CHAPTER VI

GOD AND THE WORLD

God would be of no lasting interest to us if we were not related to Him essentially. Thus the Buddhists and the Jainas, the Sāṅkhya and the Māmaṣakas have no place for the ultimate Reality in their closed systems except to repudiate it. The others like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Yoga and the various schools of Vedānta subscribe to a relationship which differs widely in its extent. The teaching of each system on the point of creation may be rightly regarded as the criterion of the wide variety.

As the Naiyāyikas see it, the world in its ultimate particles or atoms as well as the jīvas are eternal and independent of God for their existence. God must be considered an outsider to them. His act of creation is rather a sort of fashioning. In this fashioning the first impulse starts from Īśvara. His wish to create works in all the souls as adṛṣṭa. Then the constructive process of integration and unification sets in, first in vāyu atoms and then in others. This crystallization of the atoms into grosser conglomerates and the assuming of the bodies by the jīvas is what constitutes creation in the Naiyāyika sense. Īśvara, they believe, undertakes to create not for his own benefit, but for the good of all men. On his part he does it for sport—ลילayas.1

The creator, as the Yoga conceives, is somewhat akin to the one of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. We know that the Sāṅkhya attributed all evolutionary activity of the world to the infinite number of reals themselves. But the Yoga finds the


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explanation too ingenuous to be able to carry conviction. It postulates an Īśvara in order to disturb the equilibrium of prakṛti in its quiescent state and give the evolution a direction according to the law of karma. As in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, here also Īśvara does not create prakṛti.²

A number of views has been defended in the Vedānta itself. We have in it such pantheists as Bhāskara who rejects Śaṅkara's contention that the world is the result of māyā or avidyā. For Bhāskara the world is real because it is the evolute or parināma of Brahman. It therefore shares the nature of Brahman who encompasses within himself both unity—in his causal form—and multiplicity—in his evolved state. Hence both unity and diversity are equally real—bhedabheda. In this way alone the paradoxical statements of the Revelation like 'ekam-eva-advitiyam' can make sense. As sparks are different from fire and at the same time are one with it, so the jīvas differ from and are identical with Brahman. Thus we may say that it is Brahman in reality who undergoes suffering and rebirth as jīvatman.³

The bhedabheda theory of Bhāskara would seem to be rather primitive when compared to the semi-pantheism of the great Vaiṣṇava Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja. The theist in him certainly made the difference. Hence he can assert without a trace of embarrassment that jīvas and matter, while being the modes or prakaras of God, do at the same time enjoy an existence of their own from all eternity. This existence is so distinctively theirs that a complete dissolution of them into Brahman is an impossibility. Thanks to this mode of existence, too, they are able to develop their distinct individuality each in his own way.

² Dasg. I, p.259
³ Iph., pp.670ss.
Out of love alone God creates the world. But creation has a distinctive sense in the system. All the jīvas and the matter are said to have two states of existence. One is subtle, obtaining at the time of pralaya when the jīvas are divested of all their qualities and with their intelligence contracted (sahkucita) lose their distinctive name and form; as for matter it is also amorphous (avyakta) still. The condition of Brahma then is regarded as causal—kāraṇāvasthā. We have the second state when matter assumes grosser forms and the jīvas take on material bodies accompanied also by the development (vikāsa) of their intelligence. The process takes place on account of God's will. The jīvas upset the equilibrium of the three gunas according to their karma, and prakṛti works out the fruits of karma, all under divine providence. The entire process is termed creation. Brahma with the jīvas and matter thus evolved is considered to be in the state of effect—kāryāvasthā. More technically it is known as Brahma-parināma where Brahma modifies himself—parināmayati—by gradually evolving his body which of course is nothing else than the entire universe, sentient and insentient. We may also note that in his explanation of creation Rāmānuja makes God both the efficient (nimitta) and material (upādāna) cause of the world.4

While in parināmavāda we have real transformation of the Ultimate Reality, in vivartavāda the modification is unreal or illusory. To put it another way, we have parināmavāda when the effect enjoys the same kind of being as the cause and vivarta when that being is different. Vivartavāda is the classical theory proposed by the Śāṅkara school of Vedānta in its explanation of the world illusion. Brahma, which is the only reality, is beyond all changes. Whatever appears to be different from it is but an illusion. As to how the illusion

has come to be the explanation differs according to the emphasis one places on māyā, ajñāna, and avidyā, on Brahman or on both. Thus the pure Brahman could be the material cause of the world illusion; or the cause could be Iśvara who is the parināma of Brahman as reflected through māyā—where the world would be the māyā as associated with Iśvara, and vīrtā of Iśvara himself. According to another view māyā is the cosmic illusion, and avidyā the same entity as affecting the individual jīva. Or it could be that since the world-appearance affects the jīva, it is his manifestation in association with his avidyā or ajñāna. We have another theory according to which Brahman is the unchangeable material cause (upādāna) while māyā is the evolving entity or parināma. Both of these aspects can be seen in the world appearance. Even this view is further distinguished in that Brahman is the permanent cause with māyā as the instrument (sahakāri) where Brahman that is one appears in the eyes of the jīva as the multifold world of appearance. And finally māyā alone could be viewed as both instrumental and material cause of the world appearance with Brahman remaining unaffected even where appearance is concerned.5

Madhva makes a short shrift of paripāmahavada without getting into the finer points of each school. The strength of his arguments is the strength of the Revelation. There is no end of texts that could be cited from śruti which would go directly counter to one or the other aspect of Brahman constituting the material cause of the world. It is sacrilegious, as Madhva sees it, to equate prakṛti mentioned in the sacred texts with Brahman and make him undergo what matter does. For we know for certain that the eternal Hari is eternally beyond all modifications; that he is the pure, ageless Atman, enjoying knowledge and power of ever-abiding nature. Bliss is

his form. He suffers no change, destruction or pain. He does not age or die. While he himself is not everything he, the origin-less, is the originator of everything. He it is who is known as the Supreme.6

Thus the Revelation is definitive in rejecting any compromise in the immutability and transcendence of God. Even experience tells us that curds can be produced from milk alone, and nothing else. A fortiori the non-spiritual cannot be a transformation of the spiritual or the spiritual that of the non-spiritual. Our experience is positive on the point. Thus precisely because he is omniscient Brahman can be known only as distinct from the world, and not as a part of it.7 In the face of such incontrovertible evidence let the adversaries remember that no fine distinctions of theirs could be of any account. They may resort to subterfuges such as: Brahman changing and unchanging—changing in so far as the world is a modification of him; unchanging in so far as he and the world have something in common, like for instance, the fact of existence between iron and gold. Such being their contention we might take it that the distinction introduced by the parinamavādin between the changing and the unchanging is real unless we are treated to a play on words. A real distinction would give us a part of Brahman which undergoes changes as the material cause of the world, and the part which as the efficient


(nimitta) cause is not affected by changes. In such an event we may conclude that only that part of Brahman which is immune to changes is the God we worship.\(^8\)

We are not unaware, of course, that the advocates of parināmavāda may, to make their point, press into service random scriptural texts that may sound pantheistic. But this is to distort their purport. Thus the declaration 'I mean to be many' (bahu syām) implies that God creates the world in its variety after the manifold forms He has in himself.\(^9\) As for the text which declares that this universe is Brahman, it must be understood as meaning that the existence and the knowledge of the universe depend on Brahman, and not that it constitutes the essence of Brahman.\(^10\)

Much has been said in the foregoing chapters that knocks the bottom out of vivartavāda, whatever be its shade. Going straight to the point we might thus pose the problem: The monist maintains that Brahman which is one, and beyond all change is seen as the essence of the world, thanks to a faulty perception. Now the question may be asked—is it the Brahman itself that is the victim of the faulty perception, or is it something else? If it is Brahman, what of its omniscience? But if it is something else, how can you deny multiplicity? We may go even further and ask--what is it that we find here which owes itself to illusion? We are told that difference is due to illusion, as illusion itself has its roots in ignorance, and ignorance in its turn presupposes difference. How can there be ignorance established with this argument of mutual

\(^8\) abhedaḥ sattvamātreṇa syāt kharvasvāṁayoicapi/ bhāgena parināmāśced bhāgayorbheda eva hi/ yo bhāgo na vikāri syāt sa evāsāmākāmiśvarāḥ/—A.V. I, 4, 68b-69

\(^9\) bahu syām iti tasyaiva hyuktaṁrgena yuyjate/ tattagatena rupena tadartham hysṛajjagat/—Ibid., 80

\(^10\) sarvam etad brāhmaṇyucyate/ tadadhīnasattāpratītītvaṁ/ na tu tatsvarūpatvaṁ/—G. Bh. IV, 24
support—to say nothing of the absurdity of affirming universal error which must include the affirmation itself.\textsuperscript{11}

It follows then that the so-called key texts on which the Advaitins rely so heavily will suffer perversion if given monistic colouring. Thus the text 'ekam-eva-advitiyam' indicates only Brahman's excellence and uniqueness in the scale of beings since he is the only svatantra.\textsuperscript{12} 'Neha nāmāsti' signifies that in God there is no multiplicity whatever, even with regard to His perfections. It certainly does not deny the world of plurality all around us.\textsuperscript{13} As for the māyā of the Lord, the monist may wield it as the shibboleth to delude the world, but in general it means only God's power.\textsuperscript{14}

So the world is real, the atms are real as much as Brahman is real. In fact it is the real nature of the world that points to its causation at the hands of God. The world is real even in its ultimate principle—the primordial matter or prakṛti. In taking his stand Madhva breaks away from the Vedantic tradition as set by monistic commentators and aligns himself with the dualism of the Sāṅkhya's. But there is a difference between the two realistic schools, which is more than super-

\begin{enumerate}
  \item[11.] yac ca vikrtame vaitad brahma visvātmanā mṛṣa/ dṛṣya eva mandadṛṣṭyaiva sa sarga iti kathyate/ sa mandadṛṣṭistatasaiś brahmaṇaḥ kim tato'nyagā/ brahmaṇaḥ ceto kva sārvajñayamanyaḥ ceto svato'nyatā/—A.V. I, 4, 81s.

  \item[12.] Kim bhrāntikalpitam tatra bheda'pi bhramajo yadi/ bhrānterajñanamulatvat tasya bhedavyapekṣayā/ nājñanakalpakaṁ kīccid-anyonyāśrayatā yataḥ/ bhramatvetvīyamuktiśca tadentahpatanāni/—Ibid., 84s.

  \item[13.] ekamevadvitīyam tannēha nāmāsti kīcchana/ mṛtyouṣa mṛtyumānapnoti ya iha nāneva paśyati/ yathodakām durge vṛṣṭam parvateṣu vidhiḥvati/ evam dharmān prthakpaśyamastānevānu-vidhiḥvatiṣyādyāśruteśca/—V.T.V., 459

  \item[14.] Vide Dasg. I (pp.469-70) for the various senses of māyā in the Scriptures, starting with the Ṛgveda.
\end{enumerate}
ficial. For the Śāṅkhya even where it tolerates the existence of a vyavasthāpaka—Īśvara—the first among the puruṣas—the distinction between the puruṣa and prakṛti is so radical that they are independent of each other for their existence. What is still more anomalous in the eyes of Madhva is that prakṛti and puruṣa should reverse their roles with the result that something which is material by nature and inert by tradition becomes the only principle of activity, while the spiritual element, the subject of knowledge and will is divested of all activity and reduced merely to be a passive spectator. Not even the Īśvara, the best of all purusas, can have anything to do with the world, endowed as he is with neither strength nor will for it. All will and desire is the result of manas which itself is the product of matter.

With all his love for realism Madhva can scarcely condone such a lop-sided theory. On what ground does the Sāṅkhya assert that an ordered development in the cosmos which presupposes freedom in activity is due to unconscious matter? For to claim freedom for the unconscious, is to discard the evidence of our internal experience. Also the wise know that to be free means to be able to follow one's own desires. How how on earth could the unconscious possess a desire, and if it did, how could it not cease to be unconscious any more? And then, is it at all conceivable that things material should constitute the source of spontaneous activity since all such activity presupposes thought in operation? Finally if what attains liberation is puruṣa who is distinct from manas which is believed to desire it, why does manas entertain the desire at all?

15. svatantravṛtti-racana sa caivācetane kutaḥ/ acetanat-vaṁ svātantryamiti ṣā'impramāhatam/ sveçchānusāritāsva svā- tantryam hi vido viduh/ kuta icchā'cetanasya secchaṁ cet kim acetanam/—A.V. II, 2, 18s.

16. moksakāmo bhavedanyo yadi muktād bhaviṣyataḥ/ moksā- kāmasya kim tena svanāsārtham ca ko yatet/—Ibid., 28

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The fact is that besides Īśvara there can be no independent potency whatever in any reality of the universe. Hence a total autonomy either of prakṛti or of puruṣa is a baseless assumption. Rather should we admit that God is the one who puts into operation the potencies of prakṛti and puruṣa which are always dependent on Him. He controls them eternally through His eternal power. There should be nothing strange in such a view. For if non-eternal things could be ordained to be such by the eternal will of the Lord, the eternal things too could equally be decreed to be eternal by His gracious will. The śruti itself refers everything to the will of God: the individual nature, the jīvas, their karmas, substance, kāla, śruti, kriyā—all these exist by his favour. They will cease to be if he ignores them. It should be clear, then, how futile are the views of Patañjali, Vindhyāvāsin and others for a real spiritual advancement.17

What does creation positively mean in Madhva's philosophy? The question is innocent enough, but only at first sight. Even a most cautious answer may run the risk of misrepresenting him, or at least reading into his position alien concepts owing in part to alien terminology. We shall start with facts. Besides God, Madhva admits other eternal realities too, like Veda and jīva, as well as prakṛti, kāla and ākāśa in their primitive form. Did God create them? If by creation we mean 'creatio ex nihilo', we might safely answer that the eternal entities were not de facto created. And yet Madhva readily admits

17. anyatra kā'pi śaktirna svātantryeneśa eva hi/ ṣaktī- stāh prerayatyasājastadadhīnāśca sarvadā/ sattāpraḍhānapuruṣa- saktīnāṁ ca pretitayaḥ/ pravrīttayaśca tāṁ sarvā nityam nityāt- manā yataḥ/ yathā'ṇityatayā'ṇityaṁ nityasāktyā svayeśvareḥ/ nīyāmysyati nityam ca na rte tvaditi śrutēḥ/ svabhāvajīvavakar- māṇi dravyam kālaḥ śrutih kriyāḥ/ yatprasadādime santi na saṃti yañupēkṣayaḥ/ iti śrutena sattādyā api nārṣyaṁvinś/ tatpatañjalivindhyādīmatam na puruṣārthadām/—A.V. II, 2, 34ss.
śrutī texts like—'sa īdām sarvam āṣaṁjaya', or 'yato vā īmāni bhūtāni jāyante...' (Taitt. Up. III 1). So one side of the solution could be thus formulated: If creation is applied to eternal entities taken in the strictest sense we should understand it to mean existence in dependence upon God.18

But a reality could also be taken in its grosser form. As a matter of fact, excepting the Supreme there is absolutely no entity which does not undergo some sort of 'production'. And every production is a modification in dependence upon another—a modification which implies the loss of the previous term and the assuming of a grosser state.19 This is in fact another word for change, where some viśesas are lost and others gained.20 It is easy to see that a change can be either substantial or accidental. If the change affects the substance radically, transforming it into some other substance we have a substantial change. But if the alteration is only superficial, leaving the reality substantially the same, we have an accidental change.21

18. Perhaps the wording should have been 'coming to existence in dependence upon another', to avoid confusion with 'continuing to be in dependence'. But there is no coming to be where eternal beings are concerned. The ambiguity in terminology is inherent in the Mādhva view of creation. For in Mādhva thought creation is by nature a continuous process.


20. Cf. supra, chapter on viśesas. (pp. 77 55)

21. In the Mādhva school of thought the viśeṣas involved in the substantial change are usually known as yāvadāvṛtyas, while those of the accidental change ayāvadāvṛtyas.
Madhva has described all change as an acquisition of višeṣas in dependence on another.\(^{22}\) We have parādhīna-višeṣāsāpti in the change of milk into curds as well as any reality undergoing a new 'birth' or production.\(^{23}\) Now taking the case of eternal entities we see that every one of them undergoes a change—a new birth or production—all in dependence upon the Supreme. Thus a jīva that undergoes no 'birth' as a spirit, assumes a body of psychosomatic influences, and this must be regarded as its birth or production.\(^{24}\)

The application is clear in the case of prakṛti. We are told that at the beginning of each aeon (kalpa) the equilibrium of prakṛti in its three guṇas is disturbed and as a result there emerge forty-four tattvas which go to constitute the world. This may be the scheme more or less as proposed by the Sāṅkhya, but as Madhva's theism would have it the entire process is due really to the Supreme Viṣṇu who enters prakṛti, transforms it and assuming several forms continues to be there for keeping the transformations orderly. Every manifestation of things is brought about by the Supreme who with his infinite powers is able to enter in at each stage of evolution.\(^{25}\)

\(^{22}\) paradhinaviśesāptiranivartyānyathābhavah/ kaśrādivad vikāreṇa syānvalva sa syādharesv kvaṣcit/—A.V. I, 4, 59b-60a.

\(^{23}\) It will be seen from this text that Madhva makes no distinction between substantial and accidental changes, whereas the application of parādhīnaviśesāpti is concerned. The restriction of parādhīnaviśesāpti to accidental changes, and abhūtvā bhavanam to substantial changes is of later origin. The statement of Dr. B.N.K. Sharma, therefore, (Phil. of Madh., p.157) that 'Madhva designates the former kind of change as 'parādhīnaviśesāpti', and the latter as 'abhūtvā bhavanam' is, to say the least, inaccurate.

\(^{24}\) puruṣeḥ prakṛtih kālo mahānityādiṣu kramat/ vikāre eva jananaṁ puruṣe tadvīśeṣanam/ paratantṛaviśeṣo hi vikāre iti kirtitah—B. S. Bh. II 3, 9.

\(^{25}\) tatra tatra sthito visnustattacchaktih prabodhayan/ eka eva mahāaktih kurute sarvaneśaḥ/—Ibid., II 11

prakṛtāvavipraviśāya tām parināmya tatparināmesu sthitvā' tmano bahūdhākaraṇat/—Ibid., I 4, 27
Madhva distinguishes two main stages of 'production'. The first, asamsrṣṭi or inchoate production which gives us mahat, ahaṅkāra, buddhi, manas, the six indriyas and ten elements—five subtle and five gross. But the productive process does not stop there. We have the second stage where the production becomes complete, when this 'cosmic egg' with all its contents comes into being. At neither of these stages, nor later on for that matter, could we speak of God as keeping aloof, without actively guiding the evolutionary process. This is in sharp contrast to the other naturalistic systems like the Sāṅkhya where the process is believed to take care of itself.

God's direct intervention in the evolutionary process is best seen in the development of time. In His eternal will He decrees that there be Time; and Time comes to be not as an indeterminate (nirviśeṣa) reality which is there eternally, but as determined—in the way we have explained it earlier. All the determinations it takes on in its homogeneous course are from outside—that is from God. It is God who introduces divisibility into Kāla, fixing that portion when 'creation' should take place, that when conservation should persist and that when destruction should come about. These partial periods, as also days, hours, minutes etc. are so determined by God in their succession that they cannot overlap each other. This process of parādhīna-visēṣāpti is what constitutes the 'production' of time.


27. tatkalasrṣṭim evātō vānchatīśa† sadaiva hi/ syāv kālaḥ sa tadaivos kālasya svagatatvataḥ/ svabhāvādeva hiṣčaisā devasyaiṣa iti śrutēh/ svabhāvo'pi pareśeochāvāsa ityudītah purē/--A.V. II 2, 167s.

Cf. also chapter on Time (pp.75-8)
The acquisition of determinations by other eternal entities takes place on similar lines. The avyākṛta ākāśa becoming vyākṛta, the Veda coming to have the order of its syllables immutably fixed, and the jīvas assuming a body. But whatever be the entity which takes on the determinations the Lord brings about the process through the instrumentality of time. Time alone is exempt from all instrumental causality in its determinations as God acts on it directly through His will. With its determination, however, God instills into it His śakti or potency so as to wield it as a perfect instrument in the determination of other realities whether temporal or eternal.

Thus the Lord can decree: Let this be the time for cosmic evolution. Whereupon the evolutionary process will be set in motion with the disturbance of prakṛti determinations of space, the embodiment of the jīvas and the 'revelation' of the Vedas. Hence we are justified in seeing a sort of production even in eternal realities.

A few words must be said about the revelation of the Veda. We know Madhva takes the unequivocal stand that the śruti is apaureṣeya by nature. But he also distinguishes two stages in its manifestation. One is the stage that obtains during the period of cosmic dissolution. The Veda at this stage is the conglomeration of all the varṇas, infinite in number, eternal in their existence, unchangeable in their nature and omnipresent in space. Then starts the other stage with the inauguration of a new aeon or kalpa when the Vedic rṣis are given the privilege of hearing the Vedic texts as we have them today. Because it takes place in dependence on the will of God this specification of the Veda is regarded as its production.

We should remember, however, that whatever be the stage, the Veda is intrinsically one—one in the Object it is designed to reveal, as well as in the Source of its dependence.

28. Cf. the previous note.

29. ...vedasyāpyāśvarecchayaḥ/ vyaktirnāma viśeṣ 'sti tasmāt tadvasātaiva hi/ utpattir atra kathitāḥ//—A.V. II 3, 22a.
The paradoxical nature of the Mādhva theory on the Veda is bound to come to the fore at this point: How reconcile the apanuṣṭayatva of śruti on the one hand and the svātantrya of the Absolute on the other? An Advaitin might brush aside the difficulty by ascribing only the ephemeral nature to the reality of the Veda. But no realist of Mādhva's calibre can dream of resorting to such gimmicks without being untrue to himself. The solution he offers, then, ought to harmonize with the rest of his system, and so it does to a large extent.

The relation which the Veda bears to God, is most intimate. It is His mouthpiece, the most perfect manifestation of the most perfect Being. We could go to the extent of denying all raison d'être to the Veda if it were not to declare the glory of God. Also, since there can be only one svatantra entity, the Veda which is not svatantra must necessarily be paratantra or dependent on God. And just as the independence of the Lord could no way be compromised, so the dependence of any other being, not excluding that of the Veda could never be underplayed. Now, we know that whatever be the reality, its potencies (śakti), its being (sattā), its cognition (pratīti) and its activity are all under the omnipotence of the Supreme.30 We can go deeper and assert that being (sattā) in full sense entails the entire reality (svarūpa), cognition (pratīti) implying the basis of cognoscibility, and activity (pravṛtī) involving the source of all activity. Mādhva allows absolutely no exception on this point of dependence whether we speak of eternal entities or non-eternal.31 Speaking specifically of the Veda he avers: Thus it is that Hari under the fivefold form is declared by all the Vedas. He is their quintessence.

30. anyatra kā'pi śaktirna svātantryena eva hi/ śaktīs- tāh pravṛtīs/sattā svarūpa-sattā svarūpa-pravṛtīs ca pratītās ca pravṛtīs ca tāh sarvāh...
—A.V. II 2, 34s.

31. Cf. note 17 (p.141).
He it is who gives the Vedas their eternal nature.\textsuperscript{32}

What of the 'apauruseyatva', then? In answer we must note that the above explanation of the dependence of the Vedas does not entitle us to picture God as a human author composing the Veda piecemeal, unaware yet what would follow next. That would be pure anthropomorphism, and anthropomorphism is precisely what is ruled out by apauruseyatva. The truth is, as we said above, at the first stage the varnas exist infinite and un-changeable, though all of them are grouped and telescoped together. Any order between them would be the order meant for beings of cognition and designed to reveal infallibly the one and only Object. Since there can be no change in this, there can be no change in the order of varnas, either, when the revelation takes place aeon after aeon. The Lord governs that order, preserves it and reveals the Vedas in the fullness of time.\textsuperscript{33} He does more than that. He contemplates eternally the eternal Veda. Even in its recessive state the Veda cannot lay any claim to existence unless it is 'seen' by the Blessed One. To contend otherwise is like asserting the existence of cognition without the cognizer and without the object cognized; or like fruition without the subject or the object of fruition; or like the chastisement without the chastiser or the chastised.\textsuperscript{34} So while the Supreme is not the author of the Veda

\textsuperscript{32} sa vācyah sarva-vedānām evam pañcabāmsa karitvā harih/ vedānām sarabhūto 'sau vedānām nityāpradah/—Ch.U.Bh. III 1, 5 (pp.399-400)

\textsuperscript{33} Nityā vedāssamastāsca sāsvatā viṣṇubuddhayā/ sarge sarge'munaivaita udgīryante tathaiva ca/ tatkrameṇaiva tair-varṇaistalissvaraireva nānyathā/—V.T.V. , 41

\textsuperscript{34} jñātrjñeyavihīnaṃ ca jñānam ced bhoktrbhojyatāh/ hīnam bhojanam eva syāt tādānam kartarātāyāh/ nityatvat tādrām ca syāditi cennityavāgapi/ vācyavaktrvihīna syānāhi sā caiva tādir/ draṣṭāro vedaśca hi santī vācyāni caṁjasā/ nityā draṣṭā ca vācyāsca bhagavāneva ca svayam/ nahi vaktvihīna ca vācyŪhīnāpi vāk vaścit/ jñātrjñeyavihīnaṃ ca jñānam evam na tad bhavet/ nahi nityo'pi vaktāśti vākyavācyavīrjetāh/ jñāna- jñeyavihīnasca jño'pyevasa niavā vidyate/—A.V. III 4, 174–78.
in a purely anthropomorphic sense, he is the one who contem­
plates the varṇas, controls their order, reveals them in time
decreed by himself and sees that what has been revealed is
preserved intact.

Before we conclude the chapter we must discuss in brief
the age-old question every theory on creation is bound to face:
What makes God bring anything into existence? A monist or a
pantheist will answer it merely by resorting to the laws of
being. For a theist, however, the solution is not so simple.
He has for his God a being all perfect in itself, that needs
nothing outside for a complement. So he was free to create
any being and free as much not to create it. And yet he has
decided to create a world—the world of the jīvas and of
matter. Why?

In formulating his answer Madhva remains as orthodox as
ever, but at the same time we notice that his theistic perspec­
tive endows it with greater piquancy. Insisting on the abso­
lute perfection and sovereignty of God, he denies that there
could be anything of interest—prayojana—for Īśvara when he
decides to create. It is true, we as imperfect beings will
find it next to impossible to picture such a purely altruistic
action, prompted as we are almost always by what appears to be
good for us. But a few comparisons might help. God's action
could be explained as a sport (līlā), like that of a drunk, who
in the abundance of his joy, gambols, dancing, singing etc.
He has nothing to gain by such capering. He acts so because
he is happy, with a happiness that is unlimited and overflow­
ing. No one would conduct oneself in that way from unhappiness.

35. Kṛtakṛtyaḥvāna prayojanaṁya srstih/ kintu? yatha
loke māttasya sukhodrekādeva nṛttagānādilīlā, na prayojanaṁpeksayā, evamevaśvarasya/—B.S.Bh. II 1, 33s.
Unhappiness could bring in only misery, tears.  

Besides the idea of sport, the śruti refers also to naturalness and spontaneity. Creation on the part of God may be compared to a man gesticulating with his hands. While the man intends nothing beyond it, we must admit that it is so natural (svabhāva) to him. But this naturalness must not be taken in the sense that creation is brought about through an imperceptible and inexorable law which operates despite God and His will. Naturalness implies first an effortlessness on the part of God when He creates by operating His will efficaciously. How could there be an effort or pain where the omnipotence of the Blessed One is concerned? Secondly it signifies spontaneity and gratuitousness, implicit already in God's benevolence, but more manifest in the grace and helps He provides for the working out of our liberation.

Not much must needs be said about the preservation (sthiti) of the world. Madhva's argument to that effect is brief, cogent and in keeping with his broader idea of svatantra. For every reality in all its aspects depends on the Supreme. The very being (svabhāva) of a thing cannot claim to be an exception. It is pointless to imagine, therefore, that while

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36. yasmāt sukham labdhvā karotyaṁ/ karoti nāsukhaṁ bhūmaṁ sukham nālpe sukham bhavet/ ityuktaṁ yat pravruttisca nyttagānādikā sukhaṁ/ duḥkhād rodādikā caiva sarvakartṛtvato'sya ca/ sarva-śakterna duḥkham syādatah leśeṣi/ pravartako na cedēsa prāṇyādanyāsca kaḥ pumāṁ/—A.V. I 1, 184s.

37. icchamātram prabhoh arṣṭir iti arṣṭau viniścitah/ iti praśamsayā kāmaśrutibhyāśaiva yuktaiḥ/ mahāśītyāśaiva-yukteścāneṣcāḥmaṁ nisiddhyate/—A.V. II 1, 105s.

38. ramaṇam nātiyaṁসya vikṣepādeva yujyate/ iti cet saranviyamo yasya kasmāṁśe śākṣaye/ ātmānāṁśiyeōm vastu pratīpaṁ hṛṣṭam bhavet/ svādhīnasaṁtāśaktyādi katham-ātmapratisphakam/—A.V. I 2, 14s.

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the production and destruction of a thing depends on the Lord, its conservation is its own affair—in accordance with its nature. What was said elsewhere concerning the divine śakti governing all other 'śaktis' of matter and soul is more than relevant here. In no being other than God could there be autonomous potency. It is God alone who actuates the potency of matter and soul—their being, cognition and activities. There can be no doubt, then, that preservation of all entities depends on God's sweet will; and that conversely when the sweet will so decides they will come to an end and recede into pralaya or general dissolution.

39. Srstināsau tadadhīnāvitīrite/ svabhāvatvāt sthiternai-tadapekṣeti na yujyate/ yatah svabhāvo'khila Īśāyatto'khilasya ca/—A.V. III 2, 156s.

40. Cf. note 30 (p.146).