Chapter Three

REPERCUSSION OF RELIGIOUS POLICY
AT MADRAS
The East India Company retained its commercial attitude towards India till the last decades of eighteenth century. The imperial motives and policy gradually entered Indian affairs from the time of Pitt and Dundas. The Directors, shareholders, politicians and statesmen did not favour propagation of Christianity in India, as it might 'injure the Empire in India'. Ilbert Courtney observed that on the advent of missionaries "one discerns the planter following in the wake of missionary, each watched with a jealous eye by the Company's servant".

The great Missionary renaissance began in England about 1795. Evangelicals, who came in contact with Indians became interested in their welfare. They considered the only 'way of promoting native welfare was to convert them to Christianity'. Charles Grant denounced moral and social conditions of Indians; he considered them to be due to ignorance. The only way of removing ignorance was English education and conversion to Christianity. "The cure of darkness is light", so Grant and his friends strove to introduce Christianity in India.

1. Bearce, British Attitudes Towards India, pp.34, 51, 60.
2. Cambridge History of British Empire, p.212.
Henry Dundas, the imperialist statesman, was influenced by the majority of Directors and Proprietors, who were against change in religious policy of the Company. He did not incorporate provisions for encouragement and propagation of Christianity in the Charter Act of 1793.

The Missionaries took up this challenge. Grant and Parry sent Evangelical clergymen, Claudius Buchanan and Henry Martin, to India. Buchanan encouraged Missionary zeal amongst the clergy and British officials of the Company.

The Government of Madras gave facilities to the Missionaries. William Bentinck and other English officials encouraged conversion of Indians to Christianity at Madras. In matters of administration also this fanaticism crept in. Reforms were required in the military administration of the Madras Presidency. John Craddock, with the concurrence of Bentinck, made certain innovations in Turban and appearance of Sepoys at Madras, which gave them the look of a Christian. This was the main cause of Sepoy Mutiny at Vellore.

1. Ibid., 159.
State of Indian Sepoys in the Madras Army

The contingents of Indian Sepoys in the British army were well known for their faithfulness and loyalty towards their masters. It had been found that even in major military disasters and distressing fatigues, they had maintained an attitude of unflinching loyalty towards their masters. During war time they were unpaid for more than fifteen months, almost without clothing and a very scanty allowance of food. They suffered all the hardships without complaint. These soldiers rejected the tempting offers from the opposite camp of enemy, i.e., Tipu Sultan.

It had always been the policy of the East India Company to respect the religious sentiments, customs and usages of Indians. In the administration of military also this factor had been kept in view. There has been a change in religious policy at Madras on account of directions from the Chairman Grant and Deputy Chairman Parry for providing greater facilities to clergy. In order to anglicize Indians, innovations were made in the existing mode of appearance.

1. Secret Consultations. Year 1806, Serial No. 20, G.N. 640, Minutes of William Petrie, Member of the Council 17th July, 1806.
Change in Turban pattern

Sir John Craddock took over charge as Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Presidency in 1804; he found that the discipline in the army was lax. The regulations were not strictly enforced. In order to create better conditions, he undertook the task of overhauling the military system. At that time he lost sight of the part played by special consideration given to Indian customs and usages, and was influenced by ideas of anglicization.

In November, 1805, Fred Pierce, the Deputy Adjutant General, attempted to improve the turban, worn by Indian sepoys, with the approval of the Commander-in-Chief. In the presence of Adjutant General Col. Agnew and the Commander-in-Chief, three different patterns of turbans were worn by men of 2nd battalion, 14th regiment. Craddock personally ascertained the extreme lightness of the turban by holding the old one in one hand and the new one in another. The new turban was cheaper, fitted firmly on the head, and imparted a smart appearance from the military point of view. It was approved by the Commander-in-Chief and prescribed as the Uniform Turban.

In January 1806, John Craddock felt the necessity of compiling all the existing military orders, in order to enforce them in letter as well as spirit. In March, 1806, he submitted to the Military Board the necessity for a general review of several orders and regulations of military system. At that time he had only contemplated to enforce those orders which had already been sanctioned by the Government.

In order to enforce strict discipline in the army, Craddock directed a change in the general appearance of the sepoys. They were forbidden to wear caste marks on their foreheads and wearing of earrings at the time of duty and parade. The orders stressed uniformity in the shape of moustache and clean shaving of the chin.

Disaffection among the Sepoys

The sepoys who, in the face of terrible defeats of the army, had remained steadfast in their loyalty to the British were now perturbed. The encroachment on their

1. Ibid., Minutes of William Bentinck, dated 25th July 1806, pp.1110-12, Secret.

2. Ibid., p.847. Extract from a Code of Military Regulation. "It is ordered by the regulations that a native soldier shall not mark his face to denote his caste or wear earrings when dressed in uniform, it is further directed that all parades and upon all duties every soldier of the Battalion should be cleanshaved on the chin. It is directed also that uniformity shall as far as practicable be preserved in regard to the quantity and the shape of hair on upper lip".
religion and sacred customs provoked great discontentment. They were bewildered at the new policy of the Government in anglicising Indians. A fear had gripped their minds at increasing missionary activity that the British were intent on converting them to Christianity. Political servility they did not mind, but an outrage on their ancient customs, sanctity of castes and outer appearance was reprehensible to them. They felt that

"They (English) first take away the external marks of our caste and religious distinctions, they then desire to change our dress and to assimilate the turban to cap of the Portuguese Drummer. They mean next to make us Christians". 1

Apart from the change in turban, the Code of Regimental orders unambiguously affected the most sacred and universal Hindu customs. The sepoys were justified in their feelings of confusion, disaffection and alarm. It was the duty of Government in consonance with justice and policy to give complete satisfaction to sepoys on social and religious aspects.

On receiving intelligence of unrest and disaffection in the army due to new regulations, Craddock committed a great blunder. He should have revoked reprehensive orders, to quieten the fears of general conversion to

1. Ibid., p.896.
Christianity, and given assurance for safeguarding their customs and usages. Instead he ordered an enquiry into existing grievances and disaffection. On enquiry it was found out from the testimony of Indians of highest castes that the opposition to the new turban was without any foundation. Now, Craddock awarded punishment to the chief instigators in order to impress upon the soldiers the futility of opposition to military orders.

These punishments did not instill enough fear in the minds of sepoys. There was general opposition to new orders, which encroached upon ancient customs and usages, which were highly valued by Indian sepoys.

The sons of Tipu Sultan, who were interned at the Fort of Vellore, lamenting as they did their loss of power, sought to make capital out of this unrest with the object of escaping from the English custody and reoccupying Mysore.

1. Ibid. Letter from Bentinck to Craddock dated 4th July 1806, p.808. The Governor-in-Council pointed to the Commander-in-Chief that "in present case it appears after the strictest enquiry and according to the testimony of the Native highest caste that the opposition which have been experienced in the late change of turbans is destitute of any foundation, in either the law or the usage of the Mohomadans or Hindu religions, any persons who may persevere in that opposition cannot in consequence, fail to be subjected to the severest penalties of military discipline. .... The salutary examples which have already taken place in the punishment of chief instigators of the opposition will be sufficient to excite in the minds of the Native Corps of this Establishment, a correct sense of their duty".

2. Embree, Ainslie Thomas, Charles Grant and British Rule in India, p.238.
It was Muzi-ud-din, the third son of Tipu Sultan, who took advantage of the delicate situation and tried to break the British bondage. His servants contacted the sepoys in the regiments stationed at Vellore. The Musalman inhabitants of the Vellore Town were also sounded by them. As it happened some sepoys serving in Vellore Fort were disbanded soldiers from the armies of Tipu Sultan. Allahdin, a foster brother of Muzi-ud-din, was the medium of communication between the Princes and the sepoys. He told the sepoys that Prince Muzi-ud-din wished them to take and keep the Fort for eight days only; in the meantime help would come from outside from Gurumcondah, a powerful Poligar and a friend of the Princes. However, sepoy Mustapha Beg, imparted all this intelligence to the superior British Officers, but no one believed him.

The Commander-in-Chief, Craddock, and the Governor, Bentinck, were totally ignorant of this explosive situation in the army. Craddock, in a letter dated 18th June, 1806, solicited the advice of Bentinck on the embarrassing question of turban. As he was not well conversant with the manners and customs of Indians, he felt that defiance of military orders should be crushed in the initial stages.

2. Ibid., 29th June, 1806, Letter of Craddock, p.301.
Bentinck in his reply to Craddock dated 4th July, 1806, considered that change of dress was not a cause of objection, so it was not advisable to yield to clamour. In order to avoid further complications, he advised the promulgation of a general order to Indian troops of the Madras Presidency. It was a sort of general assurance that it was not the intention of the British Government to introduce any change repugnant to the law and religious customs of Indians. He hoped that an order of this nature would allay the fears of the Indian troops and at the same time avoid the necessity of revoking previous orders relating to dress etc. He repeated his government's determination to suppress all symptoms of insubordination in Indian troops.

Mutiny at Vellore

Up to the last minute Bentinck and Craddock were unaware of the temper of the Indian troops, who, only after six days, on the 10th July, 1806, at mid-night rebelled against the authority of the British. They took all the key positions in the Fort of Vellore and started firing on the barracks of 69th Regiment. They killed the Europeans guarding the Main Guard Gate and Magazine Guard and took possession of the whole Fort. Some of the British officers

1. Ibid. Letter from Bentinck, 4th July, 1806, p.804. "As it appears from the evidence taken in the late enquiry at Vellore that no objection of this nature existed certainly deems it advisable that the alternative of yielding to the clamour arising from an unfounded prejudice should, if possible, be avoided".
continued to defend their posts till the arrival of Col.  
1 Gillispie with His Majesty's 19th Dragoon.

On Col. Gillispie's arrival a large number of the 
rebels fled towards South and West rampart. The advance 
party occupied 1st, 2nd and 3rd Gateways. On the inner 
gate which was occupied by the mutineers, several men of 
British army were lost in the attempt to recapture it. 
After the arrival of guns, the gates were blown open. 
There was incessant fire by the mutineers, so several men 
of the 69th Regiment were lost. Col. Gillispie was ably 
supported by Lt. Col. Kennedy in the attack. The mutineers 
soon broke up. They were pursued and slain by the British 
soldiers. Within a year the fort was restored to 
British possession, Gillispie gave orders to Col. Marriot 
to take into custody all the sons of Tipu Sultan. Col. 
Gillispie stressed the need of removing the princes from 
Vellore Fort. After making an enquiry it was ascertained 
by him that the Mutiny was not the result of a momentary 
impulse but a systematic and calculated bid for the overthrow 
of British power by Tipu's sons. The sons of Tipu 
Sultan were accordingly sent to Bengal, as their presence 
was considered a danger to the security of the Empire.

1. Ibid. Letter from Col. Gillispie, 12th July 1806, 
p.831.
Bentinck was taken by surprise at the happenings at Vellore. He confessed this to Craddock on 14th July, 1806, "We confess to your Excellency that spirit of disaffection has shown itself to a greater extent than we had supposed." In order to quell unrest among the sepoys, he issued a general order on 14th July, 1806 and revoked the previous orders concerning turban and dress.

This discontent was not limited to Vellore but spread to the other Indian Corps of Wallijahbad and Nandrug in the Madras Establishment.

In a spirit of vindictiveness, Craddock, in a Proclamation dated 16th July, 1806, declared that offenders were to be punished for horrors committed by them at Vellore. He advised strong action.

The Commander-in-Chief, however, tried to absolve himself of the responsibility of Mutiny at Vellore, stating that in March 1806, he had put up all the Regulations before the Governor-in-Council. Bentinck declared his inability to check up all matters relating to military drill and discipline, while to the new regulations he had given full scrutiny. Bentinck advised mild action against the mutineers.

1. Ibid., p.896. Bentinck's letter to Craddock, dated 14th July 1806.
George Barlow, the Governor-General, imputed the ghastly occurrence at Vellore to disaffection in the troops caused by the recent orders of change in turban and abolition of other marks of distinction between the different castes, thus, he laid the blame on Governor and Commander-in-Chief.

The Court's reaction to news of Mutiny

The Court of Directors received the intelligence of the Mutiny at Vellore on 17th February, 1807. They were much concerned and horrified at the turn of events which had taken place in the Madras Presidency at Vellore Fort, where an armed uprising of Indian troops had taken place against the British authority. In order to restore confidence in the minds of sepoys at Madras they removed Governor, William Bentinck, and Commander-in-Chief, John Craddock, from their respective posts. It was a dire punishment for negligence on their part in the administration of the Madras Presidency. At this emergency the Court, finding a danger to their possessions at Madras unanimously

2. Auber Peter, Rise and Progress of British Empire in India, pp.442-44.
proclaimed them guilty. Though appreciating the zealous integrity of Bentinck, the Court considered him responsible for Mutiny at Vellore.

On 15th April, 1807, the Court's orders removing the Governor and Commander-in-Chief were sent to Madras. William Petrie was appointed as provisional Governor and Bentinck was to hand over charge immediately. No arrangement was made for his passage back to England. But for the voluntary kindness of Sir Edward Pellam he would have been obliged to remain at Madras, stripped of all authority, degraded in the eyes of the public at Home and at Madras.

The Court did not rest content with the removal of Bentinck and Craddock. On 29th May, 1807, it transmitted a Political Despatch on the recent Mutiny at Vellore. The Court observed that never before in the history of Indian Empire, the Indian sepoys had revolted against Europeans, barbarously attacking them while asleep. There had never been a necessity for the European soldiers to take up arms, in retribution against the Indian sepoys. The Court reiterated its policy of non-interference in all religions prevalent in India. The Court pointed out that enquiry regarding turban and marks of distinction of castes should

1. Parliamentary Papers: Roll No.6, File Micro-copy No.9, A Copy of Political Letter from the Court, dated the 29th May 1807.
have been executed in such a manner as to gauge real feelings of the people. The Court found that the Government at Madras did not exercise proper discernment and vigilance in the conduct of its affairs. It was further observed that the conduct of John Craddock was injudicious in enforcing Regulations. He was not even aware of the unrest prevailing in his army and, therefore, he could no longer retain the command of the army.

About Bentinck also the Court stated that though they appreciated the uprightness of his conduct, there were some instances in the last one year which called for disapprobation. The confidence of the Court in Bentinck had been completely shaken after the happenings at Vellore. So, it was considered expedient to remove him from the post of Governor.

The Court approved the measures adopted after the Mutiny for its suppression. They appreciated "the gallantry, judgment and activity" of Col. Gillispie of His Majesty's 19th Dragoon. A reward of pagodas 7,000 was awarded to him in token of appreciation of his zeal and high sense of service in time of danger.

The Court bestowed on Sargent Brady a reward of Pagodas 800. The widow of Col. Fancourt who was killed at Vellore, was granted a pension of £100 per annum and £50

1. Ibid., para 25.
2. Ibid., para 33.
for his son and daughter. Sepoy Mustapha Beg was awarded a sum of pagodas 2,000 and a medal to perpetuate in his family "this single instance of fidelity". The Court approved the payment of a gratuity of a month's pay to non-commissioned officers and privates of the 19th Dragoon.

It has been seen that the Religious Policy of the Home government had disastrous effect in the Madras Presidency. The Christian Missionaries considered welfare of Indians, only through 'a policy of assimilation', which was to be done by introducing English laws and imparting English education. The Evangelicals advocated conversion of Indians to Christianity as the only way to bring them happiness.

Rift in the Home Government over Religious Policy at Madras

This policy did not have unanimous support of the Home authorities. Even before Sepoy Mutiny at Vellore, a minority of the Directors, under Baring's leadership, was against religious fanaticism of Grant and Parry. There was a dispute in the Court over religious policy in 1807, even before the intelligence of Mutiny had reached England.

1. Ibid., para 35.
2. Ibid., para 39.
3. Stokes, English Utilitarians and India, pp.xiii, XIV.
Bentinck and Craddock did not pay any regard to the existing social and religious customs at Madras in their zeal for reform. This refractory religious policy carried out at Madras on the instruction of Home authorities had ghastly effect on the Madras administration. On the news of Sepoy Mutiny at Vellore, majority of the Directors including Baring, Toone, Twining and the British public, openly criticised Christian Missionary activities in India. As a matter of fact, the Directors and shareholders were against Christian Missionary propaganda in India. They considered it expedient to recall the Missionaries for the safety of trade and Empire. Elphinstone, the Chairman of the Court, admitted the origin of mutiny in

"opposition to the innovations in the customs and religious institution of the sepoys, fanned to heat by the general rumours of their forced conversion to Christianity, and by the family and adherents of Tipu Sultan at Vellore". 2

Grant and Party, who were responsible for the religious policy, completely denied missionary activity to be a cause for Mutiny at Vellore. After receiving full information they tried to divert the attention towards defects in general administration of India which required immediate investigation.


While Toone brought before the Court controversial issue of Missionary activity in India, there was alteration between Grant and Toone on this point. Parry used his influence as Chairman to avoid debate on this issue. As Baring was absent from the Court, no formidable opposition was faced by Grant and Parry. Thomas Twining took up this matter in hand. He published a pamphlet condemning Christian Missionary activity in India, which caused a controversy. He, later on, motioned a resolution in the General Court regarding religious policy. Grant and Parry were disconcerted at the idea of a general controversy on religious policy. They persuaded Twining to drop the issue by promising to take immediate steps in the right direction. Later on Baring pressed the case against missionaries in the Court, but Grant carried on a resolution by which status quo of the Missionaries in India was retained.

Meanwhile in India the Missionaries at Serampore carried on their propaganda with unabated enthusiasm. Minto, the Governor-General, finding the situation going out of hand, was forced to impose restriction over their publications. He tried to conciliate people by discouraging Missionary activity. He was horrified by its effects on

1. Ibid., pp.162, 163.
the local population, who zealously safeguarded their ancient customs and usages against religious encroachments. He solicited the advice of Home government on this issue. Dundas despatched instructions to Minto regarding the religious policy of the Company. Though himself reclined on propagation of Christianity, did not allow the use of any persuasions, which might irritate Indians. He observed:

"Our paramount power imposes upon us the necessity to protect the native inhabitants in the free and undisturbed possession of their religious opinion." 1

He advised Minto to base religious policy on 'political expediency' rather than on Evangelical ideals of propagation of Christianity. He observed that "political sovereignty gives the Company the obligation to preserve public institutions". 2

This declaration of wise policy in religious matters had the acquiescence of fanatic Grant and Parry for the while. Removal of Bentinck and Craddock from their respective posts and this declaration calmed down disturbed feelings of Indians. The Missionary activity had also slowed down for the time being. Though the religious policy was admittedly a failure, Grant and Parry refused to admit

2. Ibid.
this. Till then, Home administration considered Army Regulations to be the cause of Sepoy Mutiny at Vellore. Bentinck and Craddock demanded a further probe into the causes of this outbreak.

Bentinck, on his return to England from Madras, met Grant and Parry privately on many occasions. He addressed a powerful appeal to the Court of Directors against his removal from Madras. After giving full particulars of the events at Vellore, he stated that Mutiny at Vellore could not be directly or indirectly attributed to him. He had been dismissed from his post and condemned as chief instigator of the sepoy Mutiny. The punishment meted out to him was very harsh and mortifying, which injured his character and ideals.

The Court considering his petition in a resolution dated 25th July 1809 observed that at the occurrence of Sepoy Mutiny at Vellore, its cause was considered to be "wanton or needless violation of religious usage of people". Therefore at that time in order to safeguard the interest of the Company, and to eradicate feeling of disaffection from the minds of people, it was considered expedient to

1. Embree, Charles Grant and British Rule in India, p.238.
2. Auber, Peter, Rise and Progress of British Empire in India, pp.446-9.
remove Bentinck and Craddock from their respective posts. However, after receiving fuller reports from the Madras Government and from the testimony of Bentinck it was deduced that there was no violation of religious sanctity. The Government had not interfered in the customs and religion of the people. The sepoys in their ignorance misunderstood Government's intention for order and uniformity. The Court held that judgment of situation by Bentinck and Craddock was faulty, as they had not properly investigated the true feelings of the sepoys on the question of turban and other caste marks.

Grant did not hold them any way responsible for sepoy Mutiny, but considered 'the underlying cause' to be Muhammadan political disaffection, and advantage was taken of popular orders to provoke Mutiny. Grant considered it to be 'a very important extensive question, both in religious and political view', as it affected British attitude towards Indians. A resolution was passed in the Court in this context. This resolution of the Court exculpating Missionaries from any responsibility was a personal triumph for Grant. He insisted on a deep probe into the administration of Madras, and the cause of bitterness and resentment were in the 'seizure of Carnatic lands, dispossession

3. Ibid., p.169.
or Raja of Tanjore and drastic changes in revenue and judicial system.

While in reality there was no conspiracy at Vellore for the overthrow of British power by Muzi-ud-din either with other Indian princes or with mutineers had been proved. The real cause of mutiny was the opposition of sepoys to enforcement of new military regulations, which changed their pattern of turban and prohibited caste marks. They considered these orders as a step towards conversion to Christianity. It was in self-defence that they massacred English officers at Vellore. After Sepoy Mutiny at Vellore and its repercussions, the active religious support of Government was discontinued. But the officers in the Company's service, fired with religious zeal, still helped the Missionaries. Thomas Munro, during his Governorship of Madras, took serious view of the religious zeal of Deputy Collector of Bellary. This Deputy Collector distributed Bible amongst Indians, used his official influence for their conversion to Christianity. As Munro was aware of the consequences of religious fanaticism, he 'reiterated the policy of non-interference in religious matters', and removed that officer from Bellary.

So, we have seen that influence of Home Government on the Madras administration in the matter of religious policy brought about great disaster. The Evangelical policy of Christian propaganda did not have unanimous support either of the Directors or imperialists or traders. There was opposition in London to the religious policy formulated and carried out by Grant and Parry. This was a departure from the religious policy followed by the East India Company till 1784. Clapham sett and Evangelicals had become too powerful, so carried out policy of religious conversion, which was against the interests of the British imperialism and the Indian population.

The Court of Directors created further difficulties at Madras by their shortsighted policy. They imputed sepoy mutiny at Vellore to injudicious conduct of Craddock. They did not give May Macdonal a seat in the Governor's Council, and made the position of the Commander-in-Chief subservient to the Governor. There was a controversy between Bentinck and Craddock on this issue.

Controversy between the Governor and the Commander-in-Chief over Military patronage

During Bentinck's administration an issue of controversial character arose out of the orders of the Court of Directors in 1807, laying down the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. It was felt by the Court that the Governors of
subordinate Presidencies required a greater degree of support for their authority and dignity. This was to be achieved through the transfer of control of military affairs of the Presidency to the Governor. The Governor was to appoint personnel to the particular posts. He was empowered to decide situation of military cantonments and distribution of the Company's troops in the Presidency. These orders, though most agreeable to the Governor, were protested against by John Craddock, the Commander-in-Chief of the army at the Madras Presidency.

The Commander-in-Chief who was an officer of the King's army held a direct appointment from His Majesty. He was in sole command of military affairs, disposition of cantonments, distribution of the army and appointments to higher stations. In fact, he enjoyed a quasi-independent authority. But, now the Court's recent orders meant a great diminution in the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. He was placed in a position subordinate to the Governor, like any other member of the Council, shorn of all power, authority and dignity previously attaching to his office. He was left only with the right of objection. Though he was held responsible for the good order, discipline and efficiency of the army, his position was made subservient to the Civil

authority of the Company. The authority of the Governor
over him was declared unlimited. The Commander-in-Chief
was thus degraded and stripped of all authority and power
in military affairs. He could no longer post the army in
the different parts of the country or promote an able
officer. The promotion was to be based only on seniority.
The only authority left with him was the power of punishment
by Court Martial.

Craddock, in a minute dated 28th March, 1807,
vehemently protested against the injustice of the orders
of the Court of Directors. He pointed out the dangerous
consequence of this diminution of the powers of the Commander-
in-Chief in military appointments and superintendence of
military affairs. The situation of the Commander-in-Chief
had no parallel in any part of His Majesty's dominions.
Though he admitted the necessity of vesting the Governor
with "both practical and theoretical" powers in the adminis-
tration yet ye held his ascendancy in military affairs was
dangerous.

Bentinck, in a minute dated 11th May, 1807, tried to
assuage the feelings of Craddock. He stated that the Court's
orders empowering the Governor to frame and submit to Council
the distribution of the army was an alteration in form only.

1. Ibid., p. 180.
2. Ibid., Craddock's minutes, 28th March, 1807, pp. 111-20.
The duties and responsibilities of the Commander-in-Chief exactly remained what they were, as the Governor was directed to receive the suggestions from him and also to consult him upon all appointments in the military command. He considered that the Commander-in-Chief had the same obligations and responsibility for the discipline and efficiency of the army as before. He further observed that there was lot of difference between political situation in Madras and England. The former was just a dependency, while the later was the ruling authority.

On 22nd May, 1807, the Commander-in-Chief again expressed his opinion on the minutes of the Governor dated 11th May, 1807, about orders of the Court. The Commander-in-Chief pointed out that the powers of the President would vary from one person to another. One Governor might be moderate and not super-imposing while another may strictly authoritative. He further observed that to the orders of the Court, which had transferred so much authority and professional functions of the Commander-in-Chief to the Governor, he had no right to object. He would obey them implicitly in consonant with his profession and character. Court's orders had created dual authority in the army. Governor was vested with superintendence and control, while discipline and efficiency was to be maintained by the

1. Ibid., Craddock's minutes, 22nd May, 1807, pp.166-84.
Commander-in-Chief. It created great impediment in the military administration.

Now, Bentinck in another minute dated 28th May, 1807, recorded his opinion on the representation of Craddock. He stated that as the Commander-in-Chief had not agreed with the interpretation of the Court's orders, he on his part would never press on Commander-in-Chief any responsibility or service which was inconsistent with the Court's orders in letter and spirit. He was convinced that the new arrangement directed by the Court would work well under the supervision and guidance of the Governor.

These orders were enforced in the Madras Presidency. Fears of Craddock were justified by White Mutiny amongst the British officers of the Company.

The effect of religious policy of the Home government on Madras administration had been tremendous. The overpowering figure of Charles Grant eclipsed wisdom and sagacity of the Home authorities on religious policy.

1. Ibid., Bentinck's minutes, 3rd June, 1807, pp.185-88.