CHAPTER V

THE JAINA THEORY OF SENSE PERCEPTION

The Jainas have made a significant contribution to the theory of sense perception. In order to understand the Jaina theory of sense perception it is necessary to study their epistemology.

The Jaina attitude is empirical and realistic. The upaniṣadic philosophers found the Immutable Reality behind the world of experience. Goutama, the Buddha, denounced everything as fleeting and sorrowful. While Mahāvīra stood on common sense and experience and found no contradiction between permanence and change. The Jaina philosophy is based on logic and experience. 'Mokṣa' is the ultimate aim of life. It is realised by the three-fold path of right intuition, right knowledge and right conduct.  *

Right knowledge is one of the major problems of Jaina philosophy. It is necessary to understand the Jaina theory of knowledge and experience for the proper understanding of Jaina thought. The Jaina epistemology is very complex and it developed gradually in response to the demand of the time.

The Agama theory of knowledge is very old and it probably originated in the pre-Mahāvīra period.  *

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*1 'Tattvārthādhiṣṭhikā Śūtra' 1.
formed a part of the 'pūrvasrūta' which formed a part of the ancient literature. Jīnabhadrā in his Viśeṣāvāsyaka bhāṣya quotes a 'pūrva gāthā' on jñāna. There seems to have been no difference of opinion between the followers of Fārsāva and Mahāvīra regarding the division of knowledge. Both of them accept the five-fold distinction of knowledge. The Āgamas have also presented the five-divisions of knowledge.

Knowledge is inherent in the soul, but due to the perversity of attitude arising out of the veil of 'karma', we may get wrong knowledge, 'ajñāna'. Knowledge is perfect when the veil of 'karma' is totally removed. It is imperfect when there is even partial subsidence or destruction of 'karma'. The soul can get perfect knowledge directly when the veil of 'karma' is removed. That is 'pratyakṣa jñāna'. But the empirical knowledge, experience of this world, is possible with the help of the sense organs indirectly. Such knowledge was called 'parokṣa jñāna', 'antijñāna' sense experience, and 'śrutijñāna', knowledge due to verbal communication are 'parokṣa jñāna'. While 'avadhi', extrasensory perception, 'manambahyā', telepathy and 'kovaḷa jñāna', omniscience were called 'pratyakṣa' but, later in order to bring the Jaina theory of knowledge in line with the theories of other systems of Indian

*3 'Viṣeṣāvāsyaka Bhāṣya' 121.

*3 'Sthanāṅga-Sūtra. II. 1.7.'
thought they modified their conception of the 'pratyakṣa' and the 'parākṣa jñāna'. In the *Anuvogadvara-sūtra*, we find a change in terminology. 'Mati' and 'sruta' began to be called 'pratyakṣa', as they were possible due to the operation of the sense organs. Jinabhadra calls the two as 'sāmyavahāra pratyakṣa'. Along with the 'jñāna' we have direct intuition of the object. It is 'darsana'. 'Darsana' has similar sub-divisions. In the same way, wrong knowledge is also possible in those cases where the veil of 'karma' is not removed and where there is perversity of attitude. Thus, we have 'mati-ajñāna', 'sruta-ajñāna', and 'avādhi-ajñāna'. The general classification of knowledge and intuition mentioning their perversities is shown in table VII. This classification shows that the Jains believed that the subsidence and destruction of the veil of 'karma' is a necessary condition of knowledge and intuition. Wrong knowledge is characterised as 'samsaya' doubt, 'viparyāya' perversity and 'anādhyavasaya' wrong knowledge caused by carelessness and indifference. Due to the lack of discrimination of the real and the unreal, the soul with wrong knowledge like the lunatic, knows things according to his own whims. Perversity of attitude veils the faculty of perception and knowledge, and knowledge becomes vitiated. It becomes 'ajñāna'.

*Pratyakṣa*

We may now consider sense perception or 'pratyakṣa'

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'Mandi-Sūtra' 4.
*6 'Tattvārtha-sūtra' 32. 'Pañcastikāyasaṃgīta'. 47.
'jnana' as Nandi-Sutra calls it. It is knowledge obtained through the operation of the sense organs and the 'manas'. It was called 'paroksha' by Umasvati. Jimabheda called it 'samvyavahara-pratyaksha'. It is also called 'indriya pratyaksa'.

In the Nandi-Sutra a distinction is made in 'pratyaksha' as sense perception, 'indriya pratyaksha' and perception not due to the sense organs called 'unindriya pratyaksha'. Hemacandra describes in the Pramana-mimasha that 'pratyaksha' is that which is immediate, clear and unambiguous. He analyses the various definitions of 'pratyaksha' of other schools and shows that they are not adequate. The Naiyayika definition of perception as unerring cognition which is produced by the sense object contact is not adequate. How can the sense object contact and the like, he asks, which is not of the nature of cognition, function as efficient instrument for the determination of the object? Buddhists have given the definition of perceptual cognition as that which is free from conceptual construction and is not erroneous. But Hemacandra says that this definition is irrational since it has no bearing on practical activity. It has no pragmatic value. Jaimini defines perception as that which is engendered in the mind of a person upon the actual contact of the sense organ with the object. This definition

*7 'Visesavasyaka Bhaya' 95 'Nandi-Sutra'
*8 'Nandi-Sutra'. For this discussion also refer to 'Tattvartha Sutra' I, II and its Bhaya.
is also too wide since it overlaps such cognition, as doubt and illusions also occur as a result of sense contact. The older exponents of the Śāmkhya school define perceptual cognition to be modification of the sense organs such as the organ of hearing. But sense organs are devoid of consciousness; and, therefore, their modifications cannot be conscious. If, on the other hand, it is assumed to derive its conscious character from its association with the conscious principle like the self, then the status of the organ of knowledge should be accorded to the self. Therefore, Hemacandra said that perceptual cognition is immediate and lucid.*9

It is not possible that a sense perception which is based upon the stimulation present to the senses is incapable of knowing the cognitions that preceded and that follow. Even in the case of the cognitions arising out of the data present to the senses the cognitions would be only subjective. It would not be possible to determine the validity or invalidity to the satisfaction of the outsider. It would be difficult to establish objective validity, hence sense perception is one of the sources of knowledge and not the only source as the Carvākas would maintain.

In Plato's dialogue Theaetetus Socrates examines the doctrine of Theaetetus that knowledge is through perception.

*9 'Pramāṇa-nīmaṇa' I. 1. 29. and its commentary.
This is the position of the common sense that knowledge of the external world comes to us through the senses. Socrates points out that the view of Theaetetus is identical with the doctrine of Heracleitus of Ephesus that all things are in motion and the Protagorean dictum 'homo mensura'. Socrates in the end shows that the position adopted by Theaetetus is not acceptable because it leads to an impossibility. Socrates said that if knowledge and perception are the same, it leads to an impossibility, because a man who has come to know a thing and still remembers it does not know it, since he does not see it, and that would be a monstrous conclusion.*10

'Pratyakṣa' is defined in the Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā as that which is immediate and lucid. These characteristics are applicable to both perceptual and non-perceptual experience, experience through operation of the sense organs and experience without the help of the sense organs as well. We have seen that in the Nandi-Sūtra a distinction is made between the 'pratyakṣa' as that which is due to the sense organs and that which does not need the mediation of the sense organs. They are called 'indriyapratyakṣa' and 'unindriyapratyakṣa' respectively.' 'Indriyapratyakṣa' is cognition which is immediate and direct and which arises out of the operation of the five sense organs. There are, therefore, five types of sense perception, like the visual, auditory, tactual, olfactory...
and gustatory. The experience that does not need the sense organs and that is immediate may be called extra-sensory perception. It is also 'pratyakṣa' because it is immediate and direct. This was called real 'pratyakṣa' by the followers of Agama literature. It is of three types as 'avādhi', 'manah-paryāya' and 'kevala pratyakṣa'. In this chapter, discussion will be restricted to the sense 'pratyakṣa' 'indriya pratyakṣa'. It is also called as was seen earlier, 'saṃvyavahāra pratyakṣa'. Empirical knowledge may be called 'saṃvyavahāra pratyakṣa'. It is of two kinds as 'mati' and 'śruti'. 'Mati-jñāna' is a species of 'saṃvyavahāra pratyakṣa' 'matijñāna' is defined as knowledge due to the sense organs and mind. 'Indriya pratyakṣa' may be, therefore, referred to as a form of 'matijñāna'. This may be called sense perception. The sense perception may be referred to as 'matijñāna', as it is concerned with the contact of the sense organs with the object. The sense perception of this type may be compared with the definition of 'pratyakṣa' given by Gautama, the founder of Nyāya philosophy as has been already referred to. Gautama defines 'pratyakṣa' as knowledge which arises out of the contact of the sense organs with its object, inexpressible in words and unerring and well-defined. Gangesa says that this does not include intuitive perception which is also direct and without mediation of the senses.  

*11 'Nyāya-Sūtra' 1. 1. 4.  
*12 'Tattvacintamani' P. 552.
The Jainas called the type of perception defined by Gautama as a form of 'matijnāna'. In the Jaina 'Agamas', 'matijnāna' is also known as 'ābhinibodhika-jñāna'. But, the term 'matijnāna' seems to be older than the 'ābhinibodhika-jñāna', as 'matijnāna' is associated with the 'karma' theory which is very old. The old Jaina thinkers thought that knowledge born with the help of the five senses as well as the 'manas' may be called 'matijnāna'. But, in the 'indriya pratyakṣa' they included knowledge born of the five sense organs, as the mind is not exactly a sense organ for them. It is a quasi-sense organ.

In Jaina literature various synonyms for 'matijnāna' have been mentioned. Tattvārtha Sūtra mentions 'mati', 'smṛti', recollection, 'cintā', thought and 'ābhinibodha', the perceptual cognition as synonyms. Bhadrabāhu mentions 'āhā' associative integration, 'apoha', 'vimarsa', 'mārgañcā', 'sageṣāpū' and 'sāvā' and 'smṛti' as synonyms. Nandi-Sūtra also follows Bhadrabāhu. The mention of all these synonyms does not mean that they identified the various forms of cognition mentioned in the synonyms as sense perception, because Bhadrabāhu and Umasvati, for instance, would have in the least meant...

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13 'Dasaveikālika Nirvukti' Gāthā 49-50.
15 'Tattvārtha Sūtra' I, 13.
16 See 'Vīsaśvavasya-Sūtra'. 396.
that 'śmaṛti' is identical with sense perception; nor is 'cintā' identical with 'matijñāna'. However, what they meant was that in the empirical experience we find 'matijñāna' and experience like recollection and thought. In this sense, 'matijñāna' may be said to include the sense experience due to the operation of the five senses and experience through the 'manas', as the Jaina philosophers following the Agamic literature maintained. In the Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā empirical perception is described as perception due to the senses and mind. In the commentary of the same stanza it is said that the phrase due to the sense and mind, 'indriya mānonimittam' has both collective and distributive reference.*17 But, 'matijñāna' in the sense of experience due to the five sense organs is a form of 'pratyakṣa'. It is 'indriya pratyakṣa'. Umāsvāti includes experience due to the mind also in 'matijñāna'. He defines 'matijñāna' as knowledge caused by the senses and mind since mind is a quasi-sense, 'no-indriya'.*18 The commentator Siddhasenagāni mentions three types of 'mati' as (1) knowledge born of the sense organs (ii) knowledge born of the mind and (iii) knowledge due to the joint activity of sense organs and mind.*19 However, from the Ghāṣya of the Tattvārtha-Sūtra we find that 'matijñāna' can be distinguished into four types as

*17 'Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā' 20 and commentary.
*16 'Tattvārtha-Sūtra' 1. 14.
*19 'Tattvārtha Tīka' 1. 14.
(i) knowledge due to sense organs like sense perception (ii) knowledge due to mind only like 'cintā' (iii) knowledge due to the joint activity of the mind and senses. Memory and recognition can be included in 'matijñāna'. Akalanka says that memory recognition and discursive thought are cases of 'matijñāna' so long as they are not associated with language. As soon as they are associated with words they become 'sruta-ñāna', although very few philosophers have supported Akalanka in this respect.\textsuperscript{20} However, if 'matijñāna' were to include the cognition due to the joint activity of the sense organs and mind, memory and recognition may well be included in the 'matijñāna'. In the fourth stage of 'matijñāna' cognitions without the help of the sense organs and the mind are included. For instance, the vague and primitive awareness of the plant life and the instinctive awareness of the lower organisms who have not yet developed sense organs may be said to be the cognitions of this type. They are direct forms of awareness of the plants and the simple organisms.

Sense perception, 'indriya-pratyakṣa' as a species of 'matijñāna' is of five types based on the nature and the function of the five sense organs.\textsuperscript{21} The five senses possess the capacity of apprehending the sense experiences because the cognition of the stimulation must be conditioned by the relevant instruments. The sense is the mark which generates the cognition of the object.

\textsuperscript{20} 'Laghīyastrāya' 10. 11.
\textsuperscript{21} 'Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā'. 21 and Commentary.
by the self. We get a similar description of the sense perception in the Nyāya-Sūtra. The five types of sense perception are based on the special characteristics of knowledge, 'buddhi laksana', visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactual.

The senses consist of elements endowed with special quality, and as such they are able to perceive the respective objects and not themselves. For instance, the eye sees the external object and not itself. In the sense perception, it was seen in the last chapter, that the sense of touch is fundamental. Similarly, the sense of sight is vital for the human life. Price says that experiences in the way of seeing and touching are primary, other modes of sense experience like hearing and smelling are only auxiliary. 'If we possessed them but did not possess either sight or touch we should have no belief about the material world at all, and should lack even the very conception of it'.

It was also seen in the last chapter, that according to the Jainas the sense of sight is of a fundamentally different nature in that the other sense organs are based on the contact of the sense organs with object, while the sense of sight does not need the contact with the object. It is a vital sense giving us experiences based on different factors. The nature of sense perception will now be analysed. The task, here, is to give a psychological analysis of the experience if possible. It may

*22 'Nyāya-Sūtra' III. 1. 68-69.

aptly be said that the Jaina analysis of the sense perception has a great psychological significance, although perception was a logical and the metaphysical problem for the Jainas and for other ancient Indian philosophers. In fact, even in the West, philosophers were first busy with the logical and the metaphysical analysis of the problem of perception, but with the advancement of psychology as a science, philosophers have realised that perception is more a problem for psychology to analyse. Bertrand Russell says 'the problem of perception has troubled philosophers from a very early date. My own belief is that the problem is scientific, not philosophical, or, rather, no longer philosophical'.

The conditions of perception.

Sense organs are a condition of sense perception. 'Indriyas' formed the instruments by which we get sensory experience. The senses are the marks of the self, and they afford proof of the existence of the self. The senses are the instruments like the carpenters' axe by which experience is obtained by the self. The contact of the sense organs with the object is a condition of perception as mentioned by the Naiṣeṣiyikas, although according to the Jainas such a contact is not necessary in the case of visual experience. According

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*25 *Śrāvāna-mīmāṃsā* 21. and Commentary.
*26 *Avaśya-bhāṣya* III. I. 63-65. 'Indriyartha sannikṣerṣam'.
to the Nyāya definition, perception involves different factors as (i) sense organs (ii) their objects (iii) the contact of the sense organs with the object and (iv) the cognition produced by them. It is sometimes maintained that the description given by the Jainas of the sense experience as cognition due to senses and mind is inadequate. Visual perception, for instance, has the additional condition of the presence of light and the object. But, it has been pointed out by Hemacandra that objects and light are not the conditions of experience because of the lack of concomittance in the difference between the two. But, it is not denied that they are remote conditions like time and space, which are of direct use to the service of the cause of the subsidence and the destruction of the knowledge-obscuring 'karmas'. They are indirectly useful by benefiting the visual organs, like the collerium paint. The inadequacy of the view that object and light are conditions of perception can be seen from the fact that illusive perception of water takes place in a mirage. Cats and owls get perception in the dark where the stimulation of light is absent. This is meant to show that the Nyāya emphasis on the object as a condition of perception is not acceptable. Perception of a particular object is, in fact, according to the Jainas, due to the destruction and subsidence of the relevant knowledge-obscuring 'karmas', 'jñānā-varaniya karma'. This implies a psychological factor. 

*27 *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* 1, I, 25 'Narthalokau jñānasya nimitta avyatirekat.'

*28 ibid and Commentary.*
appropriate psychical condition in the destruction and the subsidence of knowledge-obscuring 'ārma' is a necessary factor in the perceptual experience. It also depends on the competency of the appropriate psychical factor. For instance, even when the object is present we may not see it when we are elsewhere engaged. In the Śāṇevasāra we read that the presence of the stimuli in the external environment and even their coming into contact with the sense organs may not be effective to produce the relevant experience. For instance, we may not see an unpleasant visual form, even though the stimulation may reach the eyes. The psychic factor, selective attention, is needed to get the sense experience. This is possible when all psychic impediments are partially or wholly removed due to the destruction and the subsidence of knowledge-obscuring 'ārma'.

We have described such a psychic factor as a mental set which is necessary for the perceptual experience. Emphasis on the mental factor in perception has been mentioned in the Upanisad also. This was referred to in the earlier chapter. We read the description that when the mind is elsewhere we do not see. 'I was absent in mind I did not hear'.

In Western thought, Aristotle was clearly aware that perception is not possible merely by the sense organs. For him, perception consists in being moved and affected. Sense perception does not arise from the senses themselves, as organs of sense perception are potentiality and not...

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*29 'Śāṇevasāra' 376-382.
*30 'Brāhādārāmayāke Upanisad' III. 1, 4.
actuality.*31 Locke writes that whatever alterations are made in the body, if they reach not the mind; whatever impressions are made outward part if they are not taken notice of within, there is no perception. For we may burn our body with no other effect than it does a billet unless the motion be continued to the brain, and there the sense of heart or idea of pain be produced in the mind, wherein consists actual perception.*32

In modern psychology, Prof. Woodworth gives a formula 'W-S-O-R-W* for explaining the fascinating problem of how an individual perceives objective fact. At any given moment a man is set for the present situation. He might be listening to a low hum just as a smooth tone. But, if he tries to make out what the sound can be he is more likely to perceive it as the hum of an aeroplane.*33

Thus, we find that the analysis of perceptual experience shows that the sense organs and the contact of the sense organs with the stimulations of objects are no doubt conditions of perception. But that alone is not sufficient. A psychological condition is necessary for the experience. This psychological factor consists negatively in the removal of the psychic impediments in the way of perception. This may be likened to the subsidence and the obstruction of the knowledge-obscuring 'karmas' of the Jainas. On the positive side, psychic condition is the selective attention and the 'mental set'.

*31 'Aristotle's Psychology' as quoted in the Classical psychologists by Rand. p. 57.
*32 'An Essay concerning human understanding. Ch.IX. or Perception, by Locke.
*33 'Psychology' A study of mental life' by R.S. Woodworth. P. 403.
The Stages of Sense Perception:

According to the Jainas sense perception can be analysed into four stages as (i) 'Avagraha', (ii) 'Thā' (iii) 'Avaya' and (iv) 'Dharana'. These are the stages of sense experience. They arise through the operation of the sense organs and the mind. In the Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā we get the description of the four stages of the sense experience, 'saṃvyavahāra pratyakṣa'. The four stages mentioned above have been usually described as the four sub-divisions of the sense experience. For instance, in the Nandi-Sūtra they are mentioned as four types, 'caturvidha'. But it would be more appropriate to say that they are the four stages of sense experience, because psychologically analysed they express the four stages of perceptual cognition, although we may say that perception is a concrete psychosis. The appropriateness of this interpretation can be seen from the fact that in the commentary of sutra 20 of the Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā it is stated that the earlier form like 'avagraha' develops into the subsequent forms, and all of them partake of the same essential nature. Thus, in the Jaina thought four stages of 'matijñāna' as mentioned above have been described. 'Avagraha' refers to the first simple and primitive stage of experience. It may be said to be merely the

*34 'Tattvartha-Sūtra' I. 15
*35 'Nandi-Sūtra'
*36 'Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā' I. 1, 20 and commentary.
*37 'Dravyasaṃgraha' Edited by Ghosal. P. 12.
stage of sensation. Next comes 'Ihā'. In this state there is an element of mental factor. It refers to the integrative factors of the mind. In the third stage we get a clear and decisive cognition of the object. It is 'avāya'. It implies the presence of the inferential element in perception. 'Dhāraṇā' is retention of what is already experienced in the perceptual cognition. In fact it is not merely a stage of perceptual experience although it is included in perceptual experience.

Psychologists point out that perception is not a simple process nor is it merely the sense datum. It consists in the organisation and interpretation of sensations. It is 'knowledge about' and not merely 'knowledge of acquaintance' as William James said. Perception involves certain psychological factors like association, discrimination, integration, assimilation and recognition. Perception also involves inference. We perceive a table, and when we perceive the object as a table we recognise it and we get the defined picture of the object. As Angell said, perception is a synthetic process and the combination of the new and the old is the essential part of the synthesis. This process of combining was often called by early psychologists as 'apperception'. This problem will be referred to later. Structural psychologists like Wundt, Titchener and others analysed perception into sensations. They said that perceptions combine and fuse together a number of sensory elements like the process of forming $\text{H}_2\text{O}$. It is not merely a sum of sensations. It gives a new psychological product, a creative
synthesis like the mental chemistry of J.S. Mill. Later, the Gestalt psychologists gave a new turn to the psychology of perception. Gestalt psychologists hold that every perceptual experience is an unanalysed whole. It has a quality of its own. Thus we find that perceptual experience is not a simple unit although it is a whole and unanalysed experience. In the Pramana-mimamsa there is a description that different stages of perceptual experience are essentially of the same nature.

The Jaina philosophers were concerned with giving a logical and epistemological analysis of the perceptual experience. Therefore, they were more interested in giving the conditions and the stages of knowledge. However, their discussion of the problem has given the psychological picture of perception in terms of logical analysis. It is difficult to find the psychological acumen of the present day psychological analysis in the writings of the ancient philosophers. Moreover, we may remember that their knowledge and equipment of psychology were very meagre. They had no experimental basis. Their analysis was more on logical basis, on common sense and also on insight. However, the stages of perception mentioned by the Jaina philosophers very much correspond to the analysis of perception given by the traditional psychology and the structuralist school.

'Avagraha'- sensation.

'Avagraha' is the first stage of sense experience. It may be said that it is analogous to sensation. It is the level of sensation in which perceptual experience can be analysed.
Umāsvāti defines 'avagraha' as the implicit awareness of the object of sense. He says that 'grahanā', grasping, 'ālocana' holding, 'avadhāranā' prehending are the synonyms of 'avagraha'. It is indeterminate. The object presented through the sense stimulation is cognised in an undefined and indeterminate way. In this stage we are merely aware of the presence of the object without any association, without cognising the specific features, and in fact without even being aware of its association and name. In the 'Avasyaka-Nirukti' 'avagraha' has been defined as awareness of the sense data. Jinabhadra insists that 'avagraha' is indeterminate in its character. He is not prepared to consider that it has reference to any specific features of the object, because even relative reference is enough to transform the experience to the stage of 'avāya'. Then 'avāya' becomes a higher stage, and the stage of 'avāya' will not be necessary and possible, once the cognition of specific feature is admitted in the case of 'avagraha'. It would lead to endless series because cognition of particular is relative to the state of knowledge, and it would increase as the knowledge increases. It is not possible to ascertain all the particulars of an object even in the course of a long time. It is therefore more appropriate to say that 'avagraha' is mere awareness, mere cognition of an object without knowing the specific nature of the object.

*38 'Tattvārtha-Sūtra Bhasya' I. 15.
*39 'Tattvārtha-sūtra Bhasya' I. 15.
*40 'Avasyaka-Nirukti'. 3.
nor of its name. *41 *Nandi-Sutra* does not define 'avagraha'. It gives the implications of the definition of 'avagraha' as given in the *Avaysaka-Niryuktā*. It is described as cognition of sense data. It gives illustrations. It gives 'avagrahaṇātā', 'upadharanātā', 'sravanaṇātā', 'avalambanātā' and 'mālākā' as synonyms. *42 But, some Jaina logicians, like Pujyapāda Devaranandi, Akalanaka, Vidyanandi and Hemacandra, have said that 'avagraha' is a determinate cognition. Pujyapāda Devaranandi says that when the sense organ come in contact with the object there is intuitive apprehension, 'darsana'. After that we get cognition of the object which is of specific nature. This is 'avagraha'. *43 For instance, we cognise by means of the eyes the white colour as 'it is white'. In this sense the intuitive apprehension 'darsana' becomes the first stage of sense experience. It will be indeterminant. It will be a species of 'jñāna'. It has already been mentioned in this connection that 'darsana' cannot be identified with the primitive and the early stages of sense experience. In that case, we cannot have the highest stage of 'darsana' like the 'kevala darsana'. Akalanaka defines 'avagraha' as a determinate cognition of the distinctive nature of the object. It comes after the intuitive apprehension which is due to the contact of the sense organs with the object. *44 With the contact of the sense organs with

*41 *Vīsesavasyaka-Bhāsya* 25.5.6.
*42 *Nandi-Sutra* 30.
*43 *Sarvarthasiddhi* 1. 15.
*44 *Laghivasstraya* 5.
the object, there arises 'intuition of the bare existence' of
the object, 'samāṭra darsanaṃ'. This intuitive apprehension
develops into the determinate cognition of the object. That is
'avagraha'. According to Hemacandra 'avagraha' is a deter­
minate perception which follows the indeterminate intuition due
to the contact of the sense organs with the object. Indetermi­
nate intuitive experience is 'darsana'. It does not grasp the
specific characteristic of the object. This 'darsana' trans­
forms itself into a determinate cognition which is 'avagraha'.'*45
But, this 'avagraha' is not a mental construction because it
depends on the active exercise of the sense organs like the
visual and also because it cannot be corrected by discursive
thought. Therefore, it is still immediate and direct experi­
ence based on the contact of the sense organs and the object.
Similarly, Vidyānandī and Vādidevasūri make 'avagraha' deter­
minate cognition.

However, it would be difficult to make 'avagraha' a
determinate cognition as coming after 'darsana' which is in­
determinate and which is due to the contact of the sense organs
and the object, as these logicians have described. In that
case, as we have said earlier, 'darsana' will become a mere
species of 'jñāna' and it will be reduced to the level of mere
sensation. The higher forms of 'darsana' like the 'kṣaṇa

*45 'Pramāṇa-mīśāsā' I. 1, 26.
*46 'Pramāṇa-mīśāsā' I. 1, 26. 'Na cāyaṁ mānasopaṃ vikalpah'
Darsana would be meaningless because there would be no higher form of 'darsana'. All 'darsana' will be reduced to the sensational level. But, we find that the higher forms of 'darsana' have been accepted. It would, therefore, be more appropriate to treat 'darsana' as a separate type of experience in the sense of intuitive experience, and 'avagraha' should be treated as the first stage of 'jñāna'. It is really the sensational stage where there is mere awareness of the existence without the cognition of the specific features of the object.

Sensations, as William James said are the first things in the way of consciousness. It does not mean that all our experience is only fusing and compounding of sensations. Our experience can be analysed into sensations and they form the elements in our sensory experience. As Stout says, sensations are of the nature of immediate experience like the experience of cold and warm, a specific tinge of pain or a touch located in the body or at the surface of the body. The term sensation is also extended to cover the visual data, sound, taste, smell which may enter into immediate experience. Sensations vary not only with the variations in the presented objects but also in accordance with the state of the bodily organs. They are private and immediate experiences of the individual.\(^{47}\)

Sensations are aboriginal and without precedent; it is a mental first cause, uncaused by antecedent mental events and inexplicable.

in strictly psychological terms. It is a first beginning of knowledge, and the ultimate source upon which all empirical cognition rests.*48 Further, sensations are simply given rather than made. They are 'impressions' which the mind passively receives. They constitute, as Lewis says, a content of experience "which we do not invent and cannot have as we will, but merely find".*49 During the period of two hundred years between the publication of Locke's Essay and of James's Principle, two further characteristics, now largely of antiquarian interest, were gradually attributed to sensation. Sensations were held to be the simple elements of which complex ideas are formed, as well as the matter or crude stuff out of which the associative machinery fashions the organised and meaningful world of every-day experience.*50

In this sense we can say that 'avagraha' is the state of sensation. It is the first stage of experience. It is the given. It does not involve the stage of 'darsana' which is a qualitatively different from 'jñāna'. 'Avagraha' is a species of 'jñāna'. Therefore, we describe 'avagraha' as the immediate experience. It is a sensation.

*48 Sense-datum theory and observational fact: Some contributions of Psychology to Epistemology.
*50 Ibid.
The stages in 'Avagraha':

'Avagraha' has been here identified with sensation, the immediacy of experience. It is bare awareness of the existence of the object without any determination of the specific features. This fact becomes clear if we remember that 'avagraha' has been further distinguished into two stages as (i) 'vyañjanāvagraha' and 'arthāvagraha'.*51 'Vyañjanāvagraha' is the earlier stage. It is a physiological stimulus condition of the sensation of the immediate experience. In the Vīṣṇuvaśyaka-śāstra we get the description of 'vyañjanāvagraha'. It is said that what reveals an object as a lamp reveals a jar is 'vyañjanāvagraha'. It is only the relation of the sense organ and the object in the form of its sense stimulation such as sound.*52 In the Śānta-śūtra we get an example of the earthen pot and the drops of water, 'mallaka dṛṣṭanta'. It gives a description of the stage of 'vyañjanāvagraha'. A clay pot is to be filled with water. In the beginning when a person pours out one drop of water, it is absorbed and there is no sign of the existence of water. Similarly he goes on pouring drops of water and after a certain stage a drop of water will be visible. Then the water begins to accumulate. We may call that stage where the water became visible as the 'threshold of saturation'. The drops of water below the threshold were all absorbed. Similarly a person who is asleep receives the sound stimulation successively for some-

*51 'Tattvārtha-Sūtra' I. 17-18. 'Arthasya vyañjanāvagrahaḥ.'
*52 'Vīṣṇuvaśyaka-śāstra' 191. 193.
time. The sound atoms reach the ears. Innumerable instances have to pass before the ears become full of sound atoms. At a particular stage the person becomes conscious of the sound. So far he was not aware of the sound although the auditory stimulation was pouring in. We may call this stage of the first awareness as 'the threshold of awareness'. The sensation of sound starts the moment the threshold is crossed, and we become aware of the sound. That is the immediate experience of sound that is 'arthāvagraha'. So far there was no awareness of the sound although the conditions of stimulation for the awareness were operating below the threshold.\(^5\) The stimulus was pouring in constantly although no awareness of sound was possible upto a particular stage. Such a preparatory stage of sensation presents physiological and stimulus conditions for the sensational stage. It is indeterminate and undefined. In fact it is sometimes contended that it is not consciousness at all. 'Yasovijaya says that 'vyañjanāvagraha' is cognition only in name. It is only a condition of 'arthāvagraha' which is cognition.\(^5\) However, the presence of consciousness in 'vyañjanāvagraha' may be admitted although it is not explicit due to its undeveloped existence.\(^5\) In this, the awareness is implicit. It may be referred to as potentiality of awareness.

\(^5\) 'Nandi-sūtra. 34. 'Mallaka drṣṭānta'  
\(^5\) 'Jaina taraka Shāra. P. 3.'  
\(^5\) 'Visesāvavyaka-śāṣya' 196.
In this sense 'vyājanāyavagraha' is not totally unconscious because it is this that develops into consciousness. It is not possible for man to be clearly aware of all the contents in the mind even when he is wide awake. A countless points of consciousness emerge in the course of a single day. 'Vyājanāyavagraha' has been just described as implicit awareness, the physiological and stimulus condition of awareness. It gradually develops into awareness and gives the sensation. It is very often described as 'contact awareness'. However, it would not be appropriate to call this 'awareness', although there is the stimulation flowing in. Awareness gradually emerges later due to the accumulation of stimulation. It is merely potentiality of awareness or the implicit awareness.

Such a stage of potential consciousness may be compared to the unconscious experiences described by Stout. The question of unconscious mental states relates to the possibility of there being experiences which may be ours, but of which we cannot become aware directly. There are feelings and sensations which do not enter into the stream of our mental life so as to be open to direct observation at the time at which they occur. Leibnitz has also talked of unconscious mental states, 'petites perceptions'. Leibnitz's doctrine of 'petites perception' enables him to understand how things may be in the mind in an

*56 'Visesavasyaka-Bhasva'. 196.
*57 'Manual of Psychology'. G.F. Stout. P. 28
undeveloped way even when we do not seem to be conscious of it. He agrees with Locke that sensations come first.  But the unconscious mental states and the 'petites perceptions' imply the presence of a certain experience of which we are not directly aware. If we can know of them at all, as Stout says, we can only do so in the way in which we can come to know the mental dispositions or as we come to know of mental states in the lower animals. In this sense, although we have compared 'vyanjanevaghana' with the unconscious mental states of Stout and Leibnitz, we may not say that they are identical. It is true that there is a remote likeness, but they cannot be similar to each other, because the unconscious mental states of Stout do not accumulate and gradually emerge into consciousness. They are there and they cannot be observed directly.

We may give the analogy of the psychological investigations from the modern psychologists in their attempt to measure the intensity of felt sensation. Weber carried on experiments in the direction of measuring the felt difference in the intensity of the sensation. He found that in comparing objects and observing the distinction between them, 'we perceive not the difference between the objects but the ratio of this difference to the magnitude of the object compared.'  If we are comparing

*58 *'A Students' History of Philosophy' by A.K. Rogers. P. 320

*59 *'Weber's Law' as formulated by him in a monograph entitled *Determinate* (1834).

See also *Weber-Fechner Law* as stated by Fechner in *Elements of Psycho-Physics* (1860), translated from the German: VIII. *The Measurement of Sensation.*
by touch two weights, the one of thirty and the other of twenty-
nine half ounces, the difference is not more easily perceived
than that between weights of thirty and twenty-nine drachms.
Similar observations can be made about the sense of sight. The
difference in the intensity of light is discernible when the
ratio of the original stimulus to the increased stimulus is
100:101. Weber said that in addition also not the absolute
difference between the vibration of two tones but the relative
difference compared with the number of vibrations of the tones
is discriminated. The original stimulus, whatever its absolute
intensity may be must be increased by a certain constant fraction
of its own account, before any unlikeness in the sensation is
discernible, before 'the threshold of discernment' is passed.
The constant fraction is different for different kinds of sensa-
tions. The basis of the stimulus consists in the fact that the
awareness of sense experience is possible after 'the threshold
of awareness is reached'. This is possible when the stimulus
units are accumulated and they produce the awareness after the
particular stage. 'malkaka ārstānta' gives a picture of such
a mental process although the quantitative measurement and the
experimental basis were not possible.

'Arthaavagraha'

As soon as the person becomes conscious the stage of
'vyanjanavagraha' is over and it transforms itself into 'arthāva-
graha'. This may be called the stage of sensation proper. It
is awareness of the object. In the Nandi-Sūtra there is a description that in this stage we are aware of the sound as 'this is sound' or 'colour' or 'touch'. But we do not exactly cognise the nature of the sound. But in the Vīsesāvasyaka-Bhāṣya this kind of determinate awareness as 'this is sound' is denied in the stage of sensation. It is merely awareness of the occurrence of the cognition because it lasts only for one moment. It is therefore indeterminate and indefinite. It does not reach the stage of the cognition of specific content. In the Vīsesāvasyaka-Bhāṣya there is the discussion of an opinion of the Jaina thinkers who define 'arthāvaegraha' with reference to the development of personality. It is said that the awareness of a new-born infant is confined to the cognition of the general nature only. But as it gradually grows it gets sufficient experience and acquaintance with the objects. Then it cognises specific features of the object even in one instant. This view is criticised in the Vīsesāvasyaka-Bhāṣya on the ground that it will lead to indefinite series of cognitions and it would vary with the extent of the knowledge of the individual.

On the basis of such a distinction regarding the two stages of 'avagraha' it is stated that 'vyanjanavagraha' lasts

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*59 Nandi-Sūtra 35.
*60 Vīsesāvasyaka-Bhāṣya 253.
*61 op.cit. 268-269.
for indefinite moments gradually proceeding towards the level of consciousness. The physiological and stimulus conditions of awareness in the form of sensation continue to accumulate for a number of moments till the threshold of awareness is reached. But once the stage of awareness in the form of sensation is reached it lasts only for an instant, which is indivisible point of time and which is infinitesimal.

We have seen that the Western psychologists, like Stout, describe the sensations as something of the nature of immediately experienced warm or cold, a specific tinge of pain, touch located in or at the surface of the body, rather than anything outside. Psychologists have extended the term to cover the visual data, the sounds and the smells that may enter into immediate experience. Stout further says that all recognition of sensation as of certain kind and all apprehension of it as continuing to be the same nature or as changing in nature at different moments involves a reference beyond this experience. For, sensation is immediate experience and nothing more. At any one moment there is no immediate experience except immediate experience at that moment. Sensations are genuine and factual while mental constructs are spurious and artificial. Sensations are new, uncontaminated and untouched by those mental processes which render ideas for suspect: They are not structured by perception, dimmed and blurred through detention, abridged through forgetting or artificially arranged as a result

*62 'Nandi-Sūtra' 35.
of fortuitous associations. From Hume to Russell, modern empiricism has tended to regard the inchoate beginnings of knowledge in uniformed sensation as more authentic than the cognitive refinement which recent enquiry provides.\footnote{A64}

The Jainas have raised another problem regarding the sub-division of the stages in 'avagraha', sensational experience. This is based on the problem of contact of the sense organs with the object, the 'prāpyakāritva' and 'aprāpyakāritva'. This problem has been discussed in the last chapter. According to the Jainas the visual sense organ is 'aprāpyakāri' because there is no contact of the sense organ with the object. Other sense organs are 'prāpyakāri'. 'Vyaṇjanāvagraha', it is maintained, is essentially concerned with the contact of the sense organs with the stimulus coming from the object gradually giving rise to awareness of the object. In this sense, according to the Jainas there are four types of 'vyaṇjanāvagraha' there being no 'vyaṇjanāvagraha' for the sense of sight. Visual sense organ is incompetent to establish direct contact with the object of the external world through the stimulation.\footnote{A65} But, 'arthāvagraha' is awareness itself. It is of six types: due to the five sense organs and due to the mind which is quasi-sense organ.\footnote{A66} Thus according to the Jainas, the visual sensation

\footnote{A64} 'Sense datum theory and observational fact: Some contributions of Psychology to Epistemology. Article by Charles F. Wallraff. In the Journal of Philosophy. Jan 2, 1958. P. 23.}
\footnote{A65} 'Nandi-Sūtra' 28. and 'Vīcesāvavaka-Sūtra' 204.}
\footnote{A66} 'Nandi-Sūtra' 29. and 'Tattvārtha-Sūtra'.
does not require the accumulation of the sense stimulus coming from the object. It would mean there is no mental state below the 'threshold of awareness.'

But it would be difficult to justify this view regarding the visual sense in the light of modern science. It may be said that even in the case of the visual sense organ, the light rays have to pass through the lens of the eyes and reach the retina. In this sense there is contact of the sense organ, the eye, and its object which is illuminated by light. This problem has been discussed in the last chapter. It would not be inappropriate to say that even in the case of the sense of sight, the physiological and the stimulus conditions are required. 'Vyanjanavagraha' is a necessary stage of 'Arthavagraha.' All sensations emerge due to the accumulation of the stimulation up to the stage of the threshold of awareness. 'Sensation is aroused by the messages which are transmitted through the nerves from the sense organ to the brain; and this is the description of the nature of the sensory message and the way in which it can be recorded and analysed.'

If the message from the sense organs is crowded closely the sensation is intense and if the message is separated by long intervals the sensation is feeble. Sensations have an upper and a lower limit. They are 'thresholds.' If the stimuli are not sufficient and if they fall below the threshold they do not evoke sense experience. They

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*67 'Basis of Sensation' by Adrian. Preface.
are called subliminal stimuli. The subliminal stimuli may accumulate and produce the experience. Modern psychologists say that sensations have a latency period. This is the time taken by bodily tissues, physiological factors before they produce their effect. For instance, it takes a certain length of time to arouse a sense organ and to excite the nerve fibres that lead to the brain. The brain connections, the motor nerves and also the muscles take time. Thus, there is found to be an interval between the stimulus and the stage of awareness and the response.

'Arthāvāgraha' then is the real sensational stage, the immediacy of experience while 'vyāhānasvāgraha' is a latency stage and the stimulus condition which gradually gives rise to the awareness. However, 'arthāvāgraha' is also indeterminate and indefinite and not determinate. According to jinabhadra the consciousness of the person just awakened from sleep and hearing the sound does not take the form 'this is sound'; because 'this is sound' is determinate and discursive and it requires more than one moment for developing. But, the 'arthāvāgraha' is awareness of the sound and it is instantaneous. The cognition 'this is sound' is possible at a later stage called 'avāya'.

*68 'Visesāvasyaka Bhāṣya' 252.
Cognition of objects in empirical experience is not complete with the mere awareness at the sensational stage. In fact, pure sensations are not possible. As Stout says, we have hardly any pure sensations, sensations absolutely devoid of meaning, either original or acquired, except perhaps in the case of children. Therefore, though sensations are not self-subsistent, they do involve mental factors. They have derivative meaning. All recognition of a sensation as of certain kind involves a reference beyond immediate experience. 'Its identity in nature or difference in nature in relation to the past or possible future experiences can only be an object of thought transcending the immediacy of sense.' Sensations transcend the immediacy of experience also because they are inseparably connected with thought. They have a reference to external objects. They mean something beyond themselves. For instance, a sensation of red refers to something red or to something which appears red. Thus, absolutely pure sensation is not possible. It is only an abstraction. It always involves some element of meaning or association which makes the experience concrete. Sensations have always a derivative meaning.

In this sense, our empirical experience will not be complete with 'avagraha'. 'Avagraha' is not self-subsistent.

It involves meaning and it has reference to object. 'Arthavāgraha', mere awareness of sensation lasts only for one instance, and it immediately transforms itself into more specific cognition. It brings in 'īhā' a factor involving meaning. The next stage in the experience, then, is 'īhā'. In 'avagraha' there is mere awareness of the object. In 'īhā' nature of the object is cognised. In 'avagraha' a person simply hears a sound. In 'īhā' he cognises the nature of the sound also. In Tattvārthasūtra Bhāṣya, we get a description of the factors in experience. Sensation cognises only a part of the object while 'īhā' strives to cognise specific features. It strives for cognition of the nature of the object. The process of 'īhā' continues for a certain period of time, although it never exceeds one 'muhūrtā'. Nandi-Sūtra gives five synonyms of 'īhā' like 'abhogatā', 'āraṇṣāyata', 'gavesapatā' and 'vimsatā'. Umāsvāti gives synonyms of 'īhā' as 'ūha', 'tarka', 'vicāraṇa' and 'jijñāsa'. Puṣyapaḍa Devaranandi defines 'īhā' as striving for understanding the specific character of the object which has been cognised by 'avagraha'. Jinabhadra says that it is enquiry for the distinctive features of the object. Akalanka defines 'īhā' similarly. Kemacandra says that 'īhā' strives for the

*70 'Nandi-Sūtra' 35.
*71 'Nandi-Sūtra' 31.
*72 'Tattvārthasūtra Bhāṣya' 115.
*73 'Sarvārthasiddhi' 115.
*74 'Vivekānandasvāmin Bhāṣya' 180.
*75 'Tattvārtharājāvārttika' I. 15. 2.
cognition of the specific details of the object apprehended by sensation. Vyānaṇa-vagraha is the potential condition of awareness. Artha-vagraha is the dawning of awareness. And iha is the tendency towards cognising the specific features of the object. Iha has been very often translated as 'speculation'. But it would be more appropriate to use 'associative integration' as a phrase which stands for iha. However, it would be difficult to find out an appropriate phrase for iha. Because the synonyms like cinta and vimarsa mentioned in Nandi-Sūtra and like parīkṣa and vicāraṇa mentioned by Umasvati lead to attribute discursive thinking at this early stage of perceptual cognition. What Umasvati and Nandi-Sūtra meant by using such terms with the content of discursive thinking as synonyms of iha it is difficult to know. We may only say that iha is the first mental association which gives content and coherence for the immediacy of experience in the sensational stage. Mere awareness of the sensation is apprehended by the cognition of specific features of the object. It is a striving of the mind to get coherence and integration of the sense impressions. In this stage, we get the nature of the object although it is still in the semi-conceptual stage. Thus, iha is the stage in the formation of perceptual experience. It brings in associative integration of sensory elements experienced in the stage of sensation. It is very often said that perceptual

*76 'Pramāna-mūrṇāsā'. 127.
experience involves factors like association and selection of the sense data. Perception involves implicit comparison, assimilation, discrimination and integration. It involves association. For instance, we perceive a red rose. In this experience, we get the experience of the sensation of red. Other characteristics are associated and integrated and then we perceive the object, the red flower. At least that is what the earlier psychologists, especially the Associationists, believed. In fact, the Associationists believed that all complex experience can be looked upon as reproduction and association of elementary sensations.

The Jainas thought as 'iha' is striving for determinate and specific cognition it is possible to be confused with doubt, 'samsaya'. But, 'iha' is not to be confused with doubt although it does involve an element of striving for finding the specific nature of the object. Jinabhādra says that the mental state which refers to many conflicting alternatives where it is difficult to make choice is the state of doubt. It is a state which is really nescience, 'ajñāna'. But, 'iha' is the mental state in which there is striving for the ascertainment of truth. It leads to the acceptance of the true and the avoidance of the untrue. Siddhasena Divākara also draws the same line of distinction between 'iha' and 'samsaya'. For instance, on

*77 'Vīcesāvyakā-Bhāṣya' 183-84.*
receiving a sense impression of sound there arises a doubt whether the sound comes from a conch or a horn. The mind is driven to consider the specific points of agreement and difference. It is perceived as sweet and agreeable. This quality is attributed to the sound of the conch and not of the horn. This associative integration and the striving for cognition of the specific nature of the object is 'ɪhā'. According to this interpretation it appears that doubt is the beginning of 'ɪhā'. It arises just before 'ɪhā' takes form. In the Pramāṇa-mīmāṁsā it is said that doubt crops up in the interval between sensation, 'avagraha' and 'ɪhā', associative integration, even when the object is a matter of habitual perception. But, the existence of the state of doubt is not easily detected due to the rapidity of succession of mental events. But, the introduction of doubt as a stage in the process of perceptual experience before 'ɪhā', the associative integration is more difficult to understand from the psychological point of view. This point has been very often responsible for terming 'ɪhā' as a speculation. However, we may say that the doubt which intervenes between sensation and 'ɪhā' which we have called associative integration is more a logical expediency than a psychological fact. The Jaina logicians are concerned with finding a logical sequence and consistency in the problem of the theory of the knowledge than in the psychological analysis.

*78 'Pramāṇa-mīmāṁsā' I. 1. 27.
It is difficult to maintain that 'īhā' in the sense of speculation is a stage which culminates from doubt or the analysis of comparison of various alternative presentations. In this sense, doubt, 'samsaya' and 'īhā' 'speculation' involve element of discursive thinking which is not possible at this early stage of perceptual experience. It would be more appropriate to say that 'īhā' is the associative factor. It integrates the impressions to form a concrete psychosis. In the language of the structural psychologists like Wundt and Titchner, such a process of association and integration is a necessary element in the perceptual experience which is a complex experience.

'Avāya'

From the stage of associative integration, 'īhā' we come to the stage of interpretation. Sensations are interpreted and a meaning assigned to the sensation. That would be perception. Sensation is the first impression of something, the meaning of which is not cognised. Perception is the interpretation of the sensation in which the meaning is known. William James says it is 'knowledge about'. This involves perceptual judgement. For instance, when we perceive a red rose our perception involves the cognition 'this is red rose'. The Jainas said that this stage of perceptual judgement is 'avāya', although it is still in the non-verbal stage. 'Avāya' follows in the wake of 'īhā', associative integration. In this stage we reach a determinate experience. The striving for a cognition of the specific nature of the object results in the definite perception
of the object. 'Avasyakanihuyukti' defined 'avāya' as determinate cognition. In the Sarvārthasiddhi we get the description of 'avāya' as the cognition of the true nature of the object due to the cognition of the particular characteristics. Umāsvatī says that 'upagama', 'upanoda', 'apavyādha', 'apeta' and 'apagata' are synonyms of 'avāya'. They mean determinate cognition.

Nandi-Sūtra gives 'āvartanata' 'pratyāvartanatā', buddhi', 'vijñāna' as synonyms. Tattvārtha-Sūtra Bhāṣya describes 'avāya' as the stage of ascertainment of right and exclusion of the wrong. For instance, on hearing a sound, the person determines that this sound must be of a conch and not of a horn, since it is sweet and not harsh. Harshness is the quality of the sound of a horn. This type of ascertainment of the existing specific feature of the object is called 'avāya'. It is perceptual judgement. It is expressed in the form of a judgement as 'this is the sound of a conch' or 'this is a red rose'.

Some Jainīa logicians say that 'avāya' has only a negative function. In this stage of experience there is merely the exclusion of the non-existing qualities. They ascribe cognition of the existing quality to the later stage of experience called 'dharanā'. Jinabhadra says that such a view is not
correct. He says that whether a cognition merely does the negative function of excluding the non-existing qualities, or it also does the determination of the existing characteristics, or whether it does both, it is still 'avāya' perceptual judgment.*84 Umāsvāti seems to hold the view mentioned by Jinaabhada. Pūjayapāda says that 'avāya' cognises the specific features of the object. Therefore it is determinate cognition. Aksaṇa holds a similar view. Vādi-Eeva describes 'avāya' as a determination of specific features of the object cognised in the stage of 'īśā'.*85 Hemacandra holds a similar view. He says that 'avāya' is the final determination of the specific nature of the object cognised by 'īśā'. 'Avāya' has been described as perceptual judgement in this treatise.

'Avāya' may be compared to the apperception involved in perceptual experience. Perception is a complex experience. The older psychologists analysed perception as involving apperception. Apperception is assimilating new experiences to old experiences. It is involved in all distinct perceptions and usually in all attentive perceptions. For instance, when we hear the footsteps of someone coming up the stairs, we are only aware through the sense organ of hearing of a sound of certain type. But, that sound is of a particular person, that is on

*84 'Viśesavasyaka Bhāṣya' 187.
*85 'Prameya-nayatattvalokakāraka' II. 9.
the stairs, all this is interpretation based on the previous experience. We then get the experience that we hear the footsteps of the person coming on the stairs. In this stage what is fragmentary in the experiences is supplemented and expanded and filled into a system to form a completed picture.

'Dhārana' Retention:

Now we come to the stage of retention, 'dhārana' in perceptual experience. *Nandi-Sūtra* defines retention as the act of retaining a perceptual judgement for a number of instants or innumerable instants. It gives 'dhārana', 'chārana', 'sthāpana', and 'pratiṣṭhā' as synonyms of 'dhārana'.*86

Umāsvāti defines 'dhārana' as final determination of the object, retention of the cognition thus formed, and recognition of the object on future occasions.*87 According to Umāsvāti retention develops through three stages as (i) the nature of the object is finally cognised, (ii) the cognition so formed is retained and (iii) the object is recognised on future occasions. *Avāsya-nirvukti* defines 'dhārana' as retention. *88* Jinabadrā says that retention is the absence of the lapse of perceptual cognition. Like Umāsvāti he also mentions three stages of retention as (i) the absence of the lapse of perceptual judgement, (ii) the formation of the mental trace and (iii) the recollection.

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*86 'Nandi-Sūtra' 35.
*87 'Tattvārtha-Sūtra Bhāṣya' I. 15.
*88 'Visesāvāsya-bhāṣya' 179. Dhāranaṃ puna dhāranaṃ 180.
- 'aviccute dhārena tassa.'
of the cognition on the future occasions. In this description
the absence of the lapse, 'aviccūti', mental trace, 'vāsanā',
and recollection 'smṛti' are three stages included in the con­
ception of 'dharana'. Pujiyapāda Devanandi defines 'dharana'
as the condition of the absence of forgetting in future of
that which has been cognised by 'avāya'. Akalaṅka says that
it is a absence of forgetting what has been cognised by per­
ceptual judgement. But, some logicians like Vādi-Deva do not
accept 'dharana' as a condition of recall in future. 'Dharana'
is a stage of perceptual cognition and it cannot last up to the
moment of recall. They say it is only establishing perception
for a certain length of time.

Thus, we find that logicians make 'dharana' a mere
retention of perceptual experience. While some others would
make it also a condition of recall of that experience at a
future time. Those who deny that it is a condition of recall
say that it cannot be a cause of recall although it is a remote
condition of recall, because recall does require retention of
an experience. Vādi-Deva says that the recollection of an
experience is due to special capacity of the soul which may be
called 'samskāra'. Hemacandra entirely agrees with Vādi-Deva's
interpretation although he tries to reconcile the two views. He

*89 'Sarvārtasidhi' I. 15.
*90 'Tattvārtharājavarttika' I. 15. 4.
*91 'Svādvārāratanākara' II. 10.
says that retention is also a condition of recall.** The retention as a condition of recall will be discussed in the next chapter. Hemacandra says that the condition is only the causal stuff capable of effecting recollection of past experience. It is only a mental trace 'saśskāra'. It is a continued existence of a cognition for a definite or indefinite length of time. He further says that mental trace or 'saśskāra' is a species of cognition, and it is not different as the Vāśiṣṭhikas have stated. If it were not cognition it would not produce recollection which is cognitive in nature. Hemacandra reconciles his view of retention as the condition of recall with the view of retention as the absence of the lapse mentioned in Vīśeśavāyaśe-Bhāṣya. He says that retention is the absence of the lapse of perception. But it is included in the perceptual judgement 'avāya'. That is why it has not been separately mentioned by him. 'Avāya' when it continues for some length of time may be called retention as the absence of the lapse of experience. It may also be said that absence of the lapse is also a condition of recall in the sense in which he defines 'dhāranā'. Mere perception without the absence of the lapse cannot give rise to recollection. Perceptual judgement which are not attended by reflective mental stage are almost on the level of unattended perception, like the touch of grass by a person in hurried motion. And such

**Pramana-Mīmanāsā I. I. 29. 'Sārīti hetu-rddhāraṇā'.**
perceptions are not capable of giving rise to recollection. * * 

Hemacandra's description of 'avaya' and his analysis of 'dhāraṇa' comes nearer to the psychological analysis of perception especially of the structuralist school. Perception is a concrete experience in which sensations are organised and interpreted. Meaning is assigned to sensations. Without the factor of meaning or interpretation of the impressions perception would be impossible. Hemacandra's example of the touch of grass by a person in hurried motion shows that 'selective interest' is a necessary condition of perceptual judgement. Such experiences would be on the fringe of consciousness, and they would enter into the focus of consciousness if they are forced by factors like nearness of selective interest. Retention is an important condition of perception. In fact, as Stout says, retentiveness is in some form an indispensable condition of mental development. Mental development would be impossible unless previous experience left behind its persistent after effects to determine the nature in the course of subsequent experience. These after-effects are called in psychology traces or dispositions. Hemacandra called them 'samskāra'. They are the latent conditions of subsequent experience. However, Hemacandra makes them special capacities of the soul. Mental traces or dispositions bring us to the problem of memory. The

*93 'Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā' 1. 1. 29 and Commentary.
psychological importance of retention in memory will be discussed in the next chapter.

However, the analysis of perceptual experience shows that the concrete psychosis which involves the accumulation of sense stimuli to produce cumulative effect. It gradually gives rise to awareness that is the physiological and stimulus condition of sense awareness. That is 'vyāñjanāvagrāha'. It gives rise to awareness of the object. It is a sensation. It is 'arthāvagrāha'. Thus, 'avagrāha' is a stage of sensation. It is a stage of immediate experience in which we are merely aware of the object of stimulation without knowing anything more of the object. 'Avagrāha', on the whole, is a stage of sensation. But, 'avagrāha' is not without thought element. There can be no pure sensation. Sensations always have a derivative meaning, for retentiveness and association operate from the very beginning of life. A sense impression or image has meaning in so far as it refers to something other than itself, in so far as it enables us to think of the object. In experiencing a sensation an object is brought before the mind. For instance, the sensation of yellow carries with it the thought of something yellow.*94 This leads us to the next stage called 'īha'. It is associative integration. In this

stage of integrative experience we do not get the full experience of the object in the form of cognition of determinate nature of the object in its fullness. In this, we do not form a judgement. In the stage of 'avāya' we get the perceptual judgement. In this stage sense impressions are interpreted and the meaning is attached to the experience. We get the perceptual judgement in the form: 'this is red rose'. The implicit reference to thought in sensation gets expression and a concrete experience is formed. According to the Jainas the perceptual experience which they sometimes call 'avagraha' in general needs to be retained. Otherwise it would not be complete. We have seen that retentiveness is in some form an indispensable condition of mental development. Our subsequent experience depends on the capacity to retain the perceptual cognition. This capacity of retention differs with different individuals. A completed perceptual experience would be possible with all the four stages cooperating. This is the concrete psychosis called perception. As it was pointed out earlier, it is sometimes referred to as 'avagraha', and 'āha' 'avāya' and 'dhāranā' have been referred as cases of 'avagraha'. But such identification of the other processes with 'avagraha' was not universally accepted. Jinabhadra says that they are cases of 'avagraha' only by courtesy, 'upacārana'.

The Jainas have given an exhaustive description of the four stages of 'avagraha' perceptual experience, so far discussed.
Each of them is of six types as they arise due to the five sense organs and due to mind. Again, 'vyanjanavagraha' is of four types only. Thus there would be twenty eight forms of perceptual cognition. Each of the twenty eight forms again is of twelve types according to the nature of the object they can have. Therefore, the Jainas have mentioned that there are three hundred and thirty six types of sense experience, 'matijñāna' or 'abhinibodhikajñāna'. This elaborate classification has no psychological significance, although it has logical and mathematical interest. The Jaina logicians were fond of presenting fabulous mathematical calculations. This is found in their elaborate classification of 'karma' as given in the Gomate-Sara-Karma Kanda. Glassenapf in his 'Doctrine of Karma in Jainism' has given a detailed analysis of this division. The same tendency must have inspired the Jaina logicians to give such an elaborate classification of 'avagraha'.

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