CHAPTER THREE

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

1. Trade Unions as Organizations
2. Trade Unions in Organizational Theory
3. Trade Union Leadership
4. Union Democracy
5. Indian Trade Unionism
Review of Literature

We are here concerned with the analysis of various theoretical issues and problems related to the study of trade union organization, structure, administration and particularly the determinants of these organizational variables. The main function of a theoretical support such as this is to see that the empirical literature published hitherto is brought to bear upon the empirical findings of the present study. Under this section, we are concerned with the kind of theoretical support needed in a study as present one, where empirical data are to be organized and integrated to yield a fairly meaningful understanding of the internal structure, nature of administration and causal relationships between the structural and environmental variables in trade union organizations. The theoretical relevance of a study as this can be established on the basis of a review of pertinent theoretical perspectives, orientations and viewpoints developed in the fields like voluntary associations, leadership practices, membership participation, decision making processes and so forth with particular reference to trade unions. It may be mentioned here that, the review of literature on organization theory 'per se' does provide a general backdrop against which trade unions may meaningfully be understood as one class or brand of organizations. A review of studies on trade union structure and functioning in diverse cultural contexts may also be of relevance here in view of the fact that the industrial system is an integral part of the larger social system and the characteristics of socio-cultural system will have bearing on the functioning of an organization like labour union. In this context, one can argue that there is no universal pattern or model to explain the way in which trade unions function and govern themselves internally and the role of union leadership in it.
However, an attempt is made under this section to provide a review of literature that would enable us to thrash out significant issues pertaining to the organizational analysis of trade unions and develop requisite theoretical insights to comprehend and interpret the findings of the present study. For this purpose, a critical scrutiny of the relevant literature is taken up in the ensuing discussion. Here it may be stated that this scrutiny is principally concerned and confined to the social science literature on organizational structure, organizational dynamics or processes and their implications for organizational behaviour (administration) with particular reference to trade unions.

Apart from classical theories of labour movement, dealing with the origin, growth and proliferation of trade unions, there are several empirical studies relating to trade unionism, its structural features and leadership. The factors which have attracted empirical attention include the factors that promote or hinder membership participation in union affairs, the rank-and-file attitudes and characteristics of union leaders, their roles and attitudes and so forth. Though the present study seeks to ascertain the extent of democratic and oligarchic tendencies in union administration and their structural determinants, studies focusing on the aspects of unionism mentioned above provide a useful backdrop against which findings of the present study could be meaningfully presented and analysed. However, the chief focus of review here will be the studies pertaining to internal structure, administration, leadership styles and democratic and oligarchic tendencies in trade unions. Further, there are a few studies on methods of ascertaining the indices and extent of democratic tendencies in union organizations. The methods adopted in this study to determine the indices and extent of democracy and oligarchy are
based on a critical analysis and synthesis of the findings of these studies, with the assumption that it provides us with a composite model or tool more reliable and valid than any single model. Hence these studies are touched upon in the ensuing discussion briefly.

However, it goes without saying that limitations inherent to an individual research endeavour as this might render the researcher unable to do adequate justice to the rich literature available on this area of social science inquiry. Further it is also not claimed that the study proposes to give an up-to-date review of literature pertaining to this field, which is not the main aim of the study. Even the paucity of space acts as a constraining factor so far as review of literature is concerned, what is attempted here is a kind of familiarization of the field in which the present study is an inquiry. It is also meant to provide the necessary intellectual insights into the phenomenon under investigation so that the analysis and interpretation of the findings tend to be better focused and theoretically oriented. By virtue of this they find a definite place in the body of empirical literature on the phenomenon under investigation.

Trade Unions as Organizations

In the literature of sociology of organizations, unions occupy a unique place by their not fitting exactly into either bureaucratic or democratic organizations or structures. Many a students of trade union structure are at loss to take a definite stand in dealing with trade unions as organizations. They are a mix of both bureaucratic and democratic structures. Not only that, we find a great deal of variation in terms of degrees of bureaucratization and democratization between unions of
different sizes, types, ideologies and cultures. And further, same union may be found functioning as strict bureaucracy at one time and as an enlightened democracy at another. Thus in literature on organizations we find unions being dealt with as both bureaucratic and democratic organizations in different contexts. An attempt is made here to discuss unions as bureaucracies and as democracies they will be treated in the next section.

Unions today, by and large are studied as bureaucracies and the theories of organizations that explain structure and functioning of large scale organizations are applied to unions also. But, there are some ways in which unions are different from rest of the formal organizations and it is these unique features that have attracted the attention and are studied extensively by the social scientists.

The unions have transformed themselves rapidly from a mass protest movement into a concrete and stable institutions. The major interest of industrial sociologists in the study of trade unions has been their internal control system and the extent to which there is membership participation in the control of unions. Trade unions have been aptly described by Blau and Scott as "mutual benefit association" (1962) in which the members are the prime beneficiaries. Further they state that, the problem of crucial importance is the maintaining internal democratic processes with an apathetic membership and under the conditions or forces that encourage autocratic or oligarchic control (1962: 45-49). Most of the unions maintain a formal democratic structure with constitutions rectified by the membership, election of leaders, conventions at regular intervals to vote on important union policies. Nevertheless, most of the leaders of large unions and national unions manage to wield a
considerable amount of power and influence in union matters and to keep themselves in power for long periods of time. This phenomenon of centralized hierarchical structure is often explained in terms of membership apathy. Studies on membership participation (Spindall, 1960) have shown that very few members are active in the affairs of the union measured in terms of attending meetings, voting in elections, contesting for leadership positions and so forth. This is believed to be giving the leaders to exercise all or more power than they are entitled to as per union rule books. It could be stated that the amount of power exercised in an organization has a fixed quantity so, if leaders exercise more power then members naturally exercise less power.

The findings suggest that it is generally those workers who have most to gain or lose, that is, those who are on a higher pay scale, more skilled, have a longer service and higher job status participating in union activities more frequently and actively. Another important theme of research in union organizations is, the causes and conditions that bring about or promote oligarchic control structure in the unions. The findings in this regard suggest that, membership apathy, lack of political and leadership skill among members, strategies adopted by the unions in attaining their goals, monopoly of administrative skills and communication structures by the leaders and the tendency among leaders to hold on to the offices rendere unions less democratic. Faunce (1967) explains that, if the alternative to being a union leader is to go back to work in factory as a semiskilled worker, the leader would avoid doing so to the best of his ability. It does not pose a big challenge to the leader as in most unions. Incumbent officers have a virtual monopoly over the communication channels, opportunities to gain leadership experience, which are of distinct advantages in elections through which they can
pe'retuate themselves in office. An attempts is made in this study to varify empirically the validity of these causes in Indian context.

However, there are other theoretical approaches to this problem of oligarchic structure of trade unions which hold that the forces that compell such structure to develop are inherent or immanent to all large scale organization, and trade unions are just one good examples along with political parties. This has a direct reference to Michel's theory of "iron-law of oligarchy" which makes us to ask whether we should regard modern trade union an organization over which the individual worker has no effective control? Or the union that has been established in his name happens to and continues to dominate him instead of expressing his sentiments and interests? Michel had an affirmative answer to this in his iron law of oligarchy in which he contended that the masses are alienated from power, which is exercised by a small elite. First published in 1911, his study has been as influential and controversial in the study of democratic organizations as Malthusian theory in the study of population.

The central theme of his theory is "who says organization says oligarchy". Even in the organizations whose express goal is to attain greater democracy for the membership, says Michels, oligarchic structures develop to prevent the fullest expression of members' interests and desires. He says that oligarchical tendencies are inherent in all human organizations. In such organizations, he says, we find oligarchy in democratic form or democracy with an oligarchic content [Michels, 1949: 9-10]. He attributes such oligarchic tendencies to the technical indespensability of leadership in all kinds of human organizations that strive to attain definite ends. He
states that at the outset, leaders arise "spontaneously", their functions are "accessory" and "gratuctos". Soon, however, they become "Professional" leaders, and in the second stage of development they are "stable" and "irremovable", such developments take place, according to Michels, due to the psychical transformation which the leading personalities in the organizations undergo in the course of their organizational lives and much more due to what may be called as the psychology of organizations, that is, due to the tactical and technical necessities which result from the growth in the size of and consolidation of functions in every democratic human aggregate. Expressing this concisely, Michels writes "It is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization, says oligarchy" (1949).

Referring to the trade unions in the 20th century, Michels emphasizes the increasing need for a bureaucratic organization staffed with technically competent men who become better educated and separated in life style from those whom they represent. Leadership and authority tend to become increasingly centralized giving scope for leadership to act independently without seeking approval from the membership. He even hints that the leadership seeking self interest and seeking to perpetuate in the office tend to compromise with the capitalists. For this he gives the example of British trade unionists entering into agreement with the capital on sliding scale whereby, the wages become linked to selling price of product. He explains how labour leaders fall prey to the traps of capitalists. To counteract this, he believes, the worker must be educated. Education diminishes the gap between the leaders and the led and increases the capacity of the
masses to exercise control on the affairs of the union. He writes "Taken in the mass, the poor are powerless and disarmed vis-a-vis their leaders. Their intellectual and cultural inferiority makes it impossible for them to see whether the leader is going or to estimate in advance the significance of his actions; it is, consequently, the great task of social education to raise the intellectual level. Of the masses, so that they may be enabled, within the limits of what is possible, to counteract the oligarchical tendencies of the working class movement" (Michels, 1949: 369). An attempt is made in this study to ascertain the validity of these assumptions.

Sidney and Beatrice Webb writing about British trade unions much before Michels wrote his treatise, arrived at similar conclusions (Webb; 1911). In fact, they are cited by Michels as evidence in support of his study. Webbs state that it could be a difficult task for working class to combine administrative efficiency with popular control. Webbs described the early trade unions as the primitive democracies. The administration of these early trade unions could be carried out by general meetings of the entire membership. Since the duties of a leader did not require any special skills, each member ranked equally competent with others. Due to this fact, Webbs say, there was no permanent officer in the primitive democracies but a new chairman was chosen at the commencement of each meeting. This was a pure form of democracy in that everybody took part in the making of decisions.

However, as the unions grew in size and became more complex with regard to membership functions, this method of direct administration proved rudimentary and unwieldy. As such, the trade unions became increasingly constrained to
develop a bureaucratic structure for the purpose of rational administration. However, unlike other bureaucracies, union bureaucracy is manned by officials elected by the workers to constitute a democratic government. They argued that if democracy is taken as everything that concerns all should be decided by all and that each citizen should enjoy an equal and identical share in the government, expressed in terms of such practices as Rotation of Office, Mass Meeting, Referendum, and so forth then inefficiency, disintegration or dictatorship or bureaucracy are inevitable. They, on the other hand, suggested that a union could be governed through modern representative democracy in which an elected representative assembly would appointing and control an executive committee under whose direction the permanent official staff performs its work.

Studying the trade union administration in the Britain about four decades later, V.L. Allen (1954) argues that the increasing size and complexity of functions and need for efficiency has led to bureaucratic tendencies in trade unions at the cost of "self government". But he considers it as a normal response because, the aim of trade union is to protect and improve the general working and living conditions of its members rather than providing the workers with an exercise in the self-government. Lipset in his explanation of John Leives actions, and Wright Mills dealing with the pressure on labour leaders to 'deliver goods' support the development of bureaucratic centralization of union structures. Further, Faunce points out that the social and ethnic heterogenety of union members contributes to the problem of coordination within the union to a considerable extent and encourages the development of the type of rationalized control structure (1967:382).

However, the influence of Michels theory of iron law of
oligarchy has been so great that the literature which deals with the problem of democracy and oligarchy in trade unions either simply documents the extent of democratic and oligarchic control in one or more unions or reworks Michels' classic analysis of the conditions which breed oligarchy in trade unions [Hiremath, 1989]. However, the present study seeks to escape from this influence and provide a better and more practical frame work for the analysis of internal government of trade unions.

Trade Unions In Organizational Theory

Trade unions have been the most frequently scrutinized and analysed of all the private governments. They are believed to be having a typical internal structure that has very few parallels. Any study of trade unions, for that matter, can not be considered complete unless it takes the study of internal structure as one of its aims, and any review of literature on trade unions can not do real justice unless it reviews works on the organizational structure and features of unions. Organizations differ from other collectivities most importantly because in organizations power is more deliberately and purposefully distributed and better institutionalized. In organizations, power is concentrated or focused on a few formally recognized and institutionalized positions in which status symbols, right to sanction or withhold economic rewards and control over means of violence converge [Etzioni, 1965].

Spaulding (1970) writes that the analysis of the internal structure of a great union organization, may not appear to be as exciting as the description and analysis of industrial strikes or riots that are organized by a union that hit the headlines of media so often, as bulk of the work connected with union administration is done quietly adhering to the procedural
patterns, and framework of rules that are established by practice and find institutionalized in the union rule book or constitution. As a constitution creates machineries and various agencies vested with specific responsibilities to be discharged in order to achieve the desired goals, even the union constitutions make provisions for the creation of various machineries, agencies and bodies and allocate different functions to them. Different unions have different ways of getting the things done and internal patterning of statuses and roles; but if we take a broad look at them, we might view considerable similarity and generality among them to venture a model that explains the internal structure of union organizations.

The basic patterns of the formal internal structure of all unions is normally found in the organizational charts or what are generally known as the blue-print. A causal look at this diagram of organizational chart reveals that union organizations are characterized by considerable amount of structural complexity. Spaulding (1970) states that a careful observation and the analysis of union structure and union functioning reveals that unions like most other bureaucracies do not work exactly according to the rule book.

Unions, like all other large-scale organizations are constrained to develop bureaucratic structures providing a rational and efficient administration. This bureaucratization is in response to the internal and external demands of the unions that need to be met with. In dealing with the internal administrative tasks, the unions must establish administrative systems with definite patterns of authority and responsibility. The union officials must function within the framework of rules that are general and universal in nature. Larger the size of the union greater is the need to establish a bureaucratic
hierarchy [Lipset, 1960]. A large union might have to handle workmen's compensation, health, education and insurance in addition to usual trade union tasks such as collective bargaining, grievance handling, maintenance of office records and so forth. Thus increased size and complexity of operations require the creation of a specialized staff and greater division of labour. Further, Lipset is of the opinion that in addition to the need for bureaucracy inherent in the large union organizations, the degree of bureaucratic centralization in unions is further necessitated by the extent of centralization in the external groups with which the unions have to deal. By way of a research hypothesis, he states that more centralized an industry, the greater is the need for the union to be bureaucratic. He quotes the examples of unions that bargain with grand corporations, which need to develop an authority structure that would match that of the corporations. [Lipset, 1960: 360]. Thus, bureaucracy as an organization, pattern that efficiently meets the demands of the organization, of the leadership and membership has come to have deep roots in the union movement. But Seidman (1954) on the other hand found that a union is enough of a fighting organization to justify the use of military analogy, yet it possesses at least formally a democratic structure that makes leaders dependent on the continued approval of the membership. Not subscribing to an ideal type. Wright Mills recognizes the fact that we find a bewildering variety of organizational arrangements depending upon the level of organization, basis for organization, the size and so forth (1948). He believes that unions are still more like patronage machines than streamlined bureaucracies. They are run by patriarchs according to patronage. The union organizations stand between the company bureaucracy and the rank-and-file operating as shock absorber for both [Mills 1948]. But one thing is very true that the trade unions are the
dependent organizations, in the sense, it comes into existence to deal with employer-employee relationships. The existence of an industrial organization is a pre-condition, in most of the cases, for the existence of union organizations.

Landsberger (1976) on the other hand views trade unions as the formal manifestation of collective reaction. Unions are mechanism of regulating and channelizing the discontent of organized low-status groups. The degree of organization or the degree of formal structure, according to him can be measured in terms of 'deliberate coordination of the efforts'. These qualities have been described as the structural features of 'mature' unionism [Ross, 1964].

However, an attempt is made in this study to analyse the trade unions as one class of formal organizations and apply the theories of formal organizations to understand the union organizations. An attempt will be made to study the implications of organizational size for complexity and formalization in union administration as envisaged by Hall and others (1967). Analyzing data from 75 organizations, they concluded that the large organizations do not necessarily seem to rely upon impersonal and formalized control mechanisms and at the same time the fact that an organization is small can not be taken as evidence that a 'gemeinschaft' like social system is operating. These are the findings which seem to be more significant in the analysis of union organizations due to their lesser degree of formalization in structure and functioning as well as less degree of impersonality. Since unions are treated as one type of organizations it is believed that the empirical literature available with us on organizations in general can as well be extended to understand the union organizations. In any organization, it is commonly noted that size of an organization has important implications for other structural features of the
organization. Controversies do exist about these notions. Caplow (1957) and Grusky (1961) among others have assumed that large organizations are by nature are more complex and formalized than smaller organizations. Whereas, Blau and Scott (1962) argue that size may not be so critical a factor in the analysis of organizational structure. Empirical studies focusing on organizational size as a major variable have come up with contradictory findings. For example, Chapin (1951) and Tsouderos (1955) suggest that increased size is related to increased bureaucratization. Hall (1963) on the other hand found no relationship between the two. Tessin and Mills suggest that administrative component increases disproportionately in size as the size of organization increases. Anderson and Warkov and Bendix (1961) found that larger unions contain a smaller proportion of personnel engaged in administration. Still recent studies by Hawley et al. (1965) and Hass et al. (1963) seem to suggest that there might be a curvilinear relationship between the two with the administrative component increasing disproportionately in size first then decreasing as the organization grows further. Relationship between organizational size and complexity or what they termed it as configuration was also noticed by Pugh, Hickson and others (1963). Similarly Kahn, Wolfe and others (1964) state that with increased size, the structure of organization becomes increasingly differentiated and specialized. An attempt will, thus, also be made in the present study to ascertain the implications of size of trade union organization for other structural features.

Coming to formalization, another important structural tract of large organizations, the scholars working on organizations seem to be rather not clear about the concept. Hage (1965) and Aiken and Hage (1965) have suggested that
formalization can be measured in terms of degree of codification that is tolerated. The higher the proportion of codified jobs and the less the range of variation that is tolerated in the frame-work of rules in the organization. So there appears to be a significant relationship between degree of codification and the range of variation allowed, and the degree of formalization in the organization understood in terms of statement of procedures, rules, role and operation of procedures dealing with decision making, communication patterns, decision implementation [Pugh and Hickson et al, 1963]. But Hall and Haas (1967) on the other hand state that, larger organizations have more hierarchical levels, the relationship between the size and organizational complexity could be found with respect to only a few structural variables. Though some of these relationships were also found to be statistically significant, enough deviant cases exist to cast doubts on the assumption that large organizations are necessarily more complex than are the small organizations. Thus, Hall is of the opinion that, based on size we can not automatically infer the level of complexity and formalization of structure. It becomes clear on the basis of this inference that large organizations need not necessarily rely upon impersonal formalized control system. An attempt is made in this study to look into these aspects of unions.

Coming to the union organizations, we find diverse accounts and descriptions. Right since the days of Michels, unions have been studied as a specific kind of organizations. They are neither perfect bureaucracies though they manifest most of the characteristics of bureaucracies, nor they are examples of, what Weber called the opposite category of bureaucracies, patrimonial organizations. On the other hand it can be considered as the blend of the two opposite type of organizations and could be called as patrimonial bureaucracies.
And the understanding of these specific and unique features is rather indispensable for understanding rest of the things associated with the system of industrial relations such as unions, union leadership, business corporations, collective bargaining, industrial democracy, union democracy, and the political economy at large. Mills (1954: 152) wrote that for businessmen, politicians, and labour leaders, each in curiously different ways, the more apathetic the members of their organizations, (that is, as long as they don't get restless and as long as they back-up their leaders in crisis) the more operating power the leaders have as the members of the national power elite. Thus Roberts (1954: 243) views trade unions in many respects as the state in miniature form. Though it started as an institution and still continues to be one, it has of late developed into bureaucracy. This is considered by many as an inevitable historical development [Lourau, 1968]. This development was found to be true in case of British Trade Unions [Flanders, 1968] unions in the United States of America, [Wright Mills, 1948] in France, [Loureau, 1968] in India, [Hiremath, 1989] in Ceylon [Kearney, 1978] in Mexico [Leon, 1975] in Germany [Wolfgang, 1976, Treu, 1977] in Argentina and Brazil [Jelin, 1976].

Thus, bureaucratic formalization can and does come to stay in unionism, which is so well illustrated by the history of union movements world over particularly in famous national and international unions. In general, this later growth of formal organization is attributed to the growth in size and functions of unions. Those writers who had close relationships with the union movement have seen this phenomenon first hand and have found it inevitable. Herberg who worked with the New York Dressmakers Union of ILGWU as Research Director for quite a few years observed in his famous article that these
bureaucratic tendencies are as inherent in large unions as they are in large-scale organizations. He further states that even the most idealistic men when established in office tend to become practical and become more and more involved in the pursuit of power and justify this pursuit in various forms of rationalization [Herberg, 1955: 124].

Further, the unions not only tend to be bureaucratic in general but resemble bureaucracies that are operating in specific realms. For instance, there are some striking resemblances between the institutional form of a mature union and that of a political party. Both command a considerable loyalty and strict compliance with the orders issued, and are capable of being completely mobilized during crisis or critical situations. On the other hand they operate with a mere skeleton organization manned by a few hired hands and volunteers during intervals. Both view their membership as a scattered public and maintain communication and contact through news papers, official bulletins, news letters, mass meetings and such other media. Further Caplow (1954) states that union also resembles political party in its internal hierarchical organization with similar names and titles of the offices like President, Vice-President, General Secretary and so forth, and further like political party depends on the charismatic reputation and influence of a few great spokesmen to hold together a somewhat loose organization. Thus both have an internal structure of an impersonal interest group rather than a spontaneous collectivity [Caplow, 1954: 209] Spanlding explaining these trends in large unions observes that the disadvantages of the lay members are increased in the face of this normal tendency of large organizations towards formalization and bureaucracy. Such large enterprise must develop an administrative apparatus and staff as Weber described it. Once
established, the organizations would reap the benefits of rationality, impersonality and large-scale coordination but at the same time members suffer due to characteristic pathologies of formal organizations. Formal communication, impersonal contacts, acute specialization of functions, and segregation of different functional groups, become way of life. The traditions and rules of the union may eventually take on an air of ultimate authenticity which makes them almost ends in themselves. The specialists in the organization lose their consciousness of the whole. Preservation of organization and operation of tasks may overshadow the need for dynamic existence of the organization. The great mass of members cannot perform the special functions required by the size and complexity of the movement, but the specialists assigned with these tasks tend to lose the sharpness of their feelings for the needs of membership that is so important for the very success of the movement. The present study seeks to probe into these aspects of unionism in the Indian context.

Voluntary Organization and Democratic Theory

There is considerable amount of research interest and empirical literature in the field of bureaucracy and democracy in voluntary organizations. The classical pluralist political theory assumes that democracy exists in the voluntary organizations that have to negotiate and bargain with elected policy-making agencies. But as these voluntary associations grow they become more and more bureaucratic creating a threat to the democracy. This leads to the theoretical and empirical question as to whether and how voluntary associations such as trade unions and professional associations develop and coordinate bureaucratic and democratic controls over their internal process of decision making [Cafferata, 1982]. Still many theorists in
the field of organizations are working seriously to probe into the classical problem of how membership of democratic associations reconcile their democratic ethos with the rational bureaucratic structure? How is it possible to achieve bureaucratic efficiency with democratic decision making? Is it possible to achieve the kind of democracy that was envisaged by Weber (1968) in which accessibility to the offices is maximized and authority of officials is restricted by extending certain explicit procedures? These are some of the important questions to which answers have been sought through research in the present investigation.

One of the important question that has been not answered adequately and which concerns the students of unionism also is to what extent the bureaucratization affects democracy in organizations and what actions can be initiated to safeguard democratic ethos and practices in the democratically constituted voluntary organizations in the face of growing bureaucratization. A few mechanisms that can exert democratizing influence on bureaucratizing organizations are proposed. There can be thought of as constraints that can prevent leaders and structures from becoming autocratic, oligarchic and undemocratic.

Democratic constitutions can be regarded as mechanisms that assure democratic rights of participation and decision making by propagating a set of rules [Zald, 1970]. These constitutions might, at least formally, regulate voting procedures, leadership tenure, participation in decision making, majority opinion and formulating goals and strategies in democratic manner. It might bring into practice equal rights of the governed and maximization of rights which are signs of democracy [Weber, 1968: 985]. Thus, for Prager (1981: 931) democracy is nothing but a formal set of rules that govern the
relations between the governed and the governors in an organizational context. Thus, due to his preoccupation with rules, Weber is included among the constitutionalists concerned with the effects of democratic rules in the realization of a variety of democratic goals, [Cafferata, 1982: 281]. It is, however suggested that analysis of organizational constitutions is necessary for understanding the process of decision making in the organizations because they define the context in which the leadership has to operate [Zald, 1970, 234]. Empirical support was found to this suggestion in the study of trade unions in America and Britain where democracy was measured in terms of closeness of elections [Edelstein and Warner, 1975].

Trade Union Leadership

Studies on trade union leadership constitute an important segment of literature on trade unions. Trade union leaders determine the policies, strategies and functioning of unionism not only in industrializing but also in highly industrialized societies and as such, leave their stamp on unionism. Major works on union leadership focus on their roles, styles and social origins. A few studies also focus on their attitudes and orientations, motivations and ideologies with a view to ascertain implications of these for the functioning of unions.

A key requirement of effective unionism is a sufficient supply of qualified leadership and it is one in which the Indian movement is seriously deficient. One set of reasons create a shortage of leadership for all groups in developing countries - low levels of average attainment in education and training, lack of opportunities for gaining experience, dependence on a narrow elite and absence of tradition of self
help and voluntary action. But the unions face the added difficulty that the qualifications needed for union leadership in India are unusually high. English is still the principal language of unionism and labour relations [Kennedy, 1966: 85]. The technical demands of Indian labour relations are also formidable. In many industries it is customary for much of the communication between unions and employers to be in writing. The body of law and rules applicable to labour relations is very large and the parties are prone to a legalistic approach. The frequent recourse to conciliation, adjudication and the courts add greatly to the complexities of union work. Combined with the English language requirement, these technical demands compel unions to rely on leaders who have a level of education and a fund of experience and sophistication beyond the reach of ordinary wage and salary earners.

Another factor is the social distance between the elite and the working class and the deeply rooted attitudes of authority and difference that mark Indian class relations. These facts erect a barrier between the employers and the rank and file unionists. All the above factors taken together help explain why most of the top leadership in Indian unions is made up of outsiders that is, educated men who have come into union-work from various middle class backgrounds. [Kennedy, 1966: 87] In fact, the western observer is struck by the social difference between leaders and members and by the paternalistic, patronizing and authoritarian attitudes on the one side and the difference on the other. Workers and others tend to look on union leadership and the conduct of labour relations as middle class activities. So much so that even unions that are in fact run by competent inside leaders insist on having at least one publicly known outside figure as an officer.

One of the charges constantly leveled by the foes of...
the unions is that all the money and procedures of the unions are diverted from achieving the true aspirations of the members through the Machiavellian machinations of self-seeking leadership. Because of the general assumption in our culture that democracy is a good thing, the most persistent and basic of the questions concerning the concentration of power is that which asks to what extent unions are democratic. While the enemies of unions have made charges of authoritarianism, many of the supporters and leaders of unions have been concerned about the lack of complete and effective democracy in the trade unions and have tried to analyze the possible means of improvement [Spaulding, 1970: 406].

The problem of the degree of democracy in unions may be approached by surveying the facts concerning union leaders and their relationships of their members and analyzing the degree of which they meet the selected criterion of democracy.

As unions have become large and carefully organized, union leadership has become a profession of fair size and considerable stability. As early as 1955, some 40,000 people were making their basic living by working for unions [Spaulding, 1970: 436]. Although most of them were not employed full time by their unions, they were the reservoir of future leadership. They were marked by abounding energy, nervous tension, idealism and discontent [Sayles and Strauss, 1953: 104]. They were the kind of men who could and would work at a production job, attend many long meetings. While their absorption in the union was hard on family life, leadership brought many satisfactions such as the intellectual outlet, relief from the monotony of industrial job, increased prestige, and a rich social life with their fellow activists.
While there is some turnover in the ranks of full-time union officials, research supports the general observation that, once a man has arrived at a top position in a union and has been elected a time or two, his tenure is remarkably good. Of the 627 individuals in Ginzberg’s study of executive board members, 40 percent served less than three years, and 70 percent served less than six years [Ginzberg, 1948: 63]. On the other hand, the men who became presidents served an average of 26 years on their respective boards, 20 of these as presidents. Ginzberg concludes that the presidency of a union is not a reward for long and faithful service, but that the president is catapulted into office as a relatively young man, as a result of some display of effectiveness in a crisis. This tendency of long tenure in the highest union offices is supported by Taft who found that in 2037 elections to general union offices (such as President, Secretary, Treasurer, Vice-President) of 34 unions, their was competition only in 23.7 percent of the cases. In election for the office of the President, opposition was recorded on only 18.8 percent occasions [Taft, 1954: 38-39].

Commenting to the social life of union leaders, it is known that though they come from rank and file positions, once they occupy leadership positions, their income increases considerably and due to their other conditions of work they become set apart from the rank-and-file in their styles of life and perspectives and modes of thought. The higher and more secure income together with a different range of experience, desk-work, travel, association with business and political leaders, give rise to a style of life markedly different from that of the men in the shop [Lipset, 1960]. Thus they do enjoy a status that is high not only in the eyes of the workers but also as viewed by the general public. A study of relative job prestige of different occupations reported that to
be an official of an international union is to rank equally with proprietors, managers, and officials [North and Hatt, 1949]. The union office carries with it power, develops skills, supports a middle-class style of life. In reality, it is a middle class occupation though it has to do with the working-class. And those leaders who are defeated cannot maintain their high status position if they go back to the shop. This explains why so many union leaders who lose their office for one or the other reasons do not return to the shops but leave the occupation entirely or aspire for appointment to some higher office in other unions or elsewhere.

In most unions one of the principal factors which perpetuate incumbent power is the administrations' almost complete monopoly of the chances for learning political skills. The average worker has little opportunity or need to learn the political skills. If we look at the structure of the trade union as part of the total system of stratification, the other factors which contribute to the oligarchic and democratic behaviour on the part of labour leaders become clear.

In any organization where there is no democratic system of replacing leaders, through formally prescribed system of selection or promotion, the disappearance of a leader often precipitates succession crisis as it upsets the power equilibrium. The more personalized the mode of leadership, more are the chances of conflict for succession after the death or retirement of the leader. Max Weber dealing with the problem of succession stated that the death of a charismatic leader may cause the organization experience a tremendous insecurity about the consequences of succession [Weber, 1947]. One solution to this problem of succession can, according to him, be bureaucratization. There appear to be unions in which
the process of bureaucratization has reduced the problem of succession to one of moving up a recognized ladder [Lipset, 1960]. Lipset (1960) views that this question of succession crisis may give students of union organizations the opportunity to test many of the hypotheses proposed about the union administration, as well as the democratic and oligarchic tendencies in unions. The same has been attempted in the present study as well.

So much has been written about the union leaders and leadership but very little of it is based on empirical research and much less is about their roles, and effectiveness as representatives of labour in the system of industrial relations. A few names figure prominently when we come to works on trade union leaders, their ideologies, work patterns, political affiliations and social background. Wright Mills is one such name which figures universally and repeatedly. He has studied America's labour leaders (1948) as new men of power and as part of power elite in the social structure (1954). The works of Wright Mills are considered as significant contribution due to their pioneering efforts to study a relatively neglected aspect of trade unionism. His works have enhanced the general understanding of this very special section of society. Problems of union leaders that stem out of their relationships with the members have been highlighted in Dutch context by Praag (1955). However, a more detailed study of trade union leadership, particularly in the context of unions was carried out by Harold Wilenski (1956). The central problem of the study was the role of the union officials in the decision making process in the unions in particular and the over-all functioning of the unions in general. The study was based on the data pertaining to 298 union officials drawn from the headquarters of 28 international unions with a membership of 50,000 or more.
Based on functions they performed, Wilensky attempts a classification of union leaders into three social type as 'Facts and Figures man', the 'Contact Man' and the 'Internal Communications Specialist'. The first one is an expert who deals with facts, figures, documents and records. These officials do not require a great deal of human relations skill. The Contact Man is an expert with requisite skills to mediate the complex relationships between the union and the outside world. The Internal Communications Specialist concerns himself with furnishing ideological and political intelligence to enhance effective communication and control within the union. Wilensky explores the importance and influence of each type of official and concludes that the Contact Man wielded greatest influence because he has access to the human relations skill necessary to make maximum use of the informal channels of communication. Compared to others, he entered more areas of decision making and above all, he has vital and nontransferable connections outside the union. He further investigates the role orientations of union leaders irrespective of their functional responsibility. Based on their orientations he attempts a classification of union officials such as, Missionary type, who are oriented toward some abstract ideals of labour movement, Professional service experts, whose primary orientation is to an outside professional group; Careerists, who are primarily oriented toward a career within the union hierarchy, and lastly, the Union Politico, whose primary orientation is toward the political process of union organization. Wilensky studies these types closely, and finds support to the hypothesis that bureaucracies motivate gradual transformation of alienated intellectual into the political technician. Thus, Wilensky's work is considered as one of the most systematic studies not only of trade union leadership alone but also of large-scale organizations. Similar study on small scale has been undertaken by Georgewon and Yammura (1968). Further, the implications of these values and
orientations for the functioning of union leaders have been studied by Michael Poole (1974). He analyses the interdependent and reciprocal relationships between values system of leaders and control system of unions and also finds that the social imagery of working people is affected by the degree of control they experience in their work and non-work lives. However, union leaders operating in societies with repressive governments seem to be not only less democratic but also more active, militant and class conscious [Makofsky, 1978]. But even among union leaders a generation gap appears to be operating in terms of the style of functioning. The younger officials tend to be more active and exhibit a much greater general political versatility than the old trade unionists [Franchi, 1984].

In addition to these scientific sketches of trade union leadership, there are a few that focus specifically on trade union leadership in India [Mohan Das, 1967; Punekar and Madhuri, 1967; Sheth and Jain, 1968; Jespal Singh, 1970; Remdorp, 1971; Jespal Singh, 1971; Ramaswamy, 1974; Agrawal, 1976; Krishnan, 1977; Vaidya, 1978; Chaudhary, 1980; Hiremath, 1989]. However, inspite of all these studies, there are still many aspects of trade union leadership in general and union leadership in India in particular that need to be researched upon. And a few of these aspects are taken up for study in the present investigation. The indices, extent and determinants of responsiveness among union leadership have not been studied empirically so far, particularly in Indian context. An attempt, therefore is made in this study to develop and operationalize the indices and determinants of leadership responsiveness, which in turn could throw light upon the oligarchic and democratic tendencies in union administration.
Union Democracy

Coming to the works on internal structure of union organizations, those that focus on democratic and oligarchic tendencies have caught the interest of students on unionism. Right from the days of Michel's propounding his theory "Iron Law of Oligarchy" in the year 1911, students of voluntary organizations in general and trade unionism in particular have been busy researching on the internal structure of trade union organizations. The main focus has been the discovery of the indices of democratic and oligarchic tendencies in union administration as well as the structural and situational determinants of these tendencies. Inspite of the concerted efforts of the industrial sociologists and sociologists of organizations, the progress made in developing a sound theoretical infrastructure for this area of study can, at best, be described as being far from satisfactory. Many works lack in scientific approach and many more in conceptualizing union democracy by identifying and operationalizing the indices of democracy or oligarchy in union organizations. Even studies seeking to measure extent of union democracy and identify the variables that foster or hinder it has been far from convincing and their findings lack applicability across, trade and cultures. Thus, works on union democracy can be classified as belonging to three broad categories.

The first category consists of those works that have tried to conceptualize union democracy by identifying and operationalizing the indices of union democracy. An attempt is made in most of these studies to define first democracy, democratic administration, democratic leadership and the same parameters and traits are then extended to union organization to conceptualize union democracy, democratic administration and democratic leadership in the union context. In short many studies are aimed at giving the meaning, definition and nature of
union democracy by identifying the main indices and components of union democracy.

The second category consists of those studies that have focused their attention on the determinants, prerequisites and preconditions of union democracy. These studies have tried to identify the factors internal as well as external to the union organizations that promote or hinder the extent of democracy in trade unions. Those studies would rather attempt to give models of union democracy which would enable us to predict the level or extent of union democracy in a given union, provided the milieu in which it is operating are given.

Thirdly there are case studies of union democracies, that focus on individual unions and study the extent of union democracies by using the indices of union democracy established by other studies. These studies would enable us to know the nature and extent of democracy in the union under study and help to build literature of case studies of union democracies which may in turn be analysed to yield more useful generalizations.

All these works together would help build a coherent theory of union democracy. Though most of the important works directly or indirectly connected with the union democracy are reviewed here, an attempt is made here, to begin with, identify the indices of and factors determining the union democracy as envisaged by scholars in this field and as available to us through a brief survey of literature on union democracy.

There are quite a few works that deal with the indices or measures of democracy in trade unions. It needs to be mentioned here that, most of those who worked in this area are of the opinion that union democracy is not a unidimensional
phenomenon and as such manifests itself in multiple indicators. It also needs to be mentioned here that, each study has identified more than one indicators of democracy in unions but the same have not been discussed here in the order of their importance as mentioned by the authors. Hence an attempt is made here to refer to each one of the indices and then relate them to the studies and authors.

Even a casual survey of literature on democracy in unions clearly indicates that membership participation in the affairs of the unions in general and participation in decision making in particular has been the most widely agreed upon index of democracy in unions. There are a host of studies that deal with this aspect of union democracy (Seidman, 1953; Lipset, 1954; Strauss, 1956; Tannenbaum, 1956; Ross, 1959; Faunce, 1962; Ramaswamy, 1977; Strauss, 1977; Anderson, 1978; Colbjornson and Olav, 1978; Bayer, 1979; Sheridan, 1979; Won, 1983; Fairbrother, 1986). Seidman (1953) considers participation of rank and file membership particularly in the decision making process as an important index of union democracy and further states that membership participation is inversely related to the age and size of the union. Further participation appears to be higher in plant units rather than industry or area unions as the members of such unions tend to be scattered. Lipset (1954) who considers two party system in the internal administration of a union as the most important index, places quite a high premium on the membership participation in decision making as one of the important measures of union democracy. His very theory of union democracy is based on this criterion to some extent. George Strauss (1956), on the other hand, in his study of Building Trade Unions considers membership attendance at union meetings as a measure of participation which in turn guarantees union democracy. Similar method was adopted by Tannenbaum (1956) in his study of control structure in unions and their
implications for union democracy. He formulated a graph depicting the control exercised by different levels of union structure and seems to conclude that unions with greater membership control over the way things are decided in the unions are more democratic than others. This control, he states, that could be exercised through attending the general and special meetings. Ross (1959) in his study of New South Wales Branch of Australian Railway Union concludes that, union democracy and membership participation reinforce each other as one facilitates the other in practice. Faunce (1962) studying the size of locals and union democracy among unions affiliated to UAW reveals that rank-and-file participation being higher in small unions, accounts for high degree of internal democracy in smaller unions. Even Strauss (1977) in his recent analysis of trends of research on union government in the United States in the past as well as future has pointed out that membership participation is a potential area of research as it is organically linked to the issue of democracy and oligarchy in unions. Anderson (1978) in his comparative study of democracy in 95 Canadian local unions of police officers, firemen, manual workers and clerical employees takes membership participation as an important measure of union democracy. Colbjornsen and Olav have proposed two models of democracy in unions representative and participatory and consider participatory model is more realistic than representative due to the membership composition. Sheridan, (1979) trying to understand democracy within Australia's largest metal union, Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) attributed it to the participation of numbers in the affairs of union facilitated by the union constitution and the strong craft tradition. Focusing on this aspect in German context Bayer (1979) emphasizes the participation of structured groups in policy making rather than discrete members which has important implications for union democracy. However,
participation in general, whether of groups or individuals is considered by him as important index of union democracy. This index has also been found useful in the study of democracy in unions in oriental society like Korea. Won and Oh (1983) studied Korean Automobile Transport Workers Union by interviewing 576 union members and could conclude that participation in the internal government of union can be an important index of union democracy. Further Fairbrother (1986), writing about union democracy in Australia concludes that union democracy is a possibility that can only be achieved through active member participation. Even in Indian context, Ramaswamy (1977) and Devaki Devi (1978) found membership participation as an essential condition for democratic control in union organization. Ramaswamy states that political scientists and sociologists studying internal structure of unions have typically concentrated on formal constitutional provisions, elections, office turnover and the existence of structured groups within unions as indicators of union democracy, but there is a need for a theory that stresses the role of membership participation in bringing about union democracy since most of the studies conducted so far have emphasized participation as the most universal index of union democracy. This brings us to the review of specific studies on nature and determinants of membership participation in the internal government of trade unions, which in turn provides justification for participation being taken up as an important index of union democracy in the present study.

The apathy of union members toward the administration and affairs of union has been one of the most widely discussed issues in the study of trade unions in general and union democracy in particular. The earlier general theories of membership participation have given way now to the case studies
and particularly of local or plant unions. Several studies have indicated that there is a gradual trend toward bureaucratization due to the growth in the size of unions and more importantly due to the passive assent of rank and file membership to whatever activities and strategies that are adopted by the union leadership. In a study of Transport and General Workers Union in England, Goldstein (1952) finds the existence of widespread apathy and indifference and the natural oligarchical controls. Though the rank and file participation is not considered as the sole index of democracy in unions, Kovner and Lahne (1953) suggest a more detailed inquiry into what they call as 'Shop Society'.

Most of studies on local unions focus on the factors that may facilitate or retard participation of the rank-and-file members in the affairs of the unions. Miller and Young (1955) report a 'disinterested allegiance' in their study of locals and also suggest that a participation of a minority or non-participation of majority need not however, be taken as an indication of lack of support for democratic administration by the members. Strauss and Sayles (1952) in their study of local unions have discussed the reasons for initial and continued participation and point out that social status of job and work group homogeneity are associated with the extent of membership participation. On the other hand, Herberg (1953) relates this to the changing ethnic composition of union membership and trend toward bureaucratization in the unions. Steele (1951) examines the participation in American Flint Glass Workers Union and Seleman (1945) investigates into the positive and negative implications of union membership participation in negotiations. Eby (1953) suggests an educational programme for members to promote their participation in the union affairs, whereas, Caldwell (1955), calls for action research to deal with membership apathy.
Further, changes in membership composition and also attitude patterns have been found to be associated with membership participation and thereby with the democratic control in union of clothing workers (Shephard, 1949). Strauss and Sayles (1953) and Strauss (1955) have discussed the variables that might be significant in determining attendance of members at union meetings and suggest certain measures to overcome the problem of non-attendance at union meetings. Coleman (1956) considering membership participation as the most compelling form of pressure in union for democracy states that, the extent of participation though not very good in many local union, need not be taken as an index of members lack of interest in union affairs as most of the members want to participate more actively but are unable to do so due to their other domestic and social preoccupations. Even Faunce (1962) in his study of Locals affiliated to UAW took rank and file participation as an index of union bureaucracy and found it associated with the size of unions. Devaki Devi (1978) on the other hand found that participation of members in union affairs is determined by the members' social origin, their level of educational attainment, composition of membership and climate of industrial relations. Further, Rose (1952) studied the participation in a successful and well-integrated union and found that thus participation in union is neither facilitated by hostility toward management nor active participation in union activities on the other hand indicated disloyalty or hostility toward management. Further, Tennenbaum and Kahn (1958) reporting the results of their study based on a questionnaire point out that various social attitudinal and behavioural variables are associated with membership participation in local unions which in turn could be related to the structural characteristics of the unions.
Spinard (1960) summerizing the literature on correlates of trade union participation in American Unions identifies a few variables that appear to be correlated with the said phenomenon. He classifies these variables into three categories, that is, (i) objective conditions of job and residence, (ii) personnel associations, (iii) personal orientations. He also points out that all these factors are inter-related. The objective conditions conducive to union activity are those which encourage personal contact with work colleagues, particularly other active members and those which stimulate relative job satisfaction. The orientations which encourage union participation include the acceptance of work experience as a central life value and the acceptance of the group or the 'working class' or both as a salient reference group. Further, Spinard cells for more systematic research and integrated theory explaining the phenomenon of union participation. But reporting somewhat different findings, Rogow (1968) states that high rates of participation are not found to be a bar to strong centralized leadership control. Further he goes on to state that several dimensions of participation in themselves have centralizing effects. However, participation is found to be significantly influenced by organizational environment and composition of membership. Another important review of literature on membership participation is that of Perline and Lorenz (1970), who based on their review identify three approaches to investigate membership participation in union activities. They are, Individual Characteristics, Group behaviour and Union structure. Thus, participation is viewed as determined by individual characteristics such as, class consciousness, gregarious nature, intensity of association with fellow workers, and union members' off the job life extent of occupational identification, degree of hostility toward management and extent of economic and social rewards received from the job.
Under the group variables, they include extent of homogeneity, physical nature and status of job, level of technology necessary, degree of newcomer orientation into the group and type of primary satisfaction perceived by participation in union activities. Lastly under variables associated with union structure they include type of organization and its leadership, size of union, charismatic qualities of leader and pace of growth of union. Concluding their review they point out that though we know that many of these factors influence participation, our knowledge about interrelationship between them is limited, hence requires further inquiry. Based on his study of 169 union members belonging to four Canadian Government Employee Unions, Anderson (1979) gives an assessment of membership participation. Participation was viewed in terms of involvement in union activities, participation in decision making and amount of influence exerted by them in these. Participation so conceived was tested for its association with independent variables such as attitudes of individuals toward their union and their job, characteristics of job and union role, demographics and other social factors. He found that role characteristics were related to involvement in unions. Further, integration in the union 'occupational community' emerged as central to involvement in union activities and decision making. It was also indicated that members are less likely to participate in the union when they are satisfied with their jobs, as well as their union, but participation increases when an important issue is at stake. He also indicates that those members having a high level of participation often experience or anticipate personal pay off rather than a fulfilment of organizational needs. Colbjornsen (1980) studied an experiment in which new work forms were introduced in two local unions in Norway to examine the conditions favouring greater participation. He found structural dilemmas that limit participation of membership such as the problem of combining
administrative and representative advantages. The union involvement was also found to be dependent on solidarity of orientations of workforce, on-site union organization and the degree to which work caused geographical dispersion. Structural constraints for participation were also reported by Gerardus Van Vliet (1983) in his study of Netherlands union with the help of participant observation and interview. It was found that priority given by union officials to centralized policy objectives and the fear of rank and file independence led to the limited scope for membership participation. Klandermans (1984) on the other hand attempted to apply expectancy-value theory to explain participation in union actions. With the analysis of questionnaire and interview data from Dutch unions he showed that expectancy-value theory accounts for 40 to 60 per cent of variance and changes in willingness to participate, that is, the level of a worker's participation depends on his/her perception of his/her own chances for financial gain or loss through such action.

Examining deterioration of democracy in Norwegian unions through participant observation, Gulowsen (1985) found that the formal attempts to practice democracy in unions may be futile as the local union boards become overloaded with bureaucratic tasks and members are passive and alienated. Supported by the silent majority the leaders can rule without giving the impression of being an oligarchy. This transformation of democracy into 'hearocracy' he attributes to the combination of administrative and political functions in large unions and suggests that for union democracy to be realistic and efficient, there should be a clearer distinction between these two areas of union action. Chacko (1985) drawing from the responses of union members to 1977 Quality of Employment Survey conducted by the Survey Research Centre at the University of Michigan states that
membership participation in union was significantly related to the members' perception of their unions' responsiveness in obtaining extrinsic and intrinsic benefits to them and unions' responsiveness to membership. Whereas, other variables such as members' perception of union power and service and demographic variables such as age, education were found to have weak linkages with membership participation. The present study seeks to ascertain the validity of these findings in Indian context with regard to membership participation in unions.

Having reviewed literature on participation as an index of union democracy and also literature on participation and its determinants we may pass on to consider works on other indexes of union democracy.

Another most important index of union democracy is the existence of party system within unions or at least the structured groups and competition for union offices between these permanent and well organized groups or parties. Lipset (1954) was the first to propose the idea of a two party democracy in trade unions. As a polemic against Michels theory of 'Iron-law of Oligarchy' which considered oligarchy as an inevitable and eventual form of administration in trade unions, Lipset set himself the task of providing proof to the existence of working democracies in trade unions. He succeeded remarkably not only in identifying the indexes of union democracy but even in finding a living example. First he analysed large number of variables affecting the degree of democracy in unions including some 'time-line' factors which occur only at specific points in the history of a trade union and also including social values. A fuller study authored with Trow and Coleman (1956) appeared which provides a more integrated framework of a theory of oligarchy and democracy in union organizations. A two-party system in
the International Typographical Union (ITU), its development, functioning and effects are analysed in this study entitled 'Union Democracy; the Internal Politics of the International Typographical Union'.

This study led to lot of research on indispensability of two party system for union democracy and democratic structure and internal processes in unions. Most of the studies have not found empirical proof to tow-party theory of union democracy. Velentine (1978) presented a major challenge to this theory of union democracy putforth by Lipset and others, through a comparative analysis of the Communication workers, Typographical workers, Oil, Chemical and Atomic workers and the Mine workers before and after. A Miller's leadership. A wide variety of data sources were used in the measurement process including political and judicial records, organizational records and documents, personal interviews, labour publications and popular media. Findings were analysed with statistical techniques most applicable to historical, case study data, including content analysis and descriptive tables. It was found that there is no consistent relationship between internal union democracy and party system on the other hand or democracy industry or society on the other. Further, Bon Porat (1979) studied Histadrut, a voluntary Israeli General Federation of Labour to counter the argument of Lipset and his associates in their theory of Union democracy, that certain democratic procedures are necessary to prevent unions evolving toward oligarchy.

However, there are other works that consider existance of party system or at least structured groups as important index of union democracy for example, Seidman (1953) in his study considers the existence of permanent parties as an important
index of union democracy. Even Lipset and others (1956) believe that the existence of autonomous subgroups, if not structured parties, can be an index of union democracy.

Further, Faunce (1962) states that, it is not mere existence of party system but organized party conflict could be a better index of union democracy. It is not the mere membership being divided into different parties but these parties must be actively engaged in competition and power struggle. Even in Indian context, Ramaswamy (1977) considered existence of structured groups within the unions and the power to administer unions being contested by these groups as indices of union democracy. On the other hand, Bayer (1979) found existence of member group autonomy as a meaningful index of union democracy in the German context.

Another important index of union democracy is the degree to which the leadership is responsive to the needs and aspirations of the members. It means, how well aware are the leaders about the wishes and aspirations of the members and how best they represent them at various levels in industrial relations. This responsiveness may be manifested in diverse types of actions such as recognition of sentiments and interests of the members, voicing members true demands in the industrial relations, non-autocratic fashion of functioning and so forth. Since every union is to be administered, there must be administrators, and feelings, actions and thoughts of these persons vested with the responsibility of administration do matter a lot in patterning the union administration either after oligarchic or democratic model. Thus, it is rightly believed that responsiveness to the membership among the leaders in their thoughts and actions would determine the type of union government. In line with these arguments, leadership
responsiveness to the membership is considered as an important index of union democracy.

Starting from Shephard (1949), one of the earliest studies, we can find leadership responsiveness being considered as an index of union democracy. He states that recognition by officers of the sentiments and interest of diverse groups among the membership as responsiveness of leadership. Seidman (1953) considered responsiveness of leaders to the presumed desires of members as an important index. He states that, the union leaders who are too unresponsive to the wishes of membership and too lax in obtaining economic benefits for the rank and file could be viewed as undemocratic and liable to be voted out of office. So does Coleman (1956) in his study who states that union democracy has both formal and informal aspects. On informal side, it embraces the notion of 'responsive leadership' in which the leaders make sincere efforts to sound out majority opinion on the key issues, present their view points to the members with reasons, avoid obstructing opposing views and finally abide by the majority opinion.

Even Strauss (1956) considers leadership being responsive to membership demand as an important index of union democracy by stating that in his study the unions were democratic to the extent the business agents were forced to be responsive to the desires of membership. Faunce (1962) referring to this states that absence of leadership monopoly of political skills and leadership responsiveness to wishes of the majority are important index of union democracy. He even states that the rank and file participation in union politics and turnover of union leaders are used as indexes of democracy under the assumption that they produce leadership that is more responsive to the wishes of a majority of members. Marcus (1966) on the other hand considers members' influence on the
functioning of union leadership as an index of union democracy. It is like looking at the same problem from the other side, because the strong influence of members can make the leaders responsive to the wishes and aspirations of membership. Handleman (1977) points out leaders being more representative of their members as an important criterion for determining union democracy. Whereas Strauss (1977) emphasizes the attitudes and orientations or rather, their having a democratic ideology that could be taken as an index. An attempt, therefore, is made in this study to employ this index of union democracy and ascertain its utility.

Further, the frequency of conventions, regularity with which the conventions are held, how actively members participate in such conventions, the scope for such participation and to what extent convention is a policy making body, and whether it is the leadership which dominates the proceedings of the convention or the membership, in short, whether convention really serves as an union legislature in the real sense or not has been considered as an important index of union democracy. As such we find a host of studies on conventions, convention frequencies, convention proceedings and so forth. However, it needs to be mentioned here that these conventions are referred to in some countries as General Body meetings which are held at different intervals in different countries. A few of such studies are reviewed here to know the relevance of conventions for union democracy. It also needs to be mentioned here that participation of union membership discussed in the foregoing pages is understood in the context of a convention since a convention or a General Body meeting is the only forum for the membership to participate in the activities and administration of union.
Shephard (1949) referring to this point tried to point out the reasons for poor attendance at union halls and thereby reduce the possibility of a rigorous democracy. He states that partial realization of their drives, existence of other social religious and political associations, heterogeneous composition of work force, have rendered both old and young workers strangers to the union hall and to each other. He further states that company sponsored sports, commercial entertainment and suburban ties replace union involvement of younger workers and older workers are tired to take active part in union meetings. This development in the recent past according to him has led to low attendance at union meetings and a decline in the participatory democracy. Seidman (1953) also opines that as the unions grow older the participation of members as measured by attendance at meetings tends to fall sharply as the members permit their other interests to absorb their free time and it takes a crisis such as a strike to bring the members back to the union hall. Even Strauss and Sayles (1953) in their study of medium sized locals found that the attendance at local meetings ranged from 2 to 8 per cent and in large locals the attendance may be just one percent or even lower. This lack of attendance they believe has made the democracy in unions a difficult thing to achieve. In a later study also Strauss (1956) considers well attended general meetings or conventions as an index of democracy in unions. Tannenbaum (1956) studying control structure in local unions holds that democratic control could be measured in terms of membership participation in both special and regular meetings, and the nature of participation measured in terms of asking questions, initiating issues and seconding motions and so forth. Spinard (1960) too is of the same opinion in his analysis of correlates of union participation. A more detailed analysis of this is attempted by Faunce (1962). He states that the degree of membership control of convention,
nature of debate at conventions, whether and to what extent the convention is a policy making body, and the general level of participation of members in conventions can be taken as important index of union democracy. Frequency of conventions is considered as a specific index of union democracy by Marcus (1966) and the same has been supported by Edelstein (1967) Anderson (1978) Devaki Devi (1978) Ramaswamy (1978) and Fairbrother (1986). In tune with these assumptions, conventions are taken as an index of union democracy in the present study.

Leadership turnover has been another such index of union democracy that has seen widely employed in many studies on union democracy. It is believed that, long tenures of leadership makes the leaders closely cling to the positions of power whereby they monopolize their control over the political machinery of unions, which in turn may allow leaders to become autocratic as well as unresponsive to the wishes and aspirations of the members. Further, high degree of leadership turnover is also taken as an index of keenly contested union elections and the capacity of membership to vote the nonresponsive and inefficient leaders out of office. It also indicates the scope for membership to change the officers at their will, as their representatives to voice their grievances, interests and needs at appropriate time and place in the industrial relations. Referring to this, Shephard (1949: 314) states that long tenure of office may itself be regarded as a threat to democratic control, and from time to time in the history in some unions this threat has been realized. Discussing about democracy in unions, Seidman (1953) states that, whatever the reasons, the fact of low attendance permits a relatively small group of leaders and active members to take control of the union. This low attendance at meetings and elections enables the leaders to take advantage of this as well as of the lack of cohesiveness among those few who
attend to entrench themselves in power being little responsive to members. Whereas, a democratic union would have a high turnover of positions including the top ones (pp. 222-223). Writing about the tendency among the full-time officials to perpetuate in office he states that with their salaries and expense accounts, they enjoy a higher income and standard of life than the factory workers. They wield considerable influence and move in higher social circles attending conferences, meetings, seminars with employers and government officials and civic functions and thus become community figures. They are also in a position to distribute certain favours and have ample time to plan strategy for local meetings and elections. Thus, they have the power to distribute rewards that can help to build a political machine and perpetuate in their office. Thus leaders' monopoly over political machinery and political skill, the incentives of full-time union office and membership apathy, and the combination of conditions such as these permit autocracy to flourish in unions at the cost of democracy (p. 225). Coming to large national unions, he states that, the power to fill jobs in union, to distribute rewards to the faithful and punish the disloyal makes a top leader be in an excellent position to build a political machine which he can use to insure his position in the office. He further states that, in extreme cases the top leaders of national unions maintain themselves in office by even resorting to such methods as not holding conventions or elections for long periods of time. To illustrate this he gives the examples of Tobacco workers International Union in which conventions were not held between 1900 to 1939 (pp. 226-227). By overcoming these things, he believes, union democracy can be achieved. Thus, leadership turnover has been considered as an important index of union democracy in the works of Coleman (1956), Faunce (1962), Ramaswamy (1977), Devaki Devi (1978), Won (1983) Kennedy (1989) and Kanhare (1990). Leadership
Elections are the major mechanisms and tools of democracy. Elections rather represent the most important tool of democracy as it guarantees precedence to the majority opinion and enables unions to have leaders of their choice. As in the political life of a democratic society, elections play an important role in the internal politics of a union, or at least they are supposed to function as mechanisms for selection of leadership. Thus, elections and democracy seem to be inseparable. However, it is not the mere ritual election but how closely contested they are, how meticulously they are conducted, what is the extent and nature of participation by the contenders, and extent of turn out or voting in these elections can be viewed as measures of democracy. Many studies take participation in election as the real participation and take it as an index of union democracy.

Ability of rank and file to displace by means of elections officers who offend their sentiments or fail to advance their interests and having an elected governing body would, according to Shephard, determine the extent of democratic control in unions (1949: 311). He further states that frequent elections for posts of union officers and absence of appointed officers provide a system of checks and balances that promote union democracy (p. 316) Seidman referring to this views elections as a democratic check on autocratic union administration. Unless the periodical elections are held under grossly fraudulent conditions, the administration in power must periodically submit itself to the membership for re-election. He further states that if elections are not held or are conducted in a dishonest fashion, blocks of members can break away from turnover, hence, has been employed as an index of union democracy in the present study.
the union to form a new union or go and join a rival union to reduce the numerical strength of undemocratic unions. Thus elections can be indicative of existence of democracy in unions (1953: 225, 230). Lipset (1954) also considers voting opportunity to replace the unresponsive leaders or to voice members views as indicators of union democracy. Strauss (1956) too suggests that well fought elections could go long way in ensuring democratic structure for the union. Spinard (1960) on the other hand views extent of voting by membership in union elections as a useful index. Faunce (1962) takes participation of all the concerned in union elections and extent of contest and choice of candidates available in elections regularly and if most of them go uncontested then he believes that only frequency and regularity of elections do not serve as useful indexes of union democracy. Edelstein (1967) considers opposition to those in power through elections as an important index. Anderson (1978) on the other hand points out that the closeness with which elections are contested could serve as an index. Similar views are held by Ramaswamy (1977), Devaki Devi (1978), Sheridan (1979), Won (1983) and Kanhare (1989) which warrant the analysis of union elections as indicators of union democracy in the present study.

Another important index of union democracy has been the process of decision making or formulation of union policies. How far the union membership has a say in the policy making and the degree of membership influence on decision making in the unions have been employed as important indexes of union democracy. Seidman (1959) states that determination of policy directly by rank-and-file and power of rank and file to control and modify vital decisions either directly or through pressures on policy making bodies can serve as good indexes of union democracy. Further the capacity of membership to change the
policies they dislike and such other powers in connection with decision making process vested with the membership can serve a useful indices. Lipset (1954) takes participation of members in decision making process and an index. Similar view is also held by Faunce (1962). Craig and Gross (1970) view members' control over shaping their own destiny by means of deciding goals and strategies of their union could be taken as an index. The degree of membership influence on decision making and implementation of them has been considered as an index by Anderson (1978) and Devaki Devi (1978).

Similarly opposition to the positions of power expressed through criticism of functioning has been considered as an index of union democracy. It even includes the recognition of legitimacy of opposition by those in power [Seidmen, 1953], freedom to criticize officers and freedom to express opposing views at meetings [Coleman 1956], existence of some pockets or centres of opposition to power to check its functioning [Lipset, 1956], opposition to policies framed by the union government [Faunce, 1962], opposition to those in power [Edelstein, 1967], right to political protest and also right to be heard [Handelman, 1977] in short, institutionalized opposition to the person in, and positions of, power could as well be taken as an index of union democracy.

Another important index of democracy in unions has been "representativeness" of various bodies, functionaries and even the policies. This includes varieties of bodies and conditions such as an elected governing body [Shephard, 1949], large ratio of administrator to membership or a relatively large administrative component [Raphael, 1967], scope for representation on various organs [Weiss, 1974], representation from various segments of union [Colbjornsen and Olav, 1978],
representation of diverse group interests [Bayer, 1979].

The nature of communication not work, through which information and influence can flow has been considered or an index of union democracy. It refers to maintenance of communication throughout the organization [Shephard, 1949, Lipset, 1954], control of means of communication and information sharing with members by the leaders [Faunce, 1962], that is, communication with grass-roots [Nyolen, 1985] in the union organization that could be used as an index of union democracy.

Democracy has always been equated with decentralization of power, skills and administrative tasks. Centralization of power is understood to be leading to autocratic rule, oligarchic structure, dictatorial leaders and other undemocratic practices. As such, decentralization of decision making process, authority and delegation of responsibilities in the union have been identified as indexes of union democracy. Lipset considers wide distribution of leadership skills and responsibilities in a union as a mark of union democracy (1954). Shephard (1949) also considers division of administrative authority as an index. Michels, the propagator of the 'Iron-law of Oligarchy' too considers that decentralization of power and influence and distribution of administrative roles could be taken as indexes of democratic unionism. Further decentralized and diffused authority structure [Leijnse, 1973, Devaki Devi, 1978, Bayer, 1979] and decentralized participatory policy making system [Fairbrother, 1986] have been employed as indexes of union democracy.

Accountability among leadership that fixes responsibility on them for the actions taken or not taken, that is, for commissions and omissions has also been viewed as an
index of union democracy. The leaders are individually or the administration of the union collectively is held answerable for the successes and failures of unions in achieving the goals and tasks as they are ultimately responsible to the members who elected them to the offices makes sense as no index. The leadership seeking approval of their performance by the membership [Seidman, 1953] or accepting formal accountability [Faunce, 1962, Won, 1983] have been employed as indexes of union democracy.

Finally, persistence or prevalence of majority opinion has been looked upon as an index. The process of democratic functioning ultimately depends on majority opinion or decisions. So are the outcomes of elections and general and special meetings. Since unanimous opinion is not possible in most of the cases democracy depends on the majority opinion. In unions, this is manifested in simple voting at meetings and conventions, occasional referendum that are held on important issues as well as the strike ballot. Thus whether leadership makes a diligent effort to sound out majority opinion on key issues or not [Coleman, 1956] or how often the opinion of the majority comes to prevail and how often and how seriously the referendum are held [Faunce, 1962] could be taken to represent the important indexes of union democracy.

Further, most of the studies, empirical or otherwise, on union democracy have attempted to document the factors that either facilitate or hinder democratic practices in trade unions. Quite diverse factors have been found associated with or are logically presumed to be associated with democracy in unions. As in the case of indices of union democracy, here also a single study may find multiple factors associated with the existence or otherwise of union democracy, or facilitating or retarding union
democracy. A reconciliation between such discrepancies, however, has not been attempted here in this review but the findings of the present study could be viewed in the light of these presumptions.

Organizational structure, organizational climate and other variables associated with union organizations are most frequently discussed factors regulating the level of democracy in trade unions. General environment in the organization which can be sum total of various aspects such as leadership practices, union solidarity, inter group harmony, patterns of communication together could give us a measure of democratic or oligarchic climate in the organization. This according to Seidman (1953) could determine the extent of democracy in the unions. It may also refer to the way the leadership skills are distributed in the organization. Greater the monopoly over leadership skills by smaller number of people, less prone is the union to democratic control [Lipset, 1954]. Devaki Devi refers (1978) to the history of industrial democracy in the plant, which might expose the union members to the ideals and methods of democratic control, as a facilitating factor. This refers to views of Lipset and others (1956) who believed that there can be correspondence between democracy in the industry, and democracy in the larger society on the one hand and union democracy on the other to which they refer as a democratic tradition that runs through. It is the belief that a highly democratic society does not tolerate totally autocratic or oligarchic institutions operating within it. So, the democratic ideals prevailing in the society permeate all institutions including the trade unions. This, however, is challenged by Valentine (1978) stating that industrial democracy, democracy in society may not necessarily guarantee democracy in trade unions. Devaki Devi (1978) further refers to the communication system in
the organization as a factor determining extent of democracy in unions. The unions with open and free flowing communication system, through which information, knowledge is made available to all the members might have high degree of democracy. Strauss (1956) on the other hand considers cohesiveness or degree of membership unity and structural integration as determinants of democracy in unions. Value consensus, class consciousness and harmonious inter-group relations within the union are believed to be having positive implications for union democracy. Membership composition, type of technology being used, the skill structure, informal organization and leadership together according to Perline (1970) could determine the extent of democracy within unions. Sheridan (1979) refers to this as unions internal democratic constitution reflecting democratic structure and democratic ideology.

One important theoretical development that has been viewed with unanimity by scholars in the field of union democracy is the trend toward bureaucratization in unions and its negative implications for union democracy. Bureaucratization in turn again has been attributed to other developments in the union as size, functional complexity, emergence of a well defined system of industrial relations and so forth, whatever may be the reasons of this bureaucratization; but its implications for union democracy has been fairly similar and universal. Anderson (1978) points out that development of bureaucratic structure and procedures lessens the democratic practices in the unions. Similar views have been expressed by Won (1983) Gulowsen (1985) and Maggi (1985).

Various social factors have been indicated as being associated with the extent of union democracy. Under this heading the focus is on demographic and social composition of
the workforce; type of community in which the plant and union are located and so forth. Factors such as social and ethnic composition of the union members, their class background (Shephard, 1949), the type and characteristics of the community from which the union draws its membership, the general social climate in which the union operates (Seidman, 1953), social distance between leaders and members in terms of social status, economic status, educational and skill level (Lipset, 1954), socially rich non-work life and working class identification (Spinard, 1960), class consciousness and intensity of informal association with fellow workers are some of the social factors that have been found influencing the extent of democracy in unions. This emphasizes the fact that unions with socially and ethnically homogenous membership, and those that draw members from a community in which democratic ideals are held in high esteem, unions operating in a climate of equality and liberty, unions in which the difference between social economic educational status of leaders and the members is not much, unions with members having socially rich off-the-job life, unions having members with high degree of working class identification and class consciousness and unions where-in workers have intense informal ties with fellow workers are the unions in which the democratic tradition and practices are believed to be strong.

With regard to size of union as a variable influencing union democracy, there appears to be difference of opinion among the scholars. However, a majority of the studies indicate that small size is almost a precondition or a prerequisite for union democracy either because relationships and contacts between members can be close, personal, face-to-face and first hand and also it is found that contacts between members and leaders can be more frequent and informal. Thus small unions are more likely to be democratic according to Seidman (1953), Strauss (1956), Spinard (1960), Devaki Devi (1978). Philip Marcus
found that large unions convene less frequently than the small unions as such have, to that extent, less scope for being democratic (1960). But Faunce (1962) in his study found that large unions had a structural pattern that suit democratic functioning-better. He oppines that for all the democratic practices and procedures to be meaningful and feasible, a union should have some minimum size below which democracy losess its applicability. An attempt is made in this study to ascertain the implications of union size for union democracy.

Membership apathy is another commonly observed factor that has been observed to reduce the incidence and possibility of union democracy. Mills (1954) points out that membership apathy has been responsible to a considerable degree for the emergence of autocratic leaders who undermine the democratic principles in the governance of unions. The membership apathy may be manifested in abstaining from union meetings, low turnout at union elections, non-review of leadership actions, absence of check on abuse of offices by the leaders, in short, it leads to such practices that can give rise to autocratic or dictatorial type of administration and leadership. These views have been endorsed by the works of Ross (1959) Devaki Devi (1978) and Gulowsen (1985). The very lack of opposition to the existing leadership and absence of challenge or contest in elections caused by membership apathy can prove determinental to union democracy [Mills, 1954].

Type of union is another factor that may be associated with the degree of democracy in unions. Tannenbaum (1956) points out that business unionism, and radical unionism might sacrifice democratic internal regulation to increase their efficiency in terms of material gains and ideological victories respectively. In the business unionism or that is also known as
bread and butter unionism the emphasis is on maximizing material benefits to the worker not-withstanding the means or mechanisms of internal regulation. On the other hand unions wedded with the ideology of radicalism or Marxism have to work like armies, they think they are in battle with the management in which they should master all the fighting force they can to face the management as a strong army and thus scope for democratic ideals or practices are lost sight off. But on the other hand welfare unionism, or humanitarian or philanthropic unionism has the necessary ideals and will to work democratically. This has been highlighted by Mills (1948).

Further, Devaki Devi (1978) and Sheridan (1979) on the other hand state that, it is the craft unions, rather than industrial unions that are more prone to be democratic in their structure and functioning. In support of this we can state that the most democratic union of all the unions studied hither to has been a craft union, namely International Typographical Union, studied by Lipset Trow and Coleman. Two party system, is however considered as one of the most conducive set up for union democracy to develop [Lipset, et al, 1956] though it was not accepted by Valentine (1978).

In consonance with type of unionism, the goals of unions have been understood to be influencing the union democracy Tannenbaum (1956) referring to this point states that those unions that are committed to broad social goals tend to be more democratic than those committed to narrow immediate material goals.

Won (1983) and Fairbrother (1986) are of the opinion that unions would be more democratic if they are assured good amount of autonomy. Self regulation, freedom from external
intervention they consider as preconditions, as such, intervention by other agencies such as federating body, or local community or government [Fairbrother, 1986] reduces the extent of union democracy. Thus, they consider the degree of autonomy that a union enjoys can be a factor significantly determining the extent of democracy.

Another important variable has been the type of industrial relations prevailing in the plant. However, the influence of hostile industrial relations has been understood differently. The general theory of integration would suggest that, external threat or danger from outside breeds unity within and in order to meet the external challenge, all the energies, resources and efforts are pooled and are kept at the disposal of a few people in the leadership positions with little scope for civil rights. Like a nation at war a union operating in hostile industrial relations is expected to work more unitedly and autocratically with members foregoing their democratic rights. Won's findings confirm to this expected pattern when he states that hostile industrial relations reduce extent of democracy in unions. But contrary to this, Tannenbaum (1956) and Perlne (1970) found some sort of positive relationship between degree of hostile industrial relations and the extent of union democracy. However, this paradox could be tested on the basis of findings of the present study.

Reviewed in the foregoing pages are some of the trend studies with a view to ascertain the indices and determinants of union democracy in the light which, the methods and findings of the present study could be viewed. However, what is significant about the present study is that it seeks to combine all the indices used hither to in different studies into one composite index and measure the extent of democracy in the
unions under study. Apart from the studies focusing on indices and determinants of union democracy as mentioned in the beginning of this review, there are some landmarks or classic studies of union democracy. These studies may have already been dealt with in the foregoing discussion on indices and determinants of union democracy, but they deserve independent treatment as case studies or analytical expositions dealing with various theoretical and methodological issues involved in the study of union democracy. An attempt is, therefore, made to review a few important works to get the feel of the subject.

Herbert Shephard (1949) studied Toronto District of Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America in order to ascertain the basis and extent of democratic control within it. The criteria selected by him were: 1. Maintenance of communication throughout the organization, 2. Recognition by officers of the sentiments and interests of diverse groups among the membership and 3. The ability of rank and file to displace, by means of election, officers who offend their sentiments or fail to advance their interests. By this definition, he found a relatively high degree of democracy in general throughout the district. He attributes the persistence of democracy in the said union largely to certain characteristics of the membership and organizational structure. He refers to the policy of decentralization and non-intervention envisaged in the constitution of ACWA which he considers as of crucial importance for the autonomy of the district, and also the constitution's emphasis on democratic procedure of administering through elective governing bodies. An attempt is made to give representation to ethnic and craft groups and biennial elections provide further protection of members' interests. He found that each department has its own committee on which crafts, subcrafts, ethnic, political, sex and age group are represented. Employees grievances are settled by
the shop chairman and foreman or turned over to the business agent for discussion with higher managements. The Joint Board, Supreme governing body for the district consists of three elected representatives from each of the locals. But he opines that inspite of the best opportunities a vigorous democracy can not be achieved within an adequately motivated membership. Thus, in this union the democracy is vigorous because many members are very active in union activities and seek higher status within the hierarchy and rank and file demand continual progress toward the goal of increased earnings (p. 313). He says, structural functional differentiation, flexibility, efficient communication, balance of power between paid and unpaid officers, concentration of ethnic and craft differences, in different locals, pressure groups, frequent elections and such other factors have provided a system of checks and balances to democratic procedures.

Joel Seidman in his two articles (1953, 1959) has tried to identify some of the requirements of union democracy. He accepts the fact that there are some limitations upon democracy in trade unions and explains how it is not abnormal to most organizations, particularly trade unions. He considers the social environment in which unions function as of significant consequences to the democracy within unions (1953; 221). Further, he tries to identify the correlates of membership participation and points out that the age of union, crisis situation, ignorance about parliamentary procedures, age and sex of the members could be related to the extent of participation. He considers the local union of small or moderate size, with not more than several hundred members, all of whom are employed in a single industrial plant as the most democratic. This is the type of union in which membership contacts are intimate and frequent, difference between the leaders and the led is less;
greater leadership turnover as the rewards of office are not great and where leaders can be and tend to be responsive to the membership feelings and interests. Whereas he considers large unions as being intermediate on the democracy scale and large national and international unions out and out oligarchic. He recognizes that though there are the ideal general pictures wide variations are possible, depending mainly upon the role membership can play in each situation. In the later article, he comes to recognize that there are different indexes of union democracy and different unions could be considered as democratic when we apply these indexes. According to one index only small local unions could be democratic and according to other both national and local unions could be democratic and according to some other only a unique union can be democratic. He also points out that, what members desire may not be grass-roots democracy but the better working and living conditions and on this count he feels that many national unions have sacrificed far more than what democracy is worth for the members, particularly due to the fact that unrestrained democracy borders on anarchy just as excessive discipline results in dictatorship. The democracy is achieved if the members will is felt by the leaders and if they can change the leaders if they do not feel the needs of members (1959: 192-193). In concluding his review he states that the state of union democracy, especially at national level, leaves much to be desired. Thus, as requirements of union democracy, it is necessary to allow the opposition groups to be formed and function freely to improve the disciplinary machinery of the union, to reduce power of union heads, to hold regular and frequent local meetings and national conventions, to encourage members to participate freely, to hold elections regularly and systematically and to make entry into union open to all (1959: 198).
George Strauss (1956) has studied the membership control in building trade unions again with a view to ascertain the determinants of democratic practices in them. He states that though the general opinion regards building unions as undemocratic, the thirteen unions that he studied, by ordinary definitions, were democratic. Meetings were well attended when important issues came up and officers' decisions were frequently reversed and the business agents were interested in and responsive to members' demands. He states that in the unions he studied, there was a definite "shop society". The members knew each other, they all had done the same sort of work for years. Based on his observations, he concludes that the locals in building unions he studied were democratic. The degree of membership participation and interest was higher than is common in industrial unions of the same size. Further, he could hypothesize that the effectiveness of the membership controls was to some extent a function of the locals' small size and cohesiveness.

William Faunce (1962) in his rather controversial study of relationship between union size and internal democracy states emphatically that it is the large locals that contribute more to the democratic processes in the national union. Most of the studies till the one under consideration and most ever since have found, that it is the small unions that tend to work more democratically compared to the large ones. Based on data collected from delegates of the 1959 Constitutional Convention of the UAW, he argues that, large unions due to their independence from national office are in a better position to express opposition to the national union. Further, it is the large unions that provide scope for organized party conflict which is an important index of union democracy. He also shows that the proportion of uncontested union elections is likely to be more
small unions, and on the other hand, large unions are more likely to have an active internal political structure with an organized party system. He found that political party system exists in virtually all locals with 4000 or more members but it is found in only one third of the locals with 750 or fewer members. He concludes stating that further research is needed on the variables that determine the effectiveness of different structural arrangement in achieving and sustaining union democracy. In addition to this, a high rate of membership participation, frequent turnover of officers, a two-party political system and frequent constitutional conventions are viewed as procedures and conditions that tend to produce a democratic organization (1967: 379). However, absence of these conditions can not be equated with absence of democracy in unions. Thus there is a need for research designed to discover whether and to what extent the objective of union democracy could be achieved in the pronounced absence of these procedures and conditions [Faunce, 1967], the present study addresses itself to this task of finding out extent of democracy in unions inspite of these conditions.

An article by Devaki Devi (1978) tends to focus on the states of union democracy in Indian context. She first identifies the indexes of democracy by reviewing relevant literature. Nature and quality of participation of union membership, decision making, structure and status in unions, institutionalized opposition, election and voting behaviour and turnover of union officials are identified as indexes of union democracy. Then coming to the practice of union democracy in Indian context she reviews studies on union participation, leadership practices, election behaviour, internal structure and management, involvement in union activities and so forth. On the basis of this she comes to the conclusion that union democracy in India
is not as vigorous as it should be due to membership apathy, centralized paternalistic union structure, structure distance and status gap between the leaders and the membership, gap between the educational status of the two, lack of leadership and administrative skill and knowledge among the membership and heterogeneous membership composition. She however, recommends for intensive studies on democratic process and other related aspects in promotion of union democracy at all levels. And further recommends certain legislative measures to promote internal democracy of union (1978: 76).

Dealing with compulsive pressures for democracy in unions John Coleman (1956) states that inspite of continuous pressures being felt by the leaders scope does exist for undemocratic practices to continue. He tries to draw attention to the continuing pressures in unionism to maintain the appearance of democratic decision making even when bureaucratically made decisions have become almost a rule of the day. He first classifies democratic decision making into two categories, formal and informal. Adherence to constitutional procedures, open access to office, freedom to criticise and due regard for the rights of minority are the formal procedures whereas making sincere effort to sound majority opinion on key issues, presentation and justification of the decisions taken, avoiding obstruction to opposing views, adhering to and fighting for majority opinion are on the informal side.

Finally he concludes by stating that because the democratic ethos is deeply rooted in the labour unions, continuing pressure are felt by their leaders to maintain the form if not the substance of democratic decision making. In those unions, that have long since operated bureaucratically, explanations or diversions are well established to find off any
new pressures toward democracy. In those unions which are in the transition stage from young democracy to older bureaucracy, the pressures for maintaining the forms of democracy are compulsive and troublesome to the leader. His position is made tenable by two realities of union life that is, bureaucratic decision making can apparently be carried on within the framework of a formally democratic organization, and pressures for democratic control of the union are so counter balanced by members apathy and members interest in efficiency in decision making that a minimal degree of democracy will ordinarily satisfy the members (p:526).

Another important study on determinants of union democracy is that of Arnold Tannenbaum [1956]. Highlighting the significance of the study of control structure in unions, he points to the misconceptions and rather nonlogical notions prevailing in the field. He has devised a 'control graph' to explain the extent of control exercised by different statuses in the structure, which he considers a better method as it is both quantitative as well as conceptually meaningful. Based on this 'control graph' he gives four models of control in union structure — 1. The democratic model, in which the curve rises, that is control increases, as one goes down the hierarchy, 2. The autocratic or oligarchic model, in which the curve falls down as one goes down the hierarchy 3. The Laissez Fair or anarchic model in which the curve remains low for all levels in hierarchy and 4. The Polyarchical model, in which the curve remains high for all hierarchical levels. He further refers to two distinct aspects of control in organizations 1. The distribution of control and 2. The total amount of control. The first is represented by the shape of the curve and the second by the average height of the curve. He applies this method and graph to four local industrial unions in Michigan.
On the basis of this, he concludes that membership participation and democratic control are correlated but strong leadership control is not inimical to membership participation. Coming to union ideology expressed in terms of conception of goals, his data suggest that while members of more democratic locals may tend to have a somewhat greater interest in broad and general union goals such as social justice and welfare, they need not be less interested in bread and butter issues. With regard to conflict with management, his findings indicate that while conflict may have bearing on the shape of the control curve, its most predictable effect will be on the average height of this curve which means, conflict may be associated with a high degree of control either by members or by leaders, but it will almost be invariably associated with an increase in total control.

A theoretical framework for the analysis of the internal structure of union organizations has been proposed in the article by Lipset (1954) who focuses on the characteristics of union members, structural features and inherent components of large-scale organizations and the adaptation that union has to make with the components of the industrial environment in which it operates. Summer (1952) who equates democracy to the sum total of rights guaranteed to the individual members points out why union democracy is to be protected and what aspects of unions need to be taken care of to safeguard democracy. Diverse views have been expressed trying to conceptualize democracy in the context of unions but all these views seem to converge in emphasizing the democratic rights of rank and file, opportunities to safeguard these rights and opportunity to oppose undemocratic practices. A democratic government is defined as the on in which members freely act from time to time to represent their will in accordance with the established
procedure, have the right to appoint or recall the leaders and to enact or revoke the laws by which the union is governed [Field 1951]. Miller and Young (1955) stress respect for individual member of the organization and an opportunity to all to express opinions, to be heard and to have their demands acted upon by their officers as indicators of union democracy.

Case studies of particular union have become common of late. The case studies have shown trend towards both centralization and democratization. One such classic has been that from Lipset and others (1956) aimed at analysing democracy in International Typographical Union which is reviewed in detail in subsequent pages. Fisher and McConnel (1954) have studied the same union analysing the political attitudes and found that all democratic devices involve recognition of conflict.

Changing power structure and problem of administration have been the main themes of many studies [Marsh, 1948; Taft, 1949; Barbash, 1952]. British Labour Unions, their government, administrative practices, internal structure and constitutions have been analysed by Allen (1954), Roberts (1956), Reiner (1978), Radice (1978).

Reynold observed that 'The structure of management is quite different from that of a political organization such as the trade union, where authority flows from the bottom of the structure toward the top'. The union is generally far more democratic than the average factory organization. The presence of the union forces management to alter its traditionally, hierarchical and autocratic character, [Reynolds, 1979: 270]. Union leaders are 'not the boss', cannot give orders as can management, and are responsible to those below them to an extent no management is.
A union is enough of a fighting organization to justify the use of a military analogy, yet it possesses, at least formally, a democratic structure that makes leaders dependent on the continued approval of the membership and subject to replacement if policies prove too unpopular. A number of national union heads, to be sure, are so strongly entrenched that they can disregard the niceties of democratic procedure and retain office as long as they produce some benefits for their membership. In some extreme cases democratic forms have been simply eliminated, as in the election of Joseph P. Ryan as president for life of the International Longshoremen's Association [Seidman, 1954: 110]. In his desire to retain office the leader is aided unwittingly by the very large proportion of union members who do not participate actively in union affairs [Seidman, 1954: 110-111].

The democratic procedures in union are also viewed as mechanisms that bring about institutionalization of internal conflict in the unions [Fisher and McConnell, 1954: 134]. These procedures include such techniques as separation of powers, regular elections, referendum, freedom of speech and so on. Further one of the means by which an organization keeps internal conflict within meaningful limits is the competitive party system. Though there are many devices through which it is envisaged theoretically that the antidemocratic tendencies could be checked, regularized party competition alone has been found really effective. This party competition, however, serves no purpose unless many of the standard devices of democracy, such as free elections, freedom of speech, leadership accountability and freedom of assembly are well secured. Yet it is increasingly true that the effectiveness of these devices is badly impaired without the additional feature of a competitive party system [Fisher and McConnell, 1954: 134].
As we turn to voluntary associations, we are beset with the question of whether a competitive party system is possible. This is more so because the internal differences or latent conflicts are minimized due to its homogeneous membership, rendering the prospect of developing a regularized and institutionalized party system weak. Since the membership of a trade-union shares the same fundamental interest and belief, factional opposition, or development of internal differences along with which opposition, or development of internal differences along with which opposition parties may be formed are extremely scarce. Lacking these differences of principles and interests, the unions are abandoned to the iron-law of oligarchy and as such become undemocratic. How good is this argument? Are trade unions inevitably given over to oligarchy? It is necessarily one party system? If it can be shown that a competitive party system is possible within a trade union then the argument is disproved. Empirically it may be true that the overwhelming majority of trade unions exemplify the iron law of oligarchy. Nevertheless, if the law is not in fact inevitable, then it may not be necessary no matter how adverse the statistics may appear.

The International Typographical Union [ITU] has a fully developed two party system. This union, the oldest of the national unions, has a record of strength and success that is surpassed by few labour organizations in the world. This is true by almost any test which we may wish to apply. The rates of pay and hours of work which its members enjoy are among the best and most favourable in the United States. The leading historians of the American labour movement singled out this union even as the one having the most complete job control of all the existing unions in the world [Perlman and Taft, 1935: 51]. The ITU has provided leadership and impetus to the transformation of the American labour movement which rose out
of industrial unionism in the thirties, although in its own
development it has moved in the opposite direction. This record
has not been achieved through any policy of collusion with
employers. On the whole, the ITU has enjoyed generally peaceful
relations with employers. The real achievement of ITU, however,
is the practical demonstration of democratic method which it
offers to private organizations or trade-unions. There are many
special features in the governmental structure of the union, and
most of them are important to the democratic character of the
organization.

1) Elections to national office are regularly held every
two years, with vote by the general membership, not
by convention delegates.

2) There are carefully drawn provisions to insure honesty
in elections.

3) Freedom of speech and expression is not only
permitted but made effective by guarantee of space in
the official journal for dissent and criticism of the
leadership.

4) This is supplemented by a practice of printing
irregular publications about union affairs by various
groups in the union.

5) The union has a system of law which has developed
out of long experience. This is contained in its
constitution, by-laws and general laws.

6) Conventions are annual by law.

7) There is an effective system of regular and detailed
accounting of union funds.

8) There are provisions for initiative and referendum.

It is inconceivable that ITU democracy would have the
same meaning without these provisions. However, these devices
do occur in the governmental systems of other unions but without
the same results. What gives them real effect in the ITU is the
union's unique two-party system. The system consists of two formal parties, the Independent and the Progressive. These parties carry on organized campaigns in the biennial elections for international office and in the elections of the larger locals. The election is taken seriously and the contest is always real. The other occasions on which the party conflict is visible are the annual conventions and the periods of divided control in the Executive Council. There have been protracted divisions in the Council, the most serious of which have occurred when one party carried the post of president and the other the post of Secretary-Treasurer. When this condition prevailed, there has been intense conflict between the parties.

The analysis of this party system in ITU is the focus of interest for many students of organization and trade unions, however, these explanations of a competitive party system are inadequate.

A union is not only part of a movement. Internally it is a political organization. It uses meetings and votes.

Iron Law of Oligarchy: Michels wrote "It is organization which gives birth to the domination of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandates, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization says oligarchy" [Michels, 1914: 401]. But unions are centralized to meet the needs of the huge organizations, not to expand the powers of the leaders.

The workers' representatives are highly responsible to their constituents at lower levels where individual personality is not submerged. Studies of four Michigan local unions showed that three-fourths of the union members interviewed believed that membership as a whole, and not the leadership, holds decisive
strike power. The key to membership control, the members felt, was their power to ractify agreements and elect officers. At the top while a union leader is frequently pictured as running a one man show, the very strongest of leaders is part of a leadership group to which he is responsible. Where strong leaders seek to rule dictatorially, they have to use force and they do not survive for long [Lipset et al, 1956: 11-12].

The union structure is a mixture of bureaucratic and democratic elements. But democratic government is not always 'good' in terms of effectiveness. Well run unions like the Amalgamated clothing workers and United Steel Workers have fine records of economic returns to membership, responsibility, financial integrity, excellent community positions, but they cannot be considered democratic in internal affairs although they are more democratic than management. Unions probably hold more meetings and conduct more votes than any other voluntary organizations. Their members may appear to be apathetic but this may be due to contentment.

But the basic question still remains concerning the degree to which the union movement as a whole is democratic. To what extent do all these tendencies toward long tenure, centralized power and the pathologies of bureaucracy destroy the democratic character of union? These are some of the assumptions and questions that need empirical validation in specific cultural contexts. An attempts is, hence, made in this study to focus on these issues in the context of Indian unionism.

Turning to the issue of union democracy in more recent times, it needs no proof that what is practiced does not always confirm to theory or put in other way, what is on paper, in constitution is not put into practice. This may be
attributed, apart from other things, to the emergence of a new profession that of a trade union leader. It is believed to have undoubtedly made a big difference for the democratic character of the trade union organization [Flanders, 1968: 46]. It also has been contemplated that the stress on union democracy has made the union leaders weak due to lot of checks and balances they have to face in functioning and delivering the goods [Radice, 1978: 82]. There has been a change in the conditions in which they have to work, they can no longer issue orders or commands and expect them to be obeyed automatically they have to, on the other hand, persuade and win the confidence and consent of the members. This in itself may indicate the existence and influence of democracy on the union functioning. The current criticism for the lack of democracy in unions has a long history and the most vehement criticism came from Michels quoted earlier. This criticism though considered as representing an extreme situation is not without living examples even today.

Giles Radice (1978) believes that, Michels' criticism might apply with more ease to the British unions as officials have taken much of the decision making power into their own hands, once elected the General Secretaries have managed to remain in office till they retire, collective bargaining at plant, local and national level has resulted in a great deal of power being wielded by the union officials, instead of being elected, officers in many unions are appointed, and once in office they manage to get hold of the advantages that go with it in contesting elections and the emergence of professional trade union official has had for reaching implications for the union democracy. Though in most union constitution and rule book serve as check on arbitrary authority of the leaders and state that membership is supreme, the reality is different from this ideal. Participation in union activities and elections is considerably low. Power of
conventions are limited and most of them are too less frequent, and even when held annually or more frequent, they determine only the broad outlines, of the policy. Thus what Michels considered as a rule rather than exception could apply to some extent, to the British Unions [Redice, 1978: 166-167].

Inspite of these characteristics, there can be a working democracy because of the very nature of union structure as Cleggs envisages. He surveyed trade union government and concluded that, the British trade unions are not autocracies as members have different channels through which they can exert influence on the leaders and through that on the policy making and governing of the unions. He considers the existence and factions and structured rival groups, separation and decentralization of power, and periodical election as the checks on autocratic behaviour and arbitrariness of the leaders.

In nearly all unions, there are channels through which opposition can be expressed and there are persons who can use these channels. There are, in union where leadership is deeply entrenched, members who can throw challenge to their leaders. There are also other powerful checks on the top authority in most unions through separation and division of power into different representative units. The most important check on trade union leadership, however, is the increase in shopfloor power, which might lead to the members acting independently if they feel their interests are not being represented properly and the very possibility that they might act independently exerts considerable amount of influence on the leaders. Due to this Radice states that the pessimistic accounts of union democracy could be considered as being over-concerned with formal mechanisms and ignoring the realities of trade union power. According to him, the priority is given today not to devising new
constraints on the arbitrary use of power by the leaders but to devising new ways of increasing shopfloor involvement and influence in trade union decision making, so that trade union leaders, not only provide effective leadership but also remain responsive to the membership at the same time [Radice, 1978: 169]. The tasks and styles of a union leaders today are much different from those of past because of the spread of democratic ethos. They now cannot control or command but persuade and involve himself in decision making 'with' the officers not 'for' them. However, this has not reduced their role in the contemporary unionism. They are as indespensable for unionism today as they ever have been. It is the changing situations themselves that are making the leaders more responsive. The trade unions have realized that they have to some how find the ways of involving their members and their representatives in the activities of unions as the influence of the rank-and-file at shop level has increased and they can no longer be mere spectators to the union drama. The unions had to build new machinery to bring the members and leadership together and make negotiating bodies more responsive. One important step toward this goal is to incorporate views of shopfloor workers and this is possible when trade union education reaches grass roots membership and the members are made aware of the advantages of internal democracy of unions. This can also be achieved through referring back the negotiated settlements for the approval of the membership, making union conferences and conventions more representative; frequent balloting of members; and by making unions internal communication system more effective and open. All these together it is believed, can safeguard and further union democracy which is likely to become a value in itself. These are some of the steps envisaged based on the careful review of literature and need to be supported by the findings of the present study.
Indian Trade Unionism

Empirical works on Indian industrial relations in general and trade unionism in particular are very sparse [Thakur, 1976]. Indian social scientists have failed to give due attention to this important area of scientific inquiry. It is lacking in quality and quantity and is beset with out-dated theories and whimsical presumption [Sheth, 1977]. A few efforts have been made in the recent past to portray empirically the structural and functional realities pertaining to unionism in Indian context. However, not many of them are worth a critical review here. Thus, an attempt is made here to review only a few of these works with a view to give a bird's eye view of Indian unionism as well as to provide a bibliographic account of unionism in India.

There are a couple of good historical accounts of Indian union movement dealing with emergence and growth of unions in its early period [Punekar, 1948; Agrawal, 1956; Mathur and Mathur, 1957; Ornati, 1957; Karnik, 1960; Ghosh, 1960; Sharma, 1963; Mathur, 1964; Johri, 1967; Sheth, 1968]. Most of these studies seem to agree that Indian trade union movement has passed through different stages, that is, the Philanthropic Stage (1875—1917), the Political Unionism (1918—1946), the Post Independence Stage, (1947—onwards). During the first stage, there was realization that, the Indian working class had its own peculiar problems and legislation in force then was not suited to solve these problems as it was alien in origin and redundant in practice. The early part of this period was characterized by absence of class consciousness. The early trade union leaders were social workers desirous to serve their society and community through amelioration of working class. Under such circumstances, labour movement could not tackle effectively some of the most pressing economic and social problems affecting the workers.
However in the early part of 20th century the class consciousness began to appear among working masses and expression of collective discontent and resentment of unjust treatment became more common. In the stage of political unionism, the sense of solidarity among workers had increased but, it was based on caste and political affiliation rather than on class consciousness among the proletarians. The factors that facilitated a more sound unionism during this period were, unfulfilled expectations, triumph of Russian Revolution, Independence movement, Establishment of ILO, Establishment of AITUC and the Second World War. It was during this period that the historical Ahmedabad Strike occurred which brought Gandhiji into union movement, which ultimately brought union movement and politics much closer than ever.

The third stage has seen hard core, business like and mature unionism. Hardships brought about by World War-II, and rapid industrialization after independence and democratic and secular constitution that was adopted were the three factors that determined the patterns of unionism that we find today. The present day unionism is characterized by multiple unions, finances and so forth [Ghosh, 1960; John, 1967; Gladstone, 1980; Verma and Mookharjee, 1982]. However, the development of a compatible inside or professional leadership of unions, as found with European and American movements, is yet to develop. The union leadership does not have necessary skill nor organizing aptitude to carryout union activities in a professional manner [Form, 1974]. Indian working class is considered as the one which is yet to learn to benefit from collective representation. As such, Sharma (1983) opines that the Indian working class could benefit from the example of Polish Solidarity movement, which fought for the rights of the working class in the face of severely repressive police state. On the other hand, Pathy (1983)
writing about the unionism sans ideology in most of the third world countries states that the Marxist theory of trade unions as agents of revolution finds little evidence here as the bourgeoisies of imperialist power have been able to sanction concessions to their working classes utilizing the huge profits of colonialism restricting workers to bread and butter unionism. The workers in the third world though receive meagre wages and concessions, compared to industrial workers elsewhere, occupy a privileged position. Even most of the union federations pursue essentially economic goals rather than ideological ones. The revolutionary struggles are supported by the individual workers with trade unions taking hardly any part in it.

Having reviewed works on the genesis and growth as well as recent trends of unionism in India, we may pass on to consider works that deal with political allegiance of Indian trade unions. Labour movements in most of the excolonial nations of Asia and Africa are characterized by strong political influences and the existence of intimate links between labour organizations and political parties [Ghosh, 1960; Millen, 1963; Pattabhi Raman, 1967]. The very circumstances which gave rise to union movement and the type of socio-political milieu that was found during major part of its development, many studies have considered it but natural for Indian trade unions to be deeply involved in national political life. Unions, according to Kearney (1971) are among the few relatively coherent, organized voluntary associations with mass membership based on occupational interests they have been responsible for the political socialization as well as recruitment of urban industrial workers. These unions normally serve as an auxiliary to the political parties. This intimacy between unions and parties is to a large extent due to the presence of party activists as outside leaders in the unions. This relationship is further strengthened by the intervention of
state in the industrial relations and expanding role of government as an employer. Based on the type of interaction with political parties, unions can be classified as party-sponsored, party-oriented and uncommitted trade unions [Kearney, 1971]. This political affiliation of Indian trade unions has been well documented in the works of Crouch (1966), Kannappan and others (1967), Vaid (1968), Nanda (1968), Ramaswamy (1971). Agarwal (1972) in his account of political dimensions of Indian trade unions states that, unions being one of the largest organized groups play a significant role in the interplay of political forces in the modern democratic societies (p. 58). And this link between political parties and unions is perpetuated whether rank and file approves it or not [Pattabhi Raman, 1967: 30]. Thus the union have to late become labour wings of the political parties [Crouch, 1979].

Coming to the white-collar unionism, one can observe phenomenal increase in the size of white-collar employees during the decade of 1951-1960 and the resultant growth in unionism. This growth has been attributed to tremendous increase in the number of white-collar jobs in industries as well as a phenomenal growth of industries themselves coupled with an unprecedented increase in the size of workforce associated with banks, insurance offices, commercial and business establishments and also increase in governmental and semi-government offices and service establishments. As a natural consequence of this, the recent times have observed tremendous growth in white-collar unionism. Unionism in whole scale and retail trade has registered about 250 percent increase. Insurance and banking sectors have registered 30 percent increase in unionization during the last 10-15 years [Goyal, 1968]. Looking at this trend we can predict a very high rate of unionization among white-collar workers in the future. However, the first attempt to study Indian white-collar unionism
was made by Panakal (1952) who tried to explore the nature, extent and factors facilitating or hindering white-collar unionism in Indian context. He considers middle-class employees, at least at the time of his study, not all that favourably disposed toward unionism due to considerations of status and middle class ideology. However, he too viewed the future of white-collar union to be bright leading to the rise of a strong movement. Goyal's study (1968) which found that the unionism is to the extent of 80 percent in selected white-collar occupations, proves this fact. Goyal considers growth in the number of white-collar employees, rising cost of living, pay disparity and the feeling of being under paid as well as need for job security as the factors chiefly responsible for growth in white-collar unionism. Mathur and Papola (1968) on the other hand, explain increase in the white-collar unionism as a consequence of their knowledge about the gains of blue-collar unionism and increasing desperation in their working lives, eroding status of their occupations. In short, the drive to organize stems from their dissatisfaction with existing socio-economic and political conditions. Inspite of such a rapid growth, the white-collar unionism according to him lack professional, full time leaders and militancy, but are lead by the part-time inside leaders. Similarly, Mitra (1968) emphasized the economic factors such as absence of uniform salaries, allowances, increased rationalization, mechanization and automation, decline in real income in the light of sharp rise in prices, are responsible for the growth of white-collar unionism. But he views white-collar unions as characterized by large size and active militancy. However, a few non-economic factors responsible for white-collar unionism as identified by him are increasing bureaucratic formality, their indispensability in the process of governing, shrinking promotion prospects, ill-treatment by the management and political influence they can wield if organized. Even Punekar's survey (1971) of white-collar unions reveals that
though the white-collar unionism is of recent origin, that is, in between 1950-60, some white-collar occupations have reached as high a degree of unionization as 80 to 100 percent. Further, Pandey (1968) analyzing the changes in the strategies of white-collar unions do not hesitate to take recourse to the methods of blue-collar unions, that is, direct action or strike to achieve their demands. Further he states that though they use political pressures in seeking advantages in bargaining, they do not identify themselves closely with any political party. In addition to these studies, mostly on clerical workers, there are two important studies of officers' unions. The first one is the study of unionism among bank officers by Dayal and Sharma (1971). They identify a fundamental difference between clerical unions and unions of officers. That is, unlike clerical unions, the officers' unions are not formally recognized by the management, thus, the negotiations between officers unions and management tend to be more informal in nature as compared to negotiations between other white-collar unions and their respective managements. Another recent study of bank officers' union is by Usha Kanhare (1987). She focuses her attention on the factors responsible for the growth of managerial unions, their organizational features, leadership and membership participation in the affairs of the unions. The findings based on the study of four bank officers' associations reveal that the members join the association not purely for economic reasons, and union activists seem to derive not instrumental but intrinsic satisfaction from their involvement in union activities. Coming to the structural features, she states that the unions studied successfully meet many criteria of union democracy including the formal structure, decision making process, the choice of union goals, recruitment of leaders, extent of membership participation in union affairs, and so forth (p: 190).
Inspite of these important works, this vital area of industrial relations in India continues to be under research. Studies probing into the structural features and structural determinants of union functioning are far from being adequate, stressing the need for studies on structural and functional aspects of white-collar unionism, especially with regard to India, which the present study seeks to fulfil.

In addition to these studies on political unionism and white-collar unionism there are micro-level area studies that focus on unionism in different regional contexts. An important among these are textile unionism at Bombay [Kulkarni, 1946]; factory unionism in Gujarat [Sheth, 1960], textile unionism at Kanpur [Pande, 1960], unionism in Rajasthan [Vaid, 1962], unionism at Poona [Lambert, 1963], unionism among dock workers at Calcutta and Bombay [Bogaert, 1970], unionism at Bangalore [Holmstrom, 1976] and Karnataka [Patil, 1976; Aziz, 1978], unionism at Coimbatore [Ramaswamy, 1977], unionism at Dhanbad [Shrivastave, 1979], unionism at Calcutta [Bose, 1979], unionism at Jamshedpur [Mankotham, 1982] and unionism at Bombay [Bhattacharjee, 1988].

Coming to studies on trade union leadership in India, work of Punekar and Madhuri (1967) merits attention as one of the very first and a more detailed account of union leadership in Indian context, though Punekar (1958) had studied outside leadership of unions at Bombay even earlier. Punekar (1958) had studied outside leadership of unions at Bombay even earlier. Punekar and Madhuri studied a sample of 360 union leaders, Presidents and General Secretaries belonging to 176 unions drawn from the states of Maharashtra, Gujarat, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. They found that, union leaders to be of the medium age of 40 and 33 percent of them being outsiders. They also
studied the attitudes of union leaders toward various components of industrial milieu, compensation from union work, reaction of family members toward respondents' union involvement and so forth. One more detailed study of trade union leadership [ Hiremath, 1989] conducted recently in the state of Karnataka deals with the role of union leadership in the system of industrial relations. In addition to this main objective, the study also probes into the social origins, attitudes and orientations, union career of the leaders the nature and extent of political involvement, affiliation patterns, their strategies for industrial peace. And on the basis of these informations an attempt is made to portray the emerging patterns of union leadership in this part of the country and to see whether a typology of union leadership based on these emerging patterns is possible. The study reveals that union leaders in this context are younger (36.31 years median age) than the Punekar and MADHURI sample (40 years median age). Over 90 (91.32) percent are the inside leaders with 70 (71.48) percent coming from 'low' social origins. As many as 60 (59.67) percent of the union leaders studied have favourable attitudes toward management whereas only 22 percent of them have favourable attitudes toward government. The study also reveals that the role played by union leaders in the system of industrial relations in the function of numerous other variables such as type of union career, political affiliation, insider-outsider status and so forth. It is also revealed that most of the leaders consider voluntary and bipartite methods as not only ideal but also effective methods in resolving industrial disputes. The final section of the work deals with typology of union leadership. The leaders studied are divided into three categories as the Union Boss, the Plant leader and the Neophyte, depending upon their role in the union organization, the system of industrial relations, the political parties and their other background variables. Apart from these
works, there are hardly any empirical studies that need to be reviewed in detail here. However, there are a few brief empirical attempts to study union leadership in the works of Das (1967), Sheth and Jain (1968a, 1968b) Jaspal Singh (1970, 1971) Reindorp (1971), Ramaswamy (1974), Agarwal (1976), Krishnan (1977), Vaidya (1978), Chaudhary (1980).

As mentioned in the statement of problem, empirical studies on internal structure of trade union organizations are very sparse. It may be noted here that sociology of organizations has not developed as an area of specialization and has not been recognized as an independent branch in academic circles as in the case of Western societies. Sociology of organization has not been taught as an independent course in many universities. This might have contributed to the lack of academic interest in the study of trade unions as one brand of organizations and also in the study of their internal structure and functioning as well as participation of union membership in the affairs of trade unions.

There are only couple of works worth mentioning on the structure and membership participation among Indian unions. For example, Ramaswamy (1977b) in his study of unions in South India states that membership participation can be taken as an index of union democracy though a definite theory of union democracy has not been possible. Further, investigation into the structure and functioning of Indian unions Devaki Devi (1978) reveals that low membership participation, centralized, top level decision making and presence of a large status gap between the leadership and the membership are the main reasons for the lack of democracy in the administration of unions. Similar findings have been reported earlier by Sheth (1969). However, Sinha (1981) in his study of decision making process in the steel workers' association at Bokaro found that decisions are normally made in the general
meetings except in unavoidable situations and even membership was generally satisfied with the unions decisions. Further, Sinha concludes his work by stating that whatever be the local differences unions are democratic organisations, in so far as decision making process is concerned. Other than these studies, works of Ghosh (1965), Munsen (1970) and Dayal and Sharma (1976) do focus on the structure, functioning and management of trade unions in India. However, it is evident from the review that empirical studies focusing on internal structure and functioning of unions and studies aimed at ascertaining the indices, extent and determinant of democracy in Indian unions are extremely sparse. Hence, the significance of the present study lies in the fact that it purports to throw empirical light on these rather unexplored areas of union government in Indian context.

In concluding this chapter, it could be stated that in view of the richness of literature available, the present review, though exhaustive, is by no means complete. However, due to the limitations of space inherent to a doctoral thesis such as this, many more studies which otherwise would have found a place in this review, have not been reviewed. Nevertheless, it is believed that the literature reviewed in the foregoing pages would provide not only necessary insights into the subject under investigation but also would provide a necessary backdrop in the context of which the findings of the present study while becoming more meaningful find a place in the integrated body of knowledge.