A BRIEF SURVEY OF
THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS

Indian philosophy in general has its roots in the Vedas which have been regarded as non-human compositions. The whole complex of the teachings of the Vedic canons that have been handed down from the past, is found to be broadly classified into two sections viz. Karma-kāṇḍa i.e. ritualistic aspect and Jñāna-kāṇḍa i.e. knowledge aspect. The Brāhmaṇa scriptures forms the Karma-kāṇḍa, whereas the Āranyakas and the Upaniṣads form the Jñāna-kāṇḍa. With this criterion/the Vedic literature in view, Indian philosophical systems have been brought under two heads namely, Heterodox (Nāstika) and Orthodox (Āstika). These words denote believer and non-believer respectively in the testimony of the Vedas.

The heterodox class of Indian philosophical systems embodies the six schools: 1) Materialism, 2) Buddhism with its four-fold division of Vaibhāṣika, 3) Sautrantika, 4) Yogācāra, 5) Mādhyamika and 6) Jainism. These six heterodox systems are described in contrast with the same number of orthodox ones. Those are: 1) The Nyāya of Gautama
2) the Vaiśeṣika of Kanāda, 3) the Sāṅkhya of Kapila, 4) the Yoga of Patañjali, 5) the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, 6) Uttara-Mīmāṃsā or Vedānta of Bādarāyaṇa. Among these orthodox systems, some are not directly based upon the Vedic texts. These schools however having an independent basis, accept the testimony of the Vedic texts and try to show harmony of their thought with that of the Vedic scriptures. Those systems are Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika.

Some common characteristics found by the survey of the Indian philosophical systems, may be mentioned as below:
At the outset, the realization of the soul is the common goal of all schools of thought. All systems not merely quench the intellectual thirst, but also solve the problems of life. In the Bhagavadgītā, the Upanisads etc. the ideals and feelings of common masses are mirrored with much emphasis. In fact, all schools owe their origin to the discontent of the spirit from temporal life. Liberation is the ultimate end. This has been unanimously held by all schools of philosophy. The root cause of bondage is ignorance. The practice of Yoga is regarded essential for getting rid of ignorance. Almost all schools believe in the theory of Karma and rebirth which go hand in hand. All schools have considerably explained the human psychology. Especially Yoga school emphasizing the psychological aspect
of philosophy prescribes the yogic exercises which are
efficacious for curing physical and mental maladies and
attaining concentration of mind. The Vedānta schools go
into minute analysis of different stages of human conscious­
ness - waking, dream and the state of deep sleep. Another
striking common feature which may be found in all the
schools, is intellectual and spiritual experiences which
are considered to be the criteria for ascertaining the
significance and worth of principles of religion. All
founders of different schools of thought have laid exclusive
emphasis on the reformation of the society in a synthetic
approach. All schools of philosophy however share these
features in varying degrees. Of course, all schools of
Indian philosophy appear to be pessimistic in so far as
they originate in dissatisfaction with the present material­
istic world. But, it is indeed that this sort of pessimistic
approach serves as a spur and leads to the destination.
Hence, pessimism is indispensable for progress in life.
To quote - "Indian thinkers are pessimistic in so far as
they look upon the world order as an evil and lie, they are
optimistic since they feel that there is a way out of it
into the realm of Truth which is also goodness."
THE CARVĀKA SYSTEM

Materialism or the Carvāka system has been placed first in list of heterodox systems, for no other system is so much anti-Vedic as the Carvāka school. It is for this reason Madhava hails Carvāka to be the Nāstika-Sīromāṇī or Crest-gem of the atheistic schools. More probably the word "Carvāka" is understood as "sweet-tongued" (Caru-vāk). This meaning of course, goes well with their doctrines characterized by superficial attractiveness. This system is also otherwise called Lokāyata Darśana because of its own Svabhāva doctrine which has only an empirical basis. It is more a philosophy of life than that of the ultimate reality. "The very designations of its followers - Carvāka and Lokāyata, have acquired a disparaging sense much as the term 'sophist' did in ancient Greece and have became bye-names for the infidel and the epicure."

Bṛhaspati is believed to be the founder of this school, whom the Maitri Upaniṣad describes as a heretical teacher (VII.9). Śrī Harṣa in his Mahākāvya, the Naiṣadhiya Carita goes to an extent of saying that the Carvāka school has been the butt of ridicule for long (XVII.39-83). This ridicule is held mainly by the orthodox due to the denouncement of the Vedic testimony.
Carvaka system severely criticizes the validity of the Vedas. Because, the scriptural texts like "Oṣadhe trāyasvainam" (Tait.Sam.I.2.1), i.e. 'O medicine, protect this'; "Srūnotice grāvanah" (Tait.Sam.I.3.13) 'O stones listen here' are untrue and meaningless, as they speak of certain action of insentient matter which is just impossible. So also, some texts like Eka eva rudraḥ na dvitiyāya tasthe (Tait.Sam.I.6.8); Sahasrāni... ye rudrāḥ adhibhumya... (Tait.Sam.IV.5...11) are self-contradictory as it is said once that 'there is one Rudra', and for the second time, 'there are many Rudras'. Moreover the Vedas ordain useless practices like killing an animal in Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, so that the animal and sacrificer would attain heaven. If a beast slain in the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice will itself go to heaven, why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father? If an offering given in the Śrāddha, produces gratification to beings who are dead, then here too in the case of travellers when they start, it is needless to give provisions for the journey. Therefore, the Vedas are useless and invalid. These are incoherent rhapsodies of knaves, buffoons and demons. All religious duties are but means of livelihood of those who are destitute of knowledge and manliness.
The most important of its doctrines is that Pratyakṣa or perception is the only means of valid knowledge. Giving credence to only perception, all other pramāṇas including Anumāna or inference are utterly rejected. Inference cannot be a means of knowledge of the universal preposition, since in case of inference, another inference is required to establish the former one; and hence there would arise the fallacy of Anavastha or ad infinitum retrogression.

Commonly all schools of thought recognizes the five elements - earth, water, fire, air and ether. The first four of these elements are matters of ordinary sense experience whereas the last one is subject to inference. As Cārvāka admits only the immediate evidence of senses, recognizes the first four and denies the last i.e. ether. When transformation of these four elements into body takes place, consciousness is also produced, just like the intoxicating quality of wine arising from fermented yeast. Consciousness perishes at once when body is destroyed. Therefore the soul itself is body. There is no evidence to prove that the soul is distinct from the body. It is all because, this school holds that perception is the only means of valid knowledge and does not allow inference etc. Besides, according to Cārvāka, fate, Adrṣṭa i.e. merit and demerit, which produces its effect in future
birth, do not exist, since these can only be proved by inference.

Gārvāka regards sensual pleasure as the *summum bonum* of life. Pain produced by pricking of the thorns, shrubs etc. is hell. The king ruling over the country, whose existence is proved by all the world's eyesight is the only Supreme. Once body is reduced to ashes there is no return. Liberation is the dissolution of the body. There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world. The actions of the four castes and orders etc. do not produce any real effect. Gārvāka concludes his instruction to the mankind that, let a man live happily throughout his life feeding himself on ghee though he runs in debt, since there is no return ever again when once body is reduced to ashes.

On the other hand, the materialist position is found to be self destructive. "If man is a product of mere nature, it is inconceivable how he should come to form moral ideals of any kind. The theory that perception is the only source of knowledge, is criticised by many schools of thought. We may give one example here from the Sāṃkhya-tattvākṣara: 'When the materialist affirms that inference is not a means of knowledge, how is it that he can
know that a man is ignorant or in doubt or in error? For ignorance, doubt and error cannot possibly be discovered in other men by sense-perception. Accordingly, even by the materialist, ignorance, etc. in other men, must be inferred from conduct and from speech and therefore inference is recognized as a means of knowledge even against his will.\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{G\breve{a}rv\breve{a}ka} system draws away man's mind altogether from the thought of higher level and fixes it upon the world of sense. "One may think of a school of thought without the ideal of moksa, but not without that of dharma also. It may be that death is final and nothing remains afterwards; but to believe in an ideal of life devoid of dharma is to reduce man to the level of the brute. It is difficult to believe that there could ever have existed such a school of thought. Even if we explain its extreme views as due to a reaction against the free speculations and the austere asceticism that were widely current in ancient India, the system, we must admit, should once have inculcated less objectionable principles. The form in which it is now presented has an air of unreality about it. If any proof were required, it is found in its lesson of self-indulgence which needs not to be taught. It is also somewhat suspicious that the \textit{G\breve{a}rv\breve{a}ka} doctrine should consist so much in denying what is accepted by the other schools and so little in
contributing any new ideas of its own to the sum of Indian thoughts."

In later Indian thought Carvaka system has naturally come in for a good deal of severe and contemptuous treatment, because of its hedonistic ethics. As a man is also a biological animal, satisfaction of the senses is as natural as the satisfaction of hunger or thirst. But man is also a psychological and a moral creature, a rational and a self-conscious person; hence he is capable of realizing the values of life. Therefore, he should transform the animal pleasure into human pleasure by means of self-control, education, culture and discipline.

JAINISM

For long time scholars of eastern as well as western were of the opinion that Jainism was an offshoot of Buddhism in as much as it had a similarity to the latter. "But it has now been proved beyond doubt that this idea is wrong and Jainism is at least as old as Buddhism. The oldest Buddhist works frequently mention the Jains as a rival sect under their old name Nigantha and their leader Nataputta Vardhamāna Mahāvīra the last prophet of the Jains. The canonical works of Jains mention as contemporaries of Mahāvīra the same kings as reigned during Buddha's career."
Thus Mahāvīra who flourished in sixth century B.C., was a contemporary of Buddha. But unlike Buddha, he was neither the author of religion nor the founder of the sect, because Jaina teachings were existent even before him due to its propagation through twenty-three tīrthānkaras or 'founders of faith' in the past. Yet he has been regarded as the reviver of Jainism as he gave a new orientation to that religion.

The orthodox Jains believe that this religion is eternal as has been revealed by the tīrthānkaras during the endless succeeding periods of the world. There are two sects of Jainism, the Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras which generally agreed on all fundamental principles of Jainism. The fourteen Pūrvas and the eleven Aṅgas form the canonical and other literature of the Jains.\(^{14}\)

The striking feature of Jainism is its theory of Jīva and Ajīva, the animate and inanimate.\(^{15}\) These two have eternal and independent existence.

1) Jīva: It being an eternal substance of limited but variable and magnitude, is capable of adjusting its size to the dimensions of the physical body where it happens to exist. This is in fact the distinguishing point with
other schools of philosophy that regards the soul as atomic, omnipresent and unchanging. Caitanya or intelligence is common to all souls, and is the real nature of the soul viewed as Parinata (i.e. as it is in itself); but by the influence Upasamaksaya and Kṣayopāsama it appears in the "mixed" form as possessing both, or again by the influence of actions as they arise, it assumes the appearance of foulness etc. The comprehensive knowledge is termed Samvak-jñāna. It is said: "That knowledge which embraces concisely or in detail the predicaments according to their real nature, is right knowledge.  

Jainism upholds the theory of transmigration with two important distinctions: They do not believe in Supreme God and maintain that all beings are operated by Karma. According to them, Arhat is the Supreme lord, the omniscient one, who has overcome all faults desires etc. He is adored by the three worlds, the declarer of things as they are, Dharma 'merit' and adharma 'demerit' assist the souls in progressing or remaining stationary in the universally extended ether characterized by light. Hence the presence of the category 'merit' is to be inferred from progress, that of 'demerit' from stationariness. The effect of Ākāśa is seen when one thing enters into the space previously occupied by another.
2) Ajīva: Ajīva which is devoid of consciousness is regarded as threefold: viz. matter (pudgala), time and space. Matter is considered to be manifold, the ultimate state of it being atomic. This matter has the qualities of colour, taste, odour and touch. Sound also is an attribute of matter, though a modification of it. Time is infinite and all-pervasive. All things are in time and all change takes place in it. The universe is, as a whole, conceived as having had no origin and as not going to have any end though it is constantly undergoing change. Space is viewed as extending beyond our world and it is infinite and all-pervasive.

Knowledge: Jñāna or knowledge is taken to be self-luminous, so that it shows to the soul not only the objects but also itself. It pertains to the soul, not in the sense of external possession but as a mode (parvāya) of the soul. The knowledge according to Jains is divided into mediate knowledge (Parokṣa-jñāna) and immediate knowledge (Pratyakṣa-jñāna). This bipartite classification knowledge has exclusive reference to the way in which the objects are made known by it. For example, the fire which is inferred from seeing smoke, is known in a manner which is different from that in which a table is known. The former knowledge is mediate and the latter immediate.
Immediate knowledge: In fact this type of knowledge is not identical with perceptual knowledge. Sensory knowledge is only one of its varieties, and it is not as what arises from the contact of sense with their respective objects as in other systems, but is merely vivid (vīśāda) knowledge. The fact is that as the Self can know all objects directly, it needs no outside help. The other variety of immediate knowledge is common perception (Saṃvyavahārika-pratyakṣa). That is, it may be sensory knowledge as when we see a table which is before us, or inner perception as when we realize that we are happy.

Mediate knowledge: This type of knowledge includes various modes of knowing such as inference, recognition etc. In Jainism the conception "recognition" (Pratyabhijñāna) is rather unique. The common explanation of the mode of knowledge found in other systems, is that it is perception supplemented by memory. To the Jains on the other hand it is a new type of knowledge which, though based on perception and memory, is not itself perceptual. The specific fact revealed in it is, the identity of a thing in the two moments - one past and the other present. Such explanation presupposes a belief in objects which though changing, endure for longer or shorter period. It is maintained that neither perception nor memory is
competent to reveal this identity, because it involves a reference to both past and present. Thus Jainism view of "recognition" mode of knowledge embraces all cases where perception and recollection are involved and the resulting knowledge is unitary.

**Anekāntavāda**

The metaphysics of Jainism is a realistic and relativistic pluralism. This doctrine is so called because it establishes the reality of matter (Pudgala) and spirit (jīva) which are regarded as separate and independent realities. There are innumerable material atoms and innumerable individual souls. And each atom and each soul possesses many aspects of its own. Each object possesses innumerable positive and negative characters. In fact, it is not possible to know all the qualities of a thing. Some qualities of some things can be known. Only the omniscient being knows all aspects of all things. Therefore Jains maintain that he who knows all qualities of one thing knows all qualities of all things; and he who knows all qualities of all things knows all qualities of one thing. Knowledge of human being is relative and limited. This epistemological and logical theory of the Jainas is called Svādvāda. Both Anekāntavāda and Svādvāda are the two sides of the same coin. The metaphysical side that reality has innumerable characters is called Anekāntavāda, while the epistemological and logical
side that we can know only some aspects of reality and that therefore all the judgements arrived at are necessarily relative, is called Svādvāda.

A thing which has many characters and exists independently is called "Substance" (Dravya). In other words, "Substance" is that which possesses qualities and modes. Of these innumerable qualities of a substance, some are permanent and essential, while others are changing and accidental. The former ones are called attributes (guna) and the latter modes (paryaya). Substance and attributes are inseparable because the latter are the permanent essence of the substance and cannot remain without it. Moreover, substance in Jainism possesses also other three characteristics of production, destruction and permanence. Since substance has unchanging essence, it is permanent; and as it has changing modes, hence is subject to origination and decay.

Syādvāda

The doctrine of Syādvāda is also called Sapta-bhaṅgi-naya, for it deals with theory of relativity of knowledge. Sapta-bhaṅgi-naya means "dialectic of the seven steps". The word Svāt means probable, may be etc. Thus, Syādvāda may be rendered as 'doctrine of probability'. It signifies
that the universe can be looked at from many points of view; and that each viewpoint yields a different conclusion. The nature of reality is expressed completely by none of them, for in its concrete richness it admits all predicates. This does not mean that it is altogether indefinite but only that it cannot be defined absolutely. This is illustrated in the example of the blind men examining an elephant and arriving at varying conclusions regarding its form. Each refers to a part of the object and is right only if we consider it in relation to that aspect and not absolutely. It is this relative character of our knowledge of reality that it is made known through the seven-fold formula. Its seven steps are:

1) **Syādasti**: May be a thing is real.
2) **Svānāasti** - may be a thing is unreal.
3) **Syādasti nāsti** - may be it is both real and unreal.
4) **Syādvaktavyam** - may be it is inexpressible.
5) **Syādasti ca avaktavyam** - may be it is real and inexpressible.
6) **Svānnāasti ca avaktavyam** - may be it is unreal and inexpressible.
7) **Syādasti ca nāsti ca avaktavyam** - may be it is both real and unreal, and inexpressible.

For example, in case of golden ornament it may be said
that 1) it exists as gold, 2) it exists not as silver, 3) it both exists as gold and exists not as silver. It may be asked here whether these two elements can be predicated of the ornament simultaneously, laying equal emphasis on both. The answer to this question obviously would be in the negative. But, Jains however add that the predicate cannot then be expressed by any language. The remaining three steps are derived by combining the fourth step successively with the first three, all of which refer to the expressible aspects of reality. This relativistic view has become very essential part of Jainism. Here, Hiriyanna remarks that "these statements should not be taken to clash with what are known in logic as the laws of identity and contradiction, for those laws apply only to reality conceived as simple and static, and not as extremely complex and infinitely variable as here." 22

Means to Liberation

The goal of life in Jainism is to restore the soul to its pristine purity so that it may attain Kevalājñāna. The discipline recommended for bringing about this consummation is three-fold. It begins with faith in the teaching; and when right knowledge (Samyajñāna) and right conduct (Samyak-cāritra) come to support it, there results liberation or Nirvāṇa. These three - right faith, right knowledge
and right conduct - are termed the "three jewels" (ratnatraya).  

Karma plays an important role in understanding how the three-fold discipline helps the attainment of liberation. The soul in the empirical stage, is bound due to Karma. There is first of all the influx of Karma (āsrava) into the soul which results in bondage (bandha). This Karma is liquidated, as a consequence of its effects of joy and sorrow being experienced. Man's hope of liberation rests on the fact that the process of influx of new karma can be stopped. And it is as a means to this end in its triple form. In case of forgoing of bondage there are two steps: 1) Stoppagge of the flow of new karma which is called Samvara; 2) destroying the accumulated karma which is called Nirjara. One automatically attains liberation when complete destruction of karma takes place. The truth is that the primary aim of Jainism is the perfection of the soul rather than the interpretation of the universe. This is supported by the statement that āsrava and samvara constitute the whole of Jaina teachings, the rest being only an amplification of them. In fine, the principles of Jainism may be summarised as below: "Firstly that there is something called the living; secondly that there is called non-living; thirdly that the two come into contact
with each other; fourthly that the contact leads to the production of some energies; fifthly that the process of contact could be stopped; sixthly that the existing energies could also be exhausted; and lastly that salvation could be achieved. "26

BUDDHISM

Every school of thought reflects the contemporary tendencies found in the society. It is known through the Tripitak books that in Buddha's time and before him, the discussions on Self, world, next world, sin and liberation etc. were very common. The Vedas were considered to be sacred in the spiritual field. Hence the importance of human efforts and the sense of responsibility started disappearing gradually. Buddha revolted against these tendencies and found out a different or new course for the salvation of the world. He was independent in thought and followed reason as well as truth. He presented rational religion practical ethics and simple principles of life.

Buddhism is broadly divided into two sections: Hinayana and Mahayana. The original terms used for these two branches are: 1) Sravakayana, or Pratyeka-buddhayana for Hinayana, 2) Buddhaya or Tathagatayana or Bodhisattvayana for Mahayana. Hinayana is meant for the Sravakas only i.e.
persons of average intellect who are capable of attaining perfection only by listening to and practising the dharma that has once been promulgated by beings of extra-ordinary intellect like a Buddha. भाव्याणि is meant for those superior beings who achieve their own salvation without anybody's help and who help others to attain the same by giving them the necessary aid and guidance. In short, विनयाणि can produce only a perfect श्रावक, while भाव्याणि can make a Buddha.

Doctrine of Dependent Origination:
The great truth of Buddhistic philosophy has been reference to the doctrine of the twelve निदः. This is the doctrine of प्रतिसामुद्धाराम i.e. dependent origination. This doctrine is the basis of all other theories of karma, momentarism etc. The doctrine of dependent origination explains the causes of the suffering etc. in the world. Buddha has called it Bodhi as well as Dhamma. Whoever sees प्रतिसामुद्धाराम sees Dhamma and whoever sees Dhamma sees प्रतिसामुद्धाराम. Indifference to the doctrine of प्रतिसामुद्धाराम is the cause of suffering and the knowledge of the same leads to the annihilation of all sufferings. This doctrine postulates that the things existence but they are not eternal. The origination of a thing is due to another. External or mental happenings are always
due to some cause. This chain of causes and effects is ever recurring. Ignorance, predispositions (Samskaras), consciousness, name and form, six provinces of six sense-organisms (ear, nose, tongue, body or touch and mind), contact, feeling (Vedana), craving, attachment, becoming (Bhava), birth, old age, death, lamentation, detachment and despair—these spring from succeeding one; also in the same order, the cessation of this whole wheel of suffering takes place. These links form the doctrine of Pratityasamutpada or dependent origination.

**Doctrine of Karma:**

The doctrine of Karma in Buddhism is based on the doctrine of Pratityasamutpada. The present life of a man is the result of his past life, and future depends upon the present. This theory of Karma emphasizes that every man is responsible for his actions, and future of every individual depends on his present actions.

This doctrine lays down that if any evil-minded one commits sin, he will have to suffer for it in the hell. If a good man happens to commit a sin, he will get rid of it after suffering a little in this very life. According to Buddha, this Karma theory is not mechanical. Though the present is determined by the past, the future is free
and depends on our will. If this doctrine is mechanical, there is hardly any room for religion and ethics in human life. The doctrine of Karma shows an order in the field of spiritual development.

The succession of world has been called Bhāva-cakra. In this cycle, the chain of cause and effects is always operating. It is this effect which has been emphasized in the doctrine of Pratītyasamutpāda. All living beings are caught this cycle of the world in accordance with the deeds done in the past life.

But there is an escape from this worldly cycle. The Karma ceases to exist in the ultimate spiritual status. In that status, after the destruction the Karmas and their effects, the man rises above both merits and demerits. After the attainment of liberation the Karmas remain but they bear no fruit as the burnt seeds do not sprout.

**Doctrine of Rebirth**

Buddhism does not allow the existence of any permanent soul. Consciousness is an eternal one where there is the relation of antecedent and subsequent between different movements. But there is no unchanging, immutable soul behind this process. Hence, logically there remains no
place for rebirth in Buddhism. Buddhists maintain here that after death, the sāṃskāras of jīvas remain, and these sāṃskāras are in accordance with his karmas. Thus it is due to these that a link between one birth and another is maintained. The sāṃskāra is expressed in the last thought of a dying person. Along with the power of Karma, clinging is required. This clinging or attachment is the power which is the cause of new birth. Bereft of this attachment, Karma itself has no power to bring about new birth. After the attainment of liberation, the attachment is destroyed resulting into the negation of the rebirth.

**Doctrine of Nairātmyavāda**

The theory of Nairātmyavāda follows from the doctrine of Pratītyasamutpāda. Buddhists hold that there is no invisible permanent substance besides the flow of consciousness. As the body is burnt into ashes the five skandhas disappear into the five elements, and nothing remains except karma. This idea is known as the theory of Nairātmya in Buddhism. This philosophy does not allow that a soul enters in a different body after leaving one body.

If the soul is taken as eternal, one gets attached to it and suffers in the efforts to make it happy. Love for invisible soul is much ludicrous as the love of some
invisible and imaginary beautiful woman. The attachment to this soul, is like preparing a ladder to mount on a place which has not been seen by any one.

Moreover, man is considered to be a name for conglomeration (Sanghāta). Just as wheel and other parts of a chariot are together called a chariot, so also, the body with the external form, mental states and consciousness is together called human being. This Sanghāta is man. Besides this, there is no soul. So long as this Sanghāta remains, the life of man also remains, and death is the name of destruction.

**Doctrine of Momentariness**

According to Buddha, all existing things have been originated due to some cause. These things are non-eternal in all respects. Whatever appears to be eternal and permanent is perishable. Whatever is perishable its destruction is imperative. These rules cannot be violated by any power. Everything in this world is merely a conglomeration of perishable qualities. Everything is momentary. This world is determined by the principle of Pratityasamutpāda.
The Buddhists have given several arguments to strengthen the idea of momentariness. Of these, the argument of Arthakriyākārita means power of generating action. According to this principle, only that thing can produce effect which has existence and whatever cannot produce effect has no existence. And, when it ceases to produce any effect, its existence also ceases. Moreover, one thing can produce only one effect in one moment. For example, a seed cannot develop in the same way in two moments. In this process of development, no two moments are similar or identical. Hence, there can be no one cause of the effect observed in two moments. So also, the man is momentary for he does not remain identical in two moments. This principle is known as the doctrine of momentariness.

Nature of Nirvāṇa

The ultimate end of Buddhism is Nirvāṇa which literally means "extinguished". In other words, it may be explained as - extinguishing of fires of passion, which includes avarice, jealousy, anger, doubt, impurities of mind etc. It effects the end of the cycle of rebirth. Nirvāṇa has been described as a state of tranquility in which passion and sorrows are vanquished. The body may exist in the state of Nirvāṇa but thirsting is destroyed. There is no rebirth after Nirvāṇa.
Having once attained spiritual consciousness permanently, there is no longer any necessity for persisting in the state of concentration and there is no longer any fear of limitation due to actions. In this state, individual's ego does not remain since pain, passion etc. have been completely destroyed.

Some old Pali texts look upon Nirvāṇa as a moral state achieved in this life. Nirvāṇa has been attributed two forms - 1) Sopāḍhi-śeṣa and 2) Nirupachī-śeṣa. In the first some impressions reside due to rebirth; but in the state of second type of Nirvāṇa complete extinction takes place. The person who has achieved Nirvāṇa spends a life of perfect knowledge and calm till death.

Four Schools of Buddhism

Though Buddha was himself rational and tried to prove everything by reasoning, he kept silent with regard to discuss some philosophical issues. It is on these issues and problems, the later Buddhist philosophers very much differed from one another and presented widely their theories. Thus, owing to the considerable difference lying in their discussion on various philosophical problems, many schools of Buddhism were established. The celebrated philosophers under the designation of Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika,
Mādhyamika and Yogācāra adopted respectively the doctrines of the perceptibility of external objects, the inferribility of external objects, the universal void (nihilism) and the external void.  

1. **Vaibhāṣika School:**

The Vaibhāṣikas accept both consciousness and matter. These two are constituted of the Dharmas such as earth, water, air and fire. They are the compounds of \( \text{Saṅghāta} \) of atoms, which have no form, sound, taste and colour. The perceptible things are conglomerations of imperceptible atoms. Here the distinction has been drawn between \( \text{Saṅghāta\ Paramāṇu} \) and \( \text{Dravya\ Paramāṇu} \). The former is the subtlest form of atom. The latter is without colour and indivisible.

The sense organs are material. They know the objects of their knowledge without any contact with them. In such knowledge, no external contact of sense organs with the object is perceived. These sense organs include the eyes, ears and mind. Other sense organs must come in contact with the things to know them. Hence an account of defect in these sense organs, there lies difference in knowledge obtained by them. As a result of contact with external world, a type of \( \text{Sāmskāra} \) occurs in the sense organs. By these \( \text{Sāmskāras} \), Citta is enlightened in view of knowing the objects.
According to this School, there are two Pramāṇas - 1) Pratyakṣa and 2) Anumāna. Pratyakṣa produces the knowledge devoid of imagination and error. This is of four types - (i) Indriyajñāna, 2) Manovijñāna, 3) Ātma-saṃvedana (manifestation of Citta) and 4) Yoga-jñāna (ultimate knowledge).

Anumāna or inference is of two kinds: 1) Svārtha, 2) Parārtha. The Svārthānūmāna is again divided into two - Sādharmyavat and other one is Vaidharmyavat. In these two there is no difference of meaning but only a difference of application.

The metaphysics of the Vaibhasika school includes two standpoints regarding the division of the world: One is objective and the other being subjective. The objective division of the world classifies the dharmas of the world into two - 1) Asaṃskṛta (that which is not born with the help of any cause). It includes the dharmas of Pratisaṃkhya-nirōdha, Apratisaṃkhya-nirōdha and Ākāśa. 2) Saṃskṛta dharmas are those which are impermanent and impure. Those are - Rūpa, Citta, Caitasika and Cittaviparyukta.

The subjective division of the world consists of the five Skandhas (Rūpa, Vedanā, Saṃjhā, Saṃskāra and Viśkāṇa), the twelve Āyatanas (six sense organs including the mind and
six objects) and the eighteen dhātus (six senses, six objects of senses and six types of consciousness) born out of these objects.

Nirvāṇa is the summum bonum of life which Arhata attains by following the path of truth. It is of the nature of existence (bhāvarūpa). By attaining this state all dharmas are destroyed.

2. Sautrāntika School:

This school has its basis on the Sutta Piṭaka while Vaibhāśikas have the basis on Abhidhamma Piṭaka. As has been already pointed out, Vaibhāśikas believe that the external things are known through perception, while according to Sautrāntika school they are subject to inference.

According to this school there are four causes of knowledge: 1) Ālambana Pratyaya, 2) Samanantara Pratyaya, 3) Sahakāri Pratyaya and 4) Adhipati Pratyaya.

From the metaphysical standpoint, Sautrāntika school believe that the knowledge itself is all proved and requires nothing to prove it. Thus it maintains concept of Svatah-pramāṇya. There is no causality in the two objects having spontaneous existence. Śabda is non-eternal as it ceases
to exist before the origination and after destruction. In contrast with Vaibhāṣika school, Sautrāntikas maintain that there is very little difference between Pratisākhyaṇīrodhā and Apratisākhyaṇīrodhā. It holds the view that suffering will be removed by the destruction of Klesas, while Vaibhāṣika says that sufferings are destroyed at the dawn of knowledge. Nirvāṇa according to this school is not an Asamskrta dharma. There is total absence of all dharmas.

3. Mādhyamika or Śūnyavāda School:

According to this school, ultimate reality is Śunya. It is attributeless. The ultimate reality is neither existent nor non-existent, neither both existent and non-existent nor different from both. Whatever is born of material cause depends upon something other than itself. The philosophers of Śūnyavāda are called Mādhyamikas, as they adopt the middle path between activism and renunciation. This school admits that the reality is of two kinds: 1) Samvṛtti Satya or empirical truth, 2) Pāramārthika satya or transcendental truth. The former is for the ordinary person. This truth is the only means for the attainment of transcendental truth. And the transcendental truth cannot be attained without the help of the empirical and without knowing the former truth Nirvāṇa cannot be attained.
The transcendental is also of two kinds - 1) *Loka-samvrti*,
2) *Mithyā-samvrti*. According to this school, the five skandhas,
dravya, guna and soul are all untrue or unreal. *Nirvāṇa* is only *Śūnya*. *Śūnyavāda* is neither absolute nihilism nor
denies all knowledge. It is the middle path which in the
end is both beyond affirmation and negation. According to
*Śūnyavāda*, the transcendental truth is known through self-
experience. It requires *Samādhi* in the form of the concentra­
tion of *Citta*. The practice of *samādhi* leads to the arousal
of spiritual consciousness. This leads to the experience of
the ultimate reality. *Samādhi* also requires renunciation as well as
the knowledge and the practice of the six paramitas namely -
*Dāna*, *Śīla*, *Śanti*, *Vīrya*, *Dhyāna* and *Prajñā* (spiritual
consciousness). Without the practice of these, the trans­
cendental truth cannot be known. Penance is most important
duty. It leads to annihilation of misery and attainment of
spiritual consciousness. Thus, the aspirant realises the
Śūnya both through the knowledge and action as well.

4. *Yogācāra* or *Vijñānavāda* School:

Another Buddhistic school that belongs to *Mahāyāna*
sect is known *Yogācāra* or *Vijñānavāda*. As it holds the
view that all things are mere consciousness, it is called
*Vijñānavāda*; and as it prescribes to the aspirant the practice
of Yoga for becoming Buddha. According to this school, *Citta*
or Ālava-vijñāna is only reality and all dharmas besides Vijñāna are unreal. Its main characteristics are as follows:

1) Ālava-vijñāna pervades all living beings;
2) Both the external and internal worlds are manifestations of the Ālava.
3) The aim is to become one with the Dharma-kāya of Buddha through the spiritual experience (Bodhi).
4) Transcending the dualism of subject and object one must identify himself with the consciousness.
5) From the transcendental standpoint, there is no difference between the world and liberation. With the attainment of equanimity and negation of multiplicity, liberation can be attained here and now.

Vijñāna is of two types: Pravṛtti vijñāna i.e. personal consciousness and Ālava Vijñāna i.e. absolute consciousness. The personal or individual consciousness is again of seven kinds: Cakṣu-vijñāna, Śrotr-vijñāna, Dharma-vijñāna, Rasana-vijñāna, Kāma-vijñāna, Mano-vijñāna and Kliṣṭa-vijñāna. All these vijñānas of the personal consciousness are born in the absolute consciousness and disappear into it. These are momentary. In fact, the personal consciousness depends upon absolute consciousness. Thus, Ālava-vijñāna is the Ālava or home of different types of Vijñānas. It is the basis of transmigration. It is also called Citta or Tathāgata garbha.
According to this school, the physical world has no existence apart from consciousness. The Vijñānavādins do not accept the empirical self of ego as ultimate reality. Because of the miseries in the world, man is ego born of ignorance. This school calls the empirical self as Manovijñāna. It is based on Ālaya-vijñāna and along with it, are attached four types of miseries - self-conceit, self-illusion, self-pride and self-love. As soon as the false idea of Manovijñāna is destroyed, these miseries also disappear.

"Vijñāna alone is eternal and imperishable. It is blissful because it is eternal. Whatever is eternal is blissful and whatever is momentary, it is sorrowful."
THE SANKHYA SYSTEM

The very name of this system, derived from सांख्य, which means buddhi, indicates that it is based on reflection rather than authority. The origin of this system and logical consistency of its teaching have, for a long time, been matters of controversy; but its importance in the history of Indian thought has never been questioned. Its characteristic ideas and the terminology in which it gives expression to them are met with in the religious and philosophical literature of India almost as commonly as those of the Upaniṣads, Purāṇas etc.

The Sāṅkhya is frankly dualistic. It recognizes two ultimate entities — Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Since these two conceptions are of fundamental importance to the doctrine, it is proper to begin with an explanation of them.

Conception of Prakṛti

It is on the basis of the theory of causation, that Sāṅkhya philosophers deduce the ultimate cause of the universe i.e. Prakṛti. Every thing has a cause but not Prakṛti. It proceeds creation. All the effects of the universe are based and dependent on it. It is therefore also called Pradhāna. It is very subtle and visible, and
can be inferred only from its creations. It is for this reason, is also known as Anumā.

According to Sāṅkhya, the entire universe is composed of objects which are effects and have their origin in material cause. Hence it also must have a fundamental cause. The fundamental cause cannot be the soul because it is neither a cause nor an effect. Besides, the nature of the soul contradicts the nature of objects found in the universe. It is the contention of the Sāṅkhya that the subtle elements such as mind, intelligence and Ahaṅkāra cannot have their origin in these physical elements. The cause of the universe should be such that, even though it is physical, it should be as subtle and infinitesimal as possible, should have no beginning and no end and should be able to give rise to all the entities. All these qualities are found in Prakṛti. Hence, Prakṛti is the fundamental or first cause of all the objects of the world. It is eternal, absolute, profound, inexhaustible and microscopic energy. 32

As has been stated in the Sāṅkhya kārika the existence of Prakṛti may be known through the five proofs. 33

1. Bhedānāṁ parimāgni: All objects in the universe are limited, dependent, relative and have an end. Hence
the cause which creates them should be unlimited, independent, absolute and unending.

2. Bhedānām samanvayāt: The objects of the world possess some common qualities in spite of being different. And due to this homogeneity they arouse pleasure, pain or attachment. Hence, there should be a general cause which can tie them in a common string.

3. Kāryatab Pravṛtteh: All effects arise out of a cause in which they were present in unmanifest form. Evolution means the manifestation of that which is concealed. The energy which causes evolution in the universe should be inherent in the cause of the universe. This cause is Prakṛti itself.

4. Kāraṇa-kārya-vibhāgāt: Cause and effect are distinct from each other. The objects are distinguished on the basis of their being cause and effect e.g., Mahat is the cause and Ahaṅkāra is its effect. Effect is the manifest cause and cause is the unexpressed effect.

5. Avibhāgāt Vaisvarūpasya: Sāṅkhya admits the identity between cause and effect. When it goes from the present to the past, the effect loses its identity in the
cause. In the process, every effect proceeds backward and is dissolved in its cause. Thus, Prakṛti is that in which all effects dissolve and the universe appears undifferentiated. This original principle, Prakṛti is not seen on account of its subtlety but not due to its non-existence. It is perceived through its effects. Mahat the intellect and others are its effects and are both like the Prakṛti, the cause, as well as unlike it.  

Conception of Purusa:

The other reality in Saṃkhya philosophy is Purusa, which is regarded as the soul, a witness free from misery, neutral, spectator and passive. It is the basis of all knowledge. It cannot be the object of knowledge. Unlike the Vedānta, Saṃkhya does not believe the self to be of the nature of bliss. According to it, happiness and consciousness are different. The Purusa is of the nature of pure consciousness and is beyond the limit of Prakṛti. Due to the following reason, its existence cannot be doubted:

1. Saṃghāta-parārthatvāt: All composed objects are meant for some one else. The unconscious element cannot make use of them, hence all these substances are for Purusa. The body sense-organs, mind, intellect are only the tools of the Purusa. The three guṇas, subtle body, - these serve the purpose of the Purusa.
2. **Trigunādi-viparyayāt:** All substances are composed of three guṇas. Puruṣa is the witness of these guṇas and itself is beyond them. The substances composed of the three guṇas prove the existence of Puruṣa who is not made of the three guṇas.

3. **Adhisthānāt:** Puruṣa is the substratum of all practical knowledge. He must be present in all kinds of affirmations and negations. There can be no experience without him.

4. **Bhoṣṭrebhāvāt:** Unconscious Prakṛti cannot make use of its own creation. A conscious element is needed to make use of them. Prakṛti is the one to be enjoyed, hence there must be some one to enjoy it. All the objects of the world create either pain or pleasure or indifference, but there must be some one conscious element to experience these three feelings of pain, pleasure or indifference. Thus, there must necessarily be a Puruṣa.

5. **Kaivalyārtha-pravṛttaḥ:** In view of the salvation, a person is needed to wish for salvation and to make an effort for it and attain it. Hence, it is necessary to accept the existence of Puruṣa.
Sāṅkhya system admits the plurality of selves. The Sāṅkhya Kārikā in this connection puts forth thus: The births and deaths and the activities of all individual souls are different. The difference is possible when there are more than one selves. (Janma-marana-kāraṇānām pratiniyamāt). And all individuals are not possessed of the same tendencies. (Ayugapratvṛttteṣa). Besides, in all individuals, there are different combinations of the three guṇas. In ordinary life, one who is sattvika is happy, another Rajasa is unhappy, while a third, Tamas suffers from delusion. Thus, by different modifications of the three guṇas, the plurality of selves is established.

Conception of the Three Guṇas:

As already said, the state of equilibrium of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas is called Prakṛti. Thus these are the constituent elements of Prakṛti in the sense here used. These constituents are of the nature of pleasure, pain, and infatuation and serve to illumine, to actuate and to restrain; they mutually domineer, rest on each other; produce each other, consort together and are reciprocally present. Sattva is considered to be buoyant and enlightening; Rajas to be stimulating and mobile; Tamas alone is heavy and enveloping. They function by the union of contraries for a purpose and co-operate like lamp. This
analogy of lamp comes in to dispel a doubt: The gunas are contrary to each other. How can they function in co-operation for some end? Like a lamp is the answer. The wick, the oil and the flame are also substances opposed in nature, yet they co-operate in giving light.\textsuperscript{37} It is due to these three qualities that all the objects in the universe are divided into desirable, undesirable and indifferent.

Theory of Evolution:

\textit{Sāṅkhya}s maintain that the universe evolves. This evolution takes place due to the association of the two, \textit{Praṅṛti} and \textit{Puruṣa}, as of a lame man with a blind one. One man is lame, and the other is blind; these two while on journey and proceeding with great difficulty, were deserted by the friends when all of them were attacked by the robbers and by course of luck, wandered here and there. By their own movement, they met each other came into a union. Now this union of theirs, on account of each relying on the words of the other, results for the purpose of going and seeing. In a like manner, in the \textit{Puruṣa} there is power to see but no action; and in the \textit{Praṅṛti} there is power to act but no power to contemplate. Thus, the association of these two produces creation. From \textit{Praṅṛti}, the Primal Nature, issues \textit{Mahat}, the Great One, intellect, thence \textit{Ahaṅkāra}, individuation and from this,
the aggregate of the sixteen: from five among the sixteen proceed five gross elements. This evolution may be shown as below:

Prakṛti

Puruṣa Maḥat

Ahaṅkāra

Mahābhūtas Tanmātras

ether, air, fire, water, earth

sound touch colour taste smell

Mind Sense organs Organs of action

eyes ears nose tongue skin mouth hand feet anus sex-organ

Doctrine of Satkāryavāda or Causation

According to Sāṅkhya system, that which does not exist cannot come into existence, and there is no absence of what is existent. The effect is concealed in the cause before it is produced. In this way, creation means the manifestation of that which is hidden, and the destruction implies the concealment of which is manifest. Thus the effect exists in its cause. This view is called Satkāryavāda.
Isvara Krsna has prescribed five arguments for establishing the above stand:

1. **Asat-akārāpāt**: Non-existent cannot be brought into existence.

2. **Upādāna-grahānāt**: There is a recourse to appropriate or specific material cause.

3. **Sarva-sambhava-asambhavāt**: There is no production of all by all.

4. **Saktasya śakyakārāpāt**: The potent produces that of what it is capable.

5. **Kārapa-bhāvāt**: Non-different from the cause like being produced by the like. Hence the effect is present in the cause before it is manifest.

In fine, Sānkhya philosophers believe the theory of **Paripāmāvāda**, while the Vedānta philosophers accept the theory of **Vivartavāda**. Being only two different states of the same object, there is no difference between them. Rāmānuja like the Sānkhya accepts the **Paripāmāvāda**. But according to Rāmānuja, the universe is the result of Brahman, while according to Sānkhya the universe is the result of Prakṛti. Hence, Rāmānuja's view is called **Brahma-paripāmāvāda** and the Sānkhya view - **Prakṛti-paripāmāvāda**.
Theory of Pramāṇas:

According to Sāṅkhya, the means of valid knowledge are recognised to be three-fold: Perception, Inference and Valid testimony, since all other means of correct knowledge of the matter to be known depends on the means of valid knowledge. Perception is the ascertainment of the objects through the contact of the sense organs. Inference is said to be of three kinds and is the result of the knowledge of the liṅga, the characteristic mark and the liṅgu the possessor of the characteristic mark. And the valid testimony is a true revelation and a right assertion. Knowledge of the objects that are beyond the reach of the senses are known through the inference based on analogy. What is not directly perceived, is beyond the senses and is not proved by inference as well, is established through valid testimony.

Concept of Bondage and Liberation:

According to Sāṅkhya philosophy, both liberation and bondage are only practical. Puruṣa is beyond both liberation and bondage. Only the ego is bound and it is the ego that is liberated. Through virtue is ascent to a region above; through vice descent to a region below; by knowledge deliverance takes place, by the ignorance the bondage. When one is possessed of non-attachment without the knowledge of the twenty five principles, then from such non-attachment,
preceded by ignorance, results absorption into the Prakṛti. After death he is resolved into eight primary elements, the nature, intellect, egotism and the five subtle elements; but there is no liberation and from there he migrates again. The intelligent being, the dweller in the body, experiences pain arising from decay and death until his deliverance from the subtle body. Pain therefore is of the nature of things. The creation from intellect down to the gross elements, is brought about by Prakṛti, for the deliverance of each Puruṣa. This is done for another's sake as for itself. Verily, any Puruṣa is not bound nor liberated; nor does it migrate. Because it is the Prakṛti alone assuming manifold forms of divine, human and sub-human, in the character of intellect, egotism, senses and gross elements, that is bound, is liberated and migrates. Through the repeated study of principles, knowledge arises which is pure, free from ignorance and absolute. When Prakṛti, the Primal Nature, as her object is accomplished, has ceased to be active and when separation from the body has taken place, the Puruṣa attains deliverance that is both absolute and final. This is abstruse knowledge leading to the attainment of the goal of the Spirit i.e. liberation and in which are contemplated the origin, duration and the termination of beings. In this way, Sāṅkhya concept of liberation attends to the realization of the difference between Prakṛti and the Puruṣa.
THE NYĀYA-VAIŠEṢIKA SYSTEM

Although in the earliest stages of their inception, the schools of Nyāya and Vaiṣeṣika held independent positions both in epistemology and metaphysics, it was recognised from the very beginning that the two schools had very much in common and their differences were of minor importance. Hence, these two systems here are not dealt with separately. At the end of this section, more important marked differences in the doctrine as taught in the two schools shall be given. The system at the outset postulates that all knowledge by its very nature points to an object beyond it and independent of it.

Concept of Pramāṇas

In Nyāya philosophy, knowledge is spoken of as the manifestation of objects. Knowledge which lights its objects is of two distinctions: Valid (Prama) and invalid (aprama). Valid knowledge is definite knowledge or real knowledge and it consists in knowing the object as it is. This valid knowledge has four distinctive sources, viz. perception, inference, comparison and testimony. Knowledge arising from sources other than these is called invalid or aprama.
1. Perception

Perception is uncontradicted knowledge which results from the contact between the object and the sense organ. If a distinct object appears to be different from what it is, that knowledge does not become perceptual. For instance, perception of a rope as the snake is not the perceptual knowledge as it is attended by doubt. This is called illusory knowledge which cannot be regarded as perceptual. The Nyāya system has recognised six kinds of proximity: Samyoga, Samyukta-samavāya, Samyukta-samavēta-samavāya, Samavāya samavēta-samavāya and Viśesana-viśeṣya-bhāva. This analysis of perception does not take into account the extra-ordinary and intuitive perceptions because there can be no knowledge of them without contact with the senses.

Distinctions of Perception

Perception has been analysed in various types. From one angle, perception is of two types: Ordinary (laukika) and extra-ordinary (alaukika). In ordinary perception, knowledge results from the contact of the sense organs with the object. Extra-ordinary perception provides immediate knowledge. From another viewpoint, the ordinary perception has two distinctions - determinate (Savikalpaka), and indeterminate (nirvikalpaka). Determinate perception gives the knowledge of the fact that 'this is a man',.
*he is black* etc. And, with regard to indeterminate perception, when the external organ comes into contact with an object, particular knowledge arises in the self consisting merely of an awareness of the existence of the object without any knowledge of its name, quality etc. This lack of determining feature amounts to indeterminate perception.\(^{44}\)

On the other hand extra-ordinary perception has three distinctions: perception of classes (sāmānyā lakṣaṇa), complication (jñāna lakṣaṇa) and intuitive (yogaja): That which is perceived by a common quality is different from ordinary perception and it therefore is called **perception of classes**. When we say that all men are mortal, the observation is based upon the knowledge of the mortality of all men and this knowledge arises from the perception of classes.

**Perception by complication** includes the perceptions such as the ice looks cold, the stone appears solid. All this knowledge is based upon past experience, hence it is called perception by complication.

And, the **intuitive perception** is that which is peculiar to Yogis who possess supernatural power. The supernatural power makes it possible to have the perceptual knowledge of
all objects - past and future, complex and minute, near and far.

2. Inference

Inference which literally means that knowledge following some other knowledge, is based on the invariable relation between the hetu and sadhyā. This invariable concomitance is called Vyāpti. The knowledge of Pakṣa through hetu is Paramārṣa; and inference is said to be the knowledge gained through Paramārṣa. Pakṣa is that part of the inference about which there is inference. Sadhva denotes that which is proved of the Pakṣa. Hetu establishes that there is relation between the Sadhva and the Pakṣa. For example, inference of fire on the hill. Here, smoke is hetu, fire is sadhva, and hill is pakṣa. To prove this, Nyāya school necessitates five constituents: 1) Pratijñā - there is fire on the hill; 2) Hetu - because there is smoke; 3) Drṣṭānta - where there is smoke, there is fire as in kitchen; 4) Upanaya - there is smoke on the hill; 5) Nigamana - hence there is fire on this hill.

Inference has been divided into two kinds: 1) Svārthānumāṇa, 2) Parārthānumāṇa. In the former distinction, the inference is intended for oneself while in the latter it is for conveying knowledge to others. On the basis of the
method of establishing Vyāpti, inference has been further divided into three kinds: 1) Kevalānvāyi - In this first premise of the inference, there is relation of Vyāpti between hetu and sādhya. 2) Kevalavatireki - where the inference proceeds from the Vyāpti between the absence of Sādhya and hetu, 3) Anvavatireki - where the relation between hetu and sādhya based on both presence and absence of them.

3. Comparison

Comparison is the name given to the knowledge of the relation between a name and the thing so named. For example: Gosadrśah gavayah - the animal known as the wild cow is similar to a cow. In this activity of comparison, when one sees the similarity between the cow and the wild cow, and recollects that the wild cow resembles a cow, only then, does he know that its name is wild cow.

4. Testimony

Testimony is a reliable statement. The quality of being evidence or source of valid knowledge is possessed not by all words but by the words of seers. According to Nyāya system, the words originate from some person - be it a human being or God. Vedic words are the creations of God and ordinary ones are created by human beings. Therefore, the Vedic words are free from defects while ordinary words
The utterances of reliable person can be true or false. The utterances of reliable person are treated as true.

**Theory of Causation**

A cause is defined as an unconditional and invariable antecedent of an effect and an effect as an unconditional and invariable consequent of a cause. The same cause produces the same effect and the same effect is produced by the same cause. Thus invariable antecedence (nivatapurvavrttitva) and unconditionality (anyathāsiddha) are essential characteristics of a cause. Nyāya emphasizes the sequence view of causality. Cause and effect are never simultaneous. Plurality of causes is also wrong because causal relation is reciprocal. Each effect has its distinctive features, and has only one specific cause. And an effect is defined as counter-entity of its own prior non-existence (Prāgabhāva-prativṛtti). It is the negation of its own prior negation. Nyāya-Vaisēṣika theory of causation has been regarded as Asatkāryavāda which is directly opposed to the Satkārya-vāda of the Sāṅkhya Yoga and Vedānta. The effect is non-existent (asat) before its creation and is a new creation. It is distinct from a cause and can never be identical with it.
There are three kinds of causes: Samavāyi, Asamavāyi and Nimitta. The Samavāyi-kārana or the inherent cause is also called material (Upādāna) cause. It is the substance out of which the effect is produced. For example, the threads are the inherent cause of the cloth and the clay is the inherent cause of a pot. The second kind of cause is Asamavāyi or non-inherent. It inheres in the material cause and helps the production of the effect. The conjunction of the threads (tantusāmyoga) which inheres in the threads is non-inherent cause of the cloth of which the threads the material or inherent cause. The third cause is nimitta or efficient which helps the material cause to produce the effect. The weaver is the efficient cause of the cloth. The efficient cause includes the accessories (sahakāri) e.g. loom and shuttle of the weaver.49

Concept of Soul and God

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika believe in teleological creation. The material cause of this universe are the eternal atoms of earth, water, fire and air; and efficient cause is God. The infinite individual souls are co-eternal with atoms. Creation means combinations of atoms and destruction means dissolution of these combinations of atoms through the motion supplied to or withdrawn from the atoms by the unseen power working under the guidance of God. God is not the
real creator as He is not the material cause of this universe; the real efficiency belongs to the unseen power. The individual soul is regarded as the substratum of the quality of consciousness which is not its essence but only an accidental property. The soul is a real knower, enjoyer, active agent and an eternal substance. It is different from God. Each soul has its manas during its empirical life and is separated from it in liberation. It is distinct from the body, the senses and mind. Bondage is due to ignorance and Karma. Liberation is due to knowledge and destruction of Karma or suffering.

Nyāya philosophers have put forward many proofs for the existence of God. Some of them are: 1) God is the creator of the organic objects of the universe. 2) He is the cause of difference in fortune and rules of past tendencies. 3) He is the author of the infallible Veda. 4) The Veda testifies to the existence of God. 5) The fruits of our action either merit or demerit are unintelligent, hence need the guidance of a Supremely intelligent God.

The chief value of Nyāya lies in its epistemology, logic and methodology which have influenced all schools of Indian philosophy. On the whole, Nyāya is a system of atomistic pluralism and logical realism.
Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Systems – A Comparative Account:

Following are the main points common to both the systems:

1. Ultimate goal is liberation of the soul.
2. The root cause of pains lacks knowledge.
3. Liberation implies cessation of all pains.
4. The nature of Ātman is regarded as same.
5. Ātman should be known through some prescribed means.
6. Delineation of intelligence, knowledge, perception etc.
7. Both have postulated the distincts of action.
8. Both are agreed on the nature of the universe.

Following are the points showing the difference between Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika:

1. Nyāya is particularly devoted to the study of the sources of knowledge, and less importance is given to the delineation of the element. In the Vaiśeṣika school, the elements have been discussed in detail. Nyāya school admits the sixteen categories and nine prameyas whereas the Vaiśeṣika says that there are seven categories and nine substances.

2. In Nyāya, there are four means of valid knowledge whereas Vaiśeṣikas accept only two sources of knowledge – perception and inference. Both comparison and testimony
have been included in inference. The Nyāya school regards perception as being consisted of five kinds concurring with the five kinds of sense-organs whereas Vaiśeṣikas admit only visual perception. The knowledge of Samavāya can be had through perception in the Nyāya school. But it is through inference in Vaiśeṣika philosophy. According to Nyāya system there are five types of Hetvābhāsas or fallacies while Vaiśeṣikas accept only three.

In this way, there are some differences between the two systems. Yet majority of the view are in consonance with each other.
THE PURVA-MI\<sup>MA</sup>\<sub>\<sup>SA</sup></sub> SYSTEM

The word \<sup>MA</sup>\<sub>\<sup>SA</sub></sup> means 'revered thought' and was originally applied to the interpretation of the Vedic rituals which commanded highest reverence. \<sup>MA</sup>\<sub>\<sup>SA</sup></sub> deals with the earlier portion of the Veda and is therefore called P\<sup>UR</sup>\<sub>\<sup>V</sup></sub>F\<sup>RA</sup>-\<sup>MA</sup>\<sub>\<sup>SA</sup></sub>. The aim of the \<sup>MA</sup>\<sub>\<sup>SA</sup></sub> is to supply the principles according to which the Vedic texts are to be interpreted and to provide philosophical justification for the views contained therein. The earliest work in the history of this system is the \<sup>MA</sup>\<sub>\<sup>SA</sup></sub>-\<sup>SA</supра of Jaimini which begins with an inquiry into the nature of \<sub>Dh</sub><sup>AR</sup>\<sub>MA</sub>, and runs into one thousand topics. The Ś\<sup>AB</sup>\<sub>ARA</sub>'s bhā\<sub>S</sub>ya on this \<sup>MA</sup>\<sub>\<sup>SA</sup></sub>-\<sup>SA</supра has been explained in two ways by Pr\<sub>B</sub>\<sup>A</sup>\<sub>H</sub>\<sub>K</sub>\<sub>\<sub>K</sub></sub>\<sub>\<sub>A</sub></sub>\<sub>R</sub>\<sub>A</sub> (A.D.650) and Kumā\<sub>\<sub>R</sub></sub>\<sub>ILA</sub> Bhatta (700 A.D.), who differ from each other in certain essential respects. Here follows a brief account of the important tenets of the \<sup>MA</sup>\<sub>\<sup>SA</sup></sub> school.

**Validity of Knowledge:**

Valid knowledge is defined as apprehension (\<sub>AN</sub>\<sub>U</sub>\<sub>BU</sub>\<sub>H</sub>\<sub>\</sub>\<sub>T</sub>\<sub>i</sub>). All apprehension is direct and immediate and valid. A cognition which apprehends an object cannot be intrinsically invalid. Memory arises from the impression of a prior cognition and therefore cannot be treated as valid knowledge. Kumā\<sub>\<sub>R</sub></sub>\<sub>ILA</sub> defines valid knowledge as apprehension of an object
which is produced by causes free from defects and which is not contradicted by subsequent knowledge. Thus valid knowledge is Kārapadośarahita (free from defective causes), bādhakajhānarahita (self-consistent and not be set aside by subsequent knowledge), agrhitārthā (which has not already been apprehended, and yathārtha and it must truly represent the object.

The Mīmāṁsaka school upholds the theory of Svatah-prāmāṇyavāda self validity of knowledge. All apprehension is intrinsically valid by itself. Its validity arises from those very causes from which knowledge itself arises. It is not due to any extraneous conditions. But, its invalidity is inferred either from some defect in the instrument of knowledge or from a subsequent contradicting knowledge. A person suffering from jaundice sees a conch yellow. It is due to the defect in the organ of vision. Though the invalidity of knowledge is inferred, yet knowledge itself is intrinsically presumed to be valid. Thus, this school advocates the self-validity of knowledge both in respect of its origin (utpatti) and ascertainment (jnāpti). As such knowledge is intrinsically valid, though its invalidity is due extraneous conditions.
Means of knowledge

According to Prābhākara, perception, inference, testimony, comparison and implication - have been regarded as means of knowledge. Kumārila further adds non-apprehension.55

Perception is defined as direct knowledge produced by the proper contact of sense-organs with the presented objects, which is free from defects.56 Mīmāṃsā broadly agrees with Nyāya in its view of perception. The self comes into contact with the mind; the mind comes in contact with sense-organ, and the sense organ with the external object. Indeterminate state of perception is the vague, and primitive stage of perception. The awareness of 'that' without its relation to the 'what', which gains the clarity and definiteness afterwards when it becomes determinate. It is the basis of activity. Like determinate perception, indeterminate perception also serves fruitful purpose. It is the bare awareness (ālocanamātra) which is non-relational and therefore indeterminate.

The Mīmāṃsā account of inference generally agrees with that of the Nyāya.57 There are certain minor differences like - the Mīmāṃsā recognises only three members of a syllogism either the first three or the last three.
Further, the Mimamsa theory of comparison or Upamaha differs from the Nyaya view. Comparison according to Nyaya, is the knowledge of the relation between a word and the object denoted by that word. But, the Mimamsaka maintains that the knowledge of the relation between a word and the object denoted by that word is derived by verbal authority, and not by comparison. It is known through the recollection of what was learnt from the verbal authority of the person. The knowledge of the wild cow is due to perception and not comparison. Hence comparison apprehends the similarity of the remembered cow to the perceived wild cow. This knowledge of similarity is comparison.58

Verbal testimony has got the greatest importance in Mimamsa. It is the knowledge of supra-sensible objects which is produced by the comprehension of the meanings of words.59 This testimony is divided into Pauruseya - the testimony of trust-worthy persons; and Apauruseya - the testimony of the Veda. It has intrinsic validity. But the validity of the former is inferred from the trustworthy character of the person. And it may be vitiated by doubt and error, and may be contradicted afterwards.60

The Veda is eternal and seen by the seers with the help of their divine vision. It deals with Dharma and
the objects denoted by it cannot be known by perception or any other means of valid knowledge. Hence there can never be internal contradictions in the Veda itself. The cognition of verbal testimony is derived from the meanings of words which form a sentence. The Mīmāṃsakas put forward the theory of Śabdanityatva, with a view to uphold the eternality and authorlessness of the Veda. Words are manifested through human effort and the sounds as well as symbols are the vehicles of the manifestation of the eternal words. Since the Veda is self-determined and therefore intrinsically valid, the particular order (ānupūrvi) in which the words occur in the Veda is self determined and eternal.

Implication or Arthāpati has been admitted by the Mīmāṃsakas as an independent means of valid knowledge. It is the assumption of an unperceived fact in order to reconcile two apparently inconsistent perceived facts. For example: "Jivan devadattah qṛhe nāsti".61 "pīno devadattah diva na bhūḥkte" i.e. A fat Devadatta does not eat during day time. Here, if Devadatta is alive and he is not in his house, we presume that he is elsewhere. 'Being alive' and 'not being in the house' are two perceived facts which appear to be inconsistent. This inconsistency is removed when we presume the fact of
'being elsewhere'. 62 If Devadatta is fat and he does not eat during day, we presume that he must be eating during night, otherwise the inconsistency between 'being fat' and 'not eating during day' cannot be explained. The Naiyāyikas reduce this Arthapatti to Anumāna. But the Mīmāṃsakas hold that in inference, there is no inconsistency. In presumption there is no middle term at all which is the basis of inference. Neither of the two perceived and apparently inconsistent facts can separately serve as a middle term. Both the facts combined appear to be the middle term. But then this combination already includes the conclusion, while a valid middle term should not include the conclusion. Hence implication is different from inference and cannot be reduced to latter.

Abhāva or negation has been regarded as the sixth independent pramāṇa by Kumārila, while Prābhākara and Naiyāyika reject it. According to the latter, negation is known either by perception or by inference. The same sense organ which perceives any object perceives its non-existence also and the same inference which infers the existence of any object infers its non-existence also. Thus, though Nyāya admits negation as a separate category, non-apprehension as a separate pramāṇa is not required as its means. He reduces non-apprehension either to perception or to inference. Prābhākara does not admit negation itself as an independent category, hence
has no need to accept non-apprehension as its means. Prabhākara agrees with the Naiyāyika in rejecting non-apprehension, as a separate pramāṇa. Refuting these views Kumārila maintains that negation exists as a separate category and is different from bare existence or locus itself. Negation is not mere nothing. If a thing is not perceived even when it is capable of being perceived, that is the means of valid knowledge called negation which makes known the non-existence. Here the non-perception is the instrument; and since that is of the form of non-existence of cognition, negation is spoken of as the means of valid knowledge. When we perceive bare ground, we perceive neither the jar nor its non-existence. Hence the perception of the bare ground is different from the non-existence and non-cognition of the jar. Naiyāyika's view is refuted stating that negation cannot be perceived as there is no sense-object contact. Also it cannot be inferred, for the invariable concomitance is not known here. Hence negation cannot be reduced either to perception or to inference. It is an independent category or pramāṇa.

Nature of Knowledge:

Prabhākara's theory of knowledge is known as tripūta-pratyakṣavāda. He regards the knowledge as self-luminous. It manifests itself and needs nothing else for its manifestation. Though self-luminous it is not eternal. It arises
and vanishes. The triputi of the jñātā (knower), jñeya (to be known) and jñāna (knowledge) is simultaneously revealed in every act of cognition. It does not need any other knowledge for its revelation. The self and the object both depend on knowledge for their manifestation. Therefore the self is not self-luminous.

Kumārila's theory of knowledge is known as jñātatāvāda. He does not regard the knowledge as self-luminous. Knowledge is not perceptible. It cannot be known directly and immediately. Knowledge is regarded as a mode of the self and it is essentially an act (kriya). It is inferred from the cognizedness (jñātata) or manifestness (prākatya) of its object. It is the means of knowing the object and is inferred as such because without it the object could never have become known by the subject. The cognitive act is inferred from the cognizedness of the object. An act involves four things - an agent (kartā), an object (karma), an instrument (karana) and a result (phala). An action is found in the agent, but its result is found in the object. For e.g. the rice being cooked. The cook is the agent, the rice-grain is the object, the fire is the instrument; and the cookedness of the rice is result. Here the act of cooking is found in the agent and the cookedness is found in the object cooked.
Theory of Error

As has already been seen, validity is inherent in knowledge and invalidity is inferred on account of some defect or contradiction in the causes of knowledge. But if all knowledge is self-valid, how can error at all arise? To answer this Prabhākara holds Akhvāti view whereas Kumārila, the Viparītakhyāti.

Prabhākara does not admit error in the logical sense. Error is only partial truth. It is imperfect knowledge. Imperfect knowledge is commonly called error. Error is due to non-discrimination between the two cognitions and their separate object. It is mere non-apprehension. The example of a person suffering from jaundice and seeing a while conch yellow, illustrates the above stand.

Kumārila says that error is mis-apprehension (Viparītakhyāti) but not non-apprehension (akhyāti). It is due to a positive wrong synthesis of the two imperfect cognitions which are welded together as a unitary knowledge in error. Thus error is positive wrong apprehension of one object as another object which in fact it is not. It is just as the shell is misperceived as silver due to some defect in the causes of knowledge. 65
Metaphysics of the Mimamsa:

In metaphysics, the Mimamsakas are pluralistic realists. He believes in the reality of the external world and of the individual souls. The word is constituted of three types of elements - 1) Body in which the self enjoys the fruits of his actions, 2) Sense and motor organs as the means of experiencing pleasure and pain, 3) External things as objects of enjoyment. Besides the objects of perception there are many realities which are not subject to perception such as heaven, hell, soul, gods etc. The creation is due to karmas. They therefore do not admit any purpose of God in creation. It strongly believes in the law of Karma, in unseen power (apurvya or adrsta), in heaven and hell, in liberation and in the ultimate authority of the eternal authorless Vedas. God is ruled out as an unnecessary hypothesis, though the later Mimamsakas like Laghakasi try to bring the idea of God. The world is eternal. There is no origination and destruction of the universe. Though individuals come and go. Yet the universe as a whole goes on for ever uncreated and imperishable. There never was a time when the universe was different from what it is at present.

The summum bonum of life according to the Mimamsa, is heaven, yet later Mimamsa thinkers have accepted liberation
as the ultimate end. Liberation is freedom from bondage. One who acts with a desire for fruit has to take birth often. After realizing that worldly pleasures are mixed with pain, one becomes disillusioned and abandons all desires. Actions without desire and self-realization lead to the annihilation of past samskāras. This results in the cessation of the cycle of birth and death.
CHAPTER II

A Brief Survey of the Indian Philosophical Systems


2. बुद्धप्रतिवेदनातुसार नासिक शिवेश्वर मणि नाम स्वरूपसार सारितानं
   तत्त्व द्वारा विश्वासितं।

3. पारस्परिकत्वमध्ये पद्धतिनाम-वार्तकम गतमनुवांगाय जानानुभूतेऽति। अते
   एवं तत्त्व-वार्तकमत्त्व लोकायतमहत्त्वमध्ये नामक्षेत्रं।
   Ibid., p. 1.


5. वाल्मीकि यज्ञानेन तन्त्र रमानुज हित्वेत।
   मूलानामध्ये सप्तसादी अष्टकदेहि संप्रदायकारणमारन्ति।
   निर्वाणस्य प्रश्नोत्तर संशोधनोद्भविषयं।
   मनोहरेचन्द्र अंजुलीस्वरूप विद्यप्रायकल्पनम्।

6. अनुभवित सयो वेदार्थायुक्त महामुण्डनत।
   बुधप्रतिवेदनानिव आधिकार धारान्तिरितिम्।
   Ibid., p. 5.

7. नाय्यानुसारं व्ययटिन्द्राणोपयोः। तत्त्र तथाये एवमित्यनवस्था
   दृष्टांध्यप्रसंगत।
   Ibid., p. 3.
73

9) अभावार्थको जन्य सचयामुखार्थक अनसत्तात कपडकारणको दुर्योगो अनसत्तात अनिष्ठ उपचरीत ||
लोकसङ्गां भवेद्ररण परेको नापूरथ समूह ||
देशस्य नास्तिको मुख्यतः न राजनामुक्तिप्राप्तये ||
Ibid., pp 3

10) न स्वप्नो नाप्पसनो वा नैवालमा पालेकिको नैव वर्णिको प्रायत्थनी विविध फलसङ्ख्यक ||
Ibid., pp 4

11) शाक्त्विजेतस्य अविनेत्त अर्थक रूपमात्र भूते पिंडे ।
भर्तीश्रृंगश्च देशस्य युन्यात्मकम् धृते ।
Ibid., 5

12) S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I,
123 M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy,
pp 194-95
13) S. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*
Vol. I, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1975, p. 169


15. औषधीज्ञान जी हैं तू सात। तभि भोज्यको आवद्धान -
करत्त्रीक।

**Madhava, Sarvadharma-sastra, p. 27**

16. त्रिवेदिकाणी जाशास्त्रयोगोत्तराद्वयंतर्कथार्थाद्वयंतर्कथायां
शास्त्रीयां ज्ञानकार्यां ज्ञानकार्यां।

**Ibid., p. 27**

17. ज्ञानसक्तिसन्तृप्ततत्त्वादिक ज्ञानस्वाधीन स्मार्तविद्या-
शिखरतिवर्षीय: सम्पन्नान्तम। योक्तिरादि-
यथार्थसंस्कृततत्त्वां संख्याधिक्षेत्रा या।

**Ibid., p. 25**

18) सर्वोत्तर ज्ञानार्थ धीरेश्त्रीयकृत्यः।

**Ibid., p. 22**

**Ibid., p. 28**
There are other two parts found in Ajīva i.e., Dharma and Adharma. These two are not included here because they mark moral or religious merit and demerit, but represent the principles of motion and of the rest. The whole of space into two parts, one of which is Kalpa, where Dharma is present motion is possible. It is thus a condition of motion. The other principle of Adharma, found in the remaining parts of space, is similarly regarded as a condition of rest.


23. दर्शनमयस्तेदविद्या साहित्यहृदयमनोरी जितमहत्त
प्रवचनभूक्तपर परमांति सम्प्ति-सम्प्ति शान-चारित्रमाणि मोहमार्ग इति।

Savadarshanasaṅgīkha, p.25

24. मिथ्यादृश्नानादानी व-धैहू निरुपेक्षकलहिमवाद निर्जीर्यातुसं
जितस्य कर्ममी नियस्तात आत्मनिकत्वमीमोक्षां मोहः॥

Ibid., p.32

25. इत्यतः आपेत्ति दृष्टिर्यद्वस्यः प्रपन्धनंम ॥

Ibid., p.31

Belur Math, Calcutta, Undated, p.224
77. यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकः यथा अस्तिद्वयं संतवच्च भावा अति शता शाक्तिरित्वार्थनिहः मिते सिद्धेन सिद्धन्त
केवल विधानत्वथा वर्ततेनाशिष्टम् श्रीपारस्तिकतः कण्ठस्य-य विश्लेषित

78. क्षणिकं सर्वसंस्कारं ज्ञति या वासना स्थिता।
स भार्तो ज्ञति विशेषाः सं च भोज्योिन्धिते।

79. ते त्या शाख्यप्रिक्त-योगा-चार-शैवनिसिद्ध-वैभाषिक सृज्ञानसः
श्रुतिः बुद्धेः मथाक्रमं सर्वसृज्ञातस्य-वाद्यशृंग-वथन्-वाक्षाभिर्युज्यते।
मेत्यते-वाक्षाभ्युज्यते-प्रत्यक्षत्वेन सन्तंतिनिधिं।

80. ते वच्चारं प्रत्ययः प्राप्तिः आलम्बनसमन्ततरसहकारी

dhipakinimānā.

81. तत् स्वादृढ़त्वाल्लाभाने युक्तवर हमारपदम्
वत्ते स्वादृढं प्राप्तितिविश्वासु यान्नीलाभिकमुक्तिविषये।

THE SANKHYA SYSTEM

32. मूलः
बोधकस्य विकारो न प्राप्तिः विभूति दुःखा।
Iṣṭvarakṛṣṇa, Sankhyā-Kār̥ka,
Oriental Book Agency, Pooṇa, 1964, Verse 3
33. भेदान्त परिमाणात सम्बन्धात कार्यां: प्रबृत्तेष्च कारणकार्यविभागात अविभागातैववर्गः प्रजाः।

Ibid., Verse 15

34. कृतः प्रभुवतनुपालिणिः भवात् कार्यक्षतुपकाशी।
सत्यदिकः कर्म ज्ञानविलयसंस्कृतः सयरेः वा।

Ibid., Verse 8

35. संघातपरम्परात् निर्मुदादिविपयदिविधिषठानात्।
पुरुषोपक्षत् भोक्तर्भावात् कैवल्यार्थ प्रवृत्तेष्च।

Ibid., Verse 17

36. जनमारणकरणः प्रतिनिः यमादूपुरः प्रवृत्तेष्च।
पुरुषबहुवं चिदाः जैतुस्यविपयात्येव।

Ibid., Verse 18

37. प्रीत्यप्रीत्यविपयातीतेन कृतः प्रकाशप्रत्यविपयातीतेन।
अन्योन्याभिवाख्यायननामस्युभुवित्यहुः पुष्पः।
सत्योऽस्तु प्रकाशकम्पितमुपक्षावलब्धमेव च च च नरः।
शुभस्व वर्णकमेत तमः प्रशीपव-यायांते वृत्तिः।

Ibid., Verses, 12 & 13

38. पुरुषस्य दृष्टि-नार्थे कृत्य-नार्थस्य तथा प्रथानस्य।
श्रृवः धर्मं धर्मं अभिरं बंधुज्ञातस्मात्। स्मरः।
प्रकृतः । त सः कार्यां तस्मादृश्यवच चोडः।
तस्मादेत् चोडिकार्यां वचनयेत्: पृथव: शृवन्तामः।

Ibid., Verses, 21 & 22

39. असद्वकेषणादिपान्तग्रहणात सर्वबिभागाभावात।
कृत्यस्य दृष्टिकारणात, कारणकारणात् सत्कार्यम्।

Ibid., Verse 9
40. 
रस्त्मवुष्टवामात्वकम् य वर्णप्रमाणाक्षरः पुर\nक्रिया प्रमाणकिंत्रिः प्रमोचायिनीः प्रमाणां दिनः।
प्रतिवधीवास्यायं दृश्यं विविधमानमाश्विनयायानम्।
तत्तद्गतिधिपूर्वकः आप्यश्रीतिरास्त्रवनन्त् ।
सामान्यतः इतिहासविद्यां प्रतिधिताषः प्रमाणानं।
तस्मादिपि चाचिहुः प्रत्येकमात्वाकालं विस्तुः॥
Ibid : Verses 4-6

41. 
पर्येक्ष गमनमूल्यः गमनमध्यस्तां भवत्वधर्मन्यः।
शरणेषु भाष्यमेव विपर्ययाद्विष्टे वर्तः॥
बैलाग्मित्र प्रकृतिलयाः संसारो भवति राजस्वात्माः।
रूपमदिविष्टे विपर्ययां तत्त्विन्यासः॥
तत्र अरोमरणैकृतं दुःखां प्राप्तोति -वेतनं दुःखः॥
लिङ्गप्राविभिन्नसः तथादृश्यः स्वभावाः॥
रूपेष्ट प्रकृतिकृतैः महादीविविशोष्ठतपर्यांः॥
प्रतिपुस्वरविन्योऽः स्मार्थाः स्वार्थः फलाः।
Ibid : Verses 44, 45, 55, 62, 64, 6
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42. तत्त्वमस्य विभिन्नताः विभार्षितः। तद्वर्त्तमाश्वेद विभिन्नताः। अवधारितिः च मधुमेधिश्च। यद्यात् श्रुत्वते यथासः। तत्त्वमाश्वेदम्। अवधारितिः। श्रुत्वते यथासः। अवधारितिः।

Annambhatta, Tarkasangraha, Bhandarkar
Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1974, pp. 23-24

43. प्रायःतुण्डतुण्डमण्डलितसंज्ञािनिकोऽनि वृद्धिः। खज्जोऽत्युक्तसमवयः। विभार्षितः। तत्त्वमाश्वेदम्। अवधारितिः। श्रुत्वते यथासः। अवधारितिः।

44. तत्त्वमाश्वेदम्। अवधारितिः। श्रुत्वते यथासः। अवधारितिः। श्रुत्वते यथासः। अवधारितिः। श्रुत्वते यथासः। अवधारितिः। श्रुत्वते यथासः। अवधारितिः।

45. प्रतिकः तत्त्वमाश्वेदम्। अवधारितिः। श्रुत्वते यथासः। अवधारितिः। श्रुत्वते यथासः। अवधारितिः। श्रुत्वते यथासः। अवधारितिः। श्रुत्वते यथासः। अवधारितिः।

46. स्वार्थ्यत्त्वमाश्वेदम्। अवधारितिः। श्रुत्वते यथासः। अवधारितिः। श्रुत्वते यथासः। अवधारितिः। श्रुत्वते यथासः। अवधारितिः। श्रुत्वते यथासः। अवधारितिः।
47. उपमितिकरणसुपमानं संज्ञास्तोंसिंबंधानमुपमिनिः। तत्कारणं
साध्यतां। अतःरोजःस्वरूपमस्मर्मवचनंतरवित्यापारः। तथा है
तथा हि कश्चिदगव्याधिश्चत्म्यान्नकृत्विशेषसकुशालमुषंधरात
शोचस्त्रयो गात्या दिति-तुत्तरा वनं गतो वाक्यार्थः समतनं गोस्वाम
पिंडः प्रख्यातः। तन्नातरायस्मा गुरवणश्चवा। इत्युपमितिकरणात् ॥
Ibid., p. 49

48. आत्माकर्म: शोभः। आलेखु यथार्थिवकः। वाक्यं परस्पमूंहः।
यथा भागात्माते। तदं वाक्यं द्विविधः कौकाकः गैरिकं च।
वैदिकमीकृतक्तत्त्वं अग्निभेदः प्रभावम्। (छोटिकं ग्लाप्तोंकं
प्रभावम्) अन्यत्र प्रभावान् ॥ Ibid., pp. 51-53

49. कारणं त्रिविधः समवायं समवायमितिभेदात्। अतःस्मृति कार्यं
मुखः दृश्यम्। तद्यथा: ततः गर्भ परस्य
परस्य स्वस्वस्याद्। कार्यविधेय स्या। अनेकस्मिन्नवे समवेतेने
सति यत्तत्त: तदस्वाभावविकारणाम्। यथा तनुस्योऽग्निः परस्य
तनुस्य गर्भः। तद्भवायत्ने कारणं निमित्तकारणं यथा
तुरीयमिकड़स्य परस्य। ॥ Ibid., pp.26-27

50. प्रथमः जगद्वितीय: परमाणुवादः-विनमुरवत्। समवायिकारणम्। परमाणु-
हल्द्योगार्थकसमवायिकारणम्। इद्वरत्नवाच्छानृतिकारणगती-
कार्यविधिकारणम् इति ॥

Sukrasah Madhujati-dikshita, Siddhanta
—in 'Quote in the Nyāyakosha',
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona,
1978, p.1033

51. जीवनान्यानं जानेऽर्धः-हृदयप्रि बुद्धि-शक्तियोऽद्वाराद्वारोऽस्माननेन। भृजम् ॥
Gautama, Nyāya-Darsana, Calcutta, 1865, Su.No. I.i.10
52. आत्मा | विविधता: | जीवाल्म परमात्मा द्वारा। तद्वादः 
प्रतिक्षितरूप विन्यास-विश्वार्थ वर्णण करते भोग्यात्। द्वितीयम्। 
वेदयं | सर्वस्वं एक एव \\
Annaabhāta, Tarkasāṅgala, p.

53. आत्मा-केशि:। मोक्षः। -- स्वातः | येन्द्री मोक्षः। इति केचित। \\
Samanādārāna-Śaṅgala, p-249

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54. अनन्तगत्यां गति प्रामाणिक होति भास्मीनागस:। आत्मा। \\
Op.cit Nyāyakosa, p.554

55. प्रत्यक्षात्मानोपभावनावह अर्थार्थपरिशोधे पूर्व प्रामाणिक होति 
प्रार्थकरारः। आत्मा। प्रत्यक्षात्मानोपभावनावह अर्थार्थपरिशोधकः 
होति बर्दप्रामाणिक हे जौरे महते। वेदानिभेतः। \\
Ibid, p.556

56. ततः इत्यादिनिःकिर्मेः। प्रमाण। प्रत्यक्षकः। काले। गुनार्थिवियारी, 
उदय: -- व्यासोभ्याःप्राणस्वर्णार्थोगाणि मनस्चेति विभिन्निवियारी। \\
Nāgārjuna, Māne Rāsādaya, Adyn Library 
and Research Centre, Madras, 1975, p.9

57. __ आण्विकःनार्थस्वर्णिः। तार्थानामा। \\
Ibid, p.27

58. दशमानार्थस्वर्णिः। स्वर्णार्थवार्थामोचनम्। 
असेनिकेष स्वादेश्यालानि | ह्यामितिधिष्टा। \\
Ibid, p.110
59. तत्र तात्वम प्रदैव्यति: पुदाप्रभवणेन कृते ।
अर्थक्रुद्धवाक्यार्थाय श्राद्धमितिवर्यते ॥
इबद, प. 93

60. रत्न साहित्य द्विविधं प्रयोगमयमौर्य कर्त्यते ॥
तत्राः द्विविधमयं भूतम्य प्रयोगम ॥ (इबद, प. 103)

dुस्तक्तकृत्तप्रभावकस्म: ईश्वरी यदा भवेत् ।
तदा स्थाय भविष्यार्थोऽधीपते प्रयोगसंग्रहेऽवचित ॥
अप्रयोगस्यं वै कर्त्ये तु पुरुषस्य प्रभावं ॥
कल्पकेन न विशेष्याति तत्कुलो यथिचारित त ॥
इबद,, प. 109

61. शाखार्थ्य प्रमाणानास्तिकृत्तमात्रात् ।
विरोधात्विरुढ्कृते धीरार्थपतिरिष्टते ॥
एव अवतन्मानाः शूद्रसाधारणाऐवातः ।
विरोधाति कर्णीभूतादि बहिःर्वयस्य कल्पनम् ॥
इबद,, प. 120

62. शाक्षाक्षमुलकनामानेन स्वाभावः देवतां तत्रं मुखः स्वत: हृदभियोज्यति
इति साधारणेनावग्न म्यते । तत्व शूद्रं नास्तिक्यं अनेन विरोधे
सति अविरोधाय बहिःर्वस्ति कल्प्यते ॥
इबद,, प. 121

(अध्ययननामभागम् ।
अभावायं प्रमाणं स्वादिशमस्तव्यम्बोधकम् ॥
अनेन हृदनुपेक्ष: करणम् । तत्त्व च शाक्षाक्षमुलमानवत्रादभावः
प्रमाणमिति स्वयं ॥
इबद,, प. 133-34)
64. भविष्यतं विषयिकेन प्रभु एवं स्थाय भावानकरभे सर्वश्रेष्ठ ज्ञानस्य भविष्यतं विषयिकेनिस्पर्शेत् त्रिधृतीप्रत्यक्षेति।

Nyuṣya-kosa, p.344.

65. अरूप्याति न क्यातिरेख्यातिरंगतिः। सुकृतिजन्तस्थले हुः ज्ञात्मित्यज्ञेयमरम्या एव प्रत्यक्षप्रतिविषयः न ज्ञातस्य।

तत्स्यं व्यक्तिरस्वंनिशंकिता। ज्ञातस्य तु स्मृत्याकाश्चर्च्यानितिति अन्यथारूपातिनिन्निति अन्यथारूपात्तेऽपि प्रतिविषयः। देशाकालान्तरादं रज्जस्वयं सुभिस्माप्रस्यतृते सेोपहतोन्निद्रियते दुःस्थः तात्त्वात्मनः उत्तरः।

Ibid., p.256.