CHAPTER III

JIVĀTMA AND THE WORLD OF MATTER

A. The Reality of the World

No orthodox school of thought in India until the time of Śaṅkara had dared to deny the reality of the world around us, however tenuous and evanescent that reality might appear in their explanations. Already in the Rgveda we meet with a cosmological hymn, the Puruṣa-sūkta, where an explanation of the genesis of the world is attempted on semi-pantetheistic lines. But even here the reality of the world is not questioned, but only the status of the ultimate principle, the Supreme Man, is brought low. Later on the Upaniṣads try to see in Brahman or ātman the ultimate explanation of the universe, but despite Śaṅkara's reading into them a patently monistic thought, the Upaniṣads themselves on the whole do not grudge the world a distinct and dependent reality. If they seem to speak otherwise at times, it must be attributed to their solicitude for explaining the absolute nature of ātman and the totally relative position of the world. The ultimate Reality is so pervading and immanent in the universe that the latter pales into insignificance in comparison with it. Often also it is the mystic or the moralist in a sage that speaks out sententiously, not so much the metaphysician. In fine for the Upaniṣadic sages things of this world may mean next to nothing, but they are not nothing. As a matter of fact it has been surmised not without reasons that the germs of Hindu philosophical cosmogonies are to be traced to the Upaniṣadic conception of the world—its constituents of fire (tejas), water (ap) and earth (kṣīti).

1. Dasgupta I, p. 51
Concerning the realism of the Sāńkhyā-yoga on the one hand and of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas on the other there can be no dispute. One of them may deny the existence of God and the other might assert it, but both of them are agreed on the realistic view of the universe.

The Naiyāyikas' realistic conception of the world springs from their epistemological realism. The sense, they maintain, goes out to meet the object. The knowing subject and the knowable object, therefore, must be regarded as existing in their own right. Also for the Naiyāyikas the substance and qualities are external to each other. Further, the atoms out of which the world is fashioned are eternal and independent not only of our mind but of God the creator as well.²

The Mimaṁsaka is a realist through and through. A real universe for him is a necessary precondition for positing the reality of virtue and vice, of teacher and pupil. Even in dreams the Mimaṁsaka sees a real substratum. The external world is not a product of mere intellect. Rather, our ideas are derived from external objects. We are assured of the existence of the objects in that the report of one sense is supported by another. The world is, therefore, objective and real. It is also, eternal, uncreated and indestructible.³

Much nearer home and in time is Rāmānuja who affirms the reality of the world no less than the reality of the self and of God. The world is constituted of six dravyas. We have already seen to what extent Rāmānuja believes in the reality of the dream object. It is an indication of the measure of his realism and of his anxiety to repudiate degrees of reality as found in Advaita.

². Vedanta, pp. 85-86
³. Ibid.
Even the atheistic Jaina are hardly divergent on the point of an objective world. As for the positivist Carvakas, they affirm only one reality in their experience, and that is the reality of the material universe. Even among the Buddhists who would seem to be congenitally allergic to reality, the kṣaṇika-vādins did concede that things are real, albeit momentarily.

It is the two prominent schools of the Buddhists, the śūnyavādins or nihilists and the vijnānavādins or the idealists that are quick to deny all reality to things of this world. However, their denial is integral, leaving aside no reality whether material or spiritual. But since they were the forerunners of Śaṅkara and wielded a marked influence on his system it would be in order to pay closer attention to their argumentation.

Reality is denied to things on seven counts: (a) Things are indefinable—laksanaśūnyatā. For being undetermined in themselves they are mutually dependent. But determination cannot be sought in the whole since it is not found in the parts. (b) Their lack of positive essence—bhāva-svabhāva-śūnyatā—is the result of non-existence which is of their very nature—svabhāvabhāvotpatti. (c) Even their non-existence is beyond our ken—apracaṇita-śūnyatā—for all the skandhas dissolve in nirvāṇa. (d) And yet phenomenally they are felt to be inter-connected in spite of their non-existence—pracaṇita-śūnyatā. For while their skandhas are neither real nor related to others they appear to be causally connected. (e) They defy demonstration by language—nirabhilapya-śūnyatā—having no definite and definable nature. (f) All knowledge of them is essentially tainted by age-old defects, since our vision is inevitably polluted by desires. (g) And finally we affirm things to be in a particular place and time in which they are not—itarētaraśūnyatā. We must conclude then that
the world is but a dream or māyā. Only fools think otherwise, 
endowing things with existence while in fact they are neither 
existent nor non-existent.4

There is something uncompromising in the radical nihilism 
of the Buddhists that may draw the admiration even of a realist. 
But what nettles him positively is the uncanny and devious 
stance taken by Śaṅkara who denies while asserting, conceals 
while revealing and holds back while proffering. We have seen 
how the formidable proponent of māyāvāda divides all reality 
into three categories—the pāramārtha, the vyāvahārika and 
the prātibhāsika. For Śaṅkara reality is what cannot be sub-
lated. Now only the pāramārtha entity, or the Absolute, 
can never suffer sublation and therefore it alone is real in 
every sense of the term. Whereas the prātibhāsika can lay the 
least claim to reality since the end of the dream is the 
synonym for its sublation. But it is not pure nothing, an 
absolute non-existent such as a sky-flower or a barren woman's 
son. What is of immediate interest for us, however, is the 
vyāvahārika entity which defines the world-appearance. In its 
 essence it can be characterized neither as sat nor as asat; 
not sat, because as world appearance it does not endure for ever; 
it is sublated with the dawn of right knowledge. It is not 
asat, whether in the sense of pure nothing—tuccha—like a 
hare's horn, or in the sense of prātibhāsika which does not 
outlast the dream. Conversely it might also be said that the 
world appearance is sat since it lasts as long as ignorance 
does, and asat since it does not last longer. Śaṅkara tries 
to explain it with an analysis of illusion.5 In the illusion 
of conch-shell silver 'this' or the conch-shell forms the 
ground of illusory silver and is the only element that is 
found real when the illusion is cleared. So too in the case

4. Dasgupta I, p.149
5. Vide supra, pp. 33 55
of world phenomena the brahman or the being—sat—constitutes the ground which alone will last when ignorance is overcome.

The reality of the world is so patent in the eyes of Madhva that he makes no secret of his impatience while dealing with the monistic subtleties on the illusory nature of the world. In Viṣṇu-tattva-vinīṛṇaya which may be regarded as his manual on metaphysics we are treated to arguments galore, each concise in wording and incisive in style till the Ācārya begs to rest for fear of finding no end—grantha bahutvaṃ syādityevo-paramyate.⁶

The Advaitin asserts time and again that the world is the imaginary creation by the self. May one ask—by whose self? Even at a first sight the number of individuals in the world is great. The case of a dream which is adduced by the Advaitin as an analogy is totally irrelevant since the man who dreams about himself and the man who wakes are easily recognizable as one and the same. Any suggestion that each jīva should regard himself as the sole jīva again misses the point altogether and introduces relativity into objective truth. Moreover it contains implications which will not be palatable even to a world-denouncing monist. For in such a hypothesis the teacher would be no more than a creation of the disciple’s imagination. The disciple himself would fare no better when it is his turn to be a teacher some day. Then, adds Madhva, with his tongue in his cheek, a thorough understanding of the scriptures would turn out to be injurious rather than be a means of emancipation. For no man could hope to be liberated since his enlightenment and teachership would entail his becoming a figment of his pupils’ imagination.⁷ What will be the result in case the single

---

6. V.T.V., 362

7. Śisyājñānaperikalpitatmyantikāre tasyaivācāryabhāve svayameva kalpīto bhavatītī samyaggranthādhigamasyaevāvānethāhetutvaṃ syāt/

Na ca kasyacinmuktī'ī granthādhigame tasyaiva śisyājñānaparikalpitatvapraśte/—V.T.V., 318-19
jīva of the hypothesis were to be a dualist? Who would rescue him from his nefarious illusion and destroy the imaginary difference which grips him, and thus bring about his final emancipation? A far grimmer fate would overtake the advocates of eka-jīva-vāda if in his imagination he consigns all of them to eternal damnation. Fiction then would yield place to reality.  

Can the māyāvādīn stoop to believe that the world of matter, which is an object of God's knowledge and protection is a product of illusory imagination? Surely the Lord is not prey to illusions.

Again the logic of the assertion that the world is a product of illusion would compel us to postulate two real worlds in place of one which the māyāvādīn would fain deny. For an illusion like the one of conch-shell silver necessarily implies three realities—shell, silver and similarity between the two. Without them even an illusion becomes inexplicable. When a conch-shell is mistakenly felt as yellow and the sky blue, these qualities are not exactly non-existent—at least elsewhere. For a conch in its being, substance etc. resembles other objects that are in truth yellow in colour. So we conclude that an illusion is not possible without two realities which are similar as well as real.

Even the example of dreams cannot be of much help to the Advaitin. For it is a real world that is felt to be existing outside, even though it subsists in the mind now in the form of impressions. Neither is the monist better placed when he maintains that the world is the super-imposition of the non-self on the self. Such a superimposition is plainly impossible.

---

8. Tena yathā kalpitam tathaiva bhavatīti tenaikajīvāvādināṃ nityanirayakalpane sa eva syāt/—Ibid., 321
9. Paramesvarama jñātatvādrakṣitavācca na dvaitam bhrāntikaḻpitamityarthāh/ na hiśvarasya bhrāntih/—V.T.V., 328-29
10. Tatśadrāyam ca dravyatvādikam kiṃcit śākhāśādīnāṃ ca-styeva/ ato na kutrāpi sadṛśasatyavastudvayaṃ vinā bhrānāḥ/—Ibid., 348
For no one is liable to delusion like 'I am not I'.

Let us suppose with as much logical justification as the monist could muster, that there is a superimposition of the self on the non-self—all apart from the superimposition of the non-self on the self. It would follow then that the non-self is real. And since at the monist's own admission there is only one reality, the non-self alone would be existent—a pretty mess for our adversary to clear.

Again if the world belonged to the non-knowledgable part of the self as the Illusionist would have it, why is it perceived as different from the self? The silver of the illusion as we know, is not perceived as distinct from the conch-shell on which it is superimposed. Or also the same object does not give rise at one time to a multiple illusion where, for instance, the same shell is seen at once as silver, gold, copper etc. On what basis then does the monist claim that his single self engenders an endless variety of objects? It is a strange business, really, where a limiting adjunct which itself is unreal by nature is supposed to produce an assortment of illusory objects. Why speak of the anomaly where knowledge and error are both products of illusory imagination? And so the conclusion ought to be that there is no metaphysical difficulty whatever for affirming the reality of the world.

Madhva concludes his argumentation by quoting confirmation of his views from the Brahma-valivarta-purāṇa: There can be no illusion at all without a substratum and two real entities that resemble each other... Hence the universe is not a product of illusion. It finds its protection in Viṣṇu's power. Unlike a magician who does not see the magic, the Lord does see the

11. Na cātmānyātmaḥ-brahmāḥ kvaśī dṛṣṭaḥ/ na hi kaścida-hamaham na bhavāṃti bhrānto dṛṣṭaye/--Ibid., 349-50
12. Ātmājānātmaḥ-katve ca jagata ātmano bhinnatvena na dṛṣṭaye/--Ibid., 354
13. Na ca jñānājñānayorapi mithyākalpitaḥ dṛṣṭeḥ/-VTV 359
universe always. Hence it is certain that the universe is not an illusory product. And finally since there can be no illusion where a direct perception is concerned, the universe which Viśṇu knows directly and immediately could not be unreal.\textsuperscript{14}

Most of these arguments, it will be seen, are negative in character, though in their value they could be most certainly positive, if what they imply is clearly drawn out. A more direct and positive proof for the reality of the world, however, is hard to come by unless we fall back upon the doctrine of sākṣīn. All our knowledge concerning the external world, it would seem, has manas or vṛtti for its terminus a quo as well as terminus ad quem. The Sautrāntika school of Buddhists has claimed precisely that, assigning all externality to inference alone.\textsuperscript{15} Madhva ridicules the position. How is this universe to be held as a mode of thought since the pramāṇa itself establishes it as different from thought at all times? If moreover a distinct world does exist which is beyond thought as the Sautrāntikas would have it, how does it come under the purview of reasoning?\textsuperscript{16}

Madhva himself has not hesitated to deny self-evidence—svatah-prāmāṇya—to knowledge produced by any organ other than sākṣīn.\textsuperscript{17} We should expect then that any positive evidence

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14} Adhisthānām ca sādrām tathāyavastudvayām vinā/...Na bhavantikalpitam viśvamato viśnu-balātreyam...Na ca māyāvinā māyā drṣṭate viśvamīśvarāh/ sadā paśyati tenaṃ na māyetyavadhār- yatām...Aparokṣadrśo mithyādarśanaṃ na kvacī bhavet/ sarvā- parokṣaviśnurviśvadrktana tannāṃteti ca/—\textit{Ibid.}, 369-71
\item \textsuperscript{15} Dasgupta I, pp.151ss
\item \textsuperscript{16} Viśvam pratyakṣaṇaṃ tyaktvā tasyor yo'numītaṃ vadet/ māyāvādvad evāsāvupkeko bhūtim icchata/ sarvapramāṇassidham yad buddher bhedena sarvadā/ katham nu tasya buddhitvam viśvam anyacca kimpramam/--A.V. II 2, 197-98
\item \textsuperscript{17} Na jñānaśūnṣātrēṇa prāmāṇyaṃ tasya drṣṭate/ niyamena sukhādyēṣu prāmāṇyaṃ sākṣīgocaram/--A.V. III 4, 145
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
on the objectivity of the world is traceable ultimately to sākṣin and sākṣin alone. And we also know that all knowledge guaranteed by sākṣin is by its very nature free from error. Now we make judgments which can be traced to sākṣin, such as: It is I; it is that; I am happy; space is real; directions are real, etc.\(^\text{18}\) Space constitutes the special object of sākṣin, and it is in space that we find and posit external objects. Once the objectivity of space is admitted it is illogical not to allow externality and objectivity to the world of objects in general. What these objects are, and how real space is we shall have to see in the chapters to follow.

\(^{18}\) So'ham tadiham evaham sukhi sad gaganam diśah/ satyā ityādyanubhavah sadā tatpratipakṣagah/—A.V. II 2, 200
B. The Reality of Space

A school of philosophy which rejects the reality of the world would be under no obligation to explain its ultimate constitution since any constituents seen in it would be as unreal as the world itself. A realistic system, however, whether naive or critical owes it to itself to attempt a rational scheme aimed at explaining the world phenomena through their ultimate principles or categories. The realistic darsanas in India, too, have accordingly worked out schemes, each born of the school's genius or need, drawing upon one another, and influencing each other in the process. Madhva is no exception. Traces of his doctrine on space, for example, are to be found even in such heterodox systems as Jainism.

For the Jainas space or ākāśa is twofold: lokākāśa and alokākāśa. The former is co-terminous with the mundane universe, and is pervaded by dharma or the principle of motion. Whereas the other variety of space pervades the transcendent world of liberated jīvas—aloka—where dharma has no entry. Whatever be the variety, space is not a mere negation or the absence of obstruction, but it is a subtle positive entity, a receptacle for other categories. It would seem from the explanation of the Jainas that lokākāśa is identical with alokākāśa but for the difference introduced in it by dharma which is strictly external.1

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas too would see two distinct entities in what we might call space. One is known as 'dik' or relative space, a substance by which the relative position of a thing—right or left, east or west etc.—are perceived. While these

1. Dasgupta I pp.197s
relative positions are directly apprehended through vision and touch, dik itself which is infinite transcends their grasp and can only be inferred. The other entity is Ākāśa which may be rendered as ether. Its existence too can only be inferred from the fact of sound. For sound is a quality which cannot inhere in anything that may be seen, touched, smelled or tasted. By elimination, therefore, it must have a substance to be in, and that is Ākāśa. It is eternal, ubiquitous and one as being is one. It pervades all objects and binds them. The atoms, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are infinitely small. They cannot give rise to magnitude however many of them might come together. It is only Ākāśa that keeps them apart and yet makes them constitute a whole.2

The Pāṭeñjala Yoga strikes a slightly different note while explaining the twofold distinction which it also introduces into space as the other systems do. There is one aspect of space which is an abstraction, a category of the mind or a construction of the intellect—buddhinnirmināna. It is not a substance as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas believe, but a relation as of time and causality, which the intellect introduces into the world of reals—of sattva, rajas and tamas, or a relation that binds the various events in the development of prakṛti. This is evidenced from the fact that when we have nirvicāra nirvikałpaprajñā (intellectual intuition), all those relations of space, time and causality disappear, and we see the real in itself.

Then there is the other variety of space or Ākāśa which may be regarded as ether. This itself is subdivided into kāraṇākāśa and kāryākāśa. The first is non-atomic and all-pervasive. Far from being a mere negation or unoccupiedness —āvaraṇābhāva— it is the mass in prakṛti or bhūtādi, or the

amorphous tamas. The other is atomic by nature, and hence occupies limited space. It is formed everywhere, and exists in the original kāraṇa-ākāśa as the medium for the development of vayu atoms. We may notice that what the Sāṅkhya denies to the first type of space, it confers on the kāraṇa-ākāśa as it were by legerdemain.3

Both Śāṅkara and the Buddhists are thorough-going in their rejection of space as objectively real. For Śāṅkara space is no more than a construction of the mind according to which the phenomenal world is organized. Nothing, therefore, which involves space and time for its understanding is truly real. Whatever is spacial is divisible, and whatever is divisible is unreal. The apparent universality of space is only relative—relative to this world of experience.4 The Buddhists, however, go even further and deny anything concrete that is extramental. Space, according to the Śūnyavādins among them, is precisely the absence of things concrete, the void that separates their intervals of appearance. A space of this kind cannot be cognized by senses since it does not exist; it is an abhūva or non-being.5

Madhva's realism, we must expect, does not stop short of space and time. His rebuttal against the Śūnyavādins' sweeping statements is well delivered. All non-being to be acceptable must have essentially a support—sadharmin—and counter-part—pratiyogin. Where these two are absent, there cannot be even a semblance of non-being. But when we think of space as non-existent we find in its place a support which itself has all the characteristics of space. Positively, asks Madhva, if there was no reality in ākāśa, how come ākāśa is found among men etc.? No amount of speculation on the part of the

3. Dasgupta I pp.252
4. I.Ph. p.528
5. D.M. p.145
Nihilists can gainsay this fact. To deny the reality of space is to posit it implicitly. And so we might say that space is self-supporting—svagata, calling for nothing outside to justify its existence.\(^6\)

The ambivalence that obtains in other realistic systems on the concept of space is to be encountered in the Madhva doctrine too—only in sharper light. One is called vyākṛta-ākāśa and the other by contrast avyākṛta-ākāśa.\(^7\) Etymologically the terms might suggest that there is a continuity between the two concepts, vyākṛta being the manifested form of the latent avyākṛta-ākāśa. In point of fact, however, there is a radical difference between them which is to be found both in their nomenclature and in reality. Vyākṛta must be taken to mean 'produced' while avyākṛta 'not produced' or 'uncreated'.\(^8\) Vyākṛta or bhūta-ākāśa is an element, resulting from a transformation in the primordial matter—prakṛti—and produced at the beginning of each cosmic evolution. It is blue in colour. Also like the other four elements it goes to constitute things of the earth in its own right, and so, we might rightly expect, it disappears in the general dissolution. Avyākṛta-ākāśa on the other hand is without origin. It is as unchangeable as it is eternal. No colour could be predicated about it. Thus it will be seen that the term space or ākāśa in the sense of expanse is rightly applicable to avyākṛta alone.

Avyākṛta-ākāśa is uncreated. Any hypothesis that it was created would entail a second supposition that there was a time

---

6. Iśo deśaśca kālaśca svagata eva sarvadā/—A.V. II 2, 165
7. It will be obvious from what we have seen that Dr. B. N. K. Sharma's claim that "this twofold classification of space is a special feature of Madhva's philosophy" (Phil. of Madhva, p. 75, italics in the original) is rather extravagant.
8. Bhūtam apyasitam divyadṛṣṭigocaram eva tu/ utpadyate vyākṛtam hi gaganam saśsāgocaram/ pradesa iti vijñeyam/ nityam nopaśyate hi tat/—A.V. II 3, 13

64
when the world existed without space. A world without space would be a concentrated mass, without maneuverability of any sort, which is an absurdity obviously.9 And yet there are passages in the Scriptures which state the creation of a space. Madhva recognizes the texts, but applies them generally to bhutakaśa. In cases, however, where the application ought to go further,10 he includes the avyākṛta space, but restricts the meaning of creation to dependence and specification. All things are dependent on the Lord. Each time the world is produced anew the Lord specifies the space with new relations in that new realities are received in it. This specification which space receives in dependence on the Lord and in link with things concrete must be considered the creation of space as the Scriptures assert.11 The acquisition of specifications in dependence on God—parādhīna-viśeṣāpti, is what constitutes creation in the narrower sense.

Avyākṛta-ākāśa must be regarded as infinite by its very nature since it tolerates no non-being whether within itself or without. That is precisely why also it is infinite on two counts, externally because there is nothing outside space; and internally because parts of space will always keep their spatial character whatever be the number of times they are divided.12 One cannot divide the real and end in a void any more than one can add up voids to obtain the real.13

9. Avakaśamātram ākāśah katham upadā youths' yadya- ākāśaḥ pūrvar kīm mūrtanibidam ja>t/ mūrtasampūrnatā caiva yadyanākāsastā bhavet/ mūrtadravyāni cākāse sthītāyeva hi sarvadā/—A.V. II 3, 10-11

10. For instance in texts like 'Idam sarvam asrają'—Tai. Up. II 6

11. Tathāpi mūtasambandha paratantra evaṇāyuk/ kham evotpattim aṁśa śrutisabda evaṇāyuk/—A.V. II 3, 14

12. A.V. II 2, 68-70

13. Bhedasya tu svarūpaḥ ye vaadanti ca śūnyatām/ abhūtas te...vibhāgenālpatāvata syāt kuta eva śūnyatā/ na śūnyānām hi saṁyogad bhavaḥ vastuna iṣyate/—A.V. II 2, 139-41
So we may conclude that the infinity characterises space both in its grandeur and in its minuteness although infinity is not to be taken univocally of both. It is like the infinity in number whether towards the maximum or towards the minimum. While the one reveals its boundless expanse, the other is the proof of unbroken continuity in matter. That is why the Vaisesika doctrine on atoms makes little sense. If there is no real contact between parts that constitute an atom how does it produce extension in the effects?

Similarly it is idle to assert as the monist do that things which occupy space do not divide it in truth although they do so to all appearance. There cannot be even an appearance of division or difference in space unless the latter involves division in fact. For the basis of such a division must be sought either in the totality of space or in a part of it. The first alternative is ruled out, because a totality cannot give rise to divisions. In the case of the second alternative we have our point proved. Thus on pain of infinite regress the Advaitin must admit that divisions or parts in space are not upādhi, imposed by adjuncts, but of its own nature—svabhāvika.

However, will not the fragmentation of space into countless parts cost it its essential unity? Does not Madhva in his anxiety to safeguard difference jettison what is more essential—integrity of space? The answer must be found in the famed

14. Mahattvānātvaśyaṁ naiva viśrāntitī upalabhyate/ anyad eva byanantaṁ mahattvānātvaṁ samam/ bahutvalpavayaṁ yad-vat saṁkhyāyāṁ upalabhyate/ ānanyam ekabhāgānāṁ tāvatvaṁ hyeva ganiyate/—A.V. II 2, 71ss

15. Yadyamāgag aṁ saṁyogaḥ kāryeṣu prathimā katham/—A.V. II 2, 110


\[ t - 699 \]
Mādhva doctrine of viśeṣa. It is this principle, as we shall see soon, that provides justification for us to see difference where apparently there is none. Space is one, really, but because of viśeṣa we distinguish parts in it such as directions —dīk—and loci—deśas. They are so united in their common base which is space that they also have characteristics in common. For instance, all of them are eternal. The words dīkā and deśāḥ are often used one for the other. The difference, then, is from points of view—no doubt justified by viśeṣa. Thanks to viśeṣa, then, avyākṛta-ākāśa, eternal and unchangeable by itself becomes a receptacle for things concrete in their endless variety, and what is more, furnishes a basis for their multiplicity.17 Avekṣāmāttram ākāśāḥ, says Madhva speaking etymologically, space is what makes room for others.18

Neither the vyākṛta nor the avyākṛta ākāśa is a direct object of the senses. However, the vyākṛta is cognized indirectly by them since it is endowed with colour and form in a body. Moreover it is a direct object of 'divine vision' —divya-drṣṭi—19 that of the Supreme Lord and the deities presiding over the elements—such as for instance the Lord Vināyaka who is the ruling deity of bhūtākāśa.20 In this sense the word vyākṛta may be taken for 'manifested'.

Both the existence and the nature of avyākṛta-ākāśa can be grasped by sākṣin alone.21 It is evident that the infinite nature of space cannot be cognized by senses which are limited in their essence and operation. Even reasoning must be held

18. A.V. II 3, 1
20. Āta ākāśāśabdoktas taddevatra vināyakah/——A.V. II 3, 12
21. ...Gaganam sākṣigocaram/ pradeśa iti vijñeyam nityaṁ notpadyate hi tath/——A.V. II 3, 13
as unequal where the difference is unsurmountable. The Scripture, too, at the most affirms the infinity of space, having nothing to say on the infinitude of atoms. The only 'faculty' left then is sākṣin, the svarūpa-indriya, which perceives the existence and essence of space immediately, leaving no room for further doubt. In fact space constitutes one of the specific objects of sākṣin, according to the Mādhva doctrine. These objects are both subjective—ātman, manas and vyrtti and objective, ākāsa, dik and time. We shall have to consider now what time means in Mādhva's system.

Space and time generally share a common approach as well as a common objective in a system's treatment of them. The same realistic or idealistic viewpoint which might distinguish one will be found as characterizing the other as well. Space, as the Jainas see it, for instance, is an objective reality pervading this world and beyond. In this world it helps motion through dharma. So too does kāla help qualitative changes in atoms. It consists of countless particles which bring about the changes in qualities without themselves mixing with one another. But the same unchangeable kāla may also be liable to 'modifications' like moments, hours, days etc. When thus modified it is known as samaya. The time taken by an atom to traverse a unit of space will itself define a unit of samaya. Kāla is a substance or dravya and the various samayas are its paryāyas.1

The position of the Buddhists is an application of their general approach. All enduring reality or substance is a myth, and so is continuous time. When they concede any reality to time at all they restrict it to the succession of instants which follow one after another in their destruction. What is more, the impressions themselves are never a continuous or uniform whole—dhāravāhika jñāna—but only a string of detached and discrete individuals or a flux of successive presentations—kṣaṇabhaṅgura-jñāna. When we perceive time we perceive in reality only succession, which further means that we perceive changes. Thus there can be no time in the absence of changes. But although the Buddhists deny that time is merely a qualifying adjunct of changes, they do see a distinct-

1. Dasgupta I p.198
tion between the consciousness of change and change-consciousness.\textsuperscript{2}

For the Vaiśeṣikas, time, as much as space, is an instrumental cause of all things produced. Such a reality which is produced is a process or a passage involving space as well as time. All changes in the order of nature such as production, destruction and action need essentially the form of time which is a condition of all movement. Things by themselves are discrete, lacking power of self-origination or self-movement. All movement which we see in them has a certain order implying a reality that relates the changes. That reality is time, pervading the universe and making all changes possible and ordered. It is one essentially and individual in character. But it is at the same time the basis of such relations as prior and posterior, simultaneous, soon or late. All conventional divisions of time like moment, minute, hour, days etc. are abstractions derived from the concrete time. This concrete time alone is an eternal substance and the basis of all experience—\textit{stītādiyavahāra hetu}.\textsuperscript{3}

On the question of perception of time it is the Naiyāyikas who attempt explanations. Some of them maintain with the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas that time is perceived by the external as well as the internal sense organs inseparably from their objects of perception. But others like Jayanta Bhaṭṭa believe that time is an object of visual perception even though it is colourless. After all, odour also, though colourless is perceived visually. Why deny the privilege to time alone, then? The fact is that colour is not sine qua non for visual perception. This is confirmed by such statements as 'there is a jar now', where the objective truth of 'now' could not be proved except

\textsuperscript{2} IPG. pp.148s; 156ss

\textsuperscript{3} Iph. pp.191s
in relation to visual perception. What is more, time is not an object of visual perception only; all perceptions have it for an object, whether they be external or internal. Only, it is never perceived apart, as an independent reality, as it were an empty time.⁴

The stark realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, evidenced in their substantializing space and time is repugnant to the Sāṅkhyaśas. The latter would rather see in them abstractions, relating the various events to prakṛti. Space and time in their objective bases are the modifications of akāśa which itself is derived from prakṛti as from a radical cause. Hence the universal aspect of space and time is traceable to prakṛti. Particular space and time are the result of akāśa limited by one upādhi or another. Since perception of infinite space and time is beyond us they should be regarded as mental constructs. On perceiving objects in their relation of priority and posteriority we jump to the conception of an infinite time order. A moment—kṣaṇa—is the minimal unit of time. It is to be defined as the time taken by a moving atom to pass from one point to the next. Only the movement is objective. But the sequence—krama—which is supposedly a continuous flow of moments is a product of the mind.⁵

The contribution of Advaita to the doctrine of time is by itself negligible. Time for it like space belongs only to the world of phenomena, and is no more real than the latter. Within it, however, time enjoys an unlimited scope. But its tendency to go beyond always falls short of realization. Despite its appearance to the contrary, therefore, time is as transitory as the world of phenomena. And yet it is not as momentary as the Buddhists would make it out. It does have a duration.

⁴. IḍG. pp.149ss
⁵. Iph. pp.277s
even if it is the duration of a world of experience.\(^6\)

Madhva brackets time with space in regarding it as a real and distinct reality. Like space, time is self-contained—svagata; like space too, it has its eternal support in the Lord. For its existence it depends constantly on him, since it is he who creates it incessantly. The reality of time is so self-evident that we cannot deny it with words without postulating it implicitly, if only to make the statement intelligible. Time is svoddiṣṭa, says Madhva.\(^7\)

As against the Naiyāyikas Madhva rejects the claim that time could be cognized by ordinary senses, to say nothing of the sense of sight. The reason is not far to seek. Any analysis of the statement like 'there is a jar now', would at the most point to the present, not to the past, nor to the future. Could the claim be shifted to the inner faculty--manas--which is primarily the faculty of memory? Even manas is ruled out, asserts Madhva, as the nature of deep sleep (suṣūpti) would indicate. And it is sophistry to argue that the existence of time could be proved by inference. What the reasoning presupposes to be already valid cannot be at the same time proved by it. Now any premiss of a reasoning such as 'this is that' is an object either of sensation or of memory. But all sensation or memory is inlaid--khecita--with time. Without time one can sense nothing, remember nothing. Thus it will be seen that where the existence of time is at stake inference is patently out of place.\(^8\)

---

6. Iph. pp.277s
7. Iṣa deśaṣca kālaśca svagata eva sarvadā/ Iśādhīrāu ca
tau nityam tadādhīrāu ca tadgatau/ iti īrūtipi iprāha kāle
svoddiṣṭa eva tva/ tatkālasṛṣṭim evātō vānchatiṣṭāh sadaiva hi/
syāt kālāḥ sa tadaiveti kālaśya svagatavataḥ/—A.V. Il 2,165ss
8. Pakṣikartam aṣaṣyatvānmaṇumā tatra vartate/ tad etad
itī sarvam ca drāyam vā smṛtigocaram/ sūkṣmi-siddhena kālena
khacitaṃ hyeva vartate/ tasmāna tāṃ vinā kālīcit smṛtum dras-
tum ahāpi vā/ śākṣyaṃ tannityasiddhaḥ hi nānumāvasero bhaṃvets/
—A.V. I 4, 96ss
While declaring time to be a substance the Haiyayikas had denied that one could cognize it all by itself, as an empty time so to speak. Madhva, however, nearly proves them wrong. But the prime objective of Madhva in proposing and analysing the example is to establish the reality of time as well as its cognition. All of us have had the experience of deep, dreamless sleep. When we are awake our senses are active; when we dream our manas is active, but not the senses. In deep sleep, however, even manas is lulled to inactivity. And yet when we wake up after a dreamless sleep we exclaim—how long I slept happily! This re-cognition of a long and happy state of things cannot be a post-factum reconstruction based on reasoning. For in that case the experience should have been at the most negative in its nature—absence of all pain, not positive happiness. It cannot be an act of memory, either, since manas being inactive during deep sleep no traces—samskāras—of the happy state could have been left behind them, to be recalled now. Unless, therefore, we prefer to take shelter under idealism and deny the objectivity of a positive experience the only solution we are left with is that the experience of the positive happiness as well as of the duration of it is the work of sāksin. And this is so despite the absence of conceptualization of any sort.9

But deep sleep is not the only experience in our cognitive life. Our normal cognition is through sense perception and memory which always presuppose cognition of time. Time is the specific object of sāksin and it goes with every piece of true knowledge without fail. We have seen how the validity of cognitive experience is due ultimately to sāksin. It would seem, then, that the knowledge of time is more than merely external to perception or memory. It constitutes in fact an essential support of all our pronouncements on reality. For through it

9. Kālo hi sāksipratyakṣaḥ suṣuptau ca pratīteḥ/
   --A.V. I 4, 95

73
as the link between the past and the future the reality of what is seen at present is cognized by sākṣin.10

The past, the present and the future—all these three phases constitute but one reality. Madhva would fairly endorse the Nyāya view that time is not only a reality, it is a substance. But its nature as substance is unique. For it is not static, but dynamic. It is essentially a continuous, eternal flow.11 And the nature of this flow gives us an insight into the infinity of time both within and without. Like space, time is infinite on two counts. Internally—no passage within time could be thought of, in which time is somehow absent. Externally—there can be no such thing as before time or after time. The parallelism that obtains between space and time is clear. So like space too, time is self-contained—svagata.12

But here we are confronted with an antinomy not found with space. How reconcile the changing, divisional and what we would call 'temporal' aspect of time with the unchanging integral and enduring character one finds in it? It is easy to see that there is one time which runs through the past, the present and the future. And yet it is undeniable that the past is no more, the present is evanescent, and the future is still to come. In fact, as the Naiyāyikas were never tired of repeating it is through changes that we come to the notion of time. Madhva, no doubt, has declared that every judgment of ours on reality presupposes the knowledge of time. But even he has apparently made little effort to resolve the paradox. Rather his emphasis now on one aspect and now on the other would seem to have only brought it up in full relief.

10. Aṭītāṅgatau kālāvapi naḥ sākṣigocarau/ tasyāṁ sattvaṁ api drśṭasya sākṣigam/—A.V. II 2, 219
11. Kālapravasāh evaiko nityah...—A.V. II 3, 16
12. Vide supra, p. 72 (footnote 7)
We know how on the one hand Madhva declares unmistakably that there is but one time, and that it is self-contained—svagata.\textsuperscript{13} Such a declaration apparently rules out any hypothesis that there are two variants in time, one changeless and the other changing. With the same emphasis he adds also that time is devoid of viśeṣas. Obviously by viśeṣas he cannot mean here mere determinations or bases of predicability since such a sense would go counter to the general Madhva principle that an absolute indeterminate reality is a contradiction in terms. Viśeṣa, then, ought to mean something more concrete, and this can be only particular moments. Unfortunately, however, in another text Madhva concedes truly if only implicitly, the existence of viśeṣas in time.\textsuperscript{14} The confusion is worse confounded by such delphic texts as the one in Tattva-Saṅkhyaṇa, declaring time to be eternal—non- eternal—nitya—āṇitya.\textsuperscript{15} Does it mean that there is a mundane time characterized by viśeṣas and eternal time devoid of viśeṣas and that the former is somehow absorbed in the latter? This may be one of the possibilities, but it does not certainly throw light on the confusion. One is reminded of 'sadasasad' of the Advaitins which Madhva himself had so unreservedly rejected. Neither is it a question of one reality being viewed under two aspects. For the problem is how one and the same reality is integral and divisible, eternal and changing, enduring and perishable. What is at stake is not aspects, but nature, not words, but reality, and one suspects not a mere paradox, but a cul de sac—the result of a theory gone awry.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{14} Viśeṣaścaiva kālasya harer icchāvaśāḥ sadā/ serve nimeśā iti hi śrutir evāha sādaram/—A.V. II 2, 163

\textsuperscript{15} Nityānitya-vibhāgena tridhalvācetanam matam/ nityā vedāḥ purāṇādyāḥ kālaḥ prakṛtireva ca/ nityānityam tridhā proktam anītyam dvividhaṃ matam asaṃśrṣṭaṃ ca saṃśrṣṭaṃ... —T.S., p.1

\textsuperscript{16} Vide infra—Chapter—General Estimate; Pp 214 s
An attempt has been made to get out of the impasse by proposing that the viśeṣas are there in time not de jure, but de facto. It is not much of a solution, evidently. For it fails to explain how the relation could be so intrinsic between time and viśeṣas which are introduced from without. However, it dovetails with another hypothesis that it is the Lord who introduces viśeṣas into time. It is a Mādhva belief that God exercises full dominion over viśeṣas of time i.e. moments etc. What is more, he is the author of those moments as they spring from him. Such a position is also in harmony with absolute freedom of God in creation. But the question as to how time was created has been ignored by Mādhva. It is for his commentators to ask the question and propose their answers.

18. Viśeṣaścaiva kālasya harer icchāvasāḥ sadā/ sarve nimeśa iti hi śrutir evaḥa sādaram/—A.V. II 2, 163
19. Vide infra—Chapter on Creation: pp 141 ss
D. Bases of Distinction

1. Viśeṣa

Whatever be the answer to the antinomy of vyākṛta and avyākṛta space, of eternal and particular time, that there is a difference between the two varieties is beyond dispute. This is a particular application of the general problem—one versus many, being versus becoming—a bone of contention in all the major philosophical schools of both East and West. The solution proposed could be the infallible criterion of the system's general outlook on reality. The easier course in the solving of the problem, no doubt, is to resort to a brand of monism, suppressing one of the horns in the dilemma. Thus the system of Śaṅkara ultimately denies multiplicity and distinction of any sort in the world of absolute reality. But there can be also another extreme view in which multiplicity or its basis is naively glorified into a reality by itself. It is so among the Vaiśeṣikas. Madhva, however, with his critical realism attempts to steer clear of both the extremes and offer a solution of his own where fundamental unity of being is respected and multiplicity or difference is preserved.

All multiplicity is finally due to some kind of distinction or difference in being. Now this distinction could be either between two or more discrete beings or within the being itself. Thus a man is different from an animal. Within the man there is a distinction between his unchanging self and his colour, for instance. Madhva treats of these two varieties under two heads: bheda, between two or more beings, and viśeṣa, within the same being.
Among their categories the Vaiśeṣikas had spoken of what they called samavāya or inherence. We may describe it as an intimate relation obtaining between entities like substance and attributes, substance and karma, cause and effect, substance and sāmānyā, atoms and viśeṣa. Samavāya unites the binaries inseparably together with the result that actual separation may destroy at least one of the components. Together they constitute one intrinsic whole. Praśastapāda terms it as ayuta. Ayutasiddhā here must be taken for inseparability, not identity, since in point of fact one entity is not the other.

Samavāya must be distinguished from samyoga or conjunction. Samyoga is a mere local contact between things of same nature which were already existing by themselves, but now are brought together—yutasiddhā. They come to appear as one whole for a while thanks to the conjunction which is a śūna or quality, and which is as numerous as there are contacts. Samavāya on the contrary is a category. It is one, and because nothing could have caused it we must regard it as eternal. But its eternity is relative in the sense that it cannot be produced or destroyed without the product itself undergoing similar changes.

The Bhāskaras have attempted a compromise between the two extremes of the Advaitins and the Vaiśeṣikas. They call it bheda-abheda, difference-non-difference. The attributes are both different from substance and identical with them.

Before formulating his own theory, Madhva has had much to learn from the formidable criticism advanced by Śaṅkara against the Vaiśeṣikas' facile explanations. Thus Madhva's change of terminology from samavāya to višeṣa seems to have been deliberate if only to spare his own theory any odious comparisons.

1. Ayutasiddādhi mādhūryādharabhūtānām yadv sambandha iha pratyaya hetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ—Iph., p. 216, footnote 3
with what he regarded as the discredited speculations of the Vaiśeṣikas. For unlike them he steadfastly refuses to look upon višēṣa as a category really distinct from the entities it is meant to distinguish. From this it would be wrong to conclude that višeṣa is a mere abstraction brought about by the need of our thought process. For that would cut us off from objective reality—a capital sin in the Mādhva school of thought. The fact is that višeṣa is embedded in reality or rather it is the reality itself under what may be viewed as a particular expression. If a boundless variety in our expressions is to be regarded as legitimate it is so thanks to the variety in the reality itself. Or as Madhva would phrase it—substance alone in that it is constituted of endless višeṣas is ever the cause of a variety of usages; infinity is from višeṣa.3 This explains also such telling phrases in the later Mādhva thought as višeṣa-śakti or višeṣa-bala. In whatever way we may view it, we must never lose sight of the fact that višeṣa is due as much to unity as to variety in a substance— and that it does not stand apart to introduce fragmentation into what provides it with raison d'être.

The Advaitins are being unfair when they inveigh against the theory of višeṣa. For no one can help having recourse to it unless one wants to eschew all use of language. Even the monist cannot count himself to be exceptional whatever be his likings on the matter. For he gleefully employs the negative texts concerning the Absolute which are found in the Revelation more than once at a stretch—'not thus, not thus'.4 Unless, therefore, a višeṣa is admitted between them they would become

3. Dravyam eva tato'nantavišeṣātmatāyā sadā/ Nānāvyavah-ṛter hetur anantatveṣ višeṣatāḥ/—A.V. II 2, 94
4. Akhandavādino'pi syād višeṣo'nicchato'pyasau/ Vyā- vrtte nirvišeṣe tu kim vyāvartyabahutvatah/—A.V. I 2, 25
purely synonymous and the defect of tautology would result. Thus viśeṣas are objectively true and true to the extent of taking care of themselves. For having no existence at all apart from that of substance viśeṣas do not call for a distinct reality to justify their entity, unlike the samavāya of the Vaiśesikas.\(^5\) So we may regard them as svanirvāhaka—self-supporting.

One can understand Śankara’s ruthless denunciation of the Vaiśesika samavāya. For in it the monist was pitted squarely against the pluralist. But should we not expect, with a certain amount of consistency, that Madhva allies himself with realists as against his sworn adversary? In point of course, though, Madhva tears the Vaisesika theory to shreds. The reason behind his vehemence appears to be, apart from his zeal for truth, that any admission of samavāya is bound to bring discredit on realism itself.

The twofold cardinal error which the Vaiśesikas have committed is categorizing samavāya as a reality different from the two terms it is alleged to relate, as well as postulating a dichotomy between the terms themselves. In the first place such a radical difference wipes out the fundamental distinction that is supposed to exist between samavāya and samyoga.\(^6\) Secondly it goes counter to our experience in which we find both the quality and qualified as one. And then how is samavāya itself related to the two terms it is expected to relate? Are we to postulate one more category to effect this relation and land finally in infinite regress? The Vaiśesikos have, no doubt, tried to circumvent the difficulty by claiming that

\(^5\) Viśeṣaśca viśeṣāḥ saḥ svēnaiva samavāyavat/ kalpanā-gurutūḍāṣṭat padarthaṁtārastā nahi/—A.V. II 2, 95

\(^6\) Kāryakāranaścātva guṇadeḥ pāṇo$c$āsya ca/ bhinnasya-iva tu sambhandhaḥ samavāya'nāṁ īryate/ bhinnatvasāmyatas tasya tāḥyām yogo bhaved dhruvam/—A.V. II 2, 91s

80
samāvāya is svanirvāhaka—self-supporting. But one fails to see how the claim is more than merely arbitrary. Postulation is no substitute for proof. The crux of the problem is how a distinct category, created in order to unite what would otherwise be disparate entities, could achieve its objective without perpetuating the problem. Why not, with better reason, identify samāvāya with substance itself and make the latter alone svanirvāhaka?7 Such a position, to be sure, would coincide with that of Madhva and cut across the Vaiśeṣika edifice.

The fact is that viśeṣas are found so united with substance that they are indivisible from it whether eternally or for a time. Substance may undergo changes under the stress of time, and in the process shed those viśeṣas which do not belong to it by essence. But so long as the change has not taken place the relationship of the viśeṣas remains unchanged. This is true not only of substance and its attributes, subject and its activity, but also of the whole and its parts. Thus whatever be the origin of a piece of cloth and its threads, however unstable be their union, we must admit that viśeṣa is present between the cloth—which is not different from the threads—and the threads themselves as closely united.8

However, the same view cannot be extended to the case of sāmānya though the Vaiśeṣikas would rather see it otherwise. For Madhva it is sheer monstrosity to suppose that abstract notions, general by their very nature, can subsist eternally and as individuals, bound to particular beings by samāvāya. Thus, for instance, humanity is the same whether it is viewed as the attribute of one man or as that of another. There does not exist such an entity as one single attribute predicatable of

7. Sa svanirvāhakaścet syād dravyam eva tathā na kim/—ibid.
8. Abhinno bhagavān svena taḍanyena vibhedavān/ nityā dharmāstadiyāstu sarve′smānnaiva bhedinā/ sāmastyocchedino′n- yatra dharmābhayārūpakāh/—A.V. II 2, 106, 107
all. What does exist is the collection which supposes the various individuals. This holds good also for the resemblance between the attributes which are to be found in each of the individuals.9

Further, any admission of the Vaiśeṣika position would lead us to infinite regress once again. For given the Vaiśeṣika scheme of general notion and the individual as well as samavāya which is the link between the two, how can we help demanding a general notion of the general notion, and this ad infinitum? The conclusion, then, should be that there exists no sāmāṇya as an entity outside the individual; and in its absence no ground for the application of samavāya.

We find the word viśeṣa already in use among the Vaiśeṣikas, but in a different context. In general it was assumed things are to be distinguished by the parts of which they are composed. But ultimately we reach simple substances such as atoms, time, space, ākāśa, souls and manas. These have no parts by which we could distinguish them. So another entity was postulated with the name of viśesa, an ultimate quality which particularizes and distinguishes the simple substances. It is ultimate, and so we cannot go beyond it.10 By implication, of course, samavāya would have a function to fulfil here: the function of uniting the viśesa with the substance. And this is the fifth role samavāya is believed to play in its wide application.

Not much thought is needed to realize that the višeṣas of the two schools have little in common beyond the name. The postulate of viśesa in their own school has been rejected by

9. Naratvādikam apyeṇa tattaddharmasyayate/ na sarva dharma eko'sti samudayās tu bhinnagah/ etādṝṣam ca sādṝṣyaṃ padārtheṣu prthak prthak/—A.V. II 2, 116s. Cf. the last statement with the doctrine of Bheda in the following chapter.

10. Iph. p.215
the later Vaiśeṣikas as unwarranted. The characteristics attributed to viśeṣa could as well be predicated of the substance itself. Madhva goes further. He repudiates any partlessness of atom, as we have seen earlier, and with that any application of samavāya to an atom or a simple substance.

Granted that the viśeṣa of the Mādhvas is a better hypothesis than samavāya, how do we know that it is objectively real as well? Could not a still better theory replace it, proving its merely hypothetical character? Mādhva, of course, in fairness to himself cannot allow such an eventuality. But he cannot provide for it by appealing to reason, either, since unaided reason, according to him offers no guarantee that it will not fall foul of truth. Scripture, too, cannot be pressed into service—explicitly at any rate. The only pramāṇa left then is pratyakṣa, the pratyakṣa of sākṣin. Viśeṣas, all without exception, are perceived by sākṣi-pratyakṣa alone. The recognition of them as such is the starting point of our usage. Sensation by itself cannot have viśeṣas for its object, since they do not exist apart from their substrata. To a certain extent the case compares with those of space and time. Viśeṣas are cognised in the cognition of objects in their totality, which is complex by implication. So the knowledge of viśeṣa is objectively true, with a truth stamped on it by sākṣin.

Such then is the doctrine of viśeṣa ably worked out by Mādhva. He believes that its acceptance in all the cases makes a clean sweep of error. If we sense in such belief a trace

11. Iph. p. 216
12. Viśeṣaḥ sarva evaite sākṣipratyaksagocaraḥ/ Üṛikṛtya ca tān sarvān vyavahārah pravartate/—A.V. II 3, 64
14. Asmatpakse viśeṣasya sarvatrāṅgikṛtatvaḥ/ nāsti doṣaḥ kvacit...—A.V. II 2, 133
of smugness we must regard it as pardonable, particularly with the ungainly samavāya still fresh in our thoughts. Who could answer then Madhva's perplexed query: etairē viśeṣe'smin ko dveṣo vādinām bhavet?15

15. A.V. II 2, 97
2. Difference

While an endless variety within a being is to be regarded as an indisputable fact thanks to experience, and an ontological truth owing to viśeṣa, what is still more striking to our eyes is the diversity to be encountered between beings. The same experience tells us apparently that there is an unbridgeable gulf between the ego and non-ego. Pluralists will make capital out of this argument while monists understandably enough will try to disprove it by finding contradiction in any explanation put forward in defence of pluralism. Śrīharṣa in his Khaṇḍana-kaṇḍa-kaṇḍya has attempted a synopsis of the various views in support of difference, followed by an attack from the monistic point of view.¹

The advocates of difference may be divided into four groups. (a) The Prabhākaras hold that we experience difference by itself, in its own nature, not as a corollary of something else. The view is known as svarūpa-bheda. (b) The Naiyāyikas and the Bhāṭṭas maintain that the absence of one in any other —anyonyābhāva—itself constitutes difference. (c) The Vaiśeṣikas assert that divergence in characteristics alone—vai-dharmya—is difference rightly understood. (d) And finally, difference is a separate quality by itself like the prthaktva of Nyāya.

Śrīharṣa brings to bear the brunt of his attack on the svarūpa-bheda of the Prabhākaras which he apparently regarded as the most formidable case put up by the adversaries. His counter-arguments merit more than a cursory glance particularly since Prabhākara's view is the nearest approach to the one

¹. Dasgupta I pp.462ss
Madhva would take later. It is more than likely too, that while formulating his defence Madhva himself kept before his eyes Śrīhara's criticism of svarūpa-bheda and its important implications.

According to Prabhākara the perception of the cloth is also the perception of the characteristic of the cloth qua different from the jar since the nature of the cloth by itself represents also its difference from the jar, as would the nature of the jar from that of the cloth. This would imply that the nature of the jar has penetrated into the nature of the cloth. Else we could not have perceived in the perception of the cloth its difference from the jar. However such an implication would in its turn involve a self-contradiction. For difference by its very nature should mean difference from something else. Now if that something else is not perceived in the perception of the difference how can we say that difference itself as an entity is perceived? If on the other hand the cloth itself were taken to represent its difference from the jar as is allegedly indicated by the jar, what would be the nature of the jar then? If the difference from the cloth were taken to be the very nature of the jar then the cloth itself would be involved in the nature of the jar. It may be argued of course that the jar does no more than indicate that it is a term intended to convey the difference from itself. In that case the term would have to fulfil the absurd function eschewing all association with the difference from other things, while as a term establishing the notion of difference. For surely a term of difference cannot cut itself off from its relation to other things from which precisely it is to be differentiated.

If, however, it is claimed that the difference of the jar from the cloth is a quality of the jar we are in for the same series of dilemmas like the involvement of the cloth in the jar.
Then if in the perception of the jar the cloth is perceived as its character we should have the experience of the two clinging one to the other; but the fact is that we do not.

Also we fail to see how qualities could be related to things. If they are not related, all things being equally unrelated anything could be related as quality to anything else. Whereas if there was a relation between the two entities we should have to postulate another relation to bind the former to the entities—and this ad infinitum. We cannot even bypass the dilemma by asserting that the jar appears to be jar when viewed in itself without reference to cloth, and the difference sets in only when the jar is viewed in reference to cloth. For we know by experience that the perception of the jar is not the perception of difference. Conversely too the notion of difference is different from the notions of both the jar and the cloth. We might say 'It is a jar'; or 'It is a cloth'; and we might also say 'The jar is different from the cloth'. But the two statements do not mean the same thing. Strictly speaking, the notion of the jar does not call for the notion of any other thing for its manifestation. And finally it is idle to assert that difference is an entity which is the same as the jar or the cloth when I merely state that the jar is different from the cloth. What is meant in reality is that the difference of the cloth from the jar is confined to the jar; and this is more than the notion of cloth having merely a reference to the jar. Thus svarūpa-bheda as a theory is unsustainable.

Similar objections could be raised against anyonyābhāva, too. For if it were supposed that the negation or absence of the jar in the cloth is its difference from the jar, then the residence of the absence of the jar in the cloth would require that the jar itself resides in the cloth—reducing difference to identity! We are not better placed even if we
suppose that the absence of the jar in the cloth is strictly identical with the cloth itself. For in that case their mutual exclusion could not be sustained. Neither can the mutual exclusion—anyonyabhāva—be the mere absence of jarness in the cloth, and clothness in the jar. For there is no such quality as jarness in the cloth and clothness in the jar, for them to be mutually excluded. Also there is no such quality in them that we could regard them as identical. Thus we might supplement the statement that there is no jarness in the cloth with another—there is no clothness in the cloth. Clothness and jarness being identical in reality the absence of jarness in the cloth would amount to the absence of clothness in the cloth itself! The same arguments, mutatis mutandis, would apply to vaidharmya and prthaktva theories as well.

As mentioned already, Madhva incorporates svarūpa bheda-vāda in his explanation, though he does not stop there. Repeated statements like 'padārthasvarūpavād bheda' define his position in brief. Difference, which is in reality identified with the svarūpa of an object is cognitively realized in the apprehending of the svarūpa itself and the realization consists in the grasping of the entity as generally different from all else. An alternative to this explanation is unthinkable. For if the difference were not the svarūpa itself we should have to admit that the general difference of an object from all others would not be apprehended in its apprehension. In that case there would be room for doubt whether one's self is not a jar. In truth, however, no one is beleagured by any such doubt. No one, for instance, starts wondering 'am I Devadatta or not?' Doubts might arise only in those cases where once the general difference of an entity from all else

2. V.T.V. 119

3. Bhedastu svarūpadarśana eva siddhah/ prāyah sarvato vilakṣanam hi padārthasvarūpam drṣyate/—V.T.V. 123as
is grasped, the similarity between that entity and something else is seen as entailing possibility of error. 4 We must note, however, that a doubt of this sort is confined between one object and its similars. It does not extend to those cases where the difference is with respect to other objects. And even that doubt will disappear with a better apprehension of the objects.

Madhva then sets out to systematically tackle objections, mostly from the monistic camp. It is fatuous to urge that a simultaneous apprehension of the difference of an entity from all else is impossible. Our experience tells us otherwise. We perceive simultaneously, though globally, a thousand lamps burning together in a place. A detailed and discursive cognition of it, to be sure, can legitimately be had through a long drawn-out process. But that does not falsify the perception already gained, or prove that it was impossible. Such is the case also with the instantaneous apprehension of the svarūpa and the difference of an object. In fact the apprehension in general of the difference of an object from all else is a prelude to the cognition of special characteristics like jarness. 5 The adversaries, no doubt, will still taunt Madhva with resorting to mutual dependence. Difference is grasped, they will argue, either as a substantive or as an attributive factor. A cognition of either of these, however, as different from each other, will presuppose that the difference has been already cognized. Similarly, the apprehension of difference presupposes the apprehension of the entity that differs and the entity from which it differs, and the apprehension of these entities in their reciprocal divergence will presuppose the

4. Cf. V.T.V., 123ss.

5. Na ca yugapajjānānānutpattirdosah/ yathā yugapadeva dīpasahasrādārsane sāmānyetah sarve jñāyanta eva tathā syāt/
   —V.T.V., 131
apprehension of their difference. In either case, therefore, one cannot escape the fallacy of mutual dependence.\(^6\)

Despite the dialectical skill with which the objection is framed, Madhva makes a short shrift of it, pointing out that difference as explained is the very svarūpa of entities.\(^7\)

Since it is at the same instant that the apprehension takes place of the entity (dharmin), counter-entity (pratiyogin) and their difference, the cognition of the substantive, of its attribute and of their relation is possible. What contradiction, then, could there be in the apprehending of an entity's difference in its svarūpa itself?\(^8\) Because it implies entity and counter-entity, difference cannot cease to be the svarūpa of the entity any more than unity would cease to be the svarūpa, because it implies the entity 'which is one with' and the entity 'with which it is one'. For the nature of the svarūpa itself is such.\(^9\)

Carrying the fight to the enemy's camp Madhva puts them on the defensive. While they cling to the identity of Isvara and Jīva, the monists themselves maintain that the svarūpa is evident. And yet the identity is not. Also the linguistic argument that expressions like "The difference of this" would suggest that difference is other than this, cuts both ways. For expressions like "The svarūpa of this entity"

\(^6\) Na ca viśeṣanaviśeṣagyatyā bhedasadāḥ/ viśeṣanaviśeṣagyabyāsataḥ bhedāpekṣaḥ/ Dharmipratiyogiyapekṣasyā bhedasadāḥ/ bhedāpekṣasya ca dharmipratiyogitvā mityanyāśreyatayā bhedasyāṣayuktīḥ padārthasya bhedasya—V.T.V., 119

\(^7\) Ibid.

\(^8\) Dharmipratiyogitvadabheda yugapad yañci/ viśeṣanam viśeṣam ca tadbhūṣaściva grhyate/ ko virodhaḥ svarūpeṇa grhiṇo bhedā eva tu/ adhyamānām āty punar viśeṣaściva grhyate/ \(--A.V. II 2, 224s\)

\(^9\) Na ca dharmipratiyogiyapekṣasyā bhedasyāṣavaroṣtavam aikyavat svarūpasyaiva tathātvāt/\(--V.T.V., 120\)
would then imply that there is a difference between the svārūpa and the entity itself! 

In cavilling at the reality of difference the monists betray the inconsistency of their own position. They find the fallacy of mutual dependence whatever be the explanation of difference. How could the talk of fallacy arise unless they first conclude the difference between those explanations and their own? Also they give no better account of themselves while dismissing all difference as belonging to the order of relative truth. Where, in the name of goodness, do we have a truth which is not relative? The accusation itself that it is relative can claim no better status than what it accuses. And if like all relative truth the accusation also is bound one day to be sublated the difference by default will be an absolute truth. If however the accusation is not regarded as relative, then also the difference by implication will have to be admitted as absolute. Cheapest is the jibe of the monist that the doctrine of difference leads to nihilism as that of the sūnyavādin. It is apparently the result of a misrepresentation of the doctrine that a reality is a bundle of differences because difference is its svārūpa. Differences within a being would certainly mean internal divisions, as countless as the differences themselves engendering inconsistency and

10. Svarūpasiddhāvapi tadasiddhiścā jīvēśvaraikyaṃ vadatabh siddhaiva// asya bheda iti tu padārthasya svārūpam etivat// --V.T.V., 121, 123

11. Dharmyādibhedagrahanāt tenokto'nyonyasamārayah/ anyast-vāghraṇe proktah katham anyonya samārayah//--A.V. II 2, 226b-27a

12. Vyāvahārikabhedaścet kvāśavavyāvahārikāḥ/ vyāvahārikam ityeva vacanam vyāvahārikam/ uta neti viśalpe tu yād vyāvahārikam/ tasyāpi bādhya tāc syād bhedaḥ syāt pāramārthi-kāḥ/ avyāvahārikatvaṃ cet bheda yah satyatāṃ ātēh/ --A.V. IV 1, 39-41a

Mithyaiva bheda vimato bheda-tvācandrabhedavat/ iti cet sādhyadharmo'yam sannasen vā na vobhayam/ yadi sannapāsiddhān-
annihilation. But why speak of divisions within the being, asks Madhva, when the question is of the difference between one being and another—dharmin and pratiyogin? Even if we were to grant for the sake of the argument that difference would introduce divisions within a being, the monist overshoots himself in his accusation of nihilism. For no amount of divisions will exhaust a reality and bring about a void.\(^3\)

The monist has still a parting-shot to deliver. Whatever be the way difference affects the nature of a being or lets itself be apprehended it is undeniable that difference implies the pratiyogin besides the dharmin. Obviously this is but another name for relation. Everyone knows that a relation should have two relata for its support. A little reflection will show them that in difference we have a tight case of anyonyasraya.

Madhva, it should be noted; has consistently refused to equate difference with relation. More specially he would point out that since difference is absolutely identified with the svarupa of a being, it must share its essential characteristics, too. This being so, it is wrong to conclude that the difference of dharmin with regard to pratiyogin is the same as the difference of the pratiyogin with regard to dharmin. The way a jar differs from the cloth is not the same as the cloth differs from the jar.\(^14\) This order ought not to be inverted whatever

\(^3\) Adbhutas te yato'nyasya pratiyogitvam igsyate/ pratiyogino hi bhedo'ym na tu svasm tath a na/ vikahegna-pa-taiva syat kuta eva tu sunyat/—A.V. II 2, 139b-14C

\(^14\) Na ca ghaadvailaksanyameva patadvailaksanyam anubhavavirodhat/—V.T.V., 134
be the enticements from our unphilosophical parlance. Our experience tells us that the thought of cloth does not necessarily entail any thought of a jar, nor does the thought of a jar force us to think of a cloth. This and the arguments mentioned above must convince anyone how unfair is the accusation of the monist concerning the fallacy of anyonyāraya.

One might expect that Madhva's aggressive stance against the monists' views would make him more accommodating towards the Naiyāyikas, realists like himself. But the truth is far from it. If there is any change at all, it is that he is even more impatient with the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika tendency of reifying concepts and dividing reality. Concerning difference we have seen, two views are prevalent among them—prthaktva and anyonyābhāva. In form the former is positive and the latter negative. In reality too, prthaktva which means being discrete is a positive quality—guna—conferring numerical differentiation on substance. The second is a particular application of a more general category—anyonyābhāva or reciprocal non-being, eternal and existing individually. It is like a generality—sāmānya—manifesting itself in particulars.

One need not be surprised that neither of the views above find favour with Madhva. To admit prthaktva as a quality apart from substance is to fall an easy prey to the fallacy of anyonyāraya. As for anyonyābhāva we have already proved beyond doubt how idle or even perilous it is to invest abstractions with existence of their own. These negative considerations apart, we might hope for better results if we look at

15. Itot'muṣyām utop'pyasya bheda drasto dvidhermikah/ tat-reikavacanaṃ yattad viprānaṃ bhojasmin yathā/—A.V. II 2, 115

16. Madhva does not treat of vaidharmya explicitly. His arguments against prthaktva and anyonyābhāva, however, would apply equally to the Vaiṣeṣika view as well—unless it is equivalent to bheda.

them more positively. Our hopes, however, are belied. To be different, to be otherwise and not to be so—these are three forms of the same mode of existence, tricks of common parlance resorted to for the sake of variety or usefulness. It is then the defect of excessive hypothesis—kalpaṅgaurava—to cling to all the three or even two and build theories on them.\(^\text{18}\)

That is not all. The equation of all the three expressions must not beguile us into believing again that difference between dharmin and pratīyogin is equally reciprocal.\(^\text{19}\) The anyonyābhāva of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas doubtly runs that danger, believed as it is to be univocally one, participated in by individual cases. If a jar differs from a cloth otherwise than the cloth does from the jar, the way a jar negates the cloth ought to be other than the way the cloth negates the jar. It will be seen that the reason behind it is the same. Since difference is totally identified with the svarūpa of a being, the negation, too, in the restricted sense employed here must be absolutely identical with the svarūpa. In its negative aspect it is a negation of other beings; in its positive aspect it is the affirmation of svarūpa. As such, therefore, it adds nothing to difference apart from a novelty in name.

---

\(^{18}\) Prthaktvābhāvatadṛūpān bhedāṁs trīṁ kalpayānti cet/ kalpaṅgauravyādyāṁ tu dosāṁ tatra virodhinaṁ/ prthaktvānyatvabhedāṁ tu paryāyenaiva laukikaiṁ/ vyavahṛtyeṣu satatam vaidikaiṁ api sarvaṁ/—A.V. I 2, 20s

\(^{19}\) Cf. Supra: footnotes 14 and 15
E. Causality

In every being there resides an infinite number of viśeṣas, but if the being is impermanent by nature, most of the viśeṣas too must be regarded as subject to change. Any change of the viśeṣas would imply that some cause is at work, and with that the difficulty of determining the exact nature of causality. Not much reflection is needed to appreciate the importance of the solution offered, for on it depend the major truths of philosophy: in Metaphysics—how objective are changes or permanence; in Epistemology—how valid is our reasoning based on vyāpti; in Theodicy—what relation does God have towards the world as creator, preserver, destroyer and summa bonum; in Ethics—how do human acts lead to or away from salvation.

It is to be expected, then, that the different systems in India propose solutions in keeping with the fundamental principles of each school. Those advocating a brand of monism restrict reality either to effect—as in some schools of Buddhism, or to cause—as in Advaita. The pluralists like the Naiyāyikas assert the reality of the effect as well as of the cause, while the Sāṅkhya theory underscores cause at the expense of the effect.

The Buddhist view of causality is founded on three points: First there is the doctrine of momentariness according to which everything exists or perishes in a moment. Secondly ajñāna or ignorance is the root cause of all suffering. Now the Buddhists maintain that whatever is caused can be eliminated. Since it is ignorance that engenders sufferings the elimination of the former will be the end of the latter. Hence the formulation of the third factor which is known as pratītasamutpāda—every effect presupposes an assembly of events, and only when
they have taken place the effect is brought into existence. It will be seen, therefore, that a deterministic view of causality here is tempered with a certain amount of contingency due to the dependence of the effect on external conditions like human effort.¹

The Buddhists, of course, prefer to see in their theory the only answer which is both rational and practical. But their adversaries cannot be expected to be as enthusiastic. The worst drawback of the explanation is that it introduces an unbridgeable discontinuity in the causal series, with the dissolution of link after link, including even the one immediately preceding the effect. What role does the assemblage of events play in such a discontinuous series? It cannot be maintained that the successive links are the continuous causes of the series, since the links destroyed can by no means fulfil the function of continuous causes. Even their efficient causality is hardly sustainable as a gap between two links cannot be avoided. Were the Buddhist to rejoin that there will be the effect anyway—even in the absence of a cause, he would be repudiating the principle of causality, not explaining it. Should he claim, however, that the previous moment lasts till the next one has originated, he would be assuming simultaneity of cause and effect, cutting the ground from under his own feet—the ground of discontinuous causal series.

Against the Mādhyamika view that the link destroyed turns out to be a cause as if by negation of negation, it is objected that the contention would mean that something could come out of nothing, or by implication, anything from anything else. In practice too, it would imperil the rationale of the entire ascetical structure—whatever be the system. Why toil for release if one could attain it doing nothing? And then, because

¹. Vedanta, pp.100s
void is absolute non-existence by definition no particular aptitude could be seen in it for the production of a definite object without making it something positive.2

The Naiyāyikas believe in the real production of the effect, which means for them that effect is not pre-existent in the cause. The material cause like clay does have some power within it, and so do the instrumental causes like the stick, the wheel etc. When these two collaborate a new effect which did not exist before comes to be produced, but with the destruction of the cause. The Naiyāyikas affirm the destruction of the cause because they believe in the dissimilarity between cause and effect, with the latter possessing novel characteristics. If moreover the effect were already contained in the cause, what need would there be for exertion to bring it out? This theory of the Naiyāyikas is known as asatkāravyaśāda, which differs from the Mādhyamika view in affirming the reality of the cause.

The Advaitins have taken exception to the Naiyāyika theory. If the effect is not to be found in the cause, because there is a difference between the two, we can as well say that anything may give rise to anything. There will be thus total unpredictability in the law of cause and effect. In life, however, to get curds we must use milk, and not anything else. To this the Asatkāravyādins retort saying that their position is only that what is produced was non-existent in the cause, and not that anything which was non-existent could be brought into effect. More positively they contend that causal substances have within them a special capacity—atiśaya—thanks to which a specific effect comes to be produced. The Advaitins, however, pour ridicule on atiśaya, pointing out that such a hypothesis either means that effect is potentially contained in the cause, or implies less. In the first alter-

native the Naiyāyika naively comes over to the Advaitin's camp from his own; in the second he means nothing.  

Diametrically opposed is the view of the Sāṅkhyas, known as satkāryavāda. They argue that no causation can bring into existence something previously non-existent. Production can only mean internal change in the arrangement of the atoms, with a slight loosening of the barrier which was holding back the change so far—all resulting in a new collocation or the effect. The effect, therefore, must be regarded as existent in the cause already before—hence the name satkāryavāda. The oil exists in the sesame, the statue in the stone, the curd in the milk. Consequently we make use of specific material to obtain specific result. Not everything can come out of everything.  

From the Advaitins' criticism of causality as held by other systems, particularly Nyāya and from their own assertions we may gather the following points: Against the Buddhistic view of discontinuous series, the Advaitin holds that causation must necessarily be continuous. The reasons are, first negative—to circumvent the difficulties encountered by the Buddhists; and secondly positive—causation can take place only in time, and time being a continuum cannot admit of a temporal intermission between cause and effect. Continuity in its turn implies concurrence, which precludes spatial intermission. In the view of Gauḍapāda concurrence is like the co-existing horns of a bull.  

Against the Naiyāyikas, the Advaitin insists on the similarity of cause and effect. It is because of similarity that we know one from the other. The principle of similarity holds good even in the case of Brahman and the world. For despite their apparent disparity they are ultimately one. Hence we

3. Vedanta, pp.103s; Dasgupta I, pp.319s  
4. Dasgupta I, p.257; Vedanta, pp.104s
must go further and assert that cause and effect are not only similar, they are moreover identical.  

True to his usual practice Madhva refuses to align himself with either extreme. But he calls his via media by a name which would appear to fit in better among the monistic circles. In point of truth, however, sad-asat-kāryavāda of Madhva is as much of a negative formula as positive. In its negative aspect it would eschew those theories which emphasize exclusively either cause or effect. Positively it implies only that before production the effect exists in the cause qua cause, while after the production it exists as a distinct being. As against the Buddhist view Madhva's conception of causality rules out any possibility of an effect's being produced from nothing or quasi-nothing. For there is a certain continuity between what existed potentially, that is qua cause, and what is now produced as a new reality. The continuity extends even beyond the entity; for it includes also temporal unity. Kāryakāranyaś'caikakāśānāvatvam vinā katham? asks Madhva. The same reasoning, as can be seen, holds good also against the Naiyāyikas when they assert that effect is something totally new, having no trace of it in the cause. 

Disagreeing with Advaita as well as Śāṅkhya, Madhva affirms the reality of the effect as also the fact that it is distinct from the cause. The effect cannot be a mere manifestation of what is pre-existing,—whether it be prakṛti ultimately or brahman. For when a production takes place our experience is that something new has come to be, and not there

5. Vedanta, pp.105s
6. Asad yat kāryārūpena kārṇātmasyāsti hi/ anavasthān- yathā hi syāt sarvatrotpatiṣṭayābhijñā/—A.V. II 1, 90b-91a
7. A.V. II 2, 190a
is a manifestation or unveiling of something that was already there, much less that it is a mere modification of some other reality. It is also a fact of experience that before its production and after its destruction a thing is not regarded as existent. Why else do we associate prāg-ābhāva with utpatti, and pradhvamsa-ābhāva with nāśa? Any loosening of their senses then would result only in confusion between being and non-being.

Causation, then, can be explained neither by sakāryavāda nor by asatkāryavāda. But how does Madhva's sadasa-kāryavāda operate in practice? We know every being is endowed with endless višeṣas. Some of these višeṣas are potencies active or efficient and passive or changing. When in operation the former give us efficient causality—nimitta-kāraṇa—while from the latter we have material cause—upādāna-kāraṇa. God, who alone is svatāntara by nature, is the efficient cause par excellence, though under him other beings also exercise efficient causality in their own way. But prakṛti is the principle of

8. Samiti vyavahriyamānam eva padārthasvarūpam utpattetvā prāh nāśottaram ca nāstīti sārvaloko vyavaharati/...ādyantoś sarvakāryam asad eva iti niścitam/—G.T.N. II, 16

9 Asad yat kāryarūpeṇa kāraṇātmakasyāt hi/ anavasthān- yathā hi syat servatropattināśeyoh/—A.V. II 1, 90b-91a

Cf. also D.M., p.313

10. Nityabhedo nimittena hyupādānena tu dveyam/ asad yat kāryarūpeṇa kāraṇātmakasyāt hi/—A.V. II, 1, 90

Kartrtvam dvividham proktam vikāraśca svatantretā/ vikārah prakṛter eva visnor eva svatantretā/ iti paiṅgiśrutēh/—G.T.N. III, 5

11. Cf. infra: pp 160 ss
change or vikāra. It is thanks to prakṛti ultimately that in a production some of the višeṣas or passive potentialities are lost while others are gained,\(^\text{12}\) as for instance, in milk becoming curds. But it is a continual process which allows no room for non-being to creep in even at a fraction of a second—thus ruling out entirely any possibility of kṣaṇikavāda.

\(^{12}\) Yadyasanna viṣeṣo'atra jāyate ko'tra jāyate...
--G.T.N. II, 16