Chapter III

State, Society and Economy of Pakistan - A Profile

The idea of the state of Pakistan was realized with the bifurcation of British India into Pakistan and India. The Islamic identity was the basis for the creation of the state. The religious consideration surpassed many other components of a state. Moreover, the ideological and intellectual foundations of Pakistan were Muslim as a monolithic community. This could be perceived in the thoughts of Muslim elites like Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan. Analyzing the Islamic factor in the genesis of Pakistan, Sumit Ganguly views Sir Sayyid was deeply concerned with domination on the Muslim minority in India. He also argues that overlooking the homogeneity of the Muslim community was really a myth. “His fears about how the subcontinent’s Muslim minority would fare, however, do require discussion. His argument presupposed that Muslims constituted a monolith, and that their religious affiliation dominated all other facets of their identity. He ignored the difference that variations in social class, sect, language, and region could make to Muslim identity” (Ganguly; 2008). For Pakistan independence meant not freedom from the British colonial rule but freedom from Hindu domination. It is a fact that everyone would agree that the creation of Pakistan was enormously based on the Islamic Identity. Exploring the internal dynamics of the state it could also be found that Islam was not the sole aim behind the creation of the state; rather it was the main solidifying factor (Malik; 1994: 471). The birth of the state of Pakistan was for the realization of different goals to different communities.

The birth of Pakistan state was not a revolutionary one but an evolutionary one. Historical factors like Colonial rule and the independence struggle along with the Islamic tradition were the significant events in this evolutionary process. The formation of the Indian Muslim League was a very significant step in this evolutionary process. In fact the policies of the British government in India such as the ‘divide and rule policy’ segregated the people of India on Hindu and Muslim identities. Though Colonial history was a major factor in the formation of the Pakistani state, the Ideology of Pakistan seldom treats it as significant. This is because Pakistani historiography has been developed under the framework of ‘Pakistani
ideology’ where colonial past is treated as India’s past (Haokip; 2009: 370). The Islamic traditions which had been inherited form the Sultan regimes and the trade with the Persian countries was a major chain in this process. However “The name, Pakistan was coined in 1933, means “land of the pure ”as a homeland for South Asia’s Muslims can be traced to the writings of Muslim intellectuals such as Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan”(Ganguli; 2008).

In the pre-independent era the Pakistani propaganda was anti-Hindu domination which changed to anti-Hindu dominated India in the post independent period. The creation of Pakistan was a reaction to Hindu domination. On the one side it was an attraction of extreme religious sentiments to Islam and on the other hand it was repulsive of the anti-Hindu feeling born out of the fear of Hindu Domination. In both the cases the religious consideration played a pivotal role. However, this religious factor, which was once the core idea and identity of the creation of the state, could not unite the people for long, as many sub-national identities were included within it. “The mismatch between this ‘Ideology of Pakistan’ and the empirical reality of the Pakistani nation-state which came into being in August 1947 resulted in a crisis of nationalism of immense proportions” (Toor; 2009). The ideology of Pakistan often conflicted with the functioning of the state. Therefore nationalism was a challenging question before Pakistan.

It is a fact that apparently the state can be identified with Islamic nationalism, built on forms of religious identity. However, Pakistan emerged out of a Muslim nationalism that developed not out of religious considerations, but on the idea of a civilizational unity of Indian Muslims (Barlas; 1995). In fact an Indian Muslim nation which was counterposed to a Hindu one. The increasing social and political friction between Hindus and Muslims in the early part of the 20th century, especially the rise of a militant majoritarian Hindu nationalist movement had further strengthened the demand for two nations. Sir Syed viewed Muslim nationalism as something necessary for Muslim survival (Malik; 1994: 472). This Muslim nationalism embedded in the Pakistani ideology demanding not mere freedom from the colonial rule but freedom from Hindu dominated India. There was also the fear that Indian Muslims would not be able to pursue their interests in a Hindu dominated independent India, and that the only solution to this weaker status was greater political autonomy in a postcolonial
Indian federation or confederation. Soon this idea resembled the name ‘the two nation theory’ and eventually became enshrined within Pakistani nationalist discourse as the ‘Ideology of Pakistan (Saddia; 2009).

The foundation of Pakistan, the Islamic identity, has been criticized as weak and narrow. The common religious identity on which Pakistan was created failed to provide its people the basic necessities. They could not obtain the socio-economic advantages in the newly created Islamic Pakistan which they found to be lacking in undivided India. The Islamic identity perpetrated the situation as it had to realize the socio-economic objectives within the ambits of Islamic ideology. To a certain extent, this rigid religious wall forbade the socio-economic development in the state, especially affecting the foreign relations and trade. Despite this, the pro Islamic and anti Hindu sentiments, which were once the foundations of the state, though failed to integrate the nation effectively, continues to be the wall that protects the existence of Pakistan.

Geography-Its Significance and Challenges

The state of Pakistan is located in the South Asian Sub-Continent, to the East of Persian Gulf, with India, China and Afghanistan sharing its boundaries. It has an area of about 803,943 sq. km. (310,527 sq. mi.). With the secession of East Pakistan (present Bangladesh) the geographical position of Pakistan is limited to the West of India.² (See Fig.1). The geographical position, especially as the centre connecting South Asian nations and the Middle East has given it a strategically important place as an international entity. Its proximity with the Gulf region has helped the state to make greater economic advantage. The geographical beauty of Pakistan has been well appriciated by many scholars as exemplary, especially the Northern parts. The beautiful topography of Pakistan has attracted many tourists. The mountaneous northern part of the state is one of the beautiful regions of the world (Marria; 2001).
Prior to 1971 the geographical location was a severe problem from the security and administrative point of view. It was a fragmented land with India, the enemy, in the middle. Geographically the formation of Bangladesh was a blessing as it could avoid the risk in security and administration but the psychological stroke it inflicted on Pakistan has still not been cured. Definitely the segregation of its geographical unit, East Pakistan in 1973, has caused both psychological and physical hurt to country. However after the partition, the country could reduce the tension of administering two geographically distinct units and integrate the multi-ethnic community. Hence the partition of East Pakistan, in this sense, has been viewed by many scholars as a grace. “With the country no longer divided into two wings separated by thousands of miles of Indian territory, it should have been possible to evolve a political structure that satisfied the communities that constituted the nation of Pakistan” (Ziring; 2005). As compared to the condition of the state prior to 1973, it is now much smaller in geographical size, its population is much more homogenous and its international borders are virtually clear, despite the borderer dispute in the Kashmir region.
The Demography of the State

Demographically Pakistan represents a wide variety of cultures, languages, art and literature. It is in fact a multi-ethnic society and there is an unsuccessful accommodation of the ethnic diversity that unbinds a bundle of ethnic issues in the society. The diversity in the society is very often reflected in the socio-political character of the state. There are five major ethnic groups in Pakistan- Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans, Baluchis and Muhajirs. The Punjabis constitute about 60% of the population, the Sindhis 12%, the Pathans 8%, Muhajirs 8% the Baluchis 4%, and others 8%. There are also several subgroups like Saraiki, Brohis, Hazaras etc…who consider themselves distinct (Yameen Niaz; 2007: 236). Religious diversity is also reflected in the state. Religious communities consist of 97% Muslim, a small minority of Christians, Hindus, and others. The ethnic composition is based on linguistic lines. Linguistic groups mainly include: Urdu (National and official), English, Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashto, Baloch, Hindko, Brahui, Saraiki (Punjabi variant). Although Urdu is the official language of Pakistan, it is spoken as a first language by only 8% of the population; 48% speak Punjabi, 12% Sindhi, 10% Saraiki, 8% Pashto, 3% Baluch, and 3% other. Urdu, Punjabi, Pashto, and Baluch are Indo-European languages (Pandey; 2005). English is the other official language, and is widely used in government, commerce, the officer ranks of the military, as well as in many institutions of higher learning. The majority of the population lives in the Indus River valley which is an arc formed by the cities of Faisalabad, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Islamabad, and Peshawar.

These communities defined their identities in different ways. Some did it on the basis of geography, for example those who lived in Baluchistan, the Northwest frontier provinces, Punjab, Sarikis, and Sindh were identified on the basis of their regional affiliations. The Muhajirs, the people who migrated from the North-central Provinces of India to Pakistan have considered themselves as a separate group from the other ethnic groups. Still others saw themselves representing a modernized populace living in large cities, determined to wrest control of the political system from the hands of the feudal class that wanted to hold on to the levers of politics in spite of their declining number and economic strength. The largest group in the state
is constituted by the Punjabis who cover nearly 44% of the population. Among the Muslim subdivisions the Sunnis constitute the major section.

According to the population estimation in 2012-13, the population of Pakistan is 184.35 million with an annual population growth rate 2% (see Table.5). This growth rate is one of the highest population growth rates in the world. However it is important to note that Pakistan has 60% of its population working and it is likely to increase in the future. Also in the coming decades its urban population is likely to increase and by 2030 it is expected to be nearly 50% of the total population. This blown up urban population is going to be great trouble for the municipal administration (Haider; 2010). The population-density of Pakistan is 231 per square kilometers. Compared to other South Asian countries such as India Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, the population-density is lesser and reduces the problem.

![Population of Pakistan](Source: Finance.gov.pak)

Fig. 3.2

Like the other South Asian nations Pakistan is also an over populated state. (See table-1) The existing family system, educational system and the health systems within the social environment have supported and contributed to the population explosion of the state. The family system makes early marriage an inevitable institution with high rate of child bearing. In Pakistan early marriage remains an
indispensable custom and incidents of early marriage remains exceptionally high (Javed; 2004). Poor schooling forces children to early marriage and increases rate of childbirth. They are unaware of the ill-effects of repeated pregnancy. Lack of education and ignorance keep them away from safe and effective contraception methods. It is said that less than one-fifth of the couples of childbearing age have some knowledge of birth-control practices in the societies of Pakistan (ibid: 24). The high infant or child mortality rate prompts people to have more children. “In Pakistan, one out of seven children dies before reaching the age of one; accordingly, Pakistani parents may feel the need to have many children to ensure that a few survive” (ibid: 28). This is yet another reason for the very feeble condition of the health system in Pakistan. The predominance of the agricultural sector with inadequate and outdated technology along with the poor financial conditions has driven the Pakistanis to have big families. The desire to have male children and the support for the old people have forced the parents to have more children.

Table 3.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Birth per 1,000 population</th>
<th>Death per 1,000 population</th>
<th>Population in million</th>
<th>Growth Rate (Percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>177.2</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>158.1</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: US Census Bureau International Database; 2010)

While analysing the Pakistani population the Pakistani diaspora can not be omitted. They constitute a good proportion of the total population of the country and greatly contribute to the national economy. There are approximately 7 million Pakistanis living abroad, remitting close to US$8 billion annually through formal channels to Pakistan. Worker remittances are the second largest source of foreign exchange after exports. It is believed that economic migrants constitute a vast majority of the Pakistani remittances. They are usually sent to immediate family
members who have stayed behind. Its benefits are spread broadly into local economies. They also serve as foreign exchange earnings for the parent countries of migrants. In 2007, US$ 5,998 million were sent to Pakistan as remittance.

According to the Human Development Report on South Asia, at least 28 million people in Pakistan live below the poverty line, two-third of the adult population is still illiterate, basic health facilities are available to only half the population, the maternal mortality rate is very high at 340 per 100,000, one-fourth of new-born babies are underweight and malnourished (Kukraj; 2005). According to the latest Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement (PSLM) Survey 2008-09, the overall literacy rate above the age of 10 years is 57% for 2007-08. The data also shows that literacy remains higher in urban areas (74%) than in rural areas (48%), and is more prevalent in men (69%) than in women (45%). However, it is evident from the data that overall female literacy is rising over time, but the progress is uneven across the provinces (See table-2.2).

Table- 3.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region/province</th>
<th>Literacy rates 10 years and above</th>
<th>GER Primary (age 5-9)</th>
<th>NER Primary (age 5-9)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Male 67 69 69</td>
<td>99 97 99</td>
<td>60 59 61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female 42 44 45</td>
<td>81 83 83</td>
<td>51 52 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Both 55 56 57</td>
<td>91 91 91</td>
<td>56 55 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural 45 49 48</td>
<td>84 83 85</td>
<td>52 51 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban 72 71 74</td>
<td>106 106 106</td>
<td>66 66 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Haider; 2010)

Generally the Pakistani health sector remains underdeveloped. However there has been noticeable improvement in some health indicators over the years, on the whole. The overall, life expectancy in Pakistan remains lower than many South Asian nations. At the same time infant as well as maternal mortality rates are amongst the
highest. Though there have been improvements in the health status, by international comparison, the status is low and similar to the under developed nations. Recent cross-country studies of vital health indicators show a wide variation in epidemiological pattern between different Asian countries. Compared to Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka, for example, Pakistan’s infant mortality rate is higher. But life expectancy is higher except for Sri Lanka. The overall population growth at 2.1% is the highest in the region (See. table.3).

Table- 3.5
Indicators of Development in Pakistan compared to South Asian nations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banglades</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The poor quality of the health sector in Pakistan is also due to the negligence of the governing institutions towards humanitarian needs. The infrastructural facilities are really poor and inadequate. “The quality of sanitation facilities in Pakistan is even worse than the quality of water supply. More than 50 per cent of the population does not have adequate access to toilets whereas another 20 per cent of the households
share toilet facilities with others. In the most populous provinces of Punjab and Sindh only one in four households has access to appropriate toilet facilities. Even when the households have access to adequate toilets, the lack of adequate sanitation infrastructure implies that untreated household and commercial waste is released into rivers and streams” (Haider; 2010).

Pakistani society is beset with the problems of hyper-urbanization in which social development has lagged considerably behind economic change, as revealed by such critical indicators as sanitation, access to health care, and literacy, especially among women. Increasing population pressure on limited resources, together with the pattern of social and economic inequity, has been causing increased disquietude within the society. Failure to develop civic-minded citizenship is also evident in public administration and imbalanced government expenditure. For example, military expenditure vastly exceeds combined expenditure on health and education. The orthodox outlook and inefficiency of the bureaucracy in Pakistan have been pointed out by many scholars. “The bureaucracy, a legacy of the British colonial period, has not modernized sufficiently to incorporate new technologies and innovations despite efforts by the government staff colleges” (Kukraj; 2005:24). These factors also add to the low level performance of the social sector in Pakistan. Regarding the question of education and health, which form the basis of any civil society, Pakistan’s record has been poor. Considering the geo-political vulnerabilities and constant security threat from India, defence spending and the resultant increasing expenditure have been consuming more of the scarce resource that would otherwise have been available for development.

The Political Environment – the Governing Institutions

Pakistan is a parliamentary federal democratic republic with Islam as the state religion. Unlike India, Pakistan began its constitution-making only after it became independent. Moreover, it took 9 years to complete its constitution making. The first Constitution of Pakistan was adopted in 1956, but was suspended in 1958 by General Ayb Khan. Again a new constitution was framed in 1973. General Zia-ul-Haq suspended this Constitution in 1977 but he re-instated the same in 1985. Now it is the most important document of Pakistan, laying the foundations of the governments
thereafter. During the sixty seven years of political life, Pakistan had to undergo both civilian and military rule in varied degrees and in different periods. The Pattern of civilian and military rule in Pakistan is depicted in the table 2.4.

Table-3.6
Pattern of rule from 1947-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elected government under a military president</td>
<td>16 years</td>
<td>1962-69, 1985-88, 2002-08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected government under a civilian president : ‘Rule of Troika’</td>
<td>12 years</td>
<td>1988-99, 2008-2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supremacy of nonparliamentary forces under the formal parliamentary rule</td>
<td>11 years</td>
<td>1947-58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian supremacy</td>
<td>6 years</td>
<td>1971-77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Jetly; 2009, modified)

From 1947 to 1956, Pakistan was a Dominion of the Commonwealth nations. It became a Republic in 1956. Non-parliamentary forces operated even under parliamentary rule and this republican rule could prevail only two years. The civilian rule was overturned by a coup d’état by General Ayub Khan in 1958 leading to a period of internal instability and an external threat, the second war with India in 1965. The military rule was continued by his successor Yahya Khan (1969–71) who had to deal with a civil war in 1971. Economic grievances and political dissent in East Pakistan led to violent political tensions and military repressions that escalated into a civil war. After nine months of guerrilla warfare between the Pakistan Army and the Bengali military backed by India, later Indian intervention led to the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, and ultimately to the secession of East Pakistan as an independent state of Bangladesh. The secession of East Pakistan and the defeat in the war with India brought about an impressive political change in the state. Civilian rule resumed in Pakistan in 1972 under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, until he was deposed and later sentenced
to death in 1979 by General Zia-ul-Haq, who became the country's third military President. Zia introduced the Islamic Sharia legal code, which increased religious influences on the civil service and the military. With the death of President Zia in a plane crash in 1988, Benazir Bhutto, daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was elected as the first female Prime Minister of Pakistan. Over the next decade, she fought for power with Nawaz Sharif as a result of which the country's political and economic situation worsened. When Benazir was dismissed by President Gulam Ishaq Khan in 1990 on corruption charges, Nawaz Sharif became the President. The period from 1993 to 1999 was a period of severe political instability, especially due to the struggle for power among the Chief institutions the President, Judiciary and Prime Minister where Nawaz Sherif, Benazir Bhutto and Acting Prime Ministers ran the governments.

Military tensions in the Kargil conflict with India were followed by a Pakistani military coup d'état in 1999 in which General Pervez Musharraf assumed vast executive powers. In 2001, Musharraf became the military President after the controversial resignation of Rafiq Tarar. The domestic and international pressure forced Musharraf to hold election in 2002 and transfer the executive powers to the newly-elected Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali. After Jamali Shaukat Aziz became the Prime Minister. This ministry could somehow manage to complete the tenure, and fresh elections were called in November 2007. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, the exiled political leaders were allowed to return to Pakistan in 2007. However, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December during the election campaign led to nationwide riots and the postponement of elections. On the other side this helped Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) to win the largest number of seats in the elections held in February 2008 and its member Yousaf Raza Gillani was sworn in as Prime Minister. The external and internal compulsions forced President Pervez Musharraf to resign and he had to face prosecution. On 19 June 2012, Supreme Court of Pakistan disqualified Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani on charges of disobeying court orders and for not reopening the accused charges against President Asif Ali Zardari. On 22 June 2012, the National Assembly elected Raja Pervaiz Ashraf as the 17th Prime Minister of Pakistan. These tugs of war between different political institutions have caused political decay in Pakistan.
Theoretically Pakistan is a parliamentary democratic state. The executive branch of the state has dual heads, the President, (the head of the state) and the Prime Minister (the head of the Government). It has a bicameral legislature, called the parliament of ‘Majlis-e Shoora’, with its two houses – the Senate and the National Assembly, comprising 100 and 343 seats respectively. Unlike the other democratic judicial systems, Pakistan’s judicial system has been severely criticized for its undemocratic practices. The Federal Islamic or the ‘Sharia Court’ possesses wide powers which are a greater threat to the secular dimension of the democratic country. As per the constitution the President is the head of the Pakistani state and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and is elected by an electoral college. The Prime Minister is usually the leader of the largest party in the National Assembly. Each province has a similar system of government with a directly elected Provincial Assembly in which the leader of the largest party or alliance becomes the Chief Minister. The president of Pakistan appoints the Provincial Governors.

The malfunctioning of the administrative institutions, especially at the higher ranks has been the major factor behind the socio-economic and political backwardness of the state. The civil services of Pakistan have been historically part of the pyramid of power in the country. The bureaucracy has been subjected to dominance by the rulers and their demands, military or civilian leaders. Hence bureaucracy has almost completely lost its integrity, discipline and dedication to its functions. Its loyalty gets divided with the politicians in power and the military which exercises direct and indirect control over them. Quite often political patronage also undermines the civil service to being the servants of political leaders or party. When it is deeply politicized it bows to the will of the party in power, civilian or military. This also makes Civilian bureaucracy largely corrupt, incompetent and ineffective in areas of administration. Lack of modern education, training, monitoring, evaluation and reward or punishment further points to the poor condition of the administrative service of the state. In the government service too, authority, responsibility and accountability remain ambiguous (Muhammed; 2008: 127).
Civil Society and Political Culture in Pakistan

The weak and meagre role of the civil society in Pakistan has helped the bureaucratic predominance in the society. The irresponsible civil society of Pakistan has created corrupt and inefficient civil servants. The culture built up by society demands no commitments form the bureaucrats. Upon joining the civil services a substantial number still cherish the ideals of honesty, integrity, public good and service to the nation. The social practices place these civil servants in the “elite governmental club. They argue, that it is the civil society which bestows status upon them, develops unreal expectations and encourages them to behave like a person who commands authority in public perception (Muhammed; 2008). This public perception, in fact, is the cause of the deterioration of civic culture. It plays an important role to mould the attitude and behaviour of the government officials.

Within the political culture of Pakistan it can be seen that ordinary citizens are alienated from the activities of the state. There is lack of participatory political culture. The citizen becomes indifferent towards the state when he is ousted from the decision making process. People are unaware of what is happening to them. In the political dispensation of the country people are treated as clients and not a citizen (Azis; 2001:417-148). However Ziring, analyzing the future democratic path in Pakistan, has identified some positive movements towards democracy in Pakistan. “Nonetheless, in the sixth decade of independence the least likely segments of Pakistan society had made themselves the torch-bearers of democracy; first the army, the epitome of centralized authority, demanding total obedience to the chain of command, had addressed another form of tutored democracy. And now the Islamist, the self proclaimed religious conscience of the nation whose ethos embodied complete submission to God’s vicegerent on earth, Emir Omer, the self declared khalifah of the Islamic state, also insisted their objective as the realization of democracy” (Ziring; 2005: 366). There are certain shifts towards an enhanced role of participant political culture of Pakistan in the future. This is expected to happen as the country progresses in information and communication technology.

Analysing the last 67 years of the history of Pakistan, it can be seen that there always existed a kind of individual centered political culture. Pakistan’s history shows
that there has been a domination of strong men despite the political upheavals brought about by the attempts of the society (Javed; 2004: 25). Cultural elitism is a prominent feature of the politics in Pakistan. Not only in the political parties but also at the administrative levels this elitist nature can be perceived. The civil servants and army also occupy a pivotal place in this elitist culture. The concentration of administrative and political power and efforts for capturing more and more power is a common trend in politics. This shows that the mass political culture in the state is very fragile. The common people show their subordination to the elites like the local officers of various departments, local governmental contractors and mine owners with whom people have direct contact. The Sardars still constitute the major part of the elite class in the society. Today the elite dominance in the society is mainly practiced by three classes - the Sardars, administrative officers and the rich investors.

The degree of political culture varies throughout the state with wide representation of different communities and different cultural geographical units. For example, the Sidhi’s political culture is different from that of the Baluchis. Political culture in Pakistan is to a larger extent influenced by religion and revolves around the regional and separatist ideologies. This elitist political culture and individual centered political culture are the chief causes for the political polarization in Pakistan. Sociologists speak of a loss of a sense of social contract among different Pakistani sects that has adversely affected the country's infrastructure: the economy, the education system, the government bureaucracy, and even the arts.

The landed feudal groups play a prominent role in the socio-political conditions of Pakistan. “In every political game played in Pakistan the feudal lord is the ace of trumps” (Aziz; 2001). The landlords in Pakistan are self centered and not politically committed. Seldom do they join in the administration of the country and if they do it is to influence the programme and policies of the government favour them. Even within the political parties the high class people possess the chief posts and dominate the decision making process. Therefore the ordinary citizens are marginalized in the decision making of the country. The landed class dominated the entire activities of the All India Muslim League. Taluqdars, the big Zamindars, Jagirdas, Rajas and Nawabs dominated the party (Ibid.). Historical analysis shows that the autocratic character of the Muslim rule and Zamindari system of the Indian
tradition paved the way for this political culture. This culture in practice kept away the ordinary men from political participation, especially in the countryside. Even, the post independence era in Pakistan also couldn’t break this clutch of the landlords in political activities. Since independence politics in Pakistan has been in the main a game played by the landed autocracy according to its whims and for its personal interests. In almost all the political parties the Zamindars occupied a pivotal place.

The political culture of the Pakistan was further deteriorated by the bureaucrat-zamindar relation. This unbreakable alliance of mutual convenience and profit proved to be a burden to the ordinary people. Any bureaucrat who tried to challenge the authority of the landlords was punished with transfer to worse places. This exposes the political power of landlords. Here three types of alliance are to be analysed- the political parties and landlords, landed autocrats and bureaucrats, and the army and landlord. These alliances were highly detrimental in deciding the political culture of Pakistan.

**The Society**

The social character of the state is a true representation of its Islamic identity. Islam had played a pivotal role in the creation of the state and the society has been governed by the values and principles of Islam. In the words of Ian Talbot “Pakistan society is overwhelmingly Islamic in its values and ideas” (Talbot; 1998; 25). The religious freedom offered by Jinna immediately after the formation of Pakistan did not mean that Pakistan could build up a secular society. Indeed the religious freedom he offered to other faiths were to be seen as issues of tolerance and indulgence on behalf of the Muslim majority and were in no sense intended to allow other faith groups to challenge or undermine Muslim dominance (Ahmed 1997, 175–7). The legitimization of the Islamic values, especially during the regime of General Zia, further strengthened the Islamic character of the society. During Zia’s rule many Islamic laws were incorporated to the constitution of Pakistan which controlled the course of the society. Zia introduced the Shari’a elements in governance. During the later years of his administration, through the Eighth Constitutional Amendment, he created a separate electorate system, whereby Christians and other minorities did not vote in the same elections as Muslims, but rather voted separately (Gregory; 2012: 202). Later in
May 27th 2003, the provincial government introduced a Sharia bill in Parliament to amend at least 71 existing laws in order to make them conform to Islamic tenets. The bill contained provisions for the establishment of a ‘Vice and Virtue Committee’. The committee would have the powers to use the police, bureaucracy and lower courts to enforce the definition of what is good or evil. This was indeed a strong move to radical Islamic lines (Madalena; 2004). Even amidst the democratic regimes Sharia continues to influence the social and political life of Pakistan (Nelson; 2011). The introduction of the ‘Zakat’ was an important step towards the creation of an Islamic welfare society. The Do’s and Don’ts, within the institutions like family, schools etc. are increasingly the product of Islamic teachings. Democratic values such as equality, freedom justice and fraternity have also a limited place. If they are, they are in accordance with the principles of Islam. In other words the Islamic values superseded democratic values. Sometimes it could be also argued that religious values oppressed democratic values. On this basis, many scholars have viewed the society of Pakistan as theocratic, which is ideologically rooted in Islamic values and tradition.

Violence promoted by Islamic radicals pervades everywhere in the society and the violence is justified by Islamic rules and sentiments. Even the barelvis, normally considered as moderates, have now turned to adopt radical lines (White; 2012: 182). The social conscience has been moulded to accommodate such crimes and violence. For example the murder of Mumtaz Quadris was justified by many people in Pakistan as ‘defence of Islam’ (Gregory; 2012:196). Usually non-Muslims are the victims of such Islamic radicalism. Though marginal in numerical strength, the people belonging to other communities are put out of the mainstream of the society. The Muslim population of the country constitutes around 96% and the remaining consists of Christians, Hindus and others (Gregory; 2012 & Hussian; 2004). The social and legal bindings of Islamic values force them to live ‘like a Muslim’, at least physically and socially. The threat of social insecurity faced by the minority community has been expressed by Ian Talbot. “The impact of Law of evidence and the introduction of the separate electorates for the minorities, conflicted with the reassurance and led some minority leaders to fear that their position would be reduced from that of citizen with full rights to the protected ‘Dhimmi’ (non-Muslim tax payers) status”(Talbot; 1998: 282). The attitude of the Pakistani regimes to minority communities reveals that these
communities could not grow within the state. Pakistan is placed among the top ten nations which violate Minority Rights (MRGH; 2010). At the time of Partition, there were around one million Hindus and Sikhs in the proposed Pakistan territory and about 30 million-35 million Muslims in what was left of India. Today, India's Muslims number about 140 million (more than Pakistan has), whereas in Pakistan virtually no Hindus or Sikhs remain. This simple fact reveals the two differing approaches the two countries toward minorities (Bajpai; 2003:120). It was General Musharraf who carried out reforms favouring the non-muslim. He was very tolerant to the minority communities. He appointed Tressler, a Christian, as the Minister for religious minorities, who listened patiently to the problems of the minorities and redressed their grievances. The most significant action of Musharraf was the abolition of separate electorates for religious minorities before the Parliament election in October, 2002.

The unrest within the social system is also caused by the internal migration, both intra-provincial and inter-provincial, as well as the migration from abroad. The demographic unrest within the society due to this migration can be analysed along with the economic burdens, affecting the cultural values and ethos of the society. It is worth while to analyse the cultural mix of the society. The Mujahirs, with the refugee culture was different from the indigenous culture of Pakistan. With the partition of British India, the refugees from the cities of North and Central India began to work for the establishment of some form of representative political system- a variant system, perhaps, of the western model (Javed; 2003). The refugee and the indigenous leadership was the product of two different cultures. The Indigenous culture, moreover contained elements of an autocratic system. The attempt by indigenous groups to dominate and command the refugee created social unrest.

It has been argued that the Pakistan society is overwhelmingly patriarchal. The gender division is very high and strictly imbalanced with women having an inferior status in about all respects. A close look at the institutional framework in the society reveals that there is a male dominated structure both in the private and public spheres of life. Social ethos and legal systems, to a greater extent supported male domination within the family, educational institutions, work place and public places. The male domination of the society has been supported by the legal system backed by the
Some of the legal stipulations in the Islamic law do seem to run against the general tenets of equality in Islam. In Civil Law, for example, in order to contract a debt or engage in a trade two male witnesses must be present, or if only one witness is a man, two female witnesses. In the Law of succession, the Quran treats men better than women: “Regarding your children, God directs: to the male, a portion equal that of two women.” (Madalena; 2004: 202). Therefore two women equal one man. The security and safety women find in the Pakistan society is comparatively very low. Women are afraid to go out alone. They have to be accompanied by men, may be a male relative (ibid.). The family structure which is an essential social safety net in the South Asian societies, turned to be a blocking net for women’s freedom in Pakistan. A girl child is less preferred by the parents. The parents spend more money for the education and other needs of the boy child than the girl child.

Modernization which was a common trend in the twentieth century, particularly in the newly independent states, could not bring any considerable result in the society of Pakistan. On the one side the rulers and the leaders were concerned with establishing and perpetuating authority. Alongside this religious doctrine, which was antagonistic to the ways of modern life, had a profound influence in the society. As a fact with the Islamic tradition, the Islamic ideas and values very often conflicted with the process of modernization. The orthodox people especially were really worried of losing the existing values in the society. This opposition by the religious elites slowed the process of modernization in the society. However it should be also mentioned that some rulers and political organization have stood and worked in favour of modernization. The Aligarh movement, which had its origin in the pre-independent era, played a vital role in the process of modernization. Ian Talbot finds that the Aligarh Movement encouraged the Muslims to engage with Western scientific thought and to reconcile to the Islamic concept of sovereignty with the nation state (Talbot; 1998: 29). It was during General Ayub’s era that the process of modernization was at its zenith, with the support of the legal frame works. For example the Pakistan Muslim Family Law Ordinance (MFLO) was introduced in 1961. What could be seen in the Pakistan society is a mixture of Islamism, traditionalism, modernism and reformism with the domination of Islam.
Pakistan’s Relations with in the Neighborhood and with the Big Powers

Pakistan’s international policy, as with the creation of the state, was embedded within the Islamization policy. The Pakistani foreign policy mainly concentrates on its relations with India, the Great powers and the Muslim world. During the initial period of its independence Pakistan was concerned with creating an identity of its own amidst the international community. At the regional level the state had to face challenges from India on various issues, particularly those related to migration and Kashmir. The anti Indian policies can be clearly traced in its foreign policy. Afghanistan, one of the close neighbours of Pakistan, has been a source of security threat to the state. The Afghani migrants have been troubling the state from its inception. The cross boarder transmission of militants is a major challenge that Pakistan is encountering at present. The crisis in Afghanistan, especially as a result of the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet Union, posed a greater threat to its security. The political environment in Afghanistan also significantly affects the domestic affairs of the state of Pakistan. “There is a challenge of an independent Pashtan state or Greater Afghanistan. The Pashtan–Afghan relation always challenges the existence of Pakistan” (Sreedhar; 2005: 166). These external dynamics also have been presented as the cause for the emergence of extremism and terrorism in Pakistan. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave rise to Jihad. The encouragement provided by the United State to the Jihad against the Soviets and the India centric issues further accelerated terrorism and extremist activities in Pakistan. Pakistan was used as a link to reach the extremist activities in the erstwhile Soviet Union by the US during the Afghan war (Sreedhar; 2005: 168).

The relation with US made Pakistan a moderate Islamic state among the International community. The US –Pakistan relation should be analysed in the context of the Indio –Pakistan confrontations. In the initial phases of the India- Pakistan conflicts the US supported Pakistani demands. However, with the passage of time, especially with the end of Cold War the US shifted its policies. Thereafter when Pakistan sought U.S. support to help implement the 1948-49 UNSC Resolutions, the latter neglected the idea and stressed that the dispute should be resolved on the basis of the Simla Agreement (Indurthy; 2005: 39). The US concern for Pakistan increased in the context of growing terrorism, Islamic extremism and nuclear weaponization of
Pakistan. The US maintained its relation with Pakistan until 2001 at a peripheral level. The September 11 terrorist attack created a new direction in the US Pakistan relations. On the one hand the Chinese interest in Pakistan made the US to make Pakistan a frontline nation and the US interest on the other hand made China to concentrate on Pakistan. Pakistan seemed to be a better country for both these nations to meddle with the South Asian nations. But today the US interest in Pakistan appears to be waring and with India is growing.

The Pak-US relation had many ups and downs whereas the Pak-China relation was always constant. Pakistan regards China as the most significant friend in the present era. The china-Pakistan relation is considered as the cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013). The US policy of containment of communism and the USSR-India ties cleared Pakistan’s route to the Western world. In 1954 Pakistan signed the Manila Pact and joined the SEATO. However, the different agreements and the relations with the US were not adequate for Pakistan to defend India. This in fact forced Pakistan to search for new relations. As Indo-China relation was strangled in the boundary dispute Pakistan found a friend in China. This pro-Chinese move by Pakistan has to some extent adversely affected the US Pakistan relations. Musharaff made three visits to China during India Pak crisis of 2001-02 and even had 22 meetings between the leaders and officials from 2001-2002 (Jetly; 2009: 83). This underpins the growing relation between Pakistan and China.

Regarding the change in Pakistan’s policy towards Central Asia, Christine Fair views that Pakistan has to focus on the myriads of domestic problems, including expansion of the Islamist militancy within. This has brought about shifts in the Central Asian strategy of Pakistan. Rather than pursuing security ties with Pakistan, many of the Central Asian states chose to re-establish security relation with Russia, which has been historically an ally of India and wary of Pakistan’s Islamists adventurism (Jetly; 2009; 129). India was more preferred by the Central Asian nations to Pakistan. Most of its neighbours chose India as their most likely South Asian partner than Pakistan. This was due to the fact that they shared a common problem: Islamic militancy originating from Pakistan (ibid.). Even the nations from the Islamic world turned away from Pakistan due to the evergrowing militancy in the state and the threat that it poses to these nations. Tehran cooled its attitude towards Pakistan
throughout the 1909s due to Pakistan’s support to the Taliban and due to its patronage and deployment of Islamist militants, operating throughout the region, including anti-Shia people (ibid.). So the concern about the Indian supremacy in the region always reflected in Pakistani ties with other nations of the region. Pakistani agenda has throughout been parity with India. It views India as a single threat to its security.

Throughout history, the country has been buffeted by external forces and subject to interference from external actors. The relationship with India has long been fraught with difficulty. The rule of the military government very often thwarted its international status. The frequent military regimes too forced the foreign countries to keep away from Pakistan and stop economic and military cooperation with it. The political instability and insecurity adversely affected the Pakistani external affairs. Nations both within and outside the sub region feared to send their citizens to Pakistan. It also reduces the foreign investment in the state retarding its economy. After it attained the nuclear capability, the countries in the region felt a very grave security threat emanating from Pakistan. Western Powers followed very hard policies such they cut the economic, military and other assistances, thereby placing Pakistan aloof. However after the September 11 incident, the Pakistan support to anti-terrorist activities, though not cordial but peaceful relation with India and shift to civilian government have helped it to build up new and promising relation with the other nations.

**Economic Posture of the State**

In the economic spheres Pakistan can be considered as a developing middle income country. Originally the economy was an agro-based one. During the time of Independence around 70% of the people were engaged in agricultural activities. But with the passage of time the economy has shown shifts, losing its agricultural predominance. In 2005 only 24% of the people were involved in agricultural activities. The GDP growth rate of Pakistan in the last decade has been going down (Looney; 2012; 231). Average GDP growth of Pakistan in the last decade was around 4.8, which is comparatively lower than that of the other South Asian countries (see table below). The military regime under General Musharaff could strengthen its economy through the economic reforms. “Musharraf’s Government and, especially
the Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz, was partly successful in balancing the country’s finance. By the beginning of 2003, Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves had risen from nearly zero to almost 7 billion $" (Javed; 2005: 116). The table below shows that the GDP rate reached its maximum nearly in the middle of the decade, during Musharaff’s regime.

Table: 3.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960’s</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970’s</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980’s</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990’s</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-01</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-02</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-04</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-05</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-06</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-07</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-08</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-09</td>
<td>1.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009-10</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-12</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: World Bank; 2012 & SIPRI Year Book; 2012)

Pakistan’s economy grew at a respectable rate for the first four decades after its independence. However during the fifth decade, the rate of economic growth
slowed down. On the other hand the population increased at a faster rate. These contradictory changes in the economy and population inflicted very decisive changes in the socio-political spheres of the country. In 1991 the World Bank classified Pakistan as a low income country—“a country with a per capita income of less than or equivalent of US $500” (Javed; 2004). The unequal distribution of wealth is one of the major causes for the poor performance of the economy. The average per capita income in the mid-1990s approached the transition line—the line that separates low-income countries from middle-income. The numerically feeble elite class maintains an extremely disproportionate control over the nation's wealth. Despite of the numerical strength the middle-class and lower class people are economically poor. Almost one-third of all Pakistanis live in poverty.

The economic policies of the government played a very decisive role in building up the economy of the state. From the time of independence in 1947 up to the end of the eighties, the government of Pakistan was mainly concerned with establishing the necessary infrastructure to support its different macroeconomic policies. This was carried out through its various nationalization policies. These nationalization policies of Pakistan overwhelmingly controlled the financial sectors. Interest rates were set administratively and were usually negative in real terms. Monetary policies were implemented primarily through the direct allocation of credit. Commercial banks often had to lend to priority sectors with little concern for the borrowing firm’s profitability. Therefore the economy showed the characters of a socialist one. Despite the opening of the non-banking financial sector for private investment in the mid-eighties, state-owned financial institutions held the bulk of the assets, deposits, advances and investments of the entire financial sector at the end of the eighties. Some scholars argue that this is one of the causes of the poor economy. To overcome these economic distortions and spur economic growth, the government of Pakistan embarked on a wide range of administrative reform programmes. Financial reforms were an important component of this programme. These economic reforms instigated a spirit of competition among the financial institutions. To a certain extent the economy was put under the control of market forces. As a whole the reforms covered seven areas: financial liberalization, institutional strengthening, monetary management, banking law, domestic debt, foreign exchange and capital
market (Khan; 2008). These reforms showed that there was a great move to strengthen privatization.

Analysing the structure of the economy it can be observed that agriculture still possesses a predominant place in the economy of Pakistan and accounts for 30% of its total exports. “It was proportionately large at the time of independence that it contributed to 53% of the GDP. With the rapid growth of the other sectors, the contribution of agriculture now is reduced to nearly 25%. The fact that the share of the service sector in Pakistan was 505 in 1995 is yet another indication of the relatively more developed structure of Pakistan’s economy compared to other poor countries” (Javed; 2005: 123). According to the economic survey by the Pakistan Finance Department in 2009 nearly 43% of the population is still engaged in agricultural activities with a contribution of 20% to the GDP. The service sector of Pakistan mainly includes industries such as finance, insurance, transport, communications and storage that account for 24% of the country’s GDP. Wholesale and retail trade has 30% share in the GDP. With an increase in the country’s software exports, the IT industry is emerging as a flourishing service industry. The trend that could be noticed now is that the Pakistani government is actively engaged in privatization of banking, telecommunications and utilities to produce more jobs in the country. This move has been observed by many as part of the global trend towards privatization. According to the 2005 estimation Pakistan’s manufacturing sector provides employment to 20.3% of the country’s labor force. Some major manufacturing industries include cotton textile and apparel manufacturing, carpets, rugs, rice, chemicals, sports goods and leather goods. Some other popular industries are construction materials, mineral, paper products, food processing and beverages. The secondary sector experienced a growth of 5.4% in 2007-08. However, electricity shortage remains the biggest challenge in ensuring development of Pakistan’s secondary sector.

Pakistan is a typical middle income country which is still placed under the group of poor countries. Some features that shows it as a middle income country are- 1) the contribution of its agricultural share to GDP, 2) Its share compared to labour force employed in industry, and 3) its level of urbanization (Javed; 2005:97). Economic development also resulted in the movement of the labour force from
agrarian sector to non-agricultural pursuits, and also transformed the countryside to towns and cities. By 1995, nearly one third of the population was living in urban areas and over 40% of its labour was engaged in non-agricultural pursuits. These features make Pakistan better off than the other low income countries. An important factor that places Pakistan still among the poor countries is the poor social development. In terms of social development Pakistan has lagged behind a number of low income countries—particularly the poor countries of South Asia (see table 3). Analysing the table below it could be seen that compared to the other South Asian countries Pakistan’s GDP showed a greater fall and a very minute fall in the population growth between 1980 and 1998. This brought an additional burden to the economic sphere of Pakistan.

Table 3.8
Pakistan’s comparison of Population and Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>Population Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Javed; 2005: 99)

The condition of Pakistan’s economy has been the result of many factors. Ian Talbot finds the very geographical location of Pakistan as being the root cause of bad and scanty condition of the economy. He says “Colonial industrial development had clustered around Bombay, Allahabad, Calcutta and West Bengal or Bihar Coal Belt. These areas all formed part of the new Indian dominion leaving Pakistan with just 10% of the subcontinent’s industrial base” (Talbot; 1998: 97). The political division had a very influential role in the economy. The economic performance of the country was very much influenced by the political system. The instability and inefficiency of the different regimes and their economic policies adversely affected the economy of Pakistan. Perhaps the economic turmoil was the result of poor policies and their implementation. Each government whether civilian or army, attempted to experiment with the economy. Some even used the economic policies for their personal gains. Javed Baruke views the mismanagement of the economy by different regimes as the
chief cause for the poor performance of the economy. The Governments from 1947 to 1958 gave more importance to the industrial sector but neglected the agricultural sector. The government of President Ayub Khan followed different economic policies that during his period, agricultural output increased at a rate not common in the third world. Growing at a rate of nearly seven percent per annum, the GDP growth was among the highest in the third world. However, Prime Minister Bhutto restructured the economy on Fabian lines. His government carried out nationalization policies and greater attention was given to the service sector. Consequently, economy lost the momentum it had picked up during the period of Ayub Khan. The government of General Ziaa ul- Haq adopted Ayub Khan’s model of economic management but failed to reduce the size of the public sector. The rate of economic growth had returned to the path it had followed in the 1960s. In 1988-1990 Prime Minister Benezir Bhutto undid most of what her father had done a decade and a half earlier and invited the private sector to participate once again in economic development. At the same time, she used the public sector for her personal gain, a trend that was maintained by following administration. The economy paid a heavy price for this abuse of power (Javed, 2005; XX).

There are some positive trends that can be seen in the economy of Pakistan. Pakistan is a developing country and its economy is the world’s 27th largest economy based on its purchasing power. With rise in development spending by Islamabad, the country’s poverty levels reduced by 10% from the year 2001 to 2007. The economy grew between 2004-07 due to rise in GDP from 5 to 8%. This was largely due to development in industrial and services sectors irrespective of severe electricity shortage. However, the country remained impoverished due to internal political disturbances and negligible foreign investment since independence. The year 2007 witnessed a lot of political and economic instability leading to depreciation of the Pakistani rupee. The growth of the economy was affected once again during the 2008 global economic recession (Institute of Economic Watch; 2009)).

Foreign assistance played a very significant role in Pakistan’s economy and the country maintained an artificial economic growth with this. “Pakistan can be aptly cited as a classical example of a case where artificial prosperity was maintained by heavy doses of foreign aid and overseas remittance of Pakistanis. Unlike India the
Pakistani ruling oligarchy did not think of building a self-reliant economy. The development of large scale indigenous industries was not encouraged due to easy and cheap availability of goods and services through foreign aid. In the process of Pakistan’s peculiar economic formation, its ruling oligarchy had steadily become addicted to the idea of foreign aid and assistance” (Kukraj, 2005:143). The mismatch in the economic development is also due to the continued influence of the external factors. The GDP growth rate, which was 5.2 per cent in 1995, increased to 8.4 per cent in 2005. This means that investment remained steady while major changes took place in the GDP growth rate. The weak link between GDP growth and investment can be justified on the grounds that in Pakistan, external factors played a dominant role to push GDP growth (Khan; 2008).

The large inflow of the foreign assistance created an artificial boom in the economy. It had many adverse impacts in the economy and later in the society. It could not attain self-sufficiency which in turn dampened the rate of domestic saving. The consequences were very severe that the foreign powers used the economic assistance to pursue Pakistan’s domestic as well as international policies. The following table indicates the foreign assistance at the end of each decade.

Table.3.9

| Pakistan: Export –Imports and Foreign assistance (yearly average in $ million ) |
|--------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Export                   | 127              | 160              | 338              | 2365             | 3486             |
| Imports                  | 276              | 379              | 690              | 4740             | 5101             |
| Trade balance            | -105             | -219             | -352             | -2375            | -1615            |
| Foreign assistance       | 118              | 585              | 564              | 1470             | 2230             |

(Javed; 2005)

Pakistan’s economy is highly vulnerable to international economic conditions and changing economic policies of developed nations as it had greatly depended on these nations for economic assistance. In the early period of the 21 century Pakistan’s
The economy was at its worse. The economic impositions due to the nuclear test conducted in 1998, had thwarted the economic growth in Pakistan. The economic performance of the state was also influenced by the process of Islamization. Islamization in the economic spheres includes policies such as the abolition of ‘riba’ and the introduction of charity taxes ‘zakat and ushr’. Many had viewed that these Islamic policies in the economic spheres would not fit to the complex realities of the modern economic systems.

Furthermore, lack of macroeconomic and political stability, weak institutions, lack of good governance, a complex legal system, corruption, lack of enabling investment climate, and low quality of government and private physical investment makes the growth–investment relationship weak. Although Pakistan has made remarkable progress in promoting financial momentum and intermediation, it is still far behind when compared to other regional economies including India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh (Khan; 2008).

September 11 2001 was a turning point for the Pakistani economy. The state’s economy was suffering from the ill effects of the economic ban made by the developed nations due to the nuclear test conducted in 1998. As Pakistan became a frontline state in the campaign against the ‘Al-Qaeda’ and the American invasion of Afghanistan from 2002, a certain level of foreign assistance was resumed, and the other sanctions were lifted (Jetly; 2009: 242). This helped Pakistan to rebuild it economy. However, it should be noted that as per the latest estimation by the World Bank, in the last few years Pakistan’s GDP growth rate is lower than the average of the South Asian Countries.

**Weak State Structure and Political Turmoil**

Pakistan, from its very birth as an independent nation, had to undergo many challenges such as formation of government, enactment of constitution, problem of migration, frequent and continued military dictatorship, sectarian violence, economic turmoil, corruption, activities of militants and terrorists and many undemocratic practices. These problems in turn resulted in the poor performance of the political sphere, leading to an insecure and unstable political system in Pakistan. Perhaps this
political deterioration has made many scholars to anticipate the failure of the Pakistan state. Some even expected the demise of Pakistan.

The Islamic Identity which was once the keystone of the foundation of the state could not bring a consensus on the ‘basic principle’ of the constitution and of the political system. The state found on the basis of religion to protect the Muslims of India from being ruled by a non-Muslim majority, had to spend many days in debating and discussing on the issue of the role of religion in the administration of the state (Javed; 2003: 30). The problem of migration was very serious. The migrated population was numerically very large. By 1951 the year of Pakistan’s first census, refugees accounted for 57 percent of Karachi’s population, 65 percent of Hyderabad’s, and 55 percent of Sukkuri’s. In all, the migrants from India in 1951 constituted 46 percent of the combined population of the twelve major cities of Pakistan (Javed; 2004: 28). The economic turmoil towards the close of the twentieth century was so severe that many had viewed even the end of the state of Pakistan. The gloomy outlook of the economy in the late 20th century have made some scholars to suggest that the survival of Pakistan as a state came into question as the economy reached the verge of collapse. Some academics, on this basis called it a ‘failed state’ or a ‘failing state’, while others described it in much stronger terms such as an anarchic state or a rogue state (Kukraj; 2005).

The political life in Pakistan always experienced instability and insecurity. Each regime attempted to bring changes in the existing laws, constitution and even the political system in order to suit their interests. For example General Musharaff created a super cabinet in the form of a National Security Council. Both General Zia and General Ayub had terminated the constitution. The failure in the political sphere and possibility of the failure of the state can be analysed in the following ways.

a) Democracy- a Failed Practice in Pakistan

The state of Pakistan has been subjected to various events of undemocratic practices. How can a nation with its religious identity- the ‘Islamic Republic of Pakistan, communal judicial system and dictatorial military regimes can establish democratic polity? This question points towards the failure of democracy in Pakistan. Rose and Evans express their skeptic outlook on the commitment of Pakistan to
democracy and its values. They view that “there are grounds for pessimism: no democratic government since 1985 has been allowed to complete its term of office, and there is still no accepted mechanism for shifting power from one elected government to another (Rose & Evans, 1997). The democratic experience in Pakistan shows that usually democratic governments were overthrown by military regimes, which were followed by civilian governments. Such constitutional and institutional failures have passivised democracy and its values in Pakistan. The undemocratic nature and structure of the political parties have been viewed by many scholars as the chief cause of failure of democracy in Pakistan. It is the lack of commitment by political parties towards democracy that created a conducive condition for the military to govern for such a long time. One man dominance in the regimes either by the parties or the military shook the very basis of democracy in Pakistan. Almost in all parties like the Muslim League of the earlier years of 1947-54, Jinnah Muslim League, the religious parties of various certitudes and dogmas, the descendants of some pre-1947 organisations, a constant factor was the personal leadership and the severe control exercised by one man at the top (Aziz; 2001: 66). In one way the ideals and the dogmas of the founder or the leader was imposed on the followers and it reflected in their governments. In a true sense popular support very seldom influenced the programmes and policies of the governments.

Analyzing the working of the political institutions of the state it can be seen that undemocratic practices are common. Inefficient and corrupt ministers very seldom leave the office. It can also be seen that not a single Governor General, President or Prime Minister left office voluntarily or as a result of democratic forces. Also in Pakistan there is no practice of a ruler or his minister resigning because of a terrible mistake made by him or his portfolio resulting in a severe crisis (Aziz; 2001:111). The overwhelming presence of militancy in the state poses a grave threat to the democratic institutions and the implementation of democratic values. Christine Fair views that though democracy has returned to Pakistan since the end of the military government, with a fragile coalition government in power and a polity, it remains unclear as to, how, Pakistan will be able to reign democratically as there exists the militant threat from within (Jetly; 2009 ). After each military regime, democratic governments have been returning to power, but vested military interests
have obstructed the smooth functioning of the democratic governments, especially in ensuring democratic values. It is due to this military dominance that many analysts regard that the present government of Pakistan will not be able to provide democratic values in Pakistan.

The governing laws and regimes were found to pose a threat to the concept of personal liberty and human rights. This was to consolidate the power especially by the military regimes. The Safety Acts and the Security Bill gave provisions for an unelected executive the right to curtail the personal and civil liberties of citizens of the nation, through summary trials and denial of Habeas Corpus (Toor; 2009). This in fact questions the right that a citizen must enjoy in a democratic nation.

The grass root level democracy in Pakistan has been subjected to a number of problems. The state of municipal services and infrastructure has deteriorated in Pakistan over the years. The local government services in Pakistan could not cope with the modernization and urbanisation processes. The urbanization process in Pakistan highlighted the need for effective and efficient local governments. The history reveals that local government initiatives in the country have contributed to the poor state of municipal service delivery. The military regimes in the past used local governments to create a loyal cadre of politicians who were later pitted against the democratic forces by the military. With the return of civilian democratic rule in Pakistan, the local governments were often abolished because these institutions were viewed as part and parcel of the military dictatorships. The tug-of-war between the democratic governments and military regimes has left Pakistan with an inadequate local government framework (Haider; 2010).

b) Dominance of the Military

The military dominance within the state has made Pakistan a praetorian state. Whether it is the military regime or the civil government, the military played a very powerful and pivotal role. Even after the succession of the civilian government the ability of the military to dictate political life continues. Sometimes the military leaders become part of the civil administration. The composition of particular military ruling groups may change; whole juntas may be replaced; but the essential military character of a government organized after a military coup has generally been viewed as unlikely
to change because of the monopoly or supremacy that the military still possesses (Heeger; 1977). The causes of Pakistan becoming a praetorian state are analysed on various grounds such as ‘military professionalism, Garrison state hypothesis, political instability due to failure of democracy, economic underdevelopment and impact of colonialism’ (Haleem; 2003: 464).

Some scholars observe that the omnipresence of the Pakistan Army in the governance of Pakistan’s short civilian governments under the leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhuto, Benezir Bhuto and Navaz Sharif can be regarded as a cause for the weakness and sudden fall of the regimes (Sreedhar; 2005: 24). Analysing the enhanced role of the army Rajshree Jetly views Pakistan as a classical example of a Praetorian state. Here, the army has emerged as a guardian of the state, initiator of national agenda and chief arbiter of conflicts between social and political forces in Pakistan (Jetly; 2009). Many reasons have been identified with the propensity of Pakistan towards praetorianism - colonial legacy, weak political parties and ethnic and sectarian violence are some among them (Haleem; 2003).

Usually the military coups were followed by elected military presidents. Ayub in mufti, Zia in uniform and Musharaff in uniform and mufti were the elected military presidents. The peculiarity of Pakistan is that the four military coups were followed by the process of democratisation through elections. Another notable feature of the Army Regime is as observed by Jetly, is that the constitutional approach of the Pakistan army to the business of the state that distinguishes it from its counter parts in Latin America (Jetly; 2009). When the pressure on the military regimes both from within and outside the state becomes very powerful, it is the tendency of the military governments to legalize their regimes. Analyzing the political regimes in Pakistan, some scholars view that the military regimes are more stable than the civilian governments. From General Ayub Khan to General Pervez Musharaf, the total span of military rule is more than 32 years. This is nearly half of the entire span of independent Pakistan.

A study on the concept of power sharing in Pakistan points to four types of nexus that exists in society-The Army –Landlord nexus, the Army- Bureaucrat nexus, the Bureaucrat- Landlord nexus and the political elites-Army nexus. In all the
alliances the army has played a very significant role either directly or indirectly. The Army also created alliances with the sectarian groups. Whenever the civilian government went against the interest of the army, the latter built up a hidden nexus with the sectarian groups that adversely affected the law and order of the nation. “During the civilian rule of Prime Minister Zulfikar Bhutto in the 1970s, the army was actively seeking alliance with ethnic and sectarian political parties unhappy with Bhuttos government in order to facilitate praetorianism”(Haleem; 2003: 470). The army- landlord nexus helped the two classes to maintain a super posture in the state. The support of the zamindars to the army helped the military regimes. The army found in the zamindars, a more than ready and willing ally in establishing an undemocratic and unrepresentative system of government. The zamindars and the army turned to the two undemocratic and autocratic forces in the country. The zamindars were well pleased as the army was more capable of thrashing down the protest against the landlords by the peasants. Ayub Khan’s civilian ministers and advisers were mainly drawn from the feudal classes. General Zia’s council, the Haq’s Majlis-I Shera was dominated by the landed autocracy and gentry. In 1985, when he ordered a parliament to be elected under the cover of martial law and on party-less basis, a horde of zamindars were elected to the parliament. They elected a big Zamindar of Multan as the Speaker, and unanimously passed a law granting amnesty to all the unlawful, illegal, unconstitutional and revolting acts of crime committed by the General and his advisers. General Ayub Khan after disqualifying politicians promulgated two Ordinances namely, the Basic Democracies Ordinance of 1959 and the Municipal Administration Ordinance of 1960, which created a new breed of local politicians who were loyal to the military and were disconnected from the political opposition against the military rule (Haider; 2010).

From the very formative years the state provided a predominant place to the army in the power structure. Developmentalism and Islamisation were the two ideologies used by the army to legitimize and consolidate their power and position in Pakistan. The influences of the direct and indirect army role created a chaotic situation in the political life. The more the army entered into the business of the state, the more adversely it affected the growth of the political institutions. The change of military regime and the installation of the civilian governance is not voluntarily done.
by the Military regime. There is a faction within the military that favors a return of civilian government to power or as a result of the growing fear of military elites that their military organization and capabilities are being undermined (Heeger: 1977; 246). The pressure, particularly economic from the International Community against the military government also forced the military to abdicate. However the army still plays a significant role in the policy making and decision making process of Pakistan.

c) Terrorisn and Pakistan

An ever growing threat to the stability and security is the perpetual influence of the terrorists in the political and social spheres of Pakistan. The US President Baruk Obama has called Pakistan as the “ladle of terrorism”. Many terrorist organizations have their roots in Pakistan. A number of Pakistanis have been arrested in different parts of the world for their alliance with many terrorist groups. The impact of the terrorist activities in Pakistan can be analysed on two ways one as the centre of fledging terrorism and the other as a victim of terrorism. Pakistan acted as a link for international movement of many terrorists. The master brains behind the September 11, Said Bahaji and Bin Al Shaib had their shelter in Afghanistan via Pakistan before and after the attack they sought shelter in Pakistan. An amazing fact about the shelter of terrorists in Pakistan is that these are big and developed cities of Pakistan. Abu Zubayda was arrested in Faisalabad, Bin Al Shaib in Karachi and Khaled Sheikh Mohammad close to Islamabad (Fischer; 2004: 55). On the other side, it is observed that Pakistan has been encountering massive terrorist attacks within their territory. It is estimated that after its Independence Pakistan has undergone over 45273 major and minor terrorist attacks within their territory. The country provides geographical, personnel and equipments’ support to terrorists and terrorist activities. The following table indicates the high degree of various terrorist incidents in Pakistan.
Table-3.10
Global Terrorism Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>GTI Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GTI Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>9.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>8.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>7.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>4.992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>4.509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3.566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1.731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Terrorism Index of the Nuclear Weapon states from 2002-2012 (Source: Institute for Economics and Peace; 2012: 4)

The Global terrorism index of the last decade shows that Pakistan is the second most state after Iraq among most terrorist affected states of the world. The Global Terrorism Index Score with 9.049 denotes that Pakistan ranks first among the nuclear weapon states. Beyond the endless squabbles about the outbreak of nuclear terrorism there is deeper consensus among the scholars that the source of nuclear terrorism would be Pakistan.

After September 11, 2001, Pakistan has shifted its strategy on terrorism, but once being the soil that bred and nourished terrorism now Pakistan cannot completely do away with terrorism. “The many welcome changes in Pakistan’s strategic direction under Musharraf, since September 11, have therefore not extended to completely renouncing terrorism as an instrument of national policy. Islamabad continues to support terrorist groups in pursuit of geopolitical interests that it perceives as critical, such as securing a friendly, even pliant regime in Afghanistan and wresting the state of Jammu and Kashmir away from India”(Tellis; 2004). Further, the insurgencies caused by the terrorists in the state even after the US-Pakistan joint action against the terrorists are clear evidences to the continued role of terrorism in Pakistan. The threat that the state is encountering from the terrorist and militant groups within, is
increasing day by day. Militancy is very high in the FATA and it is a good shelter for the militiants. “Looming ominously over Pakistan’s stability and security is the threat of terrorism emanating from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Located along Pakistan’s northwestern border adjacent to Afghanistan, the FATA consist of six small “frontier regions” plus seven larger semi-autonomous districts or agencies: Bajaur, Khyber, Kurram, Mohmand, Orakzai, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan” (Aqil; 2008). The Islamisation policies to a greater extent helped to nourish of the terrorist and militant groups. General Zia’s Islamisation policies had caused the creeping in of the Islamic radicals into the administration of the state. It was during regime of Zia that the Jamaat-e-Islami successfully penetrated key educational, administrative, military and political institutions of the state (Sreedhar; 2005).

Ayesha Siddiqa views the rise of religious extremism in the South Punjab region of Pakistan as the failure of the state in providing better living conditions. South Punjab is a region mired in poverty and underdevelopment. There is severe unemployment that even the youth with better qualifications are deprived of job opportunities. These educated youth are forced to join the militant camps and carry out militant deeds. While the government has built airports and a few hospitals, these projects are an eye-wash and barely meet the needs of the area. It is in areas like this that amid economic stagnation and hopelessness, that religious extremists find fertile ground to plant and spread their ideology. The first step is recruitment - and the methodology is straightforward. Young children, or even men, are taken to madrassas in nearby towns. The militant organizations feed them well and keep them in good living conditions considerably better than what they are used to or get at their homes. This is a simple psychological strategy meant to help them compare their homes with the alternatives offered (Siddiqa; 2009).

Analysing the possibilities of external intervention to the political turmoil in Pakistan along with the growing menace of terrorism, many scholars had viewed a high level threat to the very existence of the state. Most of the experts expect an inevitable change in Pakistan. “However, a domestic opposition to military rule grows; as ethnic conflicts intensify; as 9/11 recedes in memory; as US staying power in Afghanistan ebbs; and as political alignments change in Washington and
Islamabad alike, the nature of US relation with Pakistan could well undergo dramatic changes and the very existence of the Pakistan state in its present form could become increasingly uncertain” (Sreedhar; 2003). This change need not be the demise of the Pakistani state; rather it would be the demise of the failing conditions of the state.

D) Sectarian violence

Due to the intense sectarian violence the very existence of the state has been questioned by the pluralistic nature of the society. Zyahti Khailzed has opined there have been speculations and even anticipation of the demise of Pakistan as a state (Cohen; 2002). The sectarian violence is so severe that between 1985 and 1992 over 3000 people had lost their lives in the province of Sindh (Haleem; 2003). The sectarian violence in the state also points to the further fragmentation of the state. Though Pakistan blames the Indian role in the separation of East Pakistan, the cause could be rightly attributed to the ethnic conflicts within the state. “The universal adult suffrage associated with democratic governance, however, would have granted the more numerous Bengalis in East Pakistan the right to rule over the Mohajir- and Punjabi-dominated western wing of the state. Because this outcome was unacceptable to these groups, various constitutional drafts were rejected, and the opportunity to develop democratic institutions was irrevocably lost as the jostling ethnic and bureaucratic elites who quickly dominated Pakistan’s political vacuum forged “rules of the game” that would undermine democracy for many decades to come” (Tellis; 2004).

What could be noticed in the society is that the overlapping effect on sectarian divisions is growing with the differences in income, status and power. The unrest within the society due to deep inequalities existing and it has intensified the sectarian violence. The failure of the governments to reduce these disparities has enhanced the overlapping effect of the division. In Pakistan the ethnic divide has been further overlapped by the sectarian divide. The genesis and growth of political parties on sectarian lines further has widened the sectarian division. The ethnic political parties that sprung up in the 1970s and 1980s which identified their legitimacy with their ethnicity has exacerbated Pakistan’s fractured national identity to capture political power (Haleem; 2003: 467). One of the important factors of political instability born of the sectarian violence in Pakistan has been flaws in the land reforms. No political
party or governments dared enough to touch the landed classes. Active support and political blessings of the feudal autocracy was always essential for the government to run its administration. Ethnic policies of different governments have led to politicization of ethnicity and to the growth of ethnic nationalism which threatens the integrity of Pakistani state (Haokip; 2009: 364). Ethnic groups unable to find a share in the existing political power structure would create its own space inevitably inviting sectarian clashes.

The Political stagnation what Pakistan is encountering especially for the last two decades has made the many political scholars to designate Pakistan a failed state, failing state or a rogue state. It has been argued that though Pakistan has failed many areas as a state. The Pakistani failure grows out to new areas, though not at a faster rate. Pakistan's support for Jihadists in Kashmir and Afghanistan, the Pakistani scientist A. Q Khan's nuclear black market, the steady growth of extremist mosques and Madrasas-all were distressing signs that the country risked slipping into state failure or Islamist rule (Markey; 2007: 88). An important question to be analysed here is whether there is any criterion for placing a state as failed. If the classification is based on the economic and political turmoil, poor social development, certainly there should be a standard unit to measure the failures. Still more precisely there should be a point to divide states as ‘failed’ and ‘not failed’. But there is no such standard to measure the failures or a point to demarcate. Further no state is absolutely free from failures. It may be true that the degree of failures that Pakistan is facing may be high compared to other state.

Conclusion

After sixty years of its independence, more than anything else, Pakistan could create an identity among the international community as a country that breeds, natures and cherishes Islamic radicals. The sectarian violence, political instability and both the domestic and international terrorist activities within the state has made Pakistan a ‘black state’. The UN enquiry into the assassination of the former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto is a clear sign that Pakistan is losing it credibility amidst the international community. Many scholars expect even the demise of the state. Experts like TV Paul categorized Pakistan as a weak or failing state (Paul; 2010).
The domestic security crisis in Pakistan primarily arises from the political instability, social unrest and economic turmoil with a strong interdependence, one leading to the other. Political instability and insecurity leads to social unrest and economic crises, which further leads to political crises. Similarly social unrest and economic turmoil affect each other.

Fig. 3.11

Security Crisis in Pakistan- Vicious Circle

The infrastructure deficit and the associated urban decay are only a manifestation of much more complex structural dynamics and constraints. The poor economic growth, specifically the low rate of employment growth for the youth, lack of entrepreneurship, inadequate local governance mechanisms and the collapse of civilian institutions are some of the more inherent causes of urban decay in Pakistan. The educational attainment levels even amongst the urban youth are low. However, gainful employment, even for the educated youth, remains elusive. Add to this the lack of entrepreneurship, and the result is an army of unemployed youth, who are readily drafted by the mafia or other criminal groups (Talbot; 2008). This may be the reason behind the increase in violent crimes in the last decade in Pakistan. With the
coming of age of a large number of unemployed, educated youth in urban Pakistan, the severity of challenges is only likely to increase.

Saddia Toor suggested that the type of nationalism which characterized Pakistan was unique in the modern world in so far as it had no place for issues of ‘geography, race, caste and colour’ which it transcended. The peculiar nature of Pakistani nationalism and its superiority over other forms proved to be successful until 1971 that its ideology ‘welded’ together distant western and eastern wings of this country. The real threat to the nation lay not from external dangers but it actually helped to strengthen national unity. It is the internal danger which, through whispering, instigation and insinuation, and “mutual belittlement” can break the collective will more than the enemy’s big guns and battalions (Toor Saddia; 2009).

What may be expected from observing the history and present socio-political conditions of Pakistan is another military coup with a high degree of possibility or a fragmentation with a low chance. The political instability and the praetorian character of the state further highlight the possibility of another military regime in Pakistan. Overt and covert influences of the army are not only rampant in the political sphere but also in the economic and social spheres. Though the geographical division was a factor behind the cesession of East Pakistan, ethnic diversity also played a vital role. The sectarian violence and the demand for cesession especially from the Baluchistan movement with the support of Afghanistan militants may point to the fragmentation of the state. When analysed with the international circumstances, there is a possibility of foreign invasion. The growing threat of international terrorism and the involvement of Pakistan as a breeder and nourisher of terrorism, might invite a foreign attack. It is very evident from the statement made by former US President George Bush that the US had once thought of attacking Pakistan as a move to combating terrorism. Still many expect that seize of political power in Pakistan by non state actors, especially by the terrorists, might definitely invite the foreign intervention. However so far as Pakistan is able to manage the activities of the terrorists not extending within certain limits it can avoid this external aggression.

Strategically the political conditions in Pakistan are highly significant to the regional and international security. As Ameen Jan points out a politically unstable
Pakistan could result in widespread civil violence among a population of more than 130 million, increased domestic an international terrorism, the wholesale replacement of civilian state institutions by the military, and division with in military itself (Jan; 1999: 699). From the Indian security perception, the political and economic crisis in Pakistan increases the threat to her security and safety. Definitely the security threat that South Asia is going to face would be increasingly from Pakistan. Both geographically and culturally Pakistan is a central and very significant nation in South Asia. The nuclear capability of Pakistan further escalates this threat. A stable and secure Pakistan is indeed more desirable for the security of the world especially for India.

Notes

1) Pakistani society is pluralistic like any other South Asian societies. Though the state was created based on a single Islamic identity, what it manipulates is loyalty is divided into sub-national levels. Fractions within Islam divided the people into different identities. Also regional disparities overlapped by these religious fractions resulted in several movements such as Baluchi, Pushtan etc. based on sub-national identities

2. As per the British Independence Act of 1947 The Pakistan Domain was to have East Bengal, Sindh and west Punjab provinces which spreads on the West and East of India. However the Independence struggle in the East Bengal and the War followed by it in 1971, finally formed Bangladesh, a new independent nation in South Asia

3 In Pakistan internal migration occurs at very large scale. Due to this unchecked influx of people to major cities, the infrastructure cannot meet the requirements of the people. The most vulnerable are left on the periphery with few resources or access to employment. Rather than a push towards betterment and progression hyper-urbanisation has resulted in slum settlement, pollution issues and a very real difficulty in governments to deal with the growing cities.
4. Rule of Troika: A rule of an elected government with a civilian president. Pakistan was ruled by elected government with civilian presidents. Also there were elected governments with military presidents.

5. Under the Indian Independence Act of 1947 people were given the freedom to join either the Indian Domain or the Pakistani Domain. Since Pakistan was created for the Muslims a large number of Muslim communities from different part of India migrated to Pakistan. Though Islamic, accommodating these groups with variant culture and status was a challenge to Pakistan.

6. Pakistan has been continuously encountering border disputes with India and Afghanistan. It had to fight four major wars with India. Conflicts on Durent line and the influx of the migrants from Afghanistan have severely affected security of the nation.

7. Based on its GNI per capita, every economy is classified as low income, middle income (subdivided into lower middle and upper middle). Economies are divided according to 2011 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas Method. The groups are: low income, $1,025 or less; lower middle income, $1,026 - $4,035; upper middle income, $4,036 - $12,475; and high income, $12,476 or more. With the GDP of $176,869,569,654 and 173,593,000 Pakistan is categorized as a low middle income Country. A joint report released by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank places Pakistan among lower-middle income countries (World Bank; 2012).

8. Ayub Khan made many economic reforms that latter caused his downfall. His policies gave rise to discrimination. These reforms caused dissatisfaction among the people of East Pakistan. He also made some agricultural reforms. According to these reforms the landowners were not allowed to keep land beyond the limits set by the government. The excess of land was taken over by the government and a reasonable compensation was offered to them. The big landowners were not happy with the step taken by Ayub Khan. The peasants who were given the lands were also dissatisfied because the land they were given was not fertile. The landed politicians voiced against Ayub’s regime (Afzal R.;2005 ).
Compared to the civilian governments the military governments in Pakistan had long tenures. Except Yahya Khan all other military rulers ruled more than the normal elected period, Ayub 13 years, Yahya 3 years, Zia 11 years and Musharraf 9 years. Heeger says “For all their instabilities and developmental shortcomings, military regimes have apparently been regarded by many as virtually immune to the pressures that brought down their civilian predecessors” (Heeger; 1977). However the external pressure on the military government was more than on the civilian regimes.

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