CHAPTER IV

THE DRDS - FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
(DHARWAD AND KOLAR DISTRICTS)
This chapter is devoted to a functional analysis of the DRDS with reference to Dharwad and Kolar districts. Structures prescribe a pattern of action resulting from the institutions of the system. It is, therefore, necessary to deal with the functional expressions and orientation of a given structure.

Functions may be defined as the objective consequences of a pattern of action for the system in which it occurs. Merton is of the opinion that functions are those observed consequences which make for adoption or adjustment of a given system, and dysfunctions those observed consequences which lessen the adaptation or adjustment of the system. Further Merton classifies functions into intent and recognition, which can be termed as manifest and latent functions. Manifest functions are intended and recognised consequences of patterns of action whereas unintended consequences are termed as latent function. Under this broad theoretical framework the functional aspects of the DRDS will be analysed. The consequences intended and unintended functions of the structure adopted will be probed and analysed. As seen from the discussions in the preceding chapter, the structural connotations of the DRDS are primarily drawn on the Weberian ideal-type. Hence, the overall structure being the public
bureaucracy, the functional and dysfunctional aspects of the bureaucracy with reference to the DRDS will be analysed. In a study of bureaucratic organisation like the DRDS, the predictions and prejudices of bureaucrats should also be analysed in a meaningful manner. These have greater implication for rural development since a positive and missionary orientation and approach is needed to bring about rural development and social change. In essence, the functional approach focuses on the consequences of the administrative actions for the goals of the administrative sub-system and for the social system as a whole.

**The Dharwad and Kolar DRDS Governing Body:**

The strength of DRDS governing body comes to 23 officials and 4 non-officials with all M Ps, M.L As, and M.L Cs, and representatives of small farmers appointed by the Government. The strength varies from district to district. In case of Dharwad district, it is 2 M.Ps, 18 M.L.As, and 4 M.L Cs. As regards the Kolar district, it is 2 M Ps, 12 M.L.As, and 2 M.L.Cs.

The composition of the governing body shows that it is a conglomeration of official expertise and an element of popular will. Thus it is neither purely an expert official body nor purely representative in nature, but a combination of both these elements. Obviously, this ensures a balance between the specialised requirements
of modern public administration and the representative character of a democratic government. In essence the irrationality of the masses and the rationality of the officialdom is balanced so as to achieve democratic efficiency.

The size of the governing body is more than 35. The question arises whether such a size is optimum. The governing body is like a committee and as such its effectiveness has some relationship to its size. It is difficult to determine the optimum size of a governing body since it is not feasible to indicate the exact number. In a commercial undertaking usually the Governing Boards or bodies will not have so many numbers as to make free discussion impossible, or so few that the necessary breadth of viewpoint is not obtainable. Hence the lower limit (size of board) should be such that it should enhance the efficiency and democratic working of the enterprise whereas the upper limit on size should be determined by practicable consideration of workability.

Keeping the considerations of lower and upper limits on the size of the governing body, the present strength of 35 is optimum. It is optimum in the sense that efficiency and democratic working will not be affected with the existing size. Secondly, on practical consideration also the present size is suitable. But some scholars have opined that the present size is unwieldy in its nature.
Another facet of a governing body is its composite nature. It consists of a majority of officials who are primarily heads of functional departments in the district. They will be looking after their functional departments at sub-district levels. Likewise, the members from financial institutions will also be interested in their banking activities. Paradoxically, the DRDS governing body does not have enough representation of the rural socio-economically weaker populace, who are its ultimate target group. Since most of the members are officials and bankers are primarily concerned with their functional activities, it is obvious that their attention to the DRDS activities is only secondary. With the overburdened Deputy Commissioner as Chairman and members who give secondary attention to the DRDS activities, it casts doubts on the effectiveness of the governing body. Moreover, the effectiveness lies mainly in its activities and working.

**Governing Body Meetings Of Dharwad And Kolar:**

The governing body of the DRDS should meet at least once in a quarter for transacting its business. This is a requirement under the rules of the society. The Dharwad DRDS has met 20 times whereas the Kolar DRDS 19 times in the five year period of 1979-1984. It shows that these two DRDS have adhered to the statutory requirements. Even though these two DRDS governing bodies have fulfilled the constitutional requirement, on a few occasions they have not held the meetings.
regularly. For instance, the Dharwad DRDS governing body did not meet for six months i.e., from 26-6-1979 to 21-12-1979 and again a period of five months i.e., from 22-5-1980 to 29-9-1980 elapsed without a meeting. Likewise, the governing body of Kolar DRDS also failed to meet regularly. There were gaps of four months, five months and six months between 27-2-1980 and 28-3-1981 between three successive meetings.

**Attendance Of Members:**

Effective and efficient decision-making requires active participation by the members. The participation by members in the decision-making process also gives a sort of legitimacy to the decisions taken. This is so because when members participate in decision-making, they are morally bound by the decisions taken. Let us explore how far the members of the governing body attend the meetings. In the Dharwad DRDS governing body meetings the average attendance of the members is 20, whereas in Kolar DRDS governing body meetings it stands at 18. The average absentees in these meetings stands at 4 and 2 for Dharwad and Kolar DRDS respectively.

On further investigation among the absentee members it is seen that the Planning Officer, CADA Belgaum, District Social Welfare Officer, Deputy Director of Agriculture (Soil Conservation), Divisional Forest Officer, Superintendent Engineer, KEP are the members absent often in
the Dharwad DRDS governing body in Kolar DRDS, it is Assistant Director of Sericulture, District Social Welfare Officer, representative of RBI, Manager, Canara Bank are members absent often. The following table No 4.1 gives the clear picture of the members absent and the number of times they were absent.

TABLE - 4.1

Governing Body Members Absence in Number of Times

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl No.</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Dharwad</th>
<th>Kolar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>President, K.C C Bank, Dharwad</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Manager, Syndicate Bank</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Agriculture (SC)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Executive Engineer</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Senior Assistant Director of Fisheries</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Planning Officer, CADA, Belgaum</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>District Social Welfare Officer</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Manager, State Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Superintending Engineer KEB</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Assistant Project Officer, Livestock Production Programme</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Divisional Forest Officer</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Deputy Commissioner</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>District Horticulture Officer</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Assistant Director of Horticulture</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Representative of R.B.I.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Planning Officer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Manager, Canara Bank</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Sericulture</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>General Manager D.I.C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Assistant Director of Sericulture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Senior Assistant Director of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Service</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There is a trend of delegating representatives to the governing body meetings. This may be inevitable in a few instances, but if it becomes a regular phenomena, it will certainly affect the status of the body. Also it will undermine the decisions taken at the meetings. As regards the Dharwad DRDS Governing Body, on an average three members are represented by the representatives. Going still deeper we have to find out who the members are who often delegated representatives. Table 4.2 gives the clear picture.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl. No</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>No. of times Representatives have been delegated (This includes who have sent more than twice)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>President, K.C C. Bank, Dharwad</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Divisional Forest Officer</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Officers of Industries and Commerce</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Executive Engineer (including Minor Irrigation and P.W.D.)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>District Social Welfare Officer</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Senior Assistant Director of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Services</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Manager, Syndicate Bank</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>District Horticulture Officer</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above facts on the attendance position of the members of the governing body reveal that on the whole a majority of members do attend barring a few exceptions. In case of Dharwad the regular absentees are Superintending Engineer, K.E.B and Planning Officer, CADA, Belgaum. It seems their areas of operation do not have direct influence on the DRDS operations. That is why they often do not attend. The absence of Divisional Forest Officer, (DFO), Deputy Director of Agriculture, Soil Conservation, and the Manager, State Co-operative Land Development Bank is a serious concern. It is because a majority of the schemes of DRDS are implemented by the DFO and the Deputy Director of Agriculture, Soil Conservation. The absence of officials of financing institutions will have also effect on credit mobilisation. Obviously, these trends affect the programme implementation by the DRDS.

In case of Kolar, the problem of absentees is not much except the absence of representative of R.B.I. and Assistant Director of Sericulture. The absence of the Sericulture Officer will have an effect on programme implementation.

The trend of delegating representatives should be curbed because it reduces the effectiveness of decisions taken. Besides it may not give proper scope for the review of implementation work in the meetings. The review of progress made in implementing various schemes is one of the tasks of the governing body. In Dharwad
financing institutions (KCC Bank) and a few implementing Officers such as Executive Engineer and DFO often delegate representatives. These two members are the major implementing officers of DPAP schemes. Obviously, this will have an adverse effect on the programmes implementation and thereby the review of the progress.

The governing body of DRDS consists of a few non-official members. These include one M.L.A., one T.D.B President, one small farmer and one representative of weaker sections. These members are to be nominated by the Government for one-year term. Nominations have been made only in 1983. But till that time the Government had ordered the governing body to go ahead in their work without waiting for the nominations. Hence, the element of popular participation was by-passed in its initial phase thereby making the organisation a purely bureaucratic one.

Subjects Discussed:

Discussions in the governing body (GB) will mainly revolve around programme implementation. In this connection release of grants, proposals for action plans, delegation of powers, approving of certain schemes and expenditures and removing the bottlenecks created in the implementation of various programmes figures prominently in the discussions. However, discussions on establishment matters such as deputation allowance etc., also figure in the deliberations.
Discussions regarding the amendment to the byelaws of DRDS society in Dharwad and Kolar districts also take place in the meetings. The discussion in these meetings give an opportunity to members to exchange views on various aspects of the programme implementation.

The meetings commence with the conventional welcome by the member-secretary i.e., Project Director. Then reading and recording of proceedings of the previous meetings take place. Actions taken on the proceedings of previous meetings are taken note of. Important government order and circulars will be read and recorded. This is followed by the review of the progress made in implementing various schemes. Approving of action plans and the expenditure incurred between the two meetings follow. In every meeting these items are usually discussed.

Apart from the above mentioned usual items, the governing body also discusses the important aspects of programme implementation, establishment and constitutional (regarding bye-laws). Discussion on programme implementation mainly consists of release of grants, procedural matters, approving of schemes, expenditure involving a slight deviation in the programme implementation, alteration in the schemes, delegation of powers and removing of administrative bottlenecks. The essence of discussion on these issues is that it denotes the governing body's intention of controlling the internal and external environment to achieve its objectives.

Table No.4.3 gives a clear picture of the subjects discussed in the Governing Body Meetings.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regarding Byelaws</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Release of Grants</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Approval of Schemes</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegation of Powers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval of Petty Expenditure</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removing Bottle-necks</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratification of the Action taken by the D.C/P.D. Issue referred to Government</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE - 4.3**

*Subjects Discussed In The Governing Body Meetings From 1979-84*
It may be seen from the table that discussions on the establishments and bye-laws figures more in number in the initial periods of DRDS. This is but natural keeping in view of the new set-up of the organisation. This is a natural step in an organisation institutionalising process. Obviously, once the organisation like DRDS establishes itself, its problems in this respect are reduced, as seen from the Table No. 4.3.

Secondly, it is but natural that the discussions on programme implementation, procedural matters, approving of schemes and expenditure figure prominently.

Thirdly, ratification of the action taken by the Deputy Commissioner and Project Director figure more in Kolar governing body meetings. It is interesting to note that these do not figure in the Dharwad governing body meetings, except once in 1979. The main reason for this is the long interval between two governing body meetings in Kolar. As referred to earlier, the Kolar DRDS governing body had four months, five months and six months intervals between meetings from 27-2-1980 to 28-3-1981. Since the interval between governing body meetings increases the Deputy Commissioner and the Project Director have to use their discretionary power by taking decision and subsequently taking governing body's approval.
Nature Of Discussions:

Decision-making involves actions and interactions by members of the decision-making group. In this connection in what direction discussion will lead is the most significant aspect to know the quality of decisions.

Discussions on the review of the progress made under various programmes are made sectorwise. For instance, in IRDP and DPAP various departments like Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, Horticulture, Social conservation, Fisheries, Sericulture, Industries etc., are given their respective schemes. Hence, the review is also made departmentwise i.e. sectorwise. While reviewing sectorwise the progress is determined overwhelmingly in terms of the utilisation of grants -- what may be called as financial progress or review. The physical progress does figure but insignificantly in the review. It is observed that the Chairman of the DRDS mainly insists on the utilisation of grants. For example, to quote the proceedings of the one of the governing body meetings:

"According to the allocation of funds an amount of Rs.8.00 lakh, Rs.8.50 lakh and Rs 3.00 lakhs has been released by the Project Director to Executive Engineer P.W.D... The Chairman DRDS desired that the amount allotted to them has to be spent in full by the end of..." 15
To quote Kolar Experience:

"The Chairman expressed concern over the non-utilisation of funds by a few implementing officers such as Deputy Registrars of Co-operative Societies. The implementing officers assured of the utilisation (at least 50% to 75%) of funds by taking necessary action."  

Thirdly, a point to be appreciated here is that the discussions of the governing body of DRDS invariably suggests the course of action to be taken on a particular issue. With this it also specifies who has to act or take action. This is important because fixing responsibility is very important in getting the things done, especially in a governmental agency like the DRDS. This type of fixing responsibility helps in reviewing the progress on the decisions taken.

For example, to quote the proceedings of one of the governing body meetings -

"Subject No.9: Supply of Pliers for Plastic tags to the taluk level Veterinary Institutions in the district.

The Assistant Project Officer, SFDA, explained that many of the Veterinary institutions do not have pliers and clinchers for purchasing and identification of the milch animals, bullocks etc. It was also represented by many bankers that the Veterinary institutions do not have them and it goes difficult to punch the animals. After discussion
Lastly, discussions of the governing body of the DRDS are not discussions in the true sense of the term. This is because the body is not homogenous in its composition, status of members and so on.

Members of the governing body come from different departments and the DRDS work is not actually a part of their parent department. It is often believed that this is an additional work which involves working under the Deputy Commissioner. They will have their departmental tasks, commitments, problems and worries. In such a situation members may not participate with full spirit which they ought to do. For instance, the banking authorities look back to their bank before giving any assent to the decisions of the governing body. How far the particular decision affects their normal banking business is their main concern. Of course, this is necessary in order to safeguard their interests but if this becomes their sole concern, obviously they cannot implement the schemes of DRDS effectively.

Secondly, status-wise most of the members (except the General Manager, Director of Industries and Commerce) are below the rank of Deputy Commissioner who is the Chairman and Presiding Officer of the governing body meetings. They are not equal in power and privilege. In such a situation members hesitate to come forward with frank opinions and proposals. Obviously in most cases to whatever the
Deputy Commissioner says, every one agrees, thereby making the
decisions the product of consensus. This consensus decision is under
the bureaucratic hierarchy and not under the principle of unanimity or
compromise. Hence, mostly it becomes a monologue of either the
Chairman (DC) or the Project Director.

Decisions Taken:

In order to assess the results of a flow of decisions one must
state the goals or purposes towards which the decisions aim. Decisions
are classified in a number of ways, taking into the context in which
decisions were taken. Duncan categorises into Means-End decisions,
denoting the decisions concerning organisational goal and supporting
activities towards the achievement of goal. Simon classifies decisions
into programmed and non-programmed decisions specifying routine and
policy decisions. Longenecker speaks of routine and non-routine
decisions. Hodgetts terms decisions as organisational and personal
decisions. In the present schemata decisions are broadly classified
into administrative and programme. The decisions concerning
programme encompass the whole process of planning till evaluation,
whereas administrative decisions are concerned with organisational and
staffing issues.

The governing body of the DRDS is supossed to take a number of
decisions for planning and implementing numerous schemes for the
upliftment of rural poor. The DRDS is responsible for implementing a
number of special economic programmes sponsored by the Central and State Government. The DRDS is not powerful, nor is it the final body to take all decisions. In case of controversial or critical decisions it has to refer such matters to the Government. In the third category there are decisions which are to be referred to the Government.

Table - 4.4 gives a clear picture of decisions taken.

The table 4.4. shows that as usual decisions on programme are more in number. Programme implementation is the primary function of the DRDS and demands actions and as such it is an appropriate response in decision making process. It also shows that reference to the Government is more during the initial phase. For instance, in 1980 new IRDP was made principal programme of DRDS and conspicuously in that year referring to the Government was frequent.

On the basis of powers listed in the bye-law of the DRDS and the subject discussed in the governing body, the governing body is both a policy making and functional body. Here, the policy making role of the DRDS is very marginal and is not comparable to policy making in higher echleons of government. It can be said here that it is only policy alterations to suit the local conditions and ecology. For instance, to quote the governing body proceedings: "Modification of Poultry Scheme: As per the approved scheme of SFDA, the unit of poultry is fixed at 50 birds but it is proposed to raise it to 100 birds (pullets) so as in the case of LPP programme. After discussions, it was
### TABLE - 4.4

Decisions Taken By The Governing Body Of The DRDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decisions taken on Administrative matters</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decisions taken on Programmes</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decisions referred to Government.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Meetings held in Dharwad and Kolar.
unanimously agreed that the strength may be raised from 50 to 100 pullets, since the unit of 50 birds is not economically feasible. The Chairman DRDS, suggested that Government Approval may be obtained and the scheme implemented.

It is also functional in the sense it reviews the working of schemes and programmes. As such it coordinates the intersectoral schemes and ensures proper implementation and in these meetings sectorwise progress is reviewed. In case the particular scheme is lagging behind, the implementing officers will be instructed to expedite it by removing bottlenecks. For instance to quote: "It has been brought to the notice of the Governing Body of DRDS that the sericulture programme in Dharwad district is not taking off from past 2-3 years. Considerable area is under mulberry cultivation. The sericulturists are taking this industry in rural areas. They are now facing the problem of transportation and sales of cocoons. The Chairman feels that the problems should be solved. Though 3 sericulture farms are established and limifilature farm has come up at Hubli, still it is necessary that the Department should arrange the transportation of cocoon from rural areas on the spot or at least taluk head quarters. The Director of Sericulture may be moved to arrange the transportation and purchase of cocoon urgently, by the Assistant Director of Sericulture Hubli"
Staffing Pattern In Selected Districts:

The staffing pattern in the selected district is as follows:

Dharwad District:

1. Special Deputy Commissioner, Development and Ex-Officio, Project Director

2. Assistant Project Officer - Agriculture.

3. Assistant Project Officer - Animal Husbandry.

4. Assistant Project Officer - Co-operatives.

5. Assistant Project Officer - Accounts

6. Assistant Project Officer - Livestock Production Programme.

7. Gazetted Manager.

8. Assistant Statistical Officer


10. Accounts Superintendents - 3 (One each for IRDP, LPP and NREP).
11. Assistant Executive Engineer (For NREP).

12. Geologists - 2 (on daily wages)

13. First Division Clerks - 7

14. Second Division Clerks - 2

15. Typists - 4

Kokar District:

1. Special Deputy Commissioner, Development and Ex-Officio Project Director

2. Assistant Project Officer - Agriculture.

3. Assistant Project Officer - Animal Husbandry.

4. Assistant Project Officer - Co-operatives.

5. Assistant Project Officer - Accounts.

6. Gazetted Manager.

7. Assistant Executive Engineer (for RLEGP).
8. Assistant Statistical Officer.


10. Accounts Superintendents - 2
(One each for IRDP and NREP)

11. First Division Clerks - 4


It is evident that a uniform pattern of staffing has been adopted for the DRDS. But such uniformity is not conducive for smooth administration, keeping in view the diversities in the size and population of districts. Dharwad district has 13,738 sq.kms. of area with 29,45,487 population, whereas Kolar has 8,233 sq.kms. of area with 19,05,492 population. Uniformity in man power will have certain disadvantages. If the man-power is small the bigger district faces the problem of managing a vast area and population. If the man power is more, it affects smaller districts in the name of surplus man power. Therefore, it is evident that it would be useful to rationalise the size of districts as well as sub-divisions. The criteria for reorganising districts should be the intensity of development activity, its geographical extent, level of communication and functional literacy, the backwardness index etc.
It is found that there are problems about the staffing pattern adopted in the DRDS.

(a) Total sanctioned posts are not adequate.
(b) All posts are not filled up.
(c) Nature of appointment of the staff is temporary (deputation).
(d) The staff lack motivation as well as capabilities.

The basic requirement for implementing any programme, that too a programme of IRDP magnitude, requires two conditions with regard to manpower adequate and capable staff. The DRDS suffered heavily from the inadequacy of staff at district, block and bank level too. It is found that this basic element of manpower is missing in the DRDS which will have repercussions of varied nature and great magnitude. Hence the development functionaries must be further increased in number and their professional competence augmented by on the job management training. The successful realisation of rural development goals depends to a large extent on the size and dispersal of rural development personnel.

The description delineating the account of powers exercised and enjoyed by key officials in the functioning of DRDS exhibits trends of unevenness in the power structure. There is too much concentration at certain points, whereas at some points where the responsibility is
greater the power seems to be inadequate. In the field interviews a few officials used to complain about the lack of power for implementing. In order to know whether the powers given to them were adequate or not a question was asked to all the implementing staff.

**Question:** Powers given to you are adequate or not?

The responses are presented in Table No.4.5.

**TABLE - 4.5**

Powers Given Are Adequate Or Not

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Respondents</th>
<th>II DE</th>
<th>III BE</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Answers</td>
<td>Nos</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Nos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DE=District Executives, BE= Block Executives.

Table 4.5 shows that the majority (54.4%) feels that the powers given to them are inadequate. Even in an informal interviews officials expressed the same opinion. If this is so, they cannot act properly and take prompt action whenever the situation demands. In such a situation, they have to wait for orders from the higher authorities.
The programmes have necessarily to be implemented at the grass roots level but the functionaries executing them have to inevitably refer to higher levels which obviously causes delay. This is a normal phenomenon in a bureaucratic organisation exposing its pathetic symptom of over-centralisation and concentration.

It is, therefore, felt that a sound organisation demands matching of responsibility with corresponding powers. Lack of power has resulted in dysfunctionality in two ways. Firstly, the controlling officers were not able to effectively control either the staff or the programme implementation. The BDO had often faced with the problem of lack of power in controlling his team of extension specialists. This is because they being under dual loyalty always exhibited an upward-looking rather than lateral-looking trend. Secondly, in the absence of adequate power, the field level development functionaries were not able to control the programme implementation in a desired fashion. In view of lack of power the process of programming and implementing of schemes suffered.

At the district level, the Deputy Commissioner who is the Chairman of DRDS enjoys substantial powers. The Project Director who is a chief executive officer also enjoys substantial powers in finance and executive matter. Since the Deputy Commissioner is immediately above him he has to exercise most of the powers in consultation with the Deputy Commissioner. To know who should be given more powers at
district level to implement DRDS programmes effectively and efficiently, a question was asked to the governing body members.

**Question:** In the working of DRDS who should have more financial and executive powers?

(a) Deputy Commissioner,
(b) Project Director,
(c) Others.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DC</th>
<th>PD</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(50.0)</td>
<td>(41.7)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(8.3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The answers as indicated in Table 4.6 showed that 50 per cent respondents felt the Deputy Commissioner should have more powers whereas about 41.7 per cent respondents opined that it should vest with the Project Director. The respondents who have opined that Project Director should have more powers are the present Project Directors. This shows that the present Project Directors might be in some area lacking substantial powers and this conforms to the Downs criticism of
law of increasing conserverism. This feeling of lack of power among the Project Directors seems to be the result of the catalyst nature of DRDS organisation. In this catalyst dimension it has to deal and direct effectively the course of action involving numerous development departments. In this process naturally the Project Directors felt that they were short of powers. However, in view of the Deputy Commissioner's overwhelming position as district head as well as the Chairman of the DRDS he can effectively perform this function.

At block level the BDO is a chief coordinator and wielder of executive powers. In order to know who should have more powers at block level, a query was asked to block level implementing officers.

**Question:** In the working of DRDS who should have more financial and administrative powers at Block level?

**TABLE - 4.7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>At Taluk Level Who Should Have More Financial And Executive Powers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BDO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 (52.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(21.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A majority (52.6%) of respondents opined that the B.D.O. should have more financial and administrative powers at block level. A few
(21.4%) have given the opinion that other functionaries like Tahsildar should have more financial and administrative powers.

The BDO is a very crucial functionary in the implementation of DRDS Schemes. He occupies a strategic position in the implementation process. He requires the support of several development departments at sub-district level and financing institutions spread throughout the block. Along with it he has to involve numerous peoples organisation (Voluntary organisations, non-government organisations) to make the schemes successful. Keeping in view his strategic position, and the spectrum of agencies and functionaries he has to deal, he needs more power than what he has now. The powers of the BDO were designed in tune with the spirit of community development. Since then many changes have been made in the rural development strategies and schemes, but the BDO's powers and position have not changed positively. However, some of his powers and functionaries have been withdrawn, whereas other programmes and schemes have been forced on him. Presently there is a gross mismatch between his responsibilities and power which is evident from his assertion for more powers. The BDO's hands need to be strengthened by upgrading his position and giving him more financial and administrative powers.

Role Performance Of Key Functionaries:

The role of performance is necessary to realise the given tasks in an effective manner. In essence, a given official has to perform his
assigned role. The role in this connection represents "the behaviour expected of the occupant of a given position of status". The role performance of key functionaries is discussed with reference to Dharwad and Kolar districts DRDS.

(a) Deputy Commissioner:

The Deputy Commissioner (DC) is the vanguard of district administration. The district administration under the Deputy Commissioner represents a synthesis of new pattern of thinking grafted on traditional mechanism. He is concerned with almost all departments and district level activities in one way or the other. The functions of DC can be classified into Revenue-Magisterial, Developmental and Ceremonial. The result is that no one can hold him responsible for anything in particular and few checks are there on his performance. Moreover, the Deputy Commissioner's role and status has been changing due to four factors, (i) the impact of democracy, (ii) the separation of judiciary from the executive, (iii) the introduction of panchayati raj and (iv) the growing resentment of technical departments, and of their officers towards deputy commissioner's dominant position in the district. The question arises as to whether the Deputy Commissioner as Chairman of the DRDS can associate actively and effectively in planning, implementing, supervising and inspecting the DRDS activities. The answer is in the negative on two counts.
First the work load of the Deputy Commissioner is such that he cannot devote much time to the DRDS and other development work. This is evident from the following work load pattern of the Deputy Commissioner as indicated in Table No.4.8

TABLE - 4.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Percentage of DC's time devoted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Correspondence</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case hearing</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official and other meetings</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Important Persons</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Visitors</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Touring</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is needless to add that the Deputy Commissioner lacks sufficient time to oversee the activities of rural development and welfare of weaker sections. It is a fact that the Deputy Commissioner being the chairman of the governing body is overburdened with a lot of administrative, regulatory and development functions apart from
functions of coordination, which impedes his meaningful role in the working of DRDS.

Another aspect which hinders the DC's effective performance is the very nature of district administration carried from state headquarters. This is best exemplified in the following.

"... the departmentalisation of development and other activities at the district, regional and state, level, the unwieldy nature of many district charges, the pressure of paper work, have tramished his image as a supreme of district administration. Thus, it is evident that district administration is in shambles and the role and functions of key functionaries is obfuscated". Along with it the prevailing administrative philosophy of primary loyalty of every officer to his department adds to its further vulnerability.

The Deputy Commissioner's coordinating operations stem from his leadership role in the district administration, which is ensured by his authority and power structure. In the sphere of development administration, the coordination should not merely stem from authority or power; it requires the culture of democratic team spirit. This is the essence of modern management philosophy. This distinction of coordination based on authority and team work is very tenuous and blurred. However, it is found that the Deputy Commissioner still as the harbinger of revenue administrative culture and ethos relies heavily on coordination based on authority, thus a chance for
experimenting democratic team is overlooked. This is very much observed much in the governing body meetings. A feeling of distrust stems from such an authoritarian coordinating mechanism. Modern management culture being more problem-solving and less status and power-oriented advocates better man-power planning and sophisticated professional aids to decision-making for overcoming authoritarian system of coordination.

The ecological constraint hampers the effective and efficient working of the Deputy Commissioner since he is the product of certain socio-cultural and economic structure. It is often complained that the higher bureaucracy comprising purely of the IAS cadres is unrepresentative of the prevailing societal environment. It is generally believed that the social background of higher civil servants stands in the way of their effective performance as a development administrator. It is rather felt that the Deputy Commissioner continues to protect the interests of everybody except the rural poor and by merely changing his designation it is not possible to change his role and attitude.

(b) Project Director:

At the outset it is clear from the job chart that the Project Director is the chief executive officer. As such he is responsible for directing the activities of the DRDS, of course, under the overall leadership of the Deputy Commissioner of the district. Secondly, the
designation of Project Director into special Deputy Commissioner, Development with junior scale IAS Officers as incumbents made them not only chief executive officer of DRDS but also the chief development officer of the district. As such he assists the Deputy Commissioner in the effective implementation of all activities in the field of rural development including Panchayats. The idea to have a separate officer for development activities can be justified on two grounds. In the first instance, it ensures effective span of control and supervision which has enormously increased. Secondly, having a full-time development administrator facilitates harmonisation of technical aspects of development by initiating meaningful coordination among technical heads at district. Having two functionaries at the top of DRDS for almost similar activities and tasks, theoretically speaking, creates problems. Most of the times both belong to IAS cadre, one junior (PD) and the other senior (DC). The overall direction is given by the Deputy Commissioner, whereas the day-to-day administration is managed by the Project Director. Paul Appleby opined that the administration should be headed by a single person of strength, status, and special zeal for this kind of programme and it is sufficient to have only a single executive. His assertions hold good even in case of DRDS, since the Deputy Commissioner is overburdened with other aspects of district administration and it is impossible for him to play an active role in the DRDS administration. It is literally the Project Director who optimises the power and as such exercises the concerned duties.
The organisational climate and the functional imperatives make the Project Director a powerful and crucial functionary in the DRDS. This strategic position has both functional and dysfunctional value. Using his position, the Project Director can do a lot of positive work by associating other developmental administrators. He can give coherence and directions to the entire DRDS endeavour by his dynamism. On the other hand, the position may be used in a manner detrimental to the objectives of the DRDS. In a study such a dysfunctionality of the Project Director's strategic position has been identified. It states "... the project director instead of paying the stipend amount to the trainees of tailoring, promised to arrange the supply of sewing machines to them. But though the trainees completed the training forgoing the stipend amount, they did not receive any sewing machine promised by the Project Director." All this could happen only because of the Project Director's strategic position. It is, therefore, suggested that an effective rapport between the Project Director and District Collector can be established to countercheck each other in the exercise of their functions and such a healthy relationship will necessarily produce remarkable results.

The effectiveness of the Project Director also depends upon his tenure. In Dharwad, one Project Director had a pretty long period and he was there from 1979-84 and onwards too. For the same period in Kolar, there were 4 project directors. That is, a director had a tenure of only one year on the average, and this added to the general
instability. It is obvious that in a short-term he can neither fully comprehend the problem nor contribute to its effectiveness. On the contrary, in short tenure instability and incoherence are added to the DRDS organisation, which will naturally hamper its effective working.

(c) **Block Development Officer:**

The B.D.O. is the Chief Executive Officer at the block level. As such he is the chief co-ordinator of DRDS schemes too. The B.D.O. has the following duties with regard to DRDS work:

1. Selection of village for implementation
2. Conducting Gram Sabha.
3. Organising Survey of household.
4. Reviewing, verifying and forwarding loan applications.
5. Conducting credit camps.
6. Reviewing the progress of implementation.
7. Follow-up of assistance rendered.

The B.D.O. has certain inherent weaknesses in organisational setting and service conditions. Obviously, such inadequacies affect the smooth and effective implementation of DRDS schemes. Organisationally, the B.D.O. is functioning in a matrix organisation in which he has to control and direct the extension team derived from various development departments. Since extension officers (EOs) are under the dual control of parent and working departments, it becomes rather difficult for a
B.D.O. to control and streamline the implementation of the DRDS schemes. The EO's exhibit dual loyalty to the parent as well as the working department. This split or divided loyalty becomes an impediment in the working of an organisation. It is not only split loyalty but also too much loyalty towards the parent department that is the main obstacle. This is natural since the parent department effects the promotions and other incentives. Due to this fact B.D.O's often argue that they cannot control extension officers unless they are given more formal powers over them.

In the inter-departmental organisational net-work at block level, the B.D.O. stands on the same footing with other heads of departments. Since he is standing in a horizontal line along with other development functionaries, it becomes rather difficult for the B.D.O. to co-ordinate all activities. Amal Ray opines: "At the block level there exists an extremely heterogenous and complex organisational structure with multiple delivery channels. The block level units are actually the lower limbs of various vertically set institutions based on functional specialisation. Each of them has its own history and its own institutional culture. Obviously stupendous problems of organisational intergration arise." Under such circumstances and complex organisational frame, the B.D.O. cannot effectively coordinate the activities required in poverty alleviating schemes. The present structure of the Community Development block is the greatest obstacle to the implementation at block level. These blocks are enervated by dilution of powers and functions of the B.D.O. who is no longer looked
upon as the effective leader and coordinator of block organisation.
The doyen of community development programme, S K Day, aptly observes: "No wonder the B D O. has lost virtually all his coordinational functions concerning departments at block level which have gone back to their earlier sovereignties as prevailed during British colonial regime."

The B D O. is overwhelmingly concerned with the programmes of panchayat Raj institutions since they are operated on the latter's budget. In fact the Panchayat raj administration is a routine duty of the BDO and his team of extension officers and village level basic functionaries. With regard to special economic programmes like IRDP, NREP, etc., they accept rather grudgingly since they are purely bureaucratically administered schemes. The implementation of IRDP, NREP are additional duties of the block staff. The net result is that such a measure creates confusion, ambivalence and even in some instances downright apathy towards such schemes.

The process of adding functions and programmes to BDO's jurisdiction and consequential withdrawal of some of the functionaries and functions resulted in systematic deterioration of integrated nature of block structures. What was once a developmental role of B D O is reduced now to merely supervisory and data collection function. The B D O. is burdened with a variety of desperate functions and he has to work out his own priorities at the site with uncertainties. He is under-provided in relation to his task both in matters of funds, timely allocation and professional assis.
The consequence of such overburdened work has been emphasised as follows: "Excessive work load also leads to selecting the better off, who are readily available or have the capacity to pay speed money and spending most of the time in filling up voluminous reports, while only formally meeting quantitative targets. Commitment i.e. doing something when there is an option of not doing so cannot be achieved by coercion because the implementor can use discretion and operating routines to resist control of the supervisors". In an earlier study it was found that B.D.O's in IADP district were more dissatisfied with their job due to increase in work load. If this trend was prevailing in IADP, era, since then a number of schemes have been forced on the BDOs. The outcome of such overload is the dissatisfaction with job which again will be intense in the absence of clear promotional avenues. The enormous expansion of responsibilities has resulted in decrease in the quality of development personnel like B.D O. and VLW. Due to the increase in B.D O's work, the quality of output has deteriorated. The overload of work reduces the development functionaries' primary duty and consequently paper work and office-bound tasks increase. It must be emphasised that Government bureaucracies particularly those of low income countries which have so many burdens on them, cannot carry out a large number of programmes simultaneously. In view of heavy load of work the block machinery was found to be quite weak for providing an appropriate and integrated delivery system.
BDO has to interact with two types of environmental systems i.e., influenceable and appreciated. Influenceable environment frequently interacts with block development organisation and is in turn influenced by it. On the other hand, appreciated environment influences the block organisation but it in turn cannot be influenced or controlled.

Influenceable environment covers many linkages specially functional linkages. Functional linkages, "with those organisations performing functions and services which are complementary in a production sense, which supply the inputs and which use the outputs of the institution" (68). The block level development departments such as agriculture, animal husbandry, PWD, sericulture, fishery, industries, co-operatives, and financing agencies like banks and credit co-operative societies form functional counterparts to the block organisation. BDO’s success lies in securing maximum co-operation from these departments and agencies in implementing development schemes. Securing co-operation at Governmental level (i.e. among development departments at block) depends upon the status of BDO vis-a-vis other development functionaries. Unfortunately BDO suffers from lack of authority because basically he stands equivalent to other functionaries. BDO belongs to class II category, and most of the development functionaries at block belong to class II category except Assistant Director of Agriculture who is a class I (Junior) officer. If BDO stands equal with all development staff how can he elicit co-operation from them? It is like standing in a straight line and trying to command over the whole line (horizontal control).
belongs to the same category, but he can command other functionaries because he is a taluk magistrate and enjoys traditional prestige of revenue administration. BDO standing equal with all development staff fails to secure necessary co-operation. Hence, it is better to upgrade the position of BDO by posting high ranking officers. Narasimhan Committee in Andhra Pradesh recommended that 'the block development officers should be of a status and stature equivalent to that of a Deputy Collector,....' 69

The appreciated environment consists of an uncontrolled environment. At block level the interference of political parties falls under this environment. Political parties interfere in block administration to influence the allocation and distribution of benefits. BDO cannot control this interference as these are channelled through an organised way through ruling party MLA, MLC or TDB President and other influential members. Block administration and the functioning of BDO is very much affected by this. It is needless to say that in such a situation BDO fails to manage block affairs efficiently without violating the basic principles of administration.

At present the Integrated Rural Development (IRD), a programme modelled on Antodaya, is under implementation in most of the districts of Karnataka. The focus of the IRD is on uplifting the poorest among the poor by assisting them in their desired talents. Attention is mainly on increasing his (poor man) standard of living by raising his income. Under this BDO is once again the chief coordinator at block
level and he is Chairman of the implementation committee. As things stand today, BDO is implementing a number of development schemes apart from his normal duties. This does not permit him to take a lead and initiative in implementing IRD programmes.

The process of rural development shows that the impact and focus of community development and national extension services is declining in recent years. Whereas the BDO, the child of community development, remains the same with more and more functions added to his responsibilities, BDO's way of functioning has not been changed but the strategy for rural development is changing. Community Development adopted an extension method whereas the present IRD stresses on 'supervised rural development.' Supervised rural development means the benefits should reach the targets without deviating in the middle. For this implementor has to guard and supervise so that the benefits reach the real beneficiaries. Further, he also supervises with a view to see that beneficiaries will make proper use of the assistance and help. Here supervision is in two senses: one against the encroachment of vested interests and the other against the misutilisation of help. The BDO's role in this supervised rural development is vital, because he is the chairman of block level implementing committee. He should guard the targeted groups from vested interests and supervise over them to utilise the assistance properly. Now there are pertinent questions: Is the BDO able to guard the targeted groups from vested interests? Can he supervise these groups so that they may not misuse the benefits? The answer for both
these questions is in the negative. Boundary control is very weak in the present organisational set-up and vested interests can enter into it through an elected body (TDB) to which the BDO is subservient. Secondly, the BDO with his heavy work i.e., implementation of numerous development schemes apart from TDB works, is not in a position to supervise the targeted group constantly from the misutilisation of benefits. He lacks field staff in this regard. It is needless to say that these considerations will affect the BDO's performance in rural development.

The above discussion makes it clear that in the light of past experience, the BDO's position should be strengthened in order to cope with the requirements of new rural development policy i.e., integrated rural development. Organisationally the BDO's position should be upgraded so that all functionaries at block level can be brought under the BDO's purview. It also helps in building a good team of extension workers at block level. Incentive-wise BDOs should be provided with numerous facilities; that will go a long way in enhancing the morale and efficiency of this development functionary. Lastly, whenever a new rural development policy is advocated the BDO's role and responsibilities should be clearly spelt-out with necessary powers.

The personnel policy in respect of the B.D.O. is not very sound. There is neither coherent recruitment policy nor promotional principles. Ad hocism is the hallmark of recruitment and promotional efforts. The B.D.Os lack adequate promotional avenues. Many B.D Os are serving...
for more than ten years without any promotions. It is needless to add here that all these inadequacies necessarily affect the efficiency and effectiveness of B.D.Os performance in DRDS works.

The B.D.O. currently needed is one of the following type which P.S. Appu designs. He states, "If the massive programme for transfer of productive assets to the rural poor is to be implemented efficiently, the country should find 6000 able and dedicated persons to discharge the duties of Block Development Officers. It should be possible to pick up suitable persons from among the ranks of the Indian Administrative Service, the State Services, Agricultural and Animal Husbandry Officers, Economists, Graduates in Business Management, Executives of Nationalised Banks etc; through intensive training they can be equipped with the necessary skills and motivation. The BDO should be vested with adequate powers and he should be held squarely responsible for the implementation of the programme within the block".

(d) Village Level Workers:

The Village Level Worker (VLW) is the innovation of the community development and national extension service schemes. He is at the cutting edge of development administration, it is therefore on his role the success of entire rural development programmes depends. He is a multipurpose worker with multiple functions. Firstly, he provides various kinds of inputs to farmers in enhancing productivity of agriculture and other allied sectors. Secondly, he performs the
extension function of transmitting the latest technological methods for improving the productivity. Thirdly, he gives publicity to the schemes meant for rural populace to enlist their support for them. Thus, he is a friend, philosopher and guide to rural people.

It is widely accepted that the VLWS are over-burdened with work both in respect of the amount and complexity of work. The job chart of VLW was originally designed for the community development work as a multi-purpose worker. It has remained unchanged and changes only reflect additions to his responsibilities. During the Community Development phase the VLW job chart consisted of 22 main items with several sub-items, while in seventees in the context of special programmes it has increased to 53 items. With the result the time allocation for various activities has correspondingly changed as the following table suffices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl. No.</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Past (Late Sixtees)</th>
<th>Present (Early Eightees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Attending Conferences and Meeting</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Travelling</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Actual Job Performance</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Conducting Demonstrations</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Other Works</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
With the increase in schemes the responsibility of VLWs has also increased. In fact, while the job chart of VLWs has become comprehensive, their duties have become unduly diluted and unmanageable. The level of motivation, perception and knowledge is also not appropriate for the use of sophisticated techniques such as functional clustering of villages etc. With the introduction of T and V system in agriculture the number of VLWs have been repatriated to the parent department of agriculture. At present there is one VLW for each nolli covering an average 10-20 villages. This expanded functional jurisdiction has made VLW ineffective. Popular perception of VLW is not conducive to effective functioning. In a study it is found that by the masses (18% and 29%) that VLWs favour rich and big farmers substantially. A common complaint is that often VLWs are not found in the field, this is natural if we keep in view the wide area of operation. Another reason for their absence in the field is too frequent visits to block headquarters which have necessarily resulted in wastage of time and diversion of interest. Hence, about 30 per cent of masses feel that the VLW should remain in the field and constantly guide the villagers. In order to effectively handle the rural problems, it is recommended that the number of VLW's in each block under the DRDS should be increased to 20 with an extension officer to supervise their work.

Decision Making:

In order to accomplish the goals of an organisation, decisions have to be made. Two types of decisions can be perceived in any
organisation. They are controlling and secondary decisions. The controlling decisions determine the highest policy choice whereas secondary decisions are sub-decisions of controlling decisions, normally done by career executives.

Decisions are the product of team-work, but the act of one person or a group operation collectively is through a single authority. In the DRDS it is the governing body which takes the controlling decisions whereas the Deputy Commissioner, Project Director and other implementing functionaries take secondary decisions. The governing body is by nature a team, but decisions are arrived at collectively as a single authority. In this connection it is important to consider the decision-making procedure in DRDS.

Any effective decision-making calls for participation by the subordinates in the decision-making process. This is because it is those subordinates who are the actual executors of decisions arrived by the higher authorities.

Participation ensures involvement, thus involvement brings commitment to work or task. The participative thrust has certain advantages too. Campbell contends that participative style creates greater feelings of cohesiveness, greater productivity, greater flexibility of behaviour, and decreased inter-personal hostility, frustration and gripes. It increases the output of an organisation,
reduces the number of grievances and establishes more peaceful superior-subordinate relations. To know whether the higher officers consult the subordinates, a question was asked to implementing staff:

**Question:** Do Higher authorities consult you while fixing the target for your work?

Answers are presented in Table 4.10.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Respondents</th>
<th>II DE</th>
<th>III BE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nos.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Nos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The responses presented in the above table show that slightly more than 56.5 per cent respondents feel they are consulted by higher authorities while fixing targets. But a significant percentage - 34.8 per cent of respondents say no. This is a crucial issue. This lack of
consultation is attributed to the bureaucratic type of organization in which only downward communications are allowed. Bureaucracy also entails a close supervision by the superiors thus negating the thrust of participative approach. Moreover, the very nature of bureaucracy is that it is a monocratic organization in which one way communication is adhered to. Thus lack of participation prevails in DRDS.

The top-down targetary results in inadequate performance. "Targets are set at the highest levels; in disaggregating them down the hierarchy sufficient attention is not given to actual field problems and operational difficulties". If field staff takes no part in setting their own targets, the targets could be either too high or too low because they lack the living touch with operational problems. Thus, lack of participative spirit results in fixing unrealistic targets for subordinates which will have bearing on quality and quantity of output ratio. It also enhances problems and grievances in the implementation process. 56 per cent of respondents have opined that they are consulted in fixing targets, which obviously has a positive value in achievement of targets and raising the output of an organization like the DRDS.

**Staffing:**

The Special Deputy Commissioner, ex-officio Project Director is appointed on foreign service terms and conditions. Other key staff is also deputed by the Government of Karnataka on foreign service
conditions. However, there is a provision for direct recruitment. The pay and allowances of the staff on deputation are governed by the K.C.S.Rs, and foreign service terms and conditions. In case of officers recruited directly by the DRDS the pay and allowances are governed by the existing rules of the Government of Karnataka.

In respect of the DRDS in Dharwad and Kolar districts the confidential reports of all the staff of the DRDS except Special Deputy Commissioner are initiated by the Special Deputy Commissioner and submitted to the Chairman of the DRDS for remarks and onward transmission to the department concerned. For instance, the confidential report of the Assistant Project Officer, Agriculture is initiated by the Special Deputy Commissioner, (development) and submitted to the Chairman of DRDS. The confidential report of the Special Deputy Commissioner is initiated by the Chairman, DRDS and submitted to the Administrative Department.

At block level the confidential reports of BDO and his staff (E.Os) are initiated, by the Assistant Commissioner of the sub-division. This contains a specific remark about the performance of B.D.O. and his staff in respect of the Special Economic Programmes and the contribution of the officers to their implementation so far as area of responsibility is concerned. The reports initiated by the Assistant Commissioner of sub-divisions will be forwarded to the concerned project Directors of DRDS. After his remarks he forwards them to the Deputy Commissioner of the district.
The writing of confidential reports is usually stereotyped without much variation. Firstly, there is no formal evaluation of development programme at the block level. The progress of schemes is assessed mainly at the block level and on the utilisation of budget. There is no proper measurement of the impact of the schemes. Under this situation the question arises as to how to assess the work of B.D.O. in implementing DRDS schemes. Secondly, Assistant Commissioner is mainly a revenue functionary and as such his major portion of time is devoted to revenue and magisterial affairs. Obviously, such a revenue functionary shows an attitude of dissonance towards development. Naturally under such circumstances the writing of confidential report assumes a mere formality and does not carry much weight.

Administrative Reforms Commission observes that "Confidential reports in the manner and spirit in which they are being written tend to emphasise something more than the man and his qualities". Under such circumstances the efficacy of confidential reports as a control mechanism raises severe doubts.

The concept of socio-technical system arose from requirements of both technical and work organisations. The technical system specifies the equipment, tools, technique and the whole organisational network. On the other hand, the work organisation is related to the social and psychological properties of the personnel involved in technical organisation. The mechanistic theories placed a high premium on organisations and treat them like machines and hence invariably failed
to come to the grip of socio-psychological needs of the incumbents. This has impaired fuller utilisation of the potential of technological organisation. In contrast the socio-technical system considers both technological system and socio-psychological properties of the workers in an organisational setting. The performance of the primary task is supported by powerful social and psychological forces which ensure that a considerable capacity of cooperation is evolved among the members of the organisation created to perform it and that as a direct corollary the effective performance of the primary task can provide an important source of satisfaction for those engaged in it. In public bureaucracy the socio-psychological properties of the members are shaped and determined by the promotion, incentives, policy of transfer, redressal of grievances leading to job satisfaction. All these determine the extent of co-operation evolved among the members of the staff.

The system of reward and punishment or promotion and demotion have greater salience on the degree of efficiency and effectiveness in public bureaucracies. The promotional incentives of the DRDS staff are determined by their respective parent department. For instance, the Assistant Project Officer, Agriculture, his promotion is determined by the Department of Agriculture. This raises a controversy that incentives are given by the parent department whereas the work is taken by another. This makes the officials to look back always towards his parent department and sometimes they go to the extent of pleasing departmental authorities at the cost of DRDS work. It is
believed that an official who has good chances of promotion tends to work efficiently and effectively, so that he can exploit his promotional opportunities. This is natural since human psychology is such that human beings have a basic urge for public recognition and personal advancement. This is ensured by the system of rewards or incentives, in the form of promotion and so on. The absence of such a system will obviously create frustration, disappointment, lethargy, callousness or casuallness. It is needless to add that these will necessarily result in deterioration and fall in performance. In order to know chances of promotion for officials a question was asked to all the executive functionaries.

**Question:** How good are your chances of promotion in the present Service?

(a) Very good

(b) Good

(c) Poor.

The responses are presented in Table 4.11.

TABLE - 4.11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chances Of Promotion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Category Of Respondents</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above table shows that a majority (58.7%) respondents have poor chances of promotion. This is a significant point to be considered. This shows that the government only deputes senior officials who have attained stagnation stage. The type of work the DRDS is engaged in needs enthusiastic staff, not the officials who are stagnated in their career. This does not mean that stagnated officials do not work. They do work sincerely and seriously, but their capacity and effectiveness will be certainly low. To quote an officer's remark: "Due to a number of development schemes such as IRDP, bonded labour rehabilitation, DPAP and usual departmental schemes it is rather difficult to implement all. It is possible only for a young officer. Old officers with their personal problems cannot devote much of the time".

In governmental bureaucracy promotions are mainly determined on seniority principle. But the seniority system work well where decisions are routine and are made on the basis of clear-cut rules or precedent. This type of system helps in preserving status quo and as such distinctive accomplishments can neither be encouraged nor taken note of. It thus weakens the interest in achieving goals and results. In development administration stress is on problem solving rather than on observance of rules and regulations. Unlike private administration, in public bureaucracy a measure of efficiency does not form a part of reward and punishment of personnel. This calls for a different criteria for evaluating performance of a development functionary.
Thus, achievement criteria is well-fitted for development administration. The seniority precept kills initiative. One respondent remarked, "Due to lack of promotion there is no interest in doing the same type of work". A district official observed, "Promotion on the basis of seniority is the main killer of initiative. If I know that I am standing in queue I know the time will come when I will get my ticket. But if by working hard and showing my work and merit I will get a promotion, then I will show my initiative. Seniority should be ignored altogether". Most sufferers of present policy are the block staff, especially the village level workers. As regards the field staff promotional policy is very conservative and promises given when the Community Development Programme was commissioned were not kept. In the present field survey it was found that most of the block staff have not received promotions even once in a lifetime. The following Table No.4.12 gives the clear picture.

**Table - 4.12**

**Number Of Times Promotions Received By The Selected Block Staff**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl.No.</th>
<th>Number of Time Promoted</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>No Promotion even once</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* One respondent has not answered.
One respondent since 1955 and two respondents since 1958 have not received even a single promotion. In another study undertaken in Punjab and Rajasthan it is reported that more than one third of officials have a bleak chance of promotion. Such a situation has a tendency to blurr the distinction in terms of reward and punishment between those who are eager and painstaking and those who are 'indolent and careless'. It also reveals the government attitude towards the development administrator and a general impression is created that in government honest and good work has not sufficiently been rewarded and inefficiency and dishonesty are inadequately penalised.

The lack of promotional avenues for block personnel is due to (i) non-expansion and higher cadre posts are limited, (ii) senior positions are held comparatively by young persons and there would be no openings, (iii) certain positions are conceived without linkage in the total administrative hierarchy with no existant chances of promotion in the system. Since the introduction of community development, adequate expansion has not been effected, rather it is stagnating. A few persons are shifted from block organisation to their parent departments. For instance, the Agriculture Extension Officers and number of VLWs, the higher cadres are limited. They have to be promoted as Extension Officers. The number of posts of EOs itself has been limited. Moreover, in some instances EOs are recruited directly. In the case of EOs they have to be either promoted as B.D.O. or to
higher cadres in their own department. The number of BDO posts are also limited. Sometimes, B.D Os are also recruited directly. As regards B.D.Os, they have to be promoted mainly to the post of District Development Assistant (DDA). Their number is only 19 corresponding to 19 districts. Hence, higher cadre posts are limited as far as block staff is concerned. The block personnel especially the B.D.O and V.L.W. posts are not linked to the total administrative hierarchy so far as promotions are concerned. The lack of promotional avenues for developmental personnel has blocked their career prospects and thereby has undermined the efficiency and effectiveness of development machinery. Unless promotional prospects are created, frustration is bound to creep in and this will necessarily reduce the value and efficiency of the service. The ARC has suggested an increase in promotional quota upto 40 per cent for lower rung servants so that younger talent can be enthused to work hard. Avenues for promotion should be increased by introducing more senior and selection grade posts. Thus, Henry Maddick too pleads, "Of equal to staff in the field are promotion prospectus. The procedure for promoting reviews should be such that every member of the staff is confident that first of all, he is not subject to arbitrary assessment by remote superior when he may never have met and secondly, that being in the field he is not lost to the central promotional schemes". The basic approach underlying promotion policies should be that every employee should have a fair chance of establishing his merit and that the process of selection should be as objective as possible. In this connection equal
weightage should be given to seniority, merit, annual confidential report and performance as an objective test. However, such a broad and well-knit policy is absent in the DRDS civil service system, with the result many field administrators are denied career advancement. It is very sad to note that the man who is working for providing social equity and justice to rural populace is denied it himself.

Another contentious issue which often creates a problem is transfer. Transfers are made in view of administrative efficiency. It is believed that sometimes transfers are motivated by other than administrative efficiency. To elicit views on this, a question was asked to all the implementing officers.

**Question:** Do you think that transfer of officials are also motivated by factors other than administrative efficiency and procedure?

Responses are tabulated in Table No.4.13.

**TABLE - 4.13**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Category of Respondents</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II DE</td>
<td>II DE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nos.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above responses show that a majority (58.7%) have opined that transfers are made on grounds other than administrative efficiency and procedure. This is a clear violation of administrative norm. Hence, this results in low morale and inefficiency. The quick transfers on other than administrative efficiency introduce uncertainty in administrative actions and stalls the initiative and drive of subordinates. The frequent transfers are the legacy and culture of the policing role of administration which believes that officials create vested interests towards particular areas and people. A minimum five-year duration for the key officials is necessary to do substantial and meaningful work in the field of rural development.

The grievances and problems connected with the work should be redressed so that an official can work smoothly. In work operations, certainly there will be problems. These should be removed as and when they arise. Otherwise officials cannot implement schemes effectively. A question was asked to implementing officials to elicit opinion on this issue.

**Question:** Are your grievances and needs fully met by the higher authorities and concerned agencies relating to the functionalities?

The answers presented in the below table No.4.14 show that a significant percentage (69.5%) of respondents feel their grievances and needs are fully met by the authorities. This is a good sign keeping in view the new institution - DRDS. Grievances are of two types—
individual and organisational. Individual grievances are concerned with a particular functionary, whereas the organisational grievances are concerned with the work environment. It is rather evident that satisfactory work environment as well as personnel policies are prevalent in the DRDS.

TABLE - 4.14
Redressal Of Grievances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Category Of Respondent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II DE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to boost the morale of civil servants the system of incentives must be provided. The problem of incentives and motivation in relation to public bureaucracy is complex. Incentives bring together officials and institutions since they both are embedded in it. Thus, this fusion of individual employer and bureaucracy indicates equilibrium whereby bureaucracy and individual gain something from each other.
In DRDS incentives in the form of award of prizes for outstanding work in the implementation of IRDP has been provided. The award of prizes for outstanding work done in the implementation of IRDP are given to Extension Officers, Village Level Workers and Officers of Co-operatives and Banks. A cash award of Rs.500/- is given to an individual. Such award should not exceed Rs.2,500/- in a year. A Committee headed by the Deputy Commissioner with Senior District Level Officers of Development Departments should decide about the persons for this award. But this incentive is still on paper only revealing the existence of formalism. It has not been awarded to anybody. In America with the introduction of Government Employee's Incentives Award Act, 1954, physical achievement in various departments is significantly increased. In case of DRDS due to non-implementation of incentive of award of prize one does not know about the effect of such incentives in rural development administration. The reward system should be introduced and it should encompass various activities of an institution like the DRDS. It is suggested that rewards should be given to the following categories of work: (1) outstanding administrative, technical and scientific work, (2) suggestions leading to greater efficiency for substantial economy of expenditure in administration, (3) extraordinary devotion to duty beyond the normal call of duty and (4) completion of important projects and assignments requiring strenuous efforts. The ARC also felt the need to stimulate and sustain the enthusiasm of a group of employees by means of incentives.
Job satisfaction of functionaries is another criteria which maximises the efficiency of an organisation. An official who is dissatisfied with his job cannot take interest and give attention which the work demands. Obviously, it creates inefficiency. In this regard a question was asked to implementing functionaries.

**TABLE -4.15**

**Job satisfaction**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Category Of Respondents</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II DE</td>
<td>III BE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nos.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It shows that about 69.6 per cent are satisfied with their job. This is a positive feature. The high job satisfaction ratio shows that the functionaries involved in the DRDS are doing varied kind of work and have some chances for decisions about their work. It also shows that in doing the development work some sort of personal responsibility is prevailing, this is indicative of a high rate of job satisfaction. It is, therefore, evident that the organisation having a high job
satisfaction rate suffices that functionaries involved are doing more difficult and more skilled tasks. Only 23.9 per cent are not satisfied with their job. Their percentage is negligible compared with the percentage of satisfied personnel. Those who are not satisfied with their job are mostly the persons who have not received promotion or whose cases are reviewed marginally. The dissatisfaction is attributed to the inherent dysfunctionalities of the bureaucratic organisation. It is learnt that routine work, political interference, absence of discipline among personnel and procedural delay have contributed greatly to job dissatisfaction. One VLW says that 'he is not satisfied with his job because since 24 years he has been working in the same post'. Those who are satisfied with their job are mostly the young and those who have received promotions at least once, who may be termed as 'motivators or satisfiers' and dissatisfiers as (hygienic factors). One BDO says that he has become defunct due to no promotion for nine years. For enhancing job satisfaction respondents feel that time-bound increments, promotions and other incentives and rewards should be provided. In this connection the reward structure needs to be re-examined with a view to building an intrinsic work satisfaction into the system of administration. This is because in terms of human needs human beings have an intrinsic quality to move on to fulfill one need after another which is best exemplified by Maslow's Need-Hierarchy Premise. Maslow has classified human needs into five groups: (a) the physiological needs, (b) the security needs, (c) the love and belonging needs (social needs), (d) the self-esteem needs and (e) the self-actualisation needs. The job satisfaction is one of self-esteem and
self-actualisation need which a civil servant would like to fulfil. However, interestingly, it is found that the most dissatisfied need among the administrative officers were self-actualisation and autonomy. Thus, the motivation of a civil servant is best achieved by creating an environment which offers intrinsic and extrinsic rewards.

It can be inferred from the personnel problems that ad hocism is the hallmark in personnel policies of rural development. It is evident that a sound policy can overcome these deficiencies. In this connection O Glenn Stahl's paradigm may be adopted. The features of Stahl's personnel paradigm are:

1. Personnel administration should be viewed as part of general administration.

2. Personnel administration should be viewed as dynamic and not static.

3. The selection, motivation and retention of public employers should always be based primarily on quality and merit in the broadest sense of the terms.

4. A personnel system should provide good conditions of employment, satisfactory environment, adequate rewards and enlightened supervision.
5. The character and direction of a career service should demonstrate recognition of the dignity of the individual and of respect for human personality.

6. The administrative climate, the systems of authority, the confidence in people, the minimizing of status or class, the brand of executive direction should be sufficiently motivating and supportive that it stimulates the release of human energy and ideas in the interest of the objective of public service.

It is needless to add that such a comprehensive personnel policy on rural development will go a long way in enhancing efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness on development administration.

The preceding sections touched the organisational dynamics of the DRDS. The organisational mechanism included the governing body, the directional wing, and the various district and taluk level implementing officers. Of course, the hierarchy runs from state secretariat to village level worker encompassing various areal administrative and controlling units. The DRDS works in the overall governmental bureaucratic setting and as such it is a part and parcel of public bureaucracy. Hence, it is desirable to diagnose the other functional facets of the DRDS keeping its working in bureaucratic milieu in view.
The dichotomy between 'generalist' and 'specialist' is also visible in the rural setting of Dharwad and Kolar districts. The district administration and the DRDS are under the general charge of the Deputy Commissioner who is necessarily a generalist administrator, while the district heads of functional departments are technical personnel (specialists) managing their technical departments under the guidance and leadership of the generalist deputy commissioner. The factors responsible for the resentment of district heads of technical departments towards the Deputy Commissioner are:

(a) the bossy attitude of young and inexperienced administrative officers towards their technical colleagues;

(b) the reduced prestige of the Deputy Commissioner because of interference with his authority and public belittling of the position by ministers and politicians;

(c) the Deputy Commissioner's own inability to maintain the high standard of conduct, integrity, efficiency, dedication and initiative set by their predecessors;

(d) direct contact between district heads and higher authorities including Ministers, and
the difference in age and experience between the young deputy commissioner and the older and more experienced district heads of technical departments.

To elicit who is more capable and efficient a query was asked to implementing functionaries in the two districts of Dharwad and Kolar.

**Question:** According to you who is more capable and effective in handling administration?

a) Generalist

b) Specialist

Most of the respondents (62.2%) opined that generalists are better administrators. Further, they also felt that (about 58.6%) key roles like Project Director and B.D.O. should be given to generalist administrator. The following tables give a clear picture of this.

**TABLE - 4.16**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who Is More Capable And Effective In Handling Administrative Matters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Category Of Respondents</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE - 4.17

Key Roles Should Be Given To Generalist Administrator

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>I GB</th>
<th></th>
<th>II DE</th>
<th></th>
<th>III BE</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nos.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Nos.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Nos.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Nos.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>58.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One cannot generalise from this that a generalist is more efficient. It is situation which determines the efficiency, and the approach of the administrator determines his effectiveness. Job is more important today than the man who performs it and every job must be performed by the men competent to do it. The competence and utility of the generalist and specialist is of equal importance. This can be measured from their relative social utility, merit and inputs involved in building up their personality. Speaking utility-wise, the services of both generalist and specialist are required for societal reconstruction and in this exercise the role of the specialist is slightly more likewise in their relative merit and personality building inputs both are alike.

The generalist and specialist controversy gains much prominence in view of a false sense of prestige, superiority, dominance and
exclusiveness. The need of the time is that such wrong notions have to be replaced by a feeling that creates a sense of equal partners in development and modernity since both share the know-how required for such a massive social reconstruction enterprise.

Communication:

Communication gives life to an organisation. In the absence of an effective communication system, an organisation cannot deliver the goods and services. Hence, lack of effective communication results in inefficiency and ineffectiveness. But most of the organisations will have some communication problems. According to Chester Barnard: "In an exhaustive theory of organisation communication would occupy a central place, because the structure, extensiveness and scope of organisations are almost determined by communication techniques".

An effective communication should stand the test of proper understanding by the receiver. Communication essentially means the process of passing information or ideas or thoughts to someone else. Hence, communication is the transference and understanding of meaning. Communications can be classified into formal and informal communications. Formal communication is a must in any organisation. However, the presence of informal communication is almost universal. Formal communications are transmitted mainly through orders, instructions, circulars, rules and any other means in black and white.
In bureaucratic organisations like the DRDS, communication is carried through instructions, orders, circulars, brochures, pamphlets, meetings and workshop gatherings. The instructions, orders and circulars account for a large percentage. As noted earlier, a communication to be effective demands a proper encoding, channelling and decoding. It means it should reach the receiver in the same form which the sender sends. Also it should be perceivable in its proper spirit. Vagueness should be minimised. In order to know whether instructions/orders are clear or not a query was asked to implementing officers.

**Question:** Do you find clarity in the instructions/orders issued by higher authorities?

Responses are presented in Table No 4.18

**TABLE - 4.18**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clarity In The Instructions/Orders Issued By Higher Authorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Category Of Respondents</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Answers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The responses showed that a majority (67.4%) feels instructions/orders issued by higher authorities to be clear. There are instances of vague instructions. But their number is negligible (19.6%). However, it is found that lack of clear guidance from the government is one of the attributes for tardy implementation of the schemes. It is often found that in the government orders and circulars in order to be over exact, the language employed becomes a stumbling block in conveying the clear intention and message of communication. Thus, a case for Gobbledegook is often found in such means of communication.

Another method of communication is formal meetings and gatherings in which communications can be channelled across. Committees, conferences, group discussions and meetings provide for lateral communications. The implementing officers have to attend a number of meetings at headquarters and fields. Meetings provide an effective forum for dialogue and interaction. In these meetings it helps to communicate both ways. A question was asked to list the number of meetings attended by implementing officers. The answers are given in Table 4.19.

**TABLE - 4.19**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category Of Respondents</th>
<th>II DE</th>
<th>III BE</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nos</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Nos</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 above</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The table shows a majority (65.2 per cent) of respondents who are implementing officers attend on an average 5 meetings in a month. Thus these meetings provide lateral communication. Even though the meetings have a functional value, more often they have become a part of bureaucratic rituals. Therefore ritualism has no value of its own, being performed for the sake of compliance.

**Direction Of Communication:**

Bureaucratic organisation which represents centralist tendencies will have downward communication. That is from higher officer to the subordinator and not vice versa. For instance, it is always the Deputy Commissioner or Project Officer communicates with the immediate subordinates and they in turn follow the same downward channel. The chain continues till the field level functionary who has to listen to everything coming from above. This downward communication will not be effective always especially in a development agency like the DRDS. Downward communication is best suited for a regular routine type of administration but certainly not for development administration. Communication to be effective demands listening. Listening means communication has to be upward or rather that they have to start with the recipient rather than the emitter. Downward communication quite often takes several things for granted. It requires that subordinates should be given opportunities to express what the organisation needs, what he is expected to perform and for what he is responsible. This
type of communication demands management by objectives. Subordinates should be given accessibility to decision-making.

**Informal Organisation:**

An informal organisation is present in every formal organisation and is the system of interpersonal relations which forms to affect the decisions made in the formal organisation.

The sound health of an organisation depends upon good interpersonal relationship among officials. This is so because the work in rural development is not confined to individual work like the revenue department (collecting taxes), it is more a kind of a team work. When it is a team effort means a good interpersonal relationships are necessary to carry out the tasks. A feeling of being a team is necessary. In order to know the interpersonal relationship, a question was asked to implementing functionaires.

**Question:** Do you feel that you are really a part of the group of people who work in office?

Very much/to some extent/rarely. Answers are presented in the following table - 4.20.
TABLE - 4.20

Group Feeling Of People Who Work In Office

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category Of Respondents</th>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>II DE</th>
<th>III DE</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nos.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Nos.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Much</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>63.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To some extent</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that a majority (73.9%) of respondents feel that they are very much part of the group of people who work in office. This is a good sign keeping in view the team type of work in the DRDS. This interpersonal relation creates informal organisation. This improves efficiency.

In all formal organisations, group works are formed for reasons other than affecting decisions. Informal communications are thus facilitated by such informal organisations. Informal communications are transmitted in group discussions, conversation at tea, lunch, gossiping, and telephonic talks. This is because 'the various offices
are occupied by concrete individuals with concrete personalities who have particular concrete social relations to other individuals. Such informal communications have both functional and dysfunctional value. In order to know this, a question was asked to the executive staff,

**Question:** To what extent informal relations of officials among themselves influence the efficiency of work within the administrative units?

(a) Improves efficiency
(b) Deteriorates efficiency
(c) Does not affect

Answers are tabulated in the following table 4.21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category Of Informal Relations Among Officials</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II DE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nos.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improves efficiency</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deteriorates efficiency</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not affect</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above table shows that a majority (69.6%) respondents feel that informal relations improves efficiency. Thus it corroborates Blau's thesis that informal organisation enhances rationality and eliminates operational difficulties. But sometimes the informal relations will be dysfunctional in the formation of cliques, groups and functions which try to promote their personal interests rather than organisational interests.

Talcott Parsons is of the opinion that cliques in an administrative organisation necessarily result in an antagonistic environment thus mar the efficiency and reliability of bureaucracy in delivering the services. He states, "The existence of such clique structures places the individual in a conflict situation. He is for instance pulled between the "impartial", "objective" loyalty in his superior as the incumbent of an office and the loyalty to a person whom he likes, who has treated him well, etc. Since in the society generally the patterns of personal loyalty and friendship are prominent and deeply ingrained, it is easy for these considerations gradually to come to predominate..."

It is needless to add that under such circumstances informal communications will impair the effectiveness of an organisation. This is due to the fact that informal communications developed through the instrumentality of informal organisation lead the official to defend their entrenched interests rather than to assist their clientele. But
whether they are functional or dysfunctional they will be present in almost all organisations, only the degree of their presence varies.

**Bureaucratic Tendencies:**

The DRDS is operating within a large governmental bureaucratic organisation. Hence the DRDS has become a part and parcel of governmental bureaucracy. Many studies have observed that bureaucracy in India whether engaged in developmental or non-developmental tasks share the same role perceptions and values. In this connection it is attempted here to explore to what extent the DRDS exhibits the bureaucratic phenomenon.

Weberian bureaucracy is characterised by the existence of procedure. Procedures are treated as the 'physiology of organisation'. As such procedures play an indecisive role in the management of an organisation. In one sense one cannot think of an organisation in the absence of procedure whether simple or complex. Procedures are means to achieve the organisational goals. But with the growth of complex organisations, procedures have become ends rather than means, thereby creating 'red tapism'. In the words of Merton, "Adherence to rules originally conceived as a means becomes transformed into an end in itself and whereby instrumental value becomes terminal value". Thus, this type of rule orientation has become dysfunctional in the context of development. Whatever the procedure, it should ensure prompt
decision-making and action. It is the researchers observation through field investigations that a majority of respondents feel that the procedure adopted in the DRDS promote prompt and efficient decision-making and action. This is a positive sign, keeping in view the usual bureaucratic 'red-tape' in government departments. This necessarily conforms to the much needed requirements in public bureaucracy. Time and again it is emphasised that the various public agencies involved in the poverty alleviation programmes, will have to guard against rigid bureaucratic structure and displacement of the primary task by invoking, confusing and delay causing rules and actions.

Another feature of Weberian bureaucracy is rule-orientation. Formal application of rules and excessive rule-orientation often results in 'red-tape'. Indian bureaucracy is notorious for its rigidity in adhering to rules, practices, precedents and procedures which are followed for the last several years. To test rule-orientation, a question was administered to implementing staff.

**Question:** Do you agree that most of your day-to-day work consists of application of prescribed rules and procedures with little need of variation or adoption in application to the cases that you deal?

Strongly agree/agree/not agree. The responses are presented in the following table -4.22.
TABLE - 4.22

Day To Day Works Consists In Application Of
Prescribed Rules/Procedures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>Category Of Respondents</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II DE</td>
<td>III BE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nos.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Agree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The responses listed in the above table shows that 19.6 per cent respondents "strongly agreed", whereas 67.4 per cent "agreed". This shows that the rule-orientation and formal rule application are a feature also to be found in the DRDS. It is perturbing to note that 63.1 per cent of block level respondents feel that their day to day work is mainly rule application whereas their tasks, duties and services which demands for innovation rather than rule-orientation. In a study conducted in Tamil Nadu, it is reported that these change agents spend 80 per cent of their time in attending bureaucratic concerns like rule application, reporting, routinised work and attending meetings etc. This type of bureaucratisation of rural change
agents and extension functionaries naturally divert their concern from the primary function of extension

The rule-orientation is not confined to governmental bureaucracy, it has even spread to banking institutions, which has impeded the effective implementation of schemes. The Evaluation Report states: "many of the bank managers are rule-minded. They were reluctant to entertain IRDP loan applications during the period when crop loans were being advanced or at the time of annual accounts. This has led to delay in sanction of loans." An inevitable consequence of this kind of rigid discipline will defeat and frustrate independent professional judgement while it encourages a protective and conservative service morale which is certainly an anti-thesis to extension work of development administration. The reasons for this kind of practice is that in governmental administration reward and punishment are solely determined by considerations of seniority and other aspects like achievement etc., are hardly taken note of. The negative approach of a bureaucrat is rewarded. Negative in the sense an official who does not make mistake rather than who achieves something will be rewarded and safeguarded. The following response of a bureaucrat will suffice to explain this fact:

"What choice have I got. I am not judged by the results I achieve, but by very adherence to rules I can't be blamed if I do nothing but will be taken to task if I make a single mistake what does it matter, if a battle is lost or trains collide or buildings
collapse so long as I have acted according to rules? It is far better
that no new houses are built. That a single house should go up for
infringing any regulation. It is far better that refugees should
indefinitely go without relief which is due to them than the risk of
paying more than his due to any one. Sins of commission are easier
to detect than sins of commissions. 127

In another study it is pointed out that system of rules are still
the most guiding values. In a study of IAS Officers it is revealed
revealed that around 70 per cent of them believe in adherence to rule
and procedure and complying with formalities. It can be argued that
since higher bureaucrats, consisting of IAS officers have a strong
prelation for rule adherence naturally the lower rung civil service has
to muddle in this fetish observance of rules since in a bureaucratic
organisation orders and commands are issued by higher echelons. The
consequence of this trend over development administration is that
development functionaries have to concentrate on fetish observance of
rules and procedures. Excessive adherence to rules necessarily
encourages evasion of primary tasks. Obviously they cannot perform
their primary duty of assisting the needy rural clients.

Another feature of bureaucratic organisation is periodic reporting.
The periodic reporting is necessary to know the extent of work done
and work to be done. In this connection the executive staff has to
send monthly, quarterly, half-yearly and annual reports concerning the
progress of schemes and finances to higher authorities, even as the existing field officers are burdened with too many reports and returns. In order to know the necessity of this reporting a question was asked to executive staff.

**Question:** Do you think that periodic reporting is necessary?

**TABLE - 4.23**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category Of Respondents</th>
<th>II DE</th>
<th>III BE</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nos.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Nos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Answers listed in the above table shows that a significant percentage (80.4%) of respondents feel the necessity of periodic reporting. A negligible percentage (10.9%) of respondents feel the non-necessity of reporting. The gross percentage of responses indicates the tendency towards bureaucratic conservatism. However this type of
Peripheral work should not affect the primary or substantive duties. Over devotion to precedent or arrangement will naturally impede the efficiency of administration which in no sense will benefit the target populace. The existing system of periodic reporting on progress is found to be ineffective. This is because these are not facilitating the authorities to anticipate problems and to judge the programme with reference to pre-determined programmes and objectives. The essence of periodic reporting regarding progress is to initiate corrective measures.

But in sending up the progress reports upwards which are aggregated at a particular point consequently they lose their identity as they move up. The dire consequence is that the development claims and achievements are never verified at the field level.

Public administration doctrine and practice is inescapably culture-bound. The cultural values of a specific group (sometime interest group) are more pronounced in this cultural map of public administration. This raises a serious question as to whether civil servants bound up with a section or group of populace are committed to the total public or public interest. Development administration and programmes of social change should stress on greater representativity among their personnel. In essence commitment emanates from attitudes, orientation of civil servant and as well as the very representativeness of the target populace. Hence, commitment advocates both psychological make-up and social composition of development administration.
The notion of committed bureaucracy is also often raised whenever bureaucracy showed indifference to developmental goals and the client population. The concept of committed bureaucracy is an anti-thesis to the Weberian rational model of bureaucracy which emphasises on impersonality and neutrality. With bureaucracy shouldering the massive developmental responsibilities the commitment to socio-economic objectives of the government is sought and emphasised. Such a notion calls for missionary orientation in bureaucrats rather than 'system maintenance' function. This necessarily results in responsive bureaucracy. This is because the very attitude, orientation, and identification with the client determine the nature of commitment and responsiveness of the administration. It is often found that senior officials generally tend to associate themselves with groups corresponding to their power and status and naturally he will be predisposed to give more weight to these groups. It is often complained that civil servants are inaccessible and indifferent towards the feelings and convenience of individual citizens which obviously impede effective development administration. The cordial and helpful relation with the client facilitates the smooth achievement of targets. Public administration need to be reminded constantly that it is not an end in itself but only means to an end which is the welfare and prosperity of the people. It is because the lower level officials tend to restrict their contacts with the community as much as possible due to status consciousness and orientation. Jawaharlal Nehru thus observes: "... public administration, apart from the normal features
that it should have, should be intimately concerned with public co-operation. The idea of a public servant sitting in a world apart and doing out impartial justice is completely out of place in a democratic society, and much more in a dynamic democratic society which is moving forward, because the very pace of moving forward depends not on the public servant but on the people, and if there is no intimate connection between the people and the public servant, then there may be efficiency but there is no movement forward. In essence, it is evident that the helping client relations is necessary among officials. It denotes that every public servant is a public relations man in a true sense of the term.

**Question:** Do you like to meet the people and how often?

(a) Yes, very much
(b) Yes, like to meet them
(c) Don't mind meeting them
(d) Strongly dislike to meet them.

Answers are presented in the following table No. 4.24

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion About People</th>
<th>Category Of Respondents</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II DE</td>
<td>Nos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, very much</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, like to meet</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't mind meeting</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly dislike to</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meet people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The opinion of respondents show that a majority (73.9%) likes very much to meet the people. This is a good sign keeping in tune with the demands of development administration. In one of the studies it is reported that majority (45.4%) of respondents have opined that 'do not mind meeting people' which is essentially an attitude of neutrality and impersonality, an attribute of Weberian classicalism. In contrast to this the present study reveals that this trend of negativism is very marginal, that is 4.3 per cent.

A question was asked to give opinion on how their colleagues behave with people.

**Question:** How do you feel officials of your department behave with the people who come to your office for their work?

Very helpful/helpful/not helpful.

**TABLE - 4 25**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>Category Of Respondents</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II DE</td>
<td>III Be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nos.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Helpful</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helpful</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Helpful</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above table shows that a majority (69.6%) are helpful to the people who come to their work.

The above findings corroborate the view that with changing environment the relationship between administrator and client (people) are changing, breaking away from the colonial legacy of keeping aloof from the public. The implication of this trend in administration is that the public bureaucracy must become efficient and effective in delivering services to populace since the civil service is now a days concerned with every aspects of human life, from birth to death. Often complaints are levelled against the administration for not coming up to the mark of the expectations of citizens. Thus it has to go a long way to nullify the assertions of Merton. He is of the opinion that theoretically government personnel are held to be the servants of the people, infact, they are usually superordinate. This has to be reversed in development administration because it is aimed at the welfare of the people by uplifting the rural poor from the clutches of abject poverty.

The Weberian ideal emphasises neutral and impersonal bureaucracy. In view of massive development and modernisation ventures of the government, such a precept has been set aside as unrealistic caricature. This is because impersonality as a behavioural trait of the civil servant tends to reduce his commitment to work. Most of the observers on development administration emphasise the need
for active and committed civil service A few have advocated professionals, whereas others stress on the need for political commitment to project goals and policies. This necessitates a committed bureaucracy but it is a commitment to programmes and its goals. In essence, it denotes commitment to the uplifting of poor sections by developmental bureaucracy. It implies inculcating and exhibiting the common ethos and culture of target population. How effectively the objectives of rural development can be achieved depends to a large extent on the attitudes of development personnel towards rural areas and rural people particularly the poor. The commitment partly emanates from being the member of such group; and partly by imbibing the spirit of commitment through appropriate skills, attitudes and orientation. In this connection the social background or social composition of existing development bureaucracy from district to village level is worth noting. The general psychology of administrators shapes the overall administrative assignments. The socio-economic background moulds the psychological traits in development administration. Hence, an account of social background of development administration can divulge dimensions of commitment to poverty alleviation programme of the DRDS.

The IAS officers form the district head and Project Directors are mostly drawn from the upper middle class groups. P.N. Haksar states that Indian Civil Service is dominated by Brahmins. Their identification with the lower strata of society and commitment to them
is rather doubtful. Since a majority of them are urbanites with a high standard of living, it is very doubtful whether they are fully aware of the real problems of the rural poor who are their target population.

In like manner, the middle and lower level development bureaucracy is composed of dominant castes and fairly better-off castes. This is evident from the findings of the Second Backward Classes Commission Report. The Brahmins, Lingayats, Vokkaligas and Muslims have occupied 15.54 per cent, 16.92 per cent, 11.68 per cent and 10.97 per cent public services respectively. The SC and ST have a paltry 15.86 per cent and 2.82 per cent positions in the government service. In the selected districts the same trend continues. In Dharwad the Brahmin and Lingayats have representation to the extent of 13.3 per cent and 29.5 per cent of public service under the Deputy Commissioner. Likewise in the Kolar district it is again Brahmins 30.11 per cent and Vokkaligas 26.1 per cent dominate Government service positions. The following table No. 4.26 gives the clear picture of religion and caste composition of public services under the Deputy Commissioner.

This suffices to infer that the existing development bureaucracy is predominantly urban middle-class in nature and thrust. The bureaucracy is basically a representative of dominant sections of the society. The lower echelon bureaucracy is too not devoid of such biases.
TABLE - 426

Religion And Caste-wise Number Of Government Employees Working Under The Deputy Commissioners Of Selected Districts In 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion/Castes</th>
<th>DC DWR.</th>
<th></th>
<th>DC Kolar</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nos.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Nos.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahmin</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lingayat</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vokkaliga</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuruba</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,193</td>
<td></td>
<td>972</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From a study it is revealed that the civil servant obviously shares the value of the class to which he belongs. This necessarily leads to commitment to the class to which he is a member. The values of elitism are enshrined in a supercilious attitude towards the down-trodden and poor which makes the administrative machinery distinctively insensitive to public needs and even hostile to public
Moreover, such a factor is responsible for administrators unsatisfactory perception of principle and execution of development schemes. The social composition as revealed does not favour the administration of anti-poverty programme of the DRDS since the predominance of dominant castes is pronounced in the development bureaucracy. The development administration with this background cannot enthusiastically support and sincerely administer the radical policies of the government. In essence, such a bureaucracy is bound to acquire a negative character which in turn will make it highly dysfunctional. Donald Kingsley proposes a representative bureaucracy to overcome this type of dysfunctionality. However there are doubts too whether such a representative bureaucracy takes a positive and helpful attitude towards their representative class. Such a doubt arises due to the process of sanskritisation. Thus, middle and lower classes and castes are under the process of sanskritisation and with the result they look upward rather than downward to their peer groups. The net effect is that the gulf between the administrator and client widens in which the former stands at 'giving point' whereas the later at receiving point. A sort of patrimonial administration is established under this guise reflecting a patriarchal household.

The target population of the DRDS mainly consists of weaker sections who have difficulty in getting two square meals a day. They have unique features and orientation and values about themselves. For instance, they lack motivation or desire for growth, exhibit
psychological inhibition to take up schemes, unable to distinguish between capital and income because of their over-whelming need for consumption, and lastly lack impulses of growth due to illiteracy. To organise and assist and uplift such a target client necessarily require a cadre of professional developmental bureaucrats devoid of caste and class affinities. The professionalism has to emanate from dedication to their career, not missionary or philanthropist's approach of a charity giver. The 'giver' attitude of development administration negates the very spirit of public services. The 'giver' attitude is the result of inbuilt prevailing socio-cultural values. The classical hierarchy of Manu's Varnashram Dharma coincided with the bureaucratic hierarchy in which this 'giver' attitude and 'bossist' tendency ruled the day negating the very spirit of public services. This is evident from the social composition of developmental bureaucracy. Thus, Rajni Kothari's observations hold good in this context. He states that: "Today the State is seen to have betrayed the masses, as having become the prisoner of the dominant classes and their transnational patrons and as having increasingly turned anti-people." Therefore, to overcome this anti-people phenomenon development administration must be democratic in its personnel practices. Development is not just a mechanical or impersonal process. It can take place when skill is supported by commitment. Therefore, bureaucracies must transform themselves from a body of high status control agents aloof from the society to change agents interacting with the changing society.

The notion of committed bureaucracy has been strongly condemned on various accounts. It will result in the emergence of a complaint
bureaucracy and will produce instability in the political system. Another serious criticism levelled against it is that it produces 'a competition in insincerity' and all fair dealing will be eliminated.

**Political Interference:**

Political interference is an outcome of dichotomy between politics and administration which has become a critical issue since the publication of Woodrow Wilson's essay on "The study of Administration". Political interference is now one of the central themes of comment among citizens although students of public administration have not given it all the attention it deserves. Political interference in administration is acute in developing and transitional societies of Asia, Africa, Middle East and Latin America. These societies are marching with modern democratic politics, policies and principles on a traditional soil. In a democratic State political interference by the political masters will be there to get benefits to their area and people. Political pressures and interference by the people's representatives and political parties will be there in allocating benefits.

In a study undertaken as a part of Ph D thesis "over 50 per cent of the respondents fear that several projects are selected on grounds of political expediency at once". It is observed that political interference seems to increase as one moves down the governmental
hierarchy, at lower levels it is maximum. The cutting edge levels of
the machinery are the most affected by the official political groups or
powerful lobbies or from vested interests within the bureaucratic
mechanism. The political interference is often effected through
various 'contactmen' who necessarily belongs to the domain of the
political system.

In this connection a query was asked to administrators.

**Question:** Is there political interference/political pressure in the
working of DRDS?

The responses are tabled below.

**TABLE - 4.27**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Category Of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above table reveals that 27.6 per cent of officials experience political interference and political pressure. Since this is a very sensitive issue, many administrators have not given an objective answer. Even the percentage given above is quite significant. In this connection one official states, "Political request rather than a political pressure or interference is there for including villages in the cluster by political masters". Pressures are brought by non-officials to include the names of their members in the beneficiaries list. Thus political interference in the selection of beneficiaries and their locality is often seen in the process of development administration.

The natural outcome of political interference is conflict and strained relationship between political masters and officials. The public servant has a right to put forward what is called the 'departmental philosophy' which he had accumulated over the years of experience and knowledge; it is more than mere opinion. Whereas the non-officials usually interfere and bring undue pressures for ulterior or narrow ends. Under such a situation the conflict is bound to arise and this necessarily affects the smooth functioning of an organisation. The administration operating under this frame considerably violates the principles and requirements of the rule of law, social justice, merit and equality of opportunity.

Another facet of political interference is the politicisation of the bureaucracy which ultimately reduces the job satisfaction among the civil servants. "Politicised administration is one which influences or
is influenced to some degree, consciously or unconsciously by overt or implicit actions in the stream of politics of the day whether of the party in power or of the party/parties in opposition. Such an involvement may mean the bureaucratic promotion of special interests of political party at the expense of rational objectives..." It has its deleterious consequences, which will naturally impede the realisation of the desired goals or purposes of an institution.

It has two dysfunctionalities. It certainly deceives the government machinery by forcing the officials to help their own groups, though they are not deserving. Secondly, such politicising at times gives wrong impression to the public regarding the validity of developmental efforts and thus evoke lesser and negative response. Along with these, the device of contact-men encourages corrupt practices and the institution of corruption enters through this device.

The crux of the problem lies in conceiving the public bureaucracy as an autonomous entity losing sight of prevailing power constellations.

The essence of politics and bureaucracy is the power in which the same human factor (acquiring power) operates. Under such circumstances, interference is bound to take place to acquire power in the form of acquiring benefits.

**Management Of Finance:**

The success of an organisation depends upon sound management of finance. The Mauryas had the saying, "Look well to Finance, the
treasury is the key to all”. Finance is the life-blood of an organisation, giving an organisation the needed vitality, strength, and effectiveness in its transactions. A good financial plan and position is sine - qua-non of the success of organisation and its programmes. Thus without sound finance an organisation will not be able to deliver the services in a desired fashion. This occupies an even more significant place in a new institution like the DRDS. In essence, creating an organisation, giving it wide powers and responsibilities without adequate financial powers is like 'dressing a dead women'.

A sound financial management requires an effective mobilisation of resources, efficient use of resources and, lastly, providing a ready reckoner of the organisational transactions which are in consonance with the established norms and practices. The resources form the part of income while efficient use denotes the expenditure aspect of the financial management. The budgeting, accounting and auditing are the means in this process of effective mobilisation of resources and efficient use of available resources. Hence, the management of finance will deal with the following:

(a) Pattern of Income of the DRDS,
(b) Pattern of Expenditure of the DRDS,
(c) Budgeting,
(d) System of Accounts, and
(e) Auditing.
The income of the selected DRDS has predominantly come from governments by way of grants. This is quite natural since the fund of DRDS is mainly or mostly constituted by the recurring and non-recurring grants of the State and Central Government. This has been stipulated in the GO No.RDC 94 AEP 79, Bangalore, dated 13-3-1979. Around 98 per cent of income is accrued from grants, which is evident from the following table No.4.28. Interests on the deposits made over the years have increased. This is made possible by the very nature of DRDS, a society registered under the Societies Act, 1860.

The implication is that the funds allotted for a particular year will not lapse in case of non-utilisation as happens in department administration of the government. Since the balance account fetches interest it is also contributory to a marginal extent.

The main items of expenditure in DRDS are:

(a) Programme Implementation,
(b) Administrative Expenditure.

Since programme implementation is the primary task of the DRDS, the natural corollary is that expenditure on it is around 90 per cent. Except in two instances the administrative expenditure has been well within the stipulated level. As per the Government guidelines the administrative expenditure should not exceed 7.5 per cent of the total expenditure. The Dharwad DRDS in 1980-81 and Kolar DRDS in 1982-83 have exceeded the prescribed limit, i.e. 7.5 per cent of total expenditure. This is evident from the table no.4.29. The reasons for
TABLE - 4.28

Income Of The DRDS In Selected Districts
(Rs In lakhs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dharwad</td>
<td>Kolar</td>
<td>Dharwad</td>
<td>Kolar</td>
<td>Dharwad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Grants from Government</td>
<td>88 60</td>
<td>248 06</td>
<td>151 79</td>
<td>162.92</td>
<td>197 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(99 75)</td>
<td>(99 17)</td>
<td>(99 45)</td>
<td>(98 94)</td>
<td>(98 44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Interests from banks</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.71)</td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
<td>(0.83)</td>
<td>(0.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Miscellaneous</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.81)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>88 82</td>
<td>250 13</td>
<td>152 62</td>
<td>164.66</td>
<td>201 04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a*
### TABLE 4.29

Expenditure Of The DRDS In Selected Districts

(Rs. In lakhs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dharwad</td>
<td>Kolar</td>
<td>Dharwad</td>
<td>Kolar</td>
<td>Dharwad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Programme</td>
<td>73.87</td>
<td>16.71</td>
<td>119.00</td>
<td>103.40</td>
<td>170.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>(93.24)</td>
<td>(99.24)</td>
<td>(61.89)</td>
<td>(92.87)</td>
<td>(94.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Administrative</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>7.93</td>
<td>10.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses</td>
<td>(4.94)</td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td>(36.42)</td>
<td>(7.13)</td>
<td>(5.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Other expenditure</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.64)</td>
<td>(1.63)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Depreciation</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>79.24</td>
<td>168.44</td>
<td>192.25</td>
<td>111.33</td>
<td>180.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
such an excess expenditure may be attributed to the increase in staff and heavy expenditure on providing facilities to staff like vehicles, stationery, furniture and even some-times advances. A.D Gorwala succinctly remarks, that a government that is extravagant in a country as indigent as ours deserves indeed the severest condemnation. This applies too to development organisations like the DRDS. The price of development must be austerity which requires that officials, managers and politicians accept and implement a strategy which would reduce their own privileges and thereby the expenditures on administration. The dire consequences of this trend is that ultimately the programme suffers in view of paucity of funds. Thus in the Mertonian jargon there occurs the displacement of goals.

It is found that expenditure must be incurred as per the guidelines of respective schemes. For instance, with regard to IRDP the expenditure must be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Quarter</td>
<td>10 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Quarter</td>
<td>20 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Quarter</td>
<td>35 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Quarter</td>
<td>35 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 per cent</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This has been rarely adhered to since the government grants were too not in conformity with the guidelines. It is reported that in March 1982, 1983, 1984 the release of grant accounted for 31 per cent, 38 per cent and 44 per cent respectively. Since grants are released in this manner DRDS cannot adhere to its principal objective of spreading its expenditure throughout the year. Hence, heavy expenses are incurred like usual government departments, who in the psyche of lapse of funds after 31st March, go all way to spend money allotted. This psyche of 'March Fever' is present too in the DRDS because of uneven release of grants by the Central government. Its dire consequences are:

(a) Prices are escalated which fatten the pockets of middlemen.

(b) Leads to compromise in the quality of assets as there is a rush to spend money in a very short period

(c) It encourages all kinds of financial irregularities.

**Budgeting:**

An organisation is hardly worth the name unless it has a budget. The importance of proper budgeting can not be over emphasised. Budgeting is an important tool in the hands of the management which is used to control, guide and direct the affairs of an enterprise
through the precise allocation of financial outlays against definite targets to be achieved. The DRDS prepares its budget estimates and the same is forwarded to the State government for its approval. On the basis of indication of the probable availability of funds for the ensuring year, the Project Director, with the help of Assistant project Officers Accounts, prepares the budget. In this process he involves different heads of district development department. This is because they are the principal executors of the schemes of the DRDS. They indicate their probable work for the coming year along with the estimates. The same will be incorporated in the budget of the DRDS.

Since almost all grants are coming from the central and state governments, there is no scope for budgeting in the DRDS. It does not have its own income or any resources. It is just a fund-disbursing institution. Secondly, almost all the grants are advanced to implement a particular scheme. There is no scope for alternatives in the funds of the DRDS. It is stipulated in the order that under no circumstances funds provided under one programme may be used for some other programmes (GO No. RDC 94 AEP 79, Bangalore, dated 13th March, 1979).

Under these circumstances the DRDS' role in budgeting is mini-scale.

The System Of Accounting:

Accounting, in the words of Francis Oakey, is the science of producing promptly and presenting clearly the facts relating to financial conditions and operations that are required as a basis of
management. The principal objective of the accounting system should be that it should give a clear picture of the financial transactions of the organisation. It should highlight the financial position with regard to availability of funds and expenditure incurred. The nature of expenditure will necessarily throw light on the works taken, appropriateness of the works executed and fidelity of all officers. Wide variations in accounting system are prevalent in economic and commercial enterprises. The DRDS is a part of government and it necessarily follows the mode and procedure of government accounting system. There are two procedures followed. Firstly, all the releases made by the government are taken into the general cash book and the same is debited in due course to the implementing officers' account. The general cash book gives the overall financial position of the DRDS on a particular date. Secondly, the implementing officers maintain their concerned cash books in which they debit the expenditures incurred in their particular scheme. After the utilisation of funds the implementing officers send the utilisation certificates denoting the exact amount utilised and the nature of work taken, etc. It indicates the financial performance of the particular sector. The accounting system employed in the DRDS is a conventional governmental system. This is suited for a regulatory administration, but in view of the vast growth of development administration a development accounting on the lines of modern scientific accounting must be employed.

Auditing:

Audit is a significant step in the entire financial management of an institution like the DRDS. This will facilitate in assessing the
appropriateness of a financial transaction. In the absence of audit, misutilisation and misappropriation cannot be identified and rectified. The sanctity of financial management lies in the instrumentality of audit.

Audits in public and private administrations are of various types and nature. Pre-audit, post-audit and concurrent audit are commonly used modes of audit. Pre-audit is auditing prior to the transaction consummated and completely recorded. After the transaction which is recorded, post-audit is employed. When pre-audit and post-audit are practised in respect of same body of accounts it is concurrent audit. Audit is also either internal or external depending on the nature of the auditing agency. Audit by internal auditors is usually by the regular employees in public administration. External audit is usually by outside authorities or individuals.

In DRDS too auditing is adopted. The Government order No.RDC 94 AEP 79, Bangalore, dated 13-3-1979 states the audit provisions of the DRDS. The DRDS has adopted both internal and external audit. Internal audit is made by two authorities (a) by the rural development department authorities at secretariat and Divisional Commissioner usually by way of inspections, and (b) by the Accountant General, Karnataka. The external audit is conducted by the Chartered Accountant. This is an innovation in public bureaucracy since development administration is brought under the commercial auditing
system which necessarily employs cost-benefit approach. In essence, the two types of audit serve two distinct purposes in DRDS. Firstly, audit by internal authorities ensures the examination of appropriateness of financial transactions in the governmental rules, conventions and norms framework. It looks into the DRDS accounts keeping in view the governmental philosophy. Thus the DRDS being a government project, its finance is scrutinised in the conventional manner. Secondly, audit by the Chartered Accountant facilitates in assessing the accounts from the commercial point of view, in which the economic efficiency is measured. The cost-benefit analysis of the project in terms of financial performance will be made. Since in commercial ventures, profit is the main criterion, the system of accounts is tailored to suit it, in the same fashion the DRDS accounts are verified. However, A.D. Gorwala has a few reservations of this type of external audit. He writes "No amount of examination by exterior bodies who draw up long inspection notes, send them down, wait for compliance, issue reminders, get replies which may or may not be correct on the spot can bring about lasting efficiency".

The external audit by a chartered accountant was done in selected DRDSs regularly from 1979 to 1984. However, internal audit by the Accountant General has been taken up only in 1989-90, the reports are yet to be submitted to the Government. The chartered accountant's report reveals the following deficiencies in the DRDS accounting system.
The audit report of the chartered accountant highlights the salient features of the proceedings of the financial transactions of the DRDS. This includes the following items: Firstly, the nature of accounting system is examined. In this connection audit reports for the period 1979-84 invariably recommended maintaining the accounts on double-entry basis. This will facilitate rectification of errors in accounting and a clear picture of the financial transaction will necessarily emerge. It has suggested maintaining the following books of account (a) Journal, General ledger, (b) Summary of monthly receipts and payments accounts (c) subsidy register. In spite of audit reports' persistent insistence to maintain the accounts in a scientific and modern method, the DRDS account is maintained in a conventional government method only. It has its serious limitations which have resulted in ineffectual accounting. This has been brought out by the audit personnel. One of the Reports remarks: "An amount of Rs.24,54,250/- was paid to P.W D. Kolar against the expenditure of Rs.23,83,580.05. After taking into account the amount due and payable to them on 1-4-1980, an amount of Rs.28,745.94 is due and payable for the year 1980-81. This is due to clubbing of account of their funds and no separate account have been kept of this fund". Such numerous instances pinpointing the drawbacks of the account system and corresponding irregularities are noted invariably in all the audit reports. Hence, in the words of the French sociologist Michel Crozier "the overriding pathology of bureaucracy lies in the inability of bureaucratic organisations to learn from their own errors". The reasons for not adopting the commercial and scientific accounting
system are many. The accounts personnel of governmental bureaucracy who are in DRDS are inadequately trained in the commercial accounting. They lack the required knowledge of double-entry book keeping and so on which are the basis of commercial book keeping. The commercial accounting needs extra manpower to maintain different kinds of registers, ledgers and accounts. This is not possible in DRDS since it has to adhere to a set pattern of staff. In view of inadequacy of staff and their insufficient scientific knowledge, it has not been possible for the DRDS to adopt the commercial accounting system. In essence, the DRDS is once again muddling in conventional methods which has negative effect in its performance as a whole. Thus again a defect of public bureaucracy, that is, inadaptability and rigidity have become a stumbling block in implementing the suggestions of chartered accountants.

Secondly, the chartered accountant's audit examine the expenditure proceedings. In this connection it verifies whether the concerned officer has the requisite power to spend, how much he has actually spent and the sending of the documentary evidences in the form of utilisation certificate to the DRDS. In case the executing agency has not spent the amount, the same is noted for recoupment by the DRDS. It verifies the cash book for the authenticity of financial transactions. In some instances it has noted how the irregularities are reflected in the cash book. For instance, one report states, "In case of fisheries department Kolar an amount of Rs.8,323.35 was drawn towards the salary and travelling allowance for the month of March"
1980 on 2-4-1980. But only Rs 4,429.50 has been accounted for in the cash book. Likewise in 1980-81 report it is recorded that "An amount of Rs.49,900.00 was paid to P.W D Kolar on 31-3-1981, towards civil works. This item was not taken to cash book. This may be incorporated". It is found that many of the implementing officers have not complied with the utilization certificates.

The report also touches on the payment made to various tasks and work. In this connection it finds that there is no cross reference method to avoid duplicacy. With regard to the granting of subsidy under various schemes, no cross reference is made while delivering the subsidy. This has resulted in many instances in double payment, which are brought out by the audit party.

The chartered accountant's audit also looks into the adherence of procedures in the implementation of schemes involving financial transactions. Such a verification naturally ensures effective and proper implementation of the schemes. This naturally restricts the pilferage or leakage in the schemes and thereby the genuine target group is benefited. For instance, one of the Reports comments: "As prescribed in the guidelines the certificates either by the block or by Tahsildar do not contain a specific report that a family has been treated as a unit and that no other member of the same unit has been treated as member of small farmer, marginal farmer and agricultural labourer. The off-farm income certificates was not actually attached. The controlling officers have not given cross references of register.
containing the selected list of small farmer, marginal farmers and agricultural labourers, kept in the head office to make effective verification. This list was also not updated.

The audit by the chartered accountant has been undertaken with a view to verify the authenticity of financial transactions of the DRDS. In the process, the pros and cons of the prevailing accounting system is assessed. The financial irregularities are brought to the notice of the concerned. Ways and means for effectivising the financial system are recommended. One inference can be drawn from the audit of the chartered accountant. The irregularities, mistakes and anomalies in the financial management of the DRDS over the years are gradually declining. It suggests that the financial administration is gearing itself to handle new kind of activities in a new environment and a new organisation. Also it indicates the process of institutionalisation of an administrative innovation like the DRDS. That it is able to reduce its drawbacks of financial administration over the years gradually is itself an indication of institutionalisation in which a kind of differentiation is slowly emerging. The differentiation variable is one of the measures of institutionalisation.

As noted earlier, apart from the audit by chartered accountant the DRDS accounts are also audited by the Controller and Auditor General of India through his representative, the Accountant General, Karnataka. It observes two types of transactions and proceedings of the DRDS. In the first instance, the financial transactions of the
programme execution are examined and audited. This is an important function since it ensures adherence to prescribed rules and norms in programme implementation. Secondly, it examines the financial and personnel affairs of the development staff involved in the DRDS. In this, the pay, leave, advances, travelling allowances of the development personnel are verified.

The salient features of the audit by the Accountant General as per the audited reports are: Firstly, work progress are taken note on the basis of work assignment. It is a kind of evaluation of the progress of the scheme executed. Secondly, it examines the payments made by the DRDS to various tasks, assignments and to different kinds of functionaries. Over-payments are brought to the notice of the authorities. For instance, the report states, "A scrutiny of the records indicating to the sanction of Risk Fund to the various co-operative societies by the DRDS reveal that the risk fund was calculated on the total amount of loans sanctioned by the credit institutions without deducting the subsidy (of 25% or 50%) as the case may be paid by the DRDS. This resulted in excess payment of risk fund to the extent of Rs.3,86,530.27". Likewise, double payment was detected. It is found that to one of the beneficiaries double payment was made. Thirdly, it looks whether expenditures are made as per the annual plan sanctions. In case the expenditure fall outside the approved plan schemes such are brought to the notice of the concerned. In this way it ensures in sticking to the plan and avoids arbitrary expenditure by the officials.
In the fourth instance, to what extent rules are adhered in the plan implementation are examined. The identification of beneficiaries, areas to confirm or not with the parameters of the government prescribed norms are investigated. The defects of identification of beneficiaries are pinpointed in the audit report. Some of the defects of identification as found by the audit are: (a) in land holding the extent of irrigated and non-irrigated are not taken note (b) non-farm income of the participants have not been exhibited in the list thus making the identification a defective one. Fifthly, it ensures financial accountability. Advances given to BDOs are not complied with the receipts. Such cases are detected thus facilitating financial accountability. Another facet of financial accountability is the maintenance of proper records of the financial transactions. The report touches on this also and remarks that in the absence of records it is not possible to watch the advances made to beneficiaries as subsidy. This sometimes also leads to the double payment of subsidy. Sixthly, it ensures the proper utilisation of funds by the concerned institutions to which advances are made. Seventhly, the audit also looks into the exercise of financial powers of the key officers of the DRDS. In this connection any deviation is detected and the authenticity and necessity of such transactions are verified. It thus reduces arbitrariness, irregularities in the exercise of financial powers. Lastly, it investigates into the irregularities. In this role it ensures that governmental money is spent for the purpose it is earmarked and in the true spirit of public interest.
The audit by the Accountant General looks into the nature of the accounting system. The maintenance of books, ledgers, journals and cash books, monthly returns are examined in terms of their efficacy. It also recommends measures like maintaining different ledgers for different schemes etc. for strengthening the system of accounts. The audit by the Accountant General is a post-audit and it is not conducted regularly. Being a post-audit and in the absence of regularity its efficacy and utility are often questioned. In other words, unless the audits are current and eventually audit reports are published in time to enable prompt action to be instituted, the whole audit becomes an exercise in futility, and would serve no more useful purpose than fulfilling a legal requirement. For instance, the Dharwad DRDS for the year 1979-87 is audited in the year 1990 after a lapse of ten years. Under such circumstances, it serves almost no purpose. It is, therefore, recommended that the concurrent audit must be adopted in the working of DRDS. This will ensure that there is no misuse of funds and the drawback of the accounting system are corrected at an early stage. The apathy to initiate corrective measures must be eliminated in order to improvise performance of an organisation.

Financial intricacies of the DRDS is probed and conclusions are drawn at appropriate places. The DRDS being primarily a bureaucratic organisation exhibit the usual bureaucratic tendencies, of which a few can be considered as bureauopathy. The functioning of bureaucracy is also constrained by the following factors:
(a) Political interference and intervention
(b) Lack of motivation
(c) Narrow interests of bureaucrats
(d) Lack of clearly laid out objectives of the departments
(e) Present socio-economic values and conditions
(f) Too much stress on procedures and rules
(g) Lack of decision-making power, even amongst senior officers
(h) Lack of commitment of bureaucrats to the cause of weaker sections of the society.

Quite interestingly most of the respondents believed that these bureauapathetic symptoms have no or marginal role in development administration. However, the respondents assert that these bureaucratic trends, both structural and functional, necessarily create obstacles in delivering services particularly to the unorganised 189 ignorant poverty striken clients. This is because most of the energies are spent on conforming to official regulations and rules. The limitations imposed by internalised bureaucratic constraints also impair the effective servicing. The issue of political interference did figure, but most of the respondents (69%) expressed that this was not very pervasive.

Hopefully, this rather lengthy chapter has analysed the functional dimensions in an objective and academic manner. Attempt has also been made to examine the consequences and implications of the
intended and unintended functions of the DRDS in the Dharwad and Kolar districts. The focus in this chapter has been on the consequences of the decisions of the bureaucracy for the goals of the DRDS in particular and the social system in its entirety.
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3. Ibid., pp.60-82.


15. Dharwad DRDS Governing Body Meeting held on 24-3-1980.


34. This is a bureaucratic trend of self-serving loyalty, Antony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy*, (Boston, Little Brown Co., 1967), pp. 262-263.

35. Ibid.


47. V.Subramanian, Social Background Of India's Administration: Socio-Economic Study Of The Higher Civil Service Of India, (New Delhi, Publications Division, Government Of India, 1972)

48. The better off sections of the Indian Society generally stand isolated from the mainstream of our traditional way of life, and therefore lack the necessary orientation towards the rank and file S.K Ray, Indian Bureaucracy At The Cross Roads, (New Delhi, Sterling Publishers, 1979), p.357

50. G.O No.RDC 323 AEP 80 dt 4-2-1981


54. G.Ram Reddy and G Haragopal, Public Policy And Rural Poor In India, (Hyderabad, Centre For Economic And Social Studies, Concept Publishing Co., New Delhi, 1985), p 137.


63. A.D. Gorwala, remarks that the work allotted to public administration has increased thereby the quality of output has deteriorated. A.D. Gorwala, Report On Public Administration, (New Delhi, Planning Commission, Government of India, 1951), p.4.


66 Evaluation Report On Integrated Rural Development Programme,
(New Delhi, PEO, Planning Commission, Government of India, 1985), p.15


70 P.S.Appu, "The BDO We Need", Kurukshetra, Vol.29, no.5, October, 1, 1983, p.75


This has led to increase in the volume of work of the VLW which resulted in sidelining some of his primary duties with the result he is not able to follow up and supervise the beneficiaries after the assistance, which has given rise to misutilisation of assets and loans. See M. Mohansundaram "The Institutional Credit And The Schemes For Rural Poor", Kurukshtetra, Vol 33, no.4, January 1985, pp.16-18


Chandra Mauli Singh, Dynamics Of Rural Development Administration (New Delhi, Spike and Span Publisher, 1988), pp.128-130


Lippitt lists the following advantages of participative approach, (i) permits members to discuss policy and encourages them to get involved in decision-making, (ii) permits members to define their own job situations, (iii) permits objective criticism for lapses, (iv) permits friendly relations, and (v) provides a climate for motivation. See Renald Lippitt and Ralph White, Autocracy And Democracy: An Experimental Enquiry, (New York, Harper, 1960). Also see Clyde M Campbell, Practical Applications Of Democratic Administration, (New York, Harper and Row, 1952), pp 107-108.

80 Shiviah, "Implementation Of Rural Development Programmes: Insights From The Programming And Implementation Management System", Behavioural Sciences And Community Development, Op cit


83 It is said that there was general reluctance on the part of deputationists to take up the assignments in the DRDS as the normal perquisites enjoyed by them in their own departments did not becomes available to them. It was also suggested that there was a tendency on the part of sectoral department to lay off their less competent personnel by sending them to DRDS. The concerned officials also did not have the keenness and motivation to work in the DRDS since they were not given any deputation allowance. Evaluation Report On The Integrated Rural Development Programme, (new Delhi, p EO, Planning Commission, Government Of India, 1985), p 11

84 G O No RDC 951 SPL 80 dated 5-10-1980.

85 G O.No RDC 951 SPL 80 dated 5-10-1980.

86 Vide A R C Report On Personnel Administration, (New Delhi, Government Of India, 1969)

87 For a lucid account on the socio-technical system see A.K Rice, Productivity And Social Organisation The Ahmedabad Experiment, (London, Tavistock Publications, 1985), p.4

89. The system of promotions based on seniority is the product of British legacy in Indian administration. It is believed that the British preferred seniority to merit on three grounds: (a) They were not interested in encouraging a system in which subordinates would try to outdo each other to win promotion. They wanted a stable administration in which each officer and staff member knows his place. (b) Because the top posts in administration were always going to be held by the Britishers any way, they did not want to encourage Indian subordinates which suggested that merit would be rewarded by promotion to even higher posts. (c) They similarly did not have the man power or the resources to do complicated jobs of internal administrative assignments. The merit principle could operate at the top level of administration in the Indian Civil Service for example, but seniority would be the norm at lower levels. See Byron T Mook, The World Of Indian Field Administrator, Op cit p.132

90. Richard Taub, Bureaucrats Under Stress, Administrator And Administration In An Indian State, (Berkeley, University Of California Press, 1959), p 196


92. S G.Deogaonkar, Administration For Rural Development In India, (New Delhi, Concept, 1980), p 164

93. R B Jain and P N Chaudhari, Bureaucratic Values And Development, (New Delhi, Uppala, 1982), p 76
94. Planning Commission, *First Five year Plan*, (Delhi, Manager Of Publications, 1953), p 61


102. Fred Riggs describes the term "formalism as the extent to which a discrepancy exists between the prescriptive and descriptive, between formal and effective power, between the impression given by constitution, laws and regulations, organisational charts and statistics and actual practices of Government and society. The greater the discrepancy between the formal and effective, the more formalistic is a system" See Fred W Riggs, *The Ecology Of Public Administration*, (Bombay, Asia Publishing House,1961),pp.91-92.


105. Fredrick Herzberg, Bernard mausner and Barbara Synderman, *The Motivation To Work*, (New York, John Willey and Sons, 1959).


110. In the ideal administration in India the traditional British ethos are still found with the result the 'generalist' gains upper hand and in his case once again outweighed the specialist. The traditional British ethos of an ideal administration are best exemplified in the Fulton Committee Report. It states that, "the ideal administrator is the gifted layman who moving frequently from job to job within the service can take a practical view of any problem irrespective of subject-matter in the light of his knowledge and experience of the Government machine". See Report Of The Committee On The Civil Service, 1966-68, Vol. I (Chairman...
Lord Fulton), (London, Cmnd, 3638, HMSO, 1968), p.11. The Gorwala and Appleby reports concluded in favour of retaining the generalist administrators who are found in IAS and other such services


115 The over legalistic administrative language is humorously called "Gobbledegook" language. For details see Ruldorf Flesch, "More About Gobbledegook", Public Administration Review, 1945


117 Talcott Parsons, Essays In Sociological Theory, (New Delhi, Light and Life Publishers, 1975), p 47-


125 Robert On The Evaluation Of Integrated Rural Development Programme, (Bangalore, Evaluation Division, Karnataka Government Secretariat, 1985), p 11


145. Haridwar Rai and Sakendra Prasad Singh, "Indian Bureaucracy A Case For Representativeness", The Indian Journal Of Public Administration, Vol 9, no 1, pp 3-11

147. Ibid., pp.245-247

148. Ibid., pp 220-221

149. Ibid., pp 220-221


156. S N.Jha, "Representative Bureaucracy: An Indication Of Political Development", The Indian Journal Of Public Administration, Vol.25, no.2, April-June,1979, pp.329-335
The concept of Sanskritisation is advocated by M N Srinivas. He defines "the process by which 'low' Hindu Caste or Tribal or Other Group, changes its Customs, rituals, Ideology, and Way of Life in the Direction of a High and Frequently 'Twice-Born' Caste", M.N.Srinivas, Social change In Modern India, (Los Angeles, California Press Inc 1966), p 6.


Irving Swerdlow ed, Development Administration: Concepts And Problems, (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1963)


186. Audit Report For The Year 1980-81

187. Observations By The Accountant General 1979-1987, (Dharwad DRDS), (Typed)
