CHAPTER VI

MACRO-CONTENT: AN EXPLORATION INTO THE STRUCTURE OF A THIRD WORLD METROPOLIS

- Socio-spatial Boundaries of urban Delhi
- Delhi's population and Urban Growth
- Economic Development of Delhi
- Occupational Structure
- Organised and unorganised sectors in Delhi: Who gets what?
- Urban Inequalities
- Urban Social Structure and Class Dynamics at Cognitive-Cultural Level
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CHAPTER V

MACRO-CONTEXT:
AN EXPLORATION INTO THE STRUCTURE OF A THIRD WORLD METROPOLIS

Like most of the big towns in the post-colonial Third World, Delhi - the proximate macro-context of the micro-focus of our research endeavour - has already become an unmanageable proposition for urban planners and managers. Massive immigrations of 'shabby' (as categorised from a middle class perspective) poor people from rural and relatively backward urban regions has made it a city of shanty towns and slums. The city, despite of relatively low population density (as compared to towns in the industrialised world) is almost bursting at its seams. The civic authorities are increasingly realising their inability to provide basic civic amenities like electricity, water and sewage disposal and housing to all the inhabitants of this city. Every year the problems are getting from bad to worse seriously hampering even the existing extremely low levels of quality of urban life almost for the majority of its inhabitants. The strains on existing essential services like transport, drinking water, sewage disposal and health has put these on the verge of collapse. The massive human squatting on public lands has made the provision of urban services to Delhi's inhabitants an almost impossible task.

In this chapter, we intend to explore the structural factors and institutional mechanisms that are contributing
to the internal dynamics and phenomenal growth of urban
Delhi over last 3-4 decades.

This city which is the proximate macro-context of
the micro-focus of our research endeavour is characterised
by wide diversity and heterogeneity in terms of its ethnic,
cultural and religious composition, quality of life and
living conditions of its inhabitants. The ease with which
lacs of people every year are attracted to this city every
year inspite of perpetually worsening living conditions
for the majority of its inhabitants has made many poets
since times immemorial to give a poetic touch to the
terrific pull of this city.

Just as 'Charisma' does not really explain political
dynamics, poetic vitality, magnetic pull of city and its
glitter cannot be seriously accorded the status of pertinent
causative factors underlying the phenomenal growth of this
city in post-colonial India. Only a sober understanding of
structural and institutional mechanisms of the city and
its wider macro-human ecological context can meaningfully
contribute to a valid analytical cognition of the internal
dynamics of this city.

A relevant, valid and adequate understanding of the
human situation of the huge mass of population living
within the spatial boundaries defined by socio-cultural-
cognitive parameters of its inhabitants is really beyond
As observed in chapters II and III, the macro-context (supra-system in systems' terminology) is an important component in the study of any micro-level socio-cultural system for a valid understanding of micro-level societal dynamics. It is especially so when any intended induced changes and development of the particular micro-system depends upon its linkages with the specific macro-context and the efficacy with which it is able to meaningfully adapt to it. It is another matter, however, that both social anthropologists as well as sociologists have generally preferred to ignore the existence of macro-contexts of their micro-level phenomenological realities.

In view of limited resources and time available for this research, all we have been able to accomplish is a surface level exploration into the structural and institutional mechanisms of the immediate macro-context of the micro-phenomenological domain of our enquiry.

**SOCIOSPATIAL BOUNDARIES OF URBAN DELHI**

Delhi has a long history (or histories) of urban inhabitation (see Ch.I). However, if for purpose of continuity Shahjahanabad built and inhabited in second quarter of 17th century is taken as a starting point, we find that till the takeover of the city by the British
in 1803, Delhi's urban boundaries were restricted mainly to the walls of this old city and a few sub-urban dwellings just outside the city walls in Pahar Gunj-Sadar Bazar area. As late as 1891, walled city population alone was 127,711 out of municipal Delhi's total population of 169,648 (see figure 8 for distribution of Delhi's population in 1891).

The strains of urban population growth have tended to gradually expand the geographical boundaries of this city. The first planned expansion of the city outside its walls was probably after 1858 when the shopkeepers displaced by large scale demolitions around the Red Fort (due to colonial government's security reasons) were given cheap plots in Sadar Bazar near Lahore Gate. This Bazar served the needs of soldiers stationed at Idgah and Pahari Dhiraj. This area further grew in population when laborers working on the Railway Lines started staying here. Due to demolition of Punjabi Katra (near Mori Gate) for Railways, the displaced persons migrated to Kishan Gunj. By 1970s the new civil Lines area had also become a posh residential complex. After shifting of the capital of colonial India from Calcutta to Delhi, Civil Lines Area grew in importance till the completion of 'New Delhi' near village Raissma well outside the city walls. In the meantime, the growing urban population of city's suburbs had made Pahari Dhiraj, Sadar Bazar, Pahar Gunj and Kishan Gunj coalesce into each other.
The Karol Bagh’s western extension area (WEA) scheme was to settle the families of workers employed in the construction of the new capital. The improvement in area between WEA and Sadar Bazar led to continuous inhabitation from WEA to the city walls. Across the river, Shahdara municipality was also growing at a rapid pace.

The major concentration of population, however, remained in old Delhi. As late as 1931, Old Delhi city municipality with an area of less than 18 sq.km had a population of more than 9 lacs out of Delhi’s total urban population of 14.37 lacs spread over an area of more than 196 sq.km.

Delhi’s urban limits, as identified in census surveys, have extended to cover an area of 591.9 sq.kms by 1981 to accommodate a steadily increasing urban population which stood at 57.7 lacs at the time of last census in 1981.

But as far as Delhi’s spatial boundaries are concerned, Delhiites do not tend to confine their cognitive map of Delhi to Union Territory’s urban limits alone. They have tended to regard not only rural agricultural areas of Delhi but also nearby districts of Ghaziabad, Faridabad, Gurgaon and Sonepat also as legitimate sites for Delhi-focussed residential and industrial activities. The natural
urban growth of these districts by way of development of new townships of Sahibabad, Rajendra Nagar and Noida (Ghaziabad), Faridabad and Gurgaon from where lot of persons working in Delhi commute daily. Moreover, many entrepreneurs residing in Delhi have set up industrial units in these areas; the raw materials as well finished products are merchandise of Delhi's markets. By the criteria of intensity of horizontal communications (human and economic), the sum total of these satellite towns and the urban area of Delhi now define the spatial boundaries of Delhites' cognition of their Delhi. This process is similar to that of Calcutta where Calcuttans' expanded cognition of spatial boundaries of Calcutta saw to its spatial expansion across its district boundaries to emerge as Greater Calcutta, the most populous city of India.

An indication of such a trend in future expansion of frontiers of urban Delhi is the massive colonisation activities (selling of agricultural land in small plot sizes for house construction) going on all around Delhi's territory, rural Delhi's territory in south and east upto U.T.'s boundary, west upto Najafgarh and North upto Narela having already been colonised since 1981.

DELHI'S POPULATION AND URBAN GROWTH:

Area covered under present day Union Territory of Delhi had constant urban growth since more than a century. It is not that Delhi did not have any setbacks. Delhi's
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1901</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1931</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>212,073</td>
<td>257,053</td>
<td>334,428</td>
<td>448,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Total Population</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
prosperity had always attracted evil intentions of foreign invaders which not infrequently resulted in its plunder and massacre of its inhabitants. In recent past (2-3 centuries), one can think of Nadir Shah, Ahmed Shah Abdali, Chulam Nadir Ruhala and the British. The expulsion of Delhites from walled city in 1858 by the British and regulated entry thereafter had a serious depopulating impact on Delhi.

The constant growth of Delhi's urban population is attributable to a great extent to its immigrants from other parts of India. During colonial period, labour influx for railway construction in late 1850s and early 1860s immaculate preparations for Durbar of 1903, construction of New Delhi in second and third decades of 20th century, massive immigrations from West Pakistan after India's partition and now a steadily increasing influx of persons from rural India seriously affected by agrarian crises of post-colonial India have all contributed to accelerated population growth and expansion of Delhi.

In terms of trends in rural-urban population growth rates, we see that even though urban Delhi has witnessed a constant accelerated growth since the beginning of 20th century (doctored by spurts in between), rural decennial growth rates have fluctuated from -3.2 to 39.9. This is due to the fact that demographic profile of Rural Delhi is
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rural Population</th>
<th>Urban Population</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
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<td>1861</td>
<td>62,208,400</td>
<td>3,826,600</td>
<td>66,035,000</td>
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<td>1870</td>
<td>64,369,000</td>
<td>4,015,000</td>
<td>68,384,000</td>
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<td>1880</td>
<td>71,974,000</td>
<td>4,504,000</td>
<td>76,478,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>80,426,000</td>
<td>5,190,000</td>
<td>85,616,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>90,771,000</td>
<td>5,875,000</td>
<td>96,646,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>100,795,000</td>
<td>6,554,000</td>
<td>107,349,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>111,514,000</td>
<td>7,232,000</td>
<td>118,746,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>123,041,000</td>
<td>7,909,000</td>
<td>130,950,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>135,737,000</td>
<td>8,587,000</td>
<td>144,324,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>149,336,000</td>
<td>9,265,000</td>
<td>158,601,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>164,207,000</td>
<td>9,943,000</td>
<td>174,150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>180,182,000</td>
<td>10,621,000</td>
<td>190,803,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>196,797,000</td>
<td>11,300,000</td>
<td>208,097,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>214,720,000</td>
<td>12,079,000</td>
<td>226,809,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>233,708,000</td>
<td>12,858,000</td>
<td>246,566,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>253,188,000</td>
<td>13,637,000</td>
<td>266,825,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>273,257,000</td>
<td>14,416,000</td>
<td>287,673,000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The demand for land and reclassification of thickly populated rural areas tend to negatively influence this particular demographic indicator whereas phases of fresh immigrants or urban Delhites settling in rural areas of Delhi due to relatively cheap land in urban Delhi's hinterland may give a high value to population growth rate for the corresponding periods. The declining sex ratio in rural Delhi (810 in 1981 and 825 in 1971) which has almost touched urban Delhi's sex ratio(808 in 1991) is an indication of fresh immigrants tending to settle in rural Delhi thereby transforming its demographic profile. If such a trend comes to stay, Delhi's rural areas will rapidly transform into a constant belt of human inhabitation.

In another way, Delhi's rural population has already been urbanised. The rapidly declining percentage of persons engaged in agricultural activities (cultivators: 21.43, Agricultural workers: 6.81, Total 30.24) in contrast to secondary sector's share being almost 25% and nearly 40% of rural Delhi's workers are engaged in Tertiary service sector activities (source: Census of India, 1981). The diversified industrial activities participation base of Delhi's rural population indicates a strong effective adaptation to urban work modes.
Keeping the above in view, we can treat Delhi's population as an integrated unit for the purpose of our exploration into the structure of the metropolitan city of Delhi.

**ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF DELHI**

As we observed in chapter I, the level of macro-level economic and social development achieved by Delhi is higher than that for India as an aggregate. The advantage of Delhi in its being the seat of central political power in colonial as well as post-colonial India seems to have contributed to its speedy economic development and associated population growth and phenomenal urban expansion.

Delhi had the tradition of having a large number of artisans and craftsmen who used to cater to the sophisticated needs of the ruling family and nobility. The institutions of *Morkhanas* in Moghul India where a number of craftsmen used to work together under a common roof appears to have continued till late phases of colonial rule. However, for raw materials and marketing purposes, artisans were dependent on merchant-traders. Such institutionalised pre-industrial manufacturing and marketing pattern can be considered as a forerunner to contemporary institutional arrangements of Delhi's urban informal economy.
These urban artisans were primarily dependent upon the needs of the royal household and nobility. The peasantry and city commoners did not have the means to afford most of the fine goods produced in urban areas. With the growth of direct trade with Europe in 17th and 18th centuries, the manufacturing activities in other Indian towns, considerably increased. The artisans, however, did not gain much out of the spurt in demand of their products as the merchants took over the factual control over production processes (see section on transformation of India's urban areas under colonial rule).

The change in colonial policy in early 19th century prohibiting Indian manufactured goods into Britain seriously hampered manufacturing activities in Delhi. Even the domestic market which happened to be largely dependent upon Moghul Court was also severely curtailed after pauperization of the Moghul nobility after British plunder and take over of the city. Some reports of that period indicate that many women of the royal household were, in fact actually engaged in petty-production activities like Kandilakashi and Tarkashi after their expulsion from the royal palace. In 1901, Delhi had 16,000 female workers. Quite a few men of noble families were engaged in menial jobs just to earn their daily bread.

After introduction of Railways in 1867, few modern factories with British-type production technology were set up by some rich Delhi merchants which employed good
number of people. The cotton ginning and spinning and 
flour industries were mechanised by 1888. By 1900, there 
were more than 2500 workers in the twenty mills in Delhi. 
The labour for these factories was mainly drawn from U.P. 
and Rajasthan. The non-mechanised factories for similar 
products continued to exist alongside 'mills' in Delhi.

Some industries in the non-mechanised traditional 
sectors suffered badly due to indigenous as well foreign 
competition of mass-manufactured products by mechanised 
processes. The decline in the number of leather workers 
from 11,000 in 1891 to 2,000 in 1901 was mainly due to 
European competition. Worse was the fate of Kandakasi 
and Tarakashi workers which were badly hit by cheap German 
manufacture of wire and tinsel. "This competition led not 
to large scale unemployment but under-employment which 
itself was very serious for those workers who were already 
living on the breadline. There were a lakh of people in 
Delhi and nearby villages (engaged in this industry). 
Most of the self-employed were so poor that fall-off in 
Kandia production was an index of distress conditions; 
during times of famine, the workers lacked the money to 
buy the metal which they manufactured into wire. In such 
a situation, the Islamic Lametta Company set up in 1999 
to manufacture wire by machinery was an additional blow.

The combined effect of foreign competition, mechanisation 
and famine explains the decrease in number of employed 
women in Delhi, from 16000 in 1901 to 11000 in 1911 (Gupta, 
1981: 63-64).
Since 1870s, when the first mechanised factory was set up in Delhi, there has been a constant growth in mechanised industries in Delhi. Some of the industrial units set up in 19th century like Delhi Cloth Mills (established in 1899) still continue to exist in Delhi. By 1951, out of total 249,740 industrial workers (including dependents as per 1951 census definition), about 50,000 were said to be working directly in the 3478 large and small scale factories in Delhi and the rest were in unorganised informal sector. Out of these, 411 factories had a workforce of about 40,000. The main spurt in industrial expansion came during second world war. The demand for factory-produced items in the British armed forces had caused the spurt and many factories were producing mainly for the army.

The number of registered factories in Delhi shows a continuous upward trend with 1096 in 1961, 1628 in 1970, 2965 in 1978, 4424 in 1984 and 5108 in 1987. 5108 factories in 1987 registered with the Labour Commissioner, Delhi Administration was reported to be employing 2.07 lakh workers (Delhi Statistical Handbook, 1988:82-84). Textile industry topped the list with 0.571 lakh workers followed by 'Metal and Engineering Products' with 0.343 lakh workers.
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Total</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Construction</td>
<td>9014</td>
<td>1794</td>
<td>1747</td>
<td>2797</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2) Manufacturing</td>
<td>5908</td>
<td>3925</td>
<td>3743</td>
<td>2279</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>3) Agriculture and allied</td>
<td>2382</td>
<td>2161</td>
<td>2043</td>
<td>1690</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4) Wholesale and Retail</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1820</td>
<td>1728</td>
<td>1458</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5) Transport, storage and communication</td>
<td>1188</td>
<td>1026</td>
<td>975</td>
<td>860</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>6) Real Estate</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>570</td>
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Notes:
- Table shows the economic output of various sectors in the years 1976, 1982, 1984, 1986, and their total.
- The sectors include Construction, Manufacturing, Agriculture and allied, Wholesale and Retail, Transport, storage and communication, and Real Estate.
- The data is from the Beijing Statistical Yearbook 1986 and the Census of India, 1981 Series, Part III & IV.
In spite of a blanket ban on setting up new large industrial units in Delhi, such as phenomenal increase in Delhi's number of registered factories and the workers employed therein is remarkable.

In terms of macro-development indicators, present level of Delhi's development, as compared to India's aggregate data, appears to be quite satisfactory (see Table 1.9).

The Union Territory's increasing macro-economic development can be gauged from its increasing GDP, viz. from ₹477 crores to 1895 crores during 1971-1981 at current prices and from ₹477 crores to 982 crores at 70-71 prices. Moreover, increase in workforce in non-agricultural activities from 7.89 lakhs in 1961 to 11.01 lakhs in 1971 to 19.35 lakhs in 1981 also reflects increasing intensity of economic activities in the city. The distribution of NDP across various types of activities, however, is not uniform. NDP per worker in various types of activities is seen to range between ₹3830 to more than ₹52,000 in 1981 (for details see Table 6.3).

**Occupational Structure**

As is quite evident from the data on changing occupational structure of Delhi from 1961-81 (1951 census definitions being different from those in subsequent years,
1951 data cannot be rigourously compared with 1961, 1971 and 1981 data), the labour force participation in services sector excluding commerce, transport, storage and communication is shrinking at a very rapid pace. During 1961-81, its contribution to Delhi's labour force fell from 42.6% to 31.2% - a decline of 11.4%. It is compensated by non-household manufacturing activities by 7.1% (19.9% to 27.0), trade by 4.0% (17.2% to 21.2%), construction 2.2% (4.1 to 6.3%) and transport, storage and communication by 1.2% (5.8% to 9.0%). Other losers were household industry 0.3% and agriculture 4.9%.

The increase in labour force participation in non-household manufacturing industry reflects a continuous pace of industrial development in Delhi, inspite of Delhi's Master Plan's restrictions on setting up of big industrial units in Delhi for ecological reasons. The increased labour force participation in trade, constructions, transport and communication can also be attributed to both the increase in Delhi's total population as also to its integral linkages of these sectors to industrial activities.

The declining share in 'other services' is really surprising as if we substruct the contribution of Public Sector from the total workforce in this sector, the private sector's share in 1987 works out to be less than 3.7 lakhs in 1987, viz. only 13.9% of the total workers are estimated to be employed in 'other services' in the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Census Reports</th>
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<tr>
<td>610.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
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<td>27.5</td>
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<td>17.5</td>
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</table>

**Table 6.4: Occupational Structure of India 1961-81**
private sector (both organised and unorganised) in 1987; indicating a relatively very small share of non-Governmental workers in 'other services' in Delhi.

**ORGANISED AND UNORGANISED SECTORS IN DELHI: WHO GETS WHAT?**

From the available data on total labour-force in different industrial activities and that on employment in the organised sector, we find that Manufacturing, Construction and Trade are predominantly of unorganised nature in Delhi. Each of these activities has less than 20% workforce employed in the organised sector establishments. On an average, about 70% of Delhi's workforce in working in the unorganised sectors of Delhi's economy (for details, see Table 6.5).

Due to lack of data pertaining to relative shares of incomes in respect of different levels of workforce participation in the urban economy, let us try to make our own rough estimates. 'Manufacturing Sector' employing about 6 lakh workers may serve as our starting point.

Even within the organised sector, the capacity of workers to effectively seek statutory protection, fair wages, etc. seem to depend upon the size of workforce employed in an establishment. For instance, in 1983-84, according to Central Statistical Organisation's Annual Survey of Industries in Delhi (1983-84), the average annual emoluments of 101,442 employees working in 609 census
### Occupational Sector

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>30.4</td>
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<td>33.6</td>
<td>33.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>31.4</td>
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<td>31.4</td>
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<td>Electricity, Gas and Mater.</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transport, Storage and Comm.</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<td>Real Estate, Financial Services</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community and Personal Services</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Workers</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>166</td>
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</table>

**Notes:**
- Percentages based on total workers.
- Due to slower growth rates in the organized sector, these are overestimates; i.e. the share of unorganized sector in 1987 (due to faster growth) is likely to be higher than estimated here.

---

### Estimated Shares of Organized and Unorganized Sector in Delhi, 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1987</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>68.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity, Gas and Mater.</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, Storage and Comm.</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate, Financial Services</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community and Personal Services</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Workers</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Because of the assumptions involved in the estimation of workforce in 1987 (due to relatively slower growth rates in the organized sector), these are overestimates; i.e. the share of the unorganized sector is less than that estimated here.
sector industries (each employing more than 50 workers each) was Rs.18,160 in contrast to average annual earnings of Rs.8,116 of 50932 employees working in 2631 non-census (10-50 workers per factory) factories covered under the Factory Act, 1948.

Let us try to analyse a predominantly unorganised sector in Delhi. Manufacturing' which employed about 5.6 lakhs workers in 1981 has more than 80% of these workers in the unorganised sector.

Registered manufacturing (under Factories Act) units numbering 4424 in 1984 employed 1.79 lakh employees with value-added (output-input) of Rs.36651 lakhs (per worker = Rs.14972) whereas the value added by 3.5 lakh workers in about 53,000 small-scale production units was only Rs.39,512 lakhs (average per worker = 11,300). If we further keep in mind the factor costs in NDP (of India as a whole (table 5,7), the employee's share was only 25.5% of the value-added in the unorganised sector with 63.2% going to the owners of these petty units in the unorganised sector, the average annual earnings of employees in the unorganised sector are estimated to be less than Rs.3400 per year with the owners of these units earning more than Rs.47000 on an average per year.

Such gross inequalities in the earnings of persons working in similar type of activities is nothing unusual
for urban third world contexts. Our rough estimates in case of Delhi's manufacturing sector work force comes out to be something like table 6.6.

### Table 6.6

SOME ESTIMATES OF AVERAGE EARNINGS OF PARTICIPANTS IN DELHI'S MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 1994.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sr. No.</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Approximate Numbers</th>
<th>Approximate Average Per Annum (Rs.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Organised census sector owners</td>
<td>≤ 1000</td>
<td>≥ 15,00,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(employing more than 50 workers)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Organised non-census sector owners</td>
<td>≥ 4000</td>
<td>2,35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(employing 10 to 50 workers)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Organised census sector employees</td>
<td>1,00,000</td>
<td>13,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Organised non-census sector employees</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Unorganised sector owner/self employed</td>
<td>53,000</td>
<td>47,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Unorganised sector employees</td>
<td>3,50,000</td>
<td>3,350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
URBAN INEQUALITIES

The extent of economic inequalities in Metropolitan Delhi can be inferred from the simple fact that whereas the per capita net domestic product of urban Delhi in 1973-74 was Rs.1865 (155.4 per month) [Source: Central Statistical Organisation], consumer expenditure survey conducted by the Bureau of Economics and Statistics (1973-74) revealed that 22.8% of the households accounting for 29.6% of the population were in the lowest class of monthly per capita expenditure class "<Rs.55". In the next higher class "Rs.55-100" there were 39.8% of households accounting for 41.5% of population. The next higher class "Rs.100-200" covered 27.1% of households and 21.7% of population. The remaining 10.3% of households accounting for 7.2% of population were in the highest expenditure category of "Rs.200 and above". The workers in the organised sector, professionals and businessmen seem to be included in the higher economic classes whereas more than 70% of urban population, presumably participants in informal sectors of economy, were reeling under abject poverty conditions.

The relatively slow rise in wages in informal sector as compared to factor rise in prices has further accentuated the problem of living standards for bottom three quartiles of Delhi population. The problem seem to have been
accentuated due to continuing massive influx of population from other parts of India. Due to specific processes of development in agrarian sectors of neighbouring states, the migrations from rural U.P., Bihar, H.P., Rajasthan and other States is continuing in increasing proportions. According to a survey made by Delhi Administration, there are 200,000 (juggis) (shacks) in more than 600 clusters all over urban Delhi. Most of the inhabitants of these shacks are new immigrants from rural areas who have come to Delhi in search of a living. As the setting up a jhuggi requires a considerable amount of entrepreneurial skills a large number of new immigrants are also staying in rented rooms in unauthorised colonies where rents are still relatively cheap. Most of those new immigrants have managed to eke out a subsistence by working in informal sectors of urban economy.

The aspiration of immigrants is to seek entry into the organised sector (Government or Private corporate sector) where earnings are relatively high and workers enjoy protection by way of enforcement of statutory provisions. The organised Trade Unions impart a fair bargaining power to the employees of the organised sector who are able to get rise in wages commensurate with rising prices.

The entry to formal organised sector is however highly restricted. The mounting list of unemployed registered with the employment exchanges and relatively very few
openings are indicative of this fact. The entry to the bottom of hierarchy of Public Sector undertakings, police and army are facilitated by right contacts activated or by pay-offs ranging between ₹10,000-20,000.

The organised sector establishments also maintain a dual category of labour. One is the regular privileged labour force enjoying all the benefits. The other is the casual or daily paid labourers who draw nearly 50% of the endowments of regular workers while performing the same jobs. Not infrequently the labour supply is arranged through contractors who take off a slice of their earnings.

Even Government bodies like Public Works Department, Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking, New Delhi Municipal Committee and Municipal Corporation of Delhi employ a large army of daily workers working for many years and whose actual labour input in real terms is much higher than regular monthly workers due to relative insecurity of jobs.

Almost all the workers in unorganised informal sector interviewed by us aspired entry into the organised sector even on daily paid basis as it would give them at least the benefit of 'minimum wages act' of the government and also ensure some security of employment.
The perception of inequalities between these three broad categories of urban labour force is quite marked. The existence of masses of unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled labour force in 'informal sector' acts as a strong constraint to the bargaining power of organised trade unions of organised sector. The quashing of DTC employees strike of 1987 by the Government by just permitting private bus operators to ply in the city and subsequent advertisement for recruitment of bus drivers and conductors was enough to kill the strike. The massive queues of skilled persons outside DTC offices for employment on daily basis was enough to crush the morale of DTC employees who started returning to their duties within 2-3 days time.

Lacking detailed quantitative data pertaining to relations of production in the organised and unorganised sectors of metropolitan Delhi's economy in various types of economic activity performed, we will try to compare the cumulative data on workers' status collected by Census Survey (Table 6.7) with the patterns of consumption expenditure provided by Consumer Expenditure Surveys, keeping in mind our rough estimates of average incomes of various classes (Table 6.6). We are aware of the tenuous nature of such assumptions and a lack of relative rigour to validate inferences derived from such comparisons. However, in light of qualitative data collected from various levels of urban socio-cultural system, we feel that such inferences are not really out of context.
Furthermore, accepting the validity of the assumptions of free horizontal mobility within various social classes identified on the basis of their capacity to possess material and skills resources and structurally governed relatively rigid boundaries of such classes, we can make another associated assumption that the market mechanisms tend to provide for similar earning capacity for workers in these classes occupying similar structural class positions in various types of economic activities.

The interpretation of our class-income data (Table 6.6) in light of these assumptions plus our primary qualitative data, we infer that the highest consumption class (>Rs.200.00...
per capita per month) constituting 7.2% of Delhi's population contains the 'Employers' (5.9% of total) and highest strata of employees in the organised sector. The next consumption class (£100-200 per month per capita) containing 21.7% of Delhi's population appears to be constituted by top 50% of workers in the organised sectors (39.5% of total) and relatively well-off among the self-employed single workers (19.1%) and family workers (19.1%). The near-destitution consumption class (£55-100 per month per capita) containing 41.5% of Delhi's population appears to be constituted by lower rungs of the organised sector labour force negatively affected by non-household level consumption like use of alcoholic intoxicants, drugs and gambling, and higher levels of unorganised sector work force (64.5% of total). The participation in the lowest 'below destitution' level consumption class (£55 per month) containing 29.6% of population appears to be the sole privilege of the lower levels of unorganised sector labour force.

In terms of demographic trends, the number and percentage of Delhi's population in the lower consumption classes is constantly increasing due to lower opportunities of employment in the organised public and private sectors and the massive influx of immigrants to the city increasing labour supply and reducing real wages of workers belonging to free-market labour pools catering to informal sectors of the metropolitan economy. Even though standard of living at these lowest levels of urban living as perceived
by these immigrants is considered better than the living standards in the regions of their outmigration, their highly restricted capacity to procure basic utilities like housing is further accentuating already existing urban inequalities.

In addition to such marked urban inequalities across various classes, more pronounced inequalities are observed within the higher income strata. As per the income-tax returns filed in Delhi, the number of persons reporting annual incomes more than Rs.20,000 was less than 1.25 lakhs (5.1% of total workers) in 1985-86. As indicated in Table 6.8, the disparities within incomes reported by the class are really glaring. The implication of such a situation for urban social structures and its intricate relationships with demographic and urban class-dynamics need intensive in-depth anthropological research beyond the scope of this study.
### Table 6.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Level (Rs.)</th>
<th>Number of Workers (000)</th>
<th>Number of Returns (000)</th>
<th>Income Level (Rs.)</th>
<th>Number of Workers (000)</th>
<th>Number of Returns (000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50-100</td>
<td>1176.8</td>
<td>4.006</td>
<td>1172</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>5.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-200</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>7.08</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>20.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200-400</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>9.15</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>4.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400-600</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>20.31</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600-1000</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50-100</td>
<td>1176.8</td>
<td>1172</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>5.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100-200</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>20.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>200-400</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>4.47</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>600-1000</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1176.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>1172</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.80</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.07</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above data indicates that less than 2200 persons in Delhi's population is enjoying the advantage of more than 8.4% of total incomes in Delhi with only 94 persons claiming nearly 4.5% of total state income as their personal incomes. However, in view of the prevalent tax structures and the associated advantages of concealing actual incomes at higher levels, the real inequalities in incomes is much more pronounced than those reflected in incomes reported for tax purposes.

The translation of such economic inequalities into a system of socio-cultural classes and its sets of hierarchical symbols, values of which are based upon the urban market mechanisms has given rise to an interesting range of analytic relations between economic structures and emergent cultural-cognitive categories of urban Delhi's socio-cultural class system.

**URBAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND CLASS DYNAMICS AT COGNITIVE-CULTURAL LEVEL**

Anthropologists and sociologists have been completely amazed with the rapidly declining importance of certain primordial cognitive-cultural categories like caste and kinship in micro-level social structures of post-colonial urban India. The 'modernization epoch' social scientists tended to explain away such declining importance of primordial ideologies in terms of the modernising influence of urbanisation and industrialisation processes. However,
the resurgence of primordial sentiments relating to language, religion, caste, ethnicity and regionalism in various parts of 'developed' India is resulting in serious rethinking over such modernization and development as assumed earlier (cf. Mahajan and Singh, 1987).

Even at the present infantile stage of urban anthropological research, some exceptionally good ethnographic works on urban communities' informal economic sector workers and culture of poverty dot the scene. However, an adequate integrated analytical comprehension of the complex networks of social interactions, emerging modes of stratification, the cognitive-structural attributes defining hierarchical social classes and the macro-processes underlying such micro-sociological phenomena is usually considered beyond the scope of urban anthropology in the third world. The overwhelming focus on micro-level cognitive-cultural-communication phenomena and non-temporal modes of description and analysis in social anthropology seem to underlie such denial of possibility of analytic understanding of relatively large scale social units, as cities and towns. Furthermore, heterogeneity created by separation of interpersonal communication based on neighbourhood and habitat, those defined by work situations and macro-institutionally governed rules for societal interactions appears to map out a social realm beyond the conventional anthropological cognition which feels at ease with overlapping of such interactions at micro-societal levels rather than with their separation.
A detailed analysis of urban social structure and class dynamics of metropolitan Delhi, therefore, lies beyond the resources-time constraint of the present study. However, in view of our identified empirical objective to simultaneously analyse our micro-focus (Gaduliya Lohars) and its macro-contexts, at least an exploratory cognitive-cultural account of the proximate macro-context of our micro-focus is considered essential.

**Consumption Symbols and Urban Hierarchy**

From an actor's point of view, the hierarchy of social classes in metropolitan Delhi is identified by possession of stratified status attributes in the realm of housing, locomotion, socialisation of young, occupational hierarchies and other consumption goods of modern urban-industrial society. The possession of such symbols for defining social status is in turn governed by the position of an individual in patterns of economic activities and the associated earnings. Not infrequently the rank orders of such symbols possessed by an individual, in their various symbolic hierarchies, tend to be similar thereby indicating the possibility of analytically delineating one's position from such symbols in the urban hierarchy to match with rank-orders at cognitive cultural levels.
An individual/family tries to make an optimum use of economic resources at their disposal to acquire a maximum rank-score in cumulative terms in order to achieve a higher 'status' at cognitive level. The use of such consumption symbols tends to inculcate increasing dependency upon such symbols which in turn govern the lifestyle of their owners. The informal socialisation processes, in the family and the peer groups, tends to generate a tendency to transmit these stratified cultural patterns to successive generations. Any upward mobility of an individual resulting in higher earnings imparts an individual/household a capacity to acquire symbols of a higher rank-order, thereby facilitating his upward mobility in terms of urban cultural-cognitive class structures also. The co-operation across such vertical socio-cultural urban classes either on kinship or caste lines appears to be rare. However, there are numerous cases of an individual, regulating discriminatory advantages in formal bureaucracy, helping individuals from lower socio-cultural classes in availing available state-regulated opportunities for facilitating some upward mobility. Such co-operation across classes is usually believed to occur with maximum intensity on linguistic, regional and religious identities overlapping (of benefactor and the beneficiaries).

For all practical purposes, the maximum degree of interpersonal communication and cooperation is witnessed to operate within a particular class. The perception of
opportunities, access to information and occupational mobility also appear to be governed along class lines. Even though ideally such urban socio-cultural matrices are supposed to be rational and open societies, the differential access to structures of opportunities tends to largely reproduce existing socio-cultural classes across successive generations with little probabilities of upward mobility, albeit facilitating a good deal of horizontal mobility within the classes. Even though there has been a general preference to forge marital alliances along 'traditional' caste and kinship lines, there is a strong tendency to restrict marital alliance within a particular class. There is an increasing tendency to cross 'caste' barriers in establishing matrimonial relations and rely exclusively on class parameter for this purpose. Among relatively new immigrants there exists a tendency to marry in the region of their origin indicating their incomplete enculturation into metropolitan urban cultural systems.

**RESTRICTED OPPORTUNITIES, FAILURE AND FATALIST RESPONSES**

The arena of opportunities and status ascriptions being characterised by tough competition, unduly prolonged socialisation and parental care of the young (sometimes 25-30 years of age) and increasing age of marriage specially in higher classes seems to have attained the level of societal values and norms. Among lower classes, due to the relative inability of the parents to provide for prolonged
parental care, the situation appears to be quantitatively different from higher classes to a great degree.

Due to relatively higher earnings in the organised sectors, employment therein for an individual appears to have become an important achievement on part such person to become an independent adult who can assume responsibility of maintaining a family. The increasing number of persons on 'live Register' of the employment exchanges of Delhi (from less then three lakhs in 1981 to more than seven lakhs in 1987, i.e. growth at 15.56% per annum) reflects upon the importance of such employment at cognitive-cultural levels. Due to relatively slow rate of growth of opportunities in the organised sectors, only 3,72,000 persons could be provided employment (temporary or permanent) during 1981-87 as compared to 11,80,000 persons registered during this period. Many a registered applicants chose not to renew their registration in view of limited chances of securing organised sector employment and were to be satisfied with work in the informal unorganised 'private' employment.

The socio-cultural stresses of such urban unemployment is acutely felt in 'middle' clerical and allied occupational classes. The failure of an educated youth to acquire atleast the class position of the parents, if not a higher one, tends to be regarded as his incompetence and failure in life.
The complex psychological frustrations on part of such youth greatly stimulated the thriving business in hallucinating drugs like heroin, charas and smack over recent years. It was estimated that in 1985, there were more than one lakh smack-addicts in Delhi alone. Most of them were unemployed frustrated youth looking for an escape from their structural realities in use of such drugs.

Another indication of accentuating stresses of metropolitan Delhi's living is the increasing use of alcohol as an intoxicant. Even if we allow for the fact that all the imported spirit and wine (105,000 litres during 1987-89) and a small part of Indian spirits were used by higher classes as a consumption symbol for 'social' reasons, the increase in use of 'Desi' and Indian spirits from 1141,000 litres in 1971 to 10594,500 litres in 1981 to 8942,500 litres in 1987 as intoxicant for use by lower classes appears to be an indicator of acute stresses of living in urban metropolitan Delhi as experienced by these classes.

To a participant observer, the above data provided by Delhi Administration's Commissioner of Excise is only the tip of an iceberg. It is commonly known that the demand for alcoholic intoxicants by lower classes is met more by illegal sales outside the Excise Commissioner's tax net than by those within it. Not infrequently are the deaths reported due to use of cheap toxic alcohol purchased from illegal sources.
The use of alcoholic intoxicants, as escape from uncertainties of urban employment and living, is tending to become an integral part of the lifestyle of urban poor (in contrast to traditional values against such use) as part of a developing fatalist, present time-oriented culture-trait complex, commonly known in anthropological jargon as 'culture of poverty'. In terms of sexual dimorphism, males belonging to various classes of urban poor exhibit a greater tendency to imbibe various traits of 'poverty culture'. The females, even though they are under a much greater structural stress, due to males imbuing traits of culture of poverty which strongly accentuates existing poverty conditions at family level, have shown considerable resistance to such structural influences. Their responses to their structural position is seen to be increasing participation in labour force (predominantly unorganized and informal) rather than one of psychological escape as witnessed among men.

Among highest echelons of urban metropolitan society (< 0.5% of population), huge amounts of accumulated surpluses (after meeting consumption needs of the highest rank symbols) are resulting in a peculiar lavish life style. Uncultivated vulgar display of non-functional symbols, loosening of values pertaining to sexual relationships by both males and females as well as perception of a goal-less life and boredom by this class all indicate a cultural crisis within
this class that is also increasing cognised by some of its members. The uncritical imbibing of western values, consumption symbols and other cultural elements appear to have largely contributed to such cultural crisis and its associated psycho-social stresses. The cultural and biological (indicated by type of medical problems) consequences of 'affluence' experienced by this class appear to be similar to their western counterparts in Europe and North America.

**Hierarchies of Consumption Symbols**

The multitude of consumption symbols used to denote one's socio-cultural class position is relatively easily amenable to quantitative rank-order analysis. As the collection of such detailed data was considered to be outside the purview of this study, we should be satisfied only with a sketchy outline of such symbols. The market value of a symbol is a strong determining factor of its rank in the stratification patterns of a symbolic hierarchy.

For example, in the sphere of locomotion related consumption symbols, one may list use of (1) Imported cars, (2) Indigenous cars and Jeeps, (3) Motor Cycles and scooters, (4) Taxis, (5) Auto rickshaws, (6) Public Transport Buses and (7) Bicycles. The data from Delhi Administrator's Directorate of transport indicates the increase in number
of cars and jeeps from 61.5 thousand in 1971 to nearly 242 thousand in 1987, scooters/motor cycles from 1091 thousand to nearly 8679 thousand, Autorickshaws from 10.8 thousand to 45.5 thousand and Taxis from 4105 to 8919 during this period. Average number of passengers carried by public sector buses also increased from 10 lakhs in 1970-71 to 48.27 lakh in 1987-88 whereas the use of bicycles, a cheap mode of locomotion associated with lowest strata, drastically declined in the metropolitan Delhi.

The possession of more than one symbol for locomotion, say a car and a motorcycle, by an individual helps him to use one for functional use and other for status display. The display of cars and jeeps for their exhibitionist value to enhance status while using scooters and other cheaper modes of locomotion by middle classes reinforces such an inference.

Another set of symbols used to denote social class position in urban areas is the size, type of habitat and its location in Delhi. The cultural cognition of one's class position by the type of 'colony' and the size of dwelling unit acts as a strong economic mechanism regulating one's class position. The identified 'posh' colonies of the extremely rich, (price more than 10 million &. per dwelling unit), not so posh but decent as colonies of very rich (approximately 10 million each)
middle class colonies (51-5 million) of not so rich appear
to define one's class position within the highest strata
of urban Delhi. Flats/apartments in these elite autho-
rised decent localities also are in great demand with
price tags varying between 6 lakh to more than 30 lakh
rupees. Then comes unauthorised colonies provided with
civic amenities which are predominantly considered the
habitat of the middle classes. Even though resettlement
colonies (largely developed by the Government for the
masses of Jhuggi dwellers in mid-70s) have been considered
traditionally the abode of the poor, the increasing prices
of land (now about 1.25 lakh for a 25 sq.yds (20.9 sq.
metres) plot) indicate their inhabitation by lower middle
classes. As of now about half of Delhi's population lives
in recognised slums, Jhuggis etc. with complete lack of
civic amenities. The massive house construction plans
by DDA has failed to remove 'dwelling type' from this
list of symbols regulating socio-cultural positions. On
the contrary, the rapidly increasing prices of land and
real estate have made these symbols a convenient currency
for use by the rich to invest their accounted and unaccounted
incomes in a profitable way. Such market processes,
controlled by possession of adequate cash surpluses,
have provided strong extra-cognitive structural mechanisms
regulating access to various socio-cultural strata of urban
Delhi.
An adaptive response at cognitive-cultural level to such constraining of class positions by professional classes in the hiring of accommodation in colonies of the rich at high rents, so as to identify culturally with the higher strata. Such adaptive strategy for higher class identification, nevertheless, puts a severe economic strain upon these classes severely restricting their capacity for acquiring and using other status related symbols.

Still another conspicuous set of status-determining symbols relate to type of schooling enjoyed by the children. On the top of the hierarchy are a few elite schools patronised by the extremely rich and then follows the hierarchy of various 'public' schools with the Government schools lying at the bottom of the hierarchy. There is a competition to get one's wards admitted to 'public' schools. In most of these schools, despite their professed public image of meritocracy, it is possible to get a child admitted either with right connections or with 'donations' which may range from tens of thousand rupees to a few lakhs of rupees depending upon the elitist level of the school. The amount of tuition fees are also proportional to its position on elite hierarchy. The status value of these symbols relating to socialisation is so great that among middle class professionals there is a feeling that to get a job is easier than getting admission to a good school.
The cognitive perception of success probability of a child, being dependent upon the quality of education (and the type of school attended) in a tough competitive world by urban Delhites, has made them translate the need for maintenance of one's class position into demand for such elite schools. The increasing demand for quaternary sector 'tuitions' and 'capitation fee' engineering and medical colleges (mainly in southern India) and flourishing business of private colleges preparing students for competitive examinations (for entry into prestigious academic institution and employment) are all symptomatic of importance of symbols of socialisation being cognised as institutional mechanisms regulating socio-cultural class positions.

The list of such hierarchical status deriving symbols in various institutional arenas appears endless. In fact urban Delhites, like other Indian metropolitan town dwellers, tend to stratify various institutional responses to perceived functional needs into symbol-hierarchies which are supposedly governing urban socio-cultural class dynamic atleast in cognitive-cultural terms. Such symbols of high standard living are not infrequently reinforced at cognitive levels by well-designed information/signals received by Delhites through mass-communication channels like Radio and Television as part of 'entertainment' programmes sponsored by producers/sellers of such symbols.
Whereas consumption symbols like those used for dwelling and locomotion tend to effectively restrict one's access to higher class positions by use of strong market mechanisms, the desire to attain a higher class position at least at the level of cognitive behaviour generates a mass-demand for consumable goods produced by organised sector units and sold by brand names. Pushed by aggressive publicity campaigns and accepted due to specific urban cultural patterns emerging in third world cities, this mass demand for 'modern' consumption goods strengthens the cultural dependency of urbanites on such goods, whose manufacturers are even able to successfully hike their prices by artificially created market scarcities inspite of their low functional utility and relatively low purchasing power of most of their consumers.

The ways in which such increasing cultural dependency of third world people on the consumer goods produced by foreign and indigenous manufacturers affects their real standards of living might be an interesting area of social anthropological research of direct societal relevance. However we are not concerned with detailed analysis of such structure-cognitive relations at least in this study. Our intention was merely to point out an important cultural element of a third world metropolis.
Two sets of factors appear to govern the interpersonal communication networks and their boundaries from anemic actor's viewpoint. These are mode of participation in economic activities and the habitat for living.

In case of organised sector workers, both these tend to be relatively permanent. Such permanence facilitates sustained friendship and neighbourhood level intense interpersonal communication networks. The relative economic security enjoyed by such workers also helps them in successfully discharging family and kinship linked obligations thereby rendering retention potential of such primordial ties.

As regards the workers in unorganised sectors, their relative fluidity of employment and work-place and their extremely low probability of having a permanent dwelling makes such sustained interpersonal communication linkages a difficult proposition. The failure in discharging one's obligations to the family and kins may result in tenacity of such relations thereby resulting in loss of these sources of emotional and effective stability as well. Such conditions may result in speedy imbibing of 'culture of poverty' in varying degrees.

The failure to sustain harmonious, co-operative interpersonal communications in conditions of third world slum-living indicate the frequent cultural-relational...
response to structural forces generating such poverty conditions.

Among the middle classes, eventhough there is plenty of apparently intense interpersonal and social communication between their members, the growing competition for access to scarce resources puts such classes in an ambivalent socio-cultural position. The increasingly hypocritical behaviour of these classes can also be properly understood as a response to their ambivalent structural position.

Among the higher classes, one witnesses a marked tendency to restrict intense interpersonal communications and cooperation at the household level itself. The relative autonomy of these households provided by their affluence makes their members independent of need for such cooperation. The absence of such communications in spatial neighbourhood is, however, partly compensated by specific club-like communication patterns usually established between members of such classes. The class identity of the classes instead of being reflected in horizontal communication networks is reinforced by conspicuous displays of consumption symbols, like dresses, cars and houses.

The communication boundaries in urban areas usually overlap with class boundaries. The relative cessation of communications across class boundaries is usually guided by cognitive-level prejudices against cultural attributes of other classes which tend to inhibit communications.
across class boundaries. The paramount importance of such socio-cultural classes as cognised in stratified access to consumption symbols and/or the capacity to do so is also indicated by extremely weak interpersonal communications along caste and kin level across class boundaries.

In contrast to many other metropolitan towns of India, Delhi did not experience much organised political resurgence of primordial sentiments. Presumably the non-overlap of urban classes and primordial ties provides the clue to such a situation in contrast to other parts of India where such overlap had incidentally occurred and which facilitated perception of one’s class position in the idiom of primordial sentiments like language, caste, ethnicity and religion.