Summary and Conclusion

Nuclear weapons have created a different history in the global security calculus. Now, global security perceptions are shifting towards security devoid of nuclear weapons. The ‘absolute weapon’ which was once considered ‘more may be better’ is becoming irrelevant under the ‘Global Zero’. Nuclear deterrence, albeit provided a better tool for averting wars and conflicts, considering security beyond state and military levels has reduced the significance of nuclear deterrence. Nuclear weapon was expected to relinquish or reduce security fears and uncertainties. Conversely, nuclear weapon has brought about security dilemma of new forms. Nuclear weapon security becomes more dangerous and dreadful due to the overwhelming presence of non-state actors. Despite this, trends in some regions like South Asia show nuclear arms race. The nuclear weapon states in South Asia- India and Pakistan are expanding their nuclear capabilities. Both these nations are striving hard to obtain nuclear triad.

South Asia, an India centric region, has an imbalanced and asymmetrical power structure. However, the geographic significance of Pakistan, especially connecting to the Middle East, makes it a significant power in the region. The States in South Asia encounters a host of traditional and non-traditional security issues. Most of these traditional and non-traditional security issues emanate from domestic insecurities, internal strife, political instability, lack of civil society, communal, ethnic, racial, and regional aberrations. They pose daunting challenges to the state craft and governance. Moreover, many of the internal security problems of these states are trans-national in nature. This would further worsen the security complex of South Asia. The security system of this region is interwoven with its socio-political character. The socio-economic backwardness has also caused the rise of militant groups in the South Asian region. South Asia is increasingly referred to the most volatile area of the world, as the epicentre, the new locus of terrorism, as the venue of futile arms race and of a possible and devastating nuclear confrontation. The countries of South Asian region face the constant threats of irredentism and internal fragmentation arising from unresolved disputes over nationalist, ethnic, religious, cultural and secessionist issues within and between their territories. Territorial border disputes, water disputes, infiltration, migration, cross border terrorism and the
interference of the external powers into the region are some of the major and common challenges faced by these nations. The protracted conflict between the two big powers of the region- India and Pakistan- has been the main source of security fears in the region. Indeed this prolonged enmity between these big powers caused the nuclear weapon race in the sub region.

It has been well agreed by many scholars that the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998, has brought about a noticeable shift in the security environment of South Asia. Many scholars have argued that the South Asian security is found to be at its worse with its nuclearization. On the contrary, many considered it as a security shift which would be beneficial to the South Asian security environment. In fact the region was brought into the international concern with an active involvement of the big powers into the sub system. The nuclear weapon programme by these nations may be observed as a reaction. The Indian nuclear programme was a response to the Chinese and the Pakistani nuclear programme was to that of the Indian.

This nuclear weapon programme enhanced the asymmetrical geopolitical environment of South Asia, with India ahead of Pakistan in the nuclear weapon posture. Indeed, this is an important movement in the geopolitical stability of South Asia. Moreover, there are a number of factors that distinguishes the South Asian nuclear deterrence from that of the cold war deterrence. Geographical proximity between nuclear rivals, role of militants, terrorists, religions and extra-regional powers, and the political instability are some of the most influential factors of nuclear stability in South Asia. In a pessimistic perception, many argue that there exists a condition conducive to the nuclear failure in South Asia. They find the overwhelming role of the military in the region, particularly the organisational behaviour of the military, lack of civilian control over the military and rising military budgets, may lead to nuclear fallout in the region. Further, they suspect the command and control of nuclear weapon in Pakistan. Conversely, the supporters of the nuclear deterrence in South Asia also argue that the nuclear weapons did succeed in preventing a vigorous conflict between India and Pakistan. There have been no major wars between these two nations in the last 18 years, because of the involvement of the nuclear weapons. What makes many to suggest a positive effect of the nuclear deterrent in South Asia is
the historic lessons from the US-USSR cold war relation. Despite this, the nuclear risk in South Asia emanates from different circumstances. The prolonged hostility between India and Pakistan, political turmoil, strategic failures, terrorism, human errors and natural calamities are the contexts under which the nuclear threat becomes logical. Under the above conditions the application of the nuclear strategies becomes a challenge.

Being a central actor in the South Asian system, Pakistan’s societal, economical and political conditions have been significantly influencing the security of the region. The political instability and insecurity of Pakistan has been viewed as a major threat to the security of the subsystem. Also, this political instability and insecurity has been creating transnational issues in the region. In the last sixty seven years of political life, Pakistan had to undergo both civilian and military rule in varied degrees and periods. The elitist political culture and individual centred political culture are the chief causes for the political polarization in Pakistan. Pakistan, from its very birth as an independent nation, had to undergo many challenges such as formation of government, enactment of constitution, problem of migration, frequent and continued military dictatorship, sectarian violence, economic turmoil, corruption, activities of militants and terrorists and many undemocratic practices. These problems in turn resulted in the poor performance of the political sphere and established an insecure and unstable political system in Pakistan.

The social character of the state is a true representation of its Islamic identity. Islam had played a pivotal role in the creation of the state, and the society is controlled by the values and principles of Islam. The ethnic diversity has been a major source of security threat in the state. Pakistan is typical middle income country which is still placed under the group of poor countries. Foreign assistance played a very significant role in Pakistan’s economy and the country maintained an artificial economic growth with this. The poor condition of Pakistan’s economy has been the result of many factors. The political distortions had a very influential impact on the economy. The economic performance of the country was greatly influenced by the political system. The instability and inefficiency of the different regimes and their economic policies adversely affected the economy of Pakistan. Perhaps, the economic turmoil was the
result of poor policies and its implementations. Each government whether civilian or military, attempted to experiment with the economy, usually without success.

Pakistan discarded these domestic failures and linked its security to the external dynamics, particularly, the threat from India. This forced the state to develop the nuclear weapon capability. Many factors such as Indian bomb, national prestige, Islamic bomb and leadership, and economic imperatives are found behind this nuclear ambition. However, the Indian factor marginalizes all other factors in case of the Pakistan nuclear ambition. The 1974 Indian nuclear explosion had placed a decisive impact on Pakistan’s ambition for nuclear weapons. This Indian nuclear explosion reinforced Pakistan’s sense of urgency. With the second nuclear test by India in 1998, Pakistan was forced to demonstrate its overt nuclear posture and conducted the test after a few days of the Indian test. Though de-facto, this made Pakistan the seventh nation to become a nuclear weapon state. The six tests conducted in Chagai in 1998 were sufficient for Pakistan to advance in its nuclear weapon power. Now, Pakistan possesses over hundred nuclear warheads and adequate delivery systems. The nuclear race with India is still continued by Pakistan. There is a committed effort by the state to develop nuclear submarines, making it a nation with nuclear triad.

In Pakistan’s strategic calculus the nuclear weapon provided it with a powerful instrument to support its very survival. The Pakistani military as well as leaders argue that without nuclear weapons the Pakistani state would have ended. It protects Pakistan not only from the sworn enemy India, but also from other states, including the powerful United States. Some of them perceive that the nuclear strength of Pakistan averted the military action against it while the US started combating terrorism. It was very clear that the threat of the use of nuclear weapon was raised not only against India but even against the global power USA. Hence, Pakistan found a great advantage regarding the possession of the nuclear weapon. Pakistan could also avoid the intervention of the external powers especially in the midst of internal instability and insecurity it faced. However, the security dilemma it had been facing all through never vanished. This is because, use of the nuclear weapon is a suicidal action in the South Asian context. Many scholars believe that the political crisis and domestic turmoil in Pakistan had created a very suitable condition for the intervention by other nations, especially the neighbouring states and global powers.
The nuclear power was such a device capable of alienating the foreign powers from meddling with the domestic matters of Pakistan. It was very explicitly remarked by the former Prime Minister of Pakistan that it shall not allow any external powers to undertake any sort of military involvement in Pakistan. If any state dared to do so, the Prime minister reminded that it shall not hesitate to use its nuclear weapon. The statement of the military chief also runs similar to it. The Pakistani stand on the use of nuclear weapons expresses that it would be used at a stage when the existential threat is realized. This is embedded in its ‘first use’ nuclear policy. However, in its policy Pakistan has adopted the first use of the nuclear bomb only against nuclear armed nations. When viewed in the background of the existential threat theory, this first use only against the nuclear armed nations proves to be morally sound as well as strategically beneficial, under the present military power cycle of the region. Pakistan believes that under the present global military power analysis, it is capable of defending the nation with its conventional military strength against the non-nuclear weapon states. Therefore, for its survival Pakistan’s strategy is application of nuclear weapon against nuclear armed states and this is against India. The existential threat for Pakistan primarily comes from India. Since India is a nuclear weapon nation, it could deter the conventional threat of India with its nuclear first use policy. If India were not a nuclear weapon state, this first use only against nuclear armed state would not have served Pakistani interest under the existential threat theory, because India is conventionally superior to Pakistan. The global powers capable to deal with Pakistan militarily, such as the US, Russia, China, France and Britain are nuclear weapon states. Therefore, the first use against these nations provides a greater advantage to Pakistan.

Pakistan began its nuclear game after the defeat in the War against India in 1971, which showed the existential threat. Initially, Pakistan entered the game as a player without nuclear weapons. It involved itself in the nuclear game with sheer statements of threat. At the same time, it was developing the nuclear bomb to take-part as one of the real nuclear powers in the nuclear game. It was indeed a very difficult game that Pakistan had to play during this stage as it had to conceal its nuclear build-up as well as make the nuclear threat real. The strategy of nuclear ambiguity helped it to overcome these hindrances. The statement of Ali Bhutto, ‘we will make the bomb
even if we are to eat grasses’, was a corner step that labelled Pakistan as a key player in the nuclear game.

Many presumed a nuclear fallout in South Asia after the nuclear test by Pakistan, especially as it was an immediate reaction to the Indian nuclear test. According to the theory of security dilemma this response is quite natural. Nevertheless, the threat was exaggerated and miscalculated by many. Generally speaking, nuclear war and nuclear terrorism are the two most outrageous threats expressed with greater possibilities. Pakistani nuclear capability was viewed as something different from other nuclear weapon states, and these differences constitute the major threatening features of its nuclear capability. The inherent character of the Pakistani state distinguishes it from other nuclear powers. The Pakistani state as it experiences very different socio-political conditions generate security dilemma, principally for the countries in the region.

Analyzing the domestic politics and socio-economic conditions, to some scholars, Pakistan is categorized as a failing and weak nation. Some analysts have even argued that it is a failed state. It is due to these failing characters that Pakistan is considered the source of nuclear terrorism, nuclear war by misperception and nuclear proliferation. Of the above three threats, nuclear proliferation has already taken place from the Pakistani sources. In a failing state, the government is corrupted and inefficient, non-state actors dominate every scene and the government is incapable to provide adequate safety measures to its nuclear arsenals and materials. This would help the non-state actors to equip themselves with nuclear weapons. It would provide adequate opportunity to the terrorists to get the materials and technology required to make an atom bomb or steal one from the Pakistani shelf. Apart from this, the non-state actors might make either complete or partial control over the nuclear arsenals. It is also a very significant fact that there are certain forces in Pakistan that carry out a common control over the military, government and the non-state actors. The mullahs and the religious people constitute this great force. It is indeed this defected political and social condition that would enable the terrorist’s access to nuclear weapon and technology. A complete control over the nuclear devices by the terrorist has relatively very low chance to occur. Perhaps, it might come to effect only if the Pakistani Army deliberately allows it. It is because the Army is the custodian of the nuclear weapon.
Since the safety of nuclear weapons affects the credibility of the Army, it has a very remote chance. Partial control is maintained through influencing the nuclear decision-making and implementing it through the Army and nuclear command control structures. This has a higher chance to happen as a good faction in the Army and nuclear scientists have deep pro-Islamic attitudes.

As a failing or a weak state, Pakistan fails to constitute a clear nuclear policy and doctrine. So, the security fears and uncertainties come from this inability to provide better safety and security for its nuclear materials and weapons. To a certain extent, it is true as Pakistan has not even drafted a nuclear doctrine. Its nuclear policy has been inconsistent. Political instability doesn’t allow the government to formulate a very coherent policy and draft a nuclear doctrine. It is also found that the nuclear policy is India-centred. The Indian security dilemma is so rooted in this command control challenges. India fears that a low scale war could be transformed in to a nuclear one.

The predominant role of the Army and the frequent military coups discloses the praetorian character of Pakistan which is another source of security dilemma for other nations. From General Ayub Khan to General Parvez Musharaf, the total span of military rule is more than 32 years. This is nearly half of the entire span of independent Pakistan. The security fear generating from the military strategic perceptive points out that its praetorian character gives out a chance for a nuclear war. While the country is under military rule the entire command and control of the nuclear devices would be vested in a single hand, the military chief and the ruler. This would result in irrational and abrupt decision-making over the nuclear weapon. An important factor to be considered is the responsibility which the ruler or the government maintains. The responsibility that an elected government has towards the people will not be found with a military government. The military rulers are seldom bothered about the public discourses. If a civilian government orders to use an atom bomb in the war, it has to justify its decision before the public, providing all the compelling reasons and circumstances that led to it. People enjoy the freedom to respond to the decision of the government under the civilian regime. It is believed that people would respond to the decisions that affect their security and safety. The use of nuclear weapon invokes a high degree of risk to the safety and security even to the states that
use it. Therefore, the use of nuclear weapons, which brings about a security predicament to the state, will result in severe public protest. Such a freedom to respond is not enjoyed by the people under a military government.

It is also important to note that military governments usually alienate people from the outside world. It is unlikely that military regimes maintain good foreign relations with other nations or other nations allow their citizens to connect to people of military states. Unless the state is connected to the international community, it is difficult to have the involvement of the foreign states in the co-operative steps to avert conflicts. There is yet another factor that when an existing civilian government is overturned by a military coup, it is likely to cut off foreign relations. Usually, other nations cut off their relations with the government formed by a military coup detent. This would restrict external involvement under a crisis situation. The public protest in a military governed state seldom finds the desired result. In fact, public protests and civic movements are silenced in a military dictatorial or praetorian state. A very poor civic culture is the hallmark of a garrison state. Therefore, unlike in the case of civilian governing nations, popular movements can’t influence the decision making process in military governed nations.

Generally the nuclear posture is greatly influenced by the type of government existing in the state. The variance is manifested in the nuclear strategy which is a part of the military strategy. The civil and military governments would show difference in the military strategies they adopt. Military orientation and training are mainly directed towards the actual use of forces and winning war. Dowty and Orlas (2008) say that military men are not much interested in the game of deterrence. The degree of difference enhances as the role of the military increases and especially in a garrison or praetorian state. The question that many would ask is about the nuclear strategy of USA, in the wake of the only nuclear strike so far occurred. The US was neither a military governed nor a garrison state, but still used the nuclear weapon. One could find the supportive arguments that it was a sheer experimental test that revealed the devastating character of the atom bomb. Historical lessons tell us that it was not a military government or a revisionist state that made the only use of the nuclear bomb but the greatest democratic nation, the US. It was indeed the civilian government that advised the use of the nuclear weapon. This historical experience would perhaps
suggest that the type of government in power is not a genuine factor that defines the use of the nuclear bomb or distinguishes the strategy. Despite this illustration, the army theories suggest that a praetorian state would prefer to go for the nuclear option than for a civilian government. Nuclear decision-making becomes easy and hasty in a state with military dictatorship. Unlike in civilian democratic government the military government is not responsible to the Legislature and therefore, indirectly to the people. Both Parliamentary and Presidential forms of governments provide certain tools to the Legislature as well as to the people to control the Executive. (There exist two levels of control in parliamentary form of governments. In Parliamentary form of governing systems the executive is controlled by the legislature through parliamentary procedures. Also, through election people also exercise control over the government).

Today, in the context of globalization, the whole world is treated as a single global village. Incidents in one part of the world would have sporadic impacts in other parts. However, nations with military dictatorships remain isolated from the chain of this international system. This in turn reduces the influences of the international community, particularly the non-governmental organisation, on the government. Military governments alienate their citizen from the outside world. Therefore the international movements against nuclear war and towards the establishment of peace would fail to make influence in military governed states.

It is also important that in Pakistan the army lays greater emphasis on protecting its nuclear capability. Here the nuclear weapon -strength provides a rosy picture in the security scene of South Asia. This is because the army has to adopt strong steps to prevent the militant organizations and their activities, in order to protect their nuclear devices and materials. Pakistani state and society are now underway with the banning of extremist organizations and exercise a greater degree of control over the ‘Madrassas’ (religious schools) that had proliferated during the jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. For Pakistan, the nuclear weapons are their crown jewels. They would protect it at any cost. One of the four reasons given by General Musharaf to explain his U-turn on the Taliban after September 11 attacks was his desire to protect Pakistan's strategic nuclear weapons. It means the emphasis is given to protect the nuclear arsenals. But the question rose by nuclear experts about the nuclear command and control finger the uncertainties and fears that still exist. The
decision-making with regard to a nuclear war becomes hasty and irrational under a Military administration. Scholars like Dowty and Orlas regard that in nuclear warfare, the weapon is a type of personal tool in the hands of the head of the state. In the case of Pakistan, such a decision becomes the hand work of the military leadership. The military leadership, with the singular dominance of the military chief, makes the decision to use the nuclear weapon quite easy. This fear brings forth greater security dilemma particularly to India.

A conventionally superior Nuclear weapon state like India which has been its all time enemy, existing in close proximity is yet another reason for the uncertainties and security fears of Pakistan. The bone of contention even in nuclear South Asia continues to be Kashmir. The attention of the global community turned towards Kashmir as India and Pakistan carried out the nuclear tests in 1998. However, there was a good deal of differences of opinion among the scholars about the effect of the nuclear weapon in the region especially in the Kashmir crisis. Some found the possibility of peace in the region, some found unstable peace and still others, war and destruction. Relating the nuclear deterrence with the Kashmir issue, Mohan Malik (2003) contents that Pakistan would restrain from fighting a nuclear war on the Kashmir issue. He says that Pakistan will not be ready to sacrifice the well-being of 140 million Muslims for the sake of 3 million Muslims in Kashmir. If it is true, the nuclear weapon capability would reduce the involvement of Pakistan in the Kashmir issue. It would also enhance the stability existing in South Asia.

As Rajesh Rajagopalan argues, the risk of nuclear war is closely related to the nuclear deterrence doctrine that the nuclear states adopt. Pakistan has refused to reciprocate India's ‘No first use’ nuclear posture, and its apparent willingness to consider the actual use of nuclear weapons to compensate for the inferiority of its conventional military forces are generally seen both as a challenge to military strategy and as an important factor for raising the possibility of a nuclear escalation in the region. It is also important that it was not the nuclear capability of India that worried Pakistan and forced them to go for nuclear development. Indeed, it was the conventional supremacy of India. Even under minor conflicts provoked by Pakistan, India would not attempt a high level war due to the nuclear capability of Pakistan. Therefore, for Pakistan, the nuclear weapon would deter the conventional strength of
India. Singh (2010) finds that this view is more comprehensive, as former Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee reportedly mentioned to an Indian Army Chief that India could not fight a war with Pakistan because Pakistan had an Atom bomb that they might use against India. So, the possibility of low level conflict is high and that of high level conflict is low.

The problem of proximity with respect to Indo-Pakistan nuclear case revolves on failure of early warning capability, very limited reaction time, decapitating strike and counter force strike. Due to the limited time both these nations get, early warning would not be possible or accurate. The failure in the early warning system with very limited reaction time would lead to an irrational decision on the nuclear force. A hasty decision, due to the very limited reaction time will, therefore, become inevitable. Due to the geographical closeness the countries may target the political decision making centre or the nuclear weapon sites. Even conventional force is adequate to do the same. Algappa (2009) argues that fear of a disruption or collapse of communication systems in a conventional war provides an incentive to pre-delegate the control of nuclear weapon in an extreme situation of war. Zafar Jaspal points out that the geographical closeness will compress decision making by the national leaders and battlefield commanders, reducing stability at crisis. This is due to the very limited time they would get in crisis situation. The intensity of enmity along with the geographical proximity distinguishes the Pakistani nuclear threat from the other nuclear powers. Hostility added to geographical proximity is another significant source of security dilemma.

It is quite rational to think that terrorists can be the cause of the use of nuclear weapon. Terrorist actions culminating into a nuclear war cannot be discarded under the special circumstances prevailing in South Asia. Around 75% of the terrorism casualties take place in Asia of which the southern region is more prone to terrorist violence. According to Brahma Chellaney, this southern part of Asia, encompassing Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Chinese-ruled Xinjiang and Tibet, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Burma, is wracked by terrorist, insurgent, and separatist violence in a manner unmatched elsewhere in the world. History also reveals that intrusion by the militants have caused conflicts and wars between India
and Pakistan. There were in fact a few explicit events that rode very close to nuclear war in 1999.

There cannot be stable peace in the region as long as anti-state actors subscribe to the Islamic caliphate and Pakistan to the two-nation theory; and political power in Pakistan is exercised by the Army, the mullahs, and the feudal lords in the name of jihad, Islam, and Kashmir. Unfortunately, the condition in Pakistan reveals that the state is a victim of all the above challenges. However, when these challenges cross the limit they would bring in instability and confrontations in the region. It is not the political power controlled by Army or mullahs or feudal lords separately that precipitates the situation. When they are linked to Jihad, Islam and Kashmir it turns out to be a very dreadful condition.

Pakistan followed a dual strategy while dealing with India. While they come in to negotiations and agreements for settling disputes, they still continue to support militant moves in India particularly Kashmir. After the 1949 cease-fire the Pakistani government continued covertly to support volunteer guerrilla fighters in Kashmir. Islamabad argued that it could not control the volunteers, who as individuals were not bound by the cease-fire agreement. Islamabad continues this strategy even under this nuclearized situation. It is evident that whether nuclear terrorism has taken in effect or not, the nation states have given a very high degree of precaution to avert every possible chance of nuclear terrorism. In fact, this security concern of the state and its implementation has prevented terrorists from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Under the pretext of nuclear terrorism, states attempt to provide maximum safety and security to their nuclear weapons and materials. However, there exists ‘Nuanced Nuclear Terrorism’, which cannot be found apparently. The verbal threat of nuclear terrorism both by the terrorists and others in fact put the international community under immense pressure. This was indeed beneficial to the terrorist groups as it was their area of strength. The fear that the nation states have about nuclear terrorism rightly serves the intention of nuclear terrorists.

This fear of nuclear terrorism has a very positive result. A very coherent security, particularly on the nuclear devices will be one among the results. A high level security check-up by the nation states as well as the international community
will be followed. Another expected action is very stringent actions that would be taken against the terrorist groups. But it should be understood that the non-proliferation measures directed at states, such as sanctions and export controls are not directed at terrorist groups. As Jenkins (2006) argues, such measures should be viable against states that support terrorists groups that seek nuclear weapons. Taking steps to demystify nuclear weapons and to reduce the incentive to acquire them requires states that possess them to reduce reliance on such weapons in their own national defense strategies. These states should begin by abiding by their international legal obligations, including the reduction and eventual elimination of those weapons.

With the weak and failing conditions prevailing in the state, the nuclear capability of Pakistan unleashes several threats of diverging character. Viewed from one angle, the nuclear capability affects its own survival, the security of South Asia and eventually global security. From the other angle nuclear proliferation, nuclear war, nuclear accidents and nuclear terrorism are the other threats. The most inflicted area of the nuclear danger out of the Pakistani nuclear programme would be Pakistan itself. It would be the most affected victim of the nuclear war, nuclear accidents and nuclear terrorism, if any of them occurs out of its nuclear capability. Nuclear accidents, whether natural or man-made, would be catastrophic to the Pakistani state. Geographically Pakistan is located in the third category among the earthquake-prone areas. Tsunami has already struck the region with disastrous effect. Scholars are sceptical of the technological capability of the state to withstand these dangers. These natural threats primarily target the nuclear reactors, weapons and material reservoirs. The nuclear accidents here should be analysed distinctly from the nuclear war or any nuclear detonation that emanates from misperceptions or misjudgement by the nuclear command-control authority. Human errors while handling nuclear materials and weapons during their development and deployment would destroy the people and property of the state. The technological backwardness multiplies the possible human errors, since most of its nuclear technology owes its source from outside the state. Furthermore, the nuclear bomb in Pakistan is often referred to the product of one-man (AQ Khan) effort.

Many have compared the South Asian scene to the cold war scenario. The South Asian nuclear deterrence runs quite different from the cold war deterrence.
Windsor (2006) points out that the doctrine of MAD actually worked out in this period by avoiding direct confrontation between the super powers. The Joe-4 test in August 1953 by the USSR ended the monopoly of the US nuclear weapon. This brought about strategic shifts in the nuclear policy of America. The new US strategy rapidly came to be known as “massive retaliation”. Analysing the Cuban crisis, Lebow and Gross Stein contend that the mutually acknowledged fear of war made the other side’s nuclear capabilities less threatening and paved the way for first Arms Control Agreements. There are a number of factors that distinguishes the South Asian nuclear deterrence from that of the cold war. Regional factors like the geographical proximity, militancy, religion, role of extra-regional powers and political instability are some of the most influential factors of the nuclear stability–instability paradox in South Asia. Taking a pessimistic view, Scott Sagan argues that there exists a condition conducive for nuclear failure in the sub continent. According to Sumit Ganguly (2008), the overwhelming role of the military in the region, particularly its organisational behaviour, lack of civilian control over the military and rising military budgets may lead to the failure of nuclear deterrence.

A large volume of literature and several scholarly opinions have placed Pakistan as the most volatile state after it obtained nuclear weapon capability. Multifaceted challenges are expected from the Pakistani nuclear weapon strength and these expected security threats constitute the basis of security dilemma particularly in South Asia. Almost all the types of nuclear threats such as nuclear war, nuclear proliferation, nuclear black marketing, nuclear terrorism and nuclear accidents, are expected to emanate from the Pakistani nuclear weapon force. The question as to why only Pakistan has been described as the major source of threat is very relevant here. And these differentiating characters of the state unfold a very high-level security predicament from its nuclear potential which may not be seen in other nuclear weapon states. This failing character of the state unleashes severe threats to the nuclear safety and security. The overwhelming influence of the military (garrison state) and non state actors (terrorism and militancy), prolonged struggle with conventionally superior enemy (India) and the ugly nexus with rogue states are some of the peculiar characters of the Pakistani state. These features of the state quadruple the security dilemma particularly in South Asia.
Nuclear deterrence which is in fact meant to reduce the security risk in India, ironically enough, led to a high level security dilemma. With the weak and failing conditions prevailing in the state, the nuclear capability of Pakistan unleashes several threats of diverging character. The security dilemma that Pakistan encounters here is how to safeguard its nuclear power and how to respond to the nuclear vulnerability. The security dilemma that India faces due to Pakistan’s nuclear potential is well expressed by Indian Government and its political leaders. The dilemmas that are expressed by India include nuclear attack from Pakistan, nuclear terrorism and low scale war from Pakistan. India, definitely, has to respond to these challenges and it becomes the next level of dilemma of how to respond to the challenges. Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme has endangered the international security to a considerable extent for multiple reasons. Nuclear black marketing, nexus with rogue states and the overwhelming role of terrorists pose very grave threats to the nuclear non proliferation regime and international security system. This raises a security dilemma at the International level too. The International powers are unsure about how to respond to the expected nuclear risk emanating from Pakistan.

Security dilemma paves the way for arms race by nations. The nuclear arms race is no exception to this general rule. Security perceptions of the states, both right and wrong, cause inalienable challenge to the military potential. It is in fact true that the first nuclear bomb developed by America in 1945 was necessitated by the security dilemma created by the German alliance and it was the first successful move of the nuclear game that re-mapped history. The fear of the German nuclear programme, whether exaggerated or real, forced the US to develop the bomb. The security dilemma sensibility by the US policy makers and the military chiefs realised unchallengeable threat from the German alliance if they obtained the atom bomb. This security dilemma compelled the US to take a very strong offensive strategy where the nuclear bomb determined the end of the war. Alike, security dilemma was sensed by other nations that forced them to nuclear weapon development. For the erstwhile USSR the nuclear potential of the US provoked its global power states. The balance of power shifted in favour of the US due to its nuclear weapon capability. The USSR found that the atom bomb should be an indispensible part of their military strength. Like a chain of action and reaction this process of nuclearization progressed.
Chinese nuclear weapon power created a security dilemma to India and Indian nuclear potential to Pakistan. Therefore, this security dilemma activated the ‘tit for tat’ syndrome.

Understanding the intention of weapon acquisition poses a great challenge. The intention behind the Chinese nuclear weapon development was not India. In the same way the Indian nuclear bomb was not built to target Pakistan. However, India perceived a potential threat in the Chinese weapon and Pakistan in the Indian. It is important to note that all nations do not perceive threat in the armament by another nation. Canada encounters no threat from the American Nuclear power. Like-wise Nepal faces no nuclear threat from India. Therefore, the insecurity feeling or security dilemma is condition which depends on the relation that a nation maintains with the other. In the case of Canada, there is a very cordial relation with the US. Similarly, in the case of India and Nepal, friendly relations between them, helps to wipe off the nuclear threat. Further, it seems that the nuclear potential of the US protects Canada under the extended deterrence. On the contrary the US and the USSR had a conflicted relation especially on an ideological basis. Also, the Chinese-Indian and the Indo-Pakistan relations contained a number of confronted areas than co-operation. So, a state perceives threat in the military expansion and change by another nation, only if they have a history of animosity or if the former is a revisionist power. Generally, security dilemma arises out of antagonistic relation among nations.

The response to security dilemma by nations differs according to its military and diplomatic capability, principally in the nuclear context. Nuclear weapons are costly and require highly sophisticated technology. All nations do not possess the affordability and accessibility to nuclear bomb. It is decidedly necessary to withstand the pressure against the nuclear weapon programme. Afghanistan finds security challenges lying amidst the nuclear powers such as India, Pakistan and China, and there is perpetual conflict with Pakistan. The nuclear bomb, perhaps, would turn out to be strategically advantageous to it. But it has not yet developed one. It is because it does not possess the ability, economically and technologically, to develop the bomb. Correspondingly, though Cuba encountered a security threat from American nuclear power, it did not manufacture a bomb. Hence, animosity cannot be considered the sole factor forcing to respond with nuclear weapon.
Another significant fact of the nuclear power is that it is resolutely powerful (even in a very few numbers) to deter conventionally strong nations. Conventionally inferior Pakistan finds it safely deterred against conventionally superior India with the nuclear potential. Likewise, North Korea has greater advantage in its nuclear capability while pursuing its aggressive policies even against the global power-America. Therefore, the conventionally weak nations would demand the need for a nuclear weapon to establish balance of power. It would bring irrefutable change to the balance of power in favour of the small nations in the nuclear era. Nuclear weapons limit the role of conventional strength in dealing with conventionally weak but nuclear weapon state. This is because the threat of the use of nuclear bomb is certain from a conventionally weak nation which is on the verge of complete destruction.

Another notable feature of the nuclear weapon is that the security dilemma caused by its development and possession demands a similar response. This response could be by either manufacturing the bomb (self centred deterrence) or allying under the nuclear cover of another nation (extended deterrence). Extended deterrence works out under co-operation. However, extended deterrence under co-operation can neither be taken for granted nor expected to be everlasting. The behaviour of the state is dynamic. Moreover, the state providing extended deterrence should be capable to do so even in the changing international atmosphere. The credibility of the extended deterrence is questionable as new nations are obtaining nuclear weapon. Britain and France were members of the NATO and were under the extended deterrence of the US. But both these nations developed the bomb as they viewed self deterrence provided better security options as the USSR obtained the weapon. The Pakistani case, to a certain extent, resembles the same that it could not get the expected help from America, though it was an ally of the American led NATO.

The problem of uncertainty is the root cause of security dilemma. It is the ability of the nation to act rationally during times of uncertainty that makes it powerful and unchallengeable. A right perception about the action of the other nation is very difficult as long as uncertainty prevails. Posen (1993) rightly argues that this uncertainty and fear invariably affect peace and stability. Protective measures by one state in the event of security dilemma unintentionally raises questions of security
concerns in the neighbouring states. The first question will be whether it is a threat or not, followed by how much the threat is and what should be done.

Whenever the balance of power status quo is altered it gives a way to security dilemma. It need not be a military action, but a military action is decidedly influential. A verbal statement against the interest of one state by another would adversely affect the balance of power. The cold war between the US and the USSR did not involve a military confrontation; but the ideological conflict affected the equilibrium status and unleashed uncertainty and global security crises. Imbalances under co-operation do not cause security dilemma. In contrast imbalances under hostility would generate security challenges. So, balance of power plays a very limited role under co-operation. The US military expansion mildly affects Britain and France, so that they remain in cooperation under the NATO umbrella. However, it affects the largely ideologically-hostile USSR. The balance of power shifts between hostile nations unfold security crises.

Dilemma is imminent with regard to nuclear deterrence. Raman (2006) remarks that a dilemma arises when there is a search for the absolute means to provide full proof deterrence. The search to maximise the deterrence capability produces dilemma in the opponent because of the ambiguity concealed in the search. The search for deterrence may be misperceived by the opponent as a search to attack and shift the balance of power. Nuclear build-up as part of maximising the deterrence, results in security dilemma in the neighbouring states, particularly in the hostile nations. India’s nuclear weapon development, which was intended to deter China, gave rise to security challenges to Pakistan. A faction of the intellectual class viewed that nuclear deterrence would strengthen safety and security. Definitely, a number of nations feel insecurity as the nuclear weapon gives out multifaceted challenges. The prospect for limited war between nuclear powers raises security turmoil. The threat of low level conflicts is always present under nuclear deterrence. The historical lessons of the cold war and 16 years of Nuclear South Asia disclose that an all-out war between the nuclear rivals is inconceivable. However, conflicts and confrontations at low levels are quite possible. At the same time nations must possess strength in the conventional force to carry on with the low level conflicts. Moreover, the conventional low level
confrontations shall not cross the existing threat borders. If so, it would invoke a catastrophic nuclear war.

The Indian Nuclear programme created a fear in Pakistan’s security scene. Though India declared that its nuclear weapon capability is for deterring Chinese nuclear capability, Pakistan interpreted that it was clearly targeting them. It feared that the univocal nuclear potential of India in the region would make Indian domination unquestionable. Also Pakistan would be forced to accept the Indian stand on the Kashmir issue. Recalling the Bangladesh war in 1971 and the division of Pakistan, leaders of Pakistan found an existential threat emanating from Indian nuclear potential. The sum total of these fears and uncertainties constitute Pakistan’s security dilemma. These fears have been expressed by Pakistani leaders and heads of government at various times. As explained in the chapter on theoretical analysis, military build up in one nation would create security threat to another, though they are not targeting the other. Here, Indian nuclear weapons were not targeting Pakistan, but Pakistan perceived it so. The targeted state was China but the response came from Pakistan. This exemplifies the notion that security dilemma is very intense when mutual relations are marked by hostility.

The next dilemma of Pakistan was how to respond to this perceived nuclear threat. Pakistan responded to it by developing its own nuclear capability. This was because it found nuclear weapons can be deterred only by nuclear weapons. Also the nuclear power could be used to deter Indian conventional power, which was always superior to that of Pakistan. While facing the dilemma Pakistan adopted different strategies. As economic and technological constrains prolonged the weapon development, Pakistan adopted an ambiguous strategy. This strategy of ambiguity helped Pakistan to carry out its clandestine nuclear programme successfully. The fear of an Indian pre-emptive strike on the nuclear development centres was also responded to by Pakistan through its ambiguous strategy. At the same time Pakistan accelerated its weapon programme.

The theory of security dilemma states that it is not easy to strengthen a nation’s security without challenging the security of other nations. Both this action and response for strengthening the security and averting the fear keep the security dilemma
in continuum. The Pakistani nuclear weapon in fact was the result of this great dilemma it encountered. Generally, responding to a nuclear threat must be done with a nuclear weapon. It is also to be noted that antagonistic relations existing between India and Pakistan intensified the dilemma and put it in continuous momentum. The theory of security dilemma suggests that self security is the best security in the anarchic world. Therefore, protection under the umbrella of the big nuclear powers, in the form of extended deterrence, seems to be less relied by nation states. This is true in the case of Pakistan. It found best security in self security, developing its own nuclear bombs. However, it should also be noted that Pakistan expected assistance from the nuclear powers during wars with India. Contrary to these expectations, Pakistan could not get active support from the nuclear weapon state.

In the South Asian scene, security dilemma was born with the very birth of these two nations. Earlier the security dilemma had led to conflicts and wars. A step to strengthen the border security has been misunderstood as an offensive move, leading to a response, often one step ahead. Continuous mutual hostility is the main reason for this. There were co-operative steps taken by these states, despite which security dilemma pervaded. As a whole, dilemma led to arms race, war and cooperation in the region. The nuclear arms race and conflicts are parts of such fears and uncertainties. As long as mutual suspicion pervades the scene, co-operative steps cannot reduce or break the dilemma.

Before Pakistan was nuclearised Indian fears were confined to intrusions and its escalations into war with the conventionally weaker Pakistan. From its earlier wars with Pakistan, India found that Pakistan is not a great threat to its conventional power. In the pre-nuclearised period India was also threatened by terrorist insurgents and secessionists, which were movements sponsored by Pakistan, especially in Jammu and Kashmir. To certain analysts, India had taken coercive stand and steps against Pakistan before Pakistan was nuclearised. India even dared to meddle with the domestic affairs of Pakistan. The Bangladesh Independence war of 1971 is one such instance. Moreover, India felt the threat from Pakistani alliance with certain nations, especially China.
The China-Pakistan nexus feared India seriously, as China was a nuclear power and this prevented India from adopting a strong stand against Pakistan. Indian uncertainties revolved around the questions such as whether nuclear China would come to the rescue of Pakistan in an Indo-Pak confrontation, and also whether it would provide Pakistan conventional and non-conventional weapons. However, these security fears of India remained at the peripheral levels, since the core of the security threat and dilemma arose from Pakistani intrusions and sponsored terrorism. Principally, in the 1980’s and 1990’s, as Pakistan was closely reaching to its nuclear weapon capability, Indian security calculations perceived a very severe threat from nuclearised Pakistan. Infact, the very nuclear programme of Pakistan gave rise to fears and uncertainties in India. India regarded Pakistan as a revisionist nation and Pakistan univocally obtaining nuclear weapon power would pose a rigorous security crisis. India responded to this dilemma rationally by accelerating its nuclear weapon construction. So, even before Pakistan was nuclearized, the fear of nuclear Pakistan was deeply sensed by India.

After Pakistan had obtained the nuclear weapon, Indian security fears and uncertainties quadrupled. The fears range from low level conflicts to an all-out war. There is a very deep concern that Pakistan would go for low scale conflicts in order to alter the existing balance of power status with its nuclear deterrence. This dilemma of India was quite proved in the Kargil war. In fact, India wanted to limit the conflict in the lower levels fearing Pakistan would use the atom bomb in a major war. This dilemma of India arises from nuclear and revisionist Pakistan.

The Indian response should be such that it shall provide the least possible chance for low level conflicts with Pakistan. India should also consider maintaining better relations with Pakistan based on co-operation and mutual trust. It should also ensure the support of the world powers to avert the low level conflicts. India should make earnest attempts to force Pakistan to give up its ‘first use’ policy and choose the ‘no first use’ policy. If Pakistan abandons its first use policy, India can use its conventional power to put down a low scale conflict without escalating it into a nuclear one.
Another source of Indian dilemma is terrorism, both conventional as well as non-conventional. State sponsored terrorism often damages the relation between India and Pakistan. Under the context of nuclearised Pakistan India will be forced to limit its response to terrorist insurgencies sponsored by Pakistan. As India deals with non state actors effectively, there is a chance to set off low level conflicts and these low scale conflicts transforming into a nuclear war. Also, the fear of the use of atom bomb will not allow India to take actions against terrorists sheltered in Pakistan soil. The dilemma is whether Pakistan would take advantage of this strategic situation.

Again nuclear terrorism is the most alarming factor of Indian security concerns. Two levels of threat are imminent in nuclear terrorism caused by Pakistan- a strike by terrorists armed with nuclear bomb and terrorist attacks on the nuclear sites of India. A militant attack on Indian civil and military nuclear sites, modelling ‘Ground Zero’, would be dreadful. The reports and studies by nuclear experts divulge the fact that nuclear command and control in Pakistan is fragile, and that India has fears about the accessibility of terrorist to the atom bomb. The unholy links between militants and military, scientists and jihadis is a matter of concern to India. There is also another security concern, that terrorists might use the nuclear bomb as well as components to deter an Indian action against them.

It is the unpredictable move by the opponent that creates security dilemma and security crises to a nation. Though states show certain general characters, it is irrational to think that they shall not vary their traits. To a certain extent states possess a dynamic character. So, there arises uncertainty in assessing the action of a state. Pakistan fell into a deep security dilemma when India acquired the atom bomb. Already the conventional power of India was a challenge to its security. After the Bangladesh war in particular, Pakistan sensed a security threat not only on its Kashmir demand, but also to its survival. Pakistan perceived that the massive striking capability of the nuclear bomb would place India in an unchallengeable position in the balance-of-power stratum. It was these uncertain perceptions of Pakistan that has driven the state to nuclearization. Pakistani nuclear power was also response to the security dilemma caused by Indian conventional strength.
During the process of nuclearization, Pakistan gave out a number of statements about their nuclear programme, intended to reduce its security fears. Conversely, this put India under a dilemma. Pakistan provided a vague picture about its nuclear programme as part of its ambiguous strategy. The opaque nuclear posture of Pakistan perplexed Indian security perceptions. Such statements, without producing any nuclear weapon, caused greater security fears.

The argument that Pakistan would have constructed the bomb even if India had not attained it is to be analysed here in the light of the security dilemma concepts. India’s conventional forces have created uncertainty and fear in Pakistan. The defeats in the wars fought with India, more particularly the bifurcation of the nation, had set off fears of an unchallengeable Indian threat. Pakistan definitely has to respond to these security threats, either by strengthening its conventional power or by constructing an atom bomb. Pakistan took up the nuclear option which it felt would be capable of putting down the security dilemma through nuclear deterrence. Pakistan believed that the nuclear weapon could be used to deter both conventional and nuclear attacks.

Observing the 16 years of nuclear strategic stability in South Asia, the notion that the conflicts would remain at the peripheral levels, seems to be rational. From the very year of the nuclear tests (1998), incidents of low scale conflicts are being reported. So, the idea that the presence of nuclear weapon in the region would avert low scale conflicts proved to be a failure. The main problem leading to security dilemma is the lack of governmental control on the Army and inefficiency of the government to restrict non-state actors in Pakistan. MAD, Mutually Assured Destruction, of the nuclear bomb would normally force nation states to co-operation and even avoid low level conflicts due to the fear of its escalation in to an all- out war. However, the Pakistani state is placed in a different situation. The government, though it demands so, cannot implement it as it lacks control over the Military. The militant-military alliance becomes a threat in this context. Whenever the government attempted to overrule the military, it had to face very bitter experiences. Under Pakistan’s peculiar political atmosphere, an agreement reached by the Prime Minister or the government requires the approval of the Military.
Previous experience suggests that India also wants to limit the conflicts in the low levels. Being a mature democratic nation it is very well aware of the consequence of an all-out war. The Indian stand is always defensive. Therefore, there is a higher chance for low scale conflicts in future unless the situation in Pakistan changes into one where stable and legitimate governments should control the decision making over the military. Otherwise, India will have to face the encounters as well as restrict them at the lower levels, which can only lead to an unstable and ugly peace.

Three situations may be foreseen in this context: first, a situation in which India and Pakistan come into cooperation where stable peace would be the result; secondly, one in which mutually antagonistic relations as well as low-scale conflicts continue and unstable or ugly peace pervade; thirdly, there can be a situation where low level conflicts go beyond control escalating into a nuclear one where, mutual annihilation or partial victory of India may come in. An all-out war would damage both sides though eventually India will win. It would further precipitate the situation and diffuse the strategic stability in the region. What is desirable is a change to the existing unstable peace, brought about by socio-economic and political change in Pakistan. There should be earnest attempt to limit the conflicts at the periphery and at the same time speed up the process of desirable change in Pakistan.

Validation of the Hypotheses

From the study, the hypothesis- *Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programme was a response to Indian power, both conventional and nuclear*, is found to be true and rational. The hypothesis was studied by analysing the cause factor of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programme particularly using the theories of security dilemma and deterrence. While exploring the evolution of the nuclear programme of Pakistan, it was found that Pakistan was aggressively involved in the production of nuclear weapon after the defeat in the Bangladesh liberation war of 1971. This in fact pertains to a response to the conventional Indian power. Again, Pakistan’s nuclear test just a few days after the Indian nuclear test in 1998 as well as just one more test than the Indian proves that Pakistan’s nuclear weapon capability was a response to Indian nuclear power. To many experts and scholars, it was the perceived existential threat that Pakistan faced from India forced it to respond with nuclear deterrence.
The validity of the next hypothesis, *Foreign assistance, both financial and technological was essential for Pakistan to run its nuclear programme*, was tested by studying the economic and military assistance that Pakistan received during the course of its nuclear programme with the help of various economic and statistical tools and methods such as measures of central tendency and computation of national income and economic growth. The data provided by internationally reputed institutions like World Bank, MIT, SIPRI, ECOSOC and ADB were used to analyse this hypothesis. With regard to the technological aspect, it was found that Pakistan initiated its weapon programme with the help of the assistance it received from USA and Canada for civilian nuclear programme and later it received assistance particularly from China.

Religious influences and role of leadership were the two key factors considered to study the hypothesis-*the role of internal dynamics in Pakistan’s nuclear capability*. A certain group of scholars opine that the idea of ‘Islamic bomb’ helped Pakistan to get support and assistance from the Islamic nations. The well known statement by Z.A. Bhutto in the 1970s about the need for an ‘Islamic bomb’ shows the religious role in the nuclear weapon construction. Similarly, the role of both civilian and military leaders in realising the nuclear dream of Pakistan cannot be discarded. In a different sense the political cultivation of nuclear weapon programme of Pakistan was planted by Bhutto, nurtured by Zia and harvested by Nawaz Sharif. However, the study found that it was the India factor that was the major cause of the nuclear programme, a factor which makes this hypothesis irrelevant.

The hypothesis that *security benefits superseded the economic cost of the nuclear programme of Pakistan and economic forces cannot completely put down the nuclear ambition*, is analysed with the help of data provided by institutions like SIPRI, MIT, World Bank and UNO; and official cites of government of Pakistan. As Pakistan has already attained the nuclear capability, the study focuses on the influence of the economic aids and sanctions on the nuclear programme. It was explicit that Pakistan had to forgo the economic benefit it could have gained if it ceased its nuclear programme. On the one side USA and other leading nations stopped their present aid to Pakistan and on other side Pakistan missed the additional economic and military offers given by the big powers. It was also obvious that Pakistan was not ready to compromise its security in return of the economic assistances. With an analogical
approach the Study also found certain similarities with the case of North Korean nuclear development that the economic aid could not halt their nuclear weapon capability.

An analogical approach was made to study the typical fears and challenges Pakistan unleashes from its nuclear capability. Various scholarly works, particularly the critical security studies were analysed. The hypothesis, *Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programme caused security dilemma of new forms and types*, was studied by inspecting the fears and threats expressed by various governments, particularly India, and expert comments. Most of the scholarly books and journals expressed fears of nuclear accidents, nuclear war, nuclear terrorism and unauthorised use of nuclear weapon emanating from Pakistani sources. Political instability, nuclear command control system, and role of military are the main aspects compared with other nuclear powers. It was found that uncertainty and fear stemming up from nuclear Pakistan is major source of security dilemma.

*Political instability and lack of transparency in Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine poses serious strategic challenges to the South Asian region, particularly to India,* is the next hypothesis of the study. The hypothesis was examined with the help of various official statements by the government of India, interviews and discussions with national and international experts from military circle and security studies. Indian fears as expressed by officials of Government of India, mainly points out that the Indian source of nuclear threat from Pakistan is primarily due to political turmoil in Pakistan. Most of the scholars and literary works agreed that the ‘first use policy of Pakistan threaten Indian security. Political instability existing in Pakistan is regarded as a favourable condition for nuclear terrorism, unauthorized use and nuclear accidents. It also raises suspicion about the command –control system of Pakistan’s nuclear forces. Further, Pakistan has not yet drafted its nuclear doctrine. Its nuclear doctrine depends on the statements by political and military leaders which is ambiguous. This causes security dilemma and strategic instability is the region.