CHAPTER III

THE JAINA THEORY OF 'UPAYOGA'

The Jaina philosophers talked of 'Upayoga' as the fundamental characteristic of life. 'Upayoga' is the defining characteristic of the soul. "Upayoga' is that by which a function is served. 'Upayujyate anena iti upayogas'. It is also described as that by which a subject is grasped. In the Gommatasāra: Jīvakānda, 'Upayoga' is described as the drive which leads to the apprehension of objects. It is the source of the psychological aspect of experience. All the three aspects, cognitive, conative and affective, spring from it. It gives rise to the experience of objects, and the experience expresses itself in the forms of 'jañāna' and 'darsana'. 'Upayoga' is of two types - 'anākāra' formless and 'sakāra' possessed of form. 'Anākāra upayoga' is formless cognition. It is indeterminate cognition. 'Sakāra upayoga' is the determinate cognition. It is a defined form of experience. It would not be out of place here, to point out that 'Upayoga' is not the resultant of consciousness as it is sometimes maintained. They were the earlier attempts.

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1 'Tattvārthādhiśāsana-sūtra', II. 9. and 'Bhāṣya' on the same.
   - 'Dravyasaṃgraha' - 'Jīvo uvayogamayo'.
   - 'Prakāstikāvasāra'. 27.

2 'Preja' 27. 'Vīskṣaṇaśiva-Bhāṣya'.

3 'Gommatasāra : Jīvakānda'. Ch. 11 Verse 672.
   - 'vatthuālittābhāvāśa jādo jīvassā jo du uvajogo'.
to translate 'upayaga'. Nor is it a sort of an inclination arising from consciousness. It is the conative drive which gives rise to experience. It is, in fact, the source of all experience. The Jaina philosophers were aware of the driving force of experience, the force by which experience is possible. This may be likened to the 'horme' of the modern psychologists.

The biological studies of the lower animals from the amoeba onwards show that all animals are centres of energy in constant dynamical relation with the world, yet confronting it in its own characteristic way. A name was needed to express this fundamental property of life, the drive or a felt tendency towards a particular end. Some psychologists called it 'conation' or conative process. But this drive may not always be conscious.*

There is the presence of an internal drive in such processes. "To this drive or urge whether it occurs in the conscious life of men and the higher animals we propose to give a single name - horme". This activity of the mind is a fundamental property of life. It has various other names like 'the will to live', 'élan vital', the life urge and the libido. Horme under one form or another has been the fundamental postulate of Lamarck, Butler, Bergson and Bernard Shaw. McDougall took

*4 'Education - Data and First Principles.' Macm. 3rd Ed.

P. 28-29.
great pains to present the hormic theory of psychology as against the mechanistic interpretation of life and mind.

The hormic force determines experience and behaviour. We get conscious experience because of this drive. The conscious experience takes the form of perception and understanding. Hormic force determines experience and behaviour. We get conscious experience because of this drive. The conscious experience takes the form of perception and understanding. Horme operates even in the unconscious behaviour of lower animals. In the plants and animals we see it operate in the preservation of organic balance. In our own physical and mental life we find examples of horme below the conscious level. We circulate our blood, we breathe and we digest our food, and all these are the expression of the hormic energy. It operates in all levels both in the individual and the racial sense. But the horme expressed and presented by the Jain philosophers could not be developed and analysed in terms of the modern analysis because their analysis of 'upayoga' was purely an epistemological problem. It was tempered with metaphysical speculation. They were aware of the fact that there is a purposive force which actuates and determines experience. This is clear from the distinction between 'jñāna' and 'darsana', as two forms of 'upayoga'.

'Jñāna and darsana'

As already pointed out, the Jainas make a distinction between 'anukāra' and 'śakāra' 'upayoga'. They say that 'śakāra' 'upayoga', the indeterminate cognition is 'darsana'; and 'śakāra'

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*5 'Educational Psychology' James C. Ross. New Ed. ?.
'upayoga' is 'jñāna'. 'sākāra upayoga' is specific cognition. It cognises the specific qualities of the objects. The 'anākāra upayoga' is indeterminate and undistinguished. It is general cognition. It may be called the knowledge of acquaintance in the language of William James.

The distinction between the indeterminate and defined cognition, 'the sākāra' and 'anākāra upayoga' has been a great problem in the Jaina theory of cognition. It is an ancient problem which has its roots in the early distinction between the two types of 'karma', 'jñānāvaraṇīya' and 'darśanāvaraṇīya'. The Āgamas make a clear distinction between 'jñāna' and 'darsana'. Kundakundācārya makes a distinction between the two, both from the empirical and the transcendental points of view. He says that the 'Atman', its knowledge, 'jñāna', and intuition 'darsana' - all these are identical, and they reveal the self as well as the non-self. However, he does not make a clear distinction between the 'sākāra upayoga' and the 'anākāra upayoga' on that basis. Ācārya Vīrāsaṇa, in his commentary called Bhavāja on 'Ṣaṭkhaṇḍaśāgama' of Puṇḍarīka, says, 'What comprehends an external object of the nature of the universal-cum-particular is 'jñāna', and comprehension of the self of the same nature is

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*6 'Prajñāpana-sūtra' pāda 29-30.
* 'Viṣṇu-svāyaka-Bhāṣya'. 'sākāra viseṣa -- '
  'Abhidhāna Rājendra' Vol. II. p. 760.
*7 'Nīvṛtanīśā'. 170.
They are both valid cognitions, and it is also maintained that 'jnāna' comprehends the reality in its complex and universal-cum-particular nature. It is not correct to say that 'jnāna' comprehends the particular and 'darsana' apprehends the general only. Viśrṣana says that the only difference between them is that 'jnāna' knows the external reality, and 'darsana' intuits the internal self. 'Vṛṣana' is 'antarjñāna', turned inside, introvert; while 'jnāna' is 'bahūṣṭrutā' extrovert. Brahmadeva in his Vṛtti on Pṛvavasāṃkrama of Umacandra gāthā 43 says that 'darsana' intuits the universal characteristic. But in his commentary on gāthā 44, he distinguishes two views, one from the point of view of logic and the other from the point of view of scriptures. Logic will give us the conception of 'darsana' as intuition of the universal as for instance 'Sattā'. According to scriptures, the awareness of the one's self which shows the striving for knowledge, and the subsequent determinate knowledge is 'jnāna'. The self-same consciousness is called 'darsana' as well as 'jnāna' with reference to the object of cognition. It is called 'darsana' when it is engaged in intuiting the self, and 'jnāna' when engaged in knowing the non-self. Other great thinkers like

*8 'Gaṇāya-visesātmaka-bāhyārtha-grahānaṃ- jñānam.
    tadātmaka-svātupe-grahānaḥ darsanam iti siddham'.

*9 'Studies In Jaina Philosophy'. Tatia. P. 73.


*11 'Tarkābhīprāyena satāvalokana-darsanaṃ'.
Pūjapāda, Samantabhadra, Akalanka and Vidyānandi accept the determinate and indeterminate nature of 'jñāna' and 'darsana' respectively. 'Darśana' need not be taken to be identical with indeterminate cognition, 'Nirvikalpa pratyaksā', as it is sometimes maintained. It need not be taken as 'pure sensation of the existence of objects'. If it were to be identified with sensation, it would be a rudimentary stage of cognition, it would be the first stage of cognition. In that case, we cannot accept the higher type of 'darsana', like 'avadī' 'kevala'. The Jainas accept the possibility of the perfect 'darsana' 'kevala darsana'. We may call 'darsana' intuition as against 'jñāna' which may be called intellective cognition.

The temporal relation between 'jñāna' and 'darsana' is another problem which the Jaina philosophers faced. Acarya Am-bhadra mentioned three positions: (i) they occur simultaneously, (ii) there is alternate occurrence, and (iii) they are identical. All this problem is with reference to the perfect being. The Jainas are agreed that in the case of the imperfect 'Jīvas' there is no simultaneity of occurrence of 'jñāna' and 'darsana'. An imperfect being in the mundane existence cannot experience 'jñāna' and 'darsana' at the same time. There is no agreement among the philosophers. Philosophers following the āgamic literature maintain that there is no simultaneous occurrence.

\[12\] 'Jaina Psychology' M. Mehta. (1955) P. 46.
of 'jñāna' and 'darsana' even in the case of the 'kevalin',
because the 'jñāna' and 'darsana' are both conscious experiences,
and as such they cannot occur at the same moment of experience
even in the case of the 'kevalin' much less in the case of the
beings in the mundane existence, the 'samsarins'. In the
Vīśeṣayasya-sūtra-bhāṣya we get a similar view. In this, Jinabhadrā
says that it is not true to say that when the veil of 'karma' is
removed the omniscient soul gets the two experiences simultane-
ously, because both of them are essentially conscious experiences.
Umbāsvāti maintains that in the case of the mundane souls 'jñāna'
and 'darsana' as conscious mental states manifesting themselves
in 'mati', 'sruta' and 'avadhi' occur one after the other and not
simultaneously. But in the case of the omniscient, where there
is 'pure knowledge' and 'pure intuition' there is simultaneous
occurrence of the two experiences. Kundakundācārya is also
of the same opinion. In the case of the 'kevalin' the two
experiences occur simultaneously even as the light and the heat
of the sun. Pujyapāda Devanandi gives a similar view.
Akālanka and Vidyānandi support the simultaneous occurrence of
'jñāna' and 'darsana' in the 'kevalin'. If they were to occur

*13 'Bhaeavati-sūtra' XVIII, 8. Prajñāpana-sūtra. pada 30

*14 'Vīśeṣayasya-bhāṣya' 3093. 3096.


*16. 'Niyemasa' 159.
successively, his omniscience would only be a contingent occurrence.*17 There are some philosophers who do not make any difference between 'jhāna' and 'darsana' at the highest. They advocate the identity between the two. Haribhadra mentions that the 'old ācāryas' hold the non-difference of the 'jñāna' and 'darsana'.*18 As pointed out by Tatia it is difficult to determine who the old 'ācāryas' referred to were.*19 Siddhasena Divākara points out that we can distinguish between 'jhāna' up to the point of 'manahparyāya jñāna', but at the level of the 'kevala jñāna' there is no difference. There can be no distinction between 'jñāna' and 'darsana' in the case of the omniscient. If the omniscient soul knows all in the instant, he should continue to know for ever, or otherwise he does not know at all. He also says that 'darsana' is 'jñāna' of external objects untouched by or unamenable to the sense organs. But the cognition does not cognize the past and future events by means of a 'liṅga'.*20 Yaśovijaya sums up the discussion on this problem and says that the philosophers looked at the problem from the different points of view. Therefore, none of the three positions is untenable.*21 Those who maintained simultaneous occurrence looked at it from the empirical point of view.

*17 'Aṣṭasati on Āntumāyanasa' 101.
*18 'Nandi-sūtra vṛtti' P.52.
*20 'Sanmatitarka-prakarana' II, 3.
*21 'Jñānabinduprakarana' P. 33.
Jinabhadra resorted to the 'rjusūtra' analytic point of view, while Siddhasens looked at it from the 'samgraha' the noumenal or the synthetic point of view.

Apart from the logical and epistemological implications of this problem it has a great psychological significance. The experience of 'kevalin' is not possible to be known by us. However it is necessary to analyse the experience in its psychological aspect. The discussion of the simultaneity and the successive occurrence of 'jnāna' and 'darsana' in the case of the 'kevalin' throws light on the fundamental nature of experience in the 'jnāna' and 'darsana' aspect. Experience is concrete, it expresses itself in the analytical and the synthetic aspects. Immediate experience is a factor in the concrete psychoses. We also get the analytic experience which is sided by the intellective factors. 'Jnāna' and 'darsana' have been very often talked of as knowledge about and knowledge of acquaintance. But knowledge of acquaintance is not a proper phrase for the 'darsana', because knowledge of acquaintance is a single and early form of cognition. It is analogous to sensation. But 'darsana' is not to be identified with the primitive and the original form of cognition. It is higher and yet simple. It may be referred to as intuitive experience which apprehends reality directly in a moment of experience. For instance, we very often get the solution of a mathematical problem in a flash of experience. Farraudin, a Swiss hunter, conceived
the idea that the huge blocks of rocks had been transported by glacial action. He got this as a sudden flash of insight. It was later proved by later scientists. There has been a good deal of discussion regarding the knowledge of acquaintance or 'simple apprehension' in modern psychology. L.T. Hobhouse recognised 'simple apprehension'. Russell talked of the 'knowledge of acquaintance'. Hobhouse said that the thought relations never constitute a content of immediate experience. 'The consciousness in which we are directly or immediately aware of the content present to us, a state which I venture to call apprehension is a primitive undervived act of knowledge.' Prof. Stout speaks of immediate experience in a similar language. Simple apprehension is the term which seems most suitable for the presence of an object to consciousness without indicating any more special relation in which the mind may stand to this object. Bertrand Russell also, inspite of the frequent use of the phrase 'knowledge of acquaintance', means by it the same kind of experience as Hobhouse and Prof. Stout meant by 'simple apprehension'. It is better called 'acquaintance' and not 'knowledge based on acquaintance'. We shall say that we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without intermediacy of any process of inference, or any knowledge

*23 'Problems of Philosophy' P. 73.
of truth. However, the term 'darsana' cannot be translated in terms of any of these, as acquaintance or simple apprehension; they signify an undervived knowledge. The terms refer to the simple, direct and primitive experience. Stout says that it gives the bare presence of the object to consciousness. As such 'darsana' would quite differ from such a form of simple apprehension. 'Darsana' has various degrees. It admits of perfect experience which is direct and unerring 'kevala darsana'. Thus, it would not be appropriate to identify 'darsana' such a simple and primitive form of knowledge as mentioned by Hobhouse, Russell and Stout. It is best to call it 'intuitive experience'. 'Jñāna' is experience which presents the analytic feature of the objects. It is not also a state of perception because perception is a stage of experience. It is a stage of 'jñāna' as well as 'darsana', we find that 'mati jñāna' and 'mati darsana' are two species of cognition. Sensation and perception belong to both the forms of cognition, 'Jñāna' and 'darsana'.

In the Dravyasāmgha Śemandra says that the soul in its pure form has the quality of consciousness, śreemadeva in his commentary writes that from the ultimate point of view, 'Jīva' is distinguished by its quality of consciousness.24 it is the most direct and nearest reality of which any one who has introspected is most immediately aware.

*24 'Dravyasāmgha' Verse 3. "niscaya mayado du ccdana jāsa-"
Consciousness has been the most important point of discussion for the philosophers, the psychologists as well as the scientists. Attempts have been made to solve the problems from various angles. In the Aitareya Aranyaka, effort is made to understand the different stages of the development of consciousness in the universe. In the evolution described in the herbs and the trees and all that is animal, the Ātman is gradually developing in them. In the herbs only sap is seen; in the animated beings 'citta' is seen; and in man again there is gradual development of 'Ātman' for he is not endowed with 'prajña'. Similarly in the Chandogyya Upanisad, Prajāpati describes the progressive identification of 'Ātman' with body consciousness. Physico-psychological method is adopted in the Taittiriya. Finally the 'Ātman' as 'jñānamaya' and 'ānandamaya' is emphasised. The Jaina classification of the 'Jīvas' brings the problem of the evolution of consciousness on the scientific basis. 'Jīvas' have been classified into one-sensed, two-sensed, three, four and five sensed according to the possession of the number of the sense organs. 'Jīvas' possessing the five senses are divided into those having mind and those without mind. It is now realised that the rise of consciousness is late in the evolution of life, from the physical evolution to the evolution of life, mind and consciousness. However, it is difficult to say whether the ancient philosophers

*25 Aitareya Aranyaka*. 2.3.2.

*26 As quoted in 'Nature of Consciousness in Hindu Philosophy' by Jaxeana, P. 24.
were aware of the evolution of life and consciousness in the sense understood today. Still it would not be inappropriate to say that they were aware of the relatively later growth of the mind and consciousness.

*Cetana*

From the speculative side, 'cetana' as a fundamental quality of the soul is pure consciousness, a kind of flame without smoke. This consciousness is eternal although it gets manifested in the course of the evolutionary process of life in the empirical sense. This empirical consciousness arises due to the contact of the sense organs with the objects. Thus 'cetana' in its pure form gets embodied with the 'atman' and comes into contact with the empirical life, with the sense organs and the objects. It manifests itself in the form of 'jñāna' and 'darsana'. 'Jñāna' and 'darsana' are, therefore, the aspects of 'cetana', and 'cetana' is the spring-board from which they arise. It is like the flood of light in which the objects are illuminated. It is the psychic background and the psychic halo of cognition in its two aspects, 'jñāna' and 'darsana'. 'Cetana', therefore, is the light of consciousness that the soul possesses and through this light the cognition of objects arises.

Now the problem arises - how to relate the concepts like 'upayoga', 'cetanā', 'jñāna' and 'darsana'. 'Upayoga' has been described as of two types, 'jñāna' and 'darsana'. We have described 'upayoga' as home, the psychic force which is driving
life and consciousness with a purpose. The purpose may be conscious or unconscious. On the conscious side 'upayoga' expresses itself into 'jnāna' and 'darsana'. This expression is possible in the light of 'cetanā'. If 'cetanā' were not there, then 'upayoga' would be purely an unconscious drive expressing itself in the physiological activities like the breathing and blood circulation. But we feel that even these activities are sometimes objects of our marginal consciousness. In any case there is the psychic overtone of the physiological activities in our lives. This overtone is the light of consciousness, or the light of 'cetanā' which is a permanent quality of the soul. In the background of this light the psychic drive or 'upayoga' expresses itself into cognition, as the light of the lamp enables the man to see the objects. This irresistible force of life makes us cognise objects. Thus 'upayoga' is the force. It is the fundamental characteristic of the soul. 'Cetanā' is the background of light. It is the fundamental quality of the soul. Cognition like 'jnāna' and 'darsana' are the expressions of the force of 'upayoga' in the background light of the 'cetanā'.

The Jaina view of the consciousness as the quality of the soul differs from the Nyāya-Vaiśeśika view. Nyāya-Vaiśeśika philosophers believe that consciousness is the mechanical and adventitious quality produced by the contact of the various factors inhering in a substance separate from itself. The 'Ātman' in itself is unconscious, 'jada'. According to Kāṇāda,
consciousness is produced in a jar through its connection with fire, 'agnighata-samyogaja rohitadigunavat'. Consciousness is conceived to be the product depending upon suitable collection of circumstances. It is only an adventitious quality of the soul. In the state of 'deliverance', the soul is devoid of all qualities including consciousness. Even the materialist 'carvaka' view said that consciousness is the result of combination of some circumstances and the material substances. Consciousness for them is an epiphenomenon, just a product of nature produced like the intoxicating property of the drug when the material elements are transferred into the physical body. It is said to arise in the same way as the red colour is produced by the combination of the betel-leaf nut and lime, or is the result of mixing white and yellow. But Nyaya Vaisesikas do not deny the existence of the soul. Modern epiphenomenalism maintains that consciousness is a by-product of the physical and the chemical changes going on in the body. It is like the residue of the chemical action. It is like the whistle of the passing train.

During the discussion with the third 'ganadhara', Lord Mahavira answers the objections of the 'ganadhara'. He says that the presumption of Vayubbhuti seems to be that consciousness is produced from the collection 'samudaya' of 'bhutas' like the earth and the water. It is like the intoxication found in the

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combination of the 'ghātaki' flowers and jaggery, although it is not traceable in the components separately. If the combination 'samudāya' is destroyed, the consciousness is destroyed. But, Mahāvira points out that consciousness can never exist in the collection if it is absent in the individual constituents as oil cannot come out of the particles of sand. *29 But 'cetanā' is an intrinsic quality of the soul residing in a group of the 'bhūtas' elements. If it were the quality of all the elements only taken together, it might also exist in a dead body. Sometimes consciousness arises without the working of the sense organs; and sometimes inspite of their working the object is not apprehended. In the 'Sāmaṇḍara' it is said that the mere presence of the stimuli on the external environment and even their coming into contact with the sense-organs may not be effective to produce the psychic state like the consciousness. The presence of psychic element like the selective attention determines the nature of the state. Consciousness, then, has none of the characteristics that belong to any or all of the collection of knowable objects. The Jaina do not accept the transcendental consciousness with no distinction between the ego and non-ego of the idealists. According to Sāmkara intelligence/identical. *30 However, the Jainas accept with

*29 'Ganadharavāda' - discussion with 3rd 'Ganadhāra' Verse. 101.
Also refer: 'Sutrākṛta' 23, and its commentary.

*30 'Ātma-caitanyavārahdenā' P. 16.
the idealists that consciousness is unique and is not a product of the collection of the conditions. It is eternal. The Jain view comes nearer to the view of consciousness presented by Rāmānuja. The 'Atman' is eternal and its natural quality of consciousness is also eternal. It is 'cidrūpa' and also 'caitanya gunaka'. The self is filled with consciousness and has also for its quality consciousness. Rāmānuja tries to see between the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika view and the Śāṅkara view. Consciousness is not a non-eternal quality of the self, for in that case the selfhood would be unconscious. He also wants to avoid the identity of the self and consciousness. And the Jainas also say that the self has consciousness as its essence. Since the time of Leibnitz, consciousness is admitted to be an accident of the mental representation and not its necessary, essential attribute. His contention that the inner world is richer and more concealed was well known to writers of the Upaniṣads. However, that consciousness as an aspect of the mental life is a profound truth is slowly coming to be realised.

States of Consciousness:

The analysis of the states of consciousness has been an important problem for the philosophers as well as the psychologists. Consciousness has three aspects - cognitive, affective and conative. They are modes of consciousness. In perceiving,

*31 'Sri Bhasya' 1.1.1. P. 30. 'Evamātma cidrūpa eva caityanyagunakeh'.

*32 'Rāmānuja Bhasya' 2.3.29.
believing or otherwise apprehending that such and such a thing
exists and has the characteristics his attitude is cognitive.
In affective attitude he is either pleased or displeased about
it. He is also active about it. He tries to know more about
it. He tries to alter them in some respects. This attitude
is conative. But Stout mentions that the three modes of
consciousness are abstractly and analytically distinct phases
in a concrete psychosis. But they are not separable. They do
not occur in isolation from each other. Mind is an organic
unity and its activities have the closest degree of organic
interaction. However, in every psychosis one of the aspects
may be preeminent. In the 'pleasure of pursuit' feeling pre-
supposes conation. Sometimes feeling is dependent on certain
conative attitudes involved in the preceptual process. Similar
reciprocity is found in conation and cognition.

The Indian thinkers were aware of the distinction of
states in consciousness. The Jainas recognise three forms of
consciousness. They make a distinction between consciousness
as knowing, feeling, and experiencing the fruits of 'karma'
'karma phala cetana' and willing. Conation and feeling are
closely allied. As a rule we have first feeling, then conation
and then knowledge. McDougall has emphasised that feeling

*34 'Pañcaśatikàyasaśra' 38.
is the core of all instinctive activity. In fact, in all experience there is a core of feeling although the cognitive and conative aspects are varying factors. In the *Aitareya Upanisad* there is a mention of different modes of experience. Sensation, perception and ideation are different modes of intollection. It recognises feeling and volition as the other two forms of experience. The seers of the *Upanisad* give a classification of seven mental functions.*36 At the basis is intollection. The *Chandogya Upanisad* emphasises the primacy of the will. The Buddhists also recognised such a distinction. We have perception and conception, feeling and affection and conation or will. In the Buddhist theory will is the most dominant aspect of conscious experience, the basal element of human life. Radhakrishnan in his *Indian Philosophy* suggests that 'vijñāna, vedanā and saṁskāra' roughly correspond to knowledge, feeling and will.*37 Childers in his dictionary brings the concept of conation under 'saṁskāra'. Mrs. Rhys Davids believes that although there is no clear distinction between conation in the psychological sense and will in the ethical sense, still in the *Pitakas* there is consistent discrimination between psychological importance and ethical implication.*38 Professor Stout has given up the old tripartite

*36 'Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy' by R.D. Kanade. Chapter on Psychology.

*37 'Indian Philosophy', Radhakrishnan, Vol. I. P. 260.

*38 'The Birth of Indian Psychology and its Development in Buddhism' Mrs. Rhys Davids (1936) P. 6.
classification of mental states and he reverts to ancient bipartite analysis of mind bringing the affective and conative elements together under the name of interest. Radhakrishnan says that if we discard the separation of cognition and make it the theoretical aspect of conation, we get to the Buddhist emphasis on conation as the central fact of mental life.

In the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika theory also there is the description of the manifestation of the three aspects of self as knowledge, desire and volition. We have to know a thing before we feel the want. In order to satisfy the want we act. Thus, as Hiriyanna says feeling mediates between cognition and conation. Thus, the modes of consciousness have been the problem of philosophers and psychologists. There is a general agreement regarding the division of consciousness into three modes, although different philosophers have emphasized different aspects in the concrete psychosis. Buddhists have emphasized conation. In the Upanisads all the aspects have received their prominence. The primacy of intellect is emphasized in the Chāndogya and Maitreya Upanisads.*39 In the Chāndogya, again, we get the description of the primacy of will. But this has reference to the cosmic will rather than to the psychological aspect. The Jainas emphasize the close relation between conation and feeling. Nyāya describes the function of feeling as a mediating factor between cognition and conation.

*39 'Chāndogya Upanisad'. VII. 5.1; 'Maitreya Upanisad' VI. 30.
Self-consciousness

The term self-consciousness is very ambiguous. It may mean consciousness of the self as an object given in introspection. In this sense, the self, the empirical ego becomes both the aspect of experience and also the object of experience. Self-consciousness may also mean transcendental and pure self-consciousness. It is not the object of knowledge. It is the ultimate subject presupposed in acts of knowledge. Again, consciousness may mean the ultimate eternal consciousness which is a metaphysical concept. It is also used in the empirical sense as consciousness which is changing.*40 Some of the earlier philosophers have not made a clear distinction between the metaphysical and psychological sense of consciousness. In the Upanisads the 'Atman' is described as the basis and the ultimate presupposition in all knowledge. It is the absolute knower; and how can the knower itself be known?*41 It cannot be comprehended by the intellect. It is the seer and the knower.*42 Yet, the 'Atman' can be known by higher intuition. It is knowable as the 'pratyagātmanam', apprehended by 'ādhyātma yoga'.*43 The Buddhists recognise the distinction between subject and object within the consciousness. They do not believe in the transcendental self. Their view of consciousness

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*40 'Nature of Consciousness in Hindu Philosophy' by Saxena. Ch. V.
*41 'Bṛhadāranyaka Upanisad' 2.4.14.
*42 'Praśna Upanisad' 6.5.
*43 'Katha Upanisad' 2.12.
is like the stream of consciousness of William James. Yogacara believed that self is a series of cognitions or ideas. There is no self apart from cognitions. They reveal neither the self nor the non-self.

Some Nyaya philosophers, especially the neo-mauryyikas, believed that self is an object of internal perception, 'manasa pratyaksa'. Vaisesikas also maintain that although self is not an object of perception but of inference, it can be apprehended by yogic intuition. Sāmkhya philosophers maintain that consciousness is the essence of the self. It is self-luminous. Self is inferred through its reflection in 'buddhi'. But Āthañjali accepts the supernormal intuition of the self through the power of concentration. The self can know itself through its reflection in its pure 'sattva' and mixed with 'rajas' and 'tamas' by supernormal intuition, 'pratibha jñāna'. Then the pure self can know the empirical self, but the empirical self cannot know the pure self. There is the contradiction involved in the self being both subject, and object and the reflection theory does not much improve the situation. Vācaspati tries to avoid the contradiction by saying that the transcendent self is the subject and the empirical self is the object of self-apprehension.

According to Prabhakara, self is necessarily known in every act or cognition. Cognition is self-luminous. It manifests not only itself but also it supports the 'Ātman' much as a flame manifests its own wick. Neither the self nor the object
are self-luminous. There can be consciousness of the object without the consciousness of the self. In every act of cognition there is a direct and immediate apprehension of the self. But the self can never be known as object of knowledge. It is only to be known as a subject. It is revealed by 'triputa saṃvit'.

The Jainas hold with Prabhākara that cognition is always apprehended by the self. Cognition reveals itself, the self and its object. Every act of cognition cognises itself, the cognising subject and the cognised object. But the Jaina denies that consciousness alone is self-luminous. He regards self as non-luminous. Self is the subject of internal perception. When I feel that I am happy I have a distinct and immediate apprehension of the self as an object of internal perception, just as pleasure can be perceived though it is without form. 'Oh Gautama', said Mahāvira 'the self is 'pratyakṣa' even to you. The soul is cognizable even to you.' 44 Again, unlike the view of Prabhākara the Jainas hold that it is the object of perception and it is manifested by external and internal perception. To the question 'how can the subject be an object of perception?', the Jaina replies that whatever is experienced is the object of perception.

44 'Ganadharavāda' Ch. I.
William James made a distinction between the empirical self, the 'me', and the transcendental self the 'I'. The self is partly known and partly knower, partly object and partly subject. The empirical ego is the self as known, the pure ego is the knower. 'It is that which at any moment is conscious. Whereas the 'me' is only one of the things of which it is conscious of. But this thinker is not the passing state. It is something deeper and less metable. *45 Prof. Ward holds tha the pure self is always immanent in experience in the sense that experience without the experient, will be unintelligible. It is also transcendental in the sense that it can never be the object of our experience.*46 The Jainas were aware that consciousness of self is not possible by ordinary cognition. Therefore they said it is due to internal perception.

Self-consciousness does not belong to the realm of pure consciousness which is foundational and without limitation. That is the 'cetana' which is the essential characteristic of the soul. But when we descend to the practical level, the realm of 'vyavahāra' we find the distinction between the subject and the object in consciousness. The question whether the self is perceived by direct experience like the internal

*45 "Principles of Psychology" ed. by William James. Ch.10.
*46 "Psychological Principles" by James Ward (1920) P. 380.
perception of the Jainas or the immediate intuition, 'pratibbha
jāña' of the Vedantins is raised as a consequence of this dis-
tinction. In all this, the problem is answered from the empi-
rical point of view. On this basis we may say that there are
two aspects of consciousness as (a) pure and transcendental
consciousness and (b) the empirical consciousness. 'ātman'
is pure consciousness. 'Jīva' is the consciousness limited by
the organism. 'Ātman' is the subject of consciousness. It
is also the object of internal perception only in the sense
that it is immanent in consciousness though not clearly cognised
as object. 'Jīva' is both the subject and the object of conscious-
ness because it is the cogniser as well as the cognised.

The unconscious.

Now we come to the idea of the unconscious. The idea
of the unconscious has become very important in modern psycho-
logy. The Freudians have popularised it. In fact it has
developed in its two aspects - the metaphysical and the psycho-
logical. Plato in his 'Charmides' described in the wake of
the Socratic dictum that the knowledge of the self consists in
what one knows and what one does not know. Psychologically
the idea of the Unconscious has developed along with that of
the Conscious. Montague spoke of desires and thoughts as being
impreceptible. Leibnitz spoke of unconscious mental states.
Kant mentioned the 'dark' percepts of which we are not aware.
Hamilton analysed the unconscious into three degrees of latency.
In recent times psycho-analysis has given a systematic theory
of the unconscious. Freud arrived at the theory of the
unconscious by his study of the hysterical patients and the analysis of dreams. Mental life for him has two parts - the conscious which is the organ of perception and the unconscious. The unconscious is ordinarily inaccessible. It is that which is not conscious. It is the depth which contains all the dynamically repressed wishes mainly sexual in nature. Freud analyses the causation of neurosis and the interpretation of dreams with the help of the unconscious. Even normal forgetting was explained on this line. Hartmann's unconscious is a metaphysical principle. It is the absolute principle, the force which is operative in the inorganic, organic and the mental alike. It is the unity of idea and will. It exists independently of space, time and existence.

The Jaina thinkers were not unaware of the unconscious, although a clear scientific formulation was not possible for them and in those times due to lack of experimental investigations. Nandisutra gives a picture of the unconscious in the 'mallaka drṣṭanta', example of the earthen pot. A man takes an earthen pot from the potter and he pours a drop of water in it. The water is absorbed. Then he goes on pouring drop after drop continuously. After some time when many drops are absorbed a stage will come when the water begins to be visible. This

*47 'Unconscious'. Miller. Ch. I. Also refer to - 'Mind and its place in nature'. C.D.Brew. Ch. 10
*48 'Nandisutra'. 34.
example gives a clear picture of the vast depth of the unconscious which absorbs all our wishes and ideas, although the example was meant to explain the process of 'avagraha'. Buddhist psychology recognised the unconscious life. It is called 'vidhimmutta', and 'vidhicitta' is the waking consciousness. The two are divided by a threshold of consciousness, 'manodvāra'. Similarly 'bhavanga' subjectively viewed is subconscious existence, though objectively it is sometimes taken to mean 'nirvāṇa'. Mrs. Anya Davids says that consciousness is only an intermittent series of psychic throbs associated with a living organism beating out their coming to know through one brief span of life. Similarly the idea of the unconscious is implicit in the conception of the four states of consciousness in the various schools of Indian thought. In the 'Mandukya Upanisad' we get the description of waking, dreaming, and dreamless sleep and the highest stage 'turiya'. In the dreaming and the dreamless states of sleep there is the implicit awareness of the self. All the orthodox systems in Indian thought except this distinction of the levels of consciousness. This implies the presence of the unconscious state of which we are not at the moment aware.

In modern psychology the idea of the unconscious underwent modifications at the hands of Jung. Jung used the word

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*49 'Indian Philosophy'. Vol.I. 2nd Ed. by Radhakrishnan. P. 408 foot note.
*51 'Mandukya Upanisad' 2. 7.
unconscious in a wider sense. Jung made a distinction between the personal unconscious and the collective unconscious. Personal unconscious contains repressed wishes, forgotten memories and all that is learned unconsciously. Deeper than the personal unconscious is the collective or the racial unconscious, the common ground work of humanity out of which each individual develops his personal and unconscious life. The collective unconscious is inherited in the structure of the organism including the brain structure which predisposes the individual to think and act as the human race has thought and acted through countless generations. The collective unconscious includes the instincts and also the archetypes. Archetypes are the primordial ways of thinking submerged in the waking life. An archetype becomes an idea when it is made conscious. The new discoveries in the science and the creative work of the scientists arise out of the treasure-house of primordial images. There is nothing to prevent us from thinking that certain archetypes exist even in animals. They are grounded in the peculiarities of the living organism itself; therefore, they are direct expressions of life whose nature cannot be further explained.

The doctrine of 'karma' presented by the Indian thinkers and systematically worked out by the Jaina may be aptly compared to the collective or the racial unconscious of

*52 'Two essay on analytical psychology' (1953) by Jung. P. 67-68.
Jung, although the 'karma' theory has a metaphysical flavour. The Jainas have given a more elaborate and scientific theory of 'karma'. The law of 'karma' is the ultimate determinant of various courses of life both physical and mental. In fact our physical stature and our birth in the social surroundings is the result of 'karma' that we have accumulated. The karmic matter goes on accumulating with the deeds that we do. The innate faculty of the soul is obscured by the particles of 'karma' as the luminous light of the sun is obscured by the veil of clouds or by fog. This obscuration is beginningless although it has an end. The 'karma' that binds us is both physical and psychical in nature. The physical 'karma' is material in nature while the psychical 'karma' comprises those psychic effects and states which are produced in the soul due to the influx of the physical 'karma'. Karmic atoms are classified in eight types. 'Jrna-varaniya karma' obscures the cognitive faculties. 'Darsanāvaraniya karma' obscures the intuitive faculty. 'Mohaniya karma' deludes us. Similarly specific types of 'karma' determine our age, our physique, the states and even the power and activity of life. The force of 'karma' works implicitly and makes us what we are in both body and mind. Thus, it was suggested, the operation of 'karma' can be compared to the operation of collective or the racial unconscious. The collective unconscious stands for the objective psyche.

*53 Note. 'Gujmatasāra': Karma-kanda gives a detailed analysis of 'karma'.

Also refer to 'Doctrine of karma in Jainism' by Glassensapp.
his more recent essays Jung writes 'the contents of arche-typical character are manifestations of a process in the collective unconscious. Hence they do not refer to anything that is or has been conscious but to something essentially unconscious.*54 Elsewhere Jung writes that the personal layer ends at the earliest memories of infancy, but the collective layer comprises the pre-infantile period that is the residues of ancestral life. It contains the arche-types of the very ancient images. He says that it is possible to find the karmic factor in the arche-types of the unconscious. 'The karma aspect is essential to the deeper understanding of the nature of an arche-type.'*55

However, Jung developed the concept of the collective unconscious on the psychological plane with reference to the psycho-analytical study of the interpretation of dreams and infancy. From this side the arche-types are fundamental patterns of symbol formation. Had he developed the arche-types of the collective unconscious he would have reached the doctrine of 'karma', the store-house of the physical and psychical effect of the past. He would have realised that the force of the unconscious is the force of karma that determines the future course of life.

*54 'Essays on a science of Mythology' by Jung. P. 104.

*55 'Two essays in analytical Psychology' (1953) V.

Personal and the Collective (or transcendental) unconscious. P. 76, foot note.
The metaphysical state of the unconscious has been an equally important problem for the philosophers. In the development of the Indian thought three distinct views can be stated: (i) there is no entity such as consciousness. The unconscious alone exists. This is the view presented by the materialists. This view is associated with 'carvaka' view. (ii) Consciousness alone exists. There is nothing like the unconscious. This view is expressed by the monistic idealists of the 'Vedanta'. The 'Vedantist' believe, that there is nothing but consciousness or the 'cit' which wrongly superimposes unconsciousness upon itself by making an object of itself. The unconscious is created by the process of self-objectification. The appearance of the pure consciousness is due to either the reflection of the pure consciousness in its limiting adjuncts. The pure 'cit' wrongly identifies itself with the varying forms of the limiting adjuncts, as the moon in the water appears shaking because of the water shaking.

Similarly the all-prevading 'cit' may be limited by 'manas', 'buddhi' and 'ahamkara' as the 'akasa' which though unbounded is spoken of as bound according as it takes the form of a jug or a cloud. The unconscious is only the self-limitation of the limitless. Again, some Vedantists maintain that the unconscious is due to the limitation of consciousness through the nescience of 'avidya', and discriminative knowledge removes this veil of the unconscious as the son of Kunti was known as the son of Kadhā and he was believed to belong to the low caste family.
as he was brought in the low caste family. However, the Vedantin accepts that from the practical point of view things exist outside our consciousness and there exists a realm of unconscious in our midst. But it is due to the fact that our consciousness has not yet attained its highest stage of possibility. But when the range of consciousness is so widened as to include the realm of the subconscious and the unconscious, then it becomes identical with the universal consciousness in which there is nothing except itself. Thus the unconscious is only the receding and vanishing point of consciousness which alone exists as a permanent reality. This is the picture of the monists.

The dualists maintain that consciousness and the unconscious exist side by side and independently. This is the view of the 'sākhya' and 'yoga' philosophy. 'Puruṣa' is conscious and 'prakṛti' is unconscious. They meet to create experience. The 'puruṣa' is reflected in the 'buddhi' which is unconscious, just as a face is reflected in the mirror. 'Vijñānabhikṣu' maintains that the reflection is mutual because the 'buddhi' is reflected back in the 'puruṣa'. The unconscious 'buddhi' seems to be conscious owing to its proximity to the conscious 'puruṣa'. But the Jaina philosophers have shown some of the defects of this theory.

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*56 'Siddhāntatarkasaṅgraha' P. 158.
-candra has said of the 'saṁkhya yoga' doctrine that in 'saṁkhya yoga' consciousness does not know the objects, the 'suddhi' is unconscious and what else would be more self-contradictory than this?*58 Vidyanandisays that the 'purusa' being of the nature of non-knowledge, how could Kapila be the instructor of truth even like one in deep sleep? The 'prakṛti' is also unconscious and like a jar it cannot fulfil the function of instruction. The Jaina admits with the Vedāntin the possibility of pure consciousness at least in the final state of emancipation, because consciousness is the very essence of the soul. Even in the stage of bondage there is not a single moment in which the self ceases to be conscious. Bondage is the limitation of consciousness by means of the veil of 'karma' and what comes through the channel of senses. 'Karma' is the unconscious principle which veils right knowledge and right intuition. Ignorance and delusion are not then innate, but they are produced due to the influx of 'karma'. The senses are rather handicaps than instruments of knowledge. In omniscience the self and its consciousness are released from the barriers, and the self attains omniscience. However, the Jainas do not believe that the limitation to consciousness is illusory. It is a fact in the empirical world.

*58 'Tattvārtha sūtra' IV, as quoted by Tatia in his 'Studies in Jaina Philosophy'. P. 159.
In Western thought, Hartmann gave importance to the unconsciousness. He said that the human mind is determined by the 'unconscious in love', 'unconscious in feeling' and 'unconscious in character and morality'. For him the unconscious is the absolute principle active in all things, the force which is operative in the inorganic, organic and mental alike yet not revealed in consciousness. It is the unity of unconscious representations and will, the idea and the will. The unconscious exists independently of space, time and individual existence, timeless before the being of the world. For us it is the unconscious in itself; it is 'super conscious'.

Note on 'Pasyattā'.

The ancient Jaina literature describes 'upayoga' and along with it, it also mentions 'pasyattā'. Prajñāpanā sūtra recognises a peculiar mental force called 'pāsanāya' which is rendered as 'pasyattā' in Sanskrit. There is a description which states that both 'upayoga' and 'pāsanāya' can be 'sākāra' and 'anākāra'. It means that 'jñāna' and 'darsana' belong to both 'pasyattā' and 'upayoga'. 'Pasyattā' is derived from 'draśā' and it connotes 'prolonged vision' with reference to determinate knowledge and clear vision with reference to intuition.

*59 'Dictionary of Psychology and Philosophy'. Vol. Ii 'Unconscious'.
*60 'Prajñāpanā sūtra' 29. 30.
*61 Malayagiri's tika on Prajñāpanā sūtra' Pada 30 as quoted by Tatia in his 'Studies in Jaina Philosophy'. P. 71.
Distinguishing between 'upayoga' and 'pasyattā' the commentator Malayagiri says that 'sākāra upayoga' consists of five classes of knowledge as 'mati', 'sruta', 'avadhi', 'manah-paryāya' and 'kevala jñāna' and also three types of wrong cognition like 'kumāti', 'kuśruta' and 'avadhi ajñāna'; while 'sākāra pasyattā' consists of six classes because 'matijñāna' and 'mati-ajñāna' are not included in them. Similarly, 'anākāra upayoga' is 'darsana'. It has four types, as 'caksudārasana' visual intuition, 'acaksudārasana' intuition which is due to mind and other sense organs except the eyes, 'avadhādārasana' and 'kevala dārsana'. 'Anākāra pasyattā' on the other hand consists only of three classes, because 'acaksudārasana' which is devoid of clear vision cannot possess 'pasyattā'. 'Pasyattā' thus means prolonged vision or clear vision. However, the clear meaning is not stated, although their sub-divisions are mentioned. The distinction between 'upayoga' and 'pasyattā' and their sub-divisions cannot be dismissed as mere fancy of the ancient philosophers. We have analysed the 'upayoga' as home, the psychic force in life. Similarly, it would be possible to say that the ancient Jaina philosophers were aware of the psychic force which holds our experience and which later becomes the basis for new experience. Šīne is the first general property of the mind. It is the power of conservation. The word šīne is used by Āṇnā.63

62 'Malayagiri's lika on Prajināpana sutra' Pāda 30 as quoted by Tatia in his 'Studies in Jaina Philosophy' P. 71.
It is the power of the mind by which the past is retained, says that it is the general truth of living organisms that life processes leave behind the modification of structure in the individual and racial sense. In our mental structure are conserved the after-effects of all our individual experiences and probably many of the experiences of our ancestors also. The same idea is incorporated in the theory of Anamnesis in Plato's dialogues Meno. Knowledge is attained by the recollection in its life of realities and truths seen and known by the soul before its incarnation. But Mneme is not to be identified with memory, although memory is possible due to the mnemonic force. It is wider than memory. It is Mneme raising to the level of awareness. When I recognize the friend in the street I do not say that I remember his face; but again my recognition is possible in virtue of past experience in which my friend has figured, and it is therefore a manifestation of Mneme. It is possible that lower animals have the power of Mneme. In the lower animals also it operates both in the individual and the racial sense. Birds build their nests after the racial pattern and they cross the sea at particular places.

From the analysis of Mneme given above, it appears that some similar ideas, though in a more simple manner, must have

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*64 'Ground work of Educational Psychology' by James Ross (1951) P. 44.
*65 'Meno' 81. a.
*66 'Ground work of Educational Psychology' by James Ross, (1951) P. 45.
influenced the Jaina philosophers to point out the presence of 'pasyaţa' and distinct from 'upayoga' which is the life force for conscious experience. In the divisions of 'pasyaţa' given by Malayagiri it is mentioned that 'pasyaţa' has no 'mati jhāna' and 'mati ajhāna' as it forms. 'Mati jhāna' is direct sense experience which arises due to the contact of the sense organs with the object although knowledge due to mind is also included in 'mati jhāna'. Hence 'pasyaţa' would not include the formation of direct sense experience although other forms of experience are included. Therefore, it would not be inappropriate to say that 'pasyaţa' is the power of the mind by which we retain our experiences and which becomes the basis for more experiences. However, we should not forget the fact that the ancient Jaina philosophers, as all ancient Indian philosophers, were not clearly aware of the psychological analysis and significance of the problem. Theirs was insight and philosophic speculation.