CHAPTER VI

PANENTHEISM - II

Having arrived in the IV Chapter at the conclusion that panentheism is the most coherent theory of God, let us now to proceed to discuss in this chapter the panentheism of Whitehead and Radhakrishnan, who obviously represent, respectively, western and Indian point of view of God, in order to compare their versions with that of TS.

A. WHITEHEAD:

1. Whitehead's idea of God:

   Whitehead's idea of God is an intentional departure from most of the philosophical past. For in the past, as Whitehead holds, all the classical versions of theism are unsound collectively a "scandalous failure". He holds so with definite and with careful considerations. (Hartshorne: 1972:63)

   However, it has been also held by the great philosophers, for instance, from Carneades to Hume, Kant, Dewey, Santayana and Russell, that the effort made by the great metaphysicians and theologians of over twenty centuries, for instance, from Plato, Aristotle and Philo to Spinoza, Leibniz and Schleiermacher, to find a rational meaning in the religious idea, the idea of God, has failed (Hartshorne : 1972:63)

   As Hartshorne holds, Whitehead's idea of God is the most technical and adequate. While formulating his concept of God, he has utilised the most important ideas of his predecessors among them are Fechner, Pfleiderer, Bergson. "Whitehead's is not the first philosophy to lead naturally and consistently to the religious idea of God, for Fechner's and Ward's philosophies did that; but it is", Hartshorne thinks, "the first systematic philosophy to do so" (1972:63)
This implies that Whitehead does not simply brush aside the work of the classical theists and the older concepts as valueless, but rather sets forth the higher synthesis of the extreme tendencies of recent theism, for example James (Hartshorne:1976:64). Whitehead's idea of God is an intentional departure from the older ideas because as he says they all, though differ among themselves, involve the same fundamental error, the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness." (Hartshorne:1972:68)

The fallacy has two forms. In one form, God is identified with sheer perfection, and in the other, with sheer power or activity, or actuality. The former is in terms of value and the latter, in terms of causality.

In the former case perfection is "defined as completeness or maximality of value such that nothing conceivably could be added to it, and from which, therefore, every form of self-enrichment, every aspect of process and of potential but unactual value, is absent. This means that the temporal character of value and all contrast between purpose and achievement as well as mutual exclusiveness amount values (which seems of their very essence and all relationships to beings whose value is not perfect, must be abstracted from, omitted from consideration, in order to conceive the perfect, which must not be contaminated, it is held, by containing any of these things" (Hartshorne:1972:64).

In the latter case, God, who is identified with sheer power, or activity, a "cause of all" "is in no aspect of its being the effect of any, an agent which acts but is not acted upon. In this case, too, God is arrived by abstracting from or omitting one pole of a categorical contrast..." (Hartshorne:1972:64).

And in the case in which God is identified with the "most real being" or "pure actuality", similar abstraction is made. That is, "of the two polar abstracts of reality, actuality and potentiality, only the first could be present in an absolutely maximal reality." (Hartshorne:
Potency is simply omitted. "This is only feebly disguised by the quibbling distinction between internal and "external" potency, as when it is said that, though God is all that he could be, he may not produce all the effects "outside" himself that he could produce. Here is simply another abstract or one-sided idea, this time of being as wholly independent of doing. The conception leads to interesting paradoxes, such as that though God actually knows his potential, external acts only as potential, potentially he knows them as actual (for they are capable of actuality, and were they actual he could know that they were so). In short, his knowledge has contingent aspect, but his being has no such aspect - as though anything could be more intimately part of a knower than his knowledge and its immediate contents (or does omniscience know indirectly, hence, surely imperfectly?)" (Hartshorne: 1972:64)

To these two extreme doctrines of sheer absolute perfection and sheer causality or actuality, there is in each case an opposite extreme. That is, the doctrine, "God is the world-cause as capable of being considered in complete abstraction from his effects, or from the world, has as its logical contrary - not merely contradictory - God is the world as capable of being grasped entirely apart from any supreme and independent cause" (Hartshorne: 1972:65). The median position that lies between the two opposites is that "God is both a supreme causal factor which can be abstracted from the world of its effects and in another aspect of himself, the supreme totality of all his effects, and of their effects". This is the position that "contradicts the extremes only insofar as they contradict each other and retains the characteristic positive feature of both". (Hartshorne:1972:65). That is, in this doctrine, God is conceived as the creator-with-the-creatures, and which therefore includes the positive factors of both the extremes in the one of which God is conceived as mere creator and in the other of which as the mere totality of creatures and which thereby enables these factors really to be themselves (Hartshorne:1972:65).
"Let us symbolize the doctrine of sheer independence as CC, meaning not only that there is an independent or purely causal aspect, of God, C, but that there is no other aspect, that independent power describes all aspects of the divine being. Then the opposite extreme may be indicated by WW, meaning not only that there is a world aspect of God, W, but that there is nothing independent of the world in God, nothing but W. Then obviously the median position is CW, indicating that there is an independent factor which is cause but not effect, and also a dependent or, as Whitehead calls it, a "consequent" factor, which itself has causes" (Hartshorne:1972:65)

Of course it is true that "if God is sheer absolute perfection, a doctrine which we may symbolize as AA, nothing but absolute perfection, then there is no basis, from the standpoint of perfection, for the distinction, from the standpoint of causality, which CW involves. Simple perfection is-barely, as theologians have nearly all agreed. " But if "perfection has two aspects, one absolute, or A, the other not absolute and hence in some sense relative, or R", then "the C in CW might be the A in AR, and the W might be the R (In general the partisans of sheer perfection favoured CC as against WW)" "It is also apparent that as CW is to CC and WW, so is AR to AA and RR. In each case, we have a positive synthesis which excludes only the negative or abstract aspect of the extremes" (Hartshorne:1972:65, 66)

Thus we have here two concepts of perfection: R-perfection and A-perfection. Perfection in its generic meaning, i.e., whether as A or R is an excellence such that its possessor surpasses all other conceivable beings. "But A-perfection means the property of surpassing all others while not surpassing self (growth or improvement being thus excluded from whatever aspects of being are A); while R-perfection means surpassing all others while also surpassing self (permitting, if not requiring, growth in the R aspects of a being). Thus R is a
richer conception than A, since it includes the relation of universal superiority to others, which is the only positive feature of A, and includes also the equally positive relation of self-superiority or self-enrichment. The "unself-transcending transcender of all others" is A, the "self-transcender of all others" is R" (Hartshorne: 1972:66)

As Hartshorne argues (1972:66), the concept of AR is more adequate than the concepts of AA and RR. He holds, "just as cause-with-effect is more intelligible than mere cause or mere contingent phenomena alone, so to transcend self in some respects and others in all respects, to be AR, is more intelligible than to transcend others in all respects and self in none, to be AA, or than to transcend both self and others in all respects, to be RR. For as to RR, if self is transcended in all respects, then self has no identity and no meaning; and as to AA, if self cannot surpass itself then it can in no valuable sense involve self-contrast and without self-contrast self-identity is also meaningless". "In still other terms, if there were no abiding standard of growth, growth would be meaningless and the standard must involve an aspect (A) which does not itself grow but measures all growth, including growth of standards. But at the opposite extreme, were there no growth there would be nothing for the standard to measure. Measure of growth and growth belong together, in one reality, the perfect, which is both absolute and relative, both static and dynamic, though not in the same aspects of its being. It is this last qualification that has been most sadly lacking in the tradition. It has been too lightly assumed that God's perfection must be all of one kind, without contrast or categorical distinction" (1972:66)

One may object to this by formulating the matter thus "perfection means primarily completeness, the absolute realisation of value, and only secondarily and in consequence of this absoluteness the impossibility of self-improvement as well as of being surpassed or equaled by others" (Hartshorne: 1972:66-67). But, Hartshorne says, this way of formulating
the matter leads to the same outcome. "For it cannot be that all dimensions of value admit of absoluteness and it equally cannot be that none of them do. For some of the dimensions of value are neutral to the contrast between actual and possible reality and some are not and the former dimensions imply an absolute maximum whereas the latter exclude such a maximum; and each of these types of dimension involves the other, so that AR is required if value is to have any meaning at all" (Hartshorne:1972:67) To illustrate this: "The accuracy and adequacy of knowledge to its objects, its truth, is independent of which among these objects are actualities and which are mere possibilities, provided only that the actual things be known as actual and the potencies be known as potencies, that is in each case, provided that things be known as they are. But the joy the aesthetic richness; of the knowledge depends in part upon just what things are actualised. For instance, it depends upon the wealth of harmonious contrasts which the objects involve; it also depends, so far as what is known is sentient or perhaps even conscious, upon the degree of joy or sorrow felt by the sentient individuals known, since knowledge of feeling is irredubibly sympathetic, is "feeling of feeling". (Hartshorne:1972:67)

Following Whitehead, Hartshorne further says (1972:67) that "there can be no absolute maximum of harmonious contrasts, since possible contrasts are inexhaustible and mutually exclusive by the very meaning of possibility as a field of open alternatives. Similarly there can be no "greatest possible happiness of all things other than God". Hence the aesthetic value, and the sympathetic joy, of God's knowledge cannot be absolute. Yet its accuracy and adequacy, its truth, to what is actual and what is possible, at a given stage of cosmic development certainly can be complete, by the very meaning of knowledge. It cannot be that the whole of de facto reality could not be known, such an unknowable whole being meaningless. Indeed, as we shall see, the cosmic whole must actually be known. Hence God's knowledge
must be A in its cognitive perfection or truth, and R is in its concrete self-value as enjoyment or bliss.

"Similar reasoning supports the view that there must be an independent casual factor which, like cognitive adequacy, is abstract and neutral to the distinction between potential and actual and that there must also be a dependent or consequent factor which is concrete and varies with de facto actualization or potency. In other words, AR-CW [or better perhaps, A(C)-R(W), to show that A and C, R and W, are the same factors considered from two points of view, those of value and causality] is the most promising formula for the divine nature, although the idea it defines is one whose possibilities have only recently been explored" (Hartshorne:1972:67-68)

In this connection Hartshorne (1972:68) makes clear a point. That is, when it is said that the A (C) factor is independent of or abstractable from the world, here "world" is to be taken to mean: "this actual world which does exist with just the particular things it contains". C is involved in each and every one of these particulars but itself involves none of them. Yet C, as interpreted through CW, implies nevertheless that there is some world, some set of particulars or other. The world could, so far as C is concerned, and so far as anything is concerned, have been different from what it is, but some sort of world must have been "there", that is, must have been content to the divine knower and effect of the divine cause. Accidents must needs happen, though this or that particular accident need not have happened. Contingent existences form a class which must have members, but not any members you choose to point to. W as the generic factor in all particulars is essential to C, as R is to A, or as variety is to unity. What is contingent is a special form or case under W, say Wm or Wn (really CWm or CWn), the de facto world that now or at some other specified time happens to exist. W requires that there be some Wm or other, but not that there be this or that Wm."
With the background of this, we shall now find out Whitehead's idea of God. As Hartshorne conceives (1972:68), Whitehead's idea of God is a case of AR-CW, but not a case of the abstract extremes—such as AA-CC, or AA-CW, or RR-WW, or some other of the eight logical possible cases—invoking the fallacy of misplaced concreteness which Whitehead has been at pains to avoid. How the case is of AR-CW can be seen from the following considerations.

(a) As Hartshorne says, Whitehead's "intention is to conceive God in a balanced or concrete way, for he lays down the methodological principle that "God is not to be treated as an exception to all the metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse". Rather "he is their chief exemplification". And the metaphysical principles form a set of contraries or "ideal opposites" (Hartshorne: 1972:68).

However, for Whitehead, "Every actual entity, including God, is bipolar, and that in several ways" (Hartshorne: 1972:68). And therefore, "Nothing concrete or actual is merely one or merely many, or a mere cause which is in no way effect, or a completeness which is in no way incomplete or subject to addition, or an activity which is in no way passive, or the mere contrary of these. Of course, neither God nor anything else is in the same sense and respect cause and effect, or active and passive, or good and evil, or simple and complex; but to grant this is not to admit that there either can or must be something actual which is in no genuine sense and respect effect, passive, complex, or evil (God is the "fellow sufferer", he suffers evil, though he does not commit it) (Hartshorne: 1972:68) "yet all these unqualified or not consistently and clearly qualified, negations had been commonplaces, indeed almost automatic reflexes in theological discussions. They are all explicitly rejected", Hartshorne says, "in Whitehead's philosophy and this is the first time, to the best of my knowledge, that this rejection has been so systematically worked out" (1972:68-69). As Hartshorne holds, though Nicholas of Cusa
affirms both poles of the polarities with respect to God, he scarcely shows by what distinctions contradiction is to be avoided. Rather he glories in contradiction (1972:69).

(b) As Hartshorne (1972:69) conceives, for Whitehead "God and the world may be compared through a group of antithesis, whose apparent self-contradiction depend on neglect of the diverse categories of existence. In each antithesis there is a shift of meaning which converts the opposition into a contrast. It is as true to say that God is permanent and the world fluent, as that the world is permanent and God is fluent... . It is as true to say that God creates the world, as that the world creates God"10.

(c) As we have seen elsewhere, it was affirmed in the classical doctrines that God is "above the categories", but in order to avoid thinking by this that God is for our thought simply nothing at all, certain categories, called "transcendental", were obtained in abstraction from their contraries and were held to be incomparably more true of God than the contraries, and are applicable at least "analogically", though not "univocally", to God. "Thus, for example, actual being or form as opposed to potency or matter, and one as opposed to many, were held to be descriptive of God" (Hartshorne: 1972:69).

But in Whitehead's case, the distinction between God and the world, the totality of things, is treated as less equivocal and more complex and subtle. (It is less equivocal because as Hartshorne says "Whitehead commits himself to the application of all contrary categories to God, and... faithfully carries out this undertaking. (Moral evil is not a category being absent not only from God but from the lower creatures; yet aesthetic evil is a category and is entirely absent nowhere)" (1972:69). It is more complex and subtle because in Whitehead's case, "God is contrasted with inferior beings not by the simple method of deciding which among the categories are to have the privilege of applying (even though not univocally) to God, but by showing in what way each of the categories, the entire complexity of ultimate contraries, has its
"chief", that is, supreme, instance in God. It is the unrivaled excellence of the activity-and-passivity, the unity-and-complexity, the being and becoming, yes the joy and suffering of God which elevates him above all others, actual or conceivable." (Hartshorne:1972:69)

One may object "that at least "supremacy" or being the "chief" instance of the categories, as itself a category which, rather than its contrary, "inferiority", or "being surpassed by another", must be favoured in relation to God" Hartshorne answers that the "contrast between the being that is better than all others and these others is the contrast between a by definition unique individual, and a mere class of individuals. Of course to be the supreme being is peculiar to God. But by the same token supremacy is not a category, analogous to actuality as opposed to potency, or unity as opposed to complexity, or being as opposed to becoming. Moreover, we shall find that in a real sense even the supreme being includes inferior being, though it is not any the less supreme over it for that" (1972:70)

As Hartshorne conceives (1972:70) what is implied from these considerations is that Whitehead's God of process and reality is the case of AR-CW. We shall now find out the textual evidence for this case. As Hartshorne conceives (1972:71), what we find in Whitehead is that God, is neither AA nor CC; nor AA because, for him, "all realisation is finite, and there is no perfection which is the infinitude of all perfections,"11, and Consequent Nature of God is relative, incomplete and in flux12, not CC because Whitehead says that God is to be conceived "as requiring his union with the world", and criticizes the classical theologians for conceiving that though God is necessary to the world, the world is not necessary to God13. But, taken on one aspect, Whitehead's God really is A and C. For according to Whitehead the Primordial Nature of God is "limited by no actuality which it presupposes" and is complete, perfect, infinite14. Not only this, God "is certainly A plus a relative aspect, and he is C plus the world as internal to his complete nature"15 (Hartshorne:1972:71). Thus Whitehead's God is
unequivocally AR-CW. Here, "to show that he is AR-CW we need only prove that the relative ascribed to him is relative perfection and not ordinary, imperfect relativity. Now since God contains in "everlasting imperishableness" all actual values, from the moment of their actualisation and combined in the utmost harmony of which they are capable, there is no conceivable way in which any individual (personal-order society) other than God could equal, not to mention surpass him. For the content of the other individual, if and when it exists, must be fully contained in God, so that the two could not be distinguished except as the other failed to contain some value that was contained in God. Thus God is the self-surpassing being who in all possible circumstances surpasses all others, that is he is R-perfect." (Hartshorne:1972:71)

It is said by Whitehead that Primordial Nature is complete, yet "deficient" in actuality. This is only an apparent, not real, inconsistency, for, as Hartshorne (1972:71) says, "the unlimited conceptual realisation of the absolute wealth of potentiality", as such realisation of the potential, is superior to any conceivable conceptual realisation or awareness of potency that could be distinguished from God's. It is complete in its kind or dimension the dimension of "mentality" or abstract realisation of value. But it does not at all follow, a long tradition to the contrary notwithstanding, that God must be complete in concrete dimensions as well. Nay, it follows that he cannot be for potentiality could be neither complete not incomplete, it could be nothing, were there a complete actuality, a full realisation of potency. Inexhaustibleness is of the essence of potency and the presupposition of actuality. Possibilities are in part mutually incompatible, they are not always compossible, and as Whitehead says, theologians have been strangely reluctant to face the implications of this truth. (Hartshorne:1972:71-72)

When it is said that Whitehead's God is CW, both the supreme cause and the supreme totality of effects, one may think that God must be the pantheistic all-inclusive substance...
responsible for all evil, the "supreme author of the play", and the "foundation of the metaphysical situation with its ultimate activity". But, in reality, Whitehead protests against this. He says that God is "in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground", the "creativity", which is repeatedly distinguished from God and never identified with him. (Hartshorne 1972:72). This may imply that there is a causal factor, a C, which is beyond God. But Hartshorne thinks, it is not so. Because of two things. "First, the creativity is not an actual entity or agent which does things: it is the common property or generic name for all the domes. Second, the internality of the world to God's concrete or consequent nature has nothing to do with a reduction of all activity, all creative "decision", to God's own activity or decision. But there are two ways in which activity may be contained in a given actuality, (1) as self-decided by that actuality, and (2) as contributed by the self-decisions of others. "Recipience", "patient toleration of the activity of others is essential to concrete being, whether that of God or of anyone else. God has all activity within himself only because he accepts the activity of others as such and enjoys it within his own "immediacy". God appropriates the actions, the decisions, of others, he does not decide just what they are to be. We are told in the most unequivocal language that God's influence upon others is not decisive to the last degree of determination" (Hartshorne 1972:72). It is, therefore, also told that all of the evil as well as some aspects of the good, may derive from creaturely decisions. As Hartshorne says (1972:72), this solution of the problem of evil is the oldest of all, but before Varisco, Ward, Fechner and Whitehead, no one has ever made an adequate and honest place for it in a comprehensive metaphysical system.

In this connection, there is a problem: "how a genuine division of power, hence of responsibility for good and evil (implying a possibility at least that all of the evil, as well as some aspects of the good, may derive from creaturely decisions) can be reconciled with the
imperfections, involving particularly the relegation of most of the included content to a low or negligible level of awareness, or distinctness of consciousness" (Hartshorne:1972:73)

According to Whitehead, creativity in general is wider than God. What he points out here, as Hartshorne takes it, is that all decisions are not God's self decisions. But this does not mean that Whitehead denies that all decisions are in some manner enjoyed, possessed by God. "Even we enjoy many decisions that we do not make, particularly the radically subhuman and, in our awareness, not individually distinguishable decisions of the bodily members, such as cells or molecules" (Hartshorne:1972:73). Thus, as Hartshorne suggests, creativity is "the abstraction which leaves out of account the duality of decisions as self made and as made by others" (1972:73). And, all creativity belongs to God either, but not both, as his self-decision or as his uniquely adequate way of being decided by others". (Hartshorne:1972:73). All this only amounts to saying that existence is social and that there is a supreme, hence supremely social, existent - in which double assertion all great truths are contained with a fullness from which double assertion all great truths are contained with a fullness from which men (apparently dazzled, in Plato's image, with excess of light) have fled as though it were the most baneful of errors" (Hartshorne:1972:73)

2. Coincidence of A (or C) and R (or W) with PN and CN:

Let us find out how far the distinction between A (or C) and R (or W) coincides with Whitehead's distinction between Primordial Nature (PN) and Consequent Nature (CN).

Whitehead recognizes that God as PN is the conceptual envisagement of eternal possibilities. In this respect, then, God is absolutely perfect, A. But, for Whitehead, A is not the only aspect of God. There is also an R aspect in him. For the reason that future possibilities gain determinacy and become actual events, and therefore that, since God is aware
and enjoys the universe, at each new stage of the universe there is more for God to know and God is ever growing in the resultant aesthetic enjoyment. (Hartshorne: 1972:73-74).

This does not mean that God's knowledge is not free from error and ignorance, i.e., he is in advance ignorant of future event. For "Knowledge of all things" means of each thing as it is, of actual as actual, of the merely possible as merely possible, of the future as future, of the past as past" (Hartshorne: 1972:74). As Hartshorne claims, for "Whitehead there is a future, even for God, not because God is in advance ignorant of future events, but because, so long as they are future, objects of knowledge are not events, are not fully individual and determinate entities. There is nothing in the future for any one to be ignorant of, except those more or less determinate outlines of probability or possibility, those impure potentials, which distinguish the future both from the determinate past and from the pure undecidedness of the eternal potencies. These outlines of the future are known to God just as they, at any time, are, so that he is entirely without error or ignorance in regard to them" (Hartshorne 1972:74). So "the divine awareness of all actual occasions as so far occurred, his enjoyment of the total past of the universe, is perfect in its adequacy to that past, and equally and unsurpassably so at all times" (Hartshorne:1972:74).

Thus God's knowledge is at all times, and so primordially, free from error and ignorance, and therefore cognitively absolute. Yet there is a sense in which God's knowledge "perpetually improves upon itself, namely, in richness of content and so in aesthetic value. As future possibilities gain determinacy and become actual events, God's knowledge, without the slightest increase in adequacy to its content, realizes the aesthetic value involved in the new contrasts which the new content presents, both in itself and in relation to the old" (Hartshorne:1972:74). As Hartshorne holds (1972:74), according to Whitehead "the value of truth consists in its contribution to harmony, unity in variety; but the harmony due to the truth..."
correspondence between knower and known is only one dimension upon which the harmony of knowledge must be measured. There is also the unity-in-variety of the object itself, which becomes, through the correspondence the possession of the subject. Furthermore, there is no such thing as absolute or minimal unity in variety, since every definite variety excludes others. Apart from process there would be but one out of all possible overall aesthetic patterns for the content of God's knowledge. Through process, the wealth of patterns can be inexhaustibly increased, though it can never become absolute.

Thus there are two senses in one of which God's knowledge and enjoyment is perfect in the accuracy and adequacy, and on the other, there is ever growing in his knowledge and enjoyment as the result of increasing aesthetic content and value in the universe. As Hartshorne says (1972:74-75), according to Whitehead, God is not only at all times unsurpassably perfect in the accuracy and adequacy of his knowledge and enjoyment, both of the possible and of the actual, but he is also at all times unsurpassably perfect in the adequacy (goodness, wisdom) of his purposes and decisions. "He saves all that can be saved", and he exerts a "particular providence for particular occasions" (James's "piecemeal supernaturalism"), by furnishing all but the last element of determinateness to the subjective aims of the actual entities (Hartshorne:1972:75). Here it is suggested that no other conceivable being could surpass the quality of these divine functions, and that God himself is not any more adequate in discharging them at one time than other (Hartshorne:1972:75). As Hartshorne says, "there is aesthetic but not ethical or cognitive improvement in God, aesthetic R-perfection and ethico-cognitive A-perfection" (1972:75).

"It follows that if PN is that which God primordially or at all times is- and otherwise it seems a confusing phrase- then the description of PN as "conceptual" is inadequate. PN is at once conceptual, volitional, and perceptual. It is in fact the common element of all the successive
conceptual, perceptual, and appetitive states of the divine life, abstracting from the differences between these states. This common element is abstract, and so it is known by conception, but it is equally a quality of perception and of will" (Hartshorne: 1972:75).

This kind of Primordial character is literally not possible for any nondivine individuals, for they have had genesis. But these enduring individuals have a quasi-primordial feature, the individual quality that they have had during all their life as a person, which involves relatively fixed style of both conceiving and perceiving, as well as of volition (Hartshorne: 1972:75). "Only God has an absolutely fixed and ungenerated general style or self-identical character, an abstract element of strict invariance individual to him" (Hartshorne: 1972:75). God's individuality is invariable because he perceives and conceives each and every stage, as it is actualized, "without the qualification of any loss either of individual identity or of completeness of unity" (Hartshorne: 1972:74). "PN is this element of mere identity, apart from all differences in the Divine Life" (Hartshorne: 1972:75).

The relation between PN and CN is such that they mutually require each other. For, "identity has meaning only in relation to difference and really includes difference; but we may distinguish between difference as such, as a genetic and hence identical abstract factor, and this or that individual, concrete difference. Now the CN is this peculiar identity of difference or change as such" (Hartshorne: 1972:75). In addition to CN and PN "there is third something which contains both of these abstractions with a contingent addition, the de facto individual difference, the concrete partly novel divine state of the given now" (Hartshorne: 1972:75). In all "we have (1) the static perfection of PN, which is a definite quantum of value, namely, absolute or maximal value, and as necessary to this perfection but applying to other dimensions of value. (2) the dynamic perfection of CN, which is not a definite degree or quantum of value, but the generic property of (3) a class of possible values, this property consisting in the values being
always superior to those possessed by any being other than God, and also superior to those possessed by God himself at any earlier time, as well as inferior to any values that he may possess in the future. The primordial or static perfection includes the law that there shall be a consequent or dynamic perfection. The law that there shall be change in the form of enrichment is itself unchanging, unenriched" (Hartshorne: 1972:76).

A distinction should be made between "the generic property of having a consequent state, and the particular state that God in any given now may have". It is to be noted that "when we refer to God we ourselves are always in some consequent state, say CNm, which contains not only the entire generic or abstract divine nature, PN-CN, but also some individual de facto concrete phase of that nature, PN-CNm" (Hartshorne:1972:76). However, it is noted that, the "impossibility of deducing any particular PN-CNm from the PN-CN is thus no difficulty". "But we can deduce the necessity that there be some concrete state, PN-CNm or PN-CNn or PN-CNo, etc., and that each such state be followed by a successor; and this deduction is not useless, for it guarantees that there will be a future, that planning is not futile. The deduction consists in drawing the consequences from the negative outcome of the effort to find any basis of meaning in experience, however imaginatively extended, for the notion of the mere abstract or generic factors as entities simply apart from any instances. One may abstract from each instance but not from all instances. Another instance will always do, but none at all will not do" (Hartshorne:1972:76). Hartshorne takes this as Aristotle insight.

It is to be noted that, for Whitehead, "the primordial nature is not before or apart from but with all process, every stage of which is a contingent successor to its presupposed predecessor". (Hartshorne: 1972:76). Following Plato Hartshorne gives the reasons that "Abstraction from the concrete proceeds backward in time and depends upon memory [in abroad sense]... Today need not have followed yesterday, although some today must have
individually determined. But the possibility of further or individual determination need not itself be individually determinate". (Hartshorne 1972:77).

This question has a certain bearing on the question of the conceptual character of the PN. "If eternal possibilities are fully definite items, then God’s concepts need never change, and his entire conceptual being is fixed forever. All that can change (or give place to new ones) are his physical prehensions and with them his hybrid prehension of the impure potentials as relevant to a given state of the cosmos. The hybrid prehensions will change, however, only in their physical constituents, and the impure potentials will be simply identical with certain eternal objects as selected for a given occasion by the physical prehensions. If on the other hand, impure potentials are more definite than anything to be found in eternal possibility, then God’s concepts must become more determinate with time, and thus it will not be true that the conceptual aspect of his being is completely primordial, just as it is not true that the physical aspect of his being is completely derivative. (What is not derivative is the law, the general how. of his derivations, his unique style, whose functioning had no beginning, of adequately prehending actualities). (Hartshorne: 1972:77).

As Hartshorne says, (1972:77) it is to be conceived that any PN-CNm implies a set of world members, of creatures, as existing in it. Since PN-CNm embraces ordinary things, it does not mean that ordinary imperfection or ordinary relativity, r, that the ordinary things have, should be attributed to God himself. There is no need to do so, but we must do so as the properties of God’s parts; for, they are not the properties of him, but of his parts. "Just as a small part can belong to a large whole, so it is clear that the imperfections of the parts are not as such and identically imperfections of the whole "(Hartshorne:1972:77-78). Therefore, there is no need to consider the ideas of God which are derivable by adding r to him. (Hartshorne:1972:78).
As Hartshorne says (1972:78), it is true that the whole must be AR and not AA. "For there can be no greatest possible number, or an absolute variety" (Hartshorne:1972:78). And "AR makes room for all the r's there may be, whereas mere A would make any r factor strictly superfluous, irrelevant, meaningless." (Hartshorne 1972:78;).

Further, Hartshorne (1972:78) argues that this idea of God as AR is more consistent than the idea of God as AA. For, "whereas so many writers have seen that there might be difficulty in conceiving finite evils to exist as such, if there be an in all ways simple perfect or best being (in the best or only possible state of itself), far fewer have seen that it is equally difficult to make sense out of finite good as out of finite evil, assuming AA." (Hartshorne:1972:78). For Hartshorne, "Neither finite good nor finite evil can have anything to do with sheer maximal good. God as AA could not impart significance to finite values, whether positive or negative". (1972:78) "The problem is to enable the finite to contribute to the "best" being without demanding, what is impossible, that the contribution should, either alone or with whatever supplementary you please, effect an absolute sum. No sum of finites can be absolute. It can very well, however, contribute toward making something R-Perfect, superior to all that is not itself, and through progress superior even to itself" (Hartshorne:1972:78).

Hartshorne supports his argument by Russellian theory of types. "There can be no "all" which is absolute being, the all of all possible totalities. But there can be an all which nothing other than itself can surpass, since any thing other than itself will, to exist, belong to the "itself". The cosmos must be such an all, if we admit that any possible entity is possible only because the cosmos might produce it, either within and as a part of itself, or as a state of itself as a whole. The unity of this whole is involved in its parts, since their very existence is their role in the cosmos as one, as the cosmos. Thus the correct treatment of all avoids the two extremes of AA and rr or mere relativity. As at all times the complete possessor of all that at those times exists.
the cosmos must have an A aspect, for there are no degrees of complete possession. But since there will be more to possess at one time than another there is, also, an R factor. AR and RR (or atheism) are the twin absurdities between which philosophy has tragically swung for over two millennia " (Hartshorne: 1972:78).

3. Whitehead's Arguments for God's Existence:

"Metaphysics is a descriptive science". the direct experience, intuition, is basis and proof is secondary. This is Whitehead's contention, and as such he agrees with Bergson. (Hartshorne:1972:78).

Even though Whitehead declares that "nothing like proof" is possible, he does offer "proofs for God" with some qualification. First, "The groundwork of all existence is present in all instances of existence, hence in all experience, and the task is to see it there. Argument can only rest upon some part of the groundwork that happens to be more clearly discriminated" (Hartshorne:1972:78-79). Second, argument can also be made from a given state of culture, personal or social, since some aspects of the metaphysical situation are more readily observed in them than others. According to Whitehead, "God is... that aspect of the metaphysical situation which, though involved in the other aspects, is less immediately apparent and obvious (at least to ordinary nonreligious experience) than they, and insofar is in need of indirect evidence". (Hartshorne:1972:79).

Hartshorne's answer to the question "What is the need for Whitehead to have a conception of God in his philosophy?" - is two fold: first, "Whitehead is not without religion"; second, "his categories, adopted at least as much for other purposes, require God as their "Chief" and indispensable exemplification" (1972:79). It may be said that God, by making him an exception to the categories, must not be invoked to save the collapse of them. But. Hartshorne says, Whitehead rejects this idea, and says that "the categories, however well
chosen, would collapse without God, ... that they must require God, if at all, as their supreme instance, not as an exception or a violation of their requirements" (Hartshorne 1972:79). "There can be no obligation upon categories to render God superfluous, unless the possibility of atheism is axiomatic. (Since Whitehead believes in the unconsciousness of much that is in experience in the form of feeling and impulse, he is not committed to accept at face value the claims of various persons to "believes" in a godless world.) Categories are obligated to describe the world in terms of their exemplifications, and if they can only do this on the admission that there is a chief example of their meaning, that fact is insofar a proof that such an example, a God, exists, unless another set of categories, at least equally adequate for other purposes, will function without a supreme example" (Hartshorne: 1972:79).

To the question, How do Whitehead's categories require a supreme example. Hartshorne says (1972:79) that there are many answers as much as the categories, for they all require God. That is to say: "(1) Possibility implies a supreme and primordial ground, (2) actuality an all-inclusive actual entity, (3) the transition (creativity) from possibility to actuality a supreme active agent, (4) memory [prehension] a highest type of retention of elapsed events, (5) purpose [Subjective aim] and love a highest or perfect type of purpose and love, and (6) order a supreme ordering factor." (Hartshorne: 1972:79).

However, Hartshorne says that "(3) is Whitehead's well-known argument for a "Principle of limitation" or concretion. (1) is the argument from the "ontological principle": (2) is found particularly in Modes of Thought, and is given no title; (4) is the doctrine of everlastingness, not presented so much as an argument for God as a consequence drawn from accepting his existence but capable of becoming an argument; (5) and (6) are found here and there throughout his (later) writings.
Let us consider how the categories require God. With reference to (1) - possibility implies a supreme and primordial ground - Hartshorne (1972:80) puts Whitehead's considerations in the form of argument as follows: "Possibility is either a property of existent things, or it is independent of all existence, a self-sufficient realm of essence..." Only qualities that at least might get into existence concern us, and the only more than verbal notion anyone has ever set forth as to what would make non-actual things possible is the notion of "power", the "I can", as an undetermined but determinable aspect of an existent. Only what exists has the power to create further existence, and it has this power because what exists [a society] is not complete in all aspects but has an element of futurity, or a principle self-transcendence, of being potentially what it as yet is not. But if the only existents are ordinary imperfect things, and if these things have not always existed, then when they came into existence they did so as determinations of determinables already existing, and the ultimate power involved must lie back of all such nonprimordial and secondary things. "The general possibility of the universe must be somewhere" is the summary of this line of argument. If possibility is meaningless without existence, then it cannot be that all existents are contingent, for this is to say that the being of possibility also is contingent, that it might have been that nothing was possible - this is precisely the implication of Santayana's doctrine. For, Santayana says that possibility is independent of all existence, a self-sufficient realm of essence - though at the same time substituting essence for possibility and thereby advertising that he is not really solving or even facing the question of possible quality, any more than of actual quality, but is talking about something nobody ever encountered, that is, a quality as it would be were neither actual (a datum in a real experience) nor even capable of being actual." (Hartshorne: 1972:80). Therefore, since, in Santayana's doctrine, had nature not existed (and its existence is said not to be necessary) there would have been nothing capable of actualizing essences, which are not
The conclusion of the argument is that there is a primordial power whose nonexistence is not a possibility, since possibility presupposes its existence. Its reality being the ground of alternatives, its nonreality is not an alternative. This is the old argument from contingent being to necessary being, with the difference that it is not concluded that the necessary being is necessary in all its aspects, but only that any contingent aspects it or other things may have presuppose one aspect of itself which in all possible times, places, old instances necessarily is" (Hartshorne:1972:80).

To the question-what can this necessary aspect be, Hartshorne's answer, on behalf of Whitehead, is a personality. To make it clear, "We experience potentiality as the way in which experience involves the future in the present, in the form of more or less determinate purposes. undecided as to the precise value which is to be actualized, but determined to actualize some value or other. This involves universals, ranges of value, and a function of deciding at a given moment upon a value within such a range. Personality is the only clear case we know of such a combination of universals and decisions". The necessary primordial power is a primordial personality, in its essential character an ungenerated, indestructible unity of subjective aim, appetitions, mentality, and acts of fiat. This kind of answer is also the answer to the question what is the noncontingent basis of contingency. These remarks also includes (3), the arguments for a principle of limitation.

Let us consider (2). What would it mean to say that an actuality implies an entity in which exists all actuality? Following Whitehead29 Hartshorne (1972:81) puts forward the considerations that the existence of an occasion refers to a common measure or register of existence by reference to which other things also exist. Here it is noted that this "measure cannot be the things own solipsistic or private self-awareness; for then existence would have no common or public meaning, and to say many things exist would be to say nothing" (Hartshorne:1978:81).
and that the measure cannot be the "imperfect sort of social awareness that ordinary things may have of each other, for then their is no criterion to decide between the imperfections of their views of themselves and each other." (Hartshorne: 1972:81). "To refer to "existence" as a public meaning is to refer to a register on which, with infinite exactitude, everything is recorded just as it "really is", on pain of its not being really anything" (Hartshorne:1972:81). According to Whitehead, actuality is an affair of value and feeling and thus the register of existence must be something infinitely sensitive to shades and varieties of feeling (Hartshorne:1972:81). As Hartshorne says, this would be clear by assuming "an all-embracing tenderness", or sympathy, which appropriates all feeling as soon as occurrent, not by robbing it of its selfhood, its self-decisive character, but by enjoying this character with infinite "potence" or "tolerance". The standard of existence must also be the standard of value, for nothing can really measure what we are that cannot measure what we are worth to ourselves and to each other. It must be fully conscious, for the unconscious cannot answer, point for point, quality for quality, to the conscious, or even to the contrast between the conscious and the un-or semiconscious" (Hartshorne:1972:81).

Let us consider (6), a category of order. Hartshorne says, it is Whitehead's favorite argument. It is said that order is aesthetic teleology and drive toward harmony in the relations of past, present, and future, and of self and others immanent in self (Hartshorne: 1972:82). However, the "only empirical basis for order, the only answer to Hume, that Whitehead finds is in such factors as immediate memory, anticipation, the sense of conformations to past emotions and purposes and to the feelings flowing to us from the body... " (Hartshorne:1972:81). If the enduring self or personal society is to have any richness of content, aesthetic harmony among the factors is necessary (1972:81-82).
How then does order imply an ordering factor? It is said that there must be cosmic seeker of harmony, for, otherwise "there is no reason why the various seekers of harmony should have the pure luck to succeed in assisting rather than thwarting each other in the search" (Hartshorne: 1972:82). "They have only limited knowledge of each other's needs, or of their own needs, and indeed, they would have no standard by which to recognize each other as realities" Hence in search of harmony at least in local they need each other assistance.

Further, cosmic order is presupposed by all lesser, or local, orders which can in some minor way be in the hands of local orders, and is safe, or anything but doomed, only if there be a unitary cosmic aesthetic drive. This cosmic drive is a cosmic love which seeks beauty everywhere it can be attained, and guides the general direction of cosmic change so that the right balance of novelty and repetition shall in general be secured" (Hartshorne:1972:82). It is said that the" laws of nature are not merely "imposed" upon dead matter, nor merely immanent trends in local agencies, nor mere descriptions of uniformities observed...." For, if they are so, they would give no assurance as to the future (Hartshorne: 1972:82 followed by Whitehead) "They are immanent, but this immanence is given a cosmic reference by an element of imposition, of interfusing of ideals more or less unconsciously derived from the one whose subjective aim effectively surveys the cosmic whole " (1972:82)

Hartshorne says that this is not the usual argument from design. "For it does not hold that the order of the world is so superior that it must have a superior orderer, but that if we did not take a cosmic order unconsciously for granted we would not be able even to say "world" or to know anything at all, even about disorder. To believe that there is a cosmos is to believe in a cosmic individual whose content of integration is in part the variety we see" (Hartshorne: 1972:82).
It is said that the ultimate creative aspect of reality is not accessible to the physicist. For the reason, not that there is no such aspect, but that of the second law of thermodynamics according the general trend of physical nature is towards a state of minimal activity or a "running down". However, in the history of arts we find that the running down of a type of order is a familiar aesthetic phenomenon (Hartshorne: 1972:82). As Whitehead says, each "general style has its day in art, and then undergoes decline, loss of appeal and zest, until some new order, through exploration "along the borders of chaos"...is arrived at" (Hartshorne: 1972:82). There is no reason why the cosmic artist adhere forever to one design for, he is having the inexhaustible realm of possibilities not utilized in that pattern to draw upon. Therefore, "It ought not to be that the present style of natural activity, the pattern of the present cosmic epoch, should last forever" (Hartshorne: 1972:82). With the inexhaustible realm of possibilities not utilized in that pattern to draw upon, why should the cosmic artist adhere forever to one design?" (Hartshorne: 1972:82).

"And if the physical world in general is running down, life on this planet is a partial exception, there being no evidence that the ascent of life is a mere example of the laws of quantum mechanics, but every reason to think it is partly contrary to those laws (though not in gross physical degree, the issues of life involving small amounts of energy, physically regarded). In life we see a creative force - Whitehead agrees with Bergson here - of which low-grade physical realities are only a sort of minimal and in a manner retrograde expression. They are chiefly to serve, and to pass away when their service is done" (Hartshorne: 1972:83).

With reference to (5), purpose (Subjective aim) and love implies a highest or perfect type of purpose and love, Hartshorne(1972:83) puts forward the argument of Whitehead as follows. The various societies as more or less integrated, or as in any way comparable to each
other or able in general to survive in each other's presence can be conceived only when there is a cosmic society with personal order, a supreme love. However, integration of cosmic society is presupposed as the measure of all lesser orders, and of all disorder. For, the basic structure of reality is such that it is the social integration of occasions and therefore it can be argued that sociality is cosmic, supreme, and in certain sense, perfect.

Disintegration of a society does not mean a disintegration of the cosmos, but means a rearrangement of its integrity. It is said that only by this rearrangement a thing would have a definite character in relation to others. "Integrity is not indeed the only value since richness of content is also value." God's richness of content is, includes, the total richness of his creatures. "God seeks richness of enjoyment in his creatures generally so far as guidance of their free decisions (by determining the limits within which the freedom is to exist) can produce such richness." "He loves them quite literally as himself, for they furnish parts of himself and his happiness through their own happiness" (Hartshorne: 1972:83).

4. Everlastiness and Futurity in God According to Whitehead:

Let us begin the discussion with the question of the concept of everlastingness. Everlastiness is one form of eternity which literally means existing or obtaining primordially and forever, without beginning or ending in time. The ever-existent which is ever-changing is called "everlasting" which embraces both self-identity and self-difference, both permanence and change, of which the unchanging form is an abstract aspect and not the whole, and therefore it is not difficult to see in it the concrete and ultimate form of eternity (Hartshorne:1955:256).

There is the other form of eternity, in which 'eternity' and 'changelessness' are synonyms. But "this usage is questionable, for it tends to obscure the fact 'ever-existing' and 'never-changing' that 'never-changing' are logically quite independent ideas" (Hartshorne:1955:256).
For, first, the unchanging need not exist forever. For instance, according to Bergson. Whitehead, and other philosophers and theologians, every event, or portion of process, once it has come to be, is changelessly itself... is immortal, not eternal; temporally without ending, but not without beginning". "Further, some thinkers believe that abstract qualities can be created at a given moment in time, and yet remain ever after fixed and self-identical" (Hartshorne:1955:256). Second, what exists forever might change, provided it never began and never ceased to change, and provided the change was in its accidents, never in its individual essence". "Thus the unchanging may or may not exist for ever; and the ever-existent may not be unchanging" (Hartshorne:1955:256).

Let us turn to consider Whitehead's case. As Hartshorne (1972:83) says, Whitehead has not always used the word everlastingness, but we may find evidence for the concept in his writings. First, he has applied the principle of process to God; second, he has called God 'nontemporal', and has contrasted him with "the temporal world". So far as God's nontemporality is concerned Hartshorne says that Whitehead has never said that God has a past, present and future (1972:83). Evidently Whitehead stated in one passage that for God there is no past. What is indicated in the context of this passage is that "the primordial conceptual awareness of eternal objects is not derivative from any antecedent concrete awareness, since the divine conceptual awareness must have been already involved in any concrete awareness" (Hartshorne:1972:83). However, in other passages it is described that God is in one sense nontemporal and in another sense temporal (Hartshorne:1972:83). Hartshorne says that the temporal aspect of God is most clearly and vigorously affirmed in Whitehead's three most recent books, and hence there is a change in Whitehead's belief since his book *Science and Religion*. Since Whitehead applied the principle of process to God, it is reasonable to affirm the temporal aspect in God. For, there is a change in the direction of greater
consistency with the principle of process. What is evident from these considerations is that Whitehead conceives God as everlasting, that is, God is nontemporal but an aspect of temporality is also in him.

In other passage it is said that there is no past for God, in different sense. That is, "in God occasions never "Perish", and in that sense nothing is past, is gone, for God" (Hartshorne: 1972:84). What it means is that in everlasting God there is an unchanging aspect. It is also said that in the divine life there is order of succession which is most expressly stated to be "fluent" (Hartshorne:1972:84). Which means that there is also a changing factor in God. Surely there is no inconsistency in affirming that in God occasions never "perish" and that in the divine life there is order of succession (Hartshorne:1972:84). For, order of succession depends not essentially upon perishing, upon the fading of immediacy as event cease to be present events, but rather upon the logical difference between retrospective and prospective relationships (Hartshorne: 1972:84). This idea, as Hartshorne says, is overlooked by twenty centuries, and Bergson was one of the first to realize it though in its somewhat cloudy "intuitive" fashion (1972:84).

To the question, how could events never perish, an answer is given that the "later event prehends the earlier and so contains it, but the converse is not true; and this one-way relationship remains even when both earlier and later events are in the past (or when-it is all the same- there is a new present), no matter how fully their original immediacy is preserved."

"Obviously, it is not because of fading or perishing that earlier is contained in later, though later is not contained in earlier. It is rather in spite of perishing". For loss of immediacy were the last word and therefore the faded event in its nonfaded vividness, as it was when present, cannot be contained in the new present. However, it is said that such containing is the theory of succession. That is, "it is the reality of the new as added to that of the old, rather than the
unreality of the old, that constitutes process. The denial of perishing in God, so far from removing succession, is required to rescue it from partial if not complete destruction" (Hartshorne:1972:84).

He further says: "For us, much of the past, that which has been, is "as though it had never been", except for profoundly unconscious prehensions, and these cannot be construed unless there is some consciousness whose clarity registers and measures their content. It is adequate awareness which measures inadequate, not vice versa. Thus for instance the primordial envisagement of eternal objects is necessary to make our inferior envisagement of them possible. And similarly, in the CN, "succession does not mean loss of immediate unison", and this preservation of events as they are when they occur is just what gives then a definite status in the "past", as x has a definite place in "x as a part of y", where y is the later, richer, more determinate entity. This is that higher mode of becoming which men have tried vainly for centuries to conceive when they held that all is together in God, yet not static or inactive or dead" (Hartshorne: 1972:84).

The conception of unfading everlastingness of all occasions in God has many critics (including Santayana). The critics object to the immortality of the past as fantastic, incredible, gratuitous idea. Hartshorne says that it is almost comical to see these critics. For, though they object so, at the same time they, excluding Mead "lightheartedly assume the immortality of truth, however detailed and trivial, about the past. Indeed, they usually go further and assume the eternity of truth, its completeness above time altogether, thus rendering time an illusion of which the real content is timeless" (1972:85).

But Hartshorne says that such "critics substitute for the simple and consistent idea of Whitehead and Bergson the following paradoxes".
"(a) They suppose a world of truth which is, item for item, an exact duplicate of the past, in one-to-one correspondence with its determinations, however detailed. This duplicate or truth world lacks the actual past in no determinate character, but only an ineffable something called actuality".

"(b) They suppose that truth is real now as involving a relation of correspondence with an object which is not real now. Relation-to-the-past is there - save for the past. Relation-to is there, we should say".

"If we add to these paradoxes the almost universally accompanying one that (c) truth about past, present, or future is said to be timelessly complete in all eternity, although that which it is about is either incomplete or at least seems to lose its distinctive character of process if it be supposed complete, we have three appalling demands upon credulity, or ability to believe nonsense. It is indeed partly to avoid such absurdities that Bergson adopted his view of the cumulative character of time" (1972:85).

It is told that the past should in present experience, be still immediately given. What this means is explained, on the one hand, by Hartshorne (1972:85) that "the past involves universals of which later events are instances, and in such fashion that the instances imply their universals but not the converse. Every event contains more or less determinate desires; expectations, fears, purposes hopes, and these involve generality, indeterminations as to the exact details which may fulfill or disappoint or somehow be relevant to them. The planned or feared event as outlined in the plan or fear is never so individually definite as the event which comes to pass at the time in question, and this greater definiteness of the subsequent event remains exactly that, no matter how complete the preservation of the earlier event. Indeed, it is only if the preservation is complete that the precise indeterminations of the past in its hopes and fears can be retrospectively seen for what they were when present". (Hartshorne: 1972:85).
"On the other hand, the fulfillment or disappointment, felt as such, of a purpose or hope includes the memory of the purpose or hope, plus details not foreseen in the anticipatory state and not contained in it as preserved in memory, as to how things actually "came out" (Hartshorne: 1972:85-86).

"Clearly logic allows the asymmetrical relationship required. A can be in B although B is not in A. In fact, there would otherwise be no distinction between general and particular; for the general is that which does not imply other things (unless they are of equal generality), whereas the particular contains the general as an abstractable feature. Why should not this asymmetrical structure of universal particular be essentially an aspect of the structure of time? Time either is or is not essential to existence and to all being. Many who think it is thus essential reject the only theory of time that does justice to its basic place in being as the key to the interrelations of the categories" (Hartshorne: 1972:86).

There is a doctrine that the "subject is always "superject" always an enrichment of existence, even of God, and it involves that which is enriched, but not conversely. This is succession." (Hartshorne: 1972:86). As Hartshorne says the contention of this doctrine is that the cause is never "equal to the effect", the later always being the richer; the former, seen retrospectively, being a reduction of the latter to an abstract or incomplete version of itself." (1972:86). However, as Hartshorne says, this doctrine of Whitehead is consistent with his view that "PN as a causal factor implied by all actual entities but requiring none of them in particular" (1972:86). But the philosophers, such as Spinoza and Jonathan Edwards, are deceiving themselves; for, they "wish to conceive God as C, as existing and intelligible in himself alone, and at the same time hold that all things follow without qualification from his (will or) nature (Spinoza in a sense makes a qualification, but it is equivocal), or that it is the function of a cause to necessitate its effect". (Hartshorne: 1972:86)."Independence
means asymmetrical contingency (or asymmetrical determinism, it is the same thing), the noninvolvement of the effect in the cause, or it means nothing. There are no degrees of necessity. If my hat requires God and God requires my hat (at least as an illusion or "appearance"), the logical status of the one is as dependent or independent as that of the other. Whitehead has retrapped this old trap, and has done so by "taking time (and freedom and memory) seriously" (Hartshorne:1972:86).

There are three questions, concerning the temporal structure of God, that Hartshorne puts to Whitehead. He has attempted also to answer them in the light of Whitehead.

(a) "Must there not be a cosmic present, in spite of relativity physics, the defacto totality of actual entities as present in the divine immediacy?" (Hartshorne:1972:80). Following Parker and Bergson, Hartshorne says that there is a unique cosmic present or simultaneity; and human beings are unable, by signaling methods, to determine such a present, but their inability need not prevent God, who knows things directly, from experiencing such a present. (1972:86-87)

"Since God is not spatially localized, it appears that he must intuit all occasions wherever they are as [just after?] they occur in one state of experience". But, then, it does not mean that contemporaries are causally independent, nonimmanent in each other; for, since they are all immanent in God, and he in turn immanent in them, they must be immanent in each other and "since God is not spatially separated from things, it seems no definite lapse of time can occur either between his prehension of them or theirs of him. "There can be no transmission with the velocity of light from an event to the divine observer, or from the divine process itself to the creaturely event. (There is a somewhat similar problem about the relation of the human consciousness to brain-cell event)" (Hartshorne:1972:87).

(b). Hartshorne takes a divine present, distinguishable from both the divine past and the divine future, as an "epochal" affair, not a mathematical instant, not yet containing infinite
divisions, but a unit actually undivided yet potentially divisible (such that it might have been divided, or might have been part of a longer undivided epoch). (1972:87). When the question of the length of this epoch arises, Hartshorne supposes that "it would be identical with that of the shortest creaturely unit or specious present, since the perfect perception (physical prehension) will make whatever discriminations are necessary to follow the distinctions in the things perceived, no more and no less." "The longer units will then be experienced by God as overlapping several of the shorter, and therefore not absolutely undivided, taking account of the immanence of the shorter in their prehensions". (Hartshorne: 1972:87).

(c) Hartshorne (1972:87) questions whether the world-process, as everlasting in God, is without beginning. If the answer is yes, then the totality of actual occasions is an actual infinity. Hartshorne (1972:87) accepts this answer, provided, as he hopes - and in spite of Kant, Renouvier, and Parker - the idea of the actually infinite is meaningful. "If the totality of immortalized actualities is infinite, then the enrichment of God through each new occasion is the addition to a realization already infinite" (Hartshorne: 1972:82). Hartshorne accepts also this idea, as, he says, there is nothing fatal in it. For, this would mean either that (i) the order of the infinity might increase" or that (ii) "if the number of elapsed events did not increase, the class would, since new members are added and none lost"(Hartshorne: 1972:80). Since the (i) is, as Hartshorne understands from mathematicians, not compatible with the epochal theory of time, (ii) must be the solution, as it is suggested to Hartshorne by Bertrand Russell. (1972:88) As Hartshorne supposes, "the addition of new contrasts to everlasting reality can enrich it aesthetically without effecting a numerical increase in the contrasts already there" (1972:88).
5. TS and Whitehead:

With Whitehead's idea of God, which is a case of AR-CW, in background we shall discuss here to determine TS's idea of God.

Let us know the meaning of the symbols used for modalities mentioned above:

CC is the doctrine of sheer independence. It means not only that there is an independent or purely causal aspect of God, C, but that there is no other aspect, that independent power describes all aspects of divine value.

WW is the doctrine of sheer dependence. It means not only that there is a world aspect of God, W, but that there is nothing independent of the world in God, nothing but W.

CW is the doctrine that in God there is an independent factor, which is cause but not effect, but also a dependent or a "consequent" factor which itself has causes.

AA is the doctrine that God is sheer absolute perfect, is nothing but absolute perfection.

RR is the doctrine that God is sheer relative, is nothing but absolute relative.

AR is the doctrine that God is both absolute and relative.

However, C in CW is like A in AR, and W in CW is like R in AR. So also, CW is to CC and WW, and AR is to AA and RR. AR is considered as R-perfection and AA is considered as A-perfection.

Now the question is, to which one of the cases of modalities mentioned above TS's idea of God belongs. The answer could be that it is the case of AR-CW and not of any other. This can be seen from the following considerations.

(1) From the point of value, God is AR, for TS. For this we have the following evidences. He says

(i) "Because enwombing in Thyself six Aṅgas and six Liṅgas, six Saktis and six Bhaktis, all these, thou was the existence-consciousness-Bliss, the eternal. [perfect]"
immaculate, I call Thee the impartite Śiva-Principle, Look you, Mahāliṅga Guru Śivasiddhesvara Lord! "(SJ:32)

(ii) "Enwombing in Himself the fivefold sakti, five fold sādākhyā, the five fold kalā, the five fold syllable, the five fold element, having the nature of cīdbrahmāṇda, fulfilled of consciousness, its light and bliss and its reality,... the supreme Effulgent Liṅga, All-comprehending and fulfilled of every kind of Energy is my prānaliṅga..." (SJ:36).

These vacanas of TS would mean that from the point of value, God is perfect. Perfection here is to be taken as maximality or completeness of value, because God includes everything. He includes sādākhyas (Materials) from which any possible world can be created, all arṇgas (individual beings) all powers (saktis) all kalās (powers in individuals) basic elements (bhūtas). In short, he includes everything and lacks nothing. From this one should not think that nothing conceivable could be added to such a perfect being. Because all these things God included are in the form of possibility, potentiality, abstract. The potential things become actual, for TS. He says.

(iii) "The highest Thing, having thus become the impartite Liṅga-sthala through its own spontaneous sport, just as liquid ghee by congealing is turned to solid ghee, so creating in Himself infinite forms and principles, infinite billions of cosmic eggs - all, all these, enwombing them in himself, dissolving them in Himself, He attained the mahāliṅga- Sthala, undivided, all-pervasive..." (SJ: Sūtra of Mahāliṅga-sthala).

It means that God includes infinite number of possible things and by his own spontaneous sport he is making them actual. And thus God is perfect but when possible things become actual, something is added to him. God is perfect, but every form of self-enrichment, every aspect of process and of potential but unactual value, is present in him. It means that
perfect God includes the temporal character of value, all contrast between purpose and achievement, all relationship to beings whose value is not perfect.

Thus for TS, God is not identified with the 'most real being' or 'pure actuality'. In the absolute maximal being both poles, actuality and potentiality, of reality are present. God is AR.

(2) From the point of causality, for TS, God is CW. He is C because he is the cause of all. TS says.

(i) "Lo, I invoke Thee as the impartite, the self-subsistent without support, thyself the universal base, all-knowing, Lord of all, the universal Goal..." (SJ:28).

(ii) "Before existence, consciousness and bliss were severally there, thou wast the basis of all principles, baseless Thyself; Thou wast the source of all principles, thyself without a source; because Thou wast the unbegun, I realised Thee as the impartite Śiva principle....." (SJ:31)

(iii) "... by the Linga's act, worlds upon worlds including the ideal cosmic egg were born, thus, by Thy mere thought, the triple world was born; and Thou art the cause of its birth, existence, death..."(SJ:66)

These vacanas mean that God is the cause of all while his existence is not caused by any other thing.

From this one should not think that for TS, God is in no aspect of its being the effect of any, an agent which acts but not acted upon. God is also in some aspect of his being the effect. Because, for TS, God includes the world, and the changing world affects him to exist differently. Thus TS assets that God is in different states (sthālas). So also God is the lover of the devotees, is the benedictor. This means that God is also affected by the devotees, because he has, at least in some case, to respond to the petitionary prayers of his devotees. He is also said to punish the creatures who do wicked acts. Only a totally unconcerned God would remain unchanged in spite of the changes in the world of sentient and insentient beings, and since
TS’s God is continuously active in the world, it is inconceivable that he does not change. Thus for TS, God has both supreme causal factor which can be abstracted from the world of its effects, and the aspect of the supreme totality of all his effects and of their effects. God is the creator-with-the creatures.

For TS, not only there is an independent or causal aspect of God, C, but also there is a world aspect of God, W. There is an independent, and also a dependent factor which itself has causes. It is \( \mathcal{C} \cup W \).

(3) From the point of R-perfection and A-perfection, we can now hold that TS’s idea of God is of R-perfection. Because, in TS, ‘God is perfect’ means God surpasses all the conceivable beings. God is also surpassing himself, and thus growth or improvement in him is possible.

(4) TS’s idea of God is of AR, but not of AA and RR. For, TS holds that God is the cause-with-effect, but not mere cause or mere contingent phenomena alone. God is transcending himself in some respect and others in all respects, AR; but not transcending others in all respects and self in none, AA; nor transcending both self and others in all respects, RR.

In TS’s case, God has self-identity, for, he is not transcending himself and others in all respects, as he is so in the case of RR. God has in a valuable sense involve self-contrast because he can surpass himself, as he cannot be so in AA.

With this in the background we shall now discuss the comparison between TS and Whitehead.

(1) TS and Whitehead both hold that their idea of God is the case of AR-CW. They also hold that their idea of God is of dipolar nature. For both, God is in some respect concrete and abstract, one and many, cause and effect, complete and incomplete, active and passive, good and evil, simple and complex.
In Whitehead’s case, AC coincides with primordial Nature (PN) and RW with consequent nature (CN). PN is the conceptual envisagement of eternal possibilities. God is absolutely perfect in this respect. TS also holds that God is perfect, and he includes within himself all the eternal possibilities (SJ:32, sūtra of mahāliṅga sthala, 36).

For Whitehead, God has R aspect also. For future possibilities gain determiacy and become actual events, and thus at each new stage of the universe there is more for God to know, and thus God is ever growing. For TS also God has R aspect because the possible worlds become actual and God includes them, and every new stage of the universe makes him exist differently and since God has many states (sthalas), such as Sarvasūnya Nārāyaṇa state, Śūnyaūnta state, Nihkālaś śūnta state, Mahāliṅga stage, to mention a few, he has to be different in each state.

For TS, God is omniscient, but he does not say anything definite about God’s foreknowledge. But from his standpoint we can hold that God knows actual thing as actual, possible as possible, past as past and future as future.

For Whitehead, PN is that which God primordially or at all times is. It is at once conceptual, volitional and perceptual. It is the common element of all the successive conceptual, perceptual and appetitive states of the divine life, abstracting from the differences between these states.

In TS’s case we find the similar description of PN. For TS, God has two types of characteristics: one is essential and the other is accidental. The essential characteristics of God are: existence, consciousness, bliss eternal, and perfect (SJ:32, 31,39). The accidental characteristics of God are: creation, preservation, distruction, veiling, and benediction (SJ:71). Essential characters are such that God cannot be without them, he is always with them. These characters are the common elements of all the successive state of God’s life. He is in
every state, conscious, blissful, eternal and perfect (Perfect in values or knowledge for example). This can be termed PN.

It may, however, be noted that for TS, these accidental characters are also necessary consequences of God's essential nature as śakti (energy). That is, śakti which manifests as world of sentient and non-sentient beings is an inseparable part of God, such that one without the other is just inconceivable.

Accidental characters of God are such that he can be without them. That is, for instance he can be without this creation or that creation or creation as such. When God performs these activities he is in different states. But the essential characteristics of God, PN, is the common element in all the successive states of God.

For TS, God has power (śakti) which manifests under the divine guidance in different forms. For him God's eternal inseparable association with śakti makes him an agent. Depending upon his acts, his śakti is called by various names: conscious power (Ciechakti), highest power (Parāśakti), primordial power (Ādiśakti), knowledge power (Jñānasakti), active power (Kriyāśakti) (SJ:63). In other words, God by virtue of his essential character, śakti, acts differently in different states. But the essential characteristics, PN, of God is the common element of all the successive states of him.

Since essential characteristics of God are commonly present in all his states, this can be called, as Whitehead says, absolutely fixed ungenerated general style or self-identical characteristics, an abstract element of strict invariance individual to him. God's individuality is invariable because he perceives and conceives each and every stage, as it is actualized, without the qualification of any loss either of individual identity or of completeness of unity. Essential characteristics, PN, is the element of mere identity apart from all the differences in the divine life.
(4) Whitehead holds that PN and CN mutually require each other. In the same manner we can hold that for TS, essential and accidental characteristics require mutually each other. Because, essential characteristics have meaning only in relation to accidental characteristics, and self-identity has meaning only in relation to difference.

Whitehead distinguishes between change or difference in general, and this or that individual or concrete difference or change. And CN is this change as such. Similarly, in TS's case, accidental characteristics can be taken as change as such, CN.

(5) For Whitehead, God has PN, CN and the third, which contains these two, i.e. the concrete partly novel divine state of the given now. PN is the static perfection, a definite quantum of value, CN is the dynamic perfection, the generic property of a class of possible values. The class of possible value, which contains the generic property, is such that it is superior to those being other than God, also to those possessed by God himself at any earlier time, and inferior to any values that may be possessed by him in future.

Following Whitehead, we can also hold this about TS. For TS, God has PN, essential characteristics, CN, the accidental characteristics and the concrete new present state containing both. There is the static perfection, a definite quantum of value, of the essential characteristics; and there is the dynamic perfection or generic property (śakti) of accidental characteristics; and the particular state of God for instance, sarvasūnya nirālamba state or mahālīṅga state or arīgalīṅgōdbhava state, which contains both PN and CN, essential and accidental characters. The class of values possessed by God in any particular state is superior than any value possessed by other individual beings; and by himself in earlier state and inferior to those values possessed by himself in future state.

(6) Both Whitehead and TS hold that there are different states of God. TS for instance, mentions these states as Sarvasūnya Nirālamba state, Śūnyalīṅga state, Nihkalalīṅga state.
Mahālinga state, Aṅgalīgōḍbhava state etc. And Whitehead calls these states as PN-CNm, PN-CNn, PN-CNo etc.

Whitehead holds that each state of God contains PN-CN. So also for TS, each state of God has both essential characters and accidental characters. (See SJ:31,38,39).

Whitehead holds that from God, we can deduce that necessarily there could be some concrete state, either PN-CNm, or PN-CNn or PN-CNo, etc. TS also holds the same thing. For both TS and Whitehead each state of God is followed by a successor.

For both Whitehead and TS, PN (essential characters) is not before or apart from the process, but with it.

Whitehead holds that each stage of God is containing its previous state. Same is the case with TS.

B. RADHAKRISHNAN:

1. Radhakrishnan’s Idea of God:

It is evident that the influence of Sankara’s monism and the spirit of Ramanuja is still there in India. This can be seen from the Hindu thinkers who are deeply versed in European as well as in Indian systems. Among these Hindu thinkers, Radhakrishnan is more distinguished than the others. Hartshorne and Reese think (1953:306) that “the case with which Radhakrishnan interprets European authors is not only no disproof of his representativeness as modern product of Hinduism but is rather one reason the more for accepting such representativeness”. “For only those who can face the international community of philosophers, who can speak of philosophical humanity at large, can in our shrinking world be regarded as philosophically competent. The rest are spokesmen of the remnants of primitive tribalism”
It is generally assumed by many that Radhakrishnan is a staunch follower of Sankara's monism. But Radhakrishnan's words seem to be against this. He himself says: "Although I admire the great masters of thought, ancient and modern, Eastern and Western, I cannot say that I am a follower of any, accepting his teaching in its entirety. I do not suggest that I refused to learn from others or that I was not influenced by them. While I was greatly stimulated by the minds of all those whom I have studied, my thought does not comply with any fixed traditional pattern. For my thinking had another source and proceeded from my own experience, which is not quite the same as what is acquired by mere study and reading. It is born of spiritual experience rather than deduced from logically ascertained premises. Philosophy is produced more by our encounter with reality than by the historical study of such encounters. In my writings I have tried to communicate my insight into the meaning of life". (1952:10).

It is the view of Hartshorne and Reese (1953:307) that in the writings of Radhakrishnan (An Idealist view of Life) panentheism is carried forward its complete expression, and the religious tone of the discussion is also apparent. Because, they say, it is clear from the writings of Radhakrishnan that he "affirms the real temporality of deity as well as his eternity; that for him God includes the world without prejudice to its reality or the freedom of its members; and that God is conscious of himself and of the world". (1953:307).

However, Hartshorne (1952:315) wishes to indicate his general appreciation of Radhakrishnan's fine treatment of the old problems; a treatment which seems to him to combine much that is best in both Eastern and Western thought. In saying that Radhakrishnan combines much that is best in metaphysics the world over, Hartshorne means "above all that he avoids one-sided extremes, such as sheer monism, or extreme pluralism, or again, such as the reduction of all causation to an absolute teleology, the sway of an all-coercing providence, or, on the other side the sheer denial of providence". Hartshorne further says, that Radhakrishnan "finds it
possible to admit the reality of chance, disorder, and contingency, even for and in God, without giving up the divine unity of the world whereby it is a whole which contains and cherishes the values of the parts in an inclusive value". Hartshome believes that "It is...such "Playing fair" between contrasting poles of categorical conceptions, like unity and plurality, that east and west are coming to see the only way to attain the whole truth, so far as it is humanly accessible". (1952:315).

Nevertheless, Hartshome has queries and doubts about Radhakrishnan's doctrine of God. Before knowing what these are, let us first consider Radhakrishnan's doctrine of God and to what extent it supports panentheism.

For Radhakrishnan (1937:334) God is personal having three aspects: wisdom, love and goodness. But the "conception of God as wisdom, love and goodness is not a mere abstract demand of thought but is the concrete reality which satisfies the religious demand". He says, "If we combine the ideas we are led to posit from the different directions of metaphysics, morals and religion, we obtain the character of God as the primordial mind, the loving redeemer and the holy judge of the universe".

In Hinduism, God is conceived as Brahma Visnu and Siva; and, for Radhakrishnan (1937:334) Brahma, Visnu and Siva represent the three characters—wisdom, love and goodness—of the one God. "The one God creates as Brahma, redeems as Visnu, and judges as Siva. These represent the three stages of plan, the process, and the perfection. The source from which all things come, the spring by which they are sustained, and the good into which they enter are one." God loves us, creates us [Sa no bandhur janita sa vidhata], and rules us. Creation, redemption and judgment are different names for the fact of God" (Radhakrishnan:1937:338).
Further, in relation to Brahma aspect of God Radhakrishnan says that, "Brahma is the primordial nature of God. He is the "home" of the conditions of the possibility of the world, or of the "eternal objects" in Whitehead's phrase. If the rational order of the universe reflects the mind of God, that mind is prior to the world. But the thoughts of Brahma, or the primordial mind, should become the things of the world. This process of transformation of ideas into the plane of space-time is a gradual one which God assists by his power of productive and self-communicating life. In the world process all things yearn towards their ideal forms. They struggle to throw off their imperfections and reflect the patterns in the divine mind. As immanent in the process, God becomes the guide and the ground of the progress. He is not a mere spectator, but a sharer in the travail of the world". (1937:334-5).

In relation to Visnu aspect of God, Radhakrishnan (1937:335) says that "God as Visnu is sacrifice. He is continuously engaged in opposing every tendency in the universe which makes for error, ugliness and evil, which are not mere abstract possibilities, but concrete forces giving reality to the cosmic strife. God pours forth the whole wealth of his love to actualise his intentions for us. He takes up the burden of helping us to resist the forces of evil, error and ugliness, and transmute them into truth, beauty and goodness". Radhakrishnan (1937:335) considers that this love aspect of God is mentioned in RgVeda - "All that is bare he covers; all that is sick he cures; By his grace the blind man sees and the lame walks". In Svetasvatara Upanisad and Bhagavadgita it is also said that "God is the refuge and friend of all" (Sarvasya Saranam suhrit). And Rg Veda says, "Thou art ours and we are thine" (Tvam asmakam tava smasi). Further, Radhakrishnan says, "God does not leave us in the wilderness to find our way back". And he agrees with Hindu mythology which considers God as "an eternal beggar waiting for the opening of the door that he may enter into the darkness and illumine the whole horizon of our being as with a lightning flash". (Radhakrishnan 1937:335).
In relation to Siva aspect of God, Radhakrishnan (1937:337-8) "God is not simply truth and love, but also justice. He is the perfection which rejects all evil. The sovereignty of God is indicated in the character of Siva. God acts according to fixed laws. He does not break or suspend his own laws. The liberty to change one's mind is not true liberty. God cannot forgive the criminal, even when he repents, for the moral order which is conceived in love and not in hatred requires that wrongdoing should have its natural consequences". Radhakrishnan (1937:338) agrees with Plato whose words, he thinks, seem to be an echo of Hindu texts, in saying that "you shall assuredly never be passed over by God's judge not though you make yourself never so small and hide in the bowels of the earth, or exalt yourself to heaven. You must pay the penalty due, either while you are still with us, or after your departure hence, in the house of Hades, or it may be, by removal to some still more desolate region".

For Radhakrishnan, human beings are free and thus there is an element of contingency and uncertainty in the world. He says, "While there is no risk that the world will tumble off into ruin so long as God's love is operative, yet the realisation of the end of the world depends on our co-operation. As we are free beings, our co-operation is a free gift which we may withhold. This possibility introduces an element of contingency to the universe. The creative process, though orderly and progressive, is unpredictable. There is real indetermination, and God himself is in the make" (1937:336-7).

Radhakrishnan claims that God's love will not leave the world to tumble off into ruin, that God as love will see to it that the plan succeeds. But he suggests that this claim should not be "confused with the doctrine of absolute predestination, which may be interpreted as overthrowing human freedom and paralyzing moral effort. After all it is the fight that gives life its value and not the ultimate result, and even the consummation of the result is contingent on the passion with which human individuals work for the cause. The hope is there, that even the
most willful will respond to the long suffering love of God. Though he is ever working in the hearts of men and drawing them towards himself, there are occasions when we withhold the response and make the situation serious. When the hold of God on the world becomes precarious, his love, which is constant, manifests itself in a striking way" (Radhakrishnan: 1937:336).

"So far as the world is concerned", Radhakrishnan says (1937:338) that, "God is organic with it. It is impossible to detach God from the world". Following Ramanuja, Radhakrishnan regards the relation of God to the world as one of soul to body, and brings out the organic and complete dependence of the world on God. For Radhakrishnan, "God is the sustainer of the body as well as its inner guide. Struggle and growth are real in the life of God. Time is the essential form of the cosmic process, including the moral life, and it has a meaning to God also. Life eternal which carries us beyond the limits of temporal growth may take us to the Absolute, but God is essentially bound up with the life in time. Progress may be derogatory to the Absolute, but not to God, who is intensely interested in it". (1937:338).

So far as the process of the world is concerned Radhakrishnan says (1937:339) "it is an emergence, but not of the type suggested by Alexander. It is an emergence under the guidance of God, who is immanent in the process, though the goal is transcendent to it. The process of the world is not a mere unfolding of what is contained in the beginning. It is not a question of mere preformation. The end of the world is not contained in the beginning, such that God might retire from the process altogether. Those who have any appreciation of this fact of evolution cannot adopt the view of preformation... (1937:339). But, Radhakrishnan claims, Bergson inconsistently adopts this. He says, though Bergson emphasizes the creativity of evolution, he seems to think that the whole evolution of life with its progressive manifestation of structure is latent in life. For, according to Bergson, "Life does not proceed by the
assimilation and addition of elements, but by dissociation and division" (Creative Evolution: 1911:89; quoted by Radhakrishnan:1937:339), and therefore, Radhakrishnan says, "Such a view is inconsistent with the main intention of Bergson's teaching. (1937:339). But according to Radhakrishnan, "The world is in the making, and is being created constantly, and the reality of change means a plastic world and not a block universe. The creative impulse is present from the beginning, but the forms created are due to the cosmic stress. That alone can account for the orderly character of the world of varied tendencies. If matter, life, consciousness and value had each its own independent evolution, the fact of their unity calls for an explanation, and we may be obliged to use a principle somewhat like Leibniz's pre-established harmony. Reality is a whole and acts and advances as a whole. The control of the whole is present in the growth of the parts, whether they are chemical compounds or cultural movements". (1937:339).

Further, so far as the process of the world is concerned, Radhakrishnan holds that, it "is creative synthesis, where the formative energy, local situation and cosmic control are all efficient factors. The final end is not contained in the beginning. The interest and attractiveness of the end cannot be divorced from the process which leads to it. A God who has arranged everything at the beginning of the world and can change nothing, create nothing new is not a God at all. If the universe is truly creative, God works as a creative genius does. The end grows with the process and assumes a definite shape through the characteristics of the parts of the process. There is thus an element of indetermination throughout the process, though it diminishes in degree as the amount of actuality increases. God the planner acts with real genius when confronted by actual situations". (1937:339-340).

"God, though immanent, is not identical with the world until the very end. Throughout the process there is an unrealized residuum in God, but it vanishes when we reach the end; when the reign is absolute the kingdom comes. God who is organic with it recedes into
the background of the Absolute. The beginning and the end are limiting conceptions, and the great interest of the world centers in the intermediate process from the beginning to the end. God is more the savior and redeemer than creator and judge" (Radhakrishnan:1937:340).

"The love of God is more central than either his wisdom or his sovereignty. These latter may lead to predestination theories which reduce the world process to a sham, where the freedom of man and the love of God are both illusory. If predestination is true, then the creation of novelties, the loving trust and surrender of man to God and the grace of God are illusions" (Radhakrishnan:1937:340).

Let us see now how the Absolute described above is related to God, according to Radhakrishnan.

For Radhakrishnan, "God is bound up with the world, subject to the category of time", "his work is limited by the freedom of man and the conditions of existence". (1937:342) And God is infinite in the quality of his life, in power, knowledge and righteousness. And, Radhakrishnan holds, however infinite God may be in these respects, "he is but an expression of the Absolute" (1937:342). What is Absolute? According to Radhakrishnan, Absolute is "the truth of things in itself, in the beginning - nay, before time and before plurality, the one "breathing breathless", as the Rg Veda has it, the pure, alone and unmanifest, nothing and all things, that which transcends any definite form of expression, and yet is the basis of all expression, the one in whom all is found and yet all is lost". (1937:343). In this connection Radhakrishnan claims that "While the character of god as personal love meets certain religious needs, there are others which are not fulfilled by it. In the highest spiritual experience we have the sense of rest and fulfillment, of eternity and completeness. These needs provoked from the beginning of human reflection conceptions of the Absolute as pure and passionless being which transcends the restless turmoil of cosmic life(1937:342).
Now the problem is how to reconcile the character of the Absolute as in a sense eternally complete with the character of God as a self-determining principle manifested in a temporal development which includes nature and man. Radhakrishnan suggests (1937:343) that "The identification of the absolute life with the course of human history suggested by the Italian idealists may be true of the supreme as God of the world, but not of the Absolute, the lord of all worlds". Because "Creation neither adds to nor takes away from the reality of the Absolute; Evolution may be a part of our cosmic process, but the Absolute is not subject to it. The Absolute is incapable of increase". (1937:343).

While the Absolute is pure consciousness and pure freedom and infinite possibility, it appears to be God from the point of view of the one specific possibility which has become actualized. While God is organically bound up with the universe, the Absolute is not. The world of pure being is not exhausted by the cosmic process which is only one of the ways in which the Absolute reality which transcends the series reveals itself. The absolute is the foundation and Pivot, of all actuality and possibility. This universe is for the Absolute only one possibility. Its existence is an act of free creation. Out of the infinite possibilities open to it, this one is chosen. When we analyse our sense of freedom we find that it consists in accepting or rejecting any one of a number of possibilities presented to us. The Absolute has an infinite number of possibilities to choose from, which are all determined by its nature. It has the power of saying yes or no to any of them. While the possible is determined by the nature of the Absolute, the actual is selected from out of the total amount of the possible, by the free activity of the Absolute without any determination whatsoever. It could have created a world different in every detail from that which is actual. If one drama is enacted and other possible ones postponed, it is due to the freedom of the Absolute". (1937:343-344).
"It is not necessary for this universe to be an infinite and endless process. The character of a finite universe is not incompatible with an infinite Absolute. We can have an infinite series of terms which are finite. The Absolute has so much more in it than is brought out by this world". (1937:344).

"As to why there is realisation of this possibility, we can only say that it is much too difficult for us in the pit to know what is happening behind the screens. It is maya, or a mystery which we have to accept reverently". (1937:344).

"Sometimes it is argued that it is of the very nature of the Absolute to overflow and realise possibilities. The great symbol of the sun which is used in Hindu thought, Plato's system and Persian Mythology signifies the generous self-giving and ecstasy of the Absolute, which overflows, and gives itself freely and generously to all. Timaeus says in Plato that the created world is there because the All-good wants his goodness to flow out upon it. The Indian figure of lila makes the creation of the universe an act of playfulness. Play is generally the expression of ideal possibilities. It is its own end and its own continuous reward. The Absolute mind has a perfect realm of ideal being, and is free creativity as well. Though the creation of the world is an incident in the never-ending activity of the Absolute, it satisfies a deep want in God. The world is as, indispensable to God as God is to the world" (1937:344).

"God, who is the creator, sustainer and judge of this world, is not totally unrelated to the Absolute. God is the Absolute from the human end. When we limit down the Absolute to its relation with the actual possibility, the Absolute appears as supreme Wisdom, Love and Goodness. The eternal becomes the first and the last. The abiding "I am", the changeless centre and the cause of all change is envisaged as the first term and the last in the sequence of nature. He is the creative mind of the world, with a consciousness of the general plan and direction of the cosmos, even before it is actualised in space and time. He holds the successive
details in proper perspective and draws all things together in bonds of love and harmony. He is the loving savior of the world. As creator and savors, God is transcendent to the true process, even as realization is transcendent to progress. This internal transcendence of God to the true process gives meaning to the distinctions of value, and makes struggle and effort real. We call the supreme the Absolute, when we view it apart from the cosmos, God in relation to the cosmos. The Absolute is the pre-cosmic nature of God, and God is the Absolute from the cosmic point of view" (1937:344-345).

Even from this short account it appears that Hartshorne is right in saying that Radhakrishnan is a panentheist: for him God is eternal, temporal, conscious, knowing and including the world. Nevertheless Hartshorne has questions about Radhakrishnan's notion of God, his questions concerns chiefly matters of terminology.

Let us consider Hartshorne's question about the relations of deity and the Absolute. Hartshorne (1952:317) agrees with Radhakrishnan that the chief problem in the philosophy of religion has been the reconciliation of the "Absolute" with "God"; that they simply cannot be identified with each other. Following Hume, Hartshorne admits that such identification has indeed, been the central sophistry in our Western theistic tradition; but holds that "from Shelling and Fechner to James, Bergson, Montague, and Whitehead, the task of Philosophical theism has been above all to find a tenable conception of some relation other than that of sheer identity between deity and absoluteness. In Fechner and Whitehead a solution has, in principle, been provided" (1952:317). Let us outline the solution in order to compare it with Radhakrishnan's.

"Absolute" contrasts with "relative", and thus means (roughly) nonrelative, independent of relationships. Now it seems plain that to conceive something as free from relatedness we must abstract from all that is relative in experience, from all relations and relative terms. But what is
thus conceived, by abstracting everything that is relation or relative from the concrete, can only be something extremely abstract". Therefore, the absolute, as such, is a radically abstract, not a concrete, entity. But, Hartshorne holds, more than twenty centuries have sought to find a way to dodge this conclusion (Hartshorne:1952:318).

"To conceive the relative there is no such need for abstraction. The concrete given whole of experience is itself relative in manifold ways; indeed, this whole must contain all the relativity (as well as all the absoluteness) that is actually given! But that which contains something relative is itself relative; that which contains the dependent or the contingent is itself dependent or contingent. For, if the least item in the whole depends on some relation, then the whole depends also on that relation, to just the extent that the item itself belongs to, contributes to, the whole; and if that extent is zero, then the item is no item. Thus to abstract from, to omit, nothing is to retain all the relativity, all the dependence, there is; whereas, to conceive the independent or absolute, we must omit from consideration all in the concrete which is due to relations. Thus the concrete is the relative; but the concrete includes the abstract, hence the relative includes the absolute, not vice versa". (Hartshorne:1952:318)

"In accordance with the foregoing, the supreme concrete Reality, or deity, may be conceived as containing an absolute factor; but as concrete it must also contain relations and relative terms, and therefore, in its concrete wholeness, it must be relative rather than absolute. The absolute is a factor, an adjective, of the relative, not visa versa. God is the substantive, the absolute is a character of this substantive. This inverts Bradley's doctrine that the relative is a mere appearance of the absolute. On the contrary, the absolute is a mere abstract feature of what in its total reality is more than absolute. 'More than absolute', superabsolute, may be seen as not really a paradox, if we recall that "absolute" is defined negatively as non-relative.
and that superiority is positive and relative, as indeed is value generally (for, at least, it implies a relation of interest and object).

This is the outline of the doctrine of relation between absolute and God given by Fechner to Whitehead. Hartshorne says, when we turn to compare the doctrine of Radhakrishnan with the doctrine outlined above, we find that the former is largely in harmony with the latter (1952:318). It should also be noted that according to Hartshorne, the doctrine of Radhakrishnan is now and then tantalizingly ambiguous in regard to the doctrine outlined (1952:318). Therefore Hartshorne and Reese express their fear only that in certain phrases the door is half-open to monopolar misinterpretations (1953:310). Let us see now the questions and doubts expressed by Hartshorne and Reese with reference to Radhakrishnan's doctrine.

(1) For Radhakrishnan, although God is organic to the universe, "essentially bound up with the life in time", the Absolute is not thus organic or subject to change and evolution (1932:343). Here Hartshorne's (1952:318) question is, whether for Radhakrishnan God is relative and concrete, and the Absolute is not concrete or is abstract. If the answer is yes, then Hartshorne (1952:318) says, only the words 'abstract' and 'concrete' - the 'abstract' as applied to the absolute or nontemporal and immaterial aspect of deity and 'concrete' as applied to deity - seem to be missing in the writing of Radhakrishnan. However, Hartshorne and Reese (1953:310) think that the words might have occur somewhere else in Radhakrishnan writings in this sense; and hold that in this regard Pfleiderer, Fechner, and Whitehead seem a degree clearer.

For Radhakrishnan, God is "but an expression of the absolute" (1932:342) Hartshorne claims that here the word 'but' seems misplaced and misleading. By disregarding the 'but', "the concrete may be called an expression of the abstract; thus an actual joy of joyfulness, a beautiful thing of beauty" (1952:319).
(2) For Radhakrishnan, God is “the Absolute limited down to its relation with the actual possibility” (this world being but one of the possibilities that might have been actualized) (1932:344 ff). This “suggests that the absolute as such is more than the supreme as relative to the world” (Hartshorne and Reese:1953:310) Or, to say in terms of ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ ‘a concrete embodiment of an abstraction always involves a limiting down of the latter, in the sense that the possible embodiments are always infinitely more various than any actual embodiment or set of them”. (Hartshorne:1952:319). But Hartshorne objects to this. He says (1952:319), “the logic of concrete and abstract requires... that we conceive the real subject of the relation between the absolute and the “actual possibility” (that is, the actualization of the chosen possibility) to be the relative actuality and not the absolute, which is only nominally thus related. The term that has the relation has also the other term. For relation-to-x includes x. Thus it is not the abstract and absolute but the concrete and relative that is more than the other”. Hartshorne accepts that the abstract involves the possibility of more, with respect to any concrete actuality. But holds that “possibility-of-more is not more tout court, it is not a greater actuality; whereas pure possibility abstracted from the actual is really and tout court less than the actual. For note: the possibility-of-more is itself something in the concrete, as the whiteness which another object could embody is the very whiteness this paper does embody; or as my capacity to be other than I am is, as capacity, part of what I actually am”. (Hartshorne:1952:319).

(3) Radhakrishnan says that the absolute is “in a sense eternally complete”. As Hartshorne (1952:319) points out, Whitehead, too, says that the Primordial Nature of God is ‘complete’. But Whitehead is careful to add that the Primordial Nature of God is abstract and deficient in actuality. Hartshorne greatly hopes that this is acceptable to the Eastern seer: “The capacity to create, the matrix of pure potentials, is as capacity complete: for no possibility is missing from it; but equally all actual creation is absent from the capacity, taken merely as such
Thomistic contention is that potentiality rests on actuality. Hartshorne grants (1952:319-320) that “there is no potentiality except in some actuality”, but holds that “this actuality is to be termed complete, absolute, nonrelative, immutable, only qua potentiality, only with regard to its fecundity for actualization. It is doubly wrong to say that there cannot be complete fecundity unless there is complete actualization; first, because the meaning of fecundity implies that not everything is actualized (whether “already” or eternally’); and second, because there are incompossible possibilities, so that “everything” could not be actualized”. In this connection, Hartshorne (1952:320) points out, Paul Weiss (1938:153) (Reality, Princeton University Press) seems right in saying that to be actual is to be incomplete; to be complete is to be non-actual.

(4) Hartshorne and Reese (1953:310) rightly think that it is “somewhat objectionable to use "the Absolute" as expression for the supreme in its totality of aspects”. For, as we have seen, “absolute as such is an empty abstraction, a mere ingredient in the richness of actuality, worldly or divine”.

We read in Radhakrishnan about the absolute “selecting” among possibilities for actualization, or the “free activity of the Absolute” by which the actual world is selected from the possibilities. Hartshorne objects to this. He says, “no actual selecting can he done by the Absolute factor in God; since an act of selecting for actualization a definite possibility is as truly relative and limited as the actualization. This has been pointed out by Santayana [The Realm of Essence, 162f]. It is God as relative who selected from the possibilities contained in the absolute completeness of his mere eternal potency - complete and eternal only qua potency, not qua act” (Hartshorne:1952:320). And “The subject which really owns such an act of selection is relative if
anything is, and this act owns the absolute as its abstract essence, while the absolute as such can own nothing relative” (Hartshorne and Reese: 1953:310).

Radhakrishnan says (1937:345) that “the Absolute is the pre-cosmic nature of God”. “God is the Absolute in relation to the cosmos”. Hartshorne and Reese (1953:310) accept these phrases and say that these can be assimilated to their doctrine outlined. Because, “this correctly makes “God” the subject of all the divine properties, including absoluteness” However, they say that “Pre-cosmic” indeed is open to the objection that it may seem to imply a beginning of the temporal process” (1953:310).(Please see (6) below).

(5) We have considered in (2) the statement “God is the Absolute limited down to its relation with the actual possibility”, and concluded that the statement is wrong if it suggests that the absolute as such is more than the supreme as relative to the world; for it is not the abstract and absolute but the concrete and relative that is more than the other. Further, Hartshorne and Reese (1953:310) consider that in one sense actuality limits down the absolute; for “the Absolute is indeed the home of the unbounded possibilities”, and “any actual world or state of deity is never the actualization of all, or of any finite fraction, of these possibilities”. But Hartshorne and Reese point out that “the absolute no more realizes the other possibilities than the actual relative world does; the Absolute has or is such possibility, but not its actualization. Actuality thus never exhausts the Absolute, not because it is less than the Absolute; rather because, although always more than the merely abstract absolute essence, it is never as much more as it is possible for an actuality to be. And again it must be remembered that the relative, according to surrelativism, includes the absolute, as the concrete the abstract, so that to say that the absolute is in any sense more than the relative is to say that x is more than xy. This could be so only if y were a negative quantity, or if, when x were combined with y, it lost something of its nature so that in reality x, taken literally, is an impossibility. But if the abstract could not preserve its identity in the concrete
it would be inconceivable (for any conception is itself a concrete act) and would qualify nothing in any true propositions, and so would be useless”. Therefore, they conclude that, “God, as relative to the world, though not exhausting the possibilities inherent in the Absolute as his own abstract essence, is in no sense less than this essence but in every sense in which it is distinguished at all from it simply more than its deficient reality”. (Hartshorne and Reese:1953:310).

(6) Hartshorne holds (1952:320) that certain remarks of Radhakrishnan suggest a view not easily reconciled with the doctrine outlined earlier. Radhakrishnan remarks that “God... is not identical with the world until the very end... There is an unrealized residuum in God, but it vanishes when we reach the end; when the reign is absolute the kingdom comes. God recedes into the background of the Absolute” (1937:340). From this Hartshorne (1952:320) thinks that Radhakrishnan “seems to hold that, as the pre-cosmic nature of God is identical with the Absolute, so also the post-cosmic God will return to this identity”. Hartshorne points out that (1952:320) Whitehead does not tell us what happens when the divine plan of the Primordial Nature is realized, and because of this he is criticised. But for Whitehead divine purpose is inexhaustible, and there is a reason for this: “No single world, however long it had lasted in time, could ever exhaust possibility, which is absolutely infinite, infinite in every dimension and respect. That is why there is time at all, because not all possibilities can be achieved together, so that whatever is actual, more remains possible, and no motive can forbid, while motives do command, that more should be actual” (Hartshorne:1952:320). On the one hand Radhakrishnan himself insists (1937:336) that “there is no single eternally complete plan being carried out literally and irresistibly in the world: creaturely freedom and contingency, with a genuinely open or unfinished future, being real even for and in God” (Hartshorne:1952:320). On the other hand Hartshorne points out, he speaks without qualification of the realization of the divine plan, as though it were something fully defined, exhaustible, and destined for complete enactment. Following
Whitehead, Hartshorne says that the “divine plan... envisages beauty of experience, happiness, in endlessly increasing variety and total intensity, in the creatures and in God as embracing the creatures. So there is no “far-off divine event toward which the whole creation moves”, but there is a divine purpose nonetheless” (1952:321). Radhakrishnan says (1937:340), it is true, that “the beginning and the end are limiting conceptions”. But, Hartshorne says (1952:321), “this qualification seems either not a qualification or else a retraction. It is like talking of the ‘end of the number series’ as a limiting conception”.

In this connection, Hartshorne says, as regards “pre-cosmic nature of God”. that the temporal series has neither beginning nor end, and that “pre-cosmic nature of God” should mean, not God before the creaturely process, but God in abstraction from every particular form or world-constellation which this process has actually taken. For, as all such forms are contingent, we are at liberty to conceive alternatives for every one of them, and the pre-cosmic nature is merely what all such possible forms have in common. Not before but in all times, actual or possible, is the meaning”. (1952:321).

Radhakrishnan holds that “It is not necessary for this universe to be an infinite and endless process. The character of a finite universe is not incompatible with an infinite Absolute. We can have an infinite series of terms which are finite. The Absolute has so much more in it than is brought out by this world”(1937:344). From this Hartshorne thinks (1952:321) that Radhakrishnan seems to suggest that actuality is finite, since it is not the entire infinity of possibilities. His argument is, “If the temporal series were finite, of course it must have a beginning and an end. But why should it be finite?... But we have the distinction between infinite and absolutely infinite, infinite in some and infinite in all respects or dimensions, to cover that point”(1952:321).
Up to now, we have considered Hartshorn's questions about Radhakrishnan's treatment of Absoluteness. Hartshorne remarks that his questions about Radhakrishnan's treatment of Absoluteness are not representing issues between East and West. His judgment is that Western traditions are mostly at least as unsatisfactory as to these points, and in much the same way, "if there is a difference, it is perhaps this. The West has a strong drive toward logical precision, but a drive frustrated, for many centuries, in its application to metaphysics by other strong trends in our (Western) culture, such as clerical authoritarianism, in some respects more virulent here than in India. The trend toward logic is at long last beginning to come into its own even in the philosophy of religion. The Orient never was so inhibited from applying exact logic to religious thought; but also it has had a less keen interest in logic generally (Hartshorne:1952:321). Therefore, Hartshorne imagines that "Radhakrishnan for example, may care a bit less than I do about the sort of questions I have been propounding; though I should have more hope of his being able to give an at least roughly satisfactory answer to them than I should have with reference to many a type of Western philosopher or theologian". (1952:321-322).

"The thought of Radhakrishnan illustrates that convergence of traditions which some of us think one of the most hopeful signs in our world. What formerly seemed to divide say Hinduism from Christian theology, appears more and more as due to certain arbitrary emphases found in both, emphases tending in opposite directions, but recognizable in both cases as arbitrary, and therefore as correctible without loss of basic insights. Radhakrishnan seems to feel, for example, how slight is the gap between himself and Whitehead. And it is not only these two who can easily understand each other. For Whitehead substitute Fechner, Pfleiderer, Peirce, Montague, even James and Bergson, and the distance from the Eastern thinker is still only moderate. For a really harsh and irreconcilable opposition to his views we should have to look to Roman Catholic official philosophy, on the one hand, and to positivism, dialectical materialism, or other radically
anti-religious doctrines, on the other. And indeed, we shall see more and more that the vital divisions are not between East and West, but between theism and atheism, with a cross division between intellectually reactionary and intellectually progressive versions of theism or of atheism, or perhaps better, between purely absolutistic or eternalistic and "surrelative" or temporalistic versions. Radhakrishnan is an illustrious representative of progressive theism which some take to be the hope of mankind (Hartshorne: 1952:322).

Radhakrishnan replies to some of the questions raised by Hartshorne. In relation to the question of the relation of God and Absolute, Radhakrishnan (1952:796) says that "These are not to be regarded as exclusive of each other. The supreme in its non-relational aspect is the Absolute; in its active aspect it is God. The Supreme, limited to its relation to the possibility which is actually accomplishing itself in the world, is the World Spirit." As we have seen, it is a claim of Hartshorne that the concrete and relative is more than the abstract and the absolute. To this Radhakrishnan holds that this "view assumes that the distinction of God and the Absolute is one of separation, which is not the case. The actual is more than the possible. The abstract possibility and the concrete realisation are both contained in the one reality, which is Absolute-God. The two aspects represents the absolute silence of the Spirit and its boundless movement. The silence is the basis of the movement, the condition of power. The distinction is only logical, the silence of the Spirit and its energising are complementary and inseparable. The infinite is both amurta, formless, and murti, formed. The coexistence of the two is the very nature of Universal Being. It is not a mere juxtaposition of two opposites. The Divine is formless and nameless and yet capable of manifesting all forms and names" (1952:796).

"The forms are not the objects of thought but creative conceptions in the mind of the Supreme, which is not restricted to any one form. But when we take up this universe, the Divine as working in it is said to be the world Spirit. The Bhagavadgīta says, "I support this entire
universe pervading it with a single fraction of myself” (ekamsena x, 42). The world spirit guides and controls the concretisation of one specific possibility. If we break up the supreme into the Absolute which is the eternal home of all possibilities, God who is creative freedom and World Spirit which is the active principle of this cosmic process, then the question is relevant whether or not the World Spirit is more concrete, more full of content than either God or the Absolute. We may then say that the Absolute is deficient not only in actuality but also in any kind of activity, and God who is creative power is already related to the world. The Supreme has three simultaneous poises of being, the transcendent Absolute, Brahman, the creative freedom, Isvara, and the wisdom, power, and love manifest in this world, Hiranya-garbha. These do not succeed each other in time. It is an order of arrangement and logical priority, not of temporal succession (Radhakrishnan:1952:796:797).

According to Radhakrishnan, the tendency to regard Isvara or God as phenomenal and Brahman or the Absolute as real is not correct. This is a distinction of great significance which we should preserve, if we are to have a balanced view of the Supreme” (Radhakrishnan:1952:797). He says, “Brightman’s whole criticism about my vacillation between the non-dualism of Sankara and the personal theism of Ramanuja is based on the postulate that the Supreme must be either the one or the other, which I do not admit”. (1952:797).

In relation to the question whether we can be certain that the possibility chosen for accomplishment in this world will be completely actualised, Radhakrishnan’s answer is yes. The divine purpose with regard to the world is not inexhaustible. Radhakrishnan (1952:797) agrees that the possibilities are inexhaustible, but not that any specific possibility is inexhaustible. “If we are not certain that the divine purpose with regard to this world will be realised, the cosmic process will turn out to be an unending pursuit of a goal which will for ever remain unaccomplished. There must be the assurance of the eventual triumph of this possibility of the
realisation of the ideal. Apart from this, life and effort would be meaningless. The gift of freedom to the human being is real and his abuse of it may conflict with the divine purpose. The wickedness of man may retard but cannot overpower the gracious purpose of the Divine. the accomplishment of the purpose of the world is contingent on the co-operation of human individuals with the divine will. If we feel certain that it will be accomplished, it is because we are certain of the power of divine love which will subdue man’s obstinacy and selfishness. It may take infinite time; ‘infinite’ meaning indefinite or incalculable”. (1952:797-798).

“This view assumes the reality of human freedom, and therefore, God does not impose his will but is perpetually giving Himself. He shares in the life of finite creatures. He bears in them and with them the whole burden of their finitude. A God who is indifferent to the fate of the world cannot be the god of love. There can be no love without sorrow and suffering. Either the love of God is a fiction or the sorrow of God is a reality. Through the conception of avatar or descent of the Divine into the world, Hindu thought brings out how the Divine through suffering voluntarily accepted and endured brings the goal nearer. His triumph in a universe of risks is certain” (Radhakrishnan:1952:798).

2. Radhakrishnan and TS:

The same method followed in chapter VI.B1 in order to determine Radhakrishnan’s idea of God will be followed in this section both to determine TS’s idea of God and to compare it with Radhakrishnan’s idea. The comparison is necessitated by the fact that not only Radhakrishnan and TS belong to India but also both are admittedly panentheists.

Both TS and Radhakrishnan are products of Hinduism. Though Radhakrishnan is influenced by Hindu thinkers, he himself says that he is not the follower of any in its entirety. His thought does not comply with any fixed traditional pattern. His thinking had proceeded from his own experience (spiritual experience) not by mere study or reading.
In the same manner, TS holds that his philosophy has come out of his experience, not out of the study of Dvaita, Advaita, Dvaitādvaita; Śaiva, Pasupata, Vēdas or Āgamas (SJ: 39, 9,45,56,62,71, Sūtra of Sarvasūnyaniśāhāna sthala) which were existing in India. TS calls his philosophy Sivadvaita (SJ:39), Vīraśaivism (SJ,45,71).

Following Hartshorne and Reese, we have held that Radhakrishnan is a panentheist. It is because of the following reasons.

1) Radhakrishnan affirms (i) that the real temporality as well as eternality of God, (ii) that the God includes the world without prejudice to its reality or the freedom of its members, (iii) that God is conscious of himself and of the world and (iv) that God is suffering. Hence he is a panentheist.

In the same manner, TS is a panentheist because he affirms that (i) God is both eternal and temporal (SJ:32, Sūtra of Mahālīṅga Sthala), (ii) God includes the world which is real (SJ:71), (iii) human beings are free (SJ:282), (iv) God is conscious of the world and of himself (SJ:36,39) and (v) God is suffering (SJ:432).

2) For Radhakrishnan, God is personal having three aspects; Brahma, Vishnu and Śiva who represent the three characters of God viz, wisdom, love and goodness, and creator, redeemer and judge, respectively.

For TS also, God is personal and performs five functions, viz, creation, preservation and destruction of the world (which Radhakrishnan's God also performs) and veiling and benediction (tirōḍhāna and amugraha) (SJ:71). Here one is tempted to take note of TS's ascription of five functions to God as against Radhakrishnan's ascription of only three. However, a closer examination reveals that there is no difference between the two views, for, when Radhakrishnan speaks of God as judge (the Śiva-aspect), he really means three aspects of TS's God, namely, destruction of the world, and veiling and benediction of creatures. As omniscient and perfect...
judge, God, according to TS, (1) binds the creatures to *samsara*, (2) redeems them from *samsara* when they deserve it, and (3) if the creatures all become incorrigibly wicked, and show no sign of spiritual life, he destroys the world. When Radhakrishnan refers to Siva as judge, he has in mind all these three aspects (of TS’s God).

Again when TS speaks of many gods, like Brahma, Vishnu, Rudra, Isvara, Sadasiva, Upamatita (SJ:63), who perform cosmic activities like creation, preservation, destruction, veiling and benediction, respectively (SJ:193), one is tempted to regard TS as a henotheist, rather than panentheist. But he is in fact a panentheist. Because these gods are said to be the result of God becoming (SJ:63). Or still better, Siva (God) performs these activities as Brahama, Vishnu, etc.

(3) TS holds, as Radhakrishnan does, that there is the primordial nature of God, which is the home of the conditions of the possibility of the world, and it is the primordial mind. (SJ:31, 32, Sutra of Mahāliṅga sthala). But Radhakrishnan calls this nature Brahma aspect of God, and TS does not do so.

TS like Radhakrishnan admits that the primordial mind is prior to the world. For both the primordial mind becomes the things of the world (SJ:Sutra of Mahāliṅga). For both the process of transformation of ideas into the plane of space-time as a gradual one.

The individual beings, in the world process, struggle to throw off their imperfections and in order to reflect the patterns in the mind of God. This is held by both. For TS, individual beings move from Bhakta stage to Āikya stage in order to attain their perfect patterns in the mind of God.

(4) TS and Radhakrishnan both hold that there is an aspect of God, called sacrifice. Vishnu represents this aspect according to Radhakrishnan, and Rudra according to TS. This aspect, Rudra, is such that it is engaged continuously in destruction, in opposing every tendency.
in the universe which makes for error, ugliness and evil, which are the concrete forces giving reality to the cosmic strife.

For both TS and Radhakrishnan, there is love aspect of God. Vishnu is representing this aspect according to Radhakrishnan, and Sadasiva to TS. For both God is gracious and protector.

(5) For both TS and Radhakrishnan, God is organic with the world. The relation between God and world, for both, is such that God cannot be detached from the world, God is related to the world as soul to body, the world is completely depending upon God, God is the sustainer and guide of the world. Struggle and growth are real in the life of God.

(6) For Radhakrishnan and TS, the process of the world is an emergence. But this emergence is not of the type suggested by Alexander. TS holds that the process of the world is because of God's līlā (own spontaneous sport) (SJ:Śūtra of Mahālīṅga sthala), it is like seed becoming tree (SJ:67,80) or sea gives rise to waves (SJ;71) This means that the process of the world is not a mere unfolding of what is contained in the beginning. Thus for both of them, the end of the world is not contained in the beginning such that God might retire from the process altogether. The world is in the making, and being created constantly, as Radhakrishnan holds. As Radhakrishnan holds, the creative impulse is present from the beginning, but the forms created are due to the cosmic stress.