Political parties are central to India political life. Their role in political mobilization, governance, the formulation and implementation of economic and social policy, ethnic conflict, separatist movements, and the working of democracy has long been the focus of analysis. Their centrality arises from the fact that they are the key link between individual and state, and state and society as stated earlier. Political parties provide the crucial connection between social process and policy makers, and influence debates and policies on issues affecting the interests of various social groups in the political system. As more and more people participated in the democratic process, competitive politics and the party system have undergone a major change over the past two decades. The Congress and the ruling BJP led National Democratic Alliance face dissension at all levels extending from differences between the BJP and organizations it is affiliated with, such as the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS) and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), and between the party and its coalition partners.

To understand the significance and implications of these developments, many of which are spurred by electoral and political change, it is useful to distinguish two important phases in the development of the party system. Dominance of one party, moderate level of political participation, and elite consensus characterized the first
phase. This has given way to a second phase of greater democratization and the opening up of the political system to non-elite participants. The latter has resulted in the unfolding of unexpected political patterns. These include the replacement of the Congress system with multi-party competition, an intensification of party competition, the fragmentation of parties and emergence of coalition politics. Particularly significant is the decline of one-party dominance, the rise of the BJP as the single largest party in Parliament, and the advent of coalition politics. Coalition governments have come into their own because the last five parliamentary elections have failed to produce a single party majority. Equally important is the democratic upsurge amongst the hitherto underprivileged sections of society and their perceptible influence on the working of democracy and political institutions.

Two issues are particularly vital. The first concerns the effect of institutional variables, principally, the electoral system and federalism, on the party system. The second pertains to the role of social cleavages, more precisely, the relationship between social cleavages and political mobilization. These shifts raise number of questions of general interest for students of Indian politics. What are the conditions under which parties and party system change? How has the party managed to cope with social change? How do we understand the contemporary party systems and its impact on democracy?

The Indian National Congress was unique amongst the Third World parties in dominating, almost without coercion, a competitive multi-party system. Most accounts of the Congress party from 1947 to 1964 emphasize the role of Jawaharlal.
Nehru in the construction of a high modernist India in which the state would assume charge of economic development and nation-building activities with an appeal to the ideas of socialism, secularism, federalism, and democracy. Nehru dominated the Congress party from 1951 when he successfully moved against its conservative president, Purshottam Das Tandon. Under Nehru's leadership, the party built upon the nationalist legacy in three ways: its development of party organization, its accommodation of diverse interests, and its relationship with other parties. Dominance by a single party coexisted with inter party competition, but the opposition parties had little prospect of replacing the Congress, except in a few states. Its success was attributed to the elaborate party structure and extensive patronage networks. This helped the Congress to appeal to the vast middle ground of interests and values. Internally, it was a grand coalition of major social and political forces held together by its image as the party that won India independence and popularity of leaders like Gandhi and Nehru, as well as a very large number of provincial leaders who had participated in the national movement and had managed the party organization at the state level. Ideologically, the party was centrist, committed to democracy, minority rights, secularism, a centralized form of federalism, and mixed economy. Institutionally, the Congress system was a hierarchical organization radiating downwards from the central to the provincial and district levels, each level working in consonance with the corresponding level of government. However, this system began to crumble as the Congress electoral fortunes deteriorated after 1967. The problems facing the Congress were partly symptomatic of the growing democratization of traditional power relations throughout society and partly the result
of its own actions, such as the failure to create a rational basis for generating a new leadership through political institutions.

There also began a period of acute instability in the party system. By the end of Indira Gandhi’s life, the political landscape had changed unequivocally. The legislative majorities won by the Congress under her leadership were not used to implementing the radical policy promises made by her. This weakened the government, and in the long run the party’s massive support drained away. Under both Indira Gandhi and her son Rajiv, the organizational decline of the Congress was precipitous. Electoral majorities, such as the record breaking success in the 1984 elections in the wake of Indira Gandhi’s assassination coexisted with structural decay and decadence. By the late 1980s there was a political vacuum in Indian politics. The Congress still remained the only party able to command support in every region of the country, but its share of the vote declined dramatically. not long after, it lost its parliamentary majority. This premier party with its nationalist orientation, broad social base, and a modicum of social cohesion, had begun a long decline.

Politics of Coalitions

The intensification of competitive politics has changed the party system from being a rivalry between national parties into one between alliances and coalitions of national and state parties. The nineties have witnessed a succession of minority or coalition governments. The Governments formed in 1989, 1990, 1991, 1996, 1998, and 1999 were coalitions of several parties. The BJP led government formed in 1999
is he eighth since 1989. In 1996, a fourteen party United Front government was formed, which was supported by the Left parties. It relied on the Congress to offer support from outside the government, with the aim of preventing the BJP, the largest party in parliament, from coming to power. The minority coalitions in 1989 and 1996 were toppled when their supporters outside the government, the BJP and the Congress respectively, withdrew support, whereas the 1998 coalition government fell after the AIADMK, a member of the coalition, withdrew support. The last two elections have seen the formation of four successive governments with a total of 25 parties contributing to governmental majorities, either as coalition partners or as supporters of minority governments from outside. Many small parties have acquired disproportionate influence because the few seats they held were crucial to forming a government. Even the smallest of parties, even ones with a member or two, can drive hard bargains with the larger parties, which need their support either for a majority or to shore up regional bases. Party divisions in Tamil Nadu exemplify the process. With Dravidian ideology in retreat, many groups that formerly supported the Dravidian movement have formed parties of their own. The Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, Pattali Makkal Katchi, the Tamilzhaga Rajiv Congress, ad Puthiya Tamizhagam are breakaway groups from the DMK and AIADMK; the Tamil Manila Congress broke away from the Congress party.

Trends in the last few elections suggest that a parliamentary majority is difficult to achieve in normal elections. Notwithstanding the BJP's claim that it favors coalitions, even if it wins a majority on its own, its long term political project demands a decisive majority so that it can reduce its dependence on other parties and
can pursue its core policies. The Congress has not been able to win an electoral majority since 1984. Still, the party has not given up the hope of attaining a single party majority in the Lok Sabha. Even some of the most ardent Congressmen acknowledged at a brainstorming camp in Panchamarhi in October 1998 that there are some regions, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar, for example, where the Congress has little alternative but to ally with state based parties, if it wants to come to power. Yet, the central Congress leadership perseveres with the policy of assailing regional parties as the principal obstacle to single party rule.

While coalition governments have become the order of the day, capacity to govern. Parties and politicians have changed their loyalties so rapidly that sustainable coalition building has proved impossible. The formation of four governments and the necessity for three general elections after 1996 raised ungainly apprehensions of instability and lack of governance. The twelfth Lok Sabha lasted a mere thirteen months, arousing anxiety about its impact on economic development. Political stability remains elusive because of the shifting calculations of rival parties in the political arena, which raises doubts about the viability of coalitions in a situation of rapidly changing alliances.

Party politics in India has confronted numerous challenges. Not only has the Congress system destroyed itself, but the fragmentation of the Congress coalition has triggered a new emphasis on self-representation which raise questions about the party system and its capacity to accommodate diverse interests, and also form stable state and national coalitions. An important test facing the polity is to evolve a party system
or political parties that can effectively articulate and aggregate a variety of interests. This requires parties to project broader appeals.

The democratic ideal is strong parties with well developed political identification, programmatic goals, and organization. These are rare everywhere. In India, numerous small parties have emerged principally vehicles for influential and charismatic leaders to gain power. Such leaders rarely advocate the institutionalization of parties, because parties as institutions constrain individual discretion and the personal power of charismatic leaders. Leaders of such parties, some of which may be little more than pressure groups, tend to avoid membership of umbrella coalitions and aspire to wield direct power to maximize their own influence and that of their constituencies. Well developed parties often emerge from below. The growth of the two communist parties and the DMK, AIADMK, k Telugu Desam, and BSP indicate this possibility. However these parties are confined to a few states. Furthermore, not all parties from below become institutionalized. On the contrary, leaders like Mayawati in Uttar Pradesh, M.G. Ramachandran in Tamil Nadu. N.T.Rama Rao in Andhra Pradesh showed no interest in promoting the institutionalization of their parties. This is true of national leaders too: Indira Gandhi destroyed the Congress as an institution. The development of the Congress after the 1969 split was in sharp contrast to its organizational development in there Independence period.

With all their deficiencies, India’s myriad political parties have played a crucial role in organizing a competitive multi party based democracy and in forming
representative party based governments, thus avoiding the challenges of non party, plebiscitary democracy, and strong executive leadership grounded in populist authoritarianism. Parties remain the best means of ensuring that government has a popular basis and social conflicts are mediated and settled within a process of accommodation and compromise. Even frequent elections have not alienated the majority of voters: to the contrary, they appear to give the mass of voters a sense of control over government. None of this, of course, minimizes the seriousness of the dilemmas facing India's political parties and the political system. The overriding problem is the persistent inability of governments to deliver on their promises, and the inadequacies of parties in responding to the preference of all its citizens. Yet, despite the erosion of the institutional edifice of democracy, which so preoccupies intellectuals generally, and political scientists in particular, the Indian electorate to judge by its 60 per cent turnout in national elections appears satisfied with the extraordinary range of choices that the parties offer.

There is consequently an urgent need for rebuilding, both within individual parties and in relations among them. Since his election victory in the last week of 1984, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi has begun, somewhat hesitantly, the process of rebuilding within the formal institutions of state. He has also, at least for the time being, restored a modicum of civility to relations between his ruling Congress-I party and the opposition, and this has in turn led to an improvement in relations between the central government in new Delhi and opposition controlled governments at the state level. Rajiv Gandhi has also indicated, through scorching criticisms, that he is well aware of the wretched condition of his own party. But he may also have missed his
opportunity to rebuild it. If that is indeed true, then he could eventually experience the kind of vulnerability that caused him and his mother before him to seek all out confrontation with opposition parties. It could even lead civilian elites to abandon hope in parties and in open, competitive politics.

In comparison with the experience of Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, democracy in India has proved to be resilient. This despite the fact that the preconditions which Western scholars often associated with democracy homogeneous population, an industrial economy, high levels of education, and shared civic culture were absent in the India of the 1950s. Yet, democracy, in India has not only endured, it has grown. Apart from the brief interlude of the Emergency from 1975 to 1977, democratic institutions have remained intact; thirteen parliamentary elections and many more assembly elections have been conducted. Turnouts for elections to parliament and to state assemblies have risen steadily and significantly. Governments have taken major policy initiatives, and parties have alternated in power through the electoral process. The democratic process has deepened with new social groups entering the ambit of the political system represented by new parties like the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) embodying the interests of the Dalits. Parties in general have played a critical role in the democratic process, especially in drawing historically disadvantaged section of society into the political system.

As system, the Indian system is distinctive. Certainly, it does not correspond to its European and American counterparts. Writing about it, Paul Brass noted the difference: 'party politics in India display numerous paradoxical features, which
reveal the blending of Western and modern forms of bureaucratic organization and participatory politics with indigenous practices and institutions, India's leading political party, the Indian National Congress, is one of the oldest in the world, yet it has not succeeded in providing the nucleus for an institutionalized party system which can be fitted easily into any one of the conventional categories of party systems known in the West. At a broader level, Rajni Kothari highlighted the distinct features of the Indian political system, and profiled an Indian model of democratization, which he argued should not be assessed by any supposedly universal (or Western) criterion. The Indian party system is indeed complex, and an important reason for the complexity is the social heterogeneity that has made it impossible for a single set of parties to emerge across the country. This is reflected in the variegated character of Indian political parties. The Congress, established in 1985, continues to occupy a place in the national political arena. The 1980s witnessed the emergency of Hindu nationalism and the right wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) around which the ruling coalition currently revolves, and these coexist with the world's longest surviving democratically elected Communist government at the state level. Unfortunately, Indian historians tend to focus exclusively either on the north or the south of India, thus demonstrating a lack of national perspective or even expertise a failing which is of critical importance in the understanding of urbanization processes in both the ancient and medieval periods.

Town planners were a rarity in India before Independence, but after 1947 their number and their contribution to the study of urban development problems has been phenomenal, particularly since the 1960s. However, studies by town planners in India
have two major failings. Firstly, town planners rarely step out of the metropolitan 
fringe of the million cities into the arena of the small cities and towns; secondly, they 
are too deeply rooted in western town planning notions to begin to understand the 
Indian reality. Too much emphasis on the western art of town planning, focusing on 
law, regulation, land zoning, beautification and landscaping have left the Indian city 
folk bewildered at what is being done for them. Standards and norms, imported 
wholesale from the West, have no relevance in a country with an entirely different 
cultural and economic setting. In recent times, there has been discussion on the need 
to change the norms and standards to suit Indian conditions. However, what is 
actually needed is a break from the western approach to towns. Such a development is 
perhaps in the offing, if the experience of hundreds of town planners who have been 
seasoned under Indian reality in the various state town planning departments is 
reflected in the thinking of the articulate town planners.

Party Politics in India: A Cursory Glance

Therefore an elucidation of party politics in India should begin with an 
understanding of the role of political parties in democratic systems generally. Parties 
are undoubtedly essential to the functioning of democracy; they perform varied 
functions within and outside the realm of politics. Their leadership and policies, 
internal practices, and the patterns of interaction with other parties and institutions can 
have profound consequences for the system of governance. As a keystone political 
institution in representative regime, the modern political party regularly fulfils three 
critical functions: nominating candidates for public offices; formulating and setting
the agenda for public; and mobilizing support for candidates and policies in an election. Other institutions perform some of these functions too. What, however, distinguishes parties is their emphasis on linkage. Parties are seen, both by their members and by others, as agencies for forging links between citizens and policy makers. Their raison d'etre is to create a substantive connection between the ruler and ruled.

Following a number of studies in the late 1960s and 1970s, political scientists have paid little attention to mapping the growth and decline of parties. However, during the past decade, interest in democracy and electoral politics has grown enormously. India's democracy in the 1950s and 1960s was not seriously competitive. Low levels of competition marked elections in this period. The choice was between the all-powerful congress and regionally fragmented opposition. Competition increased owing to the greater importance of electoral politics and participation in the 1970s and 1980s. The past decade has seen a participatory upsurge amongst the marginalized sections of society in terms of the caste hierarchy, classes, and gender. The average voter turnout has been within the range of 55 to 64 per cent in ten last eleven general elections between 1962 and 1999. This exceeded the average level in the United States. Even in the first two elections the aggregate voter turnout was as high as 46-8 per cent. More striking, voter turnout for state assembly elections was close to these levels during the same period, surging to 67 per cent in elections held during 1993-6 India is among the few democracies where the electoral turnout of the lower orders of society is well above that of the most privileged sections. This is remarkable in the absence of laws relating to compulsory voting. The possibility that
the lower caste person will vote is much higher than for an upper caste person. This has been accompanied by a significant rise in the more active forms of political involvement, such as attendance at elections meetings, membership of political parties, along with a much greater sense of the political efficacy of the vote.

Not being tied to any particular group or region, the Congress enjoyed a distinct advantage over sectional and regional parties. It is still the party that manages to garner the largest amount of support from the underprivileged. This support, however, comes to the Congress by default and is not the outcome of a systematic effort to create a counter bloc of the underprivileged, or to build a social coalition based on social democratic politics. Moreover, the advantage has been greatly reduced by the salience of the state level as the substantive arena of electoral choice over the past decade. In many a local or regional contest, community or caste based mobilization tactics may be more effective in garnering support than a catch all strategy. Besides the Congress does not any longer pull in the lower castes and classes in sufficient numbers, into its ambit, having to count with left and left of centre parties that possess greater influence among these groups. Yet, the Congress is still quite capable of winning elections: the results of the 1998 assembly elections and its success in the Karnataka assembly elections in 1999 testify to that. Nonetheless, is has been indisputably dislodged from its position of preeminence at the Centre.

Doubtless, the compulsions of power and the demands of running a coalition government, obliged the BJP to adopt moderation. L.K.Advani observed that the moderate phase began in 1996 when the BJP failed to form the government. The party
had to tone down emotive identity politics in order to make alliances. Thus, for the BJP, coalition strategy is both an ideological and managerial challenge, which consists of harmonizing ideology with the quest for power. The former BJP president, Kushabhau Thakre, attributed the BJP’s growth to its ability to adjust to new situations. To avoid conflicts with to temper its distinctiveness. However, even while grappling with the tensions of coalition politics, the BJP has not deviated from its core commitments, adopting policies that will eventually bring the state government closer to the politics of Hindutva. Most remarkable is the systematic effort to safronize the bureaucracy, educational institutions, and the media. Above all, there has been the vilification of minorities. Despite its protestations to the contrary, BJP has not been able to contain the extremist elements in the Sangh Parivar. The deal between the BJP government and the VHP in Gujarat in December 1999 culminating in laying the foundation stone of the Ram temple in Haldim, a tribal and Christian village, was reminiscent of similar arrangement that led to the demolition of the Babri mosque. Prime Minister Vajapayee has struggled to distance his government from the political compulsions of the Hindutva agenda and move in the direction of consensual governance.

While there is normal dilution of the BJP’s social agenda, its policy of economic nationalism has been completely reversed. The renunciation of swadeshi or economic nationalism constitutes the biggest shift in BJP policy. Wedded to swadeshi for the past five decades, the BJP led NDA government, after just two years in office, has proved to be the most enthusiastic about liberalization and globalization of the economy, and the process has sought to appease foreign investors, rather than the
party's swadeshi lobby. Equally significantly, the nuclear policy has been pursued vigorously. The 1998 manifesto promised that it would resume nuclear testing begun by Indira Gandhi in 1974. The BJP government, after less than three months in office, ordered the Pokhran tests on 11 May 1998. It went ahead with the bomb in order to build its political constituency. None of this indicates that the BJP is obliged to stay moderate in power. Similarly controversial issues could force themselves back to their agenda when the party needs to consolidate its support.

In the longer run, therefore, the deeper issue is how moderate should we expect the BJP to remain if it wins a majority in Parliament and can form a government on its own? Is it possible for the BJP to transform itself into a liberal right of centre party, yet at the same time be linked to the RSS fraternity. This is the central issue of Indian politics today. An answer to this question must take into account the uniqueness of the BJP. Among political parties, the BJP is atypical. It has enduring ties with a range of allied organizations, chief among them being the RSS and the VHP. It functions as a party a movement, and government at the state and nation level. Neither the RSS nor the VHP have given up the Hindutva agenda; indeed they regularly reiterate their commitment to it, but they have not mounted pressure on the government for its fulfillment. That Vajpayee managed to distance his government from the Sangh's clutches during his second term in office was largely due to his popular appeal. This does not however mean that the BJP has liberated itself from the RSS. The three most important leaders of the BJP, which include Prime Minister Vajpayee, Home Minister Advani, and Human Resources Development Minister Murli Manohar Joshi, are close to the RSS. Moreover, the RSS knows that its electoral
success and its ability to forge strategic alliances are due to Vajapayee's leadership. Furthermore, the RSS has accepted the compulsions of coalition politics and the attendant moderation in the BJP in view of the political protection offered by the BJP government to its activities. This helped the RSS to exert and extend its influence within state and society as it has been doing over the last few years.

The BJP's more astute leaders, as well as other anxious to retain their hold on power, realize that if the party is to usurp the role of the Congress, it will have to prove that it is not a sheep in wolf's clothing. This is however an uphill task because the party is the political outgrowth of an extremist right wing ideologically motivated movement. given that many of its party cadres come from the RSS and its affiliation to the RSS VHP network has proved decisive in its growth, the BJP cannot afford to break its links with the RSS. Therefore, moderation can change the agenda of the BJP led NDA government, but it cannot modify the fundamental character of the BJP, unless there is a change in its relationship with the RSS. The BJP and its, ideological forbears have not had a consistent record. In the late 1960s the Hindu Right embarked upon anti cow slaughter agitation then went through a moderate phase in the 1970s, only to return to militancy in the 1980s, and again back to moderation from 1996. There is little reason to believe that it has settled once and for all into a moderate mould.

Over the past decades, political parties have organized along socio economic fault lines rather than linguistic divides, promising to provide a new dynamic to Indian democracy. The link between ethnic cleavages and the party system is evident
from the increased role of caste and community identity in politics, and this has motivated considerable research on the construction of political such identities. The argument has centered on two issues. One has been the impact of ethnic mobilization on mass political sentiments, political partisanship, and changes in voting patterns. The other is the impact of the processes of mobilization on the emergence of an inclusive political arena. These identities have helped the rise of regional, communal, and caste parties. A recent study of Dravidian parties demonstrates that the internal pluralism of parties, and not simply social pluralism, promotes greater representation of emergent groups, the reconstruction of public culture, and tolerance. This is explained through a distinction between organizational pluralism and social pluralism, arguing that social pluralism does not preclude the growth of non pluralistic parties. Parties like the BJP can grow in pluralistic societies, but since they lack internal pluralism, they can sideline pluralistic forces. By contrast, internal pluralism within India’s communist parties has facilitated social pluralism and democracy.

There have been major debates among scholars about the significance of language, region, class, caste, community, and ethnic conflicts in Indian society and politics. Conventionally, political discourse on ethnic categories had focused on language and region. After Independence, linguistic identities, culminating in the reorganization of the states, occupied centre stage. Many of the Congress leaders feared that the linguistic division of states would lead to secession from the Union, and the nation would thus disintegrate. That fear has largely proved to be groundless, but the formation of linguistic states has nonetheless reinforced the cohesion of regional identities. These are expressed by the formation of parties such as the DMK.
and AIADMK in Tamil Nadu, the Telugu Desam in Andhra Pradesh, the Akali Dal in Punjab, the Asom Gana Parishad in Assam, and the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra.

Numerous interpretations of Indian politics have argued that social differences associated with the process of economic and political development have provided political parties with either the organizational or numerical support to win majorities in elections. More specifically, it is assumed that the nature of the party system typically mirrors the complexity of social cleavages along lines of religion, caste, language, and region to produce a multi-party system. Social cleavage theory has had a significant influence on the perception of links between the social structure and party politics in India. One major weakness of this theory, however, is that it disregards the role of human agency. It simply derives divergence of interests from existing social divisions, without asking why particular differences are important or become influential only in some regions or why specific cleavages should be politicized in certain situations and what role political actors play in this process. This aspect is singularly important as India's diversity yields a variety of social differences, and these differences can form the basis of very different kinds of parties and distinct party systems at the national and state levels, depending upon the patterns of political mobilization and organization. Social difference that emerge in the course of economic development and state formation become cleavages as a result of political and electoral mobilization. Parties perform an extremely important role in forging links between social classes, caste groups, and party systems.
The contrasting trajectory of the communist parties that came to power in Kerala, West Bengal, and Tripura stresses the significance of political organization and mobilization in determining the relative salience of social cleavages on patterns of voting and party strategies. The CPI(M) has established an impressive support base in these three states by focusing on distributive policies and radical reforms, rather than the politicization of caste differences. Sustained land reform measures and democratically elected Panchayats have tilted the balance of power in favour of the rural poor in West Bengal, and this has helped the CPI(M) to build a wide circle of social and political support. This has enabled the regime to remain in power for twenty five years. As in most other states, the propertied classes remain dominant in the sphere of production, but unlike other states, they do not control political power. The case of the Left parties is important because it illustrates the very different party played by parties in political, and pluralist, mobilization.

Studies of left parties are concerned with the origins, dilemmas, and outcomes of Left movements. They have focused their attention on the ideology, leadership, and organization of the CPI (M) and its pursuit of incremental reforms within the constraints of a democratic capitalist framework and the predicament about using parliamentary means to achieve radical reform. What has attracted the greatest attention is the resemblance between the CPI (M) and social democratic parties in Western Europe. Examining the extent to which the CPI (M) is a social democratic party might help in mapping the conservative or radical direction of its policies, but will not illuminate the institutional reconstruction undertaken by Left parties in
achieving radical change within the existing structural conditions. These include initiatives in the areas of decentralization, federalism, and land reforms.

By contrast, in north and north-western India party strategies politicized caste differences and newly politicized groups made their presence felt through such parties. Particularly significant has been the role of middle and rich peasants and lower and backward castes, traditionally ignored by the Congress, who have in recent years thrown their weight behind the opposition parties. Leaders of lower castes, starting with Charan Singh's Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD) in the mid 1960s, later began to organize their own parties to gain greater representation and power for their caste groups. Among these parties, the BSP has attracted considerable academic attention. The party commands strong support among the scheduled castes and rural and urban poor in several states of north India. Significantly its support structure is the direct opposite of the BJPs. Several recent studies focus on ethnic identification, ethnic mobilization, or caste conflict to explain the BSP phenomenon. In South India, pro backward case parties, such as the TDP, DMK, and AIADMK, have held sway in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu for a much longer period.

The picture that emerges is of an intense power struggle in northern Indian unleashed by the entry of lower castes into the political world. As elections have gained in importance, levels of political participation have climbed. Data on participation shows that more important than the increase in the overall voter turnout, is the change in the social composition of those who participate in political activities. Expanding participation has placed the poor and the downtrodden groups in the caste,
class, and gender hierarchy, at the centre of the political system. In the early years after Independence, Congress party leaders used patronage networks to build vote banks among low castes and minorities to win majorities. This rainbow coalition dampened class conflict, thus politicizing other social identities. Indeed the Congress systematically tried to bury the class issue, and its brand of accommodation was a major obstacle to the cross caste mobilization of the poor and disadvantaged. It preempted the emergence of radical movements by making religion, caste clusters, or tribal groups the primary identity through which economic discontent was articulated.

The fragmentation of the Congress coalition into upper case, backward case, Muslim, and Dalit groups led to a redrawing of the relationship between social cleavages and political loyalties. It opened up the possibility of the mobilization of both the privileged and the underprivileged. The privileged have indeed been brought together under the BJP banner of ethno nationalism, while the underprivileged have been fragmented by their failure to forge a social bloc to counter the privileged sections. The most obvious reason for this is the emergence of sectional parties that represent distinct social constituencies which are difficult to unite and bring together into a political coalition or alliance.

One of the catalysts in the formation of these parties is the decline of Congress domination and the inability of the BJP to fill the vacuum. In consequence, caste and class clusters that were once part of the Congress coalition have found a voice through other parties. This process was advanced by the implementation of recommendations of the Mandal Commission. The rapid mobilization of socially underprivileged groups
has resulted in a realignment of political parties along states, sub state, and caste lines, creating conflict amongst them and with the upper castes. The heightened caste and communal competition provoked by the combined effect of Hidutva and Mandal has radically changed the social map of politics. This trend has become increasingly evident at the national level since 1989 when state based parties joined together to form a minority National Front government led by the Janata Dal. Attempting to offer a broad based centre left alternative to the Congress, the Principal ideological plank of the National Front was the propagation of social justice and the advancement of the interests of backward castes and minorities. However, social justice became synonymous with caste politics, and this led to the party’s fragmentation.

The Congress that once commanded overwhelming majorities in the Lok Sabha has lost its hegemonic position. Its continuing decline has however been obscured as the party returned to office in 1991 to form a minority government, and then with the help of pre poll and post election allies, was able to govern as a majority party until 1996. It has however ceased to be the natural party of governance. The 1999 election, the third in as many years, was held after the AIADMK withdrew support from the BJP led government in April 1999. In the elections that followed the Congress national vote level increased to 28.5 per cent but its seat tally was reduced to the smallest ever, down to 114 seats from the 141 it won in the 1998 election. The factors responsible for the poor performance of the Congress were the manner of the dissolution of parliament, its inability to form an alternative government, and its lukewarm response to the Kargil conflict. The success of the armed forces in repulsing the Pakistani intrusion in Kargil helped the BJP to win back the support it
has lost in the 1998 assembly elections. Serious difference between the Congress and Samajwadi party (SP) frustrated the Congress hope of forming a government. Even so, the BJP on its own was not able to increase its seats, and in terms of vote share it actually lost nearly two percentage points, declining from 25.6 per cent in 1998 to 23.7 per cent in 1999. However, the BJP led alliance won the election with a coherent majority. This was due not to the acquisition of new mass support by the BJP but to new allies. The big winners were parties such as the TDP, Trinamool Congress and the Biju Janata Dal. This is evident from the decline of BJPs share of seats from 73 per cent to 61 per cent.

All these changes have altered India's party system, and the transformation has been far reaching. Two developments stand out. First, there is no longer one party dominance. The period from 1967 to 1977 witnessed the passage from one party dominance to a multi party system. Second, several states have moved towards a two party system, through the two parties vary from state to state. This change, evident since the 1989 elections, may mark the beginning of a new era in the party system.

Political developments over the last decade make it clear that Indian Politics now has a strong lower class thrust. This development in combination with the increased influence of regional and state based parties mirrors a paradigm shift in politics. Today, both regional and state based parties are contenders for power in all states except Gujarat, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh. However, the lower caste politics of both the backward caste and Dalit variety is often more focused on local issues and sectional claims. The lower caste parties do not even attempt cohesion of
competing claims and are thus unable to federate as political force at the national level.

Through a conjunction of these processes the creation of new parties and groups and their particularistic strategies parties have increasingly fragmented over the years. Frequent party splits, mergers, and counter split significantly increased the number of parties in the national arena. In 1952, 74 parties contested in the national elections, while in 1998 the number had risen to 177. Single and multi state parties accounted for as many as 220 seats in 1998, and dominated governments in eastern and southern India. The state based parties had increased their share from 8 to 19 per cent of the vote. Two factors have contributed to the multiplication of parties. One has been the growing power of regionalism and regional parties and the other the intensified pursuit of political power rather than disagreement over principle. This explain the fracturing of the Janata Dal in 199, the formation of the NCP on the eve of the 1999 elections, and splits in the Congress and the BSP in Uttar Pradesh in 1998.

Thanks to India's social diversity and to the first past the post electoral system, a nationwide two party system has not emerged. At the national level, the BJP and the Congress have dominated the electoral contests in 1998 and 1999, obliging the regional parties to regroup around them and to coalesce into two distinct blocs: the BJP and its allies on the right and the Congress party and its allies in the middle. Regional parties such as the TDP, DMK, BSP, SP, and the Left parties retain significant influence and support in several states. At the national level, the organized expression of the 'third front' in the form of the 1996 United Front, a conglomeration
of centre left parties, has disintegrated, and most of its constituents have allied with the BJP. The fragmentation of the United Front has benefited both the BJP and Congress.

The 1990s were characterized by the emergence of the state as the effective arena of political competition. The first five general elections yielded one party dominance in which the Congress received over 40 per cent of the vote, while the second largest party could win only 10 per cent. With the exception of the 1967 elections, the pattern in the states was similar, with Congress dominating the state arena as well. In 1977, the Congress lost power to a coalition of opposition parties, but the same coalition did not rule all the states. There is now a two level party system in which the state pattern differs from the national pattern. Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh, Orissa, and Andhra Pradesh have two party system's the pattern is however different in Maharashtra, Haryana, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, West Bengal, and Tripura which have evolved a bipolar system, in which a number of parties are clustered at each pole. A third type of multi party system now obtains in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Karnataka. The 1999 elections indicate some change in this pattern, with both Bihar and Karnataka moving in the direction of bipolarity as parties converged around two poles: the BJP and its allies on the one hand and the Congress on the other. A different kind of change has occurred in Maharashtra and West Bengal, Congress splitting to give rise to the NCP in Maharashtra and the Trinamool Congress in West Bengal respectively. This pattern reveals multiple bipolarities, with different pairs of parties/alliances controlling difference states.
We are not ready to support a Third Front, Fourth Front or whatever it is called. We will not give our support to anybody else, declared Sonia Gandhi when she failed to cobble together a minority government with outside support after the defeat of the Vajpayee government on 17 April 1999. The decision not to back a Third Front, which would have included the possibility of a government headed by Jyoti Basu, was based on a refusal to accept the need for coalitions at the national level. Paradoxically, the decision of the SP to block the formation of a minority Congress-led government fortified the party's determination to secure a single party majority. Time and time again the Congress party has turned its back on coalitions. Convinced about the inherent instability of coalitions, especially an omnibus coalition of the BJP kind, the Congress made an alternative offer: the cohesion and stability of single party rule. Thus the Congress did not commit itself to alliances and searched for a majority of its own. Moreover, the Congress leadership still believes that the Indian electorate has limited faith in coalitions, owing to their repeated failures to continue in power. Persistent conflicts between coalition partners have rendered them unworkable from governance. This calculation formed the bedrock of its electoral strategy in the 1999 elections. All that the Congress offered were state specific electoral adjustments. The party's ambivalence towards coalitions stems from its conception of itself as a coalition of varied interests. In his presidential address at the 1997 plenary session in Calcutta, Sitaram Kesri cryptically dismissed the idea that coalitions are here to stay, observing that the Congress itself has been the most successful coalition. He failed to add that whereas the Congress was a successful coalition from 1947 to 1974, since then it has failed to keep the coalition intact.
The decline of one party dominance is no longer in dispute. The question of interest is how to characterize the current party system. Are we moving from catch all Congress system to a new type of multi party system or a two party system. As argued earlier, there is no pronounced tendency towards a two party system at the national level. What has emerged is a multi party system with two alliance structures at each end and several state based and small parties that are free floating. A mix of bipolarity and multiplicities distinguishes the state level.

The Congress party, an inclusive, dominant party, designed to cross cut ethnic, class, and caste divisions, dominated the first phase of the party system. By contrast, the BJP and a form of sectarian politics dominate the second phase that draws on the cleavages of caste, class, and regional, which overlap. If social integration and coalition building based on a social welfare programme was the objective of a Congress style centrist party, the principal goal of the emerging party system is to secure material and political benefits for particular groups an/or regions. Yet, because it heads a coalition of 23 parties BJP's politics is not simply caste based or community based.

This past decade has seen a sharp rise in political mobilization on the basis of ethnic identities. North Indian politics epitomizes this trend apparent in the emergence of more or less homogeneous parties of the OBC strata and Dalits, and politics in Uttar Pradesh exemplifies the new pattern. Once dominated by the centrist politics of the Congress, new electoral majorities have been built up, with statewide jati clusters constituting the primary social bloc for political mobilization. This occurred in
1989-91 when the Congress vote share dropped 10 percentage points (from 29.7 per cent to 17.4 per cent) and when the Janata Dal, SP and BSP between them managed to garner 40 per cent of the vote. The key to this transformation is the virtual disappearance of the Congress, and its replacement by the BJP, SP, and the BSP. In contrast to the Congress, these parties represent specific social groups, namely the upper, backward, and scheduled castes. However, even in Uttar Pradesh it has not been simply the replacement of a non ethnic had invoked caste and community identities in its political campaigns in the past. Rather, the important change is in the type of ethnic politics that now dominates the political arena. Whereas for the Congress non ethnic interests were combined with ethnic appeals and issues, the three parties mentioned above have made appeals to ethnicity the centerpiece of their political campaigns.

While the new caste and communal militancy has generated several arenas of conflict between upper caste and OBCs and thus might be expected to lead to a hardening of efforts to convert ethnic majorities into permanent majorities, this has not happened. One reason is the size and heterogeneity of the country’s constituencies. India’s electorate of about 600 millions is divided into 543 constituencies, fewer than those of the British House of Commons. The large heterogeneity of constituencies aids mobilization along multiple cleavage lines. However, heterogeneity does not stop parties from making efforts at playing on such cleavages as those between Hindus and Muslims to their advantage. Clearly, the existence of cross cutting cleavages did not discourage the BJP from mobilizing along the Hindu Muslim cleavage in the 1989-92 period. Other parties also make use of the
cleavages of caste and region. Yet, people do not vote exclusively on the basis of their caste or community. Even in circumstance when such interests become paramount, as during the Hindutva and Mandal controversies, a healthy concern for party programmes, policies, and economic interests balanced them. Furthermore, caste is associated with class. On a range of policy issues there are no significant differences between upper and backward castes per se. in fact intracaste difference are likely to outweigh inter caste differences. The difference reflects their different class positions. The key variable is not always caste or community but the perception that a particular party will promote the voter’s economic and social well being. This can be seen from the effect of class and caste affiliation on the BJP vote. It is evident from the tendency of scheduled caste and OBCs to favour the BJP. As they climb up the social ladder. The class base of the BJP vote is perhaps more significant than its caste base, but the BJP is not caste based or class based in any simple reductive sense. Rather, it represents a bloc of caste class privilege.

By contrast, after its inability to secure a majority to preserve its thirteen day government in May 1996, the BJP chalked out a diametrically opposite strategy. It stepped up the search for regional allies. It forged an 18 party alliance for the 1998 election, but even so failed to win a majority. However, after the election it cobbled together a majority by getting the support of the Telugu Desam and the National Conference. For a short period from 1996 to 1998, the influential secular/communal divide shaped coalition building and the choice of alliance partners. The Janata Dal, Left parties, and a number of regional parties formed the government at the Centre, supported by the Congress from outside, in order to keep the BJP out of power.
However, the unity of secular forces proved to be short lived. It was confined to the United Front government’s term in office, and proved inadequate when pitted against the attractions of anti Congressism. The Congress/anti Congress divide, a legacy of our decades of Congress dominance, proved stronger than the ideal of secular unity in determining alliances. More crucially, anti Congress helped the BJP to marshal support from state based parties, which were bitterly opposed to the Congress. Even Left parties, such as The Revolutionary Socialist Party and Forward Bloc, and parties such as the SP resolutely opposed the idea of a Congress led government.

Intense political competition encourages parties to constantly search for new support and thus prevents the growth of centrifugal tendencies in Indian society. Even the BJP cannot afford to parentally exclude other social categories, including Muslims. Because of the heterogeneity at the national, state, and constituency levels, political parties have to appeal to groups not previously part of their core constituency. Hence most parties, including parties of the Right, are under pressure to adopt broad based strategies. In deed the growth of the BJP over the past decade indicates that even a right wing party committed to Hindu majoritarianism cannot disregard, at least in the short run, the pressures India’s diversity places on all political parties. Its new social support among the OBCs and its expansion in south India testifies to the tendency of crowding around the middle to gain new support. Another factor contributing to the continued relevance of the centrist option is the enduring influence of the Congress. The Congress though not dominant, is still strong enough to ensure the continuance of centrisim. This means that the party will not be torn asunder by a typically Left Right ideological or ethnic polarization.
Political Parties today;

Political systems in which diverse parties compete freely for mass electoral support are increasingly hard to find in the less developed nations, even in those that experienced British rule for a long time thought to yield durable systems of liberal, representative government. But India, after nearly four decades of self government and eight general elections, and despite hair raising traumas and persisting threats to open, competitive politics, still qualifies. Nevertheless, in recent years, decay within parties and increasingly destructive conflict among parties have so eroded the strength of the open political system that its survival is in question.

At first glance, it may seem that few dramatic changes have actually occurred within and among India’s parties. It may appear that the victory of the Congress party in the 1984 general election closely resembles all but one of those that have come before the aberration being 1977 and that one need only dust off and update the classic studies of the party system that Rajni Kothari and W.H. Morris Jones produced some years ago. To adopt that view, however, is to overlook a number of basic changes in Indian politics over the last two decades that have substantially altered conditions within parties, relations among parties, and partly because parties are provided the main links between state and society, state society relations. Some of these changes were disguised by the result of the 1984 election, but they remain realities nonetheless.
There is a great deal of concern about the decline of parties, much of the disquiet centering around the growth and limitations of certain kinds of parties, notably caste based parties, rather than the decline of all types of parties. Attention must also be paid to developments in all types of parties that have proved detrimental to the system. Among these are factionalism, corruption, personality rule, and lack of inner party democracy. To these may be added the lack of proper organization, intolerance of the opponent’s point of view, evasion of accountability, and undue influence exerted on public officials by party functionaries. In consequence parties have not acted as effective agents in evaluating and resolving policy problems and in maintaining the stability and coherence of the political system in the long run. All this has buttressed dissatisfaction with governments, whatever their stripe.

Multi party democracy appears to have struck deep roots in India. In most states, the levels of political participation have risen, and in some states they have reached the levels of continental Europe. The persistence of a democratic political system and a competitive party system through five decades, notwithstanding the presence of politically active caste, religious communities, and tribes, challenges the long held view that consider individual rationality and aggregation of individual interests essential for the maintenance of the institutions of democracy. The relative success of democracy in India despite so much poverty, illiteracy, and inequality imply that high level of economic development is not a prerequisite for the sustenance of democracy. On the contrary, India’s experience suggests that representative institutions can function in a country composed of states with a wide range and levels of economic and social development. These include states predominantly agrarian and
poor, as well as states with varied cultural characteristics. At the same time, the Indian experience also brings to mind the tension and pressures in building a stable and accountable system of government; one capable of radical change in a society that is marked by acute economic and social disparities.

To emphasize the changes that have taken place, this paper is divided into four sections that deal with the three main phases in the evolution of India's parties and party systems the periods from 1947 to 1960, from 1967 to 1977, and from 1977 to 1984 and the year following the election in the last week of 1984. It is not yet clear whether this last period should be seen as a fourth distinct phase in the process, but enough has changed since the election to justify a separate discussion.

To understand India's parties and party system from Independence in 1947 to 1967, just after Indira Gandhi first became prime minister and the year of the fourth general elections, we can do no better than to turn to the accounts that Kothari and Morris Jones have provided. Their views are sufficiently similar, though they are developed independently, to be considered together here. They described a 'dominant party system, that is, a multi party system, in which free competition among parties occurred but in which the Indian National Congress enjoyed a dominant position, both in terms of the number of seats that it held in Parliament in New Delhi and the state legislative assemblies, and in terms of its immense organizational level that was more important, for on that rested its legislative superiority. The might, the reach, and the subtlety of its organization also enabled it to dominate the actions of bureaucrats who
were charged with the implementation of policies and laws at regional and, especially, at sub regional levels.

In this first period, India had a party system characterized by 'dominance coexisting with competition but without a trace of alternation, because opposition parties had little hope of preventing the Congress from obtaining sizable majorities in the legislatures despite the ruling party's failure on most occasions to gain a majority of the valid votes caste. Neither, by and large, did opposition parties share power in coalitions with the Congress at the state level. So here was a competitive party system. In which the competing parts play rather dissimilar roles. The ruling Congress party was a party of consensus and the opposition parties were parties of pressure. That is to say, the opposition parties played a role that was quite distinctive. Instead of providing an alternative to the Congress party, they function by influencing section within the Congress. They oppose by making Congressmen oppose. Groups within the ruling party assume the role of opposition parties often quite openly, reflecting the ideologies and interests of other parties. The latter influence political decision making at the margin.

In other words, there was a most important openness in the relations between Congress and the other parties. A positive communication and interaction between them. This meant that the main hope that opposition leaders had of exercising political influence was that opposition leaders had of exercising political influence was to address themselves to like minded... groups in the dominant party. Those efforts by opposition groups generated ideas and pressure within the ruling party's organization,
which was sophisticated enough to detect them and communicate them upward to the leaders who could respond to them.

These comments begin to reveal the extraordinary dimensions of Congress dominance in that period. It was within the Congress, and not between the Congress and the opposition parties, that the major conflicts within Indian politics occurred. It was within the Congress that nearly all of the groups that mattered in Indian politics could be found. The party possessed a large number of skilled operative who were able to arrange bargains between important social groups, to interpret the logic of politics at one level of the system to people at higher and lower levels, and to knit together the varied regions and subcultures of the subcontinent. The Congress organization was also the main instrument that knit together state and society, which is to say that it was India's central integrating institution. As a consequence, one did not find in India, as in the West, a relationship between the government and the party organization in which the latter plays an instrumental and subsidiary role. Congress was more important than the, and arguably more important than all of the formal institutions of the state put together.

The Congress occupied not only the broad centre of the political spectrum, but most of the left and right as well. This relegated the opposition parties not only to the margins of the Congress, but to the margins of the political and party systems as well. To make matters worse, these parties often found themselves on opposite sides of the Congress, which killed any hope of their making common cause against it. To save themselves from absorption by or the loss of defectors to the Congress, opposition
parties tended to develop rigorous ideologies and tightly disciplined organizations.

The Congress was able to maintain its position as a party occupying most of the space in the political system because there was plurality within the dominant party which made it more representative, provided flexibility, and sustained internal competition. At the same time, it was prepared to absorb groups and movement from outside the party and thus prevent other parties from gaining strength. The task of creating and sustaining the immensely broad Congress coalition in that first phase was, at least in the view of Morris Jones, facilitated by the complexities and ambiguities of Indian society, which prevented polarization (in class terms or any other terms) and the formation of contradictions that might fracture such an all-embracing alliance of interests. This insight differs from but complements Myron Weiner’s argument that the task of building the Congress coalition was eased by traditional values and role of conciliation that Congressmen astutely took up, and the Rudolph’s contention that traditional elements of the caste system assisted the development of modern representative politics in India.

But however much the social background may have helped, and however important the role of the Congress in the winning of independence may have been in placing the party in a dominant position in the first place, the survival of Congress dominance depended on the efficient functioning of the party organization. Of crucial importance was its effectiveness in distributing the resources, which it acquired from its control of state power, among existing and potential clients in exchange for their
political support. This management of resources, at which many within Congress organization excelled, was essential to the proper functioning of the conciliation machinery with the Congress, at various levels and for different tasks, which was almost constantly in operation, mediating in factional disputes, influencing political decisions in the States and districts.

The same skill at allotting patronage also enable the Congress to co-opt and absorb within itself groups whose grievances had been ventilated through agitations launched by the opposition parties. This was reinforced by Congress policy of neutralizing some of the more important sources of cleavage and disaffection and by the leaderships tendency to preserve democratic forms, to respect the rule of law, to avoid undue strife, and to show great sensitivity one the question of respect for minorities.

The second phase extended from 1967 to the defeat of the Congress party at the general election of 1977, which occurred in the immediate aftermath of the Emergency. It is of course possible to see the Emergency, which extended over nineteen months from 26 June 1975, as a separate phase in this story. But a paper length study cannot do justice to a more elaborate desegregation. It is nevertheless worth noting that the Emergency constituted both an intensification of certain trends from the period between 1969 and 1975 and, at the same time, something of a hiatus between phases two and three, during which opposition leaders were jailed, the party system and open politics were closed down, even Congress leaders were intimidated,
and Mrs. Gandhi attempted only partly successfully, to centralize power within the ruling party.

Some of the earliest and most perceptive comments on the party system between 1967 and 1977 came from studies by Morris Jones and Kothari after the 1967 general election, which occasioned important change. One important feature of the old system that persisted was, in Kothari’s words, the central role of the Congress in maintaining and restructuring political consensus.

As a result, the dominant party model has started to give way to a more differentiated structure of party competition.

Moris Jones also emphasized the emergence of a market polity in India. This was, of course, nothing very new. There was plenty of competition and bargaining before 1967. But it has taken place largely within the Congress, between groups and in semi institutionalized from. In the 1967 election, however, which saw the Congress lose power in six states, the competition had grown too server to be contained by the party’s internal bargaining so that dissident Congressmen played an important role in the weakening of the party in perhaps every lost State except Tamil Nadu. This brought a number of opposition parties fully into the market place, and competition that had previously occurred within the Congress was now brought into the realm of inter party conflict. Competition also increased inasmuch as opposition parties formed coalition governments in every state they controlled except Tamil Nadu, and coalition governments are themselves small markets.
The 1967 election also made Centre state relations an important feature of inter party competition. Bargaining had long been an important element of relations between New Delhi and the states, even in Nehru's days when Congressmen held sway at both levels. After Nehru's death, the power of the state level Congress leaders had become both greater and more apparent. The 1967 election created conditions in which quite serious conflict might have arisen between the Centre and the states, but, thanks mainly to the finesse of Union Home Minister Y.B. Chavan, this did not occur.

Another new phenomenon after 1967 was a pretty regular and continuous defector market. It is easy to forget that this was so, for our minds tend to rush onward to the dramatic splitting of the Congress in 1969 and Mrs. Gandhi's subsequent surprises, which gained her the political initiative and the great election victory of 1971. But defection was an important element in the aftermath of the 1967 election, and two points should be made about it. First, defectors flowed both ways, both into and out of the Congress. More flowed out, however, than in causing the fall of Congress governments in three states. Second, the highly disciplined, ideologically oriented parties of the Marxist left and the Hindu chauvinist right remained immune to this new trend. (The Communists experienced a split over ideological issues in 1969, but that was different from defection.

In other words, the parties to the far right and left tended to remain hard in that they retained tough shells through which people did not pass in and out, and in that they maintained their organizational integrity through centralization, discipline, and ideological consistency. They also retained narrower social bases than most of the
other parties in that period and narrower bases than the Communist Party of India (Marxist) CPI(M) and the Jana Sangh/Bharatiya Janata party (BJP) have developed in the post 1977 years. They nonetheless moved very cautiously along the road to more moderate policies, a road down which, as Stanley A.Kochanek observed, other opposition parties were motoring once the possibility of power presented itself.

The 1967 election had created a situation in which the Congress dominance was strikingly diminished because its performance in the art of governance was subjected to harsh judgment by supporters and opposition alike. It was a situation marked by ambiguity, blurred lines, flexibility and flux..., but this was not seen to represent disintegration. Indeed, the actors in the system had adjusted with such amazingly little difficulty that the stability of the regime appears more assured than ever before. This was true because the regime had, among other things, moved away from any degree of dependence of one outstanding leader. If this raised questions about the need for clarity and firmness of decision, it was reassuring inasmuch as decisions also require reconciliation of very varied interests if they are to succeed.

The schism in the Congress in 1969 was a major shock to the political system in India. Partly as a result, Mrs Gandhi’s election of 1971. B.D.Graham has compared the polarization of India’s parties into something close to two opposing blocks in 1971 (and 1977) to a few key elections in the Third French Republic when similar polar blocs emerged. This did not occur often in France, but when it did, it indicated that a crisis of regime had developed and that the two blocks were disputing fundamental issues about the nature of the political order. Mrs. Gandhi’s decision to
spoil her country's central political institution produced such conditions, in India in 1971, conditions that altered the shape of the party system at that election. This happened again in 1977 when the threat to all liberal institutions created a widely shared perception that a 'crisis of regime had occurred. Such perceptions did not arise among most opposition leaders in 1980, as I have argued elsewhere, or in 1984.

Mrs Gandhi's victory in the 1971 election made it appear, in words Morris Jones used soon afterwards, that the end of the dominant party had been too readily proclaimed in 1967, and that now it is back. This led him naturally to expect that the opposition parties would be forced to operate less by mass. Confrontation that by interaction with segments of the centre mass. They were not however, given many opportunities for interaction by the new Congress Mrs Gandhi adopted a more confrontational posture, both towards opposition parties at the national level and towards opposition controlled governments in various states. She also took a more aggressive line with her own party, and this son produced what Kochanek has rightly called a new political process as the prime minister created a paramedical decision making structure in party and government although this prevented threats to her personal power, it tended to centralize decision making. Weaken institutionalization, and create an overly personalized regime. Moreover, the new political process proved unable to manage the tensions and cleavages of a heterogeneous party operating in the heterogeneous society, federally governed. A major crisis in the system followed.

The new system entailed, crucially, the abandonment of intra party democracy, a change that has never been reversed. Positions in the Congress
organization at all levels were filled by appointment from above rather than by election from below. This change caused people at all levels to tend to tell people above them what they though those people wanted to hear, so that the organizations once formidable powers as an information gathering agency soon wasted away. The centralization of power within the party did not, however, mean that factionalism ceased to be a problem. Instead, partly because centralization reduced the leader’s ability mange conflict, partly because Mrs. Gandhi set leaders and faction is at the regional level against one another, and partly because she had largely abandoned the use of bargaining, conflict within the organization grew more severe and dysfunctional. All of this reduced the party’s ability to cope creatively or even adequately with conflicts that arose from a society facing increasing economic hardship.

Not surprisingly, this create openings for the opposition, and by 1974, under Jayaprakash Narayan’s leadership, an opposition movement had acquired real substance and momentum. Mrs. Gandhi’s reaction, which set the tone of relations between her Congress and nearly all opposition parties (with the exceptions the Communist Party of India and at time, one or the other of the two main parties in Tamil Nadu) for many years to come, was server. As Koehanek put it: ‘Dissent within the Congress, party opposition and press criticism ceased to function as thermostats measuring discontent. They were now interpreted as anti party, anti national, and traitorous, or even foreign inspired.. opposition party attempts to mobilize and express local grievances, valid or not, were perceived as law and order problems.
The opposition's response was similarly forceful and stubborn, with fasting and agitation techniques brought to the fore. Mrs. Gandhi, who found herself under growing pressure from within her own party (indeed, it was thence that the main threat came in mid 1975), turned increasingly to a small circle of confidants in which her son Sanjya figured most prominently. He began to treat the opposition to the threats, smears, and organized violence that remained his trademark until his death in mid 1980.

There followed the Emergency, during which relations between the Congress and the opposition reached their nadir. Not only were opposition activists faced with imprisonment, but power within the Congress was further centralized. The organization of the Congress itself, in some regions where it provided a base for potential rivals to Mrs Gandhi, was systematically dismantled the most vivid example being the Maharashtra machine that had been created by Y.B.Chavan.

But the centralizing often had the opposite effect to that which was intended. It cut off still further Mrs Gandhi and her circle from reliable information from states beyond the Hindi belt, so that, for example, the chief ministers of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh were repeatedly able to submit reports of huge numbers of vasectomies, none of which had occurred. And instead of homogenizing the regions as intended, centralization made possible the assertion of of their natural heterogeneity, so that they actually diverged from one another. Mrs Gandhi's centralizing violated the basic logic by which India had been governed under both the Crown and Nehru's Congress. According to that logic, the influence of people at the
apex of national and regional political systems penetrates down through the systems most effectively by means of compromise. Attempts to rule by diktat paradoxically weaken the centralizers, as happened to Mrs Gandhi.

The third phase in the evolution of India's parties and party system extends from the defeat of Indira Gandhi's Congress led by her son Rajiv in the last week of 1984, following her assassination. As it set a new and quite different trend. The years from 1977 to 1984 were, broadly speaking, a time of abrasive conflict and bad feeling between political parties and a period marked by decay and fragmentation within parties. However it is necessary to identify several larger themes in this period of India's politics that provide the context essential to an understanding of the changes within parties and the party system.

Two great themes, which had become plainly evident before 1977 and which dominated the phase thereafter, were awakening and decay. The awakening occurred among the great mass of India's voters, as people at all levels of society became increasingly aware of the logic of electoral politics, of the secrecy of the ballot, and of the notion that parties and leaders should respond to those whom they represented. It was more advanced among prosperous groups, but it also occurred among the poor. As a result, disadvantaged rural dwellers largely ceased to vote according to the wishes of the landowning groups that continued to dominate life in the villages. Voters became more assertive and competitive, and their appetites for resources from politicians grew. Interest groups crystallized and came increasingly into conflict, so that it became harder to operate a political machine that could cater to every organized
interest, as the Congress had very nearly done in the Nehru years. India became increasingly democratic and increasingly difficult to govern.

The second great theme that marked this period was the decay of political institutions, which is to say, a decline in the capacity of institutions to respond rationally, creatively, or even adequately to pressures from society, this decay affected, both, the formal institutions of state and most political parties, including, above all, the Congress party. It was partly the result of systemic problems of ossification within the party. But it was quite substantially the result of the tendency of Indira Gandhi and her associates to centralize power and to deinstitutionalize. The awakening of the electorate and the decay of institutions combined to generate five further changes as by products.

The first of these was a change in the way that elections are won and lost, or to put it more plainly, a change for the days before 1972, when incumbent governments at the state and national levels usually won reelection, to a period in which they usually lost. This follows quite logically, for the decay of ruling parties and the formal institutions through which they govern has meant when incumbents have been less able to respond to society at a time when the expectations and assertiveness of the electorate have increasingly demanded responses.

The second change was a marked decline in confidence in the state as an agency capable of creative social action (as opposed to a agency with the coercive power to maintain order). This occurred within the Congress led by both the Gandhis.
It was demonstrated by Indira Gandhi’s abandonment of reformist rhetoric in the election of 1980 and of serious attempts to create legislation for the betterment of society between 1980 and 1984, and by Rajiv Gandhi’s preference for the private sector. But this decline was also observable within many opposition parties, among many intellectuals who were critical of Mrs. Gandhi, and among large numbers of people in local arenas all across the subcontinent. There were exceptions notably on the Marxist left, among certain elements of the Hindu chauvinist right, and in some parties at the regional level but the predominant trend was nonetheless clear.

The third change which was closely related to the second was the tendency for society and politics to diverge. As political institutions, especially parties, became less able to respond rationally to appeals that arose from society, social groups tended to give up on politics and politicians and to turn inward, battening on parochial sentiments and whatever internal resources they possessed. This led to an increase in conflict between social groups as the social political divergence and the decay of political institutions reduced the state’s capacity to manage and defuse conflict.

A fourth change entailed the blurring of the relatively clear lines that had existed between many political parties and their social bases, both at the national level and in many Indian states. This was a destabilizing, and potentially destructive, trend, particularly as the awakening of the electorate made it more important than ever that parties develop solid, clearly perceived links to social bases of manageable size.
The last of the five changes was a growing divergence between the logic of political at the national level and the political logic in various state level arenas. The most obvious sign of this was the emergence in the early 1980s of regional parties in several states. But even within the Congress party, during the Emergency, state level units often went their own way. This, like the appearance of regional opposition parties, was an unintended result of the excessive centralization of power by Mrs. Gandhi.

With these themes in mind, let us now consider the third phase in the evolution of India’s parties and party system. This period, from 1977 to December 1984, was marked by freer competition between political parties but also by greater instability in the party system and within many parties. It was a time characterized by abundant alternation between parties in power at the state and national levels, by continued decay and fragmentation within parties, by a tendency towards personalized control of parties or splinters by eminent and not so eminent politicians, and by great fluidity within the party system as factions and rumps and individuals defected or realigned themselves this way and that.

The defeat of the Congress led by Mrs Gandhi in 1977 and the election of the Janata Party which was actually a motley coalition of parties brought immense changes to the party system. Defeat caused the Congress to disintegrate. Some Congress activists left Mrs. Gandhi because they had secretly disapproved of the Emergency, other because they had had enough of her son Sanjay’s bizarre and often vicious egotism. Some believed that they could revive the real Congress in the
absence of its former and supposedly discredited leader, whereas other saw little reason to stay now that Congress had lost access to the political patronage that had been its life’s blood.

Even before her defeat, Mrs. Gandhi had imposed something very close to personal and dynastic rule on the political system and the party. Defeat only intensified this tendency within the Congress, or her version of it. At a time when so many were deserting her, her already extravagant distrust of other politicians intensified, and personal loyalty became an even more precious commodity. The reconstitution of her version of the Congress party in January 1978 under the label of the Indian National Congress Indira, or the Congress-I was emblematic of this increased personalization. As the badly divided Janata party increasingly demonstrated its incapacity to govern satisfactorily and Mrs Gandhji’s prospects improved, waves of deserters redetected back to her camp. Each wave tended to operate as a new faction in an already factionalized Congress-I, and the inability of Indira and Sanjay Gandhi to apply standards consistently to these returnees actually catalyzed further division and strife. Latecomers were sometimes humiliated or sometimes inexplicably promoted over the heads of old loyalists. In this atmosphere, every group thought it had a chance and so remained a contentious force. This process continued even after Mrs Gandhi’s return to power in January 1980 and Sanjay’s death six months later.

The Janata government that held power between March 1977 and July 1979 was hastily assembled coalition of quite different opposition groups united mainly by
their opposition to Mrs Gandhi and the Emergency. Victory at the polls meant that those objectives had been realized, and the natural divisions among them then began to emerge. The Janata party contained elements of the old Congress, the mainly conservative but secularist remainder of the out faction after the 1969 Congress split. Along side it stood the Jana Sangh, a party of the Hindu Chauvinist right, whose main support came from high caste, middle class people in the urban areas, particularly in the Hindi speaking states of north and central India. Third was the Bharatiya Lok Dal (BLD), mainly representing prosperous small peasant proprietors in the Hindi belt. It sought to reallocate resources away from the urban, industrial sector towards agriculture. Fourth was the Socialist Party, whose base included some of the rural poor of north India and sizable but scattered pockets of support among urban labour unions. Finally, there was the Congress for Democracy, a group led out of Mrs Gandhi’s Congress after the Emergency by Jagjivan Ram, one of her most formidable ministers and the leading Scheduled Caste (‘ex’ Untouchable) politician. Its support was greatest among poor, low caste rural dwellers.

Given the heterogeneous composition of the Janata Party and the fierce ambitions of its three leading figures Morarji Desai, Jagjivan Ram, and BLD leader Charan Singh it is no surprise that the government was unable to achieve much cohesion. One result was a loosening of ties between the national and state levels within both the Janata party and the political system. The factions that tended to dominate the Janata party in the national Parliament were antagonistic to those that held sway in several Janata governments at loggerheads on some important questions, a trend that was reinforced by friction between the Janata regime in New Delhi and
opposition controlled governments in several other states. This made it impossible to reverse the tendency of the Indian federation to become an increasingly loose union. It was not that succession threatened national unity. That problem has always been greatly exaggerated by observers who have failed to see that insufficient solidarity exists at the state level to fuel separatism. But the threat of session prepared the ground for further deterioration of Centre state relations when Mrs Gandhi, returning to over centralization after 1980, generated regional movements in reaction and then dealt even more aggressively and unconstitutionally with those movements when they had taken power in several states.

When the Janata government disintegrated in mid 1979, many of the elements that had formed it also splintered. This paralleled the disintegration that had occurred on the Congress side after the 1977 election, and the result was a confusing array of fragmentary parties many of which were little more than personal cliques presided over by individual politicians. In this context, Mrs Gandhi’s Congress-I appeared to be the only coherent national party even though its own organization was in considerable disarray and this image enabled it to take advantage of the strong popular reaction against the Janata government and win the 1980 election. The difficulties of the anti Congress-I parties at making common cause persisted from the early 1980s through the election preparations during the third quarter of 1984. the assassination of Mrs Gandhi on 31 October 1984 seemed to ensure an emotion based victory for her son and party, making opposition unity still more difficult to achieve.
This victory has led many observers to write off the opposition over the middle and even the long term, but such a judgment is premature, as the evidence from 1967 to 1984 shows. It should first be recalled that Mrs Gandhi appeared to be in a similarly unassailable position in 1972, and that mismanagement led her into server political trouble within only three years. If such errors should recur, the Indian electorate, which is even more aware and assertive today than in the early 1970s, is unlikely to be any more patient than on that occasion. Every state in India, like the nation as a whole, has now had at least one spell of non-Congress government. Opposition rule is no longer unthinkable anywhere. Misgovernment will generate a credible opposition.

Let us first note, however that one other possible tendency is also unlikely to pass from the scene: that represented by the peasant proprietary group in the Hindi speaking areas and championed by Charan Singh under various labels (Lok Dal, Bharatiya Lok Dal, Dalit Mazdoor Kisan party). Charan Singh himself is aged and infirm and unlikely to play an important role again. But this force has sufficient cohesion to figure in future anti Congress-I alliances unless Rajiv Gandhi's new economic policies develop in ways that attract it to his party.

We should pay particular attention to the CPI(M) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which is a successor to the old Hindu chauvinist party, the Jana Sangh. These were the two most potent 'hard' parties of the late 1960s, and they are the only two opposition parties that are patently able to rejuvenate themselves by recruiting large numbers of young idealists. They have also managed to broaden their bases.
This last comment may sound strange in the aftermath of the 1984 election, in which the CPI(M) lost ground in West Bengal and suffered embarrassments in Kerala, in which the BJP was reduced to a parliamentary delegation of two. But it should be noted that the CPI(M) still came first in a solid majority of assembly segments in West Bengal, and it did so because it has managed since coming to power there in 1977, to cultivate a solid base among the rural majority, a success managed partly because it has organizational efficiency in West Bengal that is said to surpass even that of the party in Kerala. It the decay of other parties and some sort of socio economic crisis should make it possible for the CPI(M) to extend the West Bengal model to other states an eventuality that seems highly unlikely at present we may look back on this acquisition of a rural base as a crucial change. The CPI (M) has also managed this broadening without ceasing to be a 'hard' party, without losing or gaining people through defections, and without suffering too much erosion of discipline or ideology. It is nonetheless more flexible and pragmatic than it used to be, as is exemplified by electoral pacts in states where it is a minor party.

The BJP presents a different picture. It remains a corporate entity of real institutional sinew and has not suffered from the drift towards personal rule that has done so much damage to many other opposition parties and, of course, to the Congress-I. And although it lost a large number of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) activists to the Congress-I during the 1984 election, it is generally agree by most observers in India that it retained a majority of these and that many who decamped to the ruling party are likely to return, especially after Rajiv Gandhi's moves away from Hindu chauvinism in 1985. To put that statement into perspective,
it helps to recall that the RSS has no fewer than 700,000 swayamsevaks, or full time activist, in the field. The figure dwarfs that of any other party, including the Congress-I which has surprisingly few people spending most of their time working for the organization. In addition, in many states, the Congress personnel are startlingly ineffective. In Karnataka, for example, the Congress president had to go outside the party to find an efficient organizing general secretary. A large minority of the RSS swayamsevaks are adolescents, but many of them are capable of important political work.

The BJP has not however, remained the kind of ‘hard’ party that it once was and that the (CPI(M) largely remains. It is far less penetrable than the other non-communist parties, but it has become less parochial and uncompromising in its tactics and ideology, and hence more porous than it used to be. It has both lost and accepted a surprising number of defectors in the last five years, and it was possible to identify a number of people during the 1984 election campaign who had one foot in the BJP and another in other non Congress and non communist parties, so that the boundaries between it and some other parties became slightly blurred.

This political straddling is a logical result of a fundamental change of outlook among some BJP members, and a third reason why the opposition should not e written off B.D. Graham, who knew the old Jana Sangh well, became convinced on a visit to India in mid 1984 that the BJP is a genuinely new entity, both in terms of organization their party constitution is modeled on that of the post 1977 Janata party rather than that of the Jana Sangh and I terms of ideas. BJP views on economic issues
are less market oriented than social democratic and suggest a return to the reformism introduced in the 1950s by Nehru, although party members tend to describe themselves as neo Gandhians and to avoid references to Nehru.

Let us now turn to an astonishing development of the early 1980s, the adoption by Indira Gandhi of themes that have traditionally belonged to the Hindu chauvinist right. To many who are familiar with the Congress in Nehru's time or in Mrs Gandhi's earlier years as prime minister, it may be difficult to believe that this happened. Yet, it appears that at some point during 1982, Congress-I leaders recognized that a confrontational posture towards the overwhelmingly Muslim National Conference Party in Kashmir and the Sikh extremists in Punjab (whom Mrs Gandhi's confidants, Sanjaya Gandhi and Zail Singh, had initially encouraged in order to divide the opposition Akalis) might gain them the support of many Hindus in the Kashmir and Delhi elections. When numerous activists of the RSS deserted the increasingly liberal BJP to support Congress-I candidates in those elections, the tactic seemed to have worked surprisingly well.

It began to seem an even more attractive option after the defeat of the Congress-I in the southern states of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh in January 1983. That defeat led Congress-I leaders to suspect that the south might not support them at the next parliamentary election, that they would therefore need to look to northern and central India for most of their Lok Sabha seats. Because their party organization was in such disarray that it could not cultivate much of a following through patronage the main mode of operation during the 1960s an evocative theme like Hindu chauvinism,
which could be conveyed to voters through talk of threats to national unity from anti-national minorities, began to seem all the more useful.

It is impossible to regard this rightward shift as an accident, as something that happened with Congress-I leaders realizing too late that it was occurring and merely acquiescing. Too much of what took place required willful action by Mrs Gandhi and then by her son Rajiv. Indeed, as early as August 1982, after commentators like Pran Chopra had warned against the dangers of courting the Hindu majority in north India by generating communal anxieties, I asked a general secretary fo the AICC-I if that really could be the prime minister’s intention. He responded, not by denying that this was her aim, but by seeking to justify it as a creative strategy.

It remained the strategy of Congress-I leaders right through the election of 1984. Detailed accounts of the campaign were scarce engaged with the ghastly events in Bhopal. Although it may seem difficult to believe that Hindu chauvinism and anti-Sikh sentiments were important elements in the Congress-I election campaign, it was, in fact, the case. For example, at a November rally in Delhi, Rajiv Gandhi refused to present the city’s Sikh mayor (a member of his own party) from being shouted down and then went on to use the word ‘badla’ (revenge’) in a speech that followed. He also refused to criticize the Hindu extremist organization, the RSS, which at every previous election had supported the Jana Sangh/BJP, but which swung heavily, and in some cases openly, behind the Congress-I on this occasion. The prime minister further refused to disavow RSS support, thereby conforming to the precedent set by his mother in mid 1983 in Kerala where the Congress-I received RSS baking and one of
his leading party spokesmen even declined to admit that it was a communal organization.

The second reason for the choice of this confrontational approach is that, given the nature of the Congress-I rule between 1980 and 1984 and the assumptions that had underpinned it, the Gandhis had few other options. As already noted that by the time Mrs Gandhi assumed power in 1980, she had lost confidence in the state as an agency for creative action in society. As a result, next to no serious attempts were made by the authorities. During her last term as prime minister to develop carefully designed social programmes. There wee, therefore, we new legislative achievements between 1980 and 1984 to which the Congress-I leaders could point. Indeed, their election speeches and the party manifesto made virtually no reference to government programmes after 1980. It seemed at time as if some other party had been in power during that period. The only major reference in the manifesto to positive development after 1980 was to advance on the economic front, where the credit tended to go to market forces and not to the government.

The government had sought, in the period after 1980s, to direct popular attention to a number of major spectulars in order to justify the existence of a state in which the prime minister had lost confidence. Much was made of the Asian Games, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference, Antarctic explorations, and the like. But the Congress-I leaders rightly sensed that these were not election winners. They also rightly believed that Mrs Gandhi would have great difficulty in obtaining a majority in the election, and given the absence of any major
legislative achievements and the presence of a highly unreliable party organization, they were driven to present Mrs Gandhi as a figure of stability amid increasing instability and to continue to court the votes of the Hindu majority across north India by making appeals based on Hindu chauvinism and the notion that India's unity was in jeopardy. If a party adopts that set of themes, it is impelled by the logic of chauvinism and its India in danger message to raise alarms and to excoriate the opposition as dangerous, anti national destabilizes.

A brief comment is needed there on the manner in which Rajiv Gandhi and his party won the election of 1984. at least five factors appear to have had a significant impact, although, as I have argued elsewhere, we will probably never be able to say with certainty what their relative importance was. First, there was, of course, a sympathy factor after the murder of Mrs Gandhi, but its impact has probably been overestimated. It as a factor rather than a ware another obvious element was the abject failure of most opposition parties, especially the so called national paresis, to provide a credible alternative to the Congress-I yet both of these seem to have been less important than three other things. First, Rajiv Gandhi's youth, his freshness, and his apparent lack of a political past helped him to represent himself both as a figure of stability and continuity, on the one hand, and as a figure of renewal and change, on the other. As Rajni Kothari wrote long ago, this was an unbeatable combination. A second crucial factor was the widespread (and, I believe, erroneous) perception that national unity was in danger. This fear was crystallized in many people's minds by the trauma of the assassination and was relentlessly exploited by the Congress-I. Finally; there was a related Hindu backlash that was encouraged by the prime minister
and his party. To point to these factors as decisive is to identify this election as distinct from most of the national and state level elections since 1972. Those earlier elections tended to be decided on concrete issue and, particularly, on the quality of the incumbent government's performance. The 1984 election was decided at the level of anxieties, images, evocations, and symbols. The result bespoke an aggrieved and fearful assertiveness together with a desperate need for hope and some prospect of renewal in government.

The final phase in the evolution of India's parties and party system is the period since the eighth general election in the last week of 1984. Our conclusions in this section must be tenuous for, at the time of writing this paper (1985), the phase is only twelve months old.

In the year since his election victory, which he achieved by reviling and confronting the opposition parties, Rajiv Gandhi has been more accommodating in his dealings with the opposition than his mother ever was. He has also been more conciliatory towards regional movements and parties some of which he had sought to topple from power at the state level through bribery and maneuvers of dubious constitutionality. This has earned him appreciative comments from the opposition chief ministers of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. Moreover, his agreements with leaders of regional movements in Punjab and Assam, and the subsequent elections in those states are among the greatest achievements of his first year in office.
Some doubts still linger, however, about his commitment to accommodation. His abrupt change from an assertive to a conciliatory stance in Assam lost him a great deal of support among those who had been attracted by the former approach. The same thing may also have occurred in Punjab during 1985. Because his turnabout entails a departure from the Hindu chauvinism of recent years and because this will disappoint many voters in other states, he may eventually find the cost of conciliation too great. It is also possible that he will feel able to pursue accommodation only so long as he feels politically secure, that if he begins to feel vulnerable he may revert to the confrontational stance of 1984. But for the present, the predominant trend is towards a reconstruction of the tolerably good relations with the opposition that characterized the pre Indira Gandhi years.

Rajiv Gandhi’s main preoccupation during his first year in office has been a reordering within the formal institutions of state. He has concentrated on changing personnel within both the bureaucracy and ministerial ranks of the central government, though not, to any significant degree, at the state level. He has sought to persuade officials at intermediate levels to take the initiative more often in order to break the log jams that had immobilized much of the central government in his mother’s day. He has also rid the prime minister’s secretariat of the unqualified personnel who held posts thanks to their fierce loyalty to Indira Gandhi, and he has decentralized power somewhat by curtailing the power of the secretariat. All this may suggest a reordering of affairs within the Congress party. The prime minister appeared to indicate that intention in late 1985 when he shifted key aides from his secretariat to
leading party posts, but very little was said or done about the party until the last week of 1985.

Then, in Bombay on 28 December, the hundredth anniversary for the Indian National Congress, the prime minister delivered the most scorching critique of the party ever uttered by one of its leaders. He spoke of cliques... enmeshing the living body of the Congress in their net of avarice. He complained of Congress operatives self aggrandizement, their corrupt ways, their linkages with vested interests... and their sanctimonious posturing...', and he added that 'corruption is not only tolerated... but even regarded as a hallmark of leadership.

It has long been common knowledge in India that raising funds for elections is a pressing imperative for politicians and this, in turn, is one of the most powerful motive forces behind political corruption. The hawala scandal (payoffs to politicians of most major parties via illegal foreign exchange transactions) that broke in January 1996 focused public attention on both corruption and the underlying imperative for politicians of raising election funds for their parties and themselves. It highlighted the need for reform of election finance, including the possible option of state funding of elections. Such reforms are clearly linked to the process of economic liberalization. There will be no incentive for politicians to move toward deregulation without electoral finance reform, because that would limit their capacity to misuse office to raise election funds. Political finance reform is also linked to the stability of democracy itself because if election funds are raised by corrupt means, cynicism about parties and politicians can become widespread.
This attack on the Congress party, which was quite accurate, is likely to produce one of two outcomes. Given the wretched state of the party, Rajiv Gandhi may take drastic action to cleanse the Congress, or he may conclude that there is so little hope of restoring a modicum of rationality and probity to the party that no serious effort will be made. If he takes the latter route, he will, in effect, be gambling that he can get along without a party organization. He will be depending on the performance of the formal institutions of state, manned by his ministers and bureaucrats, on his personal appeal, and on innovations such as the liberalization of the economy and the introduction of micro technology to win him the support of the electorate. In a political system in which parties, particularly the Congress party, have been the main instruments for integrating and governing the national, for detecting and responding to discontents and pressures from interest groups, for managing social conflict and for cultivating electoral support through the distribution of resources, in such a system, to do without a party organization is to ask for trouble. Even a powerful executive presidency on Gaullist lines which is an option under consideration is unlikely to perform adequately the roles formerly played by the party organization.

Nevertheless, the evidence from Rajiv Gandhi’s first fifteen months in power suggests that he may eventually be compelled to do without a strong Congress organization and even to seek a radical reduction in the importance of parties in the political system. The prime minister appears already to have dallied too long to revive the Congress-I. During the first few months after the murder of his mother, he had spurned a clear opportunity to make radical change in the party. That opportunity
appears now to have passed and is unlikely to arise again. It was mainly available between the assassination on 31 October 1984 and the state assembly elections in March 1985, when many candidates for nation and state legislatures were selected. Why did he let it pass? His hesitation is explained in party by the trauma the assassination produced and the difficult task of taking command of the government and mounting an election campaign. It is also likely that he was somewhat deceived by the misleading appearance of unity and order that his party presented in that period. To understand how in came to give that impression, it is necessary to recall how the extraordinary circumstances that pertained to India during those crucial weeks freed the new prime minister from many of the intra party factional troubles that would normally have assailed any leader of the Congress-I.

Traditionally, political parties in India financed themselves through private donations and membership dues. Company contributions to political parties were legal, subject to certain restrictions, and had to be declared in the company's accounts. There were limits on elections expenditure since the Representation of the People Act (RPA) 1951. Talk about political finance reform began in the context of the debate on black money generation in the 1960s, the nexus between black money and political fund raising being mentioned in the Reports of the Santhanam Committee on Prevention of Corruption (1964) and the Wanchoo Direct Taxes Enquiry Committee (1971). Company donations to political parties were banned with effect from 1969.

An important development was the amendment of the RPA in 1975 to nullify the Supreme Court's judgment in the Kanwar Lal Gupta versus Amar Nath Chawla
case that party spending on behalf of a candidate should be included in election expenses for the purposes of the ceiling. Explanation 1 to Section 77 (i) of the RPA was appended, by which party and supporter expenditure not authorized by the candidate did not count in election expenses, in total contrast to the UK position. This made the limit on election expenditure farcical.

Political parties were exempted from income and wealth taxes from April 1979 provided they field annual returns including audited accounts and identities of donors. The main development in the 1980s was the amendment of the Companies Act in 1985, which by Section 293A, once again allowed company donations to political parties and individuals under certain conditions, most importantly, a ceiling of five per cent of average net profit over the previous three years, subject to approval by the board of directors and disclosure in the profit and loss account. However, the overwhelming majority of the contributions have continued to be by the black money route, since utilizing the provision means revealing party identification and possible problems with shareholders.

A brief background of the study area chosen for the case study has already been given in the Chapter-II. However in order to give a hint to the reader about these districts it must be said that Davanagere represents central Karnataka while Belgaum represents the northern border of Karnataka sharing its problems with Maharashtra.

In this, case study method was chosen and two districts from the regions of middle (central) and Border Karnataka were chosen for reasons of comparison.
Davanagere which represents the central part of Karnataka having a significant cultural distinctiveness and Belgaum a border District of Karnataka, once again having a distinctive cultural milieu. Since both are equally big districts we chose on a random scale four legislative Assembly constituencies in each of these districts and made the selection of respondents using voters list. We chose 30 respondents from each of these constituencies with an interval of 5 each with maximum respondents not exceeding 150 in any district.

These samples chosen were stratified, at two levels. Political party activists, elected representatives formed one pool while, ordinary citizens and Municipal officials formed another pool. Having made such a selection, a structured questionnaire was served to these respondents and their responses are analyzed. As quoted earlier in the words of P.V.Yong an authentic source for methodological understanding if the case study method. This formed the basis for our study too. Most of the questionnaires were served in Kannada for better reciprocation.

In this regard many questions were asked to the respondents who were chosen on the basis of the following methodology.

In field questionnaire was employed to probe into the idea of development as perceived by the respondents. As one can see in Table-1 Extension of income of generating activity is considered by 26.33 percent as development. While extension of basic services in the options to answer their choice by 42.00 percent preferring it. Extensions of services form their popular choice with 5.33 plus percent opting for it.
While those who said all of the above are 5.33 percent again, only 21.00 percent did not accept any of the above arguments.

Political parties need funds for three activities: election campaigns, interelection maintenance of their organizations and political activities, and support of research and information infrastructure for the parties. In most cases, election campaigns are the primary visible activity requiring funds. Historically, this has made political parties excessively dependent on big business, its intermediary organizations and wealthy individuals, especially parties of the right and centre. Parties of the left became dependent on the collective contributions of workers. Often channeled through affiliated trade unions. Such interests, typically, seek rents as a quid pro quo for political donations. Such dependence, especially with candidates who do their own fund raising, has made access to money and support of wealthy donors increasingly critical. This was so throughout the democratic world in the post war boom of the 1950s and 1960s as election campaigning costs rose steeply. There were and still are many corruption scandals associated with campaign fund raising in many countries, despite political finance reforms.

The origins of elections finance reform have three roots: corruption scandals. Rising campaign costs, and public concern for equal opportunity of political participation. In India and elsewhere, it was widely felt that a free for all system of election fund raising in capitalist societies gave excessive power to wealthy individuals and big business not only over left of centre parties, but even pro business parties and politicians. This was an important contributing factor to the introduction
**Part-I Conception about Development**

Q. 1 What according to you is Development?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Extension of Services</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Extension of basic services</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>42.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Extension of Income generating activities</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>26.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>All of the above</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>None of them.</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>21.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**Diagram Description**

- **Series1**
- **Series2**

The diagram shows the distribution of responses for each option, with the following counts and percentages:

- **a.** 16 (5.33%)
- **b.** 126 (42.00%)
- **c.** 79 (26.33%)
- **d.** 16 (5.33%)
- **e.** 63 (21.00%)
of public subsidies to political parties in Norway and Germany. In Norway in the late 1940s, the shipping industry, which was a major contributor to non socialist parties, alienated them by trying to influence their choices of leaders, candidates and policies. In Germany in the 1950s and 1960s, the attempts of political sponsor organizations to determine candidate lists and veto certain coalition arrangements prompted the introduction in 1959 of public funding for parties by the conservative Christian Democratic Adenauer government. The introduction of public funding was, in some cases due to politicians need for autonomy from financial supporters as well as their desire to reduce costs.

An important point for the Indian case is the fact that the type of party system prevailing at the introduction of public party or election funding in all countries was, typically, one without a perennially dominant party. Most of Europe had multi party systems without a perennially dominant party or two parties or two plus party systems like in the United States, Canada or Australia.

Limits on expenditures have been applied more frequently than limits on contributions to parties/candidates. Expenditure limits have been applied to election campaigns, usually limited to the formal period of the campaign, rather than to general party expenditures. The goal is to reduce costs for all contestants, thus indirectly address the issue of equality of political opportunity. Usually the limits apply to the amounts that candidates and/or parties may spend on election campaigns. Within these overall maxima there are often limits on the amounts that may be spent
on particular items, for example, broadcasting, advertising, wall posters and billboards.

Contribution limits by individuals and organizations have been introduced primarily to address the problem of equality of opportunity by lessening dependence on a small number of wealthy donors, and making candidates more responsible to the grassroots. Ceilings on contributions may apply both to donors and recipients, that is, recipient parties and candidates may face limits on amounts they receive from certain categories of donors and/or from any single donor, forcing them to broaden their fund raising efforts. Potential donors may face limits on how much they can contribute per candidate, per party or per year. In some countries, like the United States, there may be bans on certain organizations (like corporations and trade unions) from making election contributions to parties or candidates. However, intermediary organizations, like political action committees (PACs) in the United States, may be allowed to receive and channel corporate political contributions, though they too may face limits on amounts per donor as recipients and amounts per candidate as donors. These contribution limits attempt to the electoral prospects of candidates and parties. In most countries these have been less effective than expenditure limits because contributes can be channeled through intermediaries or evaded through loopholes.

A variety of systems of reporting and disclosure have been implemented simultaneously with limits on election expenditures and/or political contributions, and public subsidies to parties/candidates. This necessitates the institutionalization of legal
requirements for disclosure of party/candidate income and expenditures. The general
trend is towards a greater transience.

Who is required to report varies? In the UK, Ireland, Australia, and New
Zealand, which traditionally do not recognize political parties, it is the candidate who
is required to report. In most other countries it is the party or both party and candidate.
In the USA, PACs also have to report, Reporting is usually to the appropriate
minister, speaker of the legislature concerned, or the election commission. In some
countries, like the older members of the Commonwealth and Ireland, it is to the
electoral officer, a lower level functionary.

The reporting interval is every campaign (especially in countries which
subsidize or regulate elections rather than parties), and/or annual. Expenditures are
required to be reported in all cases and, in most cases, contributions. Audit of
accounts of political parties and/or candidates' campaigns is commonly, but not
always, required. Most countries have the further requirement of disclosure, that is, it
is not sufficient to file audited statements of accounts to the appropriate public
authority in confidence (similar to the filing of income tax returns). These records
must be made publicly available, including the press and political rivals. This is an
increasing trend generated by public pressure in many countries due to corruption
scandals. However, this need not lead to total transparency since, in many cases,
while contribution limits must be respected, the donor’s identity need not be disclosed
to the public; for example, in France, even after the post 1988 reforms, donors can
make anonymous contributions; however, without a receipt they will forgo tax
deductions.

Four broad conclusions can be drawn from the literature. First public funding
has not frozen party systems either by preventing alternation in power or by
preventing the entry of smaller new parties, as in Germany, Austria, Italy and Sweden

Second, public funding does not necessarily reduce election spending. In
several countries like Italy (1976-80) Spain, 1989, Finland, Austria, 1978-85, and
Israel, (1981-88), election spending rose despite public funding of parties, including
of elections. This was traced to increased political rivalry combined with the fact that
private funds could be raised alongside public funding furthermore, parties could
agree among themselves to increase the level of public funding as in Austria, Israel.

Third, if state funding is routed directly to candidates, bypassing the central
party leadership, then lower level leaders and party factions are strengthened and can
demand policy changes or even threaten secession. Parties can come under pressure to
decentralize and democratize. New parties can emerge from factional secession.

Fourth, public party/election subsidies and limits on expenditures and
contributions do not necessarily eliminate corruption and wrong doing. If, as in the
USA and Japan, the net effect is to greatly increase candidates imperative to raise
funds, then evasion of legal restrictions becomes common.
These conclusions stress the key role of design in whether political finance reforms lead to reduced campaign costs, less corruption, and greater equality of political opportunity. Is there to be public subsidy of parties or elections only are there to be limits and sub limits on expenditures, contributions, both or neither are public subsidy levels realistic in relation to campaign costs are public subsidies to be beaded on vote or seat shares, paid in cash or kind, in advance or reimbursed, to central party leaderships, regional/local leaderships or candidates? Are additional private funds to be allowed will party and supporters spending count as election expenses will donor identities have to be disclosed? We shall discuss various possible options for political finance reforms in India after reviewing the Indian case.

The study of the products of government, namely Development through an understanding of public policies has been dominated by students of Political Science first and Public Administration later. Today the study of Public Policy has acquired a new dimension and is struggling to acquire the status of a new discipline called "Policy Science". It is no exaggeration to suggest that Development parse proposes analysis of policies of government as a substitute for politics. Stephen Brooks maintains: "While not anti democratic, the analytical approach to public policy making aspires to the de politicization of the policy process. Although the term policy science' is mostly associated with Lasswell and Y.Dror, a policy orientation was evident in the very beginnings of American social science, the concern which informs the policy science writings of Laswell and Dror is evident in the work of American social scientists today. Education and sociological training for legislators were measures stressed by Lester Ward with a view to embedding rational decision making
into the very culture and political institutions of American society. The tradition of rationalism runs from Ward to Dror. Brooks writes: “These visions of a new politics share a conviction that the institutionalization of scientific analysis into the policy-making processes is a necessary condition for the attainment of democratic government in a modern society”. “Thus, it is clear that the study of development process while a government is at work (More so a coalition) is basically an American way of measuring the working/ functioning of government.

The Dewyism which pervades policy science has been acknowledged by Lasswell when he wrote: “Policy sciences are a contemporary adoption of the general approach to public policy that was recommended by John Dewey and his colleagues in the development of American Pragmatism”. Similarly Sidney Hook explains, “for Dewey the survival and expansion of democracy depends upon its use of scientific method or creative intelligence to solve its Problems”. It is for this reason that he laid stress on the study of developmental agenda of a government. However, even then this subject of study was not given a status that it desired. But it was at a later date that the concept of ‘Policy Science’ was first formulated by Harold Lasswell in 1951 in his co edited work “The Policy Sciences”. This work is regarded as the first systematic effort towards building a new field of enquiry to deal with social problems as governments do through their so called ‘developmental activity’.

The writings of Scotta and Shore, Horowitz, and Tribe provide a more detailed picture of the emergence of policy science. A group of converging factors, such as war, poverty, crime, race relations, and pollution are seen to be responsible for
producing a great interest in policy science vis-a-vis governments in the late 1960s. Brooks therefore adds: “Policy science is the most recent and certainly the most explicit, manifestation of this quest for an independent vantage point, above the political fray, affording objective criteria upon which policy decisions can be made. Such arguments actually drive and its perception varies according to needs. In the instant case however it is preferred to be basic services.

In case of the second question (Table-2) regarding, through what do they hope for development to come about, nearly 30% of the respondents felt that it could come about through all the options thrown at the respondents, as above, Encouragement (both 20%) for economic activities. Nearly the same percentage also preferred decentralization. This is in fact an indicator that more decentralization means more economic activity. Nearly 15% of the respondents believed that modernization and democratization would help in development.

A classical view of urbanization an urban place as an economic parasite thriving on the agricultural surplus produced in its hinterland. This view, which had, perhaps, some value when considering the emergence of ancient cities from a predominantly peasant society, is no tenable in the post-industrial revolution period. Today, the city is a focal point of productive activities. It exists and grows on the strength of the economic activities existing within itself. It does, in addition, provide services and goods to its hinterland; and to a large extent, it is the hinterland that is economically dependent on the city. Farmers have to go to the city to obtain new seed varieties, fertilizers, for the purchase of tractors, or repair of agricultural equipment.
Q. 2  Of the following, which according to you may give you the benefit?

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Modernization</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Economic Progress</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Democratization</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>Decentralization</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>All of the above</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
They also go to the city to buy a variety of consumer goods—transistor sets, bicycles, watches, clothing, footwear and electrical items. The city offers a variety of goods and services and these are sold both within and outside the city. It does not and cannot exist by itself. Its economic relations with its hinterland and other cities of the nation and the world are important to it. It is the level and nature of economic activity in the city that generates growth and, therefore, further urbanization. Looked at from this angle, urbanization in modern times is essentially an economic process.

The nature of economic activities in a town or city, in simple terms, relates to production at three levels: primary, secondary and tertiary. The character of urbanization depends very much on the type of economic producing going on in city.

Primary production has to do with agriculture, fishing, forestry and mining. It is well known that, particularly since AD 1850, a large number of mining towns have emerged in India. The entire coal region extending over Bengal, Bihar and Orissa has a number of mining towns; the chief among which are Jharia, Raniganj, Keonjhar and Asansol. The list of mining towns would run into hundreds; they include not only coal mining towns, but also towns specializing in the mining of iron ore, manganese, bauxite, copper, gold and petroleum. Thus specialized mining towns exist all over the country from Rajasthan to Assan, and Tamil Nadu to Kashmir. Today mining employs a high level of technology and the workers in mines include not only a large number of unskilled but also a significant number of highly skilled workers. The workers often come from far off places; in the process, the mining towns stand out as
cultural islands within their respective regional milieu. Further, the mining towns have their unique urban attributes and are clearly distinguishable.

Unlike mining, fishing and forestry have not generated many urban places in India. It is, however, well known that in a large number of coastal towns and cities, along both the western and eastern coasts of India, fishing is a major productive activity. In addition, there are a large number of settlements of fishermen which are generally thought of as villages; although in actual fact, they ought to be considered as urban places. These settlements attract not only traders in fish and fish products, but also other traders who cater to the needs of the fishermen; ancillary productive activities include boat building and repair and the repair of fishing equipment. With the introduction of deep sea fishing, particularly along the west coast, motorized boats and specialized equipment are now playing a more important role. With these developments, settlements of fishermen have acquired a district urban character.

India’s forests have traditionally been sources of a variety of products—from timber and firewood to animal skins and lac. A number of towns have emerged at the edge of the forests, dealing in forest produce. As against the traditional urban centres based on forestry, there are new towns where the manufacture of plywood, paper or furniture forms the main productive base. Examples are Dandeli in Karnataka, Baypore in Kerala, Sirpur Kagaz Nagar in Andhra Pradesh and Balarshah in Maharashtra. The number of such towns is much larger than one would imagine and they have played an important role in Indian urbanization.
Agriculture, particularly of the commercial variety, has also given rise to many urban centres in India. The tea plantations of South India, Assam and west Bengal have generated nearly a thousand settlements, often relatively small, for housing the plantation workers. These settlements also have modern factories for the processing of tea. The labour force often comes from distant places—for example, the Santals in Assam and the Tamils in the Kerala highlands. The plantation settlements are in no sense rural villages. In their layout, community life, and economic activity, they are indeed true urban centres, the people here are wage earners, in much the same sense as people in other town and cities. In fact, the urban amenities enjoyed by the plantation settlements, in terms of housing, water supply, electricity and so on, are often unavailable in many Census towns.

Finally, the small towns in India—with population of less than 20,000—have a substantial and sometimes even a major part of their work force engaged in agriculture. In fact, out of a total of 2,122 towns in India in 1961, Asok Mitra recognizes no less than 656 towns being agricultural towns, where the dominant economic activity is cultivation. There is in fact no inherent contradiction between agricultural activity and urban character. The modern Indian farmer may live in the city and commute to the villages to work on the farm; he may use tractors and other machinery and often his level of technical knowledge and expertise is no less that that of the factory worker. A substantial number of India’s innovative and prosperous farmers live in towns. Agriculture is in effect just another economic activity, requiring certain specialized skills. With increasing mechanization and decreasing labour-intensity in agriculture, the relationship between agriculture and urbanization needs a
through review. That agriculture is a non-urban occupation is no longer tenable in India today. The Green Revolution in Panjab has vitalized and generated a number of small towns, which provide a variety of amenities to the new rich class of farmers. A similar situation is noticeable in the Guntur-Vijayawada districts of Andhra Pradesh, in the Coimbatore-Salem districts of Tamil Nadu, as well as in the sugar belt of Maharashtra, and the Rajasthan canal area.

The key to the emergence of a class of primary activity oriented urban centres is technological change from traditional to modern methods of farming and forestry. India’s small towns are likely to emerge as new foci of an urban revolution on the heels of an agricultural or primary activity oriented revolution. The provision of infrastructure for these towns can stimulate agriculture or any other primary activity and at the same time raise the level of urbanization. The process of urbanization through modernization of primary activities is an ongoing and potentially most significant urbanization process in India. And it is clear from the above argument and the preference of the respondents that all basic amenities in the urban areas remain the core of development as a worthy understanding of its multidimensional facet.

In order to incite the respondents to discuss the issues connected to development, it was questioned as to, whether, development facilitated change. (Table-3) an over whelming 57% percent of the people agreed to that view while 43% did disagree.
Q. 3. Do you feel Development brings about change?

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Yes</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>57.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. No</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>43.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Bar chart showing the distribution of responses to the question about Development bringing about change. The chart indicates that 57.00% of respondents answered 'Yes' while 43.00% answered 'No'.]
An understanding of these linkages contributes to the development of policy science. Not only this, an understanding of the causes and consequences of public policy helps us to apply scientific knowledge to find the solutions to the practical problems of development. The professionals, if they understand and know something about public policy, are in apposition to say something useful concerning how governments or public authorities can act to achieve their policy goals. Such advice can either be on what policies can be pursued for achieving particular goals or what environmental factors are conducive to the development of a given policy. Indeed factual knowledge is a prerequisite to solving the problems of society. In other words, the study of public policy helps the development of professional advice about how to achieve particular development goals in the light of a democratic process of change of guards at the state level as and when elections takes place.

To wind up this discussion of why one needs to study public policies while researching on the Developmental process thus justifies the fact that they are interconnected. Further, it can be noted that the field of public policy has assumed considerable importance in response to the increasing complexity of the society. It is not only concerned with the description and explanation of the causes and consequences of government activity, but also with developing scientific knowledge about the forces shaping public policy. The study of public policy helps to understand the social ill of the subject. Under this study of public policy, an important mechanism for moving a social system from the past to the future is well followed to explain in scientific terms the question of continuity or change in them keeping in
focus the development process under the coalition government in the state of Karnataka.

A significant part of the study of public policy consists of the study of development of scenarios and extrapolations of contemporary trends, when the scope and sheer size of the public sector has grown enormously in all the developing countries in response to the increasing complexity of technology, social demands and need for supply. Countries in response to the increasing complexity of technology, social organization, industrialization and urbanization are focusing their attention to fulfill the demands that emanate from them. At present the functions of practically all governments, especially of the developing countries, have significantly increased in manifolds. They are now concerned with the more complex functions of nation building and socio economic progress. Today the government is not merely the keeper of peace, the arbiter of disputes, and the provider of common goods and day to day services. For better or worse, government has, directly or indirectly, become the principal invocator, the major determiner of social and economic programmes and the main financer as well as the main guarantor of large scale enterprises that ensures that the process of development traverses without hindrances to achieve the goals desired by the Governments.

To quote a United Nations publication,

“in countries where the problem of poverty is less serious,

there is great pressure on governments to accelerate national
development, make use of up to date and relevant technological innovations, adopt and facilitate necessary institutional changes, increase national production, make full use of human and other resources, and improve the level of living. These trends and developments have therefore enhanced both the size and scope of the public policy in a democratic set up where the study of development process involving various bodies of government and political institutions in tandem to achieve goals of development (and to see that change and continuity one negotiated).

Michael Teitz on the other hand describes the outreach of public policy in terms of the citizen’s life cycle: Modern urban man is born in a publicly financed hospital receives his education in a publicly supported school and university, spends a good part of his time traveling on publicly built transportation facilities, communicates through the post office or the quasi public telephone system, drinks his public drinking water, disposes of his garbage through the public removal system, reads his library books, in public library picnics in public parks, is protected by public policies, fire and health system, eventually, he dies, again in a public hospital and may even be buried in a public cemetery. Ideological conservatives notwithstanding, his everyday life is inextricably bound up with government decisions on these and numerous other public services”. As a result of this, it is certain that ‘change’ in life styles, patlens, services are seen as indicators of development. Hence the choice.
Further inorder to be very specific about what change is? the respondents were questioned as to where and what do they see as change. In their response (Table-4) many of them preferred demographic changes as an indicator to recognize changes. Nearly 27.67 percent of people identified it as their response. Percent saw, change in social values and social facilities as change. 11% percent did not endorse any of the above and 55.67 percent were in favour of political activities and political participation as indicators of change and 5.67 percent preferred change in economic measurement and activities as change.

In a seminal article published in 1964, Rajni Kothari analyzed the Indian party system from the comparative perspective of the distinction between one, two, and multi party systems. He argued that the term one party dominance expressed India’s party system more accurately than the term one party system, which more precisely described the authoritarian type of party system, for instance that in Ghana. He formulated a new conceptual category, the Congress system, to characterize India’s party system. As the leading and preponderant political organization, the Congress obtained an absolute majority seats in parliament in the first four general elections. The party split in 1969. the Congress split thrice before 1969. in 1946, the Socialists (Congress Socialist Party) left the Congress to form the Socialist Party. In 1950 Acharya Kriplani and his followers left to form the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party. Later, Rajaji and his band left to establish the Swatantra Party. In 1969 the faction which remained with Indira Gandhi won a majority of seats in the Lok Sabha elections of 1971. However, following a brief period of Emergency rule, her party lost the elections of 1977 and began a period in opposition, during which it split again.
Q. 4 If so, of the following what do you identify as change inducing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Change in Social value and social facilities</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Change in Political activity and political participation</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>55.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Change in Economic measurement and activities</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Demographic changes</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>27.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. None of the above</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Renamed Congress (Indira) in 1978, it returned to power not only in the election of 1980s, but also after her assassination in 1984. It was defeated in the 1989 elections but was victorious in those of 1991.

Political change from the 1967 to the 1977 elections increased party competition. Opposition parties formed coalition governments in several states. Both elections created conditions in which a group of state leaders, popularly known as the Syndicate, comprising K. Kamaraja, Sanjiva Reddy, S. Nijilingappa, S.I. Patil, and Atulya Ghosh, assumed an important role in national politics. The split in 1969 ushered in significant change in the party system. In the 1971 elections Indira Gandhi’s Congress faced a united opposition, and this gave rise to a polarization in which two contending blocs disputed fundamental issues about the nature of the political order. After considerable unrest, Indira Gandhi imposed a national Emergency. The Emergency threatened liberal institutions and affirmed the perception that a crisis of regime had indeed occurred. However, the 1977 elections were the harbinger of a new era in the party system, creating new openings for the opposition parties. This period witnessed an intensification of conflict and competition between political parties.

The reasons for Congress’s decline can be attributed to the political changes that occurred during Indira Gandhi’s tenure in office. Although Indira Gandhi confronted difficult problems of governance, it was the government’s centralizing drives coupled with her intense desire for personal power and penchant for political
manipulation that were eventually responsible for many of India's woes. Under her regime, the once robust Congress party's roots withered and governance became less institutionalized, more personalized and centralized. This is an argument that many commentators have advanced repeatedly. According to them, the erosion of institutional arrangements was intimately bound up with the deinstitutionalization of the Congress party and the emergence of genuinely pluralist politics in the post 1977 period.

The Congress's decline has complex causes. Most striking is the inability of the party to maintain the political bases of its coalition, especially the loyalty of the socially disadvantaged groups. It is true that the Congress party continues to secure support across the social spectrum. From the late 1980s however, the party has found itself hard pressed to command support for its broad centrist and secular appeal in the face of a serious challenge from political formations with sectarian appeals and social bases, such as the BJP, Samajwadi Party (SP), and BSP. New parties, representing the backward and scheduled castes, are regionally concentrated and have strengthened their position at the expense of the Congress. To contend with this challenge, the Congress has needed to revitalize its electoral base, built over the years by representing the needs of different constituencies and groups. Unfortunately, its dependence on charismatic leadership as means of winning elections has distracted the party from the task of reconstructing its organization. Furthermore, the inadequacy of the Congress practice of socialism and secularism discredited its traditional ideological plank. Once embracing a broad spectrum of ideological, caste, and regional interests, the Congress has lost its authority over the past two decades. Since
the late 1980s, it has failed to generate a popular leadership capable of accommodating varied interests and blunting the counterattack of its rivals.

Some of these trends were in evidence as far back as the 1970s but leaders like Indira and Rajiv Gandhi were able to contain them by building coalitions around their own personalities. They reinvented the Congress, but on a different basis from the organizational or ideological configuration of the party in the 1950s and 1960s. In the process, the Congress became a leader dependent force that adhered to the charismatic appeal of the Nehru Gandhi family. This worked so long as the other ingredients of success were in place: its social base in the countryside, its mobilization through populist slogans, and well oiled party machine.

The death of Rajiv Gandhi exposed the inadequacies of the Indian National Congress in all these areas. Instead of dealing with them, the Congress leadership invited Rajiv Gandhi’s widow to lead the party. The entry of Sonia Gandhi into Indian politics in the 1998 election reinforced the domination of Nehru Gandhi leadership over the Congress organization. While her entry appeared to arrest the long term decline of the party, the setbacks suffered by the Congress in the 1999 parliamentary election indicate that charismatic leadership is wholly insufficient for the Congress’s revival. The revolt of the Maharashtra strongman, Sharad Pawar, against Sonia Gandhi’s leadership in May 1999 was symptomatic of the deeper problems that have faced the Congress since 1967: the need to include regional leaders who represent the emerging social forces. These alone can appeal to the regionally based, vernacular speaking, rural but rapidly urbanizing lower caste groups. The above argument thus,
endorse the respondents choice that political activity and political participation acts as vehicles of change, but what is disturbing in this table is the choice given economic activity. While respondents chose economic activity as an indicators of development although with less percentage (See Table 1 and 2) their choice in table 4 seemed quite continuous Demographic changes, though forms an important component of change it is preferred as second choice. Thus, it is interesting note that the people still hope and look forwards political parties as agents of change despite the academic line believes that the parties are on decline vis-à-vis their political base or public trust.

For a question about their understanding of (Table-5) Urbanization in their usual reference to it, the response was quite complex with 23.67% in favour of organized extending services, flow of investment from state and international levels also had 23.67% respondents preferring it. All of the above also was a choice of 23.67% While 11.67 percent pointed out to migration of rural working class, other and the 11.33 percent disagreeing to all of the above. Only 6% percent actually agreed to the Idea that urbanization is a process of investing rural capital in the urban areas. The explanation given to Table-2 holds good here too. However the proportion of a country's total population living in urban areas has generally been considered as a measure of the level of urbanization. Since the industrial revolution, which began in the latter half of the 18th century, all western countries have experienced rapid urbanization, in the sense that the proportion of urban population to total population remained static at about 10 per cent over a long period until 1931; thereafter, it increased to 18 per cent in 1951 and was around 24 per cent in 1981. Since 1951, there has been a remarkable relative growth of larger cities (with a population of one
Q. 5. When you talk about urbanization how do you understand it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Investing rural capital in urban areas</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Migration of rural workers to urban areas</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>11.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Organized service extending services</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>23.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Supporting investment drives both at National and International levels</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>23.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. All of the above</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>23.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. None of the above</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>11.33%</td>
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Their contribution to the total urban population increased from 44 per cent in 1951 to 60 per cent in 1981. This means that there has been a major shift of population to larger cities, while the smaller towns have remained virtually stagnant.

Population growth in urban areas is partly a function of natural increase in population and partly the result of migration from rural areas and smaller towns. An increase in the level of urbanization, that is, an increase in the proportion of population living in urban areas, is possible only through migration of people from rural to urban areas. Hence, migration or change of location of residence of people is a basic mechanism of urbanization. This is essentially a geographical process, in the sense that it involves the movement of people from one place to another.

This spatial movement can occur in many ways, not all of which may lead to urbanization. For example, people in India do migrate from one village to another. Such rural to rural migration constitute nearly two-thirds of all migrations in any time period. This migration is substantially explained by the permanent and temporary movement of agricultural labors from densely populated areas to areas of increased agricultural activity. This type of migration does not concern us at all. On the other hand, there are three major types of spatial movements of people relevant to the urbanization process. These are (a) the migration of people from rural villages to towns and cities, (b) the migration of people from smaller towns and cities to larger cities and capitals, and (c) the spatial overflow of metropolitan population into the peripheral urban fringe villages. The first type leads to a general process of
urbanization or macro-urbanization, while the second leads to metropolization, and the third to a process of suburbanization.

It is in fact interesting to understand that respondents after get influenced by what they see the result of this shaping and hence the choice.

For a question on the relationship between the urbanization and political parties (Table-6) which is the central aspect on which this study is undertaken, (a preliminary question about what is a political party according to them was enquired into. The response clearly exhibited the understanding of the respondents about political parties in general. They (nearly 133 of them.) agreed (which nearly 44.33%) that it is meant for bringing together the aspirations of its people Aggregation of peoples aspirations Nearly 27.07% agreed that it is there to articulate the aspirations of the people. Nearly 22.33 of them exhibited their understanding of a political party as a link that tied together the society and the state 5.67% argued that it was a group of like minded persons.) preferred that it is an organization of people interested in capturing power. The above theoretical understanding in clearly exhibited by the respondents in this case. However it is important for the research work to probe further and find out, as why respondents believe in such theoretical positions despite the fact that Political Party functioning is often contrary to that what is surprising in the fact that none among the respondents were really to believe that political parties are not organizations that attempt constantly to capture power. This in fact is quote a confusing reply that also needs further probing.
Part –II

Information about Relationship between urbanization and Political parties

Q. b According to you Political Parties are?

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Helpful in aggregation of people’s aspirations</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Helps in Articulation of peoples aspirations</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>An organization of civilians with common interest</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>An organization of people interested in occupying power</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>A linkage that binds society and state</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>None of the above</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Political development may be defined as the capacity of a political system to deal with its own fundamental problems more effectively while responding to the changing political demands of the people.

Gabriel A. Almond defines political development in terms of performance capabilities. To him political developments is the acquisition of new capability, in the sense of a specialized role structure and differentiated orientations which together give a political system the possibility of responding efficiently, and more or less autonomously, to a new range of problems.

Further probing into the functioning of the political parties in their districts, Many of them indeed agreed that political parties in their district existed and worked on these understanding. (Nearly 63.33% agreeing to it). While 36.66 disagree. (See Table-7) However those who agreed (7a) infact took names of congress and BJP as parties with that level of working style. But for the next question as to which of them (BJP/Congress) have helped in the process of urbanization they placed congress first and BJP second. (7b) this also indicated that congress has been more helpful in urbanization. Furthermore, one more descriptive question as to what determinant did they have to endorse the fact that a particular party has been helpful in urbanization process- There answer was simple. They shared with us interviews, the history of the growth and development of urbanization of their districts Since independence and pointed out clearly that the changes or demand for growth and status of their corporation/Municipality was during the congress rule. They also cited many landmark developments to endorse their answer and belief. They it must be said; however
Q. 7. In your district, do you have Political parties actively functioning?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>190</th>
<th>63.33%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>36.67%</td>
</tr>
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![Graph showing the distribution of responses to Q. 7.](image-url)
did not show prejudice to BJP as a party but agreed that competitive politics lead to urbanization and hastening it. (7c).

The demolition of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya by Hindu militants, and its aftermath, dramatically highlighted the growing influence of political Hinduism and the rise to power of the BJP. Dedicated to a redefinition of nationalism, the BJP began to fill the political vacuum created by the decline of the Congress, providing a Hindu nationalist alternative. Its climb to national power was promoted by the campaign to build a Ramjanambhoomi temple in Ayodhya thought to be the birthplace of Ram. It benefited from the Congress government’s mishandling of the Shah Bano affair and the introduction of the Muslim Women (Protection of Right on Divorce) Act, 1986 and also the mishandling of the Punjab crisis. It was also linked to its opposition to the minority United Front government’s decision in 1990 to implement the recommendation of the 1980 Mandal Commission to exit reservations beyond the scheduled caste and scheduled tribes by reserving 27 per cent of all positions in the Indian Administrative Services and Indian Police Service for the OBCs.

The BJP’s rise to prominence has been the defining feature of Indian politics over the last decade. The Congress, for so long the ‘natural’ party of governance, lost out to this new political force. The BJP has emerged as the single largest party in the last three elections. It is the only party to win two elections in a row since 1984, and the only one to continually improve its seat tally. However, with 183 seats in 1999, it was almost 90 short of a majority and its share of valid votes has declined from 25.6 per cent in 1998 to 23.7 per cent in 1999. The majority of its MPs (61 per
cent) in the thirteenth Lok Sabha were returned from north India, as against 74 per cent in 1996. Gujarat is the only state beyond the Hindu belt where the BJP has established a stable base: it won 20 of the 26 seats. In all other non-Hindi-belt states the BJP remains a marginal player or depends upon regional parties. Its recent expansion is clearly through alliances with regional parties.

With the BJP's emergence as the dominant party, though it is not yet an all India party, scholarly interest in Hindu nationalism has increased, generating considerable debate about the character of the BJP. Scholars are asking whether the ideology it represents is part of wider struggle to reconstitute India in accordance with Hindu consciousness and identity. They are concerned about its assertion of Hindu power over other communities. Most accounts concentrate on the implications of the BJP's rise to national power on the political system. They have commented on its interpretation of secularism, minority rights, democracy, and the proposal to establish a presidential form of government. Scholarship on the BJP can be divided into two broad groups. The first group comprises those who believe the BJP is a right wing party underpinned by an aggressive, homogenizing Hindu nationalism committed to rewriting history by distorting the principal plank of the post Independence project of secularism, nationalism and democracy. Scholars in the second group believe that the BJP cannot pursue this agenda and it will have to adjust to the pluralism of Indian society; a pluralism that compels parties to move towards the centre.

Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph have long maintained that one of the most striking features of Indian politics is its persistent centrisn. Some scholars of the
Indian party system have extended this reasoning. They argue that all political parties that seek power in India are subject to a centripetal influence that drives them to the centre. The question however is whether centrism is a general principle that applies to the BJP. To what extent have the centripetal pressures of electoral democracy influenced the BJP? Commenting especially on the BJP's trajectory, Ashutosh Varshney finds that the party has become increasingly moderate. The reason he gives is simple enough: proximity to and assumption of power. In short, the more the BJP exercised power at the centre and in the states the more moderate it has become.

Clearly, there are tremendous pressures for moderation that all extremist parties confront once they come to power. The BJP is not exempt from such powerful pressures. In the short run, moderation is necessitated by electoral calculations and the compulsions of coalition politics. In electoral terms, its militant strategy of ethno-religious mobilization of the 1980s paid rich dividends to the party. However, after the demolition of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya in December 1992, the BJP's vote share did not increase substantially. Its core support, accounting for 85 per cent of its total Lok Sabha seats, came from the three Hindi hear land states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh plus the three western states of Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Rajasthan. In these states the pro-Hindu rhetoric has huge appeal. This rhetoric, however, has few takers in the south and the east, which the BJP has to penetrate in order to be a serious contender as the ruling party in New Delhi. Therefore, in the 1998 and 1999 elections, the BJP moderated its stance and was then able to broaden its electoral base, both spatially and ethnically, by aligning with regional parties. This moderation was manifest in the National Agenda of Governance, which dropped four
controversial issues: building a temple at Ayodhya; enacting a uniform civil code; abolishing the National Minorities Commission; and abrogating Article 370 of the constitution, which allows greater autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir. Most of the BJP's allies in the 1999 election were regional parties, of which only the Shiv Sena could be described as a like minded right wing party. Initially, the BJP was not comfortable with the idea of coalitions, but it has rapidly demonstrated its willingness to enter into power sharing arrangements with regional parties at the national level. Since 1998, most regional parties at the national level. Since 1998, most regional leaders have backed the government headed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee. In 1996, by contrast, nearly all the major regional parties had joined hands to keep the BJP out of power. Alliances have helped the geographical expansion of the BJP, to the extent that by the end of the 1999 elections it had an electoral presence in most states, Kerala being one of the exceptions.

Socially too the BJP has come a long way from being a Brahmin Bania party. In its rise to power, it has created a new social bloc, a coalition of various groups, whose claim to power is based on 'a new kind of majoritarianism,' which is not simply Hindu majoritarianism. However, this social bloc has supported the NDA coalition, which includes regional parties that have regularly reaped low caste support, and not the BJP as such. The BJP's own social support is much more elite dominated both in terms of the caste and class hierarchy. Besides, Muslims are not yet part of the BJP's social constituency though the party is trying to woo them. The election of Bangaru Laxman, a Dalit from Andhra Pradesh, as the party president in August 2000 who was subsequently replaced by Jana Krishnamurthy after the
Tehelka scam, is evidently designed to widen its support among the Dalits. This might not however be all that easy; its efforts to win over OBCs, Muslims, and Dalits will alienate its upper caste base, the mainstay of the party. This strategy, which was epitomized by the appointment of the OBC leader Kalyan Singh as chief minister of Uttar Pradesh in 1991 and again in 1997, resulted in the consolidation of the upper caste lobby and damaged the further expansion of the party in Uttar Pradesh. Nonetheless, religion is not the principal axis in the construction of the new bloc. A convergence of caste community and class distinctions, and an overlap of social and economic privileges have formed the new social bloc. This convergence is reflected in its support base in the last two elections. The BJP obtained more votes from the privileged sections of society: upper caste rather than lower caste, rich rather than poor, men rather than women, more educated rather than less educated. Its support among the lower castes and minorities is more limited. Yet BJP's vertical growth downward has been shower and hence e the advantage Congress. Further probing to that, question was asked as to what was the ground on which the preference has been given, quick came the reply vis-à-vis their well spread networking, grass root leadership and the length of their experience as ruling party thus favouring congress.

All these changes have altered India’s party system, and the transformation has been far reaching. Two developments stand out. First, there is no longer one party dominance. The period from 1967 to 1977 witnessed the passage from one party dominance to a multi party system. Second, several states have moved towards a two party system, through the two parties vary from state to state. This change, evident since the 1989 elections, may mark the beginning of a new era in the party system.
The fragmentation of the Congress coalition into upper case, backward case, Muslim, and Dalit groups led to a redrawing of the relationship between social cleavages and political loyalties. It opened up the possibility of the mobilization of both the privileged and the underprivileged. The privileged have indeed been brought together under the BJP banner of ethno nationalism, while the underprivileged have been fragmented by their failure to forge a social bloc to counter the privileged sections. The most obvious reason for this is the emergence of sectional parties that represent distinct social constituencies which are difficult to unite and bring together into a political coalition or alliance.

One of the catalysts in the formation of these parties is the decline of Congress domination and the inability of the BJP to fill the vacuum. In consequence, caste and class clusters that were once part of the Congress coalition have found a voice through other parties. This process was advanced by the implementation of recommendations of the Mandal Commission. The rapid mobilization of socially underprivileged groups has resulted in a realignment of political parties along states, sub state, and caste lines, creating conflict amongst them and with the upper castes. The heightened caste and communal competition provoked by the combined effect of Hidutva and Mandal has radically changed the social map of politics. This trend has become increasingly evident at the national level since 1989 when state based parties joined together to form a minority National Front government led by the Janata Dal. Attempting to offer a broad based centre left alternative to the Congress, the Principal ideological plank of the National Front was the propagation of social justice and the advancement of the
interests of backward castes and minorities. However, social justice became synonymous with caste politics, and this led to the party's fragmentation.

The Congress that once commanded overwhelming majorities in the Lok Sabha has lost its hegemonic position. Its continuing decline has however been obscured as the party returned to office in 1991 to form a minority government, and then with the help of pre poll and post election allies, was able to govern as a majority party until 1996. It has however ceased to be the natural party of governance. The 1999 election, the third in as many years, was held after the AIADMK withdrew support from the BJP led government in April 1999. In the elections that followed the Congress national vote level increased to 28.5 per cent but its seat tally was reduced to the smallest ever, down to 114 seats from the 141 it won in the 1998 election. The factors responsible for the poor performance of the Congress were the manner of the dissolution of parliament, its inability to form an alternative government, and its lukewarm response to the Kargil conflict. The success of the armed forces in repulsing the Pakistani intrusion in Kargil helped the BJP to win back the support it has lost in the 1998 assembly elections. Serious difference between the Congress and Samajwadi party (SP) frustrated the Congress hope of forming a government. Even so, the BJP on its own was not able to increase its seats, and in terms of vote share it actually lost nearly two percentage points, declining from 25.6 per cent in 1998 to 23.7 per cent in 1999. However, people still believe that congress has charm and can do the magic.
This was further probed to analyze the relationship between the process of urbanization and the political parties; the preferred choice of responses where as follows; (Table-8) 26.67% of the respondents agreed that political parties line feed or galvanized the activities in the district in such a manner to attract the investors to invest in their district. Thus they brought close the relationship between the process of urbanization and carved their role (political parties) with in it. The other group of 26.67% of respondents argued that they strengthened of democratic institutions and encouraged the demands for development. About 20% percent of the respondents argued that they reform civil society organization and through them brought in development linkages for urbanization. Same number of respondents (20%) on the other hand argued that the political parties were always contemplative of development of the district and it is their vision that brought about sustained urbanization process. However, it must be added here, that these respondents gave historical evidence to this effect and were also arguing at the conceptual level. About 6.67 percent felt that the political parties in effect have taken trouble to organize capital investment to hasten urbanization and district development. Thus, when we analyse the relationship between urbanization and the political parties as said in earlier tables, one needs to take in to account the multi dimensional approach and then explain its relationship.

Economic development is essentially an important component for development. Raising national income, reducing poverty and more equitable distribution of wealth and income are all essential components of economic development.
Q. 8. How do you view the relationship between Political Parties and Urbanization?

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>a.</strong> Effort of Political parties and their support to prepare ground for capital investment</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>b.</strong> Political parties are helpful in reforming service extending institutions</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>c.</strong> Vision of Political parties regarding sustained urbanization process</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>d.</strong> Encouragement to activities that support the investment environment as an indicator of its relation to urbanization</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>26.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>e.</strong> Political parties would like to strengthen the process of democratization and hence are development oriented.</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>26.67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Bar chart showing responses to Q. 8.](image)

Kindleberger uses both growth and development in economic discussion. To Kindleberger economic growth means more output, and changes in the technical and institutional arrangements by which it is produced. He further, points out that growth is an increase in output per unit of input, and development implies changes in the structure of outputs and in the allocation of inputs by sectors.

For the definition of economic development, Gerald M. Meier lays emphasis on these words “Process, real national income and long period. To him, (i) process is the operation of certain forces whereby real national income actually increases. As regards (ii) real national income, it refers to a “country’s” total output of final goods and services, expressed not in money terms but in real terms: the money expression of national income must be corrected by an appropriate price index of both consumer and capital good. Finally (iii) long period of time, implies the underlying upward trend in net national product.

Having discussed these issues at length, a question was asked as to how they rated the political parties in their district (Congress, BJP, JD(s) CPI and CPM etc.,) 60.00 percent of the respondents favored and certified the functioning of Political parties in their district. As satisfaction. While other 20% percent said it was not satisfactory. About 20% respondents agreed that their functioning was good. (Table-9).
Part -3 Functioning of Political Parties activities

Q. 9. How do you rate the activities of Political parties in your District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Satisfactory</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>60.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Good</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Not Satisfactory</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. No activities at all</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Don’t know</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To see a tail question to the above as to the ground on which they identify a political party as urbanization friendly, their responses were as follows. About 37.33 percent went on the say that it is the organizational factor that indicates the health of a political party 31.33% looks at membership as an issue connected to the activities of a political party 25% argued that it was the strong monetary base that indicates the health and activities of a political party. Only 6.33 percent thinks that good political base as an indicator of a healthy political party no body endorsed the status quo issue.

The same according to the respondents was only with Congress and BJP while JD(s) in their opinion had a small portion of that indicator these factors have been endorsed time and again in all the secondary sources that have worked on political parties, especially so in case of India. Recent studies by D'Sonza, have also endorsed these views.

Further the respondents were asked to substantiate their preference by way of authenticating the party activities. In identifying them, they were asked to identify or vouch such parties on the basis of preferences given by us. The following in the response given by respondents. Contrary to what was stated in the question prior (Table-10) to this, the response was overwhelming favour of strength of the political base a political party had as the factor (Table-11) to vouch for its activity and performance. (41.33%) Nearly 29.33% favored the contribution of its representatives in the municipal council. 17.67% believed that the position of the political party in the given political context and its vertical relationship with the echelons of power in state and centre as a determinant. 17.67 percent looked at its support to urbanization
Q. 10. According to you what are the major aspects a Political Party should posses in its activity to be recognized as urbanization friendly?

| a. Good Organization | 112 | 37.33% |
| b. Large Membership   | 94  | 31.33% |
| c. Strong Monitory support base | 75  | 25.00% |
| d. Good political base | 19  | 6.33%  |
| e. Ability to maintain statues quo | 00  | 0.00%  |
Q. 11. How do you vouch for the activity of a Political party?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. By its contribution to policy making in city municipality/corporation</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>29.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. On the strength of its political base</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>41.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. On its status and its relation with upper echelons of power</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>17.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Its support extended to urbanization</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>11.67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
as a factor. It is certain that political base after determines the chances of winning or loosing for a political party. This in the future determines their ability to contribute.

To an additional question (10a) about which of the political parties in their district incidentally goes along their preferences, many respondents chose once again congress as Preference I and BJP as II.

Further, questions were asked to them about how political parties contribute to urbanizations (Table-12) 16.67 percent of the respondents felt that occupying the position of power through contesting elections would help them to contribute to urbanization. 22.33% of them looked at public interest aggregation as a method through which they could contribute to urbanization. However, they were quick to add that along side aggregation, they should also in effect make these public interest issues a reality. The respondents felt that they should scientifically analyze the peoples need and plan to alleviate their demands. 11 percent of the respondents felt that they should with their upward connectivity must contribute to the process of urbanization.

However, 27.67% percent of them felt that a political party must indulge in collection of the funds needed and work for getting infrastructural facilities to facilitate the process of urbanization. And 22.33 percent agreed that they will have to bring to the notice of the committees in the local bodies the issues of public interest and activate it.
Q. 12. How do you think Political parties contribute to urbanization process?

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<th>%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>By bringing the attention of committees in local bodies to the public interest issues and activating it.</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>22.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>By grappling to power</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>By its relation with higher echelons of power</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>By scientifically assessing people needs and aspirations and planning accordingly</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>22.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>By collecting funds and infrastructure facilities useful to urbanization.</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>27.67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Bar chart showing the percentage distribution of responses for each option.]

- Series 1: Option a. (22.33%) Option b. (16.67%) Option c. (11.00%) Option d. (22.33%) Option e. (27.67%)
- Series 2: Option a. (22.33%) Option b. (16.67%) Option c. (11.00%) Option d. (22.33%) Option e. (27.67%)
There in this table above a sense of all of the options are needed to contribute to the process of urbanization is quite clearly seen.

Further to these a check list of statements were shared with the respondents to understand their perception of the relationship between political parties and the process of urbanization in particular. This was of course done with choices given to the respondents. This formed the part 4 of the questionnaire the first question in this part was about the statement as mentioned under;

13. Parti Politics in Pro-urbanisation;

A majority of the respondents see Table 13. favored this question with yes (71.33%) and 28.67% said No. similarly to another quick check question 14. which of the following political parties can actually realise urbanization according to you. Their preference of 46.67 percent favored National political Parties (See Table-14). Regional political parties as having that capability was agreed by 26.67% percent of respondents felt that it was the party (which ever) in power (in State) as having the capability to definitely bring urbanization as a reality. About 6.67 percent were equally divided between local political parties and the party in power (at centre) as having the ability to definitely realize the process of urbanization.

To another question about the mutual contributory nature of political parties and the process of urbanization, the response was over whelming tilted towards yes
Part-4 Urbanization and Political Parties

Q. 13. Party Politics is Pro-Urbanization;

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Yes</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>71.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. No</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>28.67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q. 14. Which of the following Political parties can actually realize Urbanization according to you?

- a. National level Parties 140 46.67%
- b. Regional level parties 80 26.67%
- c. Local level Parties 20 6.67%
- d. Party in power at centre 20 6.67%
- e. Party in Power at State 40 13.33%
they are mutually contributory. Nearly 86.67% were in its favour and only 13.33 were against it (See Table-15)

The next question was proposed to investigate as to which development activity was an indicator of urbanization with the answer being industrialization, alone as an indicator 57% respondents did not share the view that industrialization alone was to define urbanization. About 43% agreed to it. (See Table-16)

For yet another question relating to urbanization as creating complicity in district administration and that the political party’s essential to resolve these complexities; the responses were in favour of yes, (78.67%) while 21.33% were not in its favour. (Table-17)

Further, it was asked to the respondents about the progress of any was identified by them in their district which they could connect to the activities of the political parties their response can be seen in Table-18 Nearly 60% agreed to it while 40% disagreed. However, for an additional question as to how they recognized it their was no response (18a) hence no analysis for it.

On a question relating to the political institution and its activity involving political parties, it was asked to the local governments such as munupalities/corporations if they have preference to administrative reforms to cope up with urbanization, the reply was negative with nearly 57% of the total respondents answering ‘No’ while other 43% (See Table-19) agreed but could not present any
Q. 15. Urbanization and Political parties are mutually contributory?

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Yes</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>86.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. No</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>13.33%</td>
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![Graph showing the responses to the question with Yes at 86.67% and No at 13.33%]
Q. 16. Industrialization alone is an indicator of urbanization;

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<th>Yes</th>
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<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>129</td>
<td></td>
<td>43.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>171</td>
<td></td>
<td>57.00%</td>
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</table>
Q. 17. Urbanization brings complex administrative challenges and Political parties are essential to resolve it;

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>a. Yes</strong></td>
<td>236</td>
<td>78.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>b. No</strong></td>
<td>64</td>
<td>21.33%</td>
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Q. 18. When you observe the progress of your district do you find that it is Progressive?

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Yes</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>60.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. No</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>40.00%</td>
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Q. 19. Has municipality corporation given primacy to solve peoples' problem and reform administration?

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
evidence to this effect both in Davanagere and Belgaum. It is true that, it is difficult to solve the problems of people or demands of the population in all (Atul Kholi’s criss of Governability) since they are dynamic. Apart from that finance is a matter of grave convent for all these institutions. Hence the problem.

Similarly, another question was about Cleanliness of the cities in both these districts. Though the opinions were divided it was not a very encouraging. Nearly 33.33% were very disappointed with political parties vis-à-vis deadliness of the cities. They said political parties that never bothered about a small thing like cleanliness, can not think of urbanization. 26.67% felt that there was a considerable attention paid to cleanliness. 20% (See Table-20) felt that political parties had paid full attention to these issues.

While other 20% felt, that there was satisfying attention paid to cleanliness, since most of these are quick check questions the responses have not been analyzed an they are self explanatory. This is done with a view to involve the readers in the ongoing issue of this research.

Similarly for a technical question about the impact of industrialization on the environment of cities no body of the 300 respondents had any reply (Q. 20a) Which is quite a story state. It is certain that ordinarily people do not try to understand the effects of development on the state of ‘nature’ or ‘Environment’ they live in unless
Q. 20. How much have the local representatives they worked for a 'clean city?'

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. To some extent</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. To Great extent</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>26.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. To a satisfying extent</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. No action</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
</tr>
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otherwise it is brought to focus by media or public interest litigation. Hence this, response is anticipated though pathetic.

For the last three questions which were deliberately designed to find models of urbanization and the influence of globalization the respondents reply were as follows;

Q. 22. Please give your model of urbanization;

The reply was overwhelmingly Bangalore (66.67%) 6.67 % preferred Chennai, 6.67% preferred Delhi Mumbai was not preferred by respondents although it si close to the hearts of both the districts. 20% marked it as another without endorsing any model (See Table-21)

While about the question on the influence of globalization on the political Parties to work for urbanization about 66.67% preferred to agree while that there was influence of globalisation on the choices and preference of urbanization they are proposing. 33.33% of respondents did not agree to this Idea and argued that it was their indigenous belief. (See Table-22)

To a last question which is direct one, it was asked if, globalization had affected the process of urbanization 66.67% agreed while 33.33% disagreed. (See Table-23)
Q. 21. Which model of urbanization do you have in your mind, when you take up urbanization?

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Bangalore</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Mumbai</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Chennai</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>Any other</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q. 22. Are Political Parties influenced by globalization in working towards Urbanization?

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<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>a. Yes</strong></td>
<td>200</td>
<td>66.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>b. No</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q. 23. Do you think globalization has had an Impact on urbanization process?

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</table>
This entire discussion of the statistical output clearly indicates the fact that urbanization is not a mere mechanical process but a conscious process of multidimensional contribution. Its facets are rather well spread and the political parties have a major role in promoting it. It is in fact true that urbanization is a process that mutually benefits political parties and population. From increased job opportunities to mobilization of people urbanization has a role to play. It is up to political parties to be vigilant about it keeping their future in focus.
Endnotes:

3. Yogendra Yadav, Understanding the Second Democratic Upsurge: Trends of Bahujan Participation in Electoral Politics in the 1990s in Francine Frankel et al., op.cit.
13. Pradeep Chibber, Democracy Without Association: Transformation of the party System and Social Cleavage in India,