Chapter-V

CONCLUSION

The beginnings of urbanization in the Indian subcontinent go back to 2350 BC (about 4500 years ago) to the Indus valley region. Even prior to this, there is ample archaeological evidence of Paleolithic and Neolithic settlements in northern, central and southern India and in the border regions of Afghanistan and Baluchistan. In all these areas, the practice of agriculture and the domestication of animals were clearly in evidence. Together with these developments we also have evidence of wheel-thrown pottery and painted ware of great artistic beauty. The variety and range of tools used by these village people show progressive improvement, particularly in terms of the materials out of which they were made. Thus, stone implements gave way to copper and later to bronze implements. It is at this stage of cultural and technological development that the larger village settlements showed distinct urban attributes; thus ushering in an era of urbanization.

The Indian subcontinent shares, with Mesopotamia and the Nile valley, a long history of urbanization. The first phase of urbanization in the Indus valley is associated with the Harappan civilization dating back to 2350 BC. The cities of this civilization flourished over a period of more than 600 years up to about 1700 BC and this was followed by a prolonged period of over a thousand years in which we have no evidence of urban development. From around 600 BC, we again come across towns and cities associated with the two major, but closely related, cultural streams of
India, namely the Aryan civilization of the North and the Dravidian civilization of the South. From this period onwards, for about 2500 years, India has had a more or less continuous history of urbanization. However, we know from historical evidence that there were both periods of urban growth and periods of urban decline. Thus cities grew in number and in size during the Mauryan and post-Mauryan periods (from 300BC to AD 600), both in northern India as well as in the extreme South. Cities declined and were largely neglected during the post-Gupta period that is from AD 1000 in northern India. In southern India, on the other hand, urbanization attained a zenith during the period from AD 800 to 1200. Urbanization on a subdued scale flourished in northern India under the influence of Muslim rulers, who came to India from Afghanistan and beyond from around AD 1200, and attained a second climax during the Mughal period, when many of India's cities were established. The British came to India at a time when India was perhaps the most urbanized nation in the world, and the early part of British rule saw a decline in the level of Indian urbanization. During the latter half of British rule, Indian cities regained some of their lost importance; further, the British added several new towns and cities, in addition to generating newer urban forms in the existing cities. The post-Independence period has witnessed urbanization in India on a scale never before achieved.

The story of urbanization in India in historical times is a story of spatial and temporal discontinuities. The earliest urban developments were confined to the Indus valley and the adjoining parts of Rajasthan, Punjab and to some extent western Uttar Pradesh. Other parts of the country remained outside the pale of urbanization. In the early historical period, urbanization took place in the middle Ganaga plains and in the
southern part of the Indian peninsula, while the areas in between and no know cities. During much of the historical period, vast parts of the country were untouched or only partly affected by urbanization. Spatial discontinuities in urbanization continue to be an important aspect even in modern India.

The causative factors behind urbanization varied from time to time, leading to not one but several urbanization processes at different points in time. In the prehistoric period, urbanization was synonymous with the origin and rise of civilization itself, thus manifesting itself essentially as a cultural process. In the historical periods, from ancient times to the British period, urbanizations was inextricably related to the rise and fall of kingdoms, dynasties and empires, and thus in effect urbanization during this period was essentially a political process. In recent times, urbanization has been associated with industrialization and economic development. In this sense, urbanization is essentially an economic process.

Many well known cities of prehistoric and historic times exist today in the form of small mounds or ruins. This is true of such great cities as Mohenjodar, Harappa, Nalanda, Taxashila and Vijayanagar. Other ancient and historical cities survive to this day among them are Pataliputer, Madurai. Kancheepuram, Varanasi and Delhi, to name only a few. In most of these historical cities, the past has been partly or totally obliterated; in some case the old structures and street layouts are street layouts are still in evidence. The beautiful temples of southern cities belong to the 12th or 13th centuries, while the monuments of the Mughal period belong to the 16th and 17th centuries. In Varanasi, which is perhaps India's oldest existing city, there
is no trace of structures dating back more than 300 years. The present urban landscape of India is replete with cities having their origins at various points in the historical past; Nasik, jaipur, Moradabad, Kanpur and Simla, for example, testify to their widely different socio-cultural origins. The emergence of industrial cities such as Bokaro, Bhilai and Rourkela, has added another dimension to the already variegated nature of Indian urbanization.

Students of history may not agree with the terminology used for these those time periods or with the limits prescribed for them. There are, in effect, several difficulties in defining time periods for detailed study. For one thing, there are spatial discontinuities in the history of urbanization. For example, the medieval period was a period of anticlimax as far as urbanization in the Ganga plains is concerned; on the other hand, this period witnessed a very high level of urbanization in the South. The three major port cities of India, namely, Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, which we have inherited from British colonial rule, were established long before AD 1800. Nevertheless, periodization is a necessary first step in any historical analysis. What follows is a more detailed description and analyses of urbanization in different parts of the country are also taken into account.

Our understanding of the origins of the earliest cities is based entirely on archaeological evidence obtained from excavation of the ruins of the early settlements. We have. From this evidence, a fairly thorough understanding of the physical aspects of city development, such as the spatial extent for the cities, the layout of their streets, the types of structures and dwellings, and the materials of
which they were made. We have concrete evidence of pottery showing variations in the technique of its production and the articles such as clothing, food grains, and the various types of domesticated animals. Writing in baked tabloids provides additional information about the social and cultural life of the people, although the writing as such has not so far been deciphered. We have a few skeletal remains of humans from which inferences regarding their racial origins can be drawn. There is, however, no literary evidence. Though the archaeological evidence, unlike literary evidence, uncovers the truth as it was, and cannot lie, the lack of the prehistoric societies in their totality. An important aspect of the evidence has to do with the problem of dating the ruins. This is normally done by either of two methods—the stratigraphic method or the radio-carbon dating method. Each has its pitfalls and the actual dating by all reckoning can only be approximate. However, vertical digging in the same area provides a chronological sequence of evidence on human habitations.

Opinions differ as to the manner in which the earliest cities in the Indus valley region originated. Earlier archaeological studies. Mainly by western scholars, were emphatically of the view that the central idea of the urban way of life came to the Indus valley from Mesopotamia, possibly by chance migration of people. Evidence in support of this includes the rather abrupt beginnings of city life in Mohenjodaro and Harappa, where vertical digging of the sites has revealed no transitional phase of cultural development. The salient features of the civilization in Mesopotamia and in the Harappan cities are the same—these include wheel-turned pottery, the art of writing, the location of the urban settlements on the banks of rivers, the practice of agriculture and so on. Besides, the Indus valley is not far from Mesopotamia, where
cities existed nearly a thousand years before the Harappan cities, thus allowing sufficient time for the diffusion of the idea from Mesopotamia to the Indus valley. Interaction between the two areas, at least in the later stages of the Harappan civilization, is indicated by the presence of Harappan coins in Sumerian cities and Sumerian coins in the port city of Lothal, a Harappan city.

However, except for contemporary trade, the evidence of diffusion of the city way of life becomes unsustainable on closer examination. Harappan agriculture was purely rain-fed and dependent in part on the natural flooding of the plains. No elaborate irrigation works existed. The motifs, shapes, and artistic expressions on pottery and other objects in the Harappan civilization are distinctly of indigenous origin. The system of writing, as yet undeciphered, is obviously different from its Mesopotamian counterpart. Harappan cities are bereft of defensive walls and other aspects of city structure differ markedly from the Mesopotamian cities. Coins and weights are entirely new and are of a different design. There is thus no doubt that the city way of life was not transplanted in toto by people migrating from Mesopotamia to the Indus valley. However, certain specific ideas, such as the techniques of making copper from its ore and of wheel-turned pottery could have been borrowed from West Asia. The growing evidence appears to favour the indigenous origin of the Harappan cities, with some diffusion of ideas from West Asia.

The purpose of this section is to examine the salient urban morphological characteristics of the major cities and towns, and aspects of the settlement system as such will be explored in the following section. The two most important cities, namely,
Mohen Jodaro and Harappa, show remarkable similarities in their urban morphology. Each is located on the banks of a navigable river-Mohenjodaro on the Indus and Harappa on river Ravi. The city proper consisted of two component parts; (1) a citadel; build on high ground, and (2) a lower city, where the vast majority of the population lived. The citadel was always located on the western side of the city, the significance of which is not known. It consisted of a number of large structures and the whole area was fortified by walls. Thus the citadel stood apart from the other parts of the city. Within the citadel, there were structures with large halls and palatial residences for the nobles and high priests. In addition, the citadel had the well known great bath and the state granary. The nature of the structures testifies to the fact that the citadel was indeed the real capital where the rulers of the Harappan people resided.

The lower city, or the city proper, was built on a grid iron pattern, where the streets were aligned east-west and north-south. A three level hierarchy of streets is observed, the largest streets being 14 meters wide and the smallest around three meters wide. The city had an elaborate drainage system, where the main drainage channels along the main streets were fully covered, with manholes to facilitate periodic cleaning. Pipes of earthware connected the houses to the street drains and ultimately the sewage was drained into the river, after partial purification in soak-pits. The city also had a separate storm water drainage system. Water supply for the city population was available from brick-lined wells inside the larger residences, which were about a metre in diameter.
Residences of ordinary citizens varied in size from singleroomed barracks to multi-roomed houses and palatial structures with outer walls. Some of the houses had two or three floors. Thus the city had well-to-do citizens as well as poor artisans and labourers. All the residential structures were built with fired bricks of uniform size, indicating standardization, a fundamental principle in the mass production of bricks. Individual houses also had baths and privies, thus providing basic urban amenities.

The two cities extended over an approximate area of more than two square kilometers and had an estimated population of around 30,000 persons. Mohenjodaro is the older and larger of the two cities and its was rebuilt at least nine times in span of six to eight hundred years. However, the rebuilding did not disturb the basic pattern of street layout, except in the later phases, when the rigid patterns were not strictly adhered to. Harappa is apparently a city build at a later point in time, as its sudden appearance on the landscape indicates, and it was perhaps build as a secondary capital to satisfy the needs of an expanding empire.

Lothal, located near a distributary of the Sabarmati river, was actually a sea port at the mouth of the Gulf of Cambay. It probably started as a fishing village and emerged as a major trading port under the influence of the Harappan empire. Through Lothal, the Harappans established trade links with the outside world, in particular with the Mesopotamian cities, besides trade, Lothal was also a centre of industry, as indicated by the presence of a variety of items like ivory objects, cotton goods, objects used in warfare such as daggers, spearheads and so on. The city was partly destroyed
by floods in 2000 BC after which is lost its importance. A major flood around 1900 BC resulted in its final destruction.

Unlike the other two Harappan cities, Lothal was surrounded by a mud brick wall, which probably was a protective device against floods. On the other hand, Lothal had a structure similar to the other two cities. It consisted of two parts—the raised city in the west containing the major palatial buildings housing the ruling class, and the lower town with a market centre in the north, an industrial sector in the west and a residential area in the north-western part. There was a large dockyard in the eastern part, connected by an artificial channel to the river. In addition to Lothal, the Harappan people had several other part towns at Suktagendor, Sotka-koh, Bhagatrav, Tuda and Somnath.

Among the smaller towns, Kalibangan in Rajasthan has a typical Harappan city structure with lower and upper city areas, a grid pattern of streets without drains and buildings of inferior quality, indicating both a lower status of the town, as well as a declining phase of urbanization. Another sea port, on smaller scale than Lothal, was located on the Makran coast in Baluchistan, having a dockyard in addition to the citadel and lower town. The other smaller towns did not have citadels, indicating their lower status in the urban hierarchy. Thus, the Harappan towns and cities revealed variations in form, structure and functions.

The second phase of urbanization in India began around 600 BC. The architects of this phase were the Aryans in the North and the Dravidians in the South.
These parallel and independent urban developments are later culturally interlinked by large-scale migration of Aryan people to southern India, particularly the brahmanas and Jain and Buddhist monks, starting from around 300BC. These migrations initiated a process of Sanskritization of the Dravidian South, resulting in the emergence of a composite culture. Thus, during the later historical periods, the cities of the North and the South were intimately tied to each other through cultural and economic interaction.

The second phase of urbanization is in many ways more important to us, because from this time onwards, urbanization became a permanent feature of the Indian landscape. The oldest existing cities in India – Varanasi and Patna (Pataliputra) in the North and Madurai and Kancheepuram in the South, originated around 500 BC and are symbolic of India’s long urban heritage.

The early historical period covers nearly a thousand years of urban history. This period can be divided into three parts in northern India, consisting of the post-Vedic period, the Mauryan period and the post-Mauryan period. These periods indicate the early origins of urbanization, its climax in the Mauryan period, and later its decline. In southern India, urbanization originated in the pre-Sangam period and rose to great heights during the Sangam period, which saw the emergence of literary classics in Tamil.

Unlike the first phase of prehistoric urbanization, the second phase of Aryan and Dravidian urbanization is substantiated by the great literary texts of this period.
The Rig Veda is the oldest of our great religious texts and it belongs to the pre-urban phase of Aryan culture. The Rig Veda is followed by a number of Vedic texts such as the Dharmashastras and Dharmasutras belonging to the period 600 to 300 BC, wherein references are made to the presence of urban place. Panini’s great grammatical work also belongs to this period and so do the various Jain and Buddhist religious texts written in the Pali language, using the Brahmi script or its variants. The Arthasastra of Kautilya provides a wealth of information on the urban centres of the Mauryan period. The great epics, the Ramayana of Valmiki and Mahabharata of Vyasa muni were written in the post-Mauryan period, although the actual events may have belonged to much earlier times. The Kamasutra of Vatasayana, Mahabhashya of Patanjali, Manusmriti and the Puranas provide a mine of information on urbanization during the post Mauryan phase. The literary evidence during the later time period ends to exaggerate and glorify cities and much of the description is fictional rather than factual. Archaeological evidence in support of the existence of early Aryan cities is not altogether lacking; nevertheless, there are no spectacular remains of ancient cities comparable to the Harappan phase. This is mainly because the Aryans used wood and other perishable materials for building their cities, thus leaving behind very little archaeological evidence.

For southern India, literary evidence exists in the Tamil language. The earliest phase of Tamil literature is known as the Sangam period, dating back from 500 BC to AD 200. This phase of Tamil literature includes the Tolkappaim, a grammatical work, the epics of Silappadikaram and Manmekhalai the philosophical work of Tirukkural and number of other works. All these texts together provide a picture of the
emergence of early Tamil kingdoms and or urban centres, besides information on Tamil society and culture. The literature during this period also shows indirect influences of Jainism and Buddhism, and of the brahmanical religion of northern India.

The Rig Veda describes the Aryans as a pastoral and agricultural people of rural origin and the proud destroyers of an alien culture. The pre-rural bias of the Rig Veda finds sympathetic echo in the later brahmanical texts such as the Dharamasastra and Dharamasutras. The Aryans came to India in several migrational waves and over a period of several centuries between 2000BC and 1500 BC. They first settled in the valley of the Indus and its tributaries and later, in the post-Rig Vedic period, their domain was extended to the upper Yamuna and Ganga plains. The pre-urban phase of Aryan occupation of northern India is well documented in the so-called painted grey ware culture described by archaeologists. This wheel-turned pottery is distinct from the ochre coloured and red ware pottery of the later phases of Harappan culture. The Vedic pre-urban Aryans were also familiar with the use of the plough and of metals such as copper, bronze and iron.

For nearly a thousand years from 1500 to 500 BC, the pre-urban Aryans lived in enclosed rectangular villages, divided into four segments by two main streets which crossed each other in the centre. Four gates located in each of the four cardinal directions provided entry into the village. The lands around the village were communally owned and used for cultivation and grazing. Their society was essentially
egalitarian with no marked distinctions between the various sections of the population.

By the post-Vedic period, 800 to 600 BC, centre of the Aryan homeland had shifted to the upper Yamuna and Ganga basins, which were inhabited by the two principal Aryan tribes, the Kurus in the area around Delhi and the Panchalas in the upper Ganga-Ghaghara doab near Bareilly. There were many other Aryan tribes, who fought incessant wars among themselves and with the non-Aryan groups. The territorial feuds led to the emergence of small kingdoms, which necessitated the building of capital cities and palaces, and the rise of elitist classes of nobles, militia and priest. The earliest cities of this period were Hastinapura, Sravasti, Kapilavastu, Ujjain, Mahishamati, Champa, Rajgir, Ayodhya, Varanasi and Kausambi. The location of most of these cities is supported by archaeological evidence in addition to the literary evidence (see figure 2.2 later).

According to the Aitareya and Taitareya Upanishads, the Aryan country or Arya Varta was divided into eight janapads or tribal territories. Later, through territorial conquest and expansion, the janapadas increased in number and size and in time 16 and consolidation of Arya Varta continued into the later periods. Territorial expansion increased the power of the kings, who could now make land grants and impose taxes, while the role of the popular assemblies, a characteristic feature of the early Vedic period, vanished. The king was assisted by the brahmanas; the art of writing was still unknown and there is no direct evidence of it as yet. The Ashokan edicts are the earliest written either in the Brahmi or Kharosthi script in the Prakrit
language. Panini's Astadhyari, however, belongs to an earlier period (c.500) BC and this work must have required the use of a written script. It is possible, therefore, that the art of writing existed earlier than 500 BC.

The cities of the post-Vedic period were few and far between. Mention had been made of about a dozen cities of this period, which is a comparatively small number for the large area in which Aryans had already settled. However, it is important to note that cities emerged and began to play a key role in Aryan society which changed from an egalitarian society to one with marked differences within the various section of people. In particular, the kings and the kshatriyas wielded greater power and influence than before. This produced a tussle for supremacy between the kshatriyas and the brahmanas. In early Vedic times, the brahmanas, with their mystic-religious source of power, enjoyed enormous influence among the masses. The emergence of the cities resulted in the rise of secular power of the kshatriyas. This struggle resulted in the emergence of kshatriya religious movements as exemplified by the rise of Jainism and Buddhism. The new religious movements were essentially urban oriented. They not only held city life as legitimate, but in fact went so far as to praise it. The is very evident from the Buddhist and jain texts. As opposed to this, the later Vedic literature is totally contemptuous of urban places and urban people. It assigned a lower status to the vaishyas, who played a key role in urban commerce. Thus the emergence of cities juxtaposed the brahmanical spiritual power against the secular forces represented by the kshartiryas and the economic power of the vaishyas. In this struggle, the secular forces emerged triumphant and the brahmanical religion was driven almost into oblivion. It was saved partly by historical circumstances and
partly by the acceptance by the brahmanas of the superiority of the kshatriyas in all secular matters. This acceptance is evident in the epics where kshatriyas are portrayed as incarnations of god.

The emergence of cities in the post-Vedic period is to be attributed, in the final analysis, to economic forces. The Aryans were essentially an iron-age people, while the Harappans were unaware of iron. Iron tools are an important component of the Aryan period. Iron was used for making axes, saws and agricultural implements. The use of iron was important in many ways for setting the stage for urbanization. First, it made it possible to clear the thick forests of the Ganga plains for cultivation. The early Aryan settlements were located close to the foothills of the Himalayas as far east as southern Nepal and from this region they expanded southwards along the river valleys. The use of iron was of vital importance in widening the area of settlement. Secondly, the use of iron ploughs and draught animals, mainly oxen, helped to generate a large surplus of food contributed to the emergence of cities. Thirdly, iron was important in the manufacture of horse-driven chariots for warfare and ox-driven carts for transportation. These also contributed to the increased mobility of the population and helped trade and commerce, a basic economic factor leading to urbanization.

A further point to be remembered here is that the Aryans had spent over a thousand years in India before city life emerged. Naturally, there was considerable contact between the Aryan and non-Aryan people inhabiting the same area. The Vedic literature refers to the non-Aryans as panis, dasas of dasyus, Grudging credit is
given to these ethnic groups for their skills in trade and warfare the fact was that, in many areas such as trade, crafts, industries and architecture, the local population had superior skills. Even in agriculture the pre-Aryans were the first to introduce the transplantation method in rice cultivation, hereby increasing productivity. Thus, the contribution of the pre-Aryan population to the emergence of cities cannot be denied. Moreover, even at this time, the pre _ Aryan component of the population was probably larger than the Aryan component. However, through the process of Sanskritization, the Aryan and pre-Aryan cultures fused to form a richer and more varied Indian culture.

The houses of this period, both in the villages and in the cities, were made of mud walls, timber and thatch. Baked bricks were also in use, but rather sparingly, as is evident from the poverty of archaeological finds of buildings in the early cities of this period in Kurukshetra Hastinapura. The paucity of archaeological evidence is also due to the small number of field investigations that have been carried out so far.

Mauryan period is extremely rich in terms of literary sources of information, the most important being Kautilya’s Arthasastra, the Buddhist texts and the travel accounts of Fa-Hsien and Megasthenes. We have, as a result, a voluminous account of urbanization and city life during this period. Some, at least, of the literary accounts are gross exaggerations, as many a city is described as having insurmountable walls, deep moats, wide streets, large gates, sky – rocketing mansions, busy markets, parks and lakes. Furthermore, all cities are described in a similar literary style with little variation in content. The archaeological excavations provide far more convincing
evidence of urbanization during the period. This period also witnessed the introduction of aspects of Greek architecture and scientific knowledge in India’s urban landscape, brought about by Alexander’s invasion in 326 BC.

The Growth of Cities. From the post – Vedic period to the Mauryan period, there is once again a major eastward shift in the position of the Indian cultural heartland. By this time, the lower Ganga plains had been fully inhabited and the centre of gravity had shifted from the Kuru and Panchala country around Delhi to the Magadh region in Bihar. The smaller janapadas gave way to the mahajanapadas around 600 BC, However, the concept of janapadas as politico – administrative units continued to be accepted and their number increased from eight in the post – Vedic period to over 230 by about AD 500. All the janapadas continued to be administered or sometimes ruled by local kings from a capital city located in the centre of each janapada. The growth of janapada and empires encouraged urbanization. The cities increased in number, size, and the complexity of their internal structure and functions. The relations between the city and countryside also underwent important changes.

Types of Towns. The complexity of urbanization during the Mauryan period is indicated by the presence of different types of towns in addition to the capital or administrative city. The more important categories of towns were: Rajadhaniy nagara, Sthaniy nagara, Kharvata, Kheta, Putabhedana, Nigama, Pattana and Dronamukha. The first four are administrative towns at four hierarchical levels, the Sthaniya nagara, according to Kautilya, was the capital of a janapada, which at this time had the status of a province within an empire. The kharvata nagara was the focal point of about 200
villages – smaller than a Sthaniya nagara which covered 800 villages. Kheta was a small town comparable to the Kharvata but it was located in a hostile territory within the empire and the fore treated with disdain by the rulers.

The last four types refer to commercial cities. Of these, the Putabhedana was a large commercial centre specializing in wholesale trade. The Nigama was an ordinary market centre (the term itself refers to an organization of merchants). The Pattana was a coastal trading town, while the Dronamukha was located at the mouth of a river and served as a port city.

Other types of towns mentioned are Khadavara, a military camp and Nivesa, an encampment. Both these were of a temporary nature. In addition, there were cities of a permanent character, specialized centers of learning and religion, arts and crafts, and medicine. The well known educational cities of Taxashila and Nalanda, however, belong to the post-Mauryan period.

The Internal Structure of Cities. The cities of this period resembled the early Aryan villages; they were all walled cities, rectangular or square, with four gates, one in the centre of each side. The city was surrounded by moats and walls, in some cases in a successive council hall, the royal store house, buildings used for dramatic arts and sports, business quarters, and residences of ordinary people. Larger cities had market places and rest – houses for travelers.
Kautilya in his Arthasastra describes in some detail the internal structure of capital cities. These descriptions are normative rather than actual. Nevertheless, they do provide an insight into the thinking on city planning during this time. According to Kautilya, a capital city should have three royal highways in the east–west direction and three in the north–south direction, dividing the city into 16 sectors, each sector having a specific type of land-use. These specific land-uses included the following: the palaces of the king, the ministers and the priests; the houses of dealers in flowers and perfumes; residences of warriors; warehouses and workshops; stables for elephants, camels and horses; records and audit offices; the labour colony; the royal armory; residences of merchants; the labour colony; the royal armory; residences of merchants; living quarters of courtesans and dancers; residences of craftsmen in wool, leather, etc.; the royal treasury and mint; the residences of brahmanas and temples; houses of metal workers and workers in jewelry; and so on. The city's internal structure had acquired great variety and complexity. The city showed distinct levels of segregation in separate sectors of the city. The kshatriyas and vaishyas lived in the better areas of the city which were located in the north and north–east. The vaishyas lived in the southern parts of the city, while the sudras, who comprised the bulk of the artisan class, lived in the western part of the city. This section was also the industrial area of the city.

The streets had a standard width of about eight meters and formed a grid. The residents had to make their own arrangements for the disposal of rubbish. The larger houses had courtyards, pounding sheds, and latrines for the common use of the tenants. Security was a major obsession with the city fathers and consequently, a
complete record of the city population was maintained and the activities of strangers monitored.

City Administration. Kautilya's Arthasastra gives details of Mauryan urban administration. The city was under the charge of the village headman or mukhya. However, the mayor was subordinate to the samaharta or the minister in charge of municipal affairs. The duties of the nagaraka included the inspection of the city's water supply and the maintenance of the roads, public grounds, subterranean passages and the city's water supply and the maintenance of the roads, public grounds, subterranean passages and the city's defenses such as the wall, tower and moat. The town was divided into four wards, each in the charge of a sthanika, and each was divided into gopas which consisted of between 10 and 40 households. The arrival and departure of visitors to the city - guests of city residents, travelers, sadhus, merchants - were kept track of by the city's espionage network. The citizens were forbidden to move about the city in the night. The city also had a police force. According to Megasthenes, the city was ruled by a committee of 30 members, subdivided into six committees of five members each. These committees were in charge of: (1) factors, (2) foreigners, (3) births and deaths, (4) markets, weights and measures, (5) inspection of manufactured goods, and (6) sales tax. According to Kautilya, however, these functions were performed not by committees but by adhyakshas or courts at three levels: the locality, the caste and the clan level. In addition to these courts, the various occupational guilds also settled disputes among their members.
City Industry. The Mauryan city was also a centre of the manufacturing industry. Each specific industry was allotted a certain area within the city. In addition, the city was often surrounded by craft villages. These villages were more or less homogeneous in terms of occupation and specialization in some activity; thus, there were villages of reed makers, salt makers, potters and so on. Within the city itself, there was a great variety of crafts and industries. The sixty–odd industries mentioned may be grouped into 11 categories as follows: (1) textiles, (2) carpentry and woodwork, (3) metal work including smiths and jewelers, (4) stone work, (5) glass industry, (6) bone and ivory work, (7) perfumer, (8) Liquor and oil manufacture, (9) leather industry, (10) clay works including pottery, terracotta figure making, modeling and brick making, and (11) other miscellaneous industries such as making garlands, combs, baskets and musical instruments, and painting. An advanced system of guilds or shrenis of industrial labour regulated the manufacture of goods. The guilds of merchants dealing in various goods were called nigamas.

Urban Society. The urban society of this period was stratified more or less along the lines of the rural society. Caste and occupation were the primary indicators of status, and individuals spent their life within this framework. Mobility to a higher status in society was possible, but rare. The major segments of the urban society were©1) the king and his higher administrative and military officials, (2) priests, (3) lower administrative and military officials,(4) independent professional such as physicians, scribes, accountants and teachers, (5) the mercantile community, (6) artisans and craftsmen, (7) public entertainers such as musicians, dancers actors and
prostitutes, and (8) persons performing a variety of services, such as dhobis, barbers and domestic servants.

Cities, and along with them the urban way of life, began to decline from around the 5th century AD. This is lucidly described by Fa Hsien and Huien Tsang who visited India during the periods AD405-11 and AD 630-44, respectively. The accounts of these foreign travelers about the state of urban centres are further supported by Indian writers, notably Vatsayana, and the overwhelming archaeological evidence available to us today. The literary accounts describe the utter ruin and abandonment of a number of well-known cities of the earlier period. The list of cities that were in a state of decline includes: Taxashila, Mathura, Sravasthi, Kausambi and Pataliputra. In spite of the adverse conditions for urban growth during this period, a few cities still managed to maintain their former splendour, for example, the cities of Kanauj and Nalanda.

The reasons often attributed for the decline of urban centers in the post-mauryan period are many and varied: (1) the frequent recurrence of natural calamities such as famines, pestilence, fire, floods and earthquakes, took a heavy toll of urban population. (2) The political factor was no less important. The decline of well-administered empires and their replacement by the rule of feudal chiefs resulted in the exploitation of peasants and artisans alike. Capital cities, particularly the larger ones, were abandoned, as they no longer served as seats of government. (3) Foreign invasions, particularly those of the Hunas who entertained anti Buddhist sentiments, resulted in the deliberate destruction of many Buddhist centers in north-western
Indian and also in the Ganga plains, though to a lesser extent. (4) In addition to the foreign invaders, the internecine wars between feudal chiefs also contributed to the destruction of urban places. (5) Many cities in the Mauryan period had emerged directly as a consequence of the rise of Buddhism, and with its decline in the post-Mauryan period; many urban centers also lost their former importance. (6) The prosperity of earlier times was essentially due to a very productive agricultural base and the growth of crafts and industries. These had been protected and encouraged by kings, with the decline of the empires and kingdoms and the rise of petty feudal chiefs, agriculture and industry became less productive, and concomitantly urban centres began to decline.

Urbanization in Southern Indian Parts:

The story of the second phase of Indian urbanization, up to this point, has largely been confined to the North. However, the extreme southern part of India, which comprises the two states of Tamil Nadu and Kerala, witnessed an independent process of urbanization resulting in the emergence of a distinctly Dravidian (as different from Aryan) culture.

The first phase of urbanization in India, namely the Harappan phase, had resulted in the establishment of urban centers as far south as the mouths of the rivers Narmada and Tapti and in the Malwa plateau. There is distinct archaeological evidence of the spread of Harappan culture deep into the Deccan plateau. However, as in northern India, there is no continuity between the Harappan phase of urbanization
and the Dravidian phase of urban development. The origins of the Dravidian phase of urbanization may be traced to around the 5th century BC. Unlike the Aryan phase of urbanization, the origins of the Dravidian phase are not fully understood. The word dravida was first used in Sanskrit around the 8th century AD. In this context it referred to a region rather than a people or a language. In early Tamil literature the word dravida was not used at all. However, in recent times, it has found acceptance in Tamil literature and there is a need for further archaeological and historical enquiry in this direction. Nevertheless, the rough contours of the Dravidian phase of urbanization may be delineated from the available archaeological and literary evidences.

The Pre-urban Phase. The earliest human settlements in South India, from archaeological evidence, date back to 2300-1800 BC. These settlements were located on the tops of granitic hills, on hill slopes and on plateau surfaces. Evidence of the domestication of cattle, sheep and goats and the cultivation of grain crops is found on these settlement sites, Handmade pottery and stone axes are also found, but the use of metals was not known. Terracotta objects and rock paintings are also traced to this period. In summary, one could characterize this period as the Neolithic phase of rural settlements.

Between 1800 and 1500 BC, the rural settlements show further advancement with the use of metals and wheel-turned potter. There are distinct signs of harappan influence during this phase, although no urban settlements have so far been discovered. A characteristic of this period is the occurrence of circular hutments made of wattle and daub on wooden frames with mud floors. Objects made of copper and
bronze made their first appearance during this period. This chalcolithic culture developed further during the succeeding period (1400 to 1050BC), as evidenced by the increasing use of metals and wheel-turned pottery. Horses appear on the scene for the first time, indicating greater mobility of the people. A large number of sites belonging to this period have been excavated in the states of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. At that point in time, the stage was set for the emergence of urban centers.

The Urban Phase. From the early chalcolithic settlements, there arose a distinct Dravidean culture with Tamil as the spoken language. The other Dravidian languages of today, such as Kannada, Telugu and Malayalam, originated at later points in time (roughly the 10th century AD onwards) as a result of Aryan influences in the South. The fact that the Dravidean culture attained a very high level, with urbanization as a concomitant process, is attested by the vast body of classical works in the Tamil language in what is known as the ‘Sangam’ literature. The position of Tamil in the South corresponds to that of Sanskrit in the North. However, while Sanskrit ceased to be a spoken language long ago, Tamil continues to be a spoken language to the day.

The early Tamil literature of the Sangam period consists of works on grammar, collections of early poetry, epics and discussions on philosophy and culture. The earliest works, such as the Tolkappiam and its predecessors could have been written only in an urban context. The two major Tamil epics, namely, Silappadikaram and Manimekalai deal with urban societies in the Pandya and Chera kingdoms. Thus, the classical Tamil literature provides ample evidence of an independent urban
civilization in the South. The major Tamil cities were Madurai, Vanji, Urayur, Puhar and Korkai, which served as the capital cities of the early Tamil kingdoms of the Pandyas, Cholas and Chers. Megasthenes, the Greek ambassador at the court of the Mauryan king; mentions the southern cities of Madurai and Kancheepuram and the Panyan kingdom in the 4th century BC. Kautilya in his Arthasastra refers to the trade between the Mauryan Empire and the cities of Madurai and Kancheepuram in the 3rd century BC. Pearls, metals (particularly gold) and fin textile products were imported for the South into the Mauryan empire. The literary evidence indicates the existence of cities in South India is far back as the 4th and 3rd century BC. Naturally, then, Dervidian cities did not come about all of a sudden, nor did the Ramil culture and its literature emerge out of a vacuum. There are indications that city life perhaps emerged in the South even before the 3rd century BC. However, the evidence available to us is not conclusive.

Salient Features of Urbanization. From early times, the Tamil Country, which included the two southern states of India, was divided into four mandalams - equivalent to the mahajanapadas of the North, though differing from the janapadas were further subdivided into smaller territorial units called nauds and kottams. A king ruled over the mandalams, while chieftains ruled over the smaller territorial units and paid tribute to the king. Accordingly, a system of cities emerged with capital cities at their apex and smaller towns forming the focal points lower territorial orders. In addition, there were a number of port cities, specializing in international trade.
The southern cities carried on a flourishing trade with the Arabs, and later the Greeks and the Romans. Early contact with the Hebrew kingdoms of Sumeria (in Mesopotamia) around 1000 BC is indicated by the use of Tamil words in Hebrew for peacocks and monkeys. The pandya kings sent emissaries to the Roman court in the second century AD, and the presence of numerous kinds of Roman coins in South India testifies to the volume of trade between the South Indian ports and Europe.

Distinctive Aspects of Dravidian Urbanization. In general South India, and particularly the Tamil country, shows remarkable continuity in urban traditions from the 5th century BC to the present. While some of the earlier urban centers such as Uraiyur, Puhar and Korkai exist only as ruins today, others particularly Madurai and Kancheepuram, have withstood the vagaries of Indian history remarkably well. One major factor contributing to this continuity is the near absence of foreign invasions which characterize the history of North India. The South was protected from the Muslim invasions of the medieval period, and although Aryan influences penetrated into the region from as early as the 5th century BC, the South always maintained a cultural identity of its own, Aryan influences, starting with the Buddhist and Jain monks who were based primarily at Kancheepuram in Tamil Nadu and Nagarjunakonda in Andhra Pradesh, were eventually absorbed within the local traditions. The process of fusion of the Aryan and Dravidian traditions did not generate a cultural hiatus, while in the North such a hiatus emerged inevitably as a result of the conflict between Islamic and Aryan traditions and cultures.
The major kingdoms in the South during this period were the Chalukyas in Karnataka who ruled this territory between AD 600 and 800. Their capital at Vatapi (present-day Badami) was a major city of this time. The Ishvakus established their rule in the Krishna-Godavari region and built many cities, including Nagarjunakonda and Dharanikota, which are in ruins today, as well as the cities of Vijayawada, Rajahmundry and Nellore which stand to the present day. About the same time, the Pallavas of Kancheepuram rose to power (AD 500-800). They were followed by the Cholas, who ruled over the Tamil country for over 400 years from AD 900 to 1300. The cities in the South grew in number and included a large number of cities which are still well known today including Tanjore, Kumbakonam, Tiruchirappalli, Cuddalore, Nagapattinam and Tiruchendur, to name but a few. A major feature of all these cities is the presence of one or more temples which dominate the urban landscape. Indeed, the size of an urban place could be estimated by the size of its dominant temple. Even today the approach of major cities in the South is indicated by the appearance of temple gopuram.

The Chalukyas and the Pallavas were replaced by the Rashtrakutas in the Deccan. They ruled from Malkhed (near Sholapur) in Maharashtra for about 200 years (AD 750-972). The famous Ellora caves belong to this period. Other dynasties that ruled over this region were the later Chalukyas with their capital at Kalyani, the Hoysalas of Belure, the Kakatiyas of Warangal and so on. Each kingdom was remarkable not only for the emergence of its capital city, but also for its numerous administrative and commercial centers. A large number of cities that originated during this period continue to exist today.
The medieval South Indian city had a distinct urban morphology which still holds for southern cities, the major feature of the city was the temple, which served as the focal center. Around the temple there were one or more concentric squares of streets. The inner squares were occupied by the upper castes, particularly the brahmanas. The lower castes lived in the periphery of the city and often the lowest castes were not allowed to come near the temple. Streets leading outwards from the four gates (gopurams) of the temple were mostly devoted to commercial activity and served as arterial roads of the city, linking the inner city with the periphery and the rural region beyond.

Thus, Industry and Urbanization. A major factor contributing to urbanization in the Mughal period was the growth of traditional industries such as textiles (cotton, silk and woolen) and metal work, and various arts and crafts. North Indian cities hummed with industrial activity. Whether in Dacca, Varanasi or Ahmedabad, industry was major urban activity and the markets of all the cities were full of goods of high quality. This is amply testified by European travelers in India during this period. The crafts and industry were patronized by the rich. The craftsmen, however, came from the poorer sections of urban society. In earlier period, the skilled craftsmen were converted to Islam. This occurred partly in response to the pressure from the ruling elite and partly as an escape from the low caste status assigned to craftsmen in Hindu society. However, the economic conditions of the craftsmen did not improve even after their conversion to Islam. They continued to be exploited and this state of affairs has remained unchanged to the present. Nevertheless, industrialization and
urbanization proceeded simultaneously and generated a large number of small towns in addition to the many provincial and administrative capitals of the period.

External trade was another major contributing factor in urbanization during this period. Indian-made goods were much sought after in West Asian, South east Asian and European markets. A number of trade centers emerged, particularly at the periphery of the Mughal empire. The main centers were Cambay, Surat, Burhanpur, Satgaon, Chittagong, and Hooghly. Cambay and Surat were by far the most important trade centers of this time. The traders belonged to three communities – the Bohra Muslims, the Hindu Banyas, and the Parsis. Traders had appointed agents in other parts of the world, particularly in South west Asia and South east Asia. Burhanpur in Malwa was a major center of trade between the Mughal empire and the kingdoms of the Deccan. Trade and industry thus contributed immeasurably to urbanization during this period.

Urbanization During the British Period

The European phase of India’s urban history has its beginnings, ironically, in the period during which Mughal supremacy was at its height. The Portuguese were the first to establish new port towns in India – Panaji in Goa in 1510 and Bombay in 1532. They were followed by the Dutch – Machilipatnam in 1605 and Nagapattinam in 1658; and the French – Pondicherry in 1673 and Chandranagore in 1690. The British established themselves in Madras in 1639 and Calcuatta in 1690. All these European settlements, and the European presence as traders in a large number of
existing Indian ports and inland cities, continued throughout the Mughal period; but without having any marked impact on the level of urbanization in India. It is only in the early 19th century that the British established a firm territorial hold in India, and India came under the British crown in 1858. From that time, until 1947, the British exercised unquestioned sway over the entire subcontinent including the 500-odd princely state. The entire country, without exception, came under one political umbrella. This was unprecedented in Indian history. The course of urbanization after 1800 in all parts of India was determined by British colonial economic policies and social attitudes.

The decline of a large number of urban places in India during the 19th century was primarily due to the negative attitude of the British towards the traditional industries of India, particularly the cotton textile industry. This attitude was largely a result of the industrial revolution in England and the growth of the textile industry in Manchester. By the end of the 19th century, England had emerged as a major industrial economy of the world and India was the main market for British goods, India’s traditional urban centers, which depended on the export of its industrial products, declined rapidly as a consequence.

**Metropolization**

A remarkable feature of urbanization during the post-Independence period has been the rapid growth of the one-million and one-lakh cities. The number of such cities has increased from 76 in 1951 to 219 in 1981. The proportion of urban
population living in the one-lakh cities has increased from 38 per cent in 1951 to 60 per cent in 1981. In absolute terms, the population living in one-lakh cities has increased from 39 million in 1981—a phenomenal growth indeed. The unenviable result of this growth is the widening gap between the cities and the smaller towns in terms of opportunities for employment, education, and medical facilities. Further, the rapid or less unplanned and haphazard growth of the cities has imposed severe strains on housing, water supply, sewage, and sanitation in the cities—a problem that has become chronic and assumed alarming proportions.

**Political Parties in India:**

It is very common to invoke the term ‘party system’ in any discussion of Indian politics. But more often than not, a discussion of the party system tends to be a loose and generalized way of discussing the attributes of parties in a given political system. Or else, it is a simple numeric description of the number of relevant parties in a given polity: one-party systems, two-party or bipolar systems, and multi-party systems. Both these prevalent ways of discussing the party system lose sight of the basic point behind the idea of a party system: that it is a ‘system’ that conditions and constrains all the parties that operate within it, that it is more than the sum of the parts. Therefore, we need to distinguish between changing fortunes of parties and changes in the party system. For instance, what we are looking for in this chapter is not so much an explanation for why the Congress came to lose power, but how and why it found itself facing a radically different pattern of political competition, and its implication of the existing parties and for popular mobilizations. Thus, the basic idea is to grasp that the configuration in which parties find themselves locked happens to
be an independent factor that constrains what individual parties and voters can do. In this sense, this configuration provides a framework within which party competition and popular mobilization take place. The nature and structure of the competition determine how open or closed a party system is in processing societal claims, in allowing new entrants, in admitting unattended issues, etc.

This condition obtains when the different parties offer radically different policy packages that have perceived consequences for the lives of ordinary citizens. This often comes about at the time of the rise of a new political formation that challenges the existing political spectrum on issues of policy and practice (e.g., the rise of the Left Front to power in West Bengal through the 1960s and 1970s, the rise of DMK in Tamil Nadu in the 1960s) or in conditions of deep social upheaval and ethnic strife (UP and Bihar in the 1990s, Punjab in the 1980s Assam during 1980-85) or both (Kerala in the 1950). The voters choose between very different options with long term consequences. This tends to be a short lived phase, for periods of wide options are soon followed by a narrowing range of options. Either the original challenger dilutes its agenda. Eg., AGP in Assam or the rivals adopt the new agenda (e.g., rise of AIADMK as a rival to DMK in Tamil Nadu) or there is a mix of the two (e.g., West Bengal since the establishment of the Left Front dominance).

Two Lives of the Congress System

After this long but necessary detour, we can now resume our journey of the evolution of the party system in the Indian states and evaluate the usefulness of the
revised typology of the party system offered above. We have already noted that the Congress system was a product of the specific context in which democratic politics unfolded and became institutionalized in post independence India. In order to appreciate this point, one needs to be sensitive to the historical contrast between the path of bourgeois democracy in the West and the trajectory of democratic politics in post colonial societies. In the West, enfranchisement was a gradual process. As this process was in progress, social divisions were also taking shape. Thus, the final movement of enfranchisement was also the moment of freezing of party political divisions. This happened because mobilization along various social divisions and evolution of political organizations around these divisions had already taken place. Broadly, the national revolution and the industrial revolution crated structures of cleavages that formed political divisions.

In India, the anti colonial struggle that provided a platform for powerful and mass mobilization also foreclosed the entry of many social cleavages into competitive politics. Thus, the introduction of universal adult franchise took place in a situation where structure of cleavages had not evolved and thus, a large part of society was yet to be mobilized. This provided an extraordinary autonomy to politics in 20th century India, for it could activate, institute or mask various kinds of potential cleavages. The national movement played a crucial role in this regard. It was not that various competing cleavages dictated terms to this political movement; it was rather the national movement that played a decisive role in upholding certain cleavages and pushing some other to the background.
At the moment of independence, quite a few social divisions were available for political mobilization. Even a cursory look at these would invite a question as to why many of these were never actualized in politics. At the micro level, the village community, the jati, locality, were the possible platforms of mobilization. At the macro level, caste blocs, communal divisions, regional divisions within and among states, could become some of the political cleavages. Also, the division between rural and urban interests, division between the agricultural and modern economic sector could have become the bases of political contestations. Or, ideological divisions on the basis of modern vs traditional and Left vs Right were also potential platforms for political mobilization. Mobilization could also take place along issue based or class based divisions.

These potential cleavages were mediated by the imperatives of the design of modern democracy. The institutional arrangements adopted by modern democracy coupled with the background of the nationalist movement made it necessary to mobilize people on a macro scale. Political competition too, came to be conducted on the all India basis. This meant that localized, micro level divisions would not gain relevance. The aggregative compulsions of a first past the post electoral system did not encourage the formation of cleavage based politics. Some social categories were recognized constitutionally thus provide space for mobilization on these groups (SCs, STs, OBCs) which some others though not recognized, already existed (Muslims, for instance). The system of reserved seats in joint or single electorates, however, limited the potential of these categories for exclusivist mobilization.
Transition from the Congress system to the post Congress polity was neither gradual nor smooth. It was a product of a systemic shock, a cataclysmic transformation. It was not merely the change in the ruling party or a change in the political actors engaged in competition for power. The terms of political competition and the issues involved in this competition changed dramatically around this time. This period was marked by a fundamental reconfiguration of the party political space. While the decline of the Congress seemed like a crisis initially, was also an opportunity to revitalize the democratic political competition and traduce greater substance in this.

This reconfiguration of the structure of political competition was marked by the arrival of the three ‘Ms’ on to the national political stage: Mandir, Mandal and Market. This movement of sudden transformation deserves careful recall and scrutiny, if only to understand better the momentous consequences of some of the changes that happened almost overnight.

As system, the Indian Political system is distinctive. Certainly, it does not correspond to its European and American counterparts. Writing about it, Paul Brass noted the difference: ‘party politics in India display numerous paradoxical features, which reveal the blending of Western and modern forms of bureaucratic organization and participatory politics with indigenous practices and institutions, India’s leading political party, the Indian National Congress, is one of the oldest in the world, yet it has not succeeded in providing the nucleus for an institutionalized party system which can be fitted easily into any one of the conventional categories of party systems
known in the West. At a broader level, Rajni Kothari highlighted the distinct features of the Indian political system, and profiled an Indian model of democratization, which he argued should not be assessed by any supposedly universal (or Western) criterion. The Indian party system is indeed complex, and an important reason for the complexity is the social heterogeneity that has made it impossible for a single set of parties to emerge across the country. This is reflected in the variegated character of Indian political parties. The Congress, established in 1985, continues to occupy a place in the national political arena. The 1980s witnessed the emergency of Hindu nationalism and the right wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) around which the ruling coalition currently revolves, and these coexist with the world’s longest surviving democratically elected Communist government at the state level.

Therefore an elucidation of party politics in India should begin with an understanding of the role of political parties in democratic systems generally. Parties are undoubtedly essential to the functioning of democracy; they perform varied functions within and outside the realm of politics. Their leadership and policies, internal practices, and the patterns of interaction with other parties and institutions can have profound consequences for the system of governance. As a keystone political institution in representative regime, the modern political party regularly fulfils three critical functions: nominating candidates for public offices; formulating and setting the agenda for public; and mobilizing support for candidates and policies in an election. Other institutions perform some of these functions too. What, however, distinguishes parties is their emphasis on linkage. Parties are seen, both by their members and by others, as agencies for forging links between citizens and policy
makers. Their raison d'être is to create a substantive connection between the ruler and ruled.

Modern form of representative democracy has brought forth party system as an indispensable factor in every political society to lay down the rule that political party, in one form or another, "is omnipresent." This phenomena lays stress on the maximization of political participation in the sense that it enjoins upon the members of a political elite to take the people at large in confidence either for the sake of observing the myth that 'voice of the people is the voice of God', or to justify the very legitimacy of their leadership and authority. This phenomena also indicates a mark of political modernization in the sense that it calls for the involvement of more and more people into the process of what Easton says, 'authoritative allocation of values'. Whether it is the rule of a single person (monarch or dictator), or of the few (assembly or elite), or even of the many, the norms of stasiology demand attachment of sanctity to the norm that the masses must participate in the political affairs of the country as much as possible.

Meaning of Political party: Viewed in this context, the term political party has a comprehensive connotation. The classical explanation of Edmund Burke that political party is a body of men united for promoting the national interest on some particular principles in which they are all agreed needs revision in the light of recent developments. While highlighting recent trends of political behaviour, Dean and Schuman argue that political parties have become essentially political institution "to implement the objectives of interest groups." If so, a specific interest constitutes
the foundation of a political party and as 'specific' interests differ from one another, there are corresponding difference between political parties. As Neumann suggests: “A definition of party might as well begin with its simple word derivation. To become a party to something always means identification with one group and differentiation from another. Every party in its very essence signifies ‘partnership’ in a particular organisation and ‘separation’ from others by a specific programme”.

In order to make the point more clear, it may be pointed out that a political party has a comprehensive connotation to include five determining features. First, a political party is not a loosely knit organisation of some persons. It is required that the members of a political party must be organised on some specific principles (interests) in a tight manner so that the party may be distinguished from some other ‘oligarchical’ entity or entities. Second, there must be close and intimate relationship among all the members of a party. An intermittent relationship between the ‘Lords’ and their ‘vassals’ does not constitute a party in this sense. Third, there must be a clear line of distention between the ‘principles’ and ‘personalities’. Despite the weighty influence of the personalities of a few leaders, the life of the party must not depend upon the life of its leaders. That is, a party is not a firm or partnership which dissolve with the death or going away of its members. Fourth, the leaders of a party must Endeavour and struggle for maximizing their base of popular support and minimizing their circle of decision makers. Finally, the party must observe peaceful and democratic means, as far as possible, to gain power and to implement its programmes for the protection and promotion of their ‘specific’ interests.
Following a number of studies in the late 1960s and 1970s, political scientists have paid little attention to mapping the growth and decline of parties. However, during the past decade, interest in democracy and electoral politics has grown enormously. India's democracy in the 1950s and 1960s was not seriously competitive. Low levels of competition marked elections in this period. The choice was between the all powerful congress and regionally fragmented opposition. Competition increased owing to the greater importance of electoral politics and participation in the 1970s and 1980s. The past decade has seen a participatory upsurge amongst the marginalized sections of society in terms of the caste hierarchy, classes, and gender. The average voter turnout has been within the range of 55 to 64 per cent in ten last eleven general elections between 1962 and 1999. This exceeded the average level in the United States. Even in the first two elections the aggregate voter turnout was as high as 46-8 per cent. More striking, voter turnout for state assembly elections was close to these levels during the same period, surging to 67 per cent in elections held during 1993-6 India is among the few democracies where the electoral turnout of the lower orders of society is well above that of the most privileged sections. This is remarkable in the absence of laws relating to compulsory voting. The possibility that the lower caste person will vote is much higher that for an upper caste person. This has been accompanied by a significant rise in the more active forms of political involvement, such as attendance at elections meetings, membership of political parties, along with a much greater sense of the political efficacy of the vote.

Political change from the 1967 to the 1977 elections increased party competition. Opposition parties formed coalition governments in several states. Both
elections created conditions in which a group of state leaders, popularly known as the Syndicate, comprising K. Kamaraja, Sanjiva Reddy, S. Nijilingappa, S.I. Patil, and Atulya Ghosh, assumed an important role in national politics. The split in 1969 ushered in significant change in the party system. In the 1971 elections Indira Gandhi’s Congress faced a united opposition, and this gave rise to a polarization in which two contending blocs disputed fundamental issues about the nature of the political order. After considerable unrest, Indira Gandhi imposed a national Emergency. The Emergency threatened liberal institutions and affirmed the perception that a crisis of regime had indeed occurred. However, the 1977 elections were the harbinger of a new era in the party system, creating new openings for the opposition parties. This period witnessed an intensification of conflict and competition between political parties.

The Congress’s decline has complex causes. Most striking is the inability of the party to maintain the political bases of its coalition, especially the loyalty of the socially disadvantaged groups. It is true that the Congress party continues to secure support across the social spectrum. From the late 1980s however, the party has found itself hard pressed to command support for its broad centrist and secular appeal in the face of a serious challenge from political formations with sectarian appeals and social bases, such as the BJP, Samajwadi Party (SP), and BSP. New parties, representing the backward and scheduled castes, are regionally concentrated and have strengthened their position at the expense of the Congress. To contend with this challenge, the Congress has needed to revitalize its electoral base, built over the years by representing the needs of different constituencies and groups. Unfortunately, its
dependence on charismatic leadership as means of winning elections has distracted the party from the task of reconstructing its organization. Furthermore, the inadequacy of the Congress practice of socialism and secularism discredited its traditional ideological plank. Once embracing a broad spectrum of ideological, caste, and regional interests, the Congress has lost its authority over the past two decades. Since the late 1980s, it has failed to generate a popular leadership capable of accommodating varied interests and blunting the counterattack of its rivals.

Some of these trends were in evidence as far back as the 1970s but leaders like Indira and Rajiv Gandhi were able to contain them by building coalitions around their own personalities. They reinvented the Congress, but on a different basis from the organizational or ideological configuration of the party in the 1950s and 1960s. In the process, the Congress became a leader dependent force that adhered to the charismatic appeal of the Nehru Gandhi family. This worked so long as the other ingredients of success were in place: its social base in the countryside, its mobilization through populist slogans, and well-oiled party machine.

Not being tied to any particular group or region, the Congress enjoyed a distinct advantage over sectional and regional parties. It is still the party that manages to garner the largest amount of support from the underprivileged. This support, however, comes to the Congress by default and is not the outcome of a systematic effort to create a counter bloc of the underprivileged, or to build a social coalition based on social democratic politics. Moreover, the advantage has been greatly reduced by the salience of the state level as the substantive arena of electoral choice.
over the past decade. In many a local or regional contest, community or caste based mobilization tactics may be more effective in garnering support than a catch all strategy. Besides the Congress does not any longer pull in the lower castes and classes in sufficient numbers, into its ambit, having to count with left and left of centre parties that possess greater influence among these groups. Yet, the Congress is still quite capable of winning elections: the results of the 1998 assembly elections and its success in the Karnataka assembly elections in 1999 testify to that. Nonetheless, is has been indisputably dislodged from its position of preeminence at the Centre.

With the BJP’s emergence as the dominant party, though it is not yet an all India party, scholarly interest in Hindu nationalism has increased, generating considerable debate about the character of the BJP. Scholars are asking whether the ideology it represents is part of wider struggle to reconstitute India in accordance with Hindu consciousness and identity. They are concerned about its assertion of Hindu power over other communities. Most accounts concentrate on the implications of the BJP’s rise to national power on the political system. They have commented on its interpretation of secularism, minority rights, democracy, and the proposal to establish a presidential form of government. Scholarship on the BJP can be divided into two broad groups. The first group comprises those who believe the BJP is a right wing party underpinned by an aggressive, homogenizing Hindu nationalism committed to rewriting history by distorting the principal plank of the post Independence project of secularism, nationalism and democracy. Scholars in the second group believe that the BJP cannot pursue this agenda and it will have to adjust to the pluralism of Indian society; a pluralism that compels parties to move towards the centre.
Clearly, there are tremendous pressures for moderation that all extremist parties confront once they come to power. The BJP is not exempt from such powerful pressures. In the short run, moderation is necessitated by electoral calculations and the compulsions of coalition politics. In electoral terms, its militant strategy of ethno-religious mobilization of the 1980s paid rich dividends to the party. However, after the demolition of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya in December 1992, the BJP’s vote share did not increase substantially. Its core support, accounting for 85 per cent of its total Lok Sabha seats, came from the three Hindi hearland states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh plus the three western states of Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Rajasthan. In these states the pro-Hindu rhetoric has huge appeal. This rhetoric, however, has few takers in the south and the east, which the BJP has to penetrate in order to be a serious contender as the ruling party in New Delhi. Therefore, in the 1998 and 1999 elections, the BJP moderated its stance and was then able to broaden its electoral base, both spatially and ethnically, by aligning with regional parties. This moderation was manifest in the National Agenda of Governance, which dropped four controversial issues: building a temple at Ayodhya; enacting a uniform civil code; abolishing the National Minorities Commission; and abrogating Article 370 of the constitution, which allows greater autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir. Most of the BJP’s allies in the 1999 election were regional parties, of which only the Shiv Sena could be described as a like minded right wing party. Initially, the BJP was not comfortable with the idea of coalitions, but it has rapidly demonstrated its willingness to enter into power sharing arrangements with regional parties at the national level. Since 1998, most regional parties at the national level. Since 1998, most regional leaders have backed the government headed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee. In 1996, by
contrast, nearly all the major regional parties had joined hands to keep the BJP out of power. Alliances have helped the geographical expansion of the BJP, to the extent that by the end of the 1999 elections it had an electoral presence in most states, Kerala being one of the exceptions.

Socially too the BJP has come a long way from being a Brahmin Bania party. In its rise to power, it has created a new social bloc, a coalition of various groups, whose claim to power is based on 'a new kind of majoritarianism,' which is not simply Hindu majoritarianism. However, this social bloc has supported the NDA coalition, which includes regional parties that have regularly reaped low caste support, and not the BJP as such. The BJP’s own social support is much more elite dominated both in terms of the caste and class hierarchy. Besides, Muslims are not yet part of the BJP’s social constituency though the party is trying to woo them. The election of Bangaru Laxman, a Dalit from Andhra Pradesh, as the party president in August 2000 who was subsequently replaced by Jana Krishnamurthy after the Tehelka scam, is evidently designed to widen its support among the Dalits. This might not however be all that easy; its efforts to win over OBCs, Muslims, and Dalits will alienate its upper caste base, the mainstay of the party. This strategy, which was epitomized by the appointment of the OBC leader Kalyan Singh as chief minister of Uttar Pradesh in 1991 and again in 1997, resulted in the consolidation of the upper caste lobby and damaged the further expansion of the party in Uttar Pradesh. Nonetheless, religion is not the principal axis in the construction of the new bloc. A convergence of caste community and class distinctions, and an overlap of social and economic privileges have formed the new social bloc. This convergence is reflected
in its support base in the last two elections. The BJP obtained more votes from the privileged sections of society: upper caste rather than lower caste, rich rather than poor, men rather than women, more educated rather than less educated. Its support among the lower castes and minorities is more limited.

While there is no real dilution of the BJP’s social agenda, its policy of economic nationalism has been completely reversed. The renunciation of swadeshi or economic nationalism constitutes the biggest shift in BJP policy. Wedded to swadeshi for the past five decades, the BJP led NDA government, after just two years in office, has proved to be the most enthusiastic about liberalization and globalization of the economy, and the process has sought to appease foreign investors, rather than the party’s swadeshi lobby. Equally significantly, the nuclear policy has been pursued vigorously. The 1998 manifesto promised that it would resume nuclear testing begun by Indira Gandhi in 1974. the BJP government, after less than three months in office, ordered the Pokhran tests on 11 May 1998. it went ahead with the bomb in order to build its political constituency. None of this indicates that the BJP is obliged to stay moderate in power. Similarly controversial issues could force themselves back to their agenda when the party needs to consolidate its support.

In the longer run, therefore, the deeper issue is how moderate should we expect the BJP to remain if it wins a majority in Parliament and can form a government on its own? Is it possible for the BJP to transform itself into a liberal right of centre party, yet at the same time be linked to the RSS fraternity This is the central issue of Indian politics today. An answer to this question must take into account the
uniqueness of the BJP. Among political parties, the BJP is atypical. It has enduring
ties with a range of allied organizations, chief among them being the RSS and the
VHP. It functions as a party a movement, and government at the state and nation
level. Neither the RSS nor the VHP have given up the Hindutva agenda; indeed they
regularly reiterate their commitment to it, but they have not mounted pressure on the
government for its fulfillment. That Vajpayee managed to distance his government
from the Sangh’s clutches during his second term in office was largely due to his
popular appeal. This does not however mean that the BJP has liberalized itself from the
RSS. The three most important leaders of the BJP, which include Prime Minister
Vajpayee, Home Minister Advani, and Human Resources Development Minister
Murli Manohar Joshi, are close to the RSS. Moreover, the RSS knows that its electoral
success and its ability to forge strategic alliances are due to Vajapayee’s leadership.
Furthermore, the RSS has accepted the compulsions of coalition politics and the
attendant moderation in the BJP in view of the political protection offered by the BJP
government to its activities. This helped the RSS to exert and extend its influence
within state and society as it has been doing over the last few years.

There have been major debates among scholars about the significance of
language, region, class, caste, community, and ethnic conflicts in Indian society and
politics. Conventionally, political discourse on ethnic categories had focused on
language and region. After Independence, linguistic identities, culminating in the
reorganization of the states, occupied centre stage. Many of the Congress leaders
feared that the linguistic division of states would lead to secession from the Union,
and the nation would thus disintegrate. That fear has largely proved to be groundless,
but the formation of linguistic states has nonetheless reinforced the cohesion of regional identities. These are expressed by the formation of parties such as the DMK and AIADMK in Tamil Nadu, the Telugu Desam in Andhra Pradesh, the Akali Dali in Punjab, the Asom Gana Parishad in Assam, and the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra.

Numerous interpretations of Indian politics have argued that social differences associated with the process of economic and political development have provided political parties with either the organizational or numerical support to win majorities in elections. More specifically, it is assumed that the nature of the party system typically mirrors the complexity of social cleavages along lines of religion, caste, language, and region to produce a multi party system. Social cleavage theory has had a significant influence on the perception of links between the social structure and party politics in India. One major weakness of this theory, however, is that it disregards the role of human agency. It simply derives divergence of interests from existing social divisions, without asking why particular differences are important or become influential only in some regions or why specific cleavages should be politicized in certain situations and what role political actors play in this process. This aspect is singularly important as India's diversity yields a variety of social differences, and these differences can form the basis of very different kinds of parties and distinct party systems at the national and state levels, depending upon the patterns of political mobilization and organization. Social differences that emerge in the course of economic development and state formation become cleavages as a result of political and electoral mobilization. Parties perform an extremely important role in forging links between social classes, caste groups, and party systems.
The contrasting trajectory of the communist parties that came to power in Kerala, West Bengal, and Tripura stresses the significance of political organization and mobilization in determining the relative salience of social cleavages on patterns of voting and party strategies. The CPI(M) has established an impressive support base in these three states by focusing on distributive policies and radical reforms, rather than the politicization of caste differences. Sustained land reform measures and democratically elected Panchayats have tilted the balance of power in favour of the rural poor in West Bengal, and this has helped the CPI(M) to build a wide circle of social and political support. This has enabled the regime to remain in power for twenty five years. As in most other states, the propertied classes remain dominant in the sphere of production, but unlike other states, they do not control political power. The case of the Left parties is important because it illustrates the very different party played by parties in political, and pluralist, mobilization.

By contrast, in north and north-western India party strategies politicized caste differences and newly politicized groups made their presence felt through such parties. Particularly significant has been the role of middle and rich peasants and lower and backward castes, traditionally ignored by the Congress, who have in recent years thrown their weight behind the opposition parties. Leaders of lower castes, starting with Charan Singh's Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD) in the mid 1960s, later began to organize their own parties to gain greater representation and power for their caste groups. Among these parties, the BSP has attracted considerable academic attention. The party commands strong support among the scheduled castes and rural and urban poor in several states of north India. Significantly its support structure is
the direct opposite of the BJPs. Several recent studies focus on ethnic identification, ethnic mobilization, or caste conflict to explain the BSP phenomenon. In South India, pro backward case parties, such as the TDP, DMK, and AIADMK, have held sway in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu for a much longer period.

The picture that emerges is of an intense power struggle in northern Indian unleashed by the entry of lower castes into the political world. As elections have gained in importance, levels of political participation have climbed. Data on participation shows that more important than the increase in the overall voter turnout, is the change in the social composition of those who participate in political activities. Expanding participation has placed the poor and the downtrodden groups in the caste, class, and gender hierarchy, at the centre of the political system. In the early years after Independence, Congress party leaders used patronage networks to build vote banks among low castes and minorities to win majorities. This rainbow coalition dampened class conflict, thus politicizing other social identities. Indeed the Congress systematically tried to bury the class issue, and its brand of accommodation was a major obstacle to the cross caste mobilization of the poor and disadvantaged. It preempted the emergence of radical movements by making religion, caste clusters, or tribal groups the primary identity through which economic discontent was articulated.

All these changes have altered India's party system, and the transformation has been far reaching. Two developments stand out. First, there is no longer one party dominance. The period from 1967 to 1977 witnessed the passage from one party dominance to a multi party system. Second, several states have moved towards a two
party system, through the two parties vary from state to state. This change, evident since the 1989 elections, may mark the beginning of a new era in the party system.

The fragmentation of the Congress coalition into upper case, backward case, Muslim, and Dalit groups led to a redrawing of the relationship between social cleavages and political loyalties. It opened up the possibility of the mobilization of both the privileged and the underprivileged. The privileged have indeed been brought together under the BJP banner of ethno nationalism, while the underprivileged have been fragmented by their failure to forge a social bloc to counter the privileged sections. The most obvious reason for this is the emergence of sectional parties that represent distinct social constituencies which are difficult to unite and bring together into a political coalition or alliance.

One of the catalysts in the formation of these parties is the decline of Congress domination and the inability of the BJP to fill the vacuum. In consequence, caste and class clusters that were once part of the Congress coalition have found a voice through other parties. This process was advanced by the implementation of recommendations of the Mandal Commission. The rapid mobilization of socially underprivileged groups has resulted in a realignment of political parties along states, sub state, and caste lines, creating conflict amongst them and with the upper castes. The heightened caste and communal competition provoked by the combined effect of Hidutva and Mandal has radically changed the social map of politics. This trend has become increasingly evident at the national level since 1989 when state based parties joined together to form a minority National Front government led by the Janata Dal. Attempting to offer
a broad based centre left alternative to the Congress, the Principal ideological plank of
the National Front was the propagation of social justice and the advancement of the
interests of backward castes and minorities. However, social justice became
synonymous with caste politics, and this led to the party’s fragmentation.

The Congress that once commanded overwhelming majorities in the Lok
Sabha has lost its hegemonic position. Its continuing decline has however been
obscured as the party returned to office in 1991 to form a minority government, and
then with the help of pre poll and post election allies, was able to govern as a majority
party until 1996. it has however ceased to be the natural party of governance. The
1999 election, the third in as many years, was held after the AIADMK withdrew
support from the BJP led government in April 1999. in the elections that followed the
Congress national vote level increased to 28.5 per cent but its seat tally was reduced
to the smallest ever, down to 114 seats from the 141 it won in the 1998 election. The
factors responsible for the poor performance of the Congress were the manner of the
dissolution of parliament, its inability to form an alternative government, and its
lukewarm response to the Kargil conflict. The success of the armed forces in
repulsing the Pakistani intrusion in Kargil helped the BJP to win back the support it
has lost in the 1998 assembly elections. Serious difference between the Congress and
Samajwadi party (SP) frustrated the Congress hope of forming a government. Even
so, the BJP on its own was not able to increase its seats, and in terms of vote share it
actually lost nearly two percentage points, declining from 25.6 per cent in 1998 to
23.7 per cent in 1999. However, people still believe that congress has charm and can
do the magic.
Political developments over the last decade make it clear that Indian Politics now has a strong lower class thrust. This development in combination with the increased influence of regional and state based parties mirrors a paradigm shift in politics. Today, both regional and state based parties are contenders for power in all states and are talking the language of Development. In fact Bihar elections have shown that this debate on development is a sure path to success.

As a result today more and more political parties are favouring this path. As a result one finds that ‘urbanization’ is increasingly becoming a reality Karnataka is no exception to it.

During the last few decades, India has undergone a dramatic demographic shift; its predominantly rural population has been rapidly urbanizing, and over 300 million Indians now live in cities. India still has the world’s largest rural population, but by 2040 or so, it will be home to the world’s largest urban population. Karnataka has followed this national trajectory closely, led in particular by the spectacular growth of its capital city, Bangalore. During 1991-2001, urban Karnataka grew more than 2.5 times as fast as the rural areas. The future of Karnataka will increasingly be determined by the economic and social well-being of its cities.

The urbanization of the state has thrown up a number of challenges. The redistribution of political power away from the villages, the migration of large numbers of people to cities (including from other states), the changing nature of the new economy, the threats to the environment and the character of old cities, are all issues
that we must grapple with and overcome equitably and sustainably. While some efforts, both at the Center and the State level, have been made to meet these challenges, through legislation (primarily the 74th constitutional Amendment and its several Schedules, and more recently the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal mission) as well as administration, there is much more that remains to be done.

Thus, India’s urban population is growing at an average rate of around 3 percent per annum. It has almost doubled during the period between 1981 and 2001 from 160 million to 285 million. The average rate of growth of the urban population is not expected to change significantly during the next twenty years. Assuming a decadal increase of around 37%, India’s urban population is expected to be around 540 million during 2021. In terms of percentage of total population, the urban population has gone up from 17% in 1951 to 29% in 2001 and is expected to increase up to around 37% by the year 2021. Consequently, the number and size of cities have also increased considerably.

During the 1990s 68 million people joined the ranks of urban dwellers which implies a slower decadal growth of 31 percent when compared to the growth of 36 percent during the 1980s. Although urbanization has slowed down in India during the 1990s, the number of metropolitan cities those with a million plus population has increased over this period. From 23 in 1991, the number of metropolitan cities rose to 35 according to the Census of India, 2001. India’s metropolises grew rapidly during the 1990s with Surat registering the fastest growth of 85.1 percent followed by Faridabad (70.8 percent), Nashik (58.8 percent), Patna (55.3 percent), Jaipur (53.1
percent), Delhi (51.9 percent), Pune (50.6 percent), and Indore (47.8 percent). The overall decadal growth rate of the 35 metropolises worked out to be around 34 percent, which is higher than urban India’s growth of 31 percent. India’s big cities now account for a larger share of total urban population a trend that has been observed since Independence. In 2001, the share of metropolitan cities was 37.8 percent, up from 32.5 percent in 1991 and 26.4 percent in 1981.

The pattern of urbanization has many distinguishing characteristics. There is a great variation across states. The range is from around 8% for Himachal Pradesh to around 35% for Maharashtra. Many factors contribute to this variation. Transport is one of them. It is interesting is high indicating a positive correlation between urbanization and economic development.

The distribution of urban population by city size widely varies and is skewed towards larger cities. One specific feature of India’s urbanization is the increasing metropolitanization, that is, growth in the number and size of cities with a million plus population. The trends indicate the continued urbanization and metropolitanization in the years to come.

The urbanization pattern and trends raise a number of issues. There is a debate as to whether it is an index of development or distress. The very process of urbanization has often been considered as something undesirable. While the objections used to be on social and moral grounds, the criticism lately is more on economic grounds such as provision of requisite infrastructure and civic amenities at
rapidly escalating per capita costs. Despite all the objections, the rate of urbanization has not even slowed, not to speak of its being halted. A certain inevitability about the process is being accepted steadily. It is felt that urbanization is necessary for the benefits of sharing modern technology for the growth and development of the entire national economy. In India, urban areas contribute nearly 60 percent of the national income. It is expected that they will assume greater economic importance in the coming years.

Until recently policies towards urban areas have often been apologetic. The focus has been on rural areas where the poorest of the poor were said to live, and from where, it was argued, agriculture led growth must emanate. It was also argued that cities should be restricted in size, and action to tackle their problems should be limited to avoid increasing their attraction. This strategy was directed to limit migration towards cities and their by promoting growth and balanced development of the country. Several facts revealed the weaknesses of this approach, which lead to a reappraisal of the strategy. It is clear that the ambiguity, which often underpinned discussion on urban policy, is presently undergoing rapid change towards a new and positive stance.

This study has had its part of experience in understanding this at the grass root level. The inference of this study is presented below keeping in view the theme for research investigation, the research questions raised, the objectives and hypotheses stated. Some suggestions also have been attempted which may seem to be out of box expressions. There are no doubt certain limitations for the theses too. It is however,
attempted here in this work to reduce or restrict such limitations as consciously as possible.

**Inference of the Study:**

Inference in this study is the result of a comparison made between two districts in Karnataka the purpose of the comparison was to understand the rate of influence of Political Parties on the process of urbanization and vice-versa. Reasons for choosing these districts was primarily the researchers convenience (hails from Davanagere) and their location from the capital. If Davanageere is the representative sample of central Karnataka, Belgaum represented the border district. Davanagere is a model urban centre within Karnataka while Belgaum for Political reasons not yet fully blossomed in its capabilities as a district while it has an urban elite population and culture. Davanagere for all practical purposes has a more homogenous population while Belgaum has a mixed culture and migratory population. So like this, there are many distinctive characters and certain similarities.

Politically speaking both are pre-active Davanagere being a bastion on Congress, is dominated by feudal, single family predominance. While BJP has made in roads in to ti. Belgaum on the other hand represents a multi vingual, competitive politics with various linguistic minorities and Kannada forces contending both local and other elections. Party politics in that sense in both the districts is quote vibrant and needs further probe.
Having taken these two districts for a comparative study and treating them as cases for study a common questionnaire served for all the respondents. Consolidated analysis of the same is presented in this chapter with the support of the notes made and observations of the researcher. Inference drawn therefore have the effects of all this and at times helped in bringing out the destructiveness of the district too.

1. The respondents in both the districts understand clearly the need for development and have a clear perception of it with 42% preferring basic services and 26.33% preferring economy generating activity for their districts.

2. They were clear that development was equally a product of Modernity, economic progress, Decentralization and democratization with 30% opting for all of the above 20% however preferred only economic activities, 15% modernization and democratizations equally.

3. Nearly 57% agreed to the fact that Development brings about change 43% had deferred opinion.

Having agreed to these basis, 57% of the respondents looked towards political activities and political parties as indicators of ‘change’. 27.67% identified demographic changes as an indicator of change. In other words urbanization as a process has made them understand the indicators.

4. It is as noted in the objective the Perception of the people that urbanization as a process would lead to change is conceived or understood by them in a multi
dimensional manner. This includes, investment in urban areas, migration, organized services etc.

5. Urbanization in India as per latest study (2010-11) is said to be growing at a phase of 30 plus percentage and is expected to reach 50% by 2020 Although, this study did not any measurement of it, it was revealed from the perception of the respondents and officials that the demand for urbanization has actually accelerated with nearly all the population in the district demanding for change.

6. It is clear from this study that the political parties are aware of this demand and have effectively formulated their strategies to work towards urbanization. 44.33% endorsed the preparedness of political parties to work for urbanization. 27.07% agreed that they were actually articulating it at appropriate bodies where they represent. While 22.33% of the population said, that they were aware of the role of political parties in this direction the role of political parties in this direction.

7. This indicates the fact that parties have carved a role for themselves and socialized it adequately.

Once again, it must be confessed that this study did not go it to qualifying the rate of involvement of political parties in urbanizing direction but, qualified themselves as working satisfactorily towards it.

This way, the objectives of this study is meaningfully achieved.
8. Further, Nearly 66.33% agreed to the fact that political parties in their districts worked towards urbanization, and they took specifically Congress and BJP as having such a vision. Of the tow they endorsed 'Congress' as a party which is having its leadership abilities in this direction and prioritized it as the primary party.

9. The central issue of this thesis the linkage or the relationship between political parties and the process of urbanization, which is also the very first hypothesis, that there is a linkage between the process of urbanization and the role political parties have, there was 26.67% response. However, the respondents felt that this relationship was mostly in terms of economics like attracting more investment for the district. Same 26.67 also favored strengthening of democratic institutions which is other words would strengthen the 'role' political parties have 20% each favored civil society and political parties as having concern for urbanization. 6.7% felt parties, were already mobilizing funds. 26.67%+20%+6.67 thus, make 53.34% favoring our hypothesis which can be argued as proved or in favor.

10. with regard to the activities of political parties in terms of aggregating and articulating the people’s interests and aspirations, the inference we could draw about their functioning is rather very satisfactory. Nearly 60% of the respondents felt, that party functioning is their districts as being satisfactory.

11. It was also Identified and inference drawn from field evidence, that most of the political parties in these two districts were urbanization friendly. 37.33% felt, that the party organization at the district level was responsible for this. 31.33% felt that it was membership of the party that made it urbanization.
friendly. 25% argue that it was the economy of the party that supported its urbanization friendly attitude. 6.33% were of the opinion that the political base decided its priority vis-avis urbanization.

12. Their Identification Congress and BJP Urbanization friendly parties is noteworthy here.

13. most of the political parties were active even local government level in pushing the agenda of urbanization (29.33%) vouched for it) 17.67% looked at parties upward relation as being friendly to promote urbanization.

14. Urbanization is also seen by Political Parties as infrastructural development an the district. 27.67% felt that it was a job satisfyingly done by the political parties an both the districts. 22.33% felt, bringing urbanization issues before various committees was also a job done seriously by political parties.

15. What is role worthy here is the belief of respondents that national parties contribute to urbanization more than regional political parties 46.67% favored it 26.67 preferred regional political parties in this direction. And 86.67% felt that this was a mutually beneficial activity.

To characterize urbanization, our inference is that, respondents did not take to the Idea that industrialization alone as urbanization (57% did not) while 43% only agreed (16)

Political parties in their opinion was an essential tool to deal with the complex administration of urban areas.
16. In case of adequate measure of reform require by the local administration to cope up with urbanization and its challenge, the respondents noted with regrets that political parties not doing much about it (57% regret), 43% argued that parties had done enough, but failed to show any evidence to that effect.

17. The model of urbanisation preferred by both the districts was that of Bengalooru with 66.67% opting for it. Only 6.7% preferred Mumbai and Delhi.

18. The respondents agreed to the fact, that glboalisation had influenced both the demand for and processof urbanization (66.67%). Their argument swore further strengthened by their examples of new districts formed during Sri J.H.Patels government in state and their progress, 20. It is inferred through this study that urbanization in any case was not mechnical growth but a ‘choice’ made consciously with a role for political party in it to further it and sustain.

Thus, the above inference have clearly shown us that the hypotheses drawn are almost fully supported by our evidence. The one weak link of these hypotheses is the belief that was there at the beginning of the study, that there is a need to enhance the role of political parties in selting agenda and direction for urbanization.

In the result of our study above stated ‘role for political parties’ is defeated as they are already playing a vital role. But for this revelation, the study is in favor of the hypotheses drawn.
Suggestions;

Suggestions for this study are not many one important reason for this is the very nature of this study. It is a case study, empirical in nature and definitely not prescriptive. Yet an attempt is made to make very few suggestions to political parties in their role to urbanize.

1. Involvement of civil society in Political decision making is rarely seen. There is a need to work towards this.

2. Political parties need to exercise greater vigilance when it comes to agenda setting through their manifestoes keeping their operational levels in focus.

3. Political parties, despite being pro-active in urbanization with also have to work towards greater transparency, accountability, vision documents and administrative reforms.

4. Irrespective of Political parties- cadre based formations must be concentrated so that the designing of development (planning) and its implementation is with in its reach.

5. Political parties must realize that the process of urbanization is not mere economic expansion or politically progressive, but it is environmentally disturbing. As a cantion; the political parties it is suggested must work save any degradation of the environment.

6. Urbanization leads to expansion of slums and encourages migration. Political parties have a major role to play is restraining both mesa urbanization without anticipating its ill effects would be naïve.
7. Lastly, both the process of urbanization and the agents of it, in this study, political parties must work towards inclusive growth and not let a bulk of its population, to suffer ‘urban neglect’ or create urban corners, thereby losing out the gains of political economy.

Thus, this study after its empirical evidence concludes with the following theories.

“That the Political Parties are important agents of Urbanizing in India and that, they are mutually beneficial to administration and civil society”

“That Party Politics if democratized tends to provide greater input to the process of urbanization”

“Hasened process of urbanization throws up challenges to political parties for both policy output”

That, the process of urbanization if non-inclusive leads to greater division in terms of class among social groups, thus causing harm to the process of development”

Lastly, the process of urbanization and political party activities if not coherently or chartered can be catastrophic to the urban population lending itself to misery, inequality, poverty, exploitation and pollution.
End Notes:

7. Burke, E. 'Speech to the Electors of Bristol', in E. Burke, Select Works of Edmund
9. Ibid.,
16. Ibid.,