CHAPTER VIII

JĪVĀTMAN AND RELEASE

A. Jīvātman—the Free Agent

All that has been said so far, important as it is, constitutes only a prelude to the ultimate purpose of philosophy, which is the attainment of final liberation. Any such attainment presupposes a desire which to be efficacious implies in its turn a real agency on the part of jīva.

Most of the systems in India which admitted to the spiritual nature of the soul admitted also to its real agency. But the Sāṅkhya and the Advaita thought otherwise. According to the former the puruṣa is totally inactive—akārtā, though it alone is the real enjoyer, reaping the fruit sown by prakṛti. Activity in all its variety is the 'prerogative' of prakṛti, or rather of buddhi, its subtle form. And yet, strangely enough, the self thinks that the activity is its own. The congenital illusion is explained by the Sāṅkhya as due to the sattvic content of buddhi which is to a high degree similar to the purity and intelligence of the puruṣa. Buddhi reflects the intelligence of puruṣa and gives to those transformations an appearance of intelligence even though they are not so in truth. It is like the reflexion of the moon, which even though motionless in itself, moves through the moving waters.¹ A like position is held by the Advaita. The Absolute Self which alone is ultimately real, is beyond all action and passion, because it is beyond all change. It is only the empirical self with its internal organ or buddhi that desires and acts, enjoys and

suffers. Even though all this activity is strictly the play of avidyā which is superimposed on the Ātman, the impression felt is that the individual alone is the real agent. It is like the impression one has of a glass placed beside a china rose (japā). The colour of the rose is reflected in the glass which gives the impression now that it is naturally red.  

Both these views must radically paralyse any striving after salvation, according to Madhvācārya. First they will dampen any desire one has for release. The reason is patent enough. If the one who is going to be released finally were other than the person desirous of the release why entertain the desire at all which is no more than inane? Why, moreover, put in efforts which entail one's own destruction? Even a cursory analysis of our personal experience points to another fact. Nothing is more immediate to the self than the experience of desire, as is signified, for instance, when we say 'I desire'. Its clarity, simplicity and immediacy reveal that it is the experience of sāksin, and so we can analyse it without the least fear of error, and see for ourselves that it means: it is I who desire. The adversaries might call into question the validity of such basic experience, to be sure, but they will do so only at the cost of imperilling the entire structure of our certitudes. Besides, these advocates of confusion—confusion between the self and the non-self—must explain another fact of experience: how do we possibly grasp the manas as distinct from the self, when we observe, for instance, 'it is my manas'? If the confusion is so innate or natural as it is claimed, how could the sāksin or any other principle for that matter, objectify the manas and declare it

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3. moksakāmo bhavedanyo yadi muktād bhavisyataḥ/ mokṣa-kāmasya kim tena svanāśārtham ca ko yatet/—A.V. II 2, 28
4. icchāmyahamiti hyeva nīṣṇubhayārodhataḥ/—A.V. II 2, 20a.

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as 'my manas'? The true explanation must therefore be sought elsewhere. The manas, as we have said, is the depository of samskāras or traces of our past experiences—feelings, tendencies, desires, passions etc. But we also know that manas belongs to the self, and so do the samskāras, too. Even after the samskāras are whipped up from their latent state they can become 'my desires' only when they come in contact with sākṣān and influence it in relation to good or evil, and are recognized as such. Thus the sovereignty of the self over its desires, rooted in the immediacy of experience is also safeguarded. And this means that he is the master of his desires. After establishing the true agency of the jīva as distinct from that of his body, we may consider the relation he bears to God in his activity. The problem that confronts us here is far more puzzling. On the one hand we must take care never to compromise the transcendence of God even in his activity. So it has been claimed that God is the sole agent, all appearance to the contrary notwithstanding. Notorious is the view expressed in the Kauśitaki (III 9): God makes a person do righteous deeds if He wishes his welfare, and unrighteous if He wishes his downfall. Madhva himself in his anxiety to safeguard God's independence and transcendence may appear to overshoot himself at times. In general the jīva depends on God as a rainbow on the sun, or a shadow on the person.

5. ...mano ma iti bhedatah/ manaso'pi gṛhītatvāt...—Ibid.21
6. dvaiviđhye'pitu kāmādeh kutah svāmitvamātmanah/ sāksad-anubhavārūdhham sākyate'poditum kvacit/ icchāsvāmitvamevoktam-icchāvattvam na cāpīram/--A.V. II 2, 24s.
7. "esa hyeva sādhu karma kārayati tam yamēbhya unniṁśata esa u evaśādhu karma kārayati tam yamaddho ninīśate"/—B.S.Bh. II 1, 36
8. jīvah parasyaṁupādirhīndracāpo yathā raveh...yathaiśa puruṣecchāyā etasminnetadatatam/—B.S.Bh. II 3, 49
Such dependence is not confined to the jīva's being; it extends equally to his activity so that the Supreme Lord may make the creatures do his will as a man may make the puppets dance, or move his fingers and other limbs with a clear and definite objective.9 And even where we see a man apparently starting a work on his own, continuing it on his own and completing it on his own we must remember that he can accomplish it all only on account of the independent Lord who rules from within him.10 Without that ruling, the man would be completely powerless.

Moreover if the jīva were credited with the faculty of acting on his own how could he ever fail to attain what is good for him and avoid what is obnoxious?11 And yet the facts are there to prove it. Take the fact of sin, for instance. No jīva can avoid the tentacles of sin as long as he is a part of samsara. Even the enlightened one must undergo sin whose effects have begun to bear fruit—and sorrow as well.12 There is no escape. Even the Lord Vyāsa expresses himself so clearly on the deficiencies of the jīva such as his inability to procure his own good.13 Madhva's own observation in his commentary on Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad (VI 4, 5) echoes the negative sentiments of the Kauśitakī cited above: Man becomes what God makes him; he becomes righteous, whom the Supreme Person makes righteous; he turns out wicked whom Jāngādana turns wicked. A man becomes virtuous thanks to the virtues the Lord

9. yathā darumayīṃ yoṣāṁ narah sthirasamāhitah/ śāṅgamaṅgānī tathā rājannimāḥ praṭāḥ/--B.S. Bh. II 1, 24
10. ya ātmānamentaro yamayati—Ibid. II 3, 36
11. jivakartrtye hitakaraṇaṁ ahitakaraṇaṁ ca na syat
   --Ibid. II 1,22
12. apāpaṭvaṁ ca naivāsti yavatsaṃsāramasya hi/ śrabdha-pāpamasteyeva duṅkhaṁ ca jñānino'pi hi/--A.V. III 4, 25
13. hitākriaśidoṣaṁ ca vāṣyateyeva svayaṁ prabhuv/ --A.V. I 1, 100
But on the other hand Madhva upholds the autonomy of jīva in his activity, however slight that autonomy finally is. The first argument he adduces is valid by implication. It is well known that the śrutī enjoines a number of commands and prohibitions to be observed by the individual. What worth could we ascribe to them if the jīva is not a real agent? It is true the jīva cannot escape his dependent nature which obliges him to work under the Supreme. But his agency is not thereby totally destroyed. A carpenter working under a master to a certain extent works also on his own. So does the jīva with respect to the Lord. It is also true that unlike the carpenter the jīva has received his agency and instrumentality —his nature, understanding and energy—all from God's bounty. Nevertheless when God inspires a man to action He does so in accordance with the individual's karma. It does not mean of course that in doing so God subjects himself to karma. For the existence of karma itself is subject to Him.

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14. Sa yathā karoti puruṣam tathaivāyam bhavisyati/ sādhurbhavati sādhum cet karoti purusottamah/ pāpobhavati papam cet sa karoti jenardanaḥ/ tatpreritena pūnyena punyo bhavati mānavaḥ/ tatpreritena pāpena tatha pāpah pumān bhavet/—B.A.U.Bh. VI 4, 5 (p.342)

15. Kīcchit tadvaśagatve'pi svāmitvam lokavad bhavet/—A.V. II 2, 26a.

16. jīvasya kārtṛtvābhāve śāstrasya-prayoja-kativa-praśptera- jīvo'pi karta/—B.S.Bh. II 3, 32

17. yathā takṣṇaḥ kārayitrṇiyatvatvam kārtṛtvam ca vidyate, evam jīvasya'pi/ Kārtṛtvam karaṇatvam ca svabhāvaśeṣanā dhṛtih/ yatprasaśādāme santi na santi yādupekṣayā/—Ibid., 39, 40.

18. tato-prayoja-katvam śāstrasya nā'padyate/ kṛtaprayatna-peksatvat tatprerakatvasya..."pūrvakarma prayatnam ca saṁ-skāram cāpyapekṣa tu/ Īśvarah kārayet sarvaṁ taceśvarakrtam svayam/ anādītvādādosaśca pūrṇaśaktitvato hareḥ"...—B.S.Bh. II 3, 41; cf. also II 1, 36-37 op.cit.
the law of Karma it is to safeguard dharma.  

A final question may be asked before we conclude the topic. Granted God's inspiration and concurrence, as well as men's capacity to choose why does the individual often opt for what is manifestly evil? The problem is age-old, as old as the history of human thoughts itself. It has had several answers, most of them hardly satisfactory. A blanket answer, we know, has been given in India which is the law of Karma. We have seen above that Karma, so to say, postpones the problem, pushing it back even to eternity, but does not solve it. A solution has been attempted by Madhva in his doctrine of svarūpa-yogya or hatha which underlies and specifies even Karma. Hatha, found in every jīva, is eternal, as eternal as the jīva himself. It is the first factor in his moral choice explaining perhaps to a certain extent why he chooses in the way he does. The second is Karma, and the third is his effort or volitional activity—prayātma. Needless to say that the trio works ever subject to the supreme Lord. Hatha precedes karmas; and karmas precede effort. Effort, however, subsumes

19. In his G.T.N. (V, 14) Madhva tries to explain the same paradox under yet another figure. The princes in a kingdom have real power to project it even though the power is delegated to them by their royal father. In the same way we can have real power to act, characterized by a freedom of action—a power given to us by the Supreme: yathā pītrā dattam pālakātvaṁ rējaputrānāmevaṁ paramātmadattam kriya-svātantryalaksanāṁ karttvam kriyānispānadharmadīrūpa-karmāni svātantryam ca jīvānāmayastītyāśankām pariherati.

both hatha and karma. It is God who sanctions the returns for everyone. He is, no doubt, absolutely independent, but He decides to act keeping in view the triple factor, suffering thereby no loss in his independence. Thus we see that Madhva is at pains to safeguard man's right to choose without stopping short of his condemnation, and God's transcendence without imputing to Him partiality.

21. svabhāvākhyā yogyatā yā hatha-khyā ya anādisiddhā sarva-jīvesu nityā/ sā kārānam prathamām tu; dvitiyāmaṇādi- karmaiva; tathā tṛtiyā jīvāprayatsnaḥ pauruṣākhyastadetatt- trayam viṣṇorvasāgam sarvadaiva/ haṭhācca karmāni bhavanti karmajyo yatno yato haṭha-karma-prayoktā/ vinā na yatnam na haṭho nāpi karma phalaprado vāsudevo'khīsya/ svātantrya- śakterniṣyāmako hi tathāpystān so'yuṣpeksyayāva yuṣṣjet/ etanapeksyaiva phalem dedāṇītyasyaiva saṅkalpa iti svatan- trata// --Mbh.T.N. (XXII 184-88).

cf. Philosophy of Śrī Madhvācārya, pp.267ss.
B. In Quest of God

It is not only the point of departure, namely the misery of life in this world that constitutes the common ground for the philosophical systems in India. They are all agreed on the need of liberation from it, and to a large extent on the means to be adopted for attaining it. Thus the need for controlling our passions and desire for pleasures as well as for avoiding all injury to life is universally insisted on. For this purpose and especially for attaining a disciplined mind the earlier systems advocate exercises which hardly deviate from the Yoga prescriptions except in minor details. Later on, however, when the Bhakti movement swept across the country Bhakti became the vital force which subsumed all other methods and disciplines.

Buddha and his followers believed that most of the human misery is due to man's insatiable desire, based as it is on the erroneous conviction that the self is permanent. Anything we do to satisfy our desires breeds misery in its turn not only in the present life, but also in the life to come. The primary objective of any ethical pursuit, then, should be to subdue and suppress the desire, and in so doing to eradicate its minions. Buddhism itself proposes the famed eight-fold way by which to realize the objective: right faith, right resolve, right speech, right conduct, right living, right effort, right thought and right concentration. All these, however, may be subsumed under three divisions: knowledge (prajña), conduct (śīla) and intuition (samādhi). These when practised to perfection help break down the links that connect us with the wheel of samsāra. And with the rupture of the weakest link avidyā the wheel will ground to a halt, freeing us from
the misery that afflicts our human lot.¹

Like the Buddhists the Jainas too are atheistic in their metaphysics as well as ethics. They believe that their moral code, based on the five great virtues of ahimsā, satya, asteya, brahmācarya and aparigraha is self-sufficient in its explanation and autonomous in its working. What is more, when it works itself out the jīva is led further into spiritual life, ever moving to the state of a tīrthāṅkara through the path of fourteen gūṇa-sthānas. We must note that the infinite perfections the jīva thus attains—infinitesimal perception (ananta-darśena), infinite knowledge (ananta-jñāna), infinite bliss (ananta-sukha) and infinite power (ananta-vīrya) belong to jīva by his very nature; they are not a favour from someone else. Only, in the state of bondage they have suffered an obscuration.²

The ethics which the Yoga teaches has much in common with Buddhism and Jainism, particularly where virtues are concerned. However their treatment in the Yoga is more scientific and psychological, pragmatic and mystical, as well as observable in their fruits internally as well as externally. Their application is universal, admitting of no exception whatever. Thus the virtue of ahimsā, which the Yoga regards as mahāvrata, extends in its application to every living being, to be practised in word, deed or thought at all times and in all places. So are also the five great virtues of ahimsā, satya, asteya, brahmācarya and aparigraha, negative in character and known as yamas. The other five are more positive, known as niyamas or regulative principles enjoining purity, contentment, penance, pursuit of intellectual, moral and spiritual disciplines, and devotion to God. And then there are the social virtues, maitrī, karuna, muddita, and upakṣā. The list

² Vedanta, pp.139s. Dasg. I, pp.192ss.
is almost endless, virtues related to and governing other virtues with angas or physical and physiological aids supporting them. In whatever way we may look at them, we come to realize that Yoga is a continuous process which finds its reward at every stage, culminating in the samādhi. This samādhi is the climax of that intense and all-absorbing process of concentration with the name of samyama whose other two lower stages are dhāraṇā and dhyāna. Once the Yogi has reached perfection in samādhi his actions become aṣukla-akṛṣṇa—neither good nor bad—which transcend all Gunas; whereas the actions of all the others who are yet to reach perfection can only be aṣukla (good), kṛṣṇa (bad) or aṣukla-kṛṣṇa (both good and bad).3

According to the Mīmāṁsā man can attain happiness only by observing dharma. Dharma, however, can be known solely and infallibly from the Veda. The Vedas or rather those parts of them known as Brāhmānas may be viewed on the whole as vidhis and arthavādas. Vidhi may be rendered as a prescription for an action while arthavāda is an explanation of it. Action alone is the final import of the Veda. All the other texts must be subordinated to it, or else must be discarded. Thus even the well-known texts like Tat tvam asi! according to the Mīmāṁsā are not mere statements of facts but mandatory by implication. In the performance of actions all kāma and artha ought to be subordinated to dharma, and dharma itself to moksa as the later version of the Mīmāṁsā holds it. Kumārila believes that a sacrifice produces in the agent a new force known as apūrva which secures for him heavenly bliss. Apūrva is somewhat like the adṛṣṭa of the Vaiṣeṣikas in that it is also an unseen force. But while adṛṣṭa can operate only under the agency of God, apūrva is autonomous, doing by itself what God would have done, rewarding the righteous and punishing the wicked.4

4. Vedanta, pp.143ss.
Śankarācārya maintains that the study of the Vedānta alone can bring about the emancipation of the atman. The study of the Vedānta admittedly presupposes exceptional qualities on the part of the student or candidate: a thorough grounding in all the Vedas, with their accessories like grammar, lexicon etc; the performance in the present or previous life of the obligatory Vedic duties known as nitya-karma and occasional observance of other duties like naimittika-karma; scrupulous avoidance of all actions born of selfish desires or kārmya-karma, as well as of prohibited actions or niṣīḍha-karma. Then he must also acquire four great virtues which are known as sādhanas since they are means of fitting his mind for Vedānta instruction: 1) discrimination between what is eternal and what is ephemeral—nityānityavastuviveka; 2) indifference to any enjoyment of things in this world and in the next—ihāmutrārtha-bhogavirāgah; 3) attainment of peace through self-control and other modes of realization—śaṃsthamādisādhana-sampat; 4) a longing for deliverance—mumukṣatva. Once these conditions are fulfilled the man must strive for the correct understanding of the true purport of the Upaniṣads (śravana); he must seek arguments in favour of the purport and strengthen his conviction (manana); and then he must meditate (nididhyāśana) and try to realize the truth as one.5

While commenting on the first sutra of Bādarāyana Šāṅkara denies the sense of introducing a new topic to the word atā, because the quest for Brahmāna cannot be so introduced. It can only mean 'immediately'.6 If moreover the word has any auspiciousness about it, we can see it only in its sound, and not in its signification any more than in the whole phrase. Nañhva, however, disagrees. The word atā signifies auspiciousness;

5. Dasg. I, pp. 489s; La Voie vers la Connaissance de Dieu—pp. 30s.
6. atāsabdāḥ ānantaryārthaḥ parigrhyate nādikārārthaḥ brahmajijñāsāya anadhikāryatvāt—Śāṅkara's Bhāṣya I, 1, 1
it also stands for an immediate sequel introducing a new topic. The difference between the two interpretations goes back to the doctrinal roots of monism versus dualism. It is true both Śaṅkara and Madhva agree in rejecting any study of the Mīmāṁsā sūtras as the necessary prelude to brahmajijnasa. But the reasons underlying the rejection are widely different. For Śaṅkara all such study revolves around truths which can only be empirical to be eventually sublated with the dawning of enlightenment. Madhva on the other hand refuses to countenance any dichotomy between the karma-kāṇḍa and the jñāna-kāṇḍa of the Veda. The unity it enjoys is that of its object and of the quest of knowledge concerning that object. What is really implied by atha is the eligibility of the aspirant or adhikārīn.

The Advaitins, moreover, cannot grant that the Absolute could really be an object of knowledge or of its quest. For all real knowledge is beyond the subject-object distinction. It follows then that jijnāsā cannot be made to refer to a new and distinct object, and consequently the word atha cannot have any introductory significance. The monists would prefer to take jijnāsā in the sense of desire for knowledge which again would not be a topic for search. As against such an objectless position Madhva is never tired of repeating that the Supreme is the object of the Veda; that he is the object of our quest and that the pronouncement in the first sūtra has again him for its object.

7. athaśabdā maṅgalārtho 'dhiṣkārāṃantaryārthasa/—B.S.Bh. I, 1, 1
8. sa eva sarvavedārtho jijnāsyoc'yaṃ vidhiyate/—A.V. I,1,11
9. Vācaspati Miśra in Bhāmati (I 1,1)—jijnāsā tāvad iha sūtre brahmaṇaśca tajjñānāc ca sabdātāḥ predānām pratīyate/
10. "tad vijijnāsasya tad brahma" iti brahmaśabdādena pūrna-guṇatvoktermānubhavasiṣṭdhalpaṁgūWalking
atīvaḥ atyaṁ pāyaḥ gunāḥ—N.V. I, 1, 1.
With regard to the four virtues which Śankara proposed as pre-conditions for the study of the Vedānta, Madhva would have reservations on the first and the last. The first—nityānityavastuviveka—is unacceptable if it is taken in the monistic sense. The last one—mumukṣatva—would imply that any one desirous of salvation is fit to be saved—a position that would go counter to the pet Mādhva thesis of selective predestination. We know that not all persons are eligible for liberation either in this birth or in any other. Some of them are bound for everlasting hell, others for endless samsāra. The elect, however, may be viewed differently according to their place in the order of adhikārins or aspirants. Thus we have first11 the lowly (manda) type, the medial (madhyama) and the highest (uttama). The best among human beings—all those who are not debarred from liberation constitute the lowly class. These can realize the Supreme from without (bahihprakāśa). The Rṣis and the Gandharvas comprise the medial class who can realize God from within—antahprakāśa. The gods make up the highest class who can intuit the Lord all over—sarvaprakāśa.12

The other classification envisages the high degree of spirituality the adhikārins have reached. The lowly one is characterized by devotion to God and the study of the Vedas; the middling is so known because of his ascetical advancement. The highest order is attained by that jīva who having realized the vanity of all creatures and acquired real detachment,

11. The criterion used for the first classification seems to be the capacity of the adhikārin to realize the Supreme.

12. mandamadhyottamatvena trividhā hyadhikārinah/tatra mandā manusyeṣu ya uttamagena matāḥ/ madhyama rṣigandharvā devāstātrottamā matāḥ/ iti jātikṛto bhedah—B.S.Bh. I 1, 1.

antahprakāśā bahihprakāśāh sarvaprakāśāh devā vāva sarvaprakāśāḥ rṣayo'ntahprakāśā mānuṣā eva bahihprakāśāḥ—Ibid., IV 3, 16.
gives up all self-seeking in his activity and clings to Visṇu alone. We may add that following the Vedānta tradition Madhva restricts the regular śāstraic study of the Vedas and realization through it only to the males of first three castes or varnas. Women and the śudras are assigned a by-path —through the Epics and the Purāṇas—which is also effective in taking them to their liberation. And yet it cannot be denied that there may be among women some chosen souls who are eligible for the study of Brahman through the Vedānta.

The singular insistence placed on brahma-jīvāsā must not lead one to imagine that the duties involved in one's varnāśrama are of little consequence. The individual is never exempted from them. Even a jñānin must not regard himself as beyond the obligations. Although externally his act of worship may be similar to that of a novice, still thanks to his intimate realization of the Godhead his actions will be a practical recognition of the divine grandeur and will be assumed as it were by the Supreme.

13. ...anyo guṇapūrvakah/ bhaktimān paraìe visnau yastva-

14. antya apī ye bhaktā nāmējñānadhikārīnāh/ strī-

15. yadyapi jñānenaiva mokṣo niyatah, tathā'pi jñānī 

16. nāḥam kartā harī kartā tatpūjā karma cākhilam/

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The performance of the duties prescribed by varnāśrama-
dharma in its turn facilitates the acquirement of vairāgya or
detachment so essential for spiritual life. It is presumed,
of course, that no kāma or artha interlopes here with its
poisonous fruits. We should hasten to add also, if only to
eschew a naturalistic and mechanical outlook, that vairāgya in
its consummate form has a spiritualistic element, derived from
the consciousness of God's excellences. This is a blessing
traceable to Bhakti. For all that, however, the function of
vairāgya is essentially preparatory, disposing the jīva for
upāsana negatively by removing the obstacles.

Before analysing the concept of upāsana according to
Madhva, we should note the place of importance he assigns to
the religious preceptor or guru. In keeping with the Indian
tradition, Madhva shows himself peremptory in his demand
that the aspirant should start his philosophical quest under
a preceptor. Important as are the personal efforts of the
novice in the pursuit of knowledge, the grace of the guru is
more potent still. Guru's it is to introduce the aspirant to the study of the texts in their unadulterated form and
orthodox interpretation. Knowing the nature of his disciple
better than the latter knows himself, he will also guide him on
the choice of texts and the right moment to meditatively delve
deep in it. Such guidance, if followed, will certainly obtain
for the aspirant the beatific vision.

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17. utpādyādhi kavairāgyaṃ tadgunādhi kavyavedānāt—A.V. III 3, 6b.
18. Cf. story of satyakāma—Ch. Up. IV, 9
19. guruprasādah svaprayatno va balāvē...gurupradēnēva
balavat...tāvatē'lamiti ca na mantavām—B.S. Bh. III 3, 45
20. āravanam mananam caiva kartavyam sarvathaiva hi/
mātrīrūtīhoriaśvilīśām gururuttamaḥ/ vetti tasyoktī-
mārgena kurvataḥ syadādi darśanam—A.V. III 3, 71s.
curse from such a powerful guru could seriously hamper the adhikārīn's spiritual advancement. So for his own good the aspirant ought to follow scrupulously the directions of his preceptor.

However, the mystique of the guru-cult does not make Madhva blind to a preceptor's limitations; nor does he, for that matter, expect the aspirant to be blind, too. Hence he gives a few practical suggestions in the matter of choosing or withdrawing from a guru's guidance. If the guru already chosen is of surpassing qualities the disciple must not give him up for another of lesser worth. If however the aspirant prefers another of equal worth, the permission of the former must be obtained before the change-over. But if the merits of the new guru are certainly greater the need for permission does not arise.21

What if an aspirant cannot find a guru who is an adept at interpreting the sacred texts? Madhva's practical wisdom is evident in the solution he offers. Let the aspirant approach anyone, he says, who can introduce him to the texts with a passable competence and in conformity with the (dualistic) system. In case, however, such an interpreter too is not forthcoming, let the aspirant himself assiduously pore over the texts, provided of course he possesses right knowledge in abundance. Let him, moreover, dispel all his doubts with the help of great devotees of Viṣṇu. And in the absence of anyone superior to him, let him see to his training himself, and even take up the instruction of disciples without of course betraying the true doctrine.22

21. gunādhikām gurum prápya taddhīnām nā'pnuyāt kvacīt/ viparyastu kartavyah sarvathā muktimicchatā/ same vikalpa eva syāt pūrvānūjīā ca sarvathā/ taduttamaguruprāptyal pūrvānūjīā/ na uṛgyate/—A.V. III 3, 188s.

22. yadi tādṛṣg gururnāsti nīrṇītaśravanādikam/ tatsiddhan- tānasāreṇa nīrṇayajñāt samāśareṇ ca samāśareṇ/—A.V. III 3, 74.

abhāve nīrṇayajñāsya sacchāstrānyeva sarvadā/ śṛṇuyād yadi
Upāsana may be rendered as a worshipful meditation on God and on His perfections. In its complete form it implies much from the aspirant: an acknowledgement that God is the father since He is the maker of the aspirant's body; that God has given rise to a singular attachment in the aspirant; that as the maker of everything God has awakened in him the most profound respect; that God has evoked an unreserved detachment in the aspirant since everything else for him is but a source of intense pain; and finally that thanks to an awareness of the excellence of God's perfections and of the universal dependence on Him, the aspirant has his love fortified. Such are the factors that define upāsana in the concrete. It must be practised always and with fervour.

The different stages in the pursuit of upāsana are seen by Madhva in the Upanisadic statement—ātmā vāre draṣṭavyah śrōtavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyah/. The first stage is śrāvena or hearing of the sacred texts, and implies by its very nature a study under the guidance of a guru. The second stage is manana or a prayerful reflexion over the texts. It consists in a close study of the textual import, relating, comparing and interpreting the various texts so as to arrive at the final and definitive conclusion which would dispel all doubt.

23. dehakartṛtvamāsesya ājñātvā tatpitṛtāśmrteḥ/ viśeṣa-snehamāpadya sarvakartṛtvato'dhikam/ nispādyā bahumānaṁ ca tadanyatrātiddhakataḥ/ utpādyādhikavārāgyam tadgunādhikya-vedanāt/ sarvasya tadavāstvāc ca dārīhyam bhakterāpāya ca/ yatstopāsanāyaiva viśistācāryasampadaḥ/ kartavya brahma-jijñāsetyukte kāṃciṁ samāye/—A.V. III 3, 5ss.

24. Kim mayā kāryamītyeva syād buddhiradhikārīnaḥ/... upāsana nityam kartavyetadareṇa hi/--Ibid., 50s.

25. Ait. Up. II 4, 5

doubts and errors. Manana is the continuation of śravaṇa and the two are so inter-related that Madhva views them both as the first stage of upāsana or śāstra-abhyāsa—drilling in the sacred texts. The other stage would be the contemplation or dhyāna which is practically the same as nīdānāyāsana of the Upaniṣads. Whatever be its name, it must be recognized as the culmination of the jīva’s mental prayer to which all the other previous stages were only stepping stones. As stepping stones, however, they indicate where the roots of dhyāna lie, and thus establish the intimate relationship which dhyāna bears to the Vedas. We may note also that such a relationship prevents dhyāna from becoming a mere exercise in vacuity or wool-gathering.

While analysing upāsana we may view it from the way it is practised. We may see three orders of upāsana according to the way a man is capable of meditating—internal, external and all-pervasive. This threefold division in its turn may be viewed under two aspects. What we mean by the person meditating on God internally may be either that he approaches the Lord under the medium of his heart or that he does so as far as God is present in his heart. Similarly the external worship may signify either that God is worshipped in so far as He is present in images, sacrifices etc. or as far as they are means to His worship; and finally an all-pervasive contemplation may either imply that all things lead one to God or that He is in all things.

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27. sopāsanā ca dvividhā śāstrabhūyāsasvarūpinīḥ dhyānarūpā perā caiva tadangadhāraṇādikam/-A.V. III 3, 52.

28. antarbhahiṣṣarvagatvenetyupāsātraividhyāt...tattad-upāsānyogasatyā ca purusānām/-B.S.Bh. I 1, 31.

29. kesāncit sarvagatvena keśāncidārdhayā hariḥ/ keśāncid bahirevāsvavāsyah puruṣottamah/...agnau kriyāvatām visnur-yoginām ārdhayā hariḥ/ pratimāsvaprabuddhānām sarvatra vidit-ātmanām/-Ibid.

upāsanābhedavād darśanabhedaḥ/ taccoktam kamathāsrutau--
On what precise point shall we meditate concerning God? The question should answer itself since God is the God of infinite perfections—infinite in number as well as in extent. It is natural, then, that the attribute of infinity itself or bhūmatva should get the pride of place among all the guṇas since it implies all the others by affinity. We may also contemplate Him as the great Ātman in the way the Upaniṣads would have, and that is the Lord and Master.

Madhva speaks also of what is usually known as pratīkopaṇa, which may be rendered as symbol contemplation. We find scattered among the Upaniṣads such prescriptions as—nāma brahmetyupāśita; mano brahmetyupāśita etc. They imply identity of some sort between the symbol and the Reality. The Śāṅkara school has taken this identity in a stricter sense where the 'symbols' are treated as ultimately identical with Brahman. In our meditation, too, we should treat them as identical with Brahman, they say, explaining the process as the superimposition of the idea of Brahman on the symbol. Madhva shows little relish for such an interpretation, suspecting, no doubt, the ogre of monism in the whole procedure. The Upaniṣadic statements are indeed misleading, and this is conceded by Madhva. However we should take them as asserting God's presence in, and not identity with things. Hermeneutically

"antardṛṣṭayo bhūrdṛṣṭayo vṛtuḥardṛṣṭayo sarvadṛṣṭayo iti devā vāva sarvadṛṣṭayasteu cottaṛottaramā brahmaṇo 'nyaśu tu yathā yogam yathā hyācāryā ācaksate" iti—Ibid., III 3, 52

30. sarva-guṇeṣu bhūma-guṇasya jyāyastvam kṛatuva sarvatra saha-bhāvat—Ibid., 59

31. svamī me viṣṇuritī śivavā tamma kathačana vismaret—A.V. IV 1, 14s.

32. Cf. Phil. of Śrī Madhva-cārya, p. 301.

33. Na pratīke na hi saḥ/ "nāma brahmetyupāste" ityādīnā śabdabhrāntyā na pratīke brahmadṛṣṭih kāryā/ kintu? tat-sthatvenaivopāsanam kāryam/—B.S.Bh. IV 1, 4
Madhva justifies his interpretation on the ground that the nominative can stand for any other case, locative not excepted. It is plain sense that if a man is to come by his goal, he must grasp the true nature of the goal as well as reflect over it. How could it be otherwise in spiritual life? We can understand that one contemplates Hari as "my Lord and the Master of everything else". But how could one worship him as identified with a symbol? Such a worship is fraught with evil rather than good. For it is a sin of stealing perpetrated on God. Even humanly speaking we should expect God to be enraged when something else far inferior to Him were worshipped as the Godhead. What king would not be indignant if a basely-born or candala were reverenced before gods and men? The king would certainly feel that in the raising of the candala's status to royalty, his own has been lowered to that of a basely-born. Thus the so-called pratikopasana is like a double-edged sword which cuts both ways. That being the case the only salutary conclusion we can draw is that the blessed Visnu must always be contemplated as Brahman. For eminent is the meaning of Brahmas, fullness is his nature.

34. sarvārthaḥ prathamāḥ yasmāt saṃprathamāḥ tato mañāḥ--Ibid.
35. tasmād vastu yathārūpam jñeyam dhīreyam ca sarvadāḥ/ kāraṇām puruṣārthasya nānyathā bhavati kvacīt--A.V. IV 1, 29
36. Cf. note 31 (p.174)...mama svāmī hariṁniyam saṃvasya patireva ca/ iti dhīreyah sarvadāiva bhagavān visnuryeyah/ pratikavīṣṇaveti ne kārīyā visnubāvenā/ pratikām naiva vispuryanmīthopāsaḥ jyānarthadā--Ibid., 16s.
37. svātmanām samipām vā'pi devāntaram eva vā/ cetanācetanam vā'nyad dhyāyey yah keśavastvīti/ kim tene naktam pāpyam corenesāpahārinā/ yo'nyad visnurite dhyāyejñānyād vah harim tathā/ endhe tamasi majjetsa yatra naivottthiḥ kvacīt/ --Ibid., 21s.
38. Ibid., 48-55
39. Brahmeti ca sadā dhyeyo bhagavān visnurājjasā/ utkṛceto brahmaśabdārthāḥ pūrṇatvam brahmaṭaḥ yataḥ/--Ibid., 32
Given the advantages which each of these meditations can claim, the pièce de résistance according to Madhva seems to be bimbopāsana or contemplation of God as the exemplar whose copy the jīva is. We have discussed above Madhva’s conception of this intriguing idea. The bimbopāsana takes all of it for its basis and leads the bonded jīva closest to his release. For bondage consists in the obscuration of the jīva’s nature as the reflection of the Divine, and the realization of the true nature should be what brings the jīva nearest to end the obscuration.

Once the excellence of bimbopāsana is emphasized Madhva gives evidence of his psychological insight in allowing the individual to make his own choice from the infinite variety of God’s qualities. For each would see Brahman according to his own aptitude—yogyatā. But one must take care that nothing which is incompatible with his perfect nature should be ascribed to Brahman. So also the qualities we contemplate must be otherworldly by nature. If they were only of this world how could they take us beyond it?

There should be no objection if the aspirant likes to meditate also on other supernatural beings. Here a word of caution is necessary, though. All such meditation should respect the gradation in the status of those beings. While the meditation that ascribes the excellences of an inferior being to a superior one may be in order, to attribute the

40. Na ca bhagavatah sarvatra gunasāmyād yasyakasyāpi rūpasya darsanāt sarvesāṁ muktih/ "samo'pi bhagavān sva-bimbadārāna evainam mociyati/ yathā sameṣvāpi karmasv sa-krtamevainam bhojeyati//—N.V. III 3, 32

41. svayogopāsanānāntaram sāmānyasyāpi kasyaścidupāsanaṁ vikalpaṁ bhaveti viśistaphalāpeksayā/—B.S.Bh. III 3, 61

42. bhindhi viddhi śrṇihi phalabheda sarvasaṁ/ yathyādīnām tesaṁvānādhiśikāryekatā bhavet/ ayogyopāsanaṁ-dī- yuranartham cārthanāsaṁnam/—Ibid., 26
perfections of the superior to the inferior is certainly improper.43

There can be no hard and fast rule with regards to the timing of the meditation. As for posture, sitting is ideal for nididhyasana.44 The mind then loses its fickleness and instability, and takes on concentration. With the body resting a sense of tranquillity settles over the mind and senses. If the state of concentration comes over him easily the aspirant may take to meditation irrespective of time and place. After all time and place are only means to reach concentration. They ought not to be made, then, end in themselves.45

Whatever be the activity he is engaged in, let not the aspirant forget that he has one grand purpose to work for, and that is final release. Let him then make use of whatever helps him to achieve his end, and reject what does not. He should therefore realize how nefarious it is to long to be God himself or be one with Him. It is also wrong to ogle the

43. angadevatānām yathā yathā paramesvarāngaśrayatvam —"caksoh sūryo ajāyata" ityādi, tathā bhāvenā kartavye/
--Ibid., 63

44. sarvādopāsanān ca nopāsambhriyate/..."samātvād vottā matvād vā nānga-devādyupāsanām/ upasāmāryāmyāh'hurvedasiddhāntavedinah/
--Ibid., 57

45. deśakālāvasthādīgu yatraikagraṭā bhavati tatraiva sthātaival—"taneva deśam seveta tam kālam tāmavasthitim/ taneva bhogan seveta mano yatra prasidati/ nahi desadbhih kaścid viśeṣeh samudiritah/ manāhprasādānārtham hi desa- kālāticintana/
--Ibid., 11
high positions the other supernal beings enjoy. If he else he will encompass his own downfall. Finally he will do ill if he envies the Gandharvas, Rsis and others their privileged status. He may, however, righteously aspire for the exceptional knowledge they possess. Perfections like knowledge can rouse his aspirations in that they are empowered to lead one to salvation. This holds good also where the classical exercises of the Yoga are in question. For as Madhva sees them, yogic exercises are no more than auxiliaries to upāsana, itself the forerunner of liberation.

46. na ca paramātmāsvaryādikomākāṅkṣayam/ brahmādīnāmapi nā’kāṅkṣyam kimu parasyeti sūcayitumapi śabdah/..."na deva-padamānvinicchet kuta eva harerguṇān/ icchan patati pūrvasmād- adhastād yatra notthitih"—Ibid. III 4, 41

'yatharṣin prayāpatīn na kāṅkṣedevam na gandharvān na vidyādhasān na siddhān...'na daivānabhikāṅkṣeta kuta eva harerguṇān/ pra japattyān na cāreśāmba gandharvādīnapī kvacit/ ṛṣyādiṣu viśeṣe tu doso naivāvīdeśaītah"—Ibid., 42

47. sopāsānā ca dvividhā sāstrābhyaṣasvarūpīnī/ dhyānarūpā parā caiva tadaṅgam dhāraṇādhikam/—A.V. III 3, 52
C. Jñāna, Bhakti and Grace

While stressing the limitations of Karma or works in the pursuit of salvation as the other Vedāntins do, Madhva has also insisted that a total abstention from them is neither desirable nor possible. We saw how good works done without self-interest or ulterior motives, are of immense value in the attainment of vairāgya. They are, moreover, potent means in obtaining God's grace though this grace is of minor order.1 Whatever be the efficacy of disinterested work, it can constitute only means to an end or the rise of salvific knowledge by purifying the mind.2

There is a certain gradation in our pursuit of perfection which is simple enough when viewed theoretically. First there is the detachment acquired mostly through disinterested works which themselves are made efficacious by divine grace. This ascetical stage when pursued with studious efforts at meditation gives rise to jñāna—again through the efficacy of grace. Then there is the brighter side of jñāna, and that is Bhakti. We must never forget that jñāna constitutes an essential part of Bhakti. The importance of jñāna has been emphasized from of old. Tam vidvān eva cāmrtaḥ—says the Taittiriya Āraṇyaka.3 The statement ought not to be taken to mean that knowledge alone is sufficient for liberation, but that without knowledge only through sacrificial acts, for instance,—no salvation is possible. That is why Madhva declares in his commentary on

1. Karmanā tvadhamah proktaḥ prasādah—B.S.Bh. I 1, 1 (p.6)
This variety of grace will be generally known as anugraha in later Mādhva thought as distinguished from prasāda or grace in fuller sense.

2. akāmakarmanāmamantahkaranaḥ sūdhyā jñānānmokso bhavati
—G.Bh. III, 4

3. It is the one who knows that becomes immortal—III 1, 3

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The essential part which jñāna goes to constitute in Bhakti is seen in the definitions Madhva gives of the latter: Bhakti is the awareness of God's greatness, with affection accompanying it. Or to put it the other way: That bond of affection which is preceded by an admiration for Him is called Bhakti. Both the descriptions, it will be noticed, include jñāna as the 'enlightening' factor of affection, apparently because the latter would otherwise degenerate into mere sentimentality. The importance of knowledge in Bhakti is so great that Bhakti itself at times is named jñāna, as Madhva declares. When the attention is to be drawn to its cognitive aspect the same reality is designated as jñāna. Thus it is jñāna that is referred to when immediacy or mediacy are intended since they primarily pertain to knowledge. If however affection is meant to be emphasized, we have it designated as Bhakti. In either case both the aspects are included in one and the same reality.

We can now well understand the statement of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, referred to by Madhva in his Anuvyākhyāna: Those who have truly reached realization and wisdom will know the highest abode as mine; that is why the wise man is most dear to me; by his wisdom he bears me in himself. Knowledge in its

4. III, 20
5. mahitvabuddhirbhaktistusnehapūrva'bhidhiyate—B.S.Bh.
III 2, 19
6. snehānubandho yastasmin bahumānapurusasah/ bhaktirityucyate—Ibid., 3, 54
8. jñānavijñānasamsiddhāḥ padam ēreṣṭam vidur mama/ jānī pīyatamo'to me jñānenāsaubibhārti mām/ --Bhāgavata Purāṇa XI 19—quoted in La Voie vers la Connaissance de Dieu (p.35). Cf. also A.V. I 1, 11

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highest form is as welcome to God as Bhakti because both of them agree in what they signify. Hence we understand statements like: Viṣṇu grants knowledge to the ignorant, and release to the knowing. It is the same Janārđana who bestows happiness on the released.⁹

And yet in theory we are fully justified in distinguishing Bhakti from jñāna and loading it with endless encomium. It is Bhakti that sets in motion the work of our salvation, and it is Bhakti that will endure for all eternity even when salvation has been reached. Madhva lists its function at various stages of our spiritual life. Bhakti is as much the source of jñāna, he says, as jñāna is of Bhakti; then comes the vision, and with it Bhakti afresh. This in turn will lead us to liberation, and in it too we shall have Bhakti, though transformed now into bliss. It is Bhakti that propitiates the Blessed One to grant stable knowledge, which results in the vision thanks again to Bhakti; and it is due to Bhakti that he will bestow salvation, too.¹⁰ Madhva is so carried away by his appreciation of Bhakti towards the Supreme that he does not hesitate to regard it as the best of all means to reach our destiny, far more potent than mediate or immediate knowledge.¹¹ He goes further. Bhakti is an end itself, being its own fruit, thanks to its blissful character. That is why even after his liberation the jīva feels himself overwhelmed with

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⁹ ajñānam jñānado viṣṇuh, jñānīnām moksadaśca saḥ/ ānandadeśca muktānām sa evaiko janārđana iti ca/—V.T.V., 110.
¹¹ visṣubhakterova sarvasādhanottamatvam paroksāparoksasajñāneyorjñānino'pi moksasya tadadhīnantvam ca/—G.T.H. Introd. (p.2)
ever-increasing Bhakti and in it finds his happiness.\textsuperscript{12}

Bhakti on the part of the devotee implies as its correlative, prāsāda or grace from the part of the Lord. It may be recalled that efficacy of any act depends first and last on the sweet will of God. The dependence is even greater—if such a thing is possible—in the case of salvific acts. Numerous are the statements to be found among Madhva's writings which ascribe the entire process of liberation to the grace of the Lord. Yam evaisa vrūnte tena labhyah—is the Upanisadic declaration cited by Madhva to prove that all salvation finally depends on God alone.\textsuperscript{12} We know that even our first steps in asceticism or at obtaining vairāgya needs must have divine grace if they are to be efficacious at all.\textsuperscript{14} The rise of knowledge and, we may add, of Bhakti, too is due to God's favour. And finally it is God in His goodness who lets himself be seen by the devotee, emancipates him and blesses him with eternal happiness.\textsuperscript{15}

The gratuitous nature of grace has one more practical lesson for us. If liberation is not possible without the

\textsuperscript{12} Bhaktya prasannah paramo dadyag jñānamanākulaṁ/ bhaktim ca bhūyasim tābhıyāṁ prasanno darśanam vr̃jeta/ tato'pi bhūyasim bhaktim dadyat tābhıyām vimoccayet/ mukto'pi tadvaśo nityam bhuyo bhaktisamanvitah/ sandrañandasvarupaśva bhaktiraivātāra sādhanam—\textit{Ibid.} (p.4)

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Katha-Up.} II, 23. \textit{V.T.V.}, 107.

\textsuperscript{14} Vide note 1 (p.179).

\textsuperscript{15} Some of the texts extolling God's grace may be cited:

\textit{Ajñānam jñānado Viṣṇuh...}(Vide note 9, p.181). The text is from the \textit{Skandapurāṇa}. It is quoted also in B.S.Bh. I 1, 15.

\textit{Nāyamāṁ praveśanena labhyo na medhaya na bahunā śrutena/ yamevaṁa vr̃nte tena labhyah, tasyaṁśa ātmā vivr̃nte tanum svāṁ—V.T.V., 107.—Katha-Up.}

\textit{Tesāmāṁ samuddhātā mṛtyusamsārasāgarat/ bhavāṁī na cirātpārtha mayyāveśitacetāsam—V.T.V., 168. Bh.G.}
grace of God, and if final grace is impossible to come by apart from knowledge the quest for the knowledge of Brahman becomes a sine qua non. God's grace, then, calls for efforts on our part and aids them from start to finish. It also effectively meets the objection that because the jīva by nature resembles the Lord in knowledge, bliss etc. and that too intrinsically, no devotion, knowledge, grace etc. are called for. For without Bhakti such resemblance is not manifested; and this, we may believe, holds good for knowledge and grace, too.

Before we conclude the topic a word must be said concerning the opposite of Bhakti or the hatred of God. It is the Purāṇas upon which Madhva generally draws with predilection, that innocently make trouble for him in the present case. Swept off their feet, no doubt, by their enthusiasm for a personal God and for any thought about Him, some of the Purānic writers have gone so far as to suggest that even the inveterate enemies of God have attained salvation precisely through their obsessive thought of Him. Madhva is aware that to admit such an absurdity is to invert the scale of religious values, where both those who love God and those who hate Him would equally be saved! Madhva therefore does not mince words in rejecting such a contention, all the while claiming śrutī for his support. To assert the possibility of emancipation through hatred, he declares, is contrary to śrutī texts. Those who chose to turn away from Rāma and become his foes have gloomy recesses prepared for their eternal habitation, the abode of enmity—those who hate Hari, as also those who claim they are not different from him; those who proclaim him as nirguna and those who see

16. yato nārāyasprāsamātṛte na mokṣah, na ca jñānam vinā' tyaṛthapraśādah, ato brahmajīṇāsā kartavyā/—B.S.Bh. I 1, 1(p.5)

17. nityasiddhatvāt sādṛṣasya nityānandajānāder na bhaktijānānādiprayojanam iti—bhaktim vinā na tatsādṛṣyam samyagabhīvyajyate/—B.S.Bh. III 2, 19
in him imperfections. For as we have proved beyond doubt, salvation comes from God propitiated through Bhakti. The texts of Śruti, of Purāṇas as well as of āgama all speak of His perfections. Any supposition that salvation could be had through a hatred of God would imply that He is a bundle of imperfections. It is true that at times the Purānic authors resort to the idea of hate to bring out God's perfections. But what is really implied is that the Blessed One ought to be sedulously kept before our mind. Also it is like the angry words of a father who in his annoyance bids his son to die, though what he wants really is to upbraid the culprit.

There is no doubt then that the hatred for Hari brings us no good—like the hatred for one's guru. What wonder, then, that the blessed Nārāyaṇa should instruct Arjuna, Indra's avatāra, the highest of the aspirants and most dear to him, that the supreme duty for a Kṣatriya in particular is to subdue those who hate Nārāyaṇa—and this precisely when Arjuna in his affection for his own demands to know if it was not contrary to dharma.

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19. bhaktyā prasannato devān muktīryeva tadgūnā/ vadvati śrutayaḥ sarvāḥ pūrāṇāgāmā api/ yadi dveṣaṇācayaḥ/ smārtāvya bhagavān nityamityarṣēnaiva kvecit/ dveśādīva guṇanāha pūrāṇe kruddhavākyavat/ yathā kruddhah pitā putram māretyakarpurvakam/—Ibid., 4, 297śś.

20. Haridveṣo na subhādah saddveṣatvād yathā gurūḥ/ —Ibid., 234a

D. Jivanmukti

The possibility of salyific illumination even before the end of this life seems to be admitted by the author of the Brahma-sūtras. Such an illumination is another word for the identity of the individual self with the Universal Atman, as Śaṅkara believes. The same state is known as liberation, too. Physical death is not the necessary precondition or accompaniment of liberation. The self may still persist in its embodied state as the potter's wheel goes on rotating even after the vessel has been completed.1

Although Madhva cannot grant the identification of the jīva with God as defining the nature of illumination, he does teach that aparokṣa-jñāna as well as jīvanmukti is real. We have seen his views on bimbopāsana. However refined and exalted bimbopāsana may be, it is still a flower in relation to the next stage or aparokṣa-jñāna which is the fruit of all the ascetical endeavours of the devotee, and the graces and helps of the Lord. Even in the bimbopāsana the exemplar of the Lord which the jīva contemplates as the archetype of himself is no more than a reflexion as the individual sees it. It is not Brahman pure and simple. We may of course refer to it as Brahman by a sort of analogy as we call God's ānanda and man's ānanda by the same name. Yet it is like the worship of a personage through its image. Through the divine grace it leads the devotee to the actual vision of the Lord.2 And we

1. Iph., pp.645-46; Vedanta, pp.166ss.
2. yathā jīvāndāderanyad brahma tathopāsakrtādapi—
pasyanti paramam brahma citte yet pratibimbitam/ brahmaiva
pratibimbe yadatasām phalapradam/ tadupāsanam ca bhavati
pratimopāsanaṁ yathā/ drāyate tvaparokṣena jānenaiva paraṁ
padam/ upāsanā tvaparokṣyaṁ gametat tadprāsadah—3.S.Bh.,
III, 2, 37.

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must hasten to add, that if the Brahman who by nature is unmanifest, chooses to reveal his form to his devotee, he does so with his ineffable power. But for his divine will, none can hope for a vision of the Infinite One.3

By and large Madhva agrees with the other schools which subscribe to jīvanmukti. He also concedes that even when the aparokṣa-jiñāna has taken place there may be a delay in the unfolding of the final release owing to the obstructions like the prārabdha-karma or the karma that has begun to bear fruit. In case the effects have been already worked out in the present life of the individual he will attain release immediately. If on the other hand the effects are too many to exhaust in the present life, the jīva will have to undergo one or more rebirths.4 However the aparokṣa-jiñānīn may draw consolation from the fact that he has his final release assured sooner or later.

The theism of Madhva has one more point to add. Karma, even when it is ripe, is not beyond the Lord’s power which nothing can withstand. If he so wills—for reasons not known to us—the Blessed One may crush the surviving karmic effects, cutting across their aspects pleasant and unpleasant alike.5 Thus the benevolence of God and the gratuitousness of His grace come to be as underscored now as ever before.

3. nityāvyaktasya kathām prakāśā ityata ucyate—nityā-vyakto’pi bhagavāniksyate nijaśaktitaḥ/ tamṛte paramātmānaṁ kaḥ peṣyetāmitaṁ prabhūm?—Ibid., 27

4. evameva prārabdha-karmādbhāve sarīrapātāntarāmeva mokṣaḥ, tadbhave janmāntarānītyaniyamyah/—B.S.Bh. III 4, 51

5. upamṛdyā puṇyaḥ ca pāpam ca kāmācaranto brahmaṁ-vrajanti/—Ibid., 16

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E. Mukti

Divesting oneself of all that is alien to one's nature and bringing out the true self is mukti or liberation.¹ The jīva has by now lived out his prārabdha karma if it had not been already eliminated root and branch by the grace of God. Jīvanmukti, if there was one, has come to an end. The jīva departs from his subtle body (liṅga-śarīra) once and for all, and after lingering for a while in the Brahma-loka—as the Upaniṣads and the Purāṇas would have it—enters the final beatitude under the leadership of Hiraṇya-garbha.²

It is to be expected that the different philosophical systems in India should vary also in their view of man's summum bonum as they did concerning all that led up to it. Thus the Jainas believe that the jīva in spite of his infinitely perfect nature has come to be a prisoner of karma as a bird in the cage.³ The realization of his true perfect nature defines his liberation. But if karma which is but a form of prakṛti and a thoroughly inert reality at that, could by itself overpower the all-perfect jīva so as to smother its excellences beyond recognition what guarantee could there be that the release for the jīva is definitive or even possible? Mokṣa for the nihilistic

¹. "muktir-hita'nya'tthaśvāryupām svarupena vyavasthitih" --B.S.Bh. I 1, 17


³. āśritya pratibhāmāha jinastattaḥstāmaśāṁ/ jñānāt karmakṣayaṁ mokṣo bhaved dehākhyaptamjarat/ pañjaraṁ muktahājagad- vadālokakasagocaraḥ/ nityamurdhvam vrajaṭyeva padaṁ/—A.V. IV 2, 22.
Buddhists is a void—grand void. In this grand void, all desire as everything else is supposed to disappear without a trace. However, how could one maintain the total extinction of all desire as long as there remains the desire to end all desire? Desire is the offshoot of self-knowledge. It is pointless to assert therefore that all desires could come to an end as long as the self-knowledge has not vanished. The truth is that the Śūnyavādins fail to distinguish between those desires which are detrimental to mokṣa and those which are conducive to it.

The Śāṅkhyas maintain that when the puruṣa has broken loose from all contact with prakṛti he has attained his release. Puruṣa is pure consciousness. How does he, then, come to be enmeshed in the tentacles of prakṛti? The Śāṅkhyas are not being wise when they assert that what is bound and what is loosed is prakṛti, not puruṣa. Such a view plainly goes counter to our experience. After all one must admit that if we are prepared to undergo the gruelling in this life it is to get the self free from the morass it is in. What do we care whatever happens to the morass?

The Naiyāyikas argue for the absence of all consciousness in mokṣa. This is evidently the result of failing to distinguish between right knowledge and wrong one. We do admit erroneous knowledge as the cause of bondage. But we should also maintain that right knowledge is salvific more or less directly. The ingeniousness of the Naiyāyikas is indeed appalling. The same knowledge which has brought about our bondage becomes the means of release in the view of the Naiyāyikas! What sort of atman could he be who has been emptied of all

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4. A.V. IV, 2, 32ss.
5. Ibid., 71ss.
6. Ibid.
knowledge? Moreover to define mukti essentially as the absence of twenty-one vedanas is to sin by defect. What is of far greater moment is the positive aspect of mukti on which the Naiyāyikas have nothing to offer us.

The main target of Madhva's attack, of course, is the Advaitic position which denies all difference between the emancipated self and the Absolute. To admit even a semblance of such a view is to jeopardize the grand Dvaita edifice built on the five-fold difference. But there is little need for us to repeat the elaborate arguments already sketched in earlier chapters. We have only to remember that those arguments can be comprehensively understood only when they are applied to jīvas in the state of release. For it is the jīvas' way of being in mokṣa that ultimately matters. And of what worth will mokṣa be if the self does not survive in it? It is the self, we have seen, that is the goal of all desires.

And yet we may cite a number of sacred texts which apparently deny a real distinction between the jīva and the Absolute. In point of fact, however, it is not so. The unity predicated of the Absolute and the relative is often the unity of thought or of location as in the text—karmāni vijñāna-mayaśca ātmā pare'vyaye sarva ekābhavanti. If the unity implied here were identity in essential nature, to speak of both karma and the self which is characterized by consciousness as reaching identity would be wrong. For even the adversaries do not maintain that in liberation there is unity between karma and God. They could not make a case from the example of conch-shell silver, either, since the silver sublated at the dawn of

7. jñānarūpasya vijñānamāstannāsa eva yat—Ibid., 79
8. atmābhāve pumarthaḥ ka iṣṭasyatmā avadhīryataḥ—A.V. IV 2, 53a
9. ...ityatrāpi ekābhavo matyasikyaṃ kṣirābhyādīsthitadadrūpāpekṣayā sthānaikyaṃ va—V.T.V., 293

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right knowledge is not seen to become one with the shell. As a matter of fact the words "pare'vyaye sarva ekibhavanti" signify that it is Brahman that provides the basis for the unifying process and thereby they imply difference. Or else the wording should have read—they become the supreme Atman itself.10 Also the statements like 'He who knows Brahman, becomes Brahman' imply that a knower of Brahman attains development. They are like the sayings—Even a śūdra becomes a brāhmaṇa by worshipping a brāhmaṇa. Surely a worshipper of brāhmaṇa does not become a brāhmaṇa physically.11 So the primacy, uniqueness and independence of Viṣṇu cannot be in any way compromised. He is like the midday sun. In his overwhelming effulgence the faintest gleam of the lamps that are the jīvas gets lost by a sort of inundation. But there is no strict absorption, much less an identification.12

What does the state of mukti imply precisely and positively? We saw how the Sāṅkhyaś and the Pāiyāyikas cling to a negative view of mokṣa. In support of their view they may even cite passages from śrutī, like—asaśārām vāva sāntaṁ na priyāpiye spṛśataḥ.13 Any such support is essentially short-lived, being the result of a short-sighted interpretation. For not all joy and happiness is debarred from mokṣa. What is truly ruled out

10. svarūpaikyaibhipraye karmani vijnanamaya ceti na yujyate/ na hi tatpakte'pi karmāṇaṁ brahmaikyaṁ muktavasti/... na ca jñānāṇivṛttasya rajatasya śuktayāikibhāvavayaśvahāro 'sti/ pare'vyaya ityadhikaranatvayakathanāṁ ca bhedañjayakam/ evyathā para eva bhavantīti nirdēśassyaśt/-V.T.V., 296, 298-300.
11. Brahma veda brahmaiva bhavitāyahi ca sampūya brāhmaṇam bhaktyā śūdro'pi brāhmaṇo bhaveditivat brāhma bhavitāyarthah/ na hi brahmanapujakah sa eva brahmano bhavati/-Ibid., 301, 302.
12. yathāpiyanti tejāmśi mahātejāśi bhāskare/ prthak-prthak sthitānyaḥni svarūpaipareṇi sarvasāḥ/ pare brahmaṇi jīvākhyabrahmāṇyaipiyanti hī/ muktau prthak sthitānyeva tadanyeṣāmadārśanāmi/ apiṣyaṣya samuddanto na svarūpapakata kvaicit/-Ibid., 307
13. Ch.Up. VIII, 12, 1.

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is pleasure in the crude, material sense. It does not take much thought to see that whatever material as well as unpleasant is incompatible with the state of mukti. This, however, does not and cannot include that inner joy which is the essence of the jīva himself.14

Knowledge and bliss—these are the twin attributes which characterize the jīva in mokṣa. Consciousness, to be sure, defines the essence of the jīvātman and so any loss of consciousness would mean the loss of the very selfhood.15 Consequently we must characterize that objection as merely specious which sees a contradiction in a subject becoming its own object. Our experience itself would give the lie to any such supposition.16

What is said of knowledge may be with equal reason said of bliss. In the absence of bliss in mokṣa any striving after it would be deprived of any motivations, and would to that extent lose its urgency. If the negative factor alone, namely the cessation of all pain, were held as an adequate motive, we may fairly retort by pointing out that the prospective loss of all happiness on the other hand would offset such motivation and take away the very soul of all ascetical striving. Do we not see even in our everyday contacts people going to great lengths in order to win a paltry happiness? Similarly to save the little they have won, no danger is too great for them. Hence the view that makes the state of mokṣa devoid of all joy

14. prākṛtapriyāhānistu priyāsprṣtriritīryate/ aprīyam pratikūlaṁ tadaviṣeṣeṇa ṣabditeṁ/ nāsti hyapraṇkṛtaṁ duḥkhāṁ satō jivasya kutracit/ priyam svarūpāmevāsya balanandāci-vākyatāṁ/ heyatvādipriyasyaiva priyāhāneraṇiṣṭhāṁ/ na samasta priyābhāvo mokṣe prokte tu yuṣyate/—A.V. IV 2, 73ss.

15. jñānarūpasya vijñānanāśastanaṁ eva yat—Ibid., 79

16. pratyaksamātmaṁ vijñānaṁ virodhānubhāvādapi/ na svē-vijñānitāyaṁ ca virodhaṁ kaścaneṣe⁴/ kartrkarmavirodhaṁ ca nityānuḥsvaḥavirodhahah/ kathameva padaṁ gacched virodha/ drṣṭabādhanam/—Ibid., 83s.
and happiness must be itself regarded as devoid of all truth. If the Scriptures speak of a body which the jīva is
supposed to possess in mokṣa it must be understood in a spiritual sense. The very essence of the jīva is viewed here as
his body. Since, however, it is knowledge and bliss that go to form his essence they will be the constituents of his body
as well. "The head, the trunk, the hands, the feet—these constituted of knowledge and bliss, will make up the soul's
essence. Delivered of all imperfection, the emancipated souls will ever find their pleasure in sport."

Because no two jīvas are identical even in their essence their essential characteristics must differ from soul to soul,
too. Ānanda-tāratamya or a hierarchical gradation among the released souls with regard to their bliss is but a corollary
of the wider Mādhva doctrine on yogyatā and bheda. The status which the jīvas enjoyed in their life of bondage is an indication
of the grade they will attain in liberation. Thus the Lord will give them forms corresponding to their former status.
The jīva that was pità will be now given the form of pità and will really become pità; the Gandharva will receive the form of
a Gandharva and will become a true Gandharva; so will it be with deva and Prajāpati and so with Brahmā. It is like the
child having in itself the capacity for becoming a twice-born (dvija).

17. sukhādīdharmahānau tu mukteḥ kīccha prayojanem? yad-
yartho duḥkhasanānīḥ syādamanarthāḥ sukhanāśanam/ tayoṣca duḥkhā-
hānādhi sukhanāśo'dhiko bhavet/ prāpyāpi duḥkhām sumahat
sukhaleśāptaye janaḥ/ yetate sukhanānau hi ko mokṣaṃya yetet
pumān? alpāca sukhanāśādhi bibhetyatitarām janaḥ/ mahacca
duḥkhānapnoti sukhanāśenivṛttaye/--Ibid., 88ss.

18. cidānandaśirodehaḥpārandipādātmakāḥ sadā/ sarvadosāvinir-muktā
muktāḥ kṛṣṇānti nityāsāḥ/--B.A.U.Bh. III 5, 4 (p.264).
   yadā mukto bhaved brahmā tadā brahmā sa mukhyataḥ/ evam
   prajāpatiścāva tathāvāye'pi sarvaśah/ yathā hi svaramāpād-
yam malahānau hi tad bhavet/ pūrvam tu yogyatāmātraṃ dvijetvam
   bālaka yathā/ ityadi ca--Ibid.
In general, however, the thoughts of the emancipated are totally in harmony with those of their Lord. Whatever be the Lord's will, the same is the will of the jīvas in liberation. Hence all of them have something in common and that is the bliss issuing from their union with God. For bliss results from the jīva's being united with the Blessed One in his 'bodily' resemblance. The jīva comes to resemble God's 'body' in the likeness—and this is the bliss he will possess. For we must remember that God's 'body' too, with all its limbs is made of knowledge and bliss.

However there can be a difference in the jīvas' union with God, and consequently in their bliss. We have the first stage when a jīva is privileged to live in the 'world' of Viṣṇu, and this is called sālokya-mukti. In the second stage—the jīva is admitted to the divine presence as a servant could be. This is known as sāmipya-mukti. The sārūpya-mukti or the third stage consists in the realization of the jīva's desire to be united with God, in that he acquires a body resembling that of the Lord. And in the final stage named saỹujya-mukti, the soul is admitted into God's body, but without any dissolution of the self. Since it is an intimate union we may believe it entails the highest peak of bliss.

20. sa bhagavān yathākāmo bhavati tathākāmo jīvo bhavati/ ittham kāmo'ya bhūyāditi bhagavadičchāvaśādasya kāmo bhavatītyarthah—Ibid. (p.343)


23. Viṣṇor dāsatasāya viṣṇoḥ sāmipyaṁ mokṣa ucyate—Ibid. (p.260)


25. praviśya deham yo bhogah svarūpavatirekataḥ/ aṣṭyaṃ- miti tam prāhuḥ saṃyuktatvād viśeṣataḥ/ iti ca—B.A.U.Bh. VI 1, 4 (p.324).
We may derive an additional proof for the ananda-taratamya from the disparity in the sadhanas themselves. That the practice of the sadhanas differs from person to person needs no elaborate proof. Any difference in the means and in the use of them ought to assert itself in the state of moksa which is their result.26

Madhva then forestalls an objection. Both the objection and the answer, it will be noticed, have a practical and human touch about them. Given the difference in the jīvas’ status, will it not lead to jealousy and bad blood? Why should it? counters Madhva. The objection apparently ignores the fact that only he is privileged to have beatific vision who has erased from himself even the traces of all defects through numerous births and rebirths. How then could hatred, jealousy etc. make themselves felt in moksa? Further we must note that the objection cuts both ways. For once we grant the possibility of pettiness among the emancipated because of the disparities among them there is no guarantee that the levelling of all differences would keep away envy and hatred once for all from the egalitarian community. Contrary indeed would be the case. For even among the ascetics, we know, there is no dearth of hatred and jealousy towards those whom they regard as their equals. The reason for such a state of things must be traced to the prevalence of imperfections in this world. The absence of such prevalence in release should necessarily exclude hatred, jealousy etc. from among the emancipated, disparities in their status notwithstanding. If we have to postulate the absence of others as the condition for ruling out envy etc. how could we prevent the lack of happiness as the result of the same absence? Śruti itself is our witness that even Brahmā felt

unhappy in finding himself alone in the beginning.\textsuperscript{27}

The fact is that there is no room at all for any bitterness among the emancipated. Each of the jīvas enjoys the vision of God to his utmost capacity or yogyaṭā by which he is distinguished. The water that fills a jar to the brim does not equal the amount found in a river or ocean. And yet each according to its capacity will reach its fullness with greater or lesser amount. So the jīvas too, from human beings to the four-faced Brahmā, will reach their fullness according to their capacity thanks to the means like Bhakti, which have been imparted to them from time without beginning. While a lesser soul will attain its fullness with less, a greater one will need something proportionately greater.\textsuperscript{28} Thus with all their desires fulfilled to their maximum, the emancipated beings have absolutely no grievance left. Spiritually they are like a closely-knit family harmoniously well-disposed towards each other and rejoicing in the company of one another because ultimately they are of one heart and mind with God himself. Those of the higher status go all out to aid those on the lower rung. The latter, with all their activities

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\textsuperscript{27} niśeśaśaṭadoṣaṇām bahubhirjanmabhiḥ puneḥ/ syādāparokṣyaṁ hi ānandavēṣāyādistaṁ kutaḥ/ bhāvevyuṣādi/ cēryāḍyāṁ samēsvāpi kuṭo na te/ tāpyeśāṁ saṁmā dṛṣṭvā/ dveṣāyāṣyānduṭā api/ dṛṣṭante bahavo loka duṣā evaṁt kāraṇāṁ/ yādī niroṣaṭa tatra kiṁāḥikyaṁ duṣyaṁ/ yadyāyadārśaṁ- bhāvācādīdraṁdīrvinīvāyaṁ/ adārśaṁdurāraṁdīṁ kathaṁ teṇa/ nīvāyaṁ/ brahmaṁo'pyaṁtirādṛṣṭaṁ pūrvaṁekakāṁ śṛutaṁ/ --A.V. III 4, 90ss.
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\textsuperscript{28} tattadacṣṇyaṛ ča pūrtaṁ visṣṭaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ prajāyaṁ/ yathādānacākumaṁ ṇeḥ sarītasāgarṣaṁyorepi/ alpaṁ maṁtā vā'pi pūrtaṁ vṛgyataṁ bhavet/ evaṁ nāraṁbrahmaṁṣaṁjīvaṁ saṁdhanārhyapi/ enasīsādhaneḥbhaktiḥ pūrδa cṣṇyaṁ bhavet/ alpaiḥ pūrtaṁ dhūṣā'lmāṁ maṁbhirmaṁṣaṁpapi/ bhaktiḥcষṇyaṁ pūrtaṁ teṣaṁ saṁdhanāṁāryaṁ/ kvacit/ --B.A.U.Bh. III 5, 4 (p.263).
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being regulated by the favour of their superiors, pay to them due reverence and gratitude just as a disciple (aupasada) should feel towards his guru.29

Such then is the family spirit which rules the community in liberation. All their wishes in that state are capable of realization, but these wishes do not extend beyond their limited sovereignty. The cosmic functions, for instance, like creation, preservation and destruction belong to the Supreme alone, and they are not, we may surmise, the concern of the emancipated.30

29. na tāvatā virodho'ati nirdosatyat samastāsah/ ābhāsatvāt pareṣāṃ tadavāraṇāṃ ca servaṣāh/ yato'varāṇāṃ sarve'pi guṇāḥ sarvāḥ kriyā api/ nīṣamenaiva pūrveṣām suprasādanibandhanāh/ atah sacchiṣyaṣva tadām naiversyādih kathāścana/—A.V. III 3, 173a.

na kadācid viyogaśca na vidveso nacāratih/ modante sahitāḥ sarve sadā viṣṇuparāyanāḥ/—B.A.U.Bh. III 5, 4 (p.264).

30. "Jagadvyāpararvarjam"—"sarvān kāmānāptvā'mrtaḥ samabhavat" ityucyate/ tatra śṛṣṭyādibhyo'nyāṁnāpnoti/ kutah?—jīvānām tādṛksāmārthyaśavidūratvāt/—B.S.Bh. IV 4, 17, 18.