CHAPTER IV

PANENTHEISM - I

In Chapters II and III our discussion lead to the conclusions that (i) classical theism is incoherent, (ii) TS's position is different from that of classical theism and (iii) TS's position is free from the contradictions involved in classical theism. These conclusions give rise to a cluster of questions of which the important ones are: If TS's position is not classical theism, then which theory is it? Is it pantheism or panentheism or something other than these? Is his position a coherent one? Or which one of the existing theories of God is coherent? These are the questions we discuss in the chapter IV, V and VI. In chapter IV we discuss the problem as to which one of the existing theories of God is coherent. The answer to this question will help us to decide the position of TS as well as the coherence or otherwise of it.

A. MONOPOLARITY AND DIPOLARITY:

I

Both in East and West, regarding the concept of God, there are three thoroughgoing speculative theories of a religious dimension: the classical theism, the classical pantheism and the modern panentheism. The question is, which of them is coherent. Let us now first examine theism.

"The terms theist and theism, following their slightly earlier etymological equivalents deist and deism, are altogether modern, were (according to the Oxford Eng.Dict) in the 17th Cent., first used in contrast to the already established terms atheist and atheism (Plato had used atheos and atheots), as, e.g., in Cudworth's The True Intellectual System of the Universe (London, 1678...). During the 18th cent. "theism" and "deism" were used interchangeably
(indeed as late as 1827, the 2nd ed. of Samuel Johnson's Dictionary makes them synonymous) to indicate a philosophical as opposed to a dogmatic belief in God (natural theology as contrasted with revealed), with deism, however, as the dominant and more controversial term. Although Shaftsbury, as early as 1709, had written (through Palemon);" I consider still that in strictness, the root of all is Theism; and that to be a settled Christian, it is necessary to be first of all a good Theist" (The Moralists, pt. I, section 2), it was not until the 19th century that theism came commonly to be recognized as the normative philosophical expression of the Christian religion, and at the same time, critically distinguished from deism and pantheism as its logical extremes." (Hartshorne: 1956: 774).

"Theism is distinguishable from monotheism (belief in one God) only in that it is chiefly a philosophical term and connotes something more than mere contrast with polytheism (belief in a plurality of God)." (Hartshorne; 1956; 774).

Theism "signifies belief in one (theos) who is (a) personal, (b) worthy of adoration and (c) separate from the world but (d) continuously active in it" (Owen:1972:97). According to theism, God is a subject possessing not only mind but also will. Being fully personal, he can be addressed "thou" in prayer. Theists regard this personal God of religion as the ultimate reality. In this they differ from such thinkers as Sankara, Hegel, and F.H. Bradley, for whom personal images of God are intellectually immature depictions of a suprapersonal Absolute." (Owen:1972:97).

"Theists claim that God merits adoration (or worship) on two grounds. First he is wholly good. Second, he excels men in power. According to theism proper (or theism in the strict sense), God is infinitely powerful both in himself (as self-existent Being) and, consequently, in his relation to the world" (Owen:1972:97).
"Theists hold that God is, in his essence, separate from the world. This belief distinguishes theism from pantheism, according to which the world is a part, or a mode of God. According to theism proper, God created the world ex nihilo. Admittedly "theism" is also sometimes applied in a loose sense to the view that God imposes form on pre-existent matter. But this application is valid only if the other requirements of theism are satisfied" (Owen:1972:97).

"Theism always involves the belief that God is continuously active in the world. In this it differs from deism. According to deists, a word first applied to a group of eighteenth-century English thinkers-God, having made the world at the beginning of time, left it to continue on its own. Theists (notably Aquinas) on the other hand, maintain that every item in the world depends for its existence on the continuous activity of God as the creator, so that ex parte Dei "creation" and "preservation" are identical" (Owen:1972:97).

"Because deists remove God from continuous contact with world, they are hostile to the orthodox Christian claim that God has supernaturally revealed himself in a series of events which reached their fulfillment in the Incarnation. Hence Toland, claiming the support of Locke, interpreted Christianity as the reaffirmation of the truths of natural religion. Certainly the Christian does not claim that the facts of revelation (or, a fortiori, the dogmas based on them) can be deduced, or in any way established, by pure reason; but he can validly claim that the idea of such a revelation is compatible with theistic (as it is not with deistic) premises" (Owen:1972:97).

"Theism is thus contrasted with deism, which implies the total transcendence of God to nature, and with pantheism, which by identifying God with nature becomes a doctrine of exclusive immanence" (Hartshorne :1956:774).
Although 'theism' is a modern term, "it is manifestly applicable, in varying degrees, to 
many ancient and medieval, as well as modern, philosophies, eg, those of Plato, Aristotle, 
Plotinus, Anselm, Albert, Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Kant, Lotze, etc. A recent 
use of the term in combination with naturalism viz, theistic naturalism ... makes God an aspect 
of, or a principle within, the process of nature; with natural process as the ultimate category, 
however; such a view is to be sharply distinguished from theism in the strict sense." 
(Hartshorne:1956:774).

Let us know then pantheism, "The doctrine that the universe, the all of reality is God. 
Unless further defined, the doctrine is exceedingly vague. What sort of unity and character has 
the cosmic whole which is equated with God? Is it a growing or a forever-fixed totality...? Is it 
conscious? Do the parts possess freedom in relation to the whole, or the whole in relation to 
the parts? To which of the parts is the whole most analogous in character? Such questions 
are not answered by the mere identification of universe (in some sense) with God (in some 
sense). Confusion must result, therefore, from the employment of the term (without careful 
qualification) as synonym for an "impersonal" God, as though the universe as a whole could not 
possibly possess personality; or for the absence of freedom in man, as though a whole must 
consciously control its parts; or for sin and ignorance on God's part, as though properties of 
parts may automatically be ascribed to their wholes, so that, for example, a small part would 
mean a small whole! Such usages are attempts to smuggle highly controversial doctrines into 
the mere definition of a term in common use" (Hartshorne:1956:557)

"The phrase, "all is God", has two chief meanings, according as we construe the "all". 
(1) The totality of actual being, just as it stands, is simply God. In that case, God is completely 
bound by actuality, and actuality is bound by God ... Neither God nor anything else has an 
identity distinguishable from that of other things, all is simply one and one is simply all. This
view does indeed denies all definite character to anything; contradicting freedom, making it impossible to absolute God from responsibility for evil, at the same time making man as necessary to all the good in the world, and so by implication as much its creator, as God (there being no degrees of necessity). Spinoza's philosophy is the classical example of this type of pantheism". (Hartshorne:1956:557).

"(2) The totality of actual being of potential being, this totality viewed as having a "flexible self-identity" independent of its actual parts, is God. On this view, actuality is not an eternally fixed sum total but a variable self-identity no matter what else may or may not be actual, or who has enjoyed and will enjoy "himself" at all times whatever. Not that God is in all respects the same no matter what his parts may be, but that he is in all cases the same individual, as a man (though here not in all circumstances) is the same person through the variety of his experiences. On this view there is no individual essence of God which is not identical with the whole of actuality, nor is any actual thing part of this essence, even though God as a whole, essence and accidents, is the same as actuality as a whole. This second form of pantheism is better called panentheism. The first form might be called "traditional" pantheism, since it is actually though perhaps not often clearly and unambiguously, intended by the term" (Hartshorne:1956:557).

Let us now know panentheism. " The view that all things are within the being of God, who yet is not merely the whole of actual things. If God were merely the system of actual things, then, should a different system be possible, it would be possible that God should not exist or should not be himself. Hence either God must be a purely contingent being, and anything might happen to him, including being, and anything might happen to him, including his destruction, or all things, just as they are, are necessary. On either construction God and other things are upon the metaphysical level, whether of pure contingency or of pure necessity.
Panentheism holds, on the contrary, that the self-identity of God is independent of the particular things which exist and the particular totality they form, and that consequently God may exist necessarily, although all other beings exist contingently. God exists, to be sure, in a different state for every difference in the existing whole, for he is that whole, but it is a different state of the same being, or of the whole as having a flexible selfhood, the individual essence of which is unaffected by the accidents of existence. This makes the inclusive whole analogous to a human personality, which contains many things not essential to its self-identity. A man is the sum of things which fall within his experience, but he is more than that sum, and many an item could have been missing (or have been replaced by another) without making his self-identity impossible. Panentheism claims to reconcile the legitimate motives of ordinary pantheism (God is simply the de facto-or the eternal-whole of things) and the contrary extreme (things other than God are in no way parts of his being). Panentheism admits that there is in God something independent of particulars, but holds that this something is merely the "essence" of God whose entire nature includes also accidents, each of which is the integration of all the accidental being in a given state of the universe. Panentheism sees in God not just another example of whole or totality, unity in multiplicity, but the supreme and most excellent example of "goodness" "Knowledge" and other concepts". (Hartshorne:1956:557).

"The earliest clear-cut panentheism (though without use of the term) seems to have been that of Fechner. The theological views of Montague and Whitehead are recent examples". (Hartshorne:1956:557).

We have seen the positions of theism, pantheism and panentheism. When the question of coherence or otherwise of these theories arises, it is the view of the recent authors, eg. Hartshorne, that panentheism is, and the others are not, coherent. Let us now consider to what extent the view stands to be valid.
It is to be noted that classical theists and pantheists favour the concept of perfect, wholly independent, eternal, immutable necessary, wholly actual, absolute, simple God. The way in which they define God as wholly independent, absolute, perfect etc., is called the monopolar concept of God. As Hartshorne and Reese point out, the method involved here is this: "taking each pair of ultimate contraries, such as one and many, permanence and change, being and becoming, necessity and contingency, the selfsufficient or nonrelative versus the dependent or relative, the actual versus the potential, one decides in each case which member of the pair is good or admirable and then attributes it (in some supremely excellent or transcendent form) to deity, while wholly denying the contrasting term" (1976:1-2). This is called the method of categorical contrast, following this method the classical theism and pantheism are the products. The only difference between classical theists and pantheists is that "theism admits the reality of plurality, potentiality, becoming- as a secondary form of existence "outside" God, in no way constitutive of his reality; whereas pantheism, properly so called, supposes that, although God includes all within himself, still, since he cannot be really complex, or mutable, such categories can only express human ignorance or illusion. Thus, common to theism and pantheism is the doctrine of the invidious nature of categorical contrasts". (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:2).

The reason for adhering to monopolarity is that: divine reality is considered superior to the reality of the world; as one pole of each categorial contrast is regarded as superior to the other; and what is regarded as superior pole is ascribed to divine reality by denying the inferior pole. This reasoning leads to the dilemma: "either there is something outside of deity, so that the total reality is deity-and-something-else, a whole of which deity is merely one constituent; or else the allegedly inferior pole of each categorial contrast is an illusory conception. Theism takes one horn of the dilemma, pantheism the other" (Hartshorne and
Reese:1976:2). "The dilemma, however, is artificial; for it is produced by the assumption that the highest form of reality is to be indicated by separating or purifying one pole of the ultimate contrasts from the other pole" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:2)

To contrast divine reality from all else many dichotomies are used. There is for instance in the East, especially in India, the appearance-reality contrast. Though this type of contrast has emerged quite early in Parmenides, no importance is given to it as it is in India; instead other dichotomies are used in the West, they are: necessary-contingency, cause-effect, active-passive, independent-dependent, absolute-relative, infinite-finite, immutablemutable, unextended-extended, etc. This type of characterizing divine reality is also called negative way. For, all the first terms in each contrast are negative, including the terms "necessary", "cause" "active" and "absolute". That is, "necessary" means "could not have been otherwise", "cause" is the independent term in cause-effect relation, and "active" as it has been used theologically connotes "impassable", incapable of being moved or influenced by another.

Now, the question is: whether the negative way of characterizing God is consistent; whether one pole which is considered as superior in the categorial contrast retains its superiority when separated from the other pole which is considered as inferior; whether one pole of the contrast can be taken off by itself separating it from others; in what way one pole of the contrast is superior and the other inferior.

It is evident that one pole of the contrast cannot be taken off by itself separating it from the other pole, and applying it to something else. The Law of Polarity, advocated by Morris Cohen, supports this view in experience, logic and intellectual history. "According to this law, ultimate contraries are correlatives, mutually interdependent, so that nothing real can be
described by the wholly one-sided assertion of simplicity, being, actuality, and the like, each in a "pure" form, devoid and independent of complexity, becoming, potentiality, and related contraries" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:2). For instance, "The causes we know are equally, in some relationships, effects; the dependent things are also independent (of some things); and where there is actuality there is passivity. Only by passivity or by being partly an effect can an activity relate itself to, or take account of, other activities. To know something is, as Aristotle saw, to be affected or influenced by it. We are effects of our ancestors and causes of our descendants, but it is the ancestors of whom we have definite knowledge, not the descendants" (Hartshorne: 1978:401). But in classical theism and pantheism this law is violated; instead it is held that superior unity and actuality of God excludes the reality or presence of multiplicity and potentiality. And also it is held that, God is the only exemplification of holding superior pole of the contrast in their pure form free from all mixture with the contrasting pole.

Let us turn to consider the question of superior and in inferior poles of the contrast. It is held by classical theists and pantheists that divine reality is superior to, more excellent than, the reality of the world, and the divine reality can be ascribed only by what is considered as superior pole but not by inferior pole of the contrast. It is not clear in what way one pole is considered as superior and the other inferior. Is "unity" superior because it is a member of or an integration of a plurality? Is "being" superior because it is conceivably more or less than a factor in the becoming of experience and its objects, from which becoming we must have abstracted? Is "necessary" superior because it is merely in its own terms rather than as a common element of all possibilities? Is activity superior because it is separated by passivity? Is actuality superior because it is not essentially the realization of potency and the ground of potentialities for further actualization? But answers to these questions are very problematic; and theists and pantheists have given no adequate reason to their claim of superiority or inferiority of the poles.
of contrast. As Hartshorne points out, (1978:402) the only reason they have given "was that it is better to be immutable than mutable, cause rather than effect, independent rather than dependent." Then the reason for the claim raises the problem of value, and offers a theory in which all values are on one side of the categorial contrast and disvalues all on the other side. As Hartshorne (1978:402) says, this is simply false, and looked at closely, a strange, theory. For, it strangely implies "our inferiority in principle to our ancestors, even our remote subhuman ancestors, and it also implies the superiority to us of an insect that interests and thus influences us, or the sun that warms us, without our doing anything applicable to the insect or the sun! Worse it implies that the versatile human sensitivity, of which all our empirical knowledge is a development, makes us inferior to the atoms that are so much less variously passive" (1978:402). And the theory falsely implies that value would be all on one side of the contrast and disvalues all on other side; for instance cause is good and effect bad. But "To say that cause is good but effect bad is to say that speaking is good but listening bad, or writing books is good but reading them bad. It is also to say that it is good that God causes and influences us but bad if our existence and actions make any difference to God" (Hartshorne:1978:402). But this claim is contradictory to the other claim in which theologians assured that God knows, loves, and cherishes his creatures. For, according to this claim God would be affected by the creatures that he loves, by things he knows; as a result disvalues would be on God's part. So, it is clear that, theist's and pantheist's view regarding categorial contrast that one pole is superior and the other inferior, is incoherent, and without reasons.

What theists and pantheists have affirmed regarding the categorial contrast as superior and inferior is also contradictory to our experience (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:3-4). For, "experience does not... exhibit the implied essential inferiority of the theologically despised contraries (except those that are themselves genuinely negative like, "ignorant" and
"involuntary") (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:3). It also does not exhibit that the invidious contrast excellent-inferior has a tendency to coincide with that between such polar contrasts as one-many, cause-effect, active-passive, actual-potential; but that this invidious contrast breaks out indifferently on both sides of the polar contrasts. For instance, often we condemn things or persons as defective or bad, if their unity or simplicity integrates inadequate complexity or variety, if their complexity or variety is inadequately integrated into unity; and again persons as defective if they are too exclusively passive to the influences of others, if they are insufficiently subtle and versatile passivity towards others, for their wooden inflexibility, mulish stubbornness, inadaptability, unresponsiveness. Sometimes we call persons good if their passivity is likely to accommodate sensitivity, responsiveness, adaptability, sympathy; all these mean that other things are influencing them. We know also that it is good if there is unity-in-variety, or variety-in-unity, i.e., unity and variety are balanced; but bad if any one of them is overbalanced, for, if unity is overbalanced, there would be monotony or triviality, if variety, there would be chaos or discord. Whether overbalance is of unity or variety, neither would have any value whatever; for, one is as bad as the other. Therefore, what it shows is that values are not on one side of the contrast and disvalues all on the other side. There is good or superior unity, and complexity, as well as, bad, or inferior unity, and complexity; and the same is the case with active-passive and other contrasts.

But that is good, as it is shown earlier, in which both poles of the contraries are harmonized or balanced. We call plurality good for its richness or variety of functions and constituents, but mere simplicity cannot be good. There would be the greatest beauty where the parts retain their maximum individuality and yet are integrated into a single reality. "Thus drama is a greater art than mere decorative design, where the constituents are mere colours and shapes". (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:4). So, as all these indications show supreme excellence
must not be ascribed by only superior pole, unity, excluded by inferior pole, complexity, as it is held by theists and pantheists, since there is no such superior and inferior pole; but "must somehow be able to integrate all the complexity there is in to itself as one spiritual whole. Whatever is part of any whole would be even more completely integrated in to this supreme whole, which could as well be called the least as the most "simple" reality". (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:4).

The way that we arrive at of characterizing deity, is neither classical theistic nor classical pantheistic, but panentheistic according to which "in order to indicate the supreme case-or, if you will, the inconceivable supercase-of the general conceptions, we must equally affirm both poles of each pair of ultimate contraries" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:4). One may think that in affirming both poles of the contraries there would be a contradiction. But contradiction can be avoided by positing two main aspects in the essence of the supreme being and applying one pole supremely to one aspect and the other pole supremely to the other aspect. It should be noted that, to one aspect of the essence of the supreme being one pole of the contrast, and to the other aspect the other pole, supremely apply, but with the only limitation of the general inadequacy of all human ideas (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:4). "What we must strictly negate of both aspects is any nonsupreme form of either pole, any mediocre or merely ordinary unity or complexity, activity or passivity, self-sufficiency or dependence" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:4). But where these mediocre forms have their place, they must be contained in supreme reality, since it contains the supreme complexity of all things. True that even these mediocre forms are included in God, but not in his essence, in either of the two aspects spoken of, but in his accidents. "For, according to this doctrine, (which may be called the "theory of dipolarity"), God will, like other individuals, but as a supreme case or supercase, have an individual essence, and he will have accidents as well, so that what is "in him" need not, for all that, be in
his essence. To have accidents, some accidents or other, will be a requirement of the essence, by virtue of
the pole of contingency, relativity, passivity; but the particular accidents which God has will be strictly outside his essence" (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:4). What the essence here means is "the individual in abstraction from all in him that is accidental, or without which we would still be "himself" (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:4). Now the question is, if mediocre forms are all contained in God, then does it not mean that he must be characterized by mediocre forms and thus there must be defects in his essential characters? This difficulty is explained by saying that "everything - the supreme forms of both contraries and all mediocre forms as well - may be in God, without there being mediocrity, "defects" in any usual sense; in his essential character - and not even in the character of any of his accidental whole - states!" (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:4-5). To be clear, "Even mediocre forms of being will be contained in the supreme being by entering into his accidents; yet (nota bene) even these accidents will be characterized by mediocre predicates only in their parts, never as wholes" (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:4). It is just as "a building need not be small merely because it has parts that are so, or as one who has the mediocre and more or less erroneous ideas of others as his own objects of contemplation, without believing in them, need not fall into error himself. The building, the contemplation, may be exalted above all smallness or mediocrity and in this sense be 'transcendent' over all things" (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:4). So God may be exalted above all limitations or mediocrity and thus be transcendent over all things. Hartshorne and Reese (1976:5) conclude that in this way, we find an escape from the sterile dilemma of theism - pantheism by achieving a higher synthesis of the motifs of both.

II

So far we have seen that theist and pantheists have followed the method of categorical contrasts in which one pole is admitted as superior and the other as inferior. We have seen
also how this method is invidious in characterizing God. It is also already apparent that panentheists have followed the method of dipolarity, in characterizing deity, in which both poles of the categorical contrast are admitted. Here we shall see some more reasons given by Hartshorne and Reese, both dipolarists, for admitting both poles in describing God. Hartshorne and Reese argue that both poles of the categorical contraries do admit a supreme case of supercase. "If there may be a cause of which all else is effect, why not an effect of which all else is cause, a unitary or integral resultant not just of some but of all the productive factors in reality? And, again, if we can speak of actuality which includes or surpasses all actuality, why not also of a potentiality which embraces all potentiality? A power-to-become-actual which as such includes or surpasses all such powers? Or, why not a relativity consisting in this that a being is made what it is not simply by relationship to some but to all other entities? If the exclusion of all relations is a unique characteristic, perhaps the inclusion of all is no less unique. To put it in other words: since to reflect changes in some other things by changes in one's self is a feature of ordinary beings, such as men, to reflect changes in any and all other things can only be a feature of something indeed extraordinary and even very different in principle from ordinary things and surely not by way of inferiority!" (1976:5). Therefore in dipolarity, it is not considered that one pole of the categorical contrast is superior and that the other is inferior unlike in the monopolarity thesis; but that the categorical contraries are both supercase or supreme case. "If each category and also its contrary thus admit a supreme case or supercase (whether in univocal or merely analogous application), then it seems that either we have the idea of two supreme beings or we have the idea of one supreme being with two really distinct aspects - to one of which the supreme case of a category, such as unity, applies, and to the other, its contrasting category, e.g. diversity" (Hartshorne & Reese: 1976:5). But dipolarists reject the first, i.e., the possibility of two really distinct supreme beings, and follow
the second by giving reasons to show how the very same being would, in one aspect, be supreme effect and, in another, supreme cause.

This is the insight of dipolarity. If we are to find this insight of dipolarity in any philosophers from the earliest days, we find it in Plato, though in an undeveloped form, and he shows leanings towards monopolarity sometimes. Hartshorne and Reese claim (1976:5-6) that after Plato this "insight into the dipolarity of supremacy more and more waned until it became almost a blind automatism to identify God with "the absolute" or with the "purely", that is solely, actual, active, immaterial, immutable, and the like".

The reasons why the absolutist form or the form of monopolar thinking has been prevalent in theology and metaphysics for long centuries are given by Hartshorne and Reese (1976:6). They are as follows -

Firstly, monopolarity is prevalent because it is simpler than dipolarity. That is "it is simpler to accept one and reject the other of contrasting categories than to show how each, in its own appropriate fashion, applies to an aspect of the divine nature" (Hartshorne & Reese: 1976:6). Secondly, as a means of characterizing deity, it is considered that the absolute form of monopolarity is simpler than the relativistic form of dipolarity. The expressions, such as "the eternal being", "the necessary being", or "the independent being", which are of the absolutistic form, are useful to designate God as distinct from other individuals. Whether these expressions describe God in all of his reality, as monopolarists hold, or only in one aspect, as dipolarists think, "in either case, it may be maintained that other individuals than God are in no aspect eternal (they may in a certain sense be immortal), in no aspect strictly necessary or independent" (Hartshorne & Reese: 1976:6). But this consideration is based on the assumption that "God is the only individual who can, in any aspect, be designated by mere negation of a category (e.g. contingency, or becoming)". But as Hartshorne and Reese claim
"Such negation is indeed the simplest verbal way to distinguish him. The reason is that this aspect of deity is the abstract, partly negative aspect, less rich in meaning, and hence more readily stated. Temporality, even in the ordinary form, is not to be stated as a partial abstraction form eternity-eternity with something left out. No mere omission of anything will give becoming. A mixture of being and nonbeing will not do it; for the mixture itself must change or become. Becoming (on our view) is something positive and ultimate. Similarly, possibility is not mere limitation of necessity, rather, necessity is what is left when we abstract from all alternatives possibility. Thus, whereas, to reach the extreme supercase of the more abstract poles, simply negatives will do— for instance, "the ungenerated and undying one" can only be God— to indicate in a word or two the supercase of contingency or becoming is more difficult. We must say something like this: God is a being whose versatility of becoming is unlimited, whose potentialities of content embrace all possibilities, whose sensitive responsiveness surpasses that of all other individuals, actual or possible. There are many ways of saying it, but none are quite so simple as those which suffice for the contrary and abstract poles. The advantages of the latter are patent, given our human tendency to try to make things easy for our understanding." (1976:6)

The third reason for favouring one polarity over dipolarity is emotional and volitional attitudes (Hartshorne & Reese 1976:6). That is "the will to power" certain feelings natural to brutal political conditions, and a preoccupation with external manipulation of things all favor the preference of cause over effect, of activity over passivity." And "the longing for escape from the risks and uncertainties of life, under untoward circumstances, may induce a "failure of nerve" a lazy or despairing quest for mere security, which favours stress upon categories of permanence and being rather than novelty and becoming." But to this Hartshorne and Reese (1976:6) argue that however natural may be these attitudes, "they are not necessarily altogether admirable and their validity is scarcely self-evident, as compared to
contrary extremes such as the will to respond to others sympathetically - thus giving them in a
ever real sense a certain power over us - or the longing for adventure and the creation of
otherwise nonexistent values." And they also strongly hold that these contrary attitudes are not
inferior. "A theology which treats them as such encourages a one-sided sense of values which
may very well be one of the weaknesses in our religious traditions." (Hartshorne and Reese
(1976:6).

By these reasons, it is apparent that what induces monopolarists to identify God with "the
absolute" or with the "purely" i.e. solely actual, active, immaterial, immutable, and the like, is
the idea that if God in any aspect changes or is passive would be scarcely be better than a
contradiction in terms. Hartshorne and Reese, as dipolarists argue against this by holding that
there will be no contradiction if change is admitted in God. In order to show this they begin by
answering the question "What is meant by "God"?" (1976:7).

Their answer is ""God" is a name for the uniquely good, admirable, great, worship-
elicitng being." (1976:7). What is expressed here is the superiority of God. Further they
hold that the superiority of divine being "cannot (in accordance with established word usage)
be expressed by indefinite descriptions, such as "immensely good", "very powerful", or even
"best" or "most powerful", but must be a superiority of principle, a definite conceptual
divergence from every other being, actual or so much as possible" (1976:7). These expressions
are all general adjectives affixed by certain qualification; and they cannot express exactly enough
the superiority of God. For, "the divine superiority is regarded as a matter of principle not
merely of degree"; and "god is"perfect" and between the perfect and anything as little imperfect
as you please it is not merely a finite, but an infinite step." Therefore "with God", in order to
express his superiority, "all that is necessary to rule out every other individual is simply to omit
qualification of the general attributes." But with regards to "nondivine individuals, one must
always affix peculiar qualifications to general adjectives in order to reach individuals form of the
attributes in question; and this qualification cannot be any conceptual means be made exact enough to distinguish just the one individual from all others, actual or possible. To elucidate this, we "cannot say precisely, through principles or concepts alone, wherein the "nobility" of Lincoln in contrast to that of all other humane men actual or possible consisted. Or what constituted the precise "wisdom" of Confucius, in contrast to that of other sages. Or the strength of Caesar, in contrast to other strong men." Therefore, whenever the superiority of deity or his form of attributes in question is to be expressed it must be only by superiority of principle, a definite conceptual divergence from every other being, actual or possible. This divergence Hartshorne and Reese (1976:7) call "categorical supremacy". They also suggest that there is a monopolar and a dipolar way of conceiving such supremacy. "According to either way, the divine superiority is regarded as a matter of principle, not merely of degree" (1976:7).

Further, as said earlier the divine form of attributes in question can be reached only by omitting qualification of the general attributes; it could be expressed as: "He is good-period. He is wise-period. He is powerful-period." Therefore, "God alone is strictly or simply holy, omniscient, omnipotent; and this means that he alone is without arbitrary or peculiar limitation upon his righteousness, wisdom, or power... he and he alone has or is the conceptual ultimate in these attributes. Thus the essential meaning of certain basic value-concepts themselves must be exhausted if we are to "praise God" properly" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:7).

"If God is the conceptual ultimate of various attributes, without arbitrary qualification, then his merit is not a mere matter of fact, for factuality always consists in introducing some qualification upon concepts." Thus when it is said that "God" is a name for the worship-eliciting being, excellent, uniquely good, and the like, worship here "is not just an unusually high degree of respect or admiration; and the excellence of deity is not just an unusually high degree of merit. There is a difference in kind" (1976:7). For, "wherever there are gradations, we can distinguish between these only on a factual basis by comparison."
as when we say that this is larger than that or better than that we cannot say through mere concepts, how large or good. (A meter is a comparison with certain objects known to exist.) Where, however there is no question of degree or quantity, but simply of the ultimate fulfillment of a concept, no factual comparisons are needed complete our meaning" (Hartshorne and Reese :1976 : 7)

We have seen that God is the conceptual ultimate of various attributes without arbitrary qualification. In this connection we shall now consider other aspects?. When the question of conceptually ultimate form of basic attributes arises, that is not the question of fact, but of knowledge and the concept of existence; it must be considered whether, as a question of knowledge as such, in principle "there can- or must be an all-inclusive knowing, an actual omniscience"; and whether, as a question of the concept of existence, there "can or must be a being who "exists necessarily", whose existence is so utterly secure that his non-existence expresses neither a fact not even so much as a possibility" (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976 : 8). It is the essence of God, claim the theists, to exist, while the existence of all other things, though a fact, is only accidental.

Two things follow from this claim of theologians: one, in some sense "God must coincide with being as such; for he cannot be without existence, and therefore equally existence cannot be without him, so that the very meaning of "exist" must be theistic (or else theism is itself without cognitive meaning, as positivists say it is). Second, "God is thus the great "I am" the one whose existence is the expression of his own power and none other, who self-exists rather than is caused, or happens, to exist-and by whose power of existence all other things exist " (Hartshorne and Reese 1976:8).

From these implications it would be evident that it is not possible to conceive more than one God. First, suppose that "several Gods" could exist, then this "existence" must be something distinguishable from any one of them; from this it follows that they do not self-exist and do not
exist by being identical with existence. Hence by definition, they are not "Gods." Second, suppose that there are several beings and self-existence were to be attributed to each, "then for any one of them the others would constitute a sort of environment which it did not control; for since all would enjoy self-existence, all would be essentially equals. In such a democracy of supreme beings it is only the democracy itself that could be genuinely self-existent, dependent for existence on nothing else; and thus the members of the democracy would not self-exist after all and would not be "Gods."" (Hartshorne and Reese 1976:8).

This consequence that there could be but one God is inevitable. As Hartshorne and Reese pointed out, "This inevitability of monotheism provides (again through ambiguity) one more source of the monopolar prejudice. There can be but one deity; there are many nondivine beings, hence the divine may legitimately and innocently be contrasted to other realities as the One versus the Many" (1976:8). However, it should be noted here that, since there are no class of parts or factors or states in God, according to monopolarists, oneness here concerns not to deity but to individuals, and there could be no class of deities for there is only one member in the class (1976:8). In this connection, Hartshorne and Reese pose a logical question "may there not be a genuine class of parts or factors or states of the one divine individual?" The answer to this question would show a dipolarist's position, and would be clear if we consider a similar but related point.

The point is the "necessity" of deity. It is the monopolarists' opinion that the "necessity" of God, which follows from categorical supremacy, refers to his existence and thus what is meant from this is that everything in God's total reality is necessary, that God's total reality is necessary, that God could be in no fashion be other than he is. On the contrary it is Hartshorne's and Reese's (1976:8), opinion that the "necessity", of deity, which follows from categorical supremacy, and refers to his existence as an individual, does not mean that everything in God's total reality is necessary, but only that he could not fail to exist as himself. Now, these two
opinions are different from each other: that God could in no fashion be other than he is is not equivalent to saying that he could not fail to exist as himself (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:8). The first denies the possibility of different states in God, and asserts that whatever is in him is actual; while the second allows the possibility of different states in him through which he could be himself and could not fail to exist as himself. But Hartshorne and Reese (1976:8) argue that when monopolarists mean by the "necessity" of deity, which follows from categorical supremacy and refers to his existence as an individual, that everything in his total reality is necessary, that ceases to be a truism. The reason given, by Hartshorne and Reese is that "categorical supremacy is a comparison (or an incomparability) of God with respect to other individuals, not of the actuality of God in contrast to what he himself might have been" (Hartshorne and Reese 1976:8). If this is the case, this would be genuine answer to the question posed by Hartshorne and Reese earlier. There could be a genuine class of parts or factors or states of the one divine individual. He could be himself through a variety of states and yet could not fail to exist as himself. It is also clear by this account that there would be no contradiction in admitting changes in God, different states in him.

Since God could be himself through a variety of states, Hartshorne and Reese (1976:9) hold that a categorically supreme form of this very distinction between individuality and states is not required. However, they react to the claim that being must have priority over becoming since divine existence must be self-existence, hence must be involved in the very concept of being or existence and say that we need not accept this customary argument (1976:9). On the contrary they hold that "becoming is not inferior to being" since "any general concept or principle will express categorical supremacy, so long as arbitrary factual limitations are unnecessary in order to distinguish the divine individual from others" (1976:9). Further, they hold that "where as other beings are accidental products of becoming, we should think of God as qualifying becoming essentially, so that he is always certain to become, his life being a
process inherent in all process, in process as such, or within which all process must occur, therefore beginningless (for his beginning would be a process independent of him and with himself as accidental product) and for the same reason endless. If several Gods become, then none of them could be the essence of process but must be its products or accidents” (1976:9).

Here, supposition of two Gods, one of which is the essence of process and the other of being, is not legitimate. For, they are not distinct from each other, “being becomes, or becoming is - being and becoming must somehow form a single reality” (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:9). It is also a conviction of modern philosophy that becoming is the more inclusive category, (which does not mean "more real") and this conviction it differs from most previous philosophy (1976:9). For, the process of becoming includes being and more. Being is an abstraction of various real common factors from the stages of becoming, as redness is in diverse stages of process, Further, "Process is not merely the identities of "being": it is the identities with the differences, or rather it is the diverse states with abstract aspects of identity. Of course we can also say, "The present state of becoming is"; but this is no more than to say, "The present state of becoming". The "is" adds nothing. Questions about being arise in present experience and for present experience. "This experience" (as involving more than just "may", or just human, experience) is the final reference to concretions. And this experience is always something that becomes " (1976:9).

There is the old Platonic objection to the dipolarists' conception of the deity as changing. The objection tends to show that the supremely excellent or "perfect" being cannot change, for all change implies previous or subsequent defect and hence that would be against the concept of the perfect being. But Hartshorne and Reese (1976:9-10) the dipolarists, point out that this objection is ambiguous. For them, admitting any change in God would not be against the conception of his perfections. God could be perfect as well as changing. By "God is perfect" they mean: "He has no possible rival (no equal or superior) among individuals. He
could not be equaled or excelled by another" (1976:9). There may be various meanings of divine perfection, but, they claim, none would be less than the above stated meaning. Now, their meaning of perfection leaves open the door for deity as self-excelling, as he could be excelled by himself in another state. As they claim, "Through such self-excelling the most excellent being changes not into a more excellent being, but into a more excellent state of the same being" (1976:10). The point here is that the conception of God as perfect leaves open the door to changes in him, and that disproves the objection posed by the old-Platonists to the conception of deity as changing.

However, since God is said to be the conceptual ultimate of various attributes, and values, the question is: Could God really be excelled by himself in another state or could he be self-excelling? For, it seems that "the conceptual ultimates of values must exclude even self-excelling"; and therefore "In those attributes of righteousness, wisdom, and power, with which we have so far been dealing in our account of categorical supremacy, God cannot be excelled even by himself"; and he cannot go beyond what is already the uttermost possible. (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:9). But Hartshorne and Reese (1976:9) maintain that this view is mainly based "on the assumption that these attributes do admit an ultimate form". Though it seems that they do admit an ultimate form-as "ultimate goodness is the adequate taking into account of all actual and possible interests, each given its due, ultimate wisdom is clear, certain, adequate knowledge, whose content is all that is, as it is, the actual as actual, the possible as possible; ultimate power is power adequate to control the universe in the best possible way", but granting all these, Hartshorne and Reese hold, "it does not follow that all categorical aspects of value admit ultimate forms" (1976:9-10). Let us see how they do not admit ultimate forms. This is shown by taking an instance of happiness. Happiness is an aspect of power or wisdom, for, no one "wants wisdom or power except as it somehow contributes to or forms part of someone's happiness" (1976:10). Then, what is "ultimate happiness"? How can we get
an idea of ultimate happiness? Hartshorne and Reese (1976:10) say that the idea of ultimate happiness is a pseudo-idea; and they also claim that "The theological treatment of this question seems to have been for the most part, weak and fallacious". It is weak and fallacious because, the clues that are given to get an idea of ultimate happiness would be in no way helpful. For instance, it is said that happiness is contentment. By this measurement we cannot get the idea of the state of ultimate happiness. Firstly, "If happiness is contentment, then a satisfied oyster is as close to ultimate happiness as a man can ever get". But the state of ultimate happiness is not merely contentment, for, "to take as the measure is an insult to all animals above the very lowest" (1976:10). Secondly, this measurement to what happiness in principle is seen to be in conflict with the idea of "absolute happiness". For, as Hartshorne and Reese say (1976:10), this absolute happiness must accrue from or even coexist with wisdom. But wisdom is knowledge of all things, the mixed knowledge of good and evil things; which means being aware of vast misery and much intense suffering in the world as well as of much joy and immense quantities of pleasure (1976:10).

What then is the state of absolute happiness? It is clear that this "state could not be mere absence of discontent; for as we have seen, to take that as the measure is an insult to all animals above the very lowest" (1976:10). Then this state must be "the logical monstrosity": complete satisfaction of all possible desires - so to speak, infinite success of the advertisers in awakening desires, and infinite success of the producers in meeting them" (1976:10). Then, could higher beings ever get this state? Higher animals have correspondingly many ways of being discontented, and their desires are more complex, richer, more inclusive than others and their satisfaction when they are satisfied is indeed superior, but, as Hartshorne and Reese claim, "they are no more likely to be completely satisfied". Further they claim that, "there are incompatible desires and values." They are in principle subject to incompatibilities. For, the whole universe "cannot be very possible kind of harmonious whole but must be one kind, excluding others
that might have been”. It is just like “a sonnet and a ballad exclude each other’s merits”.
Eventhough we try “to put them together in a superpoem”, we will “meet alternatives,
mutually exclusive possibilities for the superpoem”. "Since beauty and richness of experience
vary not only as to harmony or unification of the factors but also as to variety and depth of the
contrasts among them, absolute richness must be unification of absolute variety. But absolute
variety could only mean all possible variety. Here again we run into contradiction: there are
mutually exclusive form of variety” (Hartshorne and Reese 1976:10).

Therefore, if all categorical aspects of value do not admit an ultimate form, then God
would not be perfect in terms of Plato’s definition: “God is eternally perfect; hence of course,
he cannot improve or in any sense increase in value”. For, this account “implicitly denies all-
inclusive value, happiness to the supreme individual” (Hartshorne and Reese 1976:10).
Hence, Hartshorne and Reese (1976:10) suggest that we must "proceed more cautiously and
define "perfection" rather as the categorically ultimate form of all attributes that admit such form
(it can be shown that they are abstract aspects of value) and the categorically superior form of
all attributes that do not admit an ultimate form (they are all ways of expressing the concrete
value, happiness)". "By categorically superior we mean such that no other individual can rival
it, thus leaving open the door to self-excelling. Through such self-excelling the most excellent
being changes, not into a more excellent being, but into a more excellent state of the same
being. God acquires, say, some new quality of enjoyment. He has not changed from "himself"
into another person, another individual, any more than I do when I engage in a new
conversation, perhaps with an old friend. This is no doubt only an analogy, but the
theologian cannot dispense with analogies. The question is : "Does he play fair with them: does he give every promising analogy its due consideration?". With respect to the most
theologians of the past, the answer (we suspect) is: "Far from it". God has (they held)
consciousness analogous to a man’s consciousness but not a body analogous to a man’s body.
He has will analogous to will in us, understanding analogous to our understanding, but nothing analogous to sensation or emotion; above all, nothing analogous to diversity of states with an enduring personal self-identity. Thus the asserted analogy is rendered problematic in the extreme by the negation of analogies logically inseparable from it" (1976:10-11).

Let us take the question of conceptually ultimate form of omniscience, and consider whether there would be any contradiction in admitting changes in God. Now, omniscience would mean the knowledge of all things; and the conceptual ultimate of it is only God, the supremely excellent one. However, it is not only the case that God knows all things, but also that any experience to be that of him, must be ideally clear and accurate as to its objects, must be infallible and adequate. As a consequence, God knows not only this world, but, if another world was or is possible, he was or is having the knowledge of it also. However, divine knowledge of this world is different from divine knowledge of some alternative world. But as in the case of this world, divine knowledge of some alternative, must be ideally clear and accurate as to its existent objects but with diverse objects existing and divinely known as existing.

Criticising the classical idea that: "God knows in eternity and in a wholly necessary way whatever at any time exists to be known" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:11), Hartshorne and Reese argue that "the notion of an eternally fixed total content of "all time" is a contradiction in terms". To be clear: "Time is "objective modality" (Peirce); it unites determinate, actual, past reality with indeterminate, potential, future reality. This union is perpetually enriched by new actualities, and there can, by the very meaning of time or process, be no ultimate totality of actualities for anyone to know" (1976:11).

With this idea of classical theists, as Hartshorne and Reese (1976:11) point out, it is still maintained by most logicians that all truth, even truth of fact, is timeless or tenseless. That is according to this view, if "It rains in Dharwar on July30,1984", is found true on that day, it would have been true had someone asserted it in 1980 or 1900. "Thus from the standpoint of
truth there is no such thing as an open future or indeed as 'future', save in the sense of later than some other event". There is no such qualitative difference between futurity and pastness as that between the determinate and the indeterminate. There is really no 'becoming', for every event simply is what it is in its locus in the temporal series, as viewed by the timeless eye of "truth". The totality of events does not become but timelessly is. But, then, neither do single events become; for if a single event became or came into being, there would to that extent be a new totality" (Hartshorne and Reese 1976:11-12).

Against this view—that all truth even truth of fact are tenseless or timeless (Hartshorne and Reese 1976:12) argue that though it may be well for purposes of logical analysis as it has convenient simplicity, it is incorrect. For, "it is an error to deduce the view in question from the Law of Excluded Middle if that is taken as a principle limiting propositions to the two values, true and false". There are some propositions of fact that cannot be said to be either true or false, that are not capable of being true or false. Take for instance the proposition about the fact: "It will rain in Dharwar on July 31, 1984". Suppose that this proposition was false in 1980. What follows from this? As Hartshorne and Reese suggest, it does not follow that "It will not rain in Dharwar on July 31, 1984" was true, but only that one and only one of the two following propositions was true: (a) "[As of 1980] it will not rain in Dharwar on July 31, 1984" or (b) "The relation of rain to Dharwar on July 31, 1984, is [in 1980] still indeterminate, a matter of open possibility". Here, Hartshorne and Reese suggest that one may say at any later time: "As of 1980, the relation ... was indeterminate". If this is the case, "we have ... three propositions, two of which must be false and one true in each case: 'It will', 'will not', 'There is [when the statement is made] no settled will or will not' concerning the predicate, place, and date in question". Thus, besides will and will not, we have may-or-may-not as mods of predication, not, however, as truth values. "May-or-May-not" must itself be true or false" (1976:12).
Further, as Hartshorne and Reese suggest the statements of the form "Rain in Dharwar, at time T" are not complete propositions capable of being true or false, according to creationists. For them, unless a proposition concerns mere abstractions like those of pure mathematics, it must describe some section of process from within some section of process. "A tense is always involved, explicitly or implicitly. To admit the tenseless formulation of propositions concerning matters of fact and yet to contest the tenseless theory of truth would indeed be foolish" (1976:12).

From these considerations we realize that eternal knowledge of "all time" is not possible. For, there is no eternally fixed total content of "all time". As the content of "all time" is perpetually enriched by new actualities, divine knowledge of it will also be enriched perpetually. Thus, God acquires new contents of knowledge. As divine knowledge is enriched perpetually, the most excellent being changes not into a more excellent being, but into a more excellent state of the same being. He has not changed from "himself" into another person, another individual, but into his another state. As Hartshorne and Reese claim (1976:11), God could have been "himself" though with other "experiences". Therefore, by different states of divine being due to this different experiences, and by admitting changes in him, his prerogative of existing necessarily cannot be renounced.

"However, even granting the possibility of an eternal knowledge of "all time", we may still argue that, if another totality of temporal things was possible (as theologians have generally held and as must be held if creation is regarded as a free act), then the divine knowledge of the existence of this other totality must also have been possible. Thus one still does not escape the implication of an alterativeness of divine states. This alterativeness, however, is intelligible only in temporal terms; for it is meaningless to say that eternity might have happened to be otherwise than it is" (Hartshorne and Reese :1976:12).
So the claim, of believers in the monopolar tradition that a God who in any aspects changes is no better than contradiction in terms, is without grounds. The claim is asserted mainly because of the assumption that to admit changes in God would mean renouncing his prerogative of existing necessarily, and that necessity of existence means there is no need to adjust to others. But the earlier arguments of Hartshorne and Reese show that this is not so. That is, for them (dipolarists) admitting change in God would not mean renouncing God's prerogative of existing necessarily, and thus necessity of existence means "unlimited capacity to adjust successfully - that is, with preservation of the individual integrity-or it means ability to adjust to all others, whoever and whatever they may be. Given such capacity, the individual cannot fail to exist" (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:13). That is, for instance, "If I can be myself, whether I do this-at a certain time-or that, experience this or experience that, am in this possible state or in that possible state, then God as necessarily existing may differ from me in principle thus: his possible states are co-ordinate with the possible states of existence in general, and so, whereas some possible states of existence in general would mean that I, for example, could not exist at all, by contrast, in any state of existence in general God can and will exist in some thereto appropriate state of himself" (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:1213).

As we saw earlier, in order to avoid the contradiction (assuming that there would be contradiction if change in God is admitted), i.e., to save God's prerogative of existing necessarily, monopolarists claim that necessity of existence means no need to adjust to others. This would lead to consequence which go against the classical theist's position itself. That is, if existence means no need to adjust to others, then it means that everything in God is on the same level of necessity as the universal traits of existence as such. If everything in God were on the same level of necessity as the universal traits of existence as such, then he would not be anything more or less than just these traits themselves, i.e., he would not be a concrete individual rather than an abstract universal or complex of universals. On the contrary, for
classical theists God is a concrete individual. He must be so because "contingent facts are knowable not through concepts alone but always, in part at least through direct intuitions. (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:13). This contradiction cannot be resolved intelligently in monopolar terms, but can only be resolved in dipolar terms. "God Himself" for dipolarism, "can, with anything remotely like adequacy, intuit a whole-accident, a particular contingent state, of the divine life" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:13). He can see the actual contingent world "against the background of an immense if not an infinite past, and with no inhibitions of prejudice or apathy to dilute for his apprehension its wealth of qualities of life and feeling and sensation" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:13).

Thus, polar contrasts-necessary and contingent-are according to dipolarism, not rivals in merit, and a combination of them would not lead to any contradiction, and therefore cannot be viewed as invidious, as it is done by monopolarism, but are complementary poles of a unity in which all meaning and value are accommodated. And it is not bad also to compare "contingent" with "necessary" as monopolarists think, but there is a merit in doing so, and in distinguishing carefully, contrasting not the necessary as such with the contingent as such, but the necessarily existing individual with contingently existing individuals (Hartshorne and Reese :1976:13).

As we have seen the individuous account of God as exclusively and in all respects necessary, proposed by classical monopolarists on the ground that a changing God is scarcely better than a contradiction in terms, violates the law of polarity. We shall see also that the reverse account of God as exclusively contingent also does the same, and is also invidious. For, this account, which is "favoured by the prestige of empirical science" which "concerns itself with facts and sees necessities only in mathematics or logic", implies that the very existence of God is a mere accident, a mere matter of fact. (Hartshorne and Reese :1976:13).
We shall now ask the question, with a view to justify this account, whether, with regard to our fundamental concepts—such as omniscience, omnipotence, ultimate goodness, holiness, etc., any contingent being, any being as a matter of fact, could know absolutely all there is, be all powerful, ultimately good or holy, etc. In other words, could these fundamental concepts entail God whose existence is only contingent? Or do they require a necessarily existing God? Let us take the question of omniscience. It is certain, as Hartshorne and Reese (1976:13-14) think, that any contingent being could not know absolutely all there is. Such beings happen to know certain things and happen not to know certain others. This is all depending upon chance and circumstances, on mere facts, how their knowledge and ignorance, are distributed. But their ignorance, cognitive maladjustment and inadequacy, could never simply by chance and circumstance reach zero. This is mainly because: they exist by chance and upon sufferance of favorable circumstances and they are partly ignorant; which are the two aspects of the same limitations or deficiency. However, this is also because: their knowledge is not a pure matter of principle but of fact; "and facts may be favorable or unfavorable to knowledge of this or that given item" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:14). Therefore it seems impossible for a factually existing knower in such a limitation, that all the facts should ever be favorable with respect to all the objects of knowledge. But it is possible for a necessarily existing knower that all facts are ever favorable with respect to all the objects of knowledge. And "Only a being who knows things on principle, without contrary possibility, could, it seems be omniscient" (1976:14).

Now we can answer the above objection that the fundamental concept of omniscience cannot involve a being whose existence is only contingent, is a mere matter of fact. It is only a being whose existence is necessary that can be omniscient. Since God is said to be the conceptual ultimate of omniscience, such a conceptual ultimate could not just happen, and therefore, such a God could not just happen to exist.
Thus the claim that God is exclusively contingent, which implies that the very existence of God is accident, is a matter of fact, is invidious. Since the fundamental concepts require a necessarily existing being, no mere fact could account for them. For, a "fact" is "something whose denial is conceivable though false; that is a fact is the realization of a possibility. But absolute security or necessity of existence means an existence which is not to be contrasted to any contrary possibility; it means existence as a matter of principle and meaning, not merely of fact" (Hartshorne and Reese 1976:13).

We can make also similar remarks about other fundamental concepts such as ultimate goodness, holiness, omnipotence etc. Now, from these consideration three things should be noted here. One. Hartshorne and Reese (1976:13-14) hold that, "the solution of basic philosophical questions and of basic theological ones cannot be separated ". "Now the question, "Do first principles and meanings involve the existence of any being (who thus exists necessarily), or do they not?" is a question as to the content of the first principles or ultimate categories themselves. It is a purely philosophical question. For philosophy is the theory of first principles or ultimate categories. Unless, then, we know the necessary existence and essential nature of God, or his necessary nonexistence (for a merely factual nonexistence is meaningless here), we do not know what our fundamental concepts mean" (1976:13). Two, since fundamental concepts necessarily involve a being whose existence is necessary, here a "mere empirical theology", that is, the view that existence of God is matter of fact, is a contradiction in terms" (1976:14). For, The study of mere facts, as such, yields only facts, more or less universal or particular; but God as a matter of fact, however important or comprehensive or basic, is God as not God" (1976:14). Three, "The distinction between a priori and a posteriori proof for God is invalid. The proofs are all a priori, proofs from principles or categories, not from facts; proofs from necessities, not from contingencies" (1976:14).
Hartshorne and Reese (1976:14) claim that "Traditional proofs were really of this appropriate character, despite their seeming to rest upon some fact. The famous proof for an unmoved mover set out from a principle that actuality is (unconditionally) "prior to potentiality", that is, to any mode of reality other than actuality". And this proof for an unmoved mover can be posited without benefit of any particular facts, even the fact of motion.

However, with reference to this proof, the answer to the question-is there any thing prior to both actuality and potentiality - differs from monopolarity to dipolarity. According to monopolarity, prior to both potentiality and actuality there is nothing, not even potentiality. But for dipolarity, prior to both potentiality and actuality is a tension between them (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:14). For, "If nothing is either actual or possible, then there is no thought and no object of thought and no meaning and no truth. That this is so plainly could not be true. For the truth itself must be either actual or possible". Therefore, the alternative answer by dipolarity is that "there is an actuality which is not an actualization (of antecedent potentiality), which contains in itself the equivalent or superior of all that ever could be actualized, and from which all actualization (if such there be) derives". Further, for dipolarity, a process is neither simply actual nor simply potential but a union of both potential and actual. "In this process ever-new states of actuality, each with its own distinctive possibilities for further actualization, are reached. In accordance with this view, God is the union of supreme actuality and supreme potentially, supreme activity and supreme passivity, supreme being and supreme becoming, the most strictly absolute and the most universally relative of all entities, actual or possible" (1976:14).

As argued in case of the proof for an unmoved mover, Hartshorne and Reese (1976:14) claim that cosmological proof can also be reconstructed. But in all these cases God is predicated by each pair of ultimate contraries: such as actuality- potentiality, being-becoming, absolute-
relative, etc. Now, two questions arise in this connection. Is not such double predication contradictory? Must we also predicate the contraries good and evil to God? The answer given in relation to first question by Hartshorne and Reese (1976:14-15) is that "there is no law of logic against attributing contrasting predicates to the same individual, provided they apply to diverse aspects of this individual. Thus a man may be "simple" in his fundamental intention but "complex" in the details of his actions not perceptions". If God does not have diversity of aspects, as it is held by monopolarists on the assumption that he is sheer simplicity, then He cannot be both absolute and relative. But as it is apparent in the earlier exposition this assumption is questioned by dipolarists. According to dipolarists, in the aspect of simplicity "of deity to which "one" exclusively applies of course, there is not a diversity of factors; but in the aspect to which "Many" applies, there is" (1976:15).

With reference to the other question Hartshorne and Reese (1976:15) answer that since all ultimate categories are within God, and in one aspect of his reality he is most complex and includes all things, categories such as good and evil also do fall within him, "but each contrast is in God in its own appropriate way. Thus for instance, only really ultimate or categorical contrasts can be used to describe the fixed character of God, that which is essential to his very existence or individuality". Further they claim that evil in the sense of wickedness "is not in the divine 'character' at all", for it is not a universal category. "For example, animals are incapable of it, because of their unconsciousness of principles. And God is incapable of it" (1976:15).

It may be argued that since God includes within himself everything, and since his total reality is more than his mere character or essential individuality, "the contrast between God's goodness and the wickedness of various individuals does fall within God? To this Hartshorne and Reese argue that, it is true that it does fall within God "but not in such fashion that he
could be called wicked even in his particular states”. It is just as, (to use their analogy) a round stone may be within a square building.

However, Hartshorne and Reese (1976:15) believe that evil in the sense of suffering is a category, and therefore admit, in accordance with dipolarity, that God contains suffering, he suffers, and that it is in his character to suffer in accordance with the suffering of the world.

"Here the Christian idea of suffering deity-symbolized by the cross, together with the doctrine of the Incarnation - achieves technical metaphysical expression. In regard to this problem, Berdyaev is perhaps the most illuminating of all theologians or philosophers, though Schelling, Fechner, Whitehead, and many others could be mentioned here" (1976:15).

B. ETCKW:

To make still more clear the position of panentheism in contrast to other theistic doctrines, (theism’ is used here in contrast to ‘atheism’), we shall now consider the five questions: Is God eternal? Is he temporal? Is he conscious? Does he know the world? Does he include the world? Let us symbolize, as Hartshorne and Reese do, the affirmative answers to these five questions, respectively, as E, T, C, K, and W: that is, E stands for the answer that God is eternal, is devoid of change, whether as birth, death, increase, or decrease; T, that God is capable of change, at least in the form of increase of some kind; C, that God is conscious, self-aware; K, that God is knowing the world or universe, is omniscient; W, that God is world-inclusive, is having all things as constituents. It is to be noted that when it is claimed that God is both E and T, E is to be taken as God is in some aspects devoid of change, whether as birth, death, increase, or decrease and T is to be taken as God is in some aspects capable of change, at least in the form of increase of some kind. Whereas, when it is claimed that God is E but not T, E is to be taken as God is in all aspects devoid of change, whether as birth, death, increase or
decrease; and that God is T but not E, T is to be taken as God is in all aspects capable of change, at least in the form of increase of some kind.

As Hartshorne and Reese claim (1976:16), an affirmative answers to all the five questions together yields the doctrine of "panentheism" which is also called as "surrelativism". Now, with reference to E and T factors panentheists contend that to contrast God merely as E with the world as T is question begging. For, divine "time", like divine predicates in general, must be categorically supreme. Therefore, for panentheists, God has both E and T aspects (1976:15). However, if the joint affirmation of E and T is consistently carried through, it would ensure the doctrine of dipolarity in which there will be no favouritism as between ultimate contraries. It is to be noted here that "When E and T are thus affirmed, it is to be understood that each is meant to apply to a different aspect of the divine being, so that no formal contradiction results" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:17).

Further, with reference to C and K factors the term "know", "consciousness" need to be clarified. For, many times it is said that God is "superconscious" above or beyond consciousness or knowledge in contrast to being unconscious, and below conscious or below knowledge; and it is not clear what these expressions mean. In this connection Hartshorne and Reese (1976:15-16) claim that "knowledge" here is to be taken neither literally nor analogically but "in the sense appropriate to rigorously or categorically supreme excellence ..., and that such expressions as "beyond consciousness" are rather eulogistic or emotional than logical or cognitive. Since God is, by definition, categorically supreme, almost no one denies anything to his essential nature, save with the contention that he is better off without it". Some time attempts have been made by many to give meaning to such expressions as "beyond consciousness" or "beyond personality"—by claiming that God's consciousness or personality is beyond our mere human consciousness or personality in quality. But to this
Hartshorne and Reese (1976:16) argue that since God is the conceptually ultimate of consciousness which affirms the categorically supreme excellence of deity, and is also implying other kinds of consciousness as inferior, there is no need to affirm his uniqueness or excellence again by using such expressions as "beyond" or "above" which would be mere matter of rhetorical emphasis. Further, it is claimed by Hartshorne and Reese that the best form of consciousness or of knowing becomes conceivable only when the correct combination of C, K and W factors, along with the right relation of time has been found (1976:16).

With reference to W factor it is claimed by panentheists that "if God be conceived as in one aspect temporal, relative as well as absolute, "matter" as well as "form", there may be no longer any good reason to deny, but good to affirm, that through this relative, temporal, material aspect deity includes the world". But "in the absolute aspects of his dipolar nature the deity is not the actual world and does not even include it" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:15). However, "if God is all inclusive, of course this inclusiveness is not just ordinary inclusiveness, say, that of a man in relation to his cells, merely stretched to cover the universe". (1976:16). Now, there is a contention by classical theists against this world inclusiveness that "while God does not literally contain the universe, he does something much better, viz, enjoys a "more eminent" analogue of all its values, since he is cause of all its being and goodness, or since he is pure underived being and good" (1976:16). Against this contention Hartshorne and Reese argue that "we are not asking, for the moment, "Does he do something better than this or that" but only "Does he do this or that? A girl who admits that her fiance is not a professor is not thereby debarred from subsequently demonstrating that he is something even better (if this be possible), say, a great statesman" (1976:16).

On the contrary we have the history of theistic doctrines ('theism' is used here as against 'atheism') which differ among themselves in giving answers to our five questions In
no one of these doctrines affirmative answers to all the five questions are given. These doctrines can be exhibited now by omission of one or more of the five factors, the omission of which is taken here as denial. And we can now classify the historical theistic doctrines into eight, mentioning their initial representatives or founder, according to the answers given by them:

EC: The Supreme as Eternal Consciousness, not knowing or including the world. Aristotelian theism.

ECK: The Supreme as Eternal Consciousness, Knowing but not including the world. Classical theism. Philo, Augustine, Anselm, Al-Ghazzali, Maimonides, Descartes, Kant, Channing, Von Hugel, Aquinas, Leibniz.

E: The Supreme as Eternal beyond consciousness and knowledge. Emanationism. Plotinus.

ECKW: The Supreme as Eternal Consciousness, Knowing and including the world (so far as "real"). Classical pantheism. Asvaghosha, Sankara, Ramanuja, Spinoza, Royce, Jeffers.

ETCK: The Supreme as Eternal-Temporal Consciousness, Knowing but not including the world. Temporalistic theism. Socinus, Lequier.

ETCK(W): The Supreme as Eternal-Temporal Consciousness, Knowing or Partially Knowing, and Partially including the world. Limited panentheism. James, Ehrenfels, Brightman.

T(C)(K): The supreme as wholly Temporal or Emerging Consciousness, Knowing or Partially Knowing the world, and not including the world. Extreme Temporalistic Theism. Alexander, Berman, Ames, Cattell.

T: The Supreme as purely Temporal but not conscious and not knowing the world, and not including the world. Extreme Temporalistic Theism. Wieman.

(Hartshorne and Reese:1976:17).
Hartshorne and Reese claim that "The above table, granted its (we hope) not grossly arbitrary choice of initial representatives or founders of the eight doctrines, follows a chronological order" (1976:17). We can add panentheistic doctrine to this table for the purpose of comparing with other doctrines.

ETCKW: The Supreme as Eternal-Temporal Consciousness, Knowing and Including the world in his own actuality but not in his essence. Modern Panentheism. Śri Jiva, Schelling, Fechner, Peirce, Pfeiderer, Varisco, Whitehead, Berdyaev, Iqbal, Schweitzer, Buber, Radhakrishnan, Weiss, Watts (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:17). There is another panentheistic doctrine which Hartshorne and Reese classify as ancient or quasi-panentheism.

ETCKW: The supreme as Eternal-Temporal Consciousness, Knowing and Including the world. Ancient or Quasi-Panenthesim Ikhnaton, Hindu Scriptures, Lao-tse, Judeo-Christian Scriptures, Plato.

However, other than these doctrines, one can give still more possible views by the combinations of one or more of the five factors. In what way these views would be meaningful is a question to be discussed. But some of these views can be easily dismissed as obviously implausible. They are: firstly, "it seems unmeaningful to suppose that a being with full knowledge of the universe will lack self-awareness or consciousness, and hence we omit combinations like EKW or EK, which affirm knowledge but not conscious". Secondly, assuming that any being with (supreme) self-awareness will know what it includes, we need not consider such combinations as ETCW, which imply divine consciousness of a world including self, without knowledge of the world which is included". Lastly, "it seems evident that every being has some status with respect to time as well as eternity, in that it must be one of the following: (1) in all aspects eternal; (2) in all aspects noneternal or temporal; (3) in some aspects the one and in some aspects the other. Accordingly, every admissible combination must
begin with E or with T or with ET, and there can be no such truncated combinations, as CWK, which would be silent as to temporal status" (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:17).

Now, what we know from the history of theistic speculations is that, as Hartshorne and Reese point out, the founders or representatives of these doctrines were experimenting to formulate adequately their doctrine of God by omitting, retaining and combining, of one or more of the five factors. That is to say, we have "Aristotle's self-enclosed deity, whose entire being consists in "thinking of thinking", awareness concerned only with itself", as a result of omitting all factors except eternity and consciousness. The classical theism, the standard doctrine of medieval and early modern theology, Jewish Mohammedan, and Christian, is the result of omitting temporality and world inclusiveness. The One of Plotinus resulted by omission of all the factors except eternity. We have "the God-totality, conscious and cognitive, of Spinoza, and (less equivocally affirmed) of Royce" as a result of omission of temporality alone. Brightman's temporalization of classical theism has resulted by the omission of world inclusiveness. The emergent theism of Alexander and others is a result of omitting eternity alone. And lastly, "Wieman's view of God as the mysterious creativity in life which, though not aware of self or world produces ever-new values" is a result of retaining temporality alone (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:17-18).

Now the question is, whether these intellectual experiments, of the theistic speculators in conceiving their doctrine adequately by the omission of one or more factors, have succeeded. Hartshorne and Reese (1976:18) hold that "none of the omissions succeed that the "truncated" views really are mutilations, and that thought has been forced back, more and more imperatively, to the integral panentheistic conception adumbrated by Plato". Because, by these truncated doctrines, it is not possible to conceive the best form of consciousness, or of knowing or inclusiveness; it can only be conceived when the correct combination of those
factors, i.e. CKW goes along with the right relation to time. And that possibility is only in
panentheism. It is true, as Hartshorne and Reese hold, that our thoughts are forced more and
more imperatively, to the integral panentheistic conception. That is, if we are the holder of any
one of the above presented eight doctrines, we are forced towards panentheism by leaving
truncated doctrines. To make it clear, let us consider these doctrines and see how the tension
arises in them.

Let us take the doctrines: E and C. E, the One of Plotinus - in which eternity is in
abstraction from consciousness and knowledge, and from actual world - is deficient in actuality,
"is mere form without content, unity which unifies nothing- save unity itself" (Hartshorne and
Reese: 1976:18). Regarding EC, the Aristotle's theism, it is to be noted that "self-awareness is
empty of content unless the self has some other mode of awareness than its awareness of its
awareness of its awareness of what?". Thus, "every subject, even and especially the supreme
subject, must have objects which are other than just itself" (1976:18). Further, with regards to E
and EC it is to be noted that, "If the Supreme lacks awareness of the world ..., then he is not
supreme in awareness. Besides, the adequate awareness-of-X is logically X plus something,
and thus there is no sense to the notion of something superior to all possible awareness"
(1976:19). Therefore what we realize from these considerations is that E and EC doctrines
are incomplete unless one adds CKW and KW factors to them respectively. However, we
shall see in considering ECK doctrine that "if the supreme has awareness of the world, then, ...
it cannot be without the contingency and change of the latter it must contain the world within itself
(1976:19). If this is the case, then T and W factor should also be added to E and EC doctrines.
Thus, we have to say further that E and EC doctrines are incomplete unless it is further added
CKWT and KWT factors to them respectively. This shows as Hartshorne and Reese claim,
how the thought is forced towards the integral panentheistic concept of deity.
Let us take the doctrine of classical theism, ECK. In ECK it is asserted that God is immutable, without change, and that the world is outside him. That means, ECK excludes T and W factors. But from the foregoing we shall see that how there is a necessary to add further T and W factors to it in order to make it complete.

It is evident that in ECK God has awareness or knowledge of the world. In this connection Hartshorne (1976:7) claims that: "To know is to sustain a genuine relation to the known, a relation that must be contingent if the known is so; hence, a being without internal contingency cannot know contingent things". What is suggested here is that God, being omniscient, must also have internal change. But it is paradoxically asserted in ECK that knowledge of the objects does not change, is wholly necessary though the objects of this knowledge change, are contingent; and that, a complex knowledge of X is immutable, is wholly without contingency though a constituent of this complex is mutable, contingent. To resolve this paradox the only way open to classical theists, is to say that "what there is in the divine is only the "knowledge of" rather than "knowledge of X" "(Hartshorne and Reese :1976:18), which seems to be senseless. Classical theists are not ready to admit temporal aspect in God, rather they try to resolve these conflicts, without admitting the T factor, but their efforts are futile. It is said that "God knows directly his own essence and that, this being the cause of all, knowledge of its imparts knowledge of X" (1976:18). Hartshorne and Reese argue against this: "If God knows that by knowing his essence he knows X, then he knows X, and there we have the complex in question. If not, he is ignorant of something known to classical theists". (1976:18). Further, it is told by classical theists that "God could conceivably have "decided" not to cause X" (1976:18). To this Hartshorne and Reese argue that the God's essence, then, must be neutral, as between existence and non-existence of X. "For God cannot have been free to decide against something implicated in his very essence. If, then, the existence of X, is not
implicated in the essence, knowledge of the essence will not imply knowledge of that existence" (1976:18).

We realize from the earlier considerations that if God is asserted as having awareness of the world, then, temporal aspect is to be admitted in Him. Now Hartshorne and Reese (1976:18-19) further holds that God, who has awareness of the world, should also include the world within Himself. Because they claim "knowledge is deficient unless it fully and literally contains its objects" (1976:18). But classical theists, the holders of the ECK doctrine, refuse to admit this, and ask how can the known be the knower?. The known, for them, must be outside and independent of the knowing. The reasons, that classical theists give are: we as knower do not literally include the known, therefore, God does not; that divine knowledge can literally include the world within itself is an unconscious piece of anthropomorphism. Since Hartshorne and Reese argue against classical theist position, we shall now ask: what makes us to think that the known must be within the knowing? Is it possible that the known is within the knowledge? Let us consider the second question, Hartshorne and Reese (1976:18-19) "distinguish the truism that the thing known must be other than the knowing from the quite different stipulation that the known must be outside the knowing". If this is the case, it is possible that the known is other than the knowing and yet not outside it. For instance, a "constituent of a whole is certainly other than the whole and yet obviously not outside it" (1976:19). As Hartshorne and Reese hold, classical theists fail to understand this distinction, and for this reason they hold that thing known must be outside the knowing.

Let us take the first question. We know that divine knowledge is radically different from human being's knowledge, and that the term "know" is here analogical rather than univocal. In other words, "human so-called "knowledge" of any concrete actuality is mostly ignorance and for the rest mostly guesswork and probability"; while divine "knowledge" is direct, infallible,
concrete, clearly conscious apprehension. Human beings can scarcely be said to have such knowledge as God has, because they do not include within themselves the objects that they know. " Granted that we do not "include" mountains when we "know" them, unless in some very attenuated sense of include, equally we do not know mountains, except in a very attenuated sense of "know", by comparison with what the world means when we say that God knows mountains" (1976:19). But "wherever our knowledge achieves something like infallibility, it also becomes evident that it includes the known within itself. Thus we know, in a sense infallibly, the aches and pains we directly feel", because we include also these feelings which are the features of our consciousness at the moment (1976:19). Therefore it is because the objects that God knows are included within himself, his knowledge of them is infallible, direct, concrete, clearly conscious apprehension. Though classical theists admit that divine knowledge of any concrete actually is different from human beings knowledge of it, they hold that human beings do not literally include the known therefore God does not. This is to forget that human beings scarcely be said to have such knowledge as God has because they do not include what they know.

Therefore, the ECK doctrine is also an incomplete doctrine, and it would be complete, as we saw earlier, when T and W factors are also included in it. It is to be admitted that if divine knowing includes within itself the world, the known, then God would have constituents. But classical theists consider that it would be an impiety that God has constituents, and therefore hold that divine knowing is indeed a self-enclosed reality, with the known entities outside it. As Hartshorne and Reese (1976:19) argue if it is supposed that "the divine knowing is indeed a self-enclosed reality, with the known entities outside it; we then have a total reality, God-and world, which is more inclusive than either, and of which God is one constituent and world the other"; "If it is held an impiety that God has constituents, what about the more obvious impiety
that he should be a mere constituent?" Of course it is true that "to have constituents in just the
way in which purely temporal ("corruptible") beings have them in certainly unworthy of
deity. But to have constituents in the manner appropriate to a being with no eternal aspect, but
for the rest (in categorically supreme fashion) temporal, is something that neither classical
theism nor classical pantheism, nor any other commonly held traditional doctrine, has
adequately considered". (1976:19).

To relate consistently the supreme to awareness and to the world, and to eliminate the
above paradox that there is something superior to the supreme, that entirety of reality other
than the supreme, the only way, as Hartshorne and Reese suggest (1976:19-20), is to admit
a temporal aspect of deity. For, "the temporal aspect of deity can very well include the temporal
world, since a changing whole can certainly contain changing elements, and since the novel can
certainly be known by knowledge similarly novel or the contingent by knowledge likewise
contingent" (1976:19-20). If so, then, there will be "nothing paradoxically superior to the
supreme, no entirety of reality other than the supreme itself, no more concrete object of
reference from which deity is abstracted". "Rather deity will be the integrated totality, the
ultimate concrete from which all abstract features are taken."

However, God-in whom a changing factor is included, and by which factor he can include
a changing world- can also include an unchanging factor. For instance, "a whole, in order to
change, has no need of altering all its components; indeed, it need not "alter" any, since it
will suffice to acquire new components. There is obviously change in the passage from abc to
abcd. Yet no component has altered, unless the absence of d be called a component- a strained
use of language at best" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:20). On the contrary, unchanging God
must be having all his aspects as unchanging (1976:20).
To speak in terms of necessity and contingency instead of change, Hartshorne and Reese hold, if God is accidental, not all his components need be so. For instance, a whole containing Abed components, if A has being by necessity and b, c, d are contingent items of existence, then it is true to say that Abed exists contingently. In other words "suppose A is the generic form "adequately knowing whatever exists as existent, and whatever is merely possible as merely possible" and suppose that b means "a certain thing adequately known as existent and as having a certain accidental character." and that c means "something else known as having another accidental character." A is then a necessary law of divine knowing, with contingent application to each particular case, what is not contingent being only that there are some such applications or other" (1976:20)

The doctrine of classical theism, ECK, in which T factor is omitted, faces other logical difficulties in relation to religious values. As Hartshorne and Reese put it, a "deity who cannot in any sense change or have contingent properties is a being for whom whatever happens in the contingent world is literally a matter of indifference. Such a being is totally "impossible towards all things, utterly insensitive and unresponsive. This is the exact denial that "God is love." It meant that nothing we can possibly do, enjoy, or suffer can in any way whatever contribute a satisfaction or value to the divine life greater or different from what this life would have possessed had we never existed or had our fortunes been radically other than they are "(1976:20). These difficulties are inadequately balanced in ECK. Not only in ECK, it was held in many traditional doctrines that it is legitimate to call such an unchanging as God of love, purpose, knowledge. As Hartshorne and Reese think, what we really have from this claim is "the idea of sheer power, sheer causation, by something wholly neutral as to what, if anything, may be its effects" (1976:20). "The naked worship of power is with wonderful exactitude, although unwittingly, enshrined in this doctrine".
Though classical theists omit the T factor in characterizing God it indirectly appears in their conception of God. "For example Jesus is a temporal being; yet, it was said, Jesus is God. Since identity is a transitive relation, it seems that God is a temporal being after all" (Hartshorne and Reese :1976:20).

Let us take the doctrines: $T(C)(K)$, and $T$; in which T factor is admitted. Here, the $T$ factor is without the combination of $E$ factor. It can also be with the combination of $E$. In case of $T$ without $E$, Hartshorne and Reese claim (1976:20), "the use of the word "God" is of dubious property", God would be merely a created entity, with no underived being whatever. Such a God one can speak only in mythology, but not in any philosophy or systematic theology. God, whose existence or essential individuality is eternal, can have much philosophic relevance. "The relevance lies just in the way in which deity alone among individuals is able to unite time and eternity, necessity and contingency, actuality and potency, and thus explain the categories by exhibiting them as abstractions from its own actuality. But this function is equally jeopardized by the omission either of $E$ or of $T$ from the union $ET$" (1976:21). If eternity is in total abstraction from time or becoming, such as $EC$, $ECK$, $ECKW$, then it would be abstract and deficient in fullness of actuality (1976:18).

We now realize that all doctrines other than ETCKW are incomplete and sacrifice categoriality. The reason is that these doctrines formulate the concept of deity, by omitting one or more of the five factors. Thus $EC$, $ECK$, $E$ and $ECKW$ doctrines omit the $T$ factor and with it contingency, relativity, diversity and complexity from the nature of God with the result that it is inexpressible in terms of the divine nature. Further, $EC$ omits the $K$ factor, the knowledge of contingent objects, from the divine nature by making it inexpressible. $ECK$, in order to escape the limitation that $EC$ has, admits the $K$ factor in characterizing God, but it does so, as we have seen, inconsistently. Therefore, only ETCKW doctrine escapes all these difficulties, and is the
truly categorial conception of God. In this doctrine all factors are reduced to their proper status as essential expressions of deity. In this doctrine "anything you please is either God as knowing the world, or the world as known by God, or some aspect of these; but, since the subject includes its objects, the form of the object is a form of the subject on its "content" side. To describe the knowing-of-all things is to describe all things known as well; so any category refers either to an aspect or to a member of the divine reality. Thus to be "actual" now is to be enjoyed by deity now (implying that there is a diversity of now's in God); to be "possible" now is to be something God may come to enjoy. The divine is thus not pure actuality but the standard or definite actuality, and by the same token he is the standard or definitive potentiality" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:21).

On the contrary, monopolarists hold the theory of pure actuality. But this theory "makes God neither the definitive actuality nor the definitive potentiality" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:21). Because, by saying that God is pure actuality which has no alternatives and is wholly neutral as regards alternative possibilities, we cannot say what is actual and what is merely potential. This theory, therefore, also makes God impossible to function as the omniscient being to measure all things actual as actual and possible as possible, as he must logically do so; for, he is not differential as between actualized and nonactualized potentialities in the world. (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:21). This incurable neutrality, implied by monopolarity, as Hartshorne and Reese hold, is metaphysical incompetence.

"Pantheists seek to evade the problem by denying that there is a real distinction between actual and possible (even Royce finally did this). They thus make deity differential (in Pickwickian fashion) by abolishing all intelligible difference. Against all these difficulties, the T factor is our safeguard. It makes the W factor, the pantheists' motif, innocuous and thus
opens the door of escape from paradoxes of a supreme reality which yet cannot intelligibly contain the totality of the actual" (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:21-22).

We have now two different interpretations of \(W\) factor: the one is rendered innocuous by \(T\) factor, the other is not; which may be put as ETCKW and ECKW respectively. As Hartshorne and Reese (1976:22) hold, to call both interpretation by term "pantheism" would lead to numerous fallacies of ambiguity. For, one of them is radically different in its implication from the other. Therefore, Hartshorne and Reese consider it appropriate in every respect to call ETCKW by the term "panentheism". They further claim that: this term has been used by many others but they have not always defined clearly their view. The position of ETCKW panentheism is that: "God is not just the all of (other) things; but yet all other things are literally in him. He is not just the whole of ordinary individuals, since he has unity of experience, and all other individuals are objects of this experience, which is no more sum of its objects; moreover, his identifying "personality traits" are entirely independent of any set of ordinary actual individuals whatever. To be himself he does not need this universe, but only a universe, and only contingently does he even contain this particular actual universe. The mere essence of God contains no universe. We are truly "outside" the divine essence, though inside God" (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:22).

We have discussed panentheistic idea of God, in contrast to other theistic ideas, with reference to five factors; in doing so, we have not discussed anything about divine will, freedom personality, power, creation, goodness, which are vital for religion. Therefore, we shall now discuss panentheistic idea of them contrasting to other theistic views ('theism' here is used in contrast to 'atheism'). Classical theists deride the pantheists because of their "impersonal deity", and in contrast hold that God has personality or is a person in the Trinity. But classical theists also cannot escape from the same charge that they have made against
pantheists. Because, God for classical theists, is entirely devoid of temporal process, of
potentiality, and of passivity; in these conditions, he cannot have personality. (Hartshorne
and Reese:1976:22). It is meaningless to ascribe personality to sheerly eternal being. The same is
the case with "will" and "freedom". If a being is sheerly eternal, devoid of temporality, of
alternative possibility, then, it is meaningless to hold that he could have been otherwise, his
volition, to create the world, could have been otherwise, than the actual one. Freedom implies
alternative of possible volition. In the sheerly eternal being, there is not scope for such
possibility. Therefore, if God is exclusively eternal - i.e., devoid of temporal process, of
potentiality of alternativeness; then, it is inadequate to describe him as free volitional
personality.

On the contrary, Hartshorne and Reese, as panentheists, hold that a fairly adequate
definition of divine will, freedom, personality, power, goodness will be constituted by the
correct interrelation of our five factors; "whereas, without these five factors, the traditional
terms will have no sharp conceptual significance but will be merely honorific or emotional, mere
epithets" (1976:22). Thus, "if God is an eternal temporal being, eternal in essential individuality,
temporal in the flux of his acts and experiences. If he is conscious and knows all things", then he
cannot fail to be also a volitional personality (1976:22). To make it clear, God is aware, of,
knows, things, and responds volitionally to what he knows. For, no one could be aware, in the
fullest degree, of joys and sorrows of others and not share these sufficiently to wish to further
the one and hinder the other (1976:22). "Awareness is essentially a response, an adaptation to
other". And personality would be an enduring individual character or essence in a flux of such
response and experience. This is what is known to psychology and common experience
With reference to divine personality, there is a problem: whether two persons must each be outside the other or not. As we have seen already, classical theists hold that two persons, even God and a man, must each be outside the other. To this Hartshorne and Reese (1976:23) argue that the claim that two persons must each be outside the other is a too-narrow and ungeneralized use of an anthropomorphic analogy. For, this claim may hold good with reference to human beings, since each is but a part of whole actuality; they are outside each other in space. But in case of God and man, it is not so. Here mutual externality is not required. That is, by following Fechner, Hartshorne and Reese hold that, "the whole of actuality, as content of the experience of one person, will be "outside" the other persons only as a whole is partly-outside its part...; they, however, will certainly not be outside it!" (1976:23). As Hartshorne and Reese point out, what is required here is mutual action and reaction, interaction between the whole person and part persons. If there is no such interaction, then, "since being is always (in one aspect) power, any part which, in relation to the whole, had no power to act but was merely passive would, in this relation, have no being, and hence, contradictorily, would not be a part".

By this account—i.e., the account that we have a power to act to which God reacts—panentheists explain the problem of evil in God. Since all contrasts fall within God, it must be the case with the contraries good and evil. Following Fechner, Hartshorne and Reese (1976:23) hold that "not all volitions in a mind need be by that mind", and therefore, evil, that is in God, is not his volition, it is of human beings; he "suffers evil acts, but his volition is always good". Why should God suffer our evil? Because, we are within as a self-decisive part, our freedom, to do good or evil, is not hindered by him, rather, he should enjoy or suffer our self-decision. For, as Hartshorne and Reese hold "To have a self-decisive part is not to decide that part but rather to enjoy or suffer its self-decision" (1976:23).
However, Hartshorne and Reese agree with Whitehead in holding that the claim, that God suffers our evil, "does not limit the perfection of the divine power but makes it the ideal case of what all power essentially is—power over powers, partial determining of the finally self-determined actuality of others, participation in their self-creation". Further, they hold, "According to many of the greatest philosophers, experiences are the very actuality of all things, and they are always in one aspect self-created. No mere manipulation of pre-existent things can make a single new experience, nor can anything not the subject of that experience make it to be what it is. It must make, enact, itself" (1976:23).

Let us discuss the notion of creation. Classical theists' idea of creation ex nihilo is that divine creation does not presuppose "matter" while ordinary creation does so. Ordinary creative power lacks something because its creation is from pre-existent matter; but in case of divine creative power, there is nothing in principle lacking because its creation is not depending upon pre-existent matter. Against this Hartshorne and Reese (1976:23) argue that though it is true that "ordinary cases of creative power lack, in principle, something reserved for the categorically supreme case" "still 'out of nothing' is a dubious way of formulating this categorically privileged way of creating". "Does God create an adult out of nothing or out of a child? The creative functioning of deity involved in the production of Beethoven's music certainly did not treat as nothing the free self-decisions of Beethoven's predecessors in composition. Only in connection with an absolute first moment of time has even divine creation not antecedent data or conditions" (1976:23).

About the goodness of God, Hartshorne and Reese (1976:23) claim that, in the consciousness and knowledge factors, that are ascribed to God, volition, power and goodness are implied. "For only a conscious being with complete knowledge, or one "to whom all hearts are open", can be trusted to use power in ways appropriate to the state of these hearts".
There is a venerable tendency, in theological speculation, to place divine power, cause, and eternity higher than divine consciousness, awareness and responsiveness. "To impute responsiveness or love or even awareness or volition to a nontemporal being has always seemed at best a pious fiction. Words like "knowledge" or "personality" or "will" come cheaply enough" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:23-24).

This tendency is part of the monopolar doctrine in which the contrast between God and other individuals is assimilated to that between being and becoming, or cause and effect, or simplicity and composition; and in which, therefore, it is said that the category of being is the object of worship, and the category of becoming is degraded. (worship of being is "ontolatry"); and that of cause "etiolatry". (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:24).

Hartshorne and Reese object to this tendency and exhibit a different logical approach in thinking about God in which room is made for ideas irresponsiveness, love, awareness and volition. In this logical approach becoming and effect are not degraded and being and cause are not objects of worship. But it is recognized that "both poles under each category apply in one way to God and in another to other individuals" (1976:24). Therefore, "God is neither being as contrasted to becoming nor becoming as contrasted to being; but categorically supreme becoming which there is a factor of categorically supreme being, as contrasted to inferior becoming, in which there is inferior being. Both poles have two levels, analogically but not simply comparable. The divine becoming is no more divine than the divine being, but both are incomparable (except analogically) to other being or becoming. For, the line of categorical supremacy must always be crossed" (1976:24).

"The divine becoming is more ultimate than the divine being only in the simple sense of being more inclusive, of being concrete while the other is abstract. So we maintain that our charge of cause-worship or being-worship or power-worship cannot be countered by the simple
expedient of accusing us of the contrary superstition, effect-worship, process-worship. We worship supreme-being-in-supreme-becoming, supreme-cause in- supreme-effect; that is, we worship the supreme, not any polar category. If it be said that, after all supreme-inferior is a polarity, we reply that even here we worship he supreme-as-containing-the-inferior and deriving enrichment from this containing. Even inferior being-becoming is not degraded in this doctrine but glorified by the recognition of its contribution to God himself. Nothing is debased to the status of irrelevance, whereas in the monopolar procedure all becoming and all effects are mere impertinence, since being just as being is held to have all value. God should least of all require the kind of praise that makes the better seem still better by saying that the inferior is even less than inferior, is nothing, merely evil or wholly negligible. But that is the kind of praise he has generally received!. We thus read our lack of imagination, or of generosity or simply of love, into God himself” (Hartshorne and Reese :1976:24).

C. IS GOD INDEPENDENT?

I

Hartshorne and Reese (1976:499-514) make clear the position of panentheism, contrasting it to the positions of other theists doctrines, with reference to the two questions:

(1) Is God independent of the universe of entities other than himself, capable of existing without them, or is he not thus capable?.

(2) Is God a perfect being, and if so, in what sense?.

They say, combined answers to these questions would yield nine possible, exactly defined versions of the supreme being. But "most of these versions are missing from the classical discussions; and indeed the classical arguments for God, as well as the counter arguments, can
be shown to depend for their apparent cogency upon restricting attention to some only of the nine cases" (1976:500).

Let us consider the first question: the question of independence. For classical theists, "God is the independent universal cause or source, the universe, his extrinsic effect or outcome. The universe is "outside" the divine actuality, not a qualification or constituent of it". On the other hand, for pantheism, "God is the inclusive reality and there is no ultimate cause distinct from an independent of the cosmic totality. The universe is within the divine actuality and qualifies its very essence or irreducible nature" (1976:500).

These are two different positions in answering the question. Here the issue is not one, there are many concepts involved in this question - "independent", "cause", and "all inclusive". "If theism holds that God is independent and cause but not all-inclusive, and pantheism holds that God is all-inclusive but not independent, and perhaps not (at least in the sense intended by theism) cause, then the two theories are extreme opposites or contraries" (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:500). One may wonder that on the same question there are two extreme answers. But it may be the case that these extremes are false. There may be a higher synthesis in which theism might be right on one of these issues and pantheism on the other, and in which God may be in some manner all three-independent, cause and all-inclusive. If that synthesis is possible we must examine whether these three concepts are logically compatible with each other.

Let us consider what exactly is the meaning of "cause" in theology. In theological case, the term means at least this: "something whose existence is requisite for, implied by inferable form the existence of its 'effects'" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:500). Here, there is no converse relation; as the effect requires cause, cause does not require effect. So, with reference to God and the world, it is held by the theological tradition that, God is independent of the world, does not require it, could exist without it, could have been himself, exactly as he is, without any
world whatever; while the world is depending upon God for its existence, requires him, and is qualified by its utter dependence upon God (1976:500).

As Hartshorne and Reese (1976:500) claim, this definition of cause makes God different in principle from what is ordinarily meant by a cause. "From a cause one expects to derive consequences, make predications; but from God, it seems, nothing follows. He has "made" the world, but, if he had made a different world or none at all, he would yet have been exactly what he is. Thus his effects do not seem in any sense to "follow from" their cause". Hartshorne and Reese call this definition a "radically asymmetrical" conception of causal necessity.

On the other hand, there is an alternative view about the cause in the modern thought: "In current science a cause is sometimes conceived as related to its effect, not by necessity but by probability; and this means that the existence of the cause involves that there shall be someone of a class of more or less likely outcomes. The cause necessitates the occurrence of some effect or other with a specified range of variability" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:500-501).

"In physics this relation is even convertible, the effect necessitating not any uniquely specifiable cause but only a class of causes as variously probable" (Hartshorne and Reese 1976:502).

"However, recent philosophy has marshaled evidence for the view that time is asymmetrical in its logical structure, so that, while the "earlier" never entails the "later" in its individual details, the later does strictly entail the earlier. A man's childhood is essential to his manhood, but not his manhood to his childhood. Not every child becomes a man at all, but every man has been a child. History, biology and psycho-analysis support the view that the present involves the past at least more completely than it involves the future; and an attractive philosophy of time holds that this "asymmetrical involvement" inheres in the very meaning of "earlier and later and that the past is involved absolutely (the past is immortal)"-
Whitehead, Bergson), while the future involvement requires only some member or other of a given class. But this it does require" (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:501).

Hartshorne and Reese (1976:501) call such asymmetrical cause-effect relation "moderate" asymmetry rather than "radical" asymmetry. "If such be the cause-effect relation, then there can be a formal analogy between divine and other causation. God's existence would make it inevitable that there be just this sort of world. Deity would be independent of (would not require or necessitate) any particular, world, but he would not be independent of world-as-such. The "Supreme cause", as pure or universal cause, would be that which, being required by all other things, itself requires only that the class "possible world" has some actual member." This is the panentheistic conception of cause, of cause-effect relationship, of God-world relationship, adumbrated by Hartshorne and Reese.

This moderate sense of cause implies that causes are also effects. "That 'causes are always also effects' means then that, besides being required as antecedents by certain things, they themselves require still other things as their antecedent conditions. The regress seems infinite, at least if time has had 'beginning" (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:501). Hartshorne and Reese do not dispute this concept of infinity. According to them, this definition of cause applies not only to concrete factors or conditions, but also to abstract conditions. Therefore, according to this definition, anything abstract or concrete, would be a cause of something if it is required by that thing; if it requires a given thing, it would in turn, also be effect of that thing.

Hence, "God as supreme (in the sense of universal) cause is what is universally required by other things and which itself requires only that the class of other things be not null". There is no inconsistency in this. It can be argued that if God is the supreme or universal cause, he is not concrete but abstract. For Hartshorne and Reese, God is not only the supreme cause in which case he may be abstract, but also concrete in his total reality. For, something concrete
may have an abstract aspect. (1976:501). "In this concreteness he may indeed be effect as well as cause, which means that he may require other things than himself to be just what he concretely and in fact is. In this his concrete total actuality God may interact with the world, receiving as well as imparting influence. Such a reactive being could not simply be identified with the supreme cause. But still it might, in an aspect of itself, be this cause". (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:501-502).

We must now decide whether cause, in the moderate sense just defined, or in panentheism, is to be conceived as a cause or the cause of all things; and whether deity is to be conceived as the or a cause of all things. Hartshorne and Reese's answer is: "Taken concretely, deity would not be merely supreme cause, but rather supreme power or agency, in the sense in which a man is a power or agency. A man as a power is not a single cause but a stream of causes, each of which is also an effect. God as an agent or power is not, perhaps, to be conceived as a cause of all things, nor yet as the cause of all things, but rather as a (or the) supreme stream of causation which at the same time is the supreme stream of effects (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:502).

To this there is an objection from cosmological argument that it (panentheism) takes "cause" out of the chain of causation in which alone it has meaning. Hartshorne and Reese's answer to this criticism is that, this objection is justified only if the cosmological argument is taken as reducing God's causal role to a single type of relationship. But as we have observed, since God's causal role is a multitude-type of relationship, it cannot be reduced so. (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:501).

Hartshorne and Reese suggest that divine cause is to be taken in to two possible senses analogously to two senses in which man is cause. In one sense, cause is not in isolation from effects. That is, "A man at each moment takes decisions, responses to the world, which
in turn becomes stimuli to which other individuals respond. Here all meaning is lost if we try to isolate "being cause" from "being effect". Perhaps in this aspect the deity is as truly acted upon as acting " (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:502). In other sense, effect would also be cause. That is, "suppose a man throughout the years is inspired by a certain persistent idea or ideal, which also, as his ideal, influences others. Once he has acquired the ideal it functions from thenceforth as cause rather than effect even though the original acquisition was an effect". Analogously, there could be a primordial mind with an acquired ideal thus one which was an effect and would have effects (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:502).

However the primordial mind in its mere possession of this ideal, would be purely cause rather than effect." But it in no way follows that all the mind's experiences, perceptions, of concrete actualities would be purely causative rather than themselves effects. Ideas and ideals, being abstract have, in proportion to their abstractness, a certain independence of a concrete alternatives of existence; but true perceptions of the concrete and actual, on the contrary, cannot disagree with particular features which the actual happens to have. They are thus not independent; they are effects. But they will also have effects and be themselves causes. In this way, the reader can perhaps see why I maintain that, on the one hand, universal cause, pure cause need not exhaust the sense in which God is cause, while, on the other hand, there is no absurdity in this idea of pure cause, provided its correctness is not asserted" (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:502).

By all these considerations Hartshorne and Reese contend that "a "cause" in the widest meaning of the term is always independent of its particular effect, while this always depends upon the cause"; and therefore, there is an asymmetry in causal necessity. But, "radical asymmetry leaves open the possibility that not even the class or kind of effect is implied" while, "'moderate asymmetry' holds the non-nullity of a class of effects - though no
particular member of the class—to be rendered necessary by the existence of the cause". (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:502). "On either view, causes are always independent of particular effects, effects always dependent upon the particular cause" (1976:502).

That causes can exist temporally prior to effects is the temporal aspect of the asymmetrical logical relation. "The present exists by virtue of the past, which it requires, but not by virtue of the future. Whatever the future may become, this, we may say, is the present. But we cannot say, whatever the past may have been, this is the present. For, we are as adults, those who have been such-and-such children. It is included in our very being that we have been what we have been. Psychiatry gives concreteness to this proposition. We here take it as the universal nature of being an effect" (1976:502-503).

We may now hold that "there are two senses in which God may be "independent cause" of the world, even if we speak of this world not merely of world-as-such, world as a class." According to one ""X is the independent cause of W" might mean only that X is in some aspect of itself is, or has, something independent and causative of W; it does not necessarily mean that X is or has nothing else besides, in being or having which it, in turn depends upon W. A man may be independent of his friends-and support them-financially but heavily dependent upon them emotionally. Or he may be emotionally self-sufficient but financially dependent" (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:503). According to another "God is independent" would mean that "he is merely or purely that, so that "something independent" in God would be God in all aspects, or in his entirety" (1976:503). The former is held by panentheists, and the latter by theists. Therefore, as Hartshorne and Reese hold, pantheism and theism are not two mutually exclusive and exhaustive ways of conceiving the causal relations of God and world. There is the third one: panentheism. If it is meant by theism and pantheism that God is in all his being independent, and he is in no aspect independent, respectively, panentheist means that he is in
some aspect of his being independent while in some others dependent. But the positions of theism and pantheism are inconsistent. As Hartshorne and Reese hold, it is not self-evident that to exert independent power one must, besides possessing something independent, avoid possessing anything dependent. "If, indeed, God is wholly "simple", without diversity of aspects, then his independent aspect must be all there is. But the problem of simplicity is only the question at issue in another form. ... Similarly, if God has no "accidents" distinct from his "essence", then he is either wholly dependent or wholly independent" (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:503). But we have already refuted the alleged proofs that God cannot have accidents.

II

We have been discussing theism, panentheism and panentheism with reference to the ideas, viz., universal cause, all-inclusiveness, and independence. Setting aside the theories in which it is purely negated that either God is universal cause or he is all-inclusive reality, Hartshorne and Reese (1976:503-506) consider the logical relations of these three theories by employing some simple symbols for those ideas - such as universal cause and all-inclusive reality." Let C stand for universal cause, i.e., for something that everything else requires, or upon which everything else depends, but which itself requires no other thing (leaving it open whether the class of "other things" is or is not required to be non-null, that is, whether "moderate" or "radical" asymmetry of causal necessity is involved). Let W stand for all the inclusive something, the whole of reality (leaving it open whether or not there is a fixed totality of the real, or an ever growing one containing new items each time it is referred to)". Certainly, we have then three possible assertions about God: (1)"God is (whether as a whole or in some aspect of himself only) universal cause, or God is C; (2) God is all-inclusive reality, or God is W; (3) God is both universal cause and all-inclusive reality, or God is CW" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:503). Relations of these three propositions is that: "If the second alternative in the
parenthesis of (1) is excluded, then (1) becomes contradictory of (2), and (3) becomes self-contradictory. (1976:503). And if (1) is taken by omitting its second alternative, we must choose either theism, positing God as independent reality, or panentheism, positing him as all-inclusive reality, and there is no other alternative. If God is, in his whole aspect, independent cause of all things, he cannot contain or include them within himself; for, to include them is to require, or to depend upon, them. Since all things were not just as they are, and God is, in his whole aspect essence, those things must be outside him; therefore, there must be a total reality in which God is one constituent and the world, the other constituent. This is the position of theism. If God is all-inclusive reality, he cannot, in his whole aspect, be independent cause of all things. Things must then be identical with his essence. This is the position of pantheism.

But if (1) is taken by omitting its first alternative only, then an inclusive reality may contain an independent cause of things; or, in other words, God may, not only in his total actuality, be identical with this inclusive reality, but also in an aspect of himself, identical with the independent cause. This is the position of panentheism. The situation in panentheism is that, (1) and (2) are compatible with one another. Therefore, "if theism only means that there is a divine independent cause of all things and pantheism, that there is a divine all-inclusive reality, both may be true. Not that there may be two Gods but that one God may have both an independent essence and dependent accidents, somewhat as a man has both his relatively fixed and unmodifiable character and also his varying actual experiences. Thus the positive content of theism and pantheism can be consistently combined in "God is CW"; for the contradiction between theism and pantheism arises only from the denial of any possible distinction between God as independent cause and God in his total actuality" (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:504).
The positive content of (1), Hartshorne and Reese argue (1976:504), is that "God will exist and will be himself (and would have existed and been himself) no matter what particular world exists (or had existed) or fails (or had failed) to exist; while the positive content of (2) is that God includes all reality in his own reality". If this is the case, then, as Hartshorne and Reese claim, there is no conflict between the two assertions; the conflict arises only when an arbitrary negation is added to positive assertion in (1), as done by classical theists. What classical theists insist is that "not only would God exist and be himself, he would exist in the very same state, or rather, there is here no possible distinction between existence and state, or between essence (what makes God always himself) and accidents" (Hartshorne and Reese 1976:504). Certainly this addition contradicts the theist's assertion. For, as Hartshorne and Reese hold, "where there is no distinction between essence and accidents, between "himself" and "his states" there (as all the history of philosophy testifies) is no intelligible meaning for essence or existence or selfhood or any other concept" (1976:504).

As classical theists, classical pantheists also add the same arbitrary negation to the positive doctrine of each assertions. Hartshorne and Reese claim, they do so unwittingly without taking notice of classical theists. Classical pantheists, "not content with affirming the all-inclusiveness of deity,... often insisted also that his total actuality could not have been otherwise, that there are no divine accidents". (1976:504). Hartshorne and Reese argue, this is not inferable from all-inclusiveness, rather, the contrary is inferable; "for, since the total reality must contain all there is, whether necessary or contingent, and since to deny the contrast between necessary and possible is to destroy the meaning of both, this contrast must be preserved and must fall within deity; and there must be divine accidents". Hartshorne and Reese hold, that "there is no reason for denying that there is also a divine essence, independent of the accidents, and necessary. In this way, the polar nature of basic concepts (Morris Cohen's Law of
Polarity) is properly expressed. Thus merely is it not imperative to interpret (1) and (2) as mutually contradictory; there is even reason to suspect that, when so interpreted, they become self-contradictory. Accordingly, (3) God is CW, not only deserved but has, if anything, the best claim of all to our consideration (1976:504).

In this version of panentheism, it is asserted by Hartshorne and Reese that "God is truly independent and truly dependent". There seems to be, in this assertion, absurdity. But there is no absurdity. For, "truly" is meant here not that in all aspect that he is, but that in something that he is. There are reasons given for this meaning. "To impute to God a distinctive excellence such as is lacking to all ordinary things, it is enough to say that he is, in some aspect, independent of all; for ordinary things are in no aspect independent of all" (1976:505).

"Further, to depend, in some aspect, upon all other things, is likewise a unique maximum, since ordinary things depend only upon some other things (According to nearly all philosophers). Thus there is no reason for supposing that Washington required your existence or mine for his own existence or nature. But God, as knowing that you and I exist, has knowledge that he could not have had, had we not existed, and, therefore, in his knowledge, he requires our existence and so, as we have been using words, "depends" on us in that respect. Note that only God thus depends for some aspect of himself, upon literally all others. Thus dependence can be maximized as definitely as independence" (1976:505).

As Hartshorne and Reese say, it is self-evident to say that inclusiveness means dependence, but it is nonsense to say that a whole could be, in all respects, just what it is even though its parts were other than what they are. "The differences may be minor, as when one of my cells is destroyed, but - assuming that "I" genuinely includes that cell - it is real" (1976:505).
Accordingly, God as independent means he is exclusive, but not inclusive; but if this independent factor be all of God, then there would be a paradox. The paradox is that there must be a total reality, which is God-and-what-is-other-than-God, and which, therefore, is more inclusive than God (1976:505).

Hartshorne and Reese say, this "desperate paradox is removed by constructing "God and-not-God" as meaning: "God in all his aspects (independent and dependent) and the parts or included factors entering into the dependent aspects". (As we have seen, only the dependent can be inclusive). We may speak of "the whole and its parts". but this is no more than just the whole itself" (1976:505). This construction points out neither theistic nor pantheistic but the panentheistic position.

As we know already, God is C, God is W, and God is CW, is called as theism, pantheism and panentheism, respectively. But how theism and pantheism are related to panentheism is shown by Hartshorne and Reese (1976:505-506) as follows:

"In scope... CW is no more than W alone, for either implies "all reality". And nothing can be more than the totality of being and value". But what separates "God is W (in isolation)", pantheism, from "God is CW", panentheism, is the former's denial of one universally causal factor which is involved in total reality, and which, by definition of cause, is independent of the rest.

"And likewise, all that separates "God is C" (in isolation), classical theism or deism from "God is CW" is the former's denial that God has in himself or in his total actuality anything from which he (in his independent aspect) is independent. The contention that the beings from which God (in some essential aspect) is independent are not parts of him(in his total reality) is sheer negation. And though "independence" itself is verbally negative, it can be construed positively. It means: "self-identical no matter how other things
different from, and superior to, a kind of relations, and change, that a reflexive imperfect beings, or ordinary concretes, have. These differences, between ordinary abstractions and the supreme abstraction, between ordinary concretes and the supreme concrete, cannot be made by the classical interpretation of perfect and imperfect. In classical interpretation perfect is identified with absolute that cannot change in any way, since change is considered as imperfect. This interpretation implies that nonreflexive form of imperfect beings and of the perfect being, would be on the same level; and the same case is with reflexive form of imperfect being and of perfect being. Therefore, Hartshorne and Reese claim that "the habit of identifying "absolute" and "perfect" conceals the cardinal truth that ordinary abstractions have a kind of absoluteness or independence of relations and of change and that reflexive maximal superiority, though relative, or varying with relations and change, is just as radically superior to ordinary concrete things as is nonreflexive or absolute perfection to ordinary abstraction"(1976:508).

As we saw earlier, according to Hartshorne and Reese's definition of perfection, the perfect being is the supreme concrete being, reflexive, in which "a certain species of quality is always just that species, trivial or exalted," and which can also "take on new, additional, perhaps better species"; therefore, it "can become better than its previous life"(1976:508). Whereas, according to classical definition of perfection, the perfect being is the supreme abstraction, non-reflexive. As the very meaning of abstraction suggests, "what a given abstractive act discerns is the same wherever and whenever it be found" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:508). Therefore, there is no question of better life than its previous one. As Hartshorne and Reese argue against this, "A, nonreflexive or classical perfection, is the supreme object of abstraction, not the supreme object of concrete or total awareness"(1976:508)
Hartshorne and Reese give many considerations in support of their above account of the supreme concrete being. They say that the reflexive perfect being, R, the supreme concrete being, implies nonreflexive form, A, as an abstractable aspect of its own meaning (1976:508). It is said that R, the supreme concrete being, improves upon itself. "But if a being in all respects was R or improved, it could in no respect remain the same or identical". Therefore, it implies that, "what improves upon itself must retain some kind of self-identity; it must become X better than X". Here, the required self-identity in R, in the supreme concrete being, is the non-R aspect of it. This required non-R aspect of R being must conform to the definition of A". Thus A is required as self-identical aspect of what, in the respect in which it is not A, is R." (1976:508).

Further, since the reflexive perfect being, R, the supreme concrete being, is superior to all others, R already possess an absolutely perfect quality which is universally other-superior surpassing absolutely all others. Then, these qualities are non-R aspect of the being, and therefore, must conform to the definition of A. (1976:508).

"Of course R itself, as such, is self-identical in that the quality of being R is always that quality. But this is like the fact that change as such never changes but is always-change. R...is really a variable, the abstract variable of which A is the abstract constant, the latter being like "sameness" abstracted from concrete sameness-and-differences, the former "difference" like \( \Delta \) abstracted from the same concrete" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:508).

As the above account suggests, there is a novelty in the experience of the concrete ultimate being. And, we get the ideas, such as identity, being, absolute, by abstracting from the abstractable aspect of novelty of the concrete ultimate being. However, by this novel experience, the concrete ultimate being is not merely being but also becoming, is not merely actuality but also actualization, is not merely being-good but also a freely
becoming-better. There is an adding of novelty to treasured and funded experience of the concrete ultimate being. This implies that, the concrete ultimate being, which is less at one time, would be more at another time. As Hartshorne and Reese say, "To be less at one time and more at another" presupposes the ideas of time and of dynamic self-identity, and these can never be derived from that of mere being" (1976:509).

It was often said that God is equally above unity and diversity, being and becoming. To this Hartshorne and Reese say that it is true only in our human sense, for God escapes all our categories. But they do not agree with the partiality for unity, identity, being over plurality, diversity, being, which we find, they say, in nearly every page written on this subject for some twenty centuries until Kant and later (1976:509). For, one could not reach the concrete ultimate by omitting process from the process of experience, or diversity from the unity in diversity (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:509). For, one could not reach the concrete ultimate by omitting process from the process of experience, or diversity from the unity in diversity (Hartshorne:1976:509).

"Being and becoming are not the only factors in the "process" from which both are abstracted. There is also the having-become, by which the real, as self-surpassing, is still what it previously became, while becoming more besides It became p, it now becomes q, additional to (and involving) p. Thus we have: (1) becoming; (2) having become, or earlier becoming as involved in later; (3) the primordial and fixed aspect of more being constituting the abstract self identity of process at any and every time" (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:509).

As we have seen, Hartshorne and Reese conceive that God is subject to increase in value. To this conception there are old objections. One is that, if it is the case that God is subject to increase, then it must also be the case that he is in danger of decrease, decay, even
of total destruction. For what is able to act well, must also be able to act badly; "therefore, either God cannot act well or he may act badly" (1976:509). But acting well is good act and acting badly is evil act, or, in other words, increase in value is good change and decrease in value is evil change. Therefore, the idea that God is subject to increase is inadequate.

Hartshorne and Reese argue against this objection thus: it is true that increase in value is good change and decrease in value is evil change, but "the capacity for one does not imply capacity for the other, unless anything good implies the correlative evil". (1976:509). However, the ultimate process is one of net gain, otherwise why process at all. "In any case, an R being cannot be conceived to decay; because then another R being (it could not be the same one) must be conceivable as its superior, namely, an incorruptible R being. And an incorruptible R being is conceivable, since we need only suppose one with complete memory of past actuality, and the ability to maintain self-integrity while becoming aware of each addition to actuality as it occurs. If the past once for all "has been what it has been", then something does preserve, and as it were remember, all that happens" (1976:509). "Thus new experiences, additional values, need not mean losing any of the old." Following Bergson, Hartshorne and Reese say, "time is creation or nothing"... Destruction is not co-ordinate with creation" (1976:509).

"For us men, who forget nearly everything, past values are, it is true, mostly lost. Also, enduring sources of values, like buildings or bodies, may "cease to endure", but this only means that they no longer add new chapters to their histories; it does not mean that the old chapters are abolished. As parts of the past, they are all fully there if it be true that the past is real in spite of our forgetting" (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:509).

To Hartshorne and Reese's claim- that God is A merely in one aspect but in whole being he is R- there is another objection; since God is simple how can he be A merely in one
aspect, while being R as a whole. Against this, Hartshorne and Reese argue that the "axiom of simplicity has been deduced as end result from reasoning that starts with such pseudo-axioms as that a cause must contain the equivalent of its effect. No panentheist will admit this axiom". As panentheists, Hartshorne and Reese claim that "the A aspect itself may indeed be simple; for instance, God's knowledge as A is the same as his goodness as A, and so on. But his knowledge as A is not the same as his knowledge as R, or as his happiness as R" (1976:509).

We know from these considerations that Hartshorne and Reese's conception of God is in the form of AR. They argue that the formula AR is more adequate than the formula A. This we can see from the following considerations:

Hartshorne and Reese hold that "The abstract and immutable qualifies the concrete and mutable". In other words, the form of A, nonreflexive, qualifies the form of R, reflexive. This claim fits in the formula AR. For instance, "A happy man may acquire a higher species of happiness, although neither one of these species becomes higher. Of course, this example is with reference to the formula ar. But the formula AR is no more contradictory than the formula ar. On the contrary, the formula A is taken as an exception to this axiom. "When the perfect was supposed an exception, it was because the conceptual structure of maximal superiority was not clearly stated, and the overlooking of the concept R illegitimately assumed the function of a refutation of that concept".

Further, the holder of the formula AR and A asserts that God is the creative source and sustainer of things. But only the formula AR is consistent to its assertions, not the formula A. For, these assertions would be possible only if the principle of relativity is admitted. The formula AR contains the principle of relativity which cannot be derived from the formula A (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:510). "Relation is a positive idea; unlike ignorance, or "inattention the interests of others", it cannot be equated with the partial absence of some
positive element. If relation is simply not in God then, no magic can explain its presence anywhere" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:510).

However, the holders of the formula A want to avoid positing relations, even of "superiority to others", in God. That is why they define God negatively as unrivaled and unsurpassed by others. By defining this they hold that God is not related to others as superior, but only others as inferior, i.e., in other words, relation is not on God's side but on others' side (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:510). It is, Anselm's definition, for instance, "that than which none greater can be conceived", may at least appear to avoid relation God (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:510). Against these considerations, Hartshorne and Reese argue that "it is of no consequence, for the same divisions of minimal, middling, and maximal and of reflexive and nonreflexive, forms, arise as much from this negative definition as from our positive one. And this is true for all the other stock concepts, such as completeness, pure actuality, ascity, or infinity. On any showing ... the neglected alternative, R, would present itself and demand a hearing, and there would be the same indications as we have found that the non-R form of perfection is abstract" (1976:510).

We can show, further, that the formula A is more inconsistent than the formula AR, with reference to the idea of omniscience (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:510). In any formula it is affirmed that God knows all things. This leads to two things: One is that, if god knows all things, he must be related to them. For, "Knowledge of X is relation-to-X as possessed by the knower" (1976-510). Another is that, the knowledge of X is contingent if X is so. For, "If X had happened not to be actual, then it could at most have been known as a possibility, not as an actuality" (1976-510). But it is asserted in the formula A that God is relationless, without accidents, absolute. Then, there would be inconsistencies in A. If God is relationless he cannot have knowledge of all things, thus cannot be
omniscient. For, as we saw, to know is to be related with the known. If God's being is without accidents, his knowing that proposition P is true cannot be an accident of his being. "Hence none of his knowledge could have been other than it is. But if P affirms the existence of a contingent being, then P could have been false, though God must, if his knowledge is necessary, have "known" it as true. Thus something could have been which, had it been would have meant false knowledge in God. This is simple, formal contradiction of the infallibility of his knowledge. It is not a mere inability on our part to imagine a knowing concretely so different from ours as the divine" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:510).

To mitigate these contradictions efforts are made by the holder of the formula A. Firstly, it is argued that God's knowledge does not have to conform to things, since it conforms things to itself. Against this, Hartshorne and Reese argue that the "contradiction is not mitigated by urging that God's knowledge does not have to conform to things, since it conforms things to itself. Read the conformity either way; you contradict it in saying that, on the one side things could have been different, but, on the other, all is as it must be. In addition, if things alone are conformed, then when a man sins he is only being conformed to God's knowledge" (1976:510).

Secondly, it is argued that God knows his own all-causative essence, and in this he sees all that can be produced by it. But Hartshorne and Reese argue: "Can he see which among the things he can produce he actually does, and which not? It is a contradiction of something contingent is involved in something wholly necessary" (1976-510).

Thirdly, it is argued that divine knowledge has only a formal analogy, not a concrete similarity, to ours, and therefore, difficulties that arise in case of human beings may not apply on the analogical level. Hartshorne and Reese agree that God's knowledge is an analogous, not similar, to our. That is to say, "divine knowledge is radically different from ours.
and surpasses ours not merely as ours surpasses that of the animals". And, "God is the being who transcends others while surpassing himself; whereas we surpass ourselves and others but transcends no one". But he argues that it is on the most formal, analogical level that the difficulties arise. For, even analogy should be honestly carried through. "It should set some requirements that are adhered to; and when one removes from classical theology all that covertly implies superrelativity and accidents in God, nothing is left of divine "knowledge" (as Maimonides in his recklessly candid moments said) but a word" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:511).

What we realize from these considerations is that the efforts made to mitigate the contradictions that arise in the formula A are failed. However, the formula AR is adequate because it is free from these contradictions. In it the principle of relativity and an aspect of accidents are both admitted in God. As Hartshorne and Reese say (1976:511), the formula AR does not relate A to any relative things; for, as we have seen the absolute cannot know or have any relation to the relative, but only the relative to the absolute. AR "relates God, as R or transcendentally relative, to A as well as to ordinary relative things" (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:511). "Since whatever contains a relation contains its terms (relation-of-x-to-y being only a relational type apart from x and y), therefore whatever includes relations is, in so far, concrete and comprehensive, and whatever excludes relations is in so far abstract and noncomprehensive". (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:511).

Therefore, in the formula AR, since God has all the reality, i.e., either, and he is relative which is more than the absolute (Hartshorne and Reese: 1976:511). "This is no paradox, except by misuse of terms. Absolute does not mean inclusive, concrete, or supreme. It means independent; and what guarantees that the independent must or even can be inclusive? True, the
inclusive must depend only upon its parts; but that is a very real dependence, for, given different parts, the whole must be correspondingly different" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:511).

Hartshorne and Reese agree that there cannot be anything more than what is "absolute in all respects", "absolutely absolute." But he holds that this concept is a self-contradictory one. He argues, "A in all respects" means no more than round square. For what it describes must have all actual values while yet having no actuality. Determination, definite actuality, is limitation, negation. But to be indeterminate, indefinite, inactual, is also limitation of another kind. The purely and all ways unlimited is mere nonsense (1976:511).

Hartshorne and Reese say that A, absoluteness, includes relationship, in one sense. "Among abstractions, as Russell has remarked, are "abstractness" and "concreteness". The property of being concrete is not a concrete thing. Now R is the over-all abstraction, divine concreteness as such. And the 'A is in AR' means that the reflexively perfect must, in some abstract aspect, be non-reflexively or immutably perfect. A has relation to R in that its only meaning is a abstract aspect of concrete perfection. But this is relation to R as a mere suchness the generic property of "having accidents", by which the perfect transcends all and surpasses itself, and this "having accidents" as such includes no accidents, but only demands that there be some. So A, though related to R, is not related to anything contingent but to the necessary category of accidentality there shall be accidents. God as a concrete whole, AR in character, is the one who is related to accidental things themselves" (1976:511).

Hartshorne and Reese hold that the whole is AR and the parts are ar. According to them the properties of all wholes, including God, the supreme whole, are distinct from the properties of the parts. Further, a "whole of relative parts can never be merely absolute, for there can always be additional parts. But a whole of ar parts can very well be AR" (1976:511).
However, "what is in the parts is in the whole; so for example, our misdeeds are in God; but not as his misdeeds, or his deeds at all rather as his misfortunes. They make his overall satisfaction less than it otherwise would be, but not his goodness of decision. For if a part decides something, the whole permits, suffers, endures, the decision, it does not make it".

"It is orthodox doctrine that God does not enact our sins, and this is just as tenable if we are parts of God, since to be is to have power; therefore, to be distinguishable from the whole, though within it, is to have power which is not the whole's as its own whole-quality. In this whole quality, the power of parts is something suffered, not enacted-as, in general, what is active in the other is possible in the self. This Fechnerian principle is the only self-consistent view of dynamic wholes and parts and of the relations of human and divine freedom." (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:512).

We have considered the ideas of God by classifying them into two: one, in terms of causality together with totality, and the other, in terms of perfection. In the former case, we have three ideas of God: one, God is universal cause, or God is C; two, God is all-inclusive reality, or God is W; three, God is both universal cause and all inclusive reality, or God is CW. We have also three ideas of God in the latter case. One, God is non-reflexive perfect, or God is A. That is, God is surpassing all others and not surpassing the self. Two, God is reflexive perfect, or God is R. That is, surpassing all others and surpassing the self, but not having an A aspect, such as self-identity. Three, God is nonreflexive reflexive perfect or God is AR. That is, God is surpassing all others, surpassing the self, and has an aspect of A, such as self-identity.

As Hartshorne and Reese (1976-512) contends, by the combination of the two classifying ideas, (that is, C, CW, W and A, AR, R) we will have in all nine possible conceptions of perfection. They are:
1. God is non reflexive perfect and universal cause (A-C).

2. God is nonreflexive-reflexive perfect and universal cause (AR-C).

3. God is reflexive perfect and universal cause (R-C)

4. God is non reflexive perfect and universal cause, all inclusive reality (A-CW)

5. God is nonreflexive–reflexive perfect and universal cause all-inclusive reality (AR-CW).

6. God is reflexive perfect and universal cause, all-inclusive reality (R-CW).

7. God is nonreflexive perfect and all-inclusive reality (A-W).

8. God is nonreflexive-reflexive and all-inclusive reality (AR-W).

9. God is reflexive perfect and all-inclusive reality (R-W).

As Hartshorne and Reese hold, A-C, AR-C and R-C are the three forms of transcendental theism; A-CW, AR-CW and R-CW are three forms of, as he likes to say, best called panentheism; and A-W, AR-W and R-W are three forms of pantheism. However, A-C, A-CW and AW are three forms of nonreflexive perfectionism; AR-C, AR-CW and AR-W are three forms of reflexive-nonreflexive perfectionism; and R-C, R-CW and R-W are three forms of reflexive perfectionism.

As Hartshorne and Reese consider, AR-CW is the most adequate form of perfectionism, for it has the advantage of synthesizing all the positive principles that all the forms have, all the other forms are extremes. AR-CW is the higher synthesis or golden mean with respect to the extreme forms.

Hartshorne and Reese argue that all the other forms are extremes, because in A-C, A-CW and A-W, God is in "the extreme of pure absoluteness, with nothing positive from which relativity can be derived", in R-C, R-CW and R-W, God is in "the extreme of pure relativity with nothing stable that can be asserted once for all, even relativity itself"; in A-C, AR-C and R-C, God is in "the extreme of sheer causality divorced from any of its effects,
power with nothing that power does”; in A-W, AR-W and R-W. God is in "the extreme of contingent phenomena with no element of independence, necessity, or self-existence" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976-512). However, the four forms: A-C, R-C. A-W and R-W - are in two extremes at once. And the other four forms: A-CW, R-CW, AR-C and AR-W - "suffer from the special absurdity of positing a profound duality in terms of one category and sheer unity in terms of the other, in spite of the evident truth that the two categories are so closely interrelated as to forbid such differential treatment." Therefore, it is evident that all these forms, except AR-CW, are broken fragments of truth rather than the truth. Only AR-CW is free from all these extremes, and hence is not a fragment of truth.

Hartshorne and Reese hold that "The argument which our analysis furnishes for the conclusion AR-CW is the stronger in that it is not isolated but is the type of argument that alone offers any hope of producing agreement in philosophy"(1976:512). And the classical doctrines: such as monism and pluralism, pure transcendentalism and pure immanentism, pure atemporalism that can point to no ultimate identity in process; are the extremes, and whatever fight they make with their apposite, they never get a definite triumph. Only the doctrine AR-CW can say to all such extremes as "you are all of you right and all of you in error, right in refusing to accept your opponent's position, wrong in supposing the choice lies between you" - and can resolve the conflicts. (Hartshorne and Reese :1976:512).

One may ask: Is the doctrine AR-CW a religious one? Hartshorne and Reese say "It implies a God more knowing, more benevolent, more powerful, more happy or blessed than any other conceivable being." And, there is an aspect of R which means that God can somehow increase in value. But, here, "omniscience," "holy" or entirely religious, and "all powerful" do not mean overcoming previous error or ignorance, over coming previous selfishness or meanness, and overcoming previous weakness respectively; if they mean
so, God of religion cannot increase in knowledge, cannot overcome previous selfishness or meanness, and cannot overcome previous weakness respectively. " But this leaves ample room for an R factor of improvement! For the things God knows to exist, and deals righteously and powerfully with as existent, are not all the things that can exist (it is logically impossible that all possible things should coexist). Accordingly, suppose that something which does not but can exist subsequently does so. There will then be a new existent for God to know and deal with as such; and his total life, as inclusive of his knowledge and its content, will be enriched." (Hartshorne and Reese :1976:513)

Further, Hartshorne and Reese say, "since the new objects of God's knowledge include new states of happiness in the creatures, and since God cares for this happiness, he must obviously derive satisfaction, and new satisfaction, from these states. Denying this is hardly an imperative of religion since it makes nonsense of the alleged love of God". (1976:513).

One may claim that "religion has thought God as beyond and exclusive of the world, rather than as, according to W its receptacle". To this Hartshorne and Reese say "this is an illusory impression of religion, due to inattention to the meaning of words. Religion has not emphasized the bare idea that we are in God but has stressed how we are in God. We are in God by being objects of his love and knowledge". As an instance, Hartshorne and Reese give quotation of Whittier's saying:

"I only know I cannot drift
Beyond his love and care".

One may object that this quotation does not literally mean we are inside God. But Hartshorne and Reese (1976:513) argues that it does, and that one should not suppose that God's actuality is one thing, and his knowledge with its immediate contents, or his love
with its direct objects of concern, just another. Because what unites God with "his" knowledge or love, or these with their objects is his actuality.

"True, our human knowledge and love may not seem to embrace things within our own being. But human knowledge and love are radically imperfect, especially where their objects are the most indirect or external to our being. It seems strange to try to conceive God's knowledge and love by supposing that the indirectness and externality of the most fallible forms of our experience are the models for conceiving his infallible form" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:513).

To the question - can dead matter be part of God - Hartshorne and Reese reply "that no one has proved there is any mere dead matter, and many of the best scientific and philosophical minds have thought the notion a pseudo-concept" (1976:513).

Again, to the question - can human freedom be part of God - Hartshorne and Reese give, following Fechnerian principle, an affirmative answer which is the same as the one given to the question, can human ignorance and error be part of divine wisdom? They explain thus: "Believing is an act, and this may be our act but not God's, except as the whole endures the acts of parts, as precisely their acts are not the whole's. It has our beliefs as ours, and as our parts of itself - but not as its beliefs would be parts of itself. That this is conceivable has been affirmed by two great psychologist-philosophers who meditated long on the matter, James and Fechner" (1976:513-514).

"Thus AR-CW seems to stand out as the truth, if there is an ascertainable truth, of theism. The absolute, nonreflexive or merely identical factor in God, God as A-C is the pure cause which neither is nor contains any effect; the unmoved mover which, as Jacob Boehme was one of the first to see, is in God but is not God (in his concreteness). The superrelative or reflexively transcendent perfection of God is the fulness of his being, his
wholeness as always self identical, but self-identical as self-enriched, influenced but never fully determined by (and never fully determining) other- in short, a living, sensitive, free personality, preserving all actual events with impartial cure and forever adding new events to his experience. The absolute is the One merely as One; the superlative is the many as also one, or the one as also many. The world as not God is the many merely as many - an abstraction from the many as one, as the integrated, active-passive content of omniscience" (Hartshorne and Reese:1976:514)

E. THE CONCEPT OF GOD FROM THE CONCEPT OF WORSHIP:

Here is a question: what does a philosopher mean by the word 'God'? As Hartshorne (1967:1-3) holds, there are three ways of reaching an answer to this question: theological, philosophical and religious. Regarding the first approach, we cannot get proper answer to the terminological question from theologians. For the reason that regarding connotations of the central religious terms, there are important disagreements among theologians. Regarding the second approach, concepts are formulated by the philosopher, and if "the philosopher's system or method leads him to formulate a conception having at least some analogy with the central operative idea in the practices, not simply in the theological theories, of one or more of the high religions, he may call his conception by the religious name" (Hartshorne: 1967:1). The concepts are enriched if the analogy is good but a weaker analogy would not do justice to the word. It may also be very misleading. That is why Spinoza has been called "God- intoxicated" and also "atheist". In Hartshorn's opinion this constitutes an objection of some force to Spinoza's system. "It seems odd to think that an idea so essentially religious should be so mistakenly conceived by all the great religions concerned with it as the religious idea must be if Spinoza is correct. Contrariwise, it is an argument in favour of a
philosophy if it can make more religious sense out of the theistic view than other philosophies have been able to do". (Hartshorne:1967:2)

Regarding the third approach, basic ideas are mainly derived from direct experience or intuition, life as concretely lived. It is the view of a theist that God can be known not merely from indirect way, nor from inference only, but must somehow be present in all experience. If the view that God is immanent in the universe is correct, he is in a sense in everybody's experience and also in what everybody experiences. In other words, God in some way is the universal datum of our experience. Religious ideas are derived mainly from this type of experience; and at least for the meaning of the term 'God' one should depend upon what religion says about it.

If this is the case, i.e., if a philosopher formulates his concepts from religions operative ideas in practice and such ideas are mainly derived from immediate experience; then the main source of the concept of God lies ultimately in the character of this direct experience. So, in order to determine philosophical sense of the term 'God' the religious sense has to be taken into account. What, then, is the religious sense?

As Hartshorne claims (1967:3) in theistic religions God is One who is worshipped, and who is supremely excellent. Now, to determine the philosophical sense of 'God', to formulate the concept of worship and that naive and simplistic analytic truth - that God is one who is worshipped - are to be investigated. For, Smart (1972:74) points out that the concept of God is indissolubly linked with the concept of worship, and therefore that the investigation of the nature of worship may help in arriving at an acceptable concept of God. Smart further remarks that the analyses of religious faith and language fail to stress the concept of God since they wrench the concept of God from its living milieu. Smart does not mean, of course, that a religion may not change its concept of God; his point is to stress the conceptual
connection between the ideas of worship and God. In a similar spirit Hartshorne (1967:3-6) also holds that the concepts of God and worship are very much linked and he clarifies the understanding of the concept of God from the focus of this link. It is to be noted that the concept of God varies when the practice of worship changes. It is from this point of view that we have to attempt to present the concept of worship in connection with God.

It is very hard to distinguish between the literal meaning of the term "worship" from the non-literal meaning. For, that word is used during the course of history sometimes literally and some other times metaphorically. When it is said for instance "Karl worships money" and "Henry worships his stomach", the word is used metaphorically. Regarding this usage it is laughable to ask questions like "whom does he worship?", "what incense does he use?", "what music does he employ?" etc. For, it is not right to count Henry's stomach as God. The expression may be apt metaphorically, but not religiously, i.e., literally. But this does not mean metaphorical expressions are without sense altogether. They can almost always be translated into alternative expressions with conventional or literal meaning. For instance "Henry worships his stomach" can be rephrased as "Henry places a very high value on eating", and "a number of his activities are supporting to eating". By contrast there can be no alternative account of a statement about religious worship. As Smart (1972:4-5) says, that one worships God is not adequately conveyed by saying merely that one places high value on God. In worshipping God, one of course places high value on God, and it would be inconsistent for one not to do so. But in worship more is involved than merely placing high value on God.

We face again another problem in knowing the nature of worship. There are many different forms of worship: noble, ignoble, primitive, sophisticated, superstitious, relatively enlightened, idolatrous etc. In relation to each form of worship, therefore, the word
"worship" is used in a different way. And each form of worship is supposed to express a different character of God according to the respective worshipper. How can we take into account all these forms to fix the character of God? The most enlightened persons like Spinoza claim that the enlightened form of worship is the "intellectual love of God". Spinoza refrained from using the word "worship" "because less enlightened people applied it to inferior varieties." These different varieties of worship are nothing but contingent empirical facts. How can we depend upon these empirical facts of worship to decide the essential nature of God? Theists treat God as eternal; but eternity is in no way intended by the mere temporal fact of worship. Can we gather merely from the word "worship," what can be the range of objects that are worshipped, and of those that should be worshipped? Of course one can say that what is worshipped is truly God. But what is the deciding factor for such a judgment?

If we consider these different varieties or form of worship of different cultures, we realise that definiteness regarding the nature of worship cannot be attained. To be definitive there must be more in it than this terrestrial human culture (Hartshorne:1967:4). In other words there must be an inner logic or rationale to the idea of worship. Lower forms of worship found in different cultures are not capable of expressing such a rationale or logic. If worship is to be truly expressive of God, it must hold an a priori possibility for all rational beings, not only of this world, but of any possible world. In other words, it must be universal in significance for any rational being.

"To obtain a broad perspective", Hartshorne says, "We may remind ourselves that subrational animals, below the level of language, can scarcely be thought to worship, unless in some radically deficient sense. Only man, among this earth's inhabitants, is a 'religious animal'. This suggests that consciousness, in the sense requiring language (or else, if God is conscious, something superior to language), is part of the definition of worship. To worship
is to do something consciously. To do what? That which all sentient individuals must do, at least unconsciously, so far as they are sane and not in at least a mild neurosis or psychosis" (1967:4). It is clear that this claim allows the scope for rituals. Hartshorne further claims that "Worship is the integrating of all one's thoughts and purposes, all valuations and meanings, all perceptions and conceptions. A sentient creature feels and acts as one, its sensations and strivings are all its sensations and strivings. So are its thoughts, if it has them. Thus one element of worship is present without worship, unity of response. The added element is consciousness: worship is a consciously unitary response to life. It lifts to the level of explicit awareness the integrity of an individual responding to reality. Or, worship is individual wholeness flooded with consciousness. This is the ideal toward which actual worship may tend" (Hartshorne: 1967:4-5).

Hartshorne (1967:5) holds that according to this account, "worship is in principle the opposite of a primitive phenomenon. The more consciousness, the more completely the ideal of worship can be realized. Those who pride themselves on transcending worship may only be falling back to a more primitive level." One may object that one can live without worship, and in such case can he be falling back to a primitive level. Hartshorne admits that one can live without worship, since the lower animals do so. And we are all animals: the animal way is partly open to us still"(1967:5).

"However, there are two possible theories of worship, the theistic and the nontheistic. According to the former, the conscious wholeness of the individual is correlative to an inclusive wholeness in the world of which the individual is aware, and this wholeness is deity. According to the nontheistic view, either there is no inclusive wholeness, or if there is one, it is not what religions have meant by deity. Perhaps it is just The Unknown, or Nature as a Great Mystery, not to be thought of as conscious, or as an individual in principle
superior to all others. Perhaps it is even Humanity. Or (more reasonably) it is all sentient creatures" (Hartshorne:1967:5-6).

Hartshorne strongly holds that (1967:6) "It is the lower animals for whom the Whole must be simply Unknown, sheer Mystery, and their own species practically all that has value. The difference between agnostics(or 'humanists') and the nonspeaking creatures is that, whereas the mere animal simply has integrity, the agnostic feels the need and possibility of raising integrity to the conscious level, but does not quite know how to do so. Thus he is in some degree in conflict with himself. However, animal innocence is there to fall back upon."

We can sum up the account of worship in the following manner. A sentient creature, which is subrational or below the level of language, feels and acts with reality, whatever it may be, as one. It has integrity with, and unitary response to, reality. Man also acts and feels with reality as one; he too has unity of response to, and integrity with, reality. The difference between subrational animals and man is that the former can scarcely be thought to worship, or to be religious; while the latter alone among the inhabitants of this world, can be thought to worship or be religious. This is so because man, in addition to having integrity and unity of response like subrational animals, has a further feature, namely consciousness. Animals cannot feel the need to rise from the level of mere integrity to the level of consciousness, while man does. To worship means to do some sort of rituals but do so consciously. And worship lifts an individual to the level of explicit awareness, and an individual's wholeness is flooded with consciousness. The more an individual's consciousness widens, the more is the ideal of worship fulfilled. At this heightened level, all thoughts and purposes, valuations and meanings perceptions and conceptions are integrated.

We have reached the conclusion that "God is the wholeness of the world, correlative to the wholeness of every sound individual dealing with the world." (Hartshorne:1967:6).
As we saw earlier, "Any sentient individual in any world experiences and acts as one" (Hartshorne: 1967:6). But the question is, if its total environment is not there with experienced as, in some profoundly analogous sense, one, then what is its status? Hartshorne's answer is that "An individual (other than God) is only a fragment of reality, not the whole..." (1967:6). The next question is, is all individuality (in other than the trivial sense in which a junk pile, say, is an 'individual' junk pile) similarly fragmentary? Or is the cosmic or all-inclusive whole also an integrated individual, the sole non-fragmentary individual? Hartshorne's answer is that all wholes or individuals are "finite", "limited", "For it is at best a leap in the dark to assert the nonfinitude of our total environment (or "all with which we have to do" - as W.E. Hocking puts it). This totality is vastly more than, and includes, ourselves; but it may for all that be finite in certain respects. Indeed, it must be so! Fragmentariness, not finitude, sets the problem of worship. Here countless theologians long ago made an initial mistake for which the full price has yet to be paid: they began the idolatrous worship of "the infinite". Cosmic wholeness, not infinity, is the essential concept. Infinity comes in if and only if-- or in whatever sense and only that sense-- we should view the whole as infinite." (Hartshorne: 1967:7).

As mentioned earlier God is the cosmic or all-inclusive whole. Now the question is: Is 'cosmic wholeness' a religious conception? In other words whether an adequate concept of worship implies the concept of God as cosmic whole? Hartshorne (1967:7-8) says yes, it is such a conception. For, three religions, if not more, such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, agree with the conception of worship embodied in: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy mind and with all thy soul and with all thy strength". Here the idea of wholeness of individual response is stated more plainly in simple, generally intelligible language. As Hartshorne says, here the word "all" reiterated four times in one
sentence does not mean nearly all—or, all important responses or aspect of personality; it
simply means that every response every aspect must be a way of loving God. "That the God
correlative to this integrity of response is himself 'One' or individual is also a Jewish-
Christian --Islamic tenet, at least apart from the subtleties of the Trinity which are surely
not intended to contradict the divine wholeness or integrity" (Hartshorne:1967:8)

It has been interpreted by many that the God of the religions mentioned is not
 cosmic whole but only the cosmic creator. Two things need to be noted in respect to this
 One, if it is said that God is only the cosmic creator, this 'only' suggests that there could be
 something more than God; and then we have a total reality, God-and-something else, which
 is more inclusive than either, and of which God is one constituent and something-else the
 other. Is it not impiety to hold that God is a mere constituent? Therefore, as Hartshorne says
 this interpretation would seem to have a severe paradox or dilemma (1967: 8).

Second, who is responsible for this paradox? Whether the basic religious writings
 or the interpreters? But Hartshorne says "the Bible, for instance, nowhere says in so
 many words that God is the whole of things, but no more does it say that he is not the
 whole"(1967:8). Either the pantheistic or the theistic issues have not arisen; and thus the
 wrong interpretation could not yet be given. Therefore the interpreters but not the basic
 religious writings are responsible for the mentioned paradox or dilemma. It is true that if
 there is nothing in the Bible to show that God is theistic or pantheistic it is an
 opportunity to interpret it either in theistic or in pantheistic manner. Further Hartshorne
 says there is no single passage in the Bible to show that the word 'God' refers to less than, or
 even other than the all—inclusive reality. Of course there are few passages such as, "God
 walked in the garden", but these would discomfort traditional theists as much as they
would any pantheists (1967:9). Taking the words of St. Paul who says that we live, move, and have our being in God, Hartshorne says that this is precisely a pantheistic view (1967:9).

But it is argued by many that the religious God is creator and therefore the world or individuals cannot be in God; for, 'X creates Y' contradicts 'Y is in X'. Against this Hartshorne argues (1967:9-12) that God can be creator as well as all inclusive. For instance man can create his own thoughts, and a poet does create the verbal images which constitute lines of his poem before he writes them down. Against this it is argued that divine creating has nothing in common with human creating. Because God creates free, self-active individuals other than himself, and this the human thinker or poet does not do. Hartshorne argues further that the word 'create' cannot be a human word, and that there is no absolute difference between human creating and divine creating. "For one thing, a human child grows new nerve or brain cells for a time after birth and even an adult perpetually grows new cells of many kinds; and these cells are living individuals which remain in the child or adult. (That they have some slight freedom of action I cannot disprove). For another thing, either a poet does ultimately create something in other individuals or he writes in vain. Still more obviously, a teacher, parent or friend creates important elements in the personalities of pupils, children or friends" (Hartshorne:1967:9-10). Further if it is argued against this that God and he alone creates the entire personality of a man, as Hartshorne says (1967:10) it seems to leave nothing for man to create in himself and there is no meaning in saying that man 'makes' a decision or an effort. "Not much is left of personality if we abstract from all the past decisions and efforts which the individual has himself made". (Hartshorne:1967:10).]

In this connection Hartshorne adds a point that "If no human making has relevance to God's making of the world, the latter phrase is more equivocation, indeed gibberish" (1967:
10). In other words what God makes in us does become a constitutive element in him. One may point out an inconsistency in this point by arguing that what the poet, teacher, parent, or friends makes in another human being does not become a constitutive element within the first human being the maker. Hartshorne defends his point by arguing that it is not absolutely true that what we make in others fails to become part of our own reality, but only relatively true. If it is only relatively true, then it is not absolutely false to say that what we make in others become part of our own reality. Correspondingly, it is not absolutely false to say that what we make in others become part of our own reality. Correspondingly, it is not absolutely false to say that what God makes in us does become a constitutive element in him. Further, Hartshorne clarifies this point as follows (Hartshorne:1967:11). "If a pupil listens in silence to a teacher absorbing valuable ideas but never communicating the changes in himself to the teacher who never learns the result of his teaching then indeed it seems that what is created in the pupil remains outside the teacher". But if the teacher intimately follows the pupil's mental growth and personality changes, then we cannot say that these, his own creations in the pupil's mind, in no degree become constitutive of his mind. For, in that case, "the teacher shares sympathetically in the pupil's excitement over ideas new to him enjoys the nuances of his emotional and intellectual responses to the ideas"; and there by his own life is enriched (Hartshorne:1967:11). Corresponding to this we can affirm about God. But it should be noted as Hartshorne says (1967:11), that the teacher's case who follows with sympathetic understanding the pupil's responses is of fallible human operations. For the teacher does not entirely understand or altogether sympathetically follow the pupils responses. Whereas God's cases, are of infallible operations. For, "if god knows the result in us of his creative actions upon us, he knows and shares them with completeness, or intimacy" (Hartshorne:1967:11). Compared to God's case a teachers knowledge is partial and external. It is partial and external
because the pupil remains outside the teacher; and thereby much in the pupil remains hidden from the teacher. If God is to be omniscient he must be all-inclusive reality and his knowledge must likewise be all-inclusive. Compared to this our knowledge, and our whole being is fragmentary; and thereby much remain outside us as knower. Here Hartshorne makes the point that the term 'omniscience' has human meaning and is not absolutely different from our knowing but it somehow differs from ours in principle (1967:12). It should be noted that men have objected to deriving the concept of God as all-inclusive from the concept of omniscience rather they exalt God by putting everything outside him. The reason given by them is that we the knowers do not include the known within us, so also God does not include the known within himself. But we have seen earlier how God is to be all inclusive reality if he is omniscient Of course, it is true that almost everything is outside us and our knowledge; that is the reason why we are not God. "But nothing can be outside God, in his total reality". From these considerations we realize that God can be creator as well as all-inclusive reality. "Thus when God creates, he creates additional contents of his own awareness, enriches the panorama of existence as his to enjoy" (Hartshorne: 1967:12)

Let us turn to consider the other point: that the concept of God as love and all-inclusive whole is derivable from the concept of worship. As Hartshorne says in many great religions the idea that worship is love with the whole of one's being is correlated.... with the idea that what we thus wholly love is itself also love, the divine love for all creatures, and for God himself as including all" (1967:12). This in Hartshorne's opinion is not simply a pretty sentiment but is, in cold logic the most rational way to view the matter. The reasons for this belief are many of which we can mention two:

(1) As we know according to many great religions, worship is love with the whole of one's being. What one wholly loves is itself also love because it is impossible to love an
unloving being with all one's own being (Hartshorne: 1967: 13). This point can be made clear as the following. As Hartshorne says, we cannot avoid self-love; if so, in loving the object of all our love we must somehow be loving ourselves. "The same is true of love for our friend or neighbour." But these loves can be element in our love for God only if the inclusive referent of our concern Himself Cherish all creatures; only if he loves all - inclusively, is the puzzle solved." "Only supreme love can be supremely lovable" (1967: 13).

(2) As Hartshorne argues concrete knowledge, knowledge inclusive of the actual concrete feeling of creatures, is some kind of sympathetic participation or love. Such as knowledge God, as the well integrated whole of things must have. It is to be noted that mere "intellect cannot know concrete qualities of feeling, for they are not concepts, abstract forms or patterns, and no mere form or pattern can contain them in their fullness". Could it be not the case that one knows but does not love what he knows? As Hartshorne argues, it cannot be the case. Because, "one knows only that in which one takes some sort of interest; we for instance know the actual feelings of others because we have at least an unconscious, or even instinctive and animal, sympathy with these feelings" (1967: 13). So also God loves what he knows; if not, this means either that he is indifferent to, or that he hates, what he knows. But the claim that is indifferent what he knows is an impossible psychology (1967: 13). To speak of purely nonemotional knowledge of particular emotions in their concrete uniqueness is nothing but gibberish or contradiction. Of course, it is rue that one may classify emotions relatively unemotionally. But, as Hartshorne says, "classification is precisely not knowing the concrete in its concreteness. And only those who feel some emotions can even classify them and know what they are doing". (1967: 14).

As Hartshorne argues (1967: 14), "If God cannot be indifferent to creaturely feelings, he also cannot hate them." The reason given is that God is inclusive and hate is exclusive,
and that there is an element of love in being not indifferent to creaturely feelings, and an element of self conflict in hating them. In this regard, therefore, the idea that God hates would contradict any classical religious idea of God.

If this is right, as Hartshorne says (1967:14), it is really odd that the Greeks were so nearly unable to conceive love as a divine quality. However as Hartshorne says Plato almost managed to conceive love as a divine quality in saying that "God created because he was not jealous or stingy, and was willing to have others enjoy the blessing of existence" (1967: 14). But in the other case he has put love strangely negatively. That is as Aristotle did, Plato thought that "the ultimate object of love must be quite other than love. It must be absolute beauty, sheer excellence, stilling all longing for anything further". (1967:14 15) Why has he done so? Because, as Hartshorne says (1967:14), he was "partly trapped (as Aristotle was wholly trapped) in the verbal confusion: God is worshipped because he is complete, perfect, free of any defect, hence he is immutable and incapable of wishing for any good not already possessed; 'love', on the contrary, means desire for the not yet attained". Now the question is, how can there be beauty or excellence inclusive of all value whatever unless it be the beauty of a love which cherishes all valuable, beautiful or loving creatures. Hartshorne claims that neither Plato not anyone else has been able to show this (1967:15). Hartshorne's contention is that beauty is the beauty of a love. It is noted that beauty as a value is actualized only in experience and that "the concrete beauty of the cosmos—and a mere abstraction cannot be the inclusive object of interest - could not be adequately appreciated by our fragmentary kind of perception and thought", but by cosmic experience. "There can then be all-inclusive beauty only if there be an all-inclusive appreciation of beauty", and this could be nothing but a cosmic sympathy." Cosmic beauty as a value must be actualized in cosmic experience, and this ... can only be a cosmic love" (Hartshorne : 1967:15).
It is to be noted that such a love must be incomplete and mutable; for it includes new responses to creaturely needs which are changing from moment to moment and the total environment that with which God has to deal, is mutable. If it is to view such a love as complete, finished once for all, then, it would be to view future events as no less determinate than past events. But, as Hartshorne claims (1967:15), the view that future events are no less determinate than past events is at best paradoxical. Therefore, as Hartshorne contends, religion should not be saddled from the outset and by definition with this paradox. And therefore, "If such a love must in some sense be incomplete and mutable, so much the worse for the identification of the One Worshipped with the complete or immutable" (Hartshorne 1967:15). "The idea of worship as conscious integrity, achieved through an inclusive integral object of love, does not of itself commit us to the immutable completeness of the One Who is Inclusively Loved. If anything it conflict with this idea, for who knows what love could be, combined with immutability? Were the Greeks not right as to that?" (1967:16).

What is required here not completeness but all-inclusiveness. As Hartshorne (1967:16) claims, this is what is conceived by theistic theories of worship, whereas nontheistic theories fail. According to the theistic theory of worship, "the conscious wholeness of the individual is correlative to an inclusive wholeness in the world of which the individual is aware, and this wholeness is deity" (Hartshorne: 1967:5). Whereas according to the nontheistic theory, "either there is no inclusive wholeness, or if there is one, it is not what religions have meant by deity. Perhaps it is just The Unknown or Nature as a Great mystery, not to be thought of as conscious, or as an individual in principle superior to others. Perhaps it is even Humanity. Or (more reasonably) it is all sentient creatures" (Hartshorne: 1967:6). Nontheistic theory fail to conceive all inclusiveness because "Humanity" leaves a vast world outside. Consider for example the quintillions of singing birds which have lived and died where no man heard them sing, or
the other habitable planets, the nonexistence of which we have no right to assume" (Hartshorne: 1967:16). "If God or the one worshipped, does not include these, then in being even slightly interested in them we are doing something besides loving God" (Hartshorne: 1967:16).

The point here is that the creator of X may or may not include X. With reference to God, as Hartshorne claims (1967:16), it is not enough to say thanks to God for creating the creatures. It must be said that God includes what he creates. For, if he does no "then in thinking this very thought I have gone beyond loving God to loving (or being mildly interested in) certain individuals outside him. But then my total interest is not in God, but only a part of my interest." (Hartshorne: 1967:16).

Thus, as Hartshorne (1967:17) claims, what makes religious sense good is the wholeness view of worship and of the divine correlate of worship. This is also more obviously relevant to the religious documents than the identification of deity with the infinite, absolute, unconditional, immutable uncaused cause most real being, or kindred philosophical objects. It is true that Spinoza has asserted all-inclusive divines, i.e., all things are in and constitutive of deity. As Hartshorne (1967:17) says, if he has done only this, he would not have been called an atheist at all. He has been called so because "he has also asserted the absolute infinity, impassibility, and non-contingency of deity, and these ideas (not merely these terms) are not religious. He identified the all-inclusive divineness with sheer infinity, necessity, or non receptivity, and this so far as religion is concerned is at best a leap in the dark" (1967:17).

There is the third way to define the One Who is Worshipped which excludes the ideas of all-inclusiveness and universal love. This way which is also Anselm's way involves the definition God is worshipped because he is the not conceivably surpassable being. God is to be the not conceivably surpassable because, if he could be surpassed by a greater or better, or even if it is so conceivable, we should worship the one who would surpass him." Also,

...
in merely thinking about the better possible being our interest would go beyond God to something else, and we should not be able to obey the Great Commandment of total devotion to the One Being" (Hartshorne:1967:17-18).

It is clear that Anslem takes the formula, 'unsurpassable', to mean 'by any other being'. Anslem supposes that this formula is equivalent to the standard definition in terms of immutable perfection. But, as Hartshorne (1967:18) alleges, this way of construing the formula would spoil the formula itself. "For there are two ways of being surpassed: by another, and by self. An individual can be or become superior to itself, without - so far as any one has shown - this necessarily entailing, even as a possibility, that another than itself surpasses it". In other words an individual who is unsurpassable by other can surpass himself, be changed. So the formula is not equivalent, if and only if, we take 'unsurpassable' to mean 'by any being, even the being itself'. But as noted earlier, Anslem construed 'unsurpassable' to mean unsurpassable by another, and what is unsurpassable by another does not necessarily be unsurpassable by self. It may be argued further that the formula is equivalent to the definition by the assumption that what is unsurpassable by other must be unsurpassable by self. But the question is: is this assumption self-evident?

Prior to answering the question let us consider why Anslem equates the formula with the definition in terms of immutable perfection. As Hartshorne points out (1967: 18), he does so because his mind is full of the Greek glorification of the immutable; he accepts "the Platonic-Aristotelian argument that what is worshipful must be self-sufficient and perfect in the sense of complete and that what is complete cannot change - obviously not for the better and surely not for the worse". It is thought that "change is a sign of weakness; and its only value must be to remedy a prior defect". But as Hartshorne argues (1967:18-19), "There is nothing in the religions (unless in Hinduism or Buddhism) to
indicate that change simply as such is a weakness and the only sense in which 'perfection' is used biblically is the ethical sense. "Be ye perfect" does not mean, be ye immutable! Nor is any immutability attributed to deity in the Scriptures save what the context implies is purely ethical. A fixity of ethical principles is one thing, a fixity of a being whole perceptive-conscious reality is another, and worlds apart from the first" (Hartshorne:1967:18-19).

Let us consider the above question: the question of self-evidence. It is true as Hartshorne says (1967:19), that if perfection is taken as an absolute maximum of value or reality, it does exclude change, as well as any possibility of being surpassed by another. It is also true that in order to equate a being which is unsurpassable by another, with such an absolute maximum we must assume that what is unsurpassable by another must be unsurpassable by self. But if it is argued that such an absolute maximum is not conceivable, it can be argued that the assumption - what is unsurpassable by others must be unsurpassable by self - is not self-evident. For the assumption that what is unsurpassable by others must be unsurpassable by self - is based on the assumption that a being is absolute maximum.

Let us see how the one assumption is based on the another. It is true that "what can be surpassed, even if only by self, is not an absolute maximum of value or reality". If "such a maximum is conceivable, then any self-surpassing being must fall short of this maximum, and so it could be surpassed by a being which possessed the maximum" (Hartshorne:1967:19). So on the assumption that such a maximum is conceivable, the self-surpassing must also be surpassable by another. And on the basis of the possibility of such a maximum, it is assumed that what is unsurpassable by others must be unsurpassable by self. Let us consider whether an absolute maximum is conceivable. Consider the expressions, such as 'class of all classes'. These expressions are grammatically smooth but can fall into implicit contradiction or nonsense (Hartshorne: 1967:19). However the expression 'The greatest possible number' is grammatical.
"but it is sheer nonsense if it means 'greatest finite number'; it is also, according to some mathematicians, nonsense if it means 'greatest infinite number'; it is at best problematic, according to any mathematician" (Hartshorne:1967:19-20). Thus Hartshorne argues that 'the greatest possible value' should be regarded as not safe from such problems. "It is vaguer but perhaps only because it has no definite meaning at all" (Hartshorne:1967:20). Therefore, according to him, since it is problematic that absolute maximum is conceivable the assumption that what is unsurpassable by others must be unsurpassable by self is not self-evident. He argues that in the minds of our ancestors this problem had not arisen because they had not yet learned our hard modern lesson concerning the ease with which grammatically smooth expressions mentioned earlier, can fall into implicit contradiction or nonsense (1967:19).

From this consideration it is evident how it is wrong to infer 'surpassable by another' from 'surpassable by self'. For, since it is at best doubtful that 'X is in all respects maximal' expresses a coherent idea, it cannot be inferred so (Hartshorne:1967:20). It is also evident that Anslem's way, without using the idea of all-inclusiveness, to define the one who is worshipped is not adequate. Hartshorne agrees (1967:20) with Anslem's argument that the very existence of the unsurpassable being must be necessary. But he throws a clear light on how 'self-surpassing' can be combined with 'unsurpassability by another' by taking the idea of wholeness. As he argues "if a being is in principle or without possible failure, all-inclusive, then any possible rival could only be one of its own possible constituents and so not a rival after all. For this to hold, God must be viewed as necessarily all-inclusive, incapable of a genuinely 'external' environment" (1967:20).

If God is necessarily all-inclusive, as Hartshorne (1967:20) claims, it must be the case that his potentiality for change is coextensive with the logically possible. Hartshorne calls this 'modal coincidence'. That is, "All actual things must be actual in God, they must be
constituents of his actuality, and all possible things must be potentially his constituents. He is the whole in every categorial sense, all actuality in one individual actuality and all possibility in one individual potentiality" (1967:20-21).

Traditionally deity was identified with infinity. But according to Hartshorne's idea of modal coincidence, this identification is a half truth. For, "All possibility ... which is indeed infinite if anything is ... coincides with divine potentiality. Thus, God is infinite in what he could be, not in what he is; he is infinitely capable of actuality, rather than infinitely actual. Not that he thus lacks on infinity which some conceivable being might have, but that an 'absolutely infinite or unsurpassable maximum of actuality' makes no sense. Possibility is in principle inexhaustible; it could not be fully actualized. Actuality and finitude belong together, possibility and infinity belong together. (This may not be quite all that needs to be said about their relations, but it is a good part of what needs to be said)" (1967:21).

So far we have considered our justification for our exposition of 'God' or 'deity' with reference to religions that of Western origin. Let us now consider explication of 'God' or 'deity' with reference to religions of Indian origin. Let us take Buddhism. The question is: is Buddhism atheistic, and yet a way of reaching individual wholeness? Hartshorne (1967:22) answers that "There is no doubt that Buddhism, at least in the Northern form, aims at and claim to reach an experience of oneness with all things. How close this comes to theism varies in different sects". According to Suzuki it comes very close in Zen (Hartshorne: 1967:22). But Hartshorne's contention (1967:22) is that "Buddhism does not offer an explicit alternative to the theistic version of the all-inclusive reality; rather the Buddhist refuses to rationalize what is given in 'satori' or salvation. His doctrine is an intuitionism, not a speculative account of the whole". (Hartshorne thinks (1967:22) that "To identify this intuitionism with Western 'scientific naturalism' is arbitrary in the extreme") Buddhism
is rather a renunciation of theorizing than a theoretical rival to theism. (And it certainly is not natural science. Supernatural overtones are pervasive in Buddhist writings, even though one cannot readily articulate them conceptually.) Metaphysics, being an attempt to theorize about first principles, does not face a choice between theism and Buddhist nontheism. The only clear-cut metaphysical theory in Buddhism is its analysis of 'substance' into unit events or momentary states. This analysis western metaphysics may well take seriously and even in large part accept. But the question of deity is not there by answered. Whitehead, granted a rather simple correction of his analysis, has shown how God can be conceived in these terms. (Hartshorne:1967:22-23)

Let us now take Hinduism. As for Hinduism, Hartshorne says that (1967:23) "it tends, like Buddhism, "when the chips are down" to renounce theory for sheer intuition. The contrast between Maya, correlative to ignorance and Reality, correlative to true knowledge, resists conceptual analysis." Now the question is: What is Maya? Is it a form of being? If so, what form? Is it a form of nonbeing, a mixture of being and nonbeing, neither being nor nonbeing? Hartshorne claims (1967:23) that "orthodox exponents are coy with the answer. The analogies, such as the rope seeming to be a snake, are not concepts but extremely vague suggestion. We are told that, as a dream is canceled by waking and finding it was but a dream so Maya is canceled by waking to True Reality. But in sober truth dreams, like ropes, are not canceled. They remain just as real events as waking experiences. True, what they seemed to reveal concerning the rest of the world may have been largely (thought never, as could be shown, wholly) mistaken, but if so the mistakes were really made. It will never be true that they were not made. And the rope was also really there". Therefore Hartshorne claims that if we press any statement by the followers of Sankara, we find that "the semblance of conceptual definiteness and logical structure is itself Maya. Or if there
is an intellectual doctrine other than the renunciation of intellect, it is the familiar Western doctrine (as in Plotinus) of 'the absolute', the formless 'infinite'; viewed as superior to, but manifested in, all definite, finite actuality, even divine actuality'. But Hartshorne holds that "this doctrine is an intellectual as well as religious mistake. Only potentiality can be strictly infinite, nonrelative, and immutable; actuality, which is richer than potentiality, is finite, relative, and in process of creation. God as actual is more than the absolute (which indeed is a mere abstraction), not less" (1967:24).

This is in short the position of Indian Philosophy. Hartshorne holds that there have been and are learned thinkers in India who have said much the same thing as just said. Hartshorne (1967:24) hopes that eventually we may all, in East and West reach better understanding concerning the role of logic in religious thought. He says that intuition is valuable and indeed indispensable; but he has a "certain faith in the rights and duties of rational metaphysical enquiry", and he shall give up "this faith only when the inevitable failure of rational metaphysics has been shown in some mere conclusive way than by arguing add nauseam from the difficulties of certain traditional forms of metaphysics whose failure" he admits "from the outset" (1967:24).

We have been dealing with the question what is the nature of God that is required by the concept of worship? From these considerations we can now decide in what kind of philosophy is the religious idea of God most at home.

One, as Hartshorne says (1967:25), it "must be a philosophy in which becoming is not considered inferior to being. For the self-surpassing divinity is in process of surpassing itself and if the supreme reality is thus a supreme process, lesser individual realities will be instance of an inferior form of process. Being can then be no more than an abstraction from becoming".
Two, it must be a philosophy which avoids declaring all individual existence to be contingent. For God, to be unsurpassable by others, must exist necessarily. Yet at the same time all actuality must indeed be contingent, even divine actuality, for the latter includes all contingent things. If follows that we need a philosophy which distinguishes between the bare or abstract truth that an individual exist and the how or actual concrete state in which it exists. Individual self-identity must be granted a certain independence from concrete actuality. Philosophies which clearly provide for this are of the Buddhist-Whiteheadian type, according to which the most concrete mode of reality is not existing substance, thing, or person, but actually occurring event, state, or experience.

Three, "A theistic philosophy must be in some sense indeterministic. It must admit (as Hume and Kant would not) that process is creative of novelty that is not definitely implicit in the antecedent situation. For otherwise only ignorance would make self-surpassing seem real; while for God past, present and future would form but a single perpetually complete reality. And this, we have seen, is not the religious view. Also a deterministic theory of temporal process implies theologically either a denial of all contingency, as in Spinoza, or an absolutely mysterious nontemporal freedom (at least for God), as in Kant" (Hartshorne: 1967:25-26).

Four, "A theistic philosophy must take 'create' or 'creator' as a universal category, rather than as applicable to God alone. It must distinguish supreme creativity from lesser forms and attribute some degree of creativity to all actuality. It must make of creativity a 'transcendental' the very essence of reality as self-surpassing process. This is precisely what Whitehead does in his 'category of the ultimate' (chapter 2 of Process and Reality)." (Hartshorne:1967:26)
Five,

"A theistic philosophy must have a theory of internal relations and also a theory of external relations. Of internal relations, for a whole logically requires its constituents and God in his concrete actuality being the inclusive whole requires all things; moreover, the creatures require God as the correlate of their own integrity. In some deficient sense the creatures include God, as well as God the creatures. Finally any creative act requires its antecedent data of external relations, for though God in his particular or contingent actuality includes all actuality, yet in his bare individual existence as the divine being and no other he - and he alone - is necessary, and what is necessary cannot include or be constituted, by relation to anything contingent. Only the contingent can be relative. Hence the abstract necessary aspect of God does not include the actual world and is not relative to it. (In addition, the antecedent data of a creative synthesis are independent of the synthesis). Both types of relations are provided for by Whitehead's theory of 'prehensions' and the two 'natures of God'" (Hartshorne: 1967:2627).

The doctrine so far delineated is panentheism or as Hartshorne calls 'neoclassical theism'. Now the question is: do we find any such doctrine in the history? It should be noted that Hume and Kant refuted all natural theology. But Hartshorne claims (1967:27) that it was no such doctrine as this 'neoclassical theism' which Hume and Kant evaluated in their alleged refutations of all natural theology. Hartshorne holds(1967:27) that it is the known fact that they were ... and especially, perhaps, Kant as unaware as any child that such a doctrine could be formulated and seriously defended. "Kant, at least, did not so much as dream of neoclassical theism, or the metaphysics which can adequately express it. If then he refuted the doctrine, this was indeed a stupendous achievement an amazing piece of luck or feat of divination" (Hartshorne:1967:27). But, Hartshorne confesses that Kant did not refute it but with one
qualification: "the first Antinomy might be thought to be such a refutation, provided one accepts the finitistic trend in mathematics as authoritative." (1967:27-28).

As Hartshorne claims, "there seems to be no equally clear religious alternative to theistic metaphysics, defined as belief in the modally all-inclusive or nonfragmentary being, surpassable only by Himself. These characterizations spring much more directly from the ideal of worship than terms like 'absolute', 'infinite', 'immutable', 'unconditioned', and similar legacies from Aristotle, Philo, Plotinus, or Plato badly understood. How different intellectual history might have been had we not been saddled so long with these pseudo-Platonic simplifications!" (Hartshorne:1967:28).