. However, like Whitehead, TS is panentheist, and his idea of God of AR-CW, is dipolaristic.

(ii) For Whitehead, God and the world may be compared through a group of antithesis. in each of these is a shift of meaning which converts the opposite into a contrast. The same can be maintained with reference to TS.

(iii) For Whitehead, categorical contrasts are applicable to God. For him, moral evil is not a category, being absent not only from God but from the lower creatures.
aesthetic evil is a category and is entirely absent nowhere. Since TS also is a dipolarist, the same thing Whitehead holds can be maintained about him.

We have seen from the above considerations that Whitehead's God is of AR-CW. There is further evidence from Whitehead on this point. For Whitehead, God has two nature, primordial and consequent; the former is limited by no actuality, is complete, perfect, and infinite; and the latter is relative, incomplete, and is influx; the former is A and the latter is R. For him, God is independent, C, and all-inclusive, W. God is AR would mean that he is surpassing all and surpassing the self. God is CW would mean that he includes the world. It he includes the world, evil must be within him. But, for Whitehead, it is the creation of human being but not of God. However, in TS's case, primordial and consequent nature of God can be called essential and accidental characteristics of God. And for TS God has both these characteristics. We can also maintain that in his case evil is the creation of human mind.

In TS's and Whitehead's case the distinction between the primordial nature (PN) and the consequent nature (CN) of God coincides with the distinction between A(C) and R(W). PN is the conceptual envisagement of eternal possibilities and thus God is absolutely perfect, A. Future possibilities gain determinacy, become actual events; and there is a new aspect for God to know and enjoy; in this respect God is R.

PN is that which God is all the times. It is not conceptual, but is at once conceptual, volitional; it is the self-identity, a common element of all the successive conceptual, perceptual, and appetitive states of the divine life.

PN and CN are mutually required by each other. For, identity has meaning only in relation to difference and really includes difference. PN and CN are contained in any given state of God. This is for both TS and Whitehead.
PN is not before or apart from all process but with them. Every stage of the process is a contingent successor to its presupposed predecessor. Let us take variables as a symbol for different states of God; the structure of his life can be put as: PN-CNn as containing PN-CNm, its predecessor, as containing...etc. PN-CN0 as containing PN-CNn as containing PN-CNm...etc. PN-CNp...etc. In TS’s case also God has different states, and each state includes its previous state and is included in the subsequent state.

Though Whitehead says that for metaphysics direct experience, intuition, is basic and proof is secondary, he offers proofs for God. The need for adopting God in Whitehead’s philosophy is, first, he is not without religion, and second, his categories require God as their chief and indispensable exemplification, and they collapse without God.

Categories require God as their chief exemplification because: (1) possibility implies a supreme and primordial ground (2) actuality on all-inclusive actual entity (3) the transition from possibility to actuality a supreme active agent (4) memory a highest type of retention of elapsed events (5) purpose and love a highest or perfect type of purpose and love (6) order a supreme ordering factor. However, in TS’s case also the same argument can be advanced for the existence of God. That is, one, TS is not without religion and, two, TS’s philosophy is such that his categories (tattvas) require God as their chief and indispensable exemplification and they collapse without God.

Whitehead holds the doctrine of everlastingness, which is one form of eternity which literally means existing or obtaining primordially and forever, without beginning or ending in time, which embraces both self-identity and self-difference, both permanence and change, both non-temporal and temporal. The same can be maintained for TS. There are two versions of eternity - eternity as equated with changelessness, and, two, eternity as taken as everlastingness.
which involves everchanging, embracing both self-identity and self-difference. Whitehead and TS adopt the second type of eternity. It is so in TS because, one, for TS there is a process in God, he becomes the world, changes from one state to another state. Two, God has both temporal and non-temporal aspects - world is temporal, and the conceptual awareness (cit) of eternal objects is the non-temporal. Three, God has both unchanging, perishing aspect and changing, fluent aspect.

For Whitehead events never perish, because the latter event prehends the earlier. This can be said about TS also. The latter state of God prehends the earlier state of God.

Towards the main end we have considered Radhakrishnan’s idea of God. Hartshorne thinks that Radhakrishnan’s idea of God supports panentheism. For Radhakrishnan, God has three aspects: wisdom, love and goodness, personified respectively, as Brahma, Visnu and Siva. God creates as Brahma, redeems as Visnu, and judges as Siva. Brahma is PN of God, the mind of God, the home of all possibilities. There is a gradual process of transformation of the possibilities, the ideas, into the actualities, by the assistance of God. The mind of God is prior to the world.

God, as Visnu opposes the tendency in the universe to become error, ugliness and evil; and transforms them into truth, beauty and goodness. This attitude of God is for the sake of human beings whom he loves and helps. God as Siva judges and acts according to fixed laws. God cannot forgive the criminal, even when he repents; he punishes the criminal with love and not with hatred. For Radhakrishnan human beings are free and the realisation of the end of the world depends on our free co-operation. Similarly, in TS’s case the three aspects of God are also found but in different way.

For Radhakrishnan, God is organic with the world; God cannot be detached from the world. The world completely depends upon God. The struggle and growth are real in the life of
God. Time is the essential form of the cosmic process, including the moral life, and it has a meaning to God also.

The process of the world is an emergence but under the guidance of God who is immanent in the process though the goal is transcendent to it. God, though immanent, is not identical with the world until the very end, when the end comes, and unrealised residuum in God which was through the process, vanishes; when the reign is absolute the kingdom comes.

So far, what is said by Radhakrishnan, can be accommodated in pantheism. But Radhakrishnan's claim about the relation between the Absolute and God is problematic. For Radhakrishnan, God is an expression of the Absolute which is the truth of things in itself, is eternally complete, is not subject to cosmic process, is incapable of increase. If the Absolute is immutable, it cannot express itself into God. If God is an expression of the Absolute, he cannot be eternal, as he says it is, if the Absolute is immutable, it cannot be free. On the contrary Radhakrishnan says it is free. If God is an expression of the Absolute, God would become a part of the Absolute. This cannot be accommodated in panentheism. For panentheism, Absolute is an aspect of God, who has also another aspect, the relative. Radhakrishnan has not succeeded in holding the relationship between the Absolute and God, even while he answers to the criticism by Hartshorne.

After these, we have considered the main question: concerning the coherence of the group of attributes ascribed to God by TS and the pattern of his philosophy. Dealing with the previous Chapter helped to deal with the main question.

The question is: is God independent of the Universe for TS? TS's answer to the question is positive: not in the sense of classical theism, nor in the sense of panentheism of Hartshorne. TS partially agrees with classical theism in holding (i) God is independent of, does
not require or necessitate, can exist without, not only any particular world but also world-as-such. TS partially differs from classical theism in holding (ii) that God is the independent universal cause or source and is the inclusive reality i.e. the universe is not his extrinsic effect or outcome, it is rather inside the divine actuality and thus is a qualification or constituent of it. TS differs from classical theism in holding (iii) that God is independent cause of the world, but could not have been himself exactly as he is without any world. For, God has different states, his one state with this world is different from his another state with another world, and from his another state without any world. Since the world is within God, every difference of the elements of the world make him to exist differently.

TS partially differs from panentheism of Hartshorne in holding the (i). TS agrees with panentheism of Hartshorne in holding the (ii) and (iii). This does not mean TS is not a panentheist; but his is a different version of panentheism. With reference to relation between cause and effect TS holds, as classical theism and panentheism of Hartshorne do, that it is asymmetrical. But the difference between classical theism, Hartshorne and TS is that for classical the effect does not follow from its cause. For TS, it does follow but by probability and for Hartshorne, it does follow by probability and necessity. However, classical theism and TS's concept of cause-effect relation is radical asymmetry, while Hartshorne's is moderate asymmetry. In TS's and Hartshorne's cases, cause can also be effect, but in classical theism it is not so.

We have considered TS's concept of God with reference to five factors ETCKW. The question is whether, for TS, God is qualified by all the five factors or by some of them. Since God is categorically supreme, for TS, he can be described by general attributes without any qualification. The five factors are also general attributes without any
qualification, they must be ascribed to God. In fact TS also holds that God is qualified by the five factors.

For TS, God is eternal, exists eternally, his existence is his essence, is necessary, he self-exists. Though for TS God's existence is necessary, whatever is in him is not necessary; there is also a contingent factor in God; he includes contingent world, has accidental characters, has different states; and has free will. Therefore God is also temporal for TS. However, God is conscious knowing and including the world, for TS Thus TS is a panentheist.

We have considered TS's concept of God implied by his concept of worship. We have seen that TS's concept of worship is on par with the concept of worship given by all the three religions, Judaism, Islam and Christianity, which implies the panentheistic concept of God. Thus we have seen that there is a consistency between TS's concept of worship and his concept of God.

We have considered the question whether God is perfect for TS. God is perfect, for TS, not in the sense in which monopolarists hold but in the sense in which dipolarists hold. His concept of God is perfect means he excels all others and excels himself.

The question is, Is TS monopolarist or dipolarist? TS is a dipolarist because, one, for him God included contingent factors, parts; two, he has accidental and essential characters and three, he has different states.

With reference to God's different states there are two questions: one, if God has different states how can he be eternal, his existence being necessary? Two, how are the different states possible? For TS God could be eternal, exists necessarily, and yet could have different states have changes. And different states of God are possible because he is not utterly devoid of unrealised potentiality, he has will and freedom.